The Post-Modern Identity Crisis:

A Narratological Exploration of Identity.

By Jonathan Pearmain Ba (Hons) CG Art and Animation UCA 2012 Word Count: 8552

Contents Introduction: Identity as Narrative Chapter One: The Development of Post-Structuralist Narratology Chapter Two: The Point of 'Being' Chapter Three: Fractured Stories Conclusion: Post-Post-Structuralism Bibliography 18 21 12 6 1 i

Introduction Identity as Narrative The human identity is an elusive and much sought after concept. Its realisation and portrayal has been and continues to be the focus of a variety of disciplines; across art, music, performance. As an area of study, it has fascinated philosophers throughout the centuries; thinkers that have sought to question the very nature of existence, the purpose of 'being'. The desire to discover a supposed 'truth' to our existence is unique to the human mind, the quest to provide the time we are alive, indeed the entirety of our species, with a point an identity. An identity gives meaning a position within the world, an origin to have come from and a purpose to strive for. It becomes the narrative of the human life, a narrative for existence. A narrative is simply a story, an account of the perception of things moving through time. Professor Mark Currie, who's work will feature prominently in this dissertation, states that Narrative is as inescapable as language in general, or as cause and effect, as a mode of thinking and being (Currie, 1998:2). This idea, that narrative in inherently human, will be a key point of discussion within this essay as will its role as either constructing identity, or being constructed by it. Narratology's post-structuralist methods, of deconstruction and narrative theory, will allow us to explore the identity as narrative and the very concept of 'being'. Initially, the study of narratology will be discussed its methodologies and principles explored, as well as an account of it history. Narratology has undergone a dramatic change in the last century, from a traditional literary based discipline it has expanded to linguistic then to a anthropological method of studying identities and cultures across humanity. Chapter one will identify a working definition of Narratology and enable us to then look further into its understanding of 'being'. The concept of 'being', the idea of a consciousness, will also be examined. Before discussing how a narratological approach may aid in the understanding and definition of an identity, it must be established exactly what forms the identity; what is the point of it? And why is so important to keep it free from oppression? This chapter will focus on exposing the malleability of objective knowledge, and the fickle goal that is 'liberty'. It will then attempt to derive what actually forms a consciousness, and what implication this has on identity. The principles thinkers used as reference for these ideas will be the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre and the German philospher, Martin i

Heidegger. Combined with the work of other post-structuralist and post-modernist writers, they will help establish conclusions from which we can reach the crux of this dissertation: can narratological thinking allow us to understand better, and even construct better, the narrative of the human identity and remain free from the very paradoxes and fallacies it reveals regarding the concept of narrative. It is a common rebuke to the post-structuralist mode of thought to state that it is impossible for it to provide any conclusion, and that it even revels in this inability to satisfy. Indeed the influential post-modern thinker, Jacques Derrida, saw no shame in labelling his work 'viral'. He destabilised institutions without any intention of replacing them with some enlightened idea he repelled the very idea of enlightenment. The thoughts of American philosopher, John Searle, and British philosopher, Roger Scruton, are the primary opposition to post-structuralism in this dissertation. They champion a more empirical outlook, seeing the destructive, abstract and inconclusive nature of post-structuralism as nihilistic, 'trivial' and 'phony'. Their points and merit will be considered and answered in turn. By the end of this essay the aim of the last chapter will be to re-define narrative from a poststructuralist point of view perhaps what could be termed a post-post-modern perspective. It is understood that it was necessary for the deconstructionist cultural revolution of the 20th century to destroy the authority of the grand-narrative ; but its critics do have a valid argument in striving to find some resolution to this crisis identification. What can be re-constructed using a narratological understanding of the consciousness to define identity in such a way that it can be attainable? How does narrative help us to move on from the post-modernist apocalypse?

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Chapter One The Development of Post-Structuralist Narratology To delve deeper in the implication of narratology upon the understanding of the human idenity, first an understanding of narratology must be established. As a methodology or mode of thought, it has crossed disciplines and is the result of a vast variety of contributors and thinkers. In this chapter a brief account of narratology's transformation into a post-structuralist study will be given, and its reasons discussed. Its transition from a purely linguistic and literary based discipline to an anthropological one is key to the rest of this essay's use of it methodologies and reasoning; therefore important to outline. A primary source of knowledge on the subject is Professor of Contemporary Literature at the Queen Mary University of London, Mark Currie. His work on the theory and structure of narrative is notable and provides an excellent overview of narratology and its past. As narratology during the post-modern era is approached, the work of French philosopher Jacques Derrida will also be introduced using readings from Jeff Collins, Bill Mayblin and American cultural theorist Hugh Silverman to better understand Derrida's impact. Work from French sociologist, Jean Baudrillard, will also be included and studied. As an opposition to many of post-structuralism's arguments, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, John Searle's thoughts will be brought to bear his frustration at narratology's seeming lack of solution, and deconstruction's denial of any such solution existing. By the end of this chapter we will be ready to delve deeper into the study of the human identity and the role narratology plays in allowing us to define it. Narratology's definition has changed dramatically over the last century; transforming from a structuralist study of literature to a contemporary study of identity. German Professor of Literary Theory, Jan Christoph Meister provides a concise summary of narratology, stating thatnarratology is a humanities discipline dedicated to the study of the logic, principles, and practices of narrative representation (Meister, 2011). It has always been a study of narrative methodologies, but the keyword here that separates Meister's definition from that of the early structuralists is 'representation'. It widens narratology's scope to include anywhere that narratives may be found. Currie expands upon this further, that today's study recognises that narrative is central to the representation of identity, in personal memory and self-representation or in the collective identity such as regions, nations, race and gender (Currie, 1998:2). The applying of principles found in traditional narrative theory to humanity is a leap that allowed existence to be analysed under a new 1

microscope, providing new understanding and interpretation. To understand the significance of the shift in narratological study, it must be understood what is meant by 'classical narratology' and who its main contributors were. In the introduction to Postclassical Narratology, editors Alber and Monika outline a suitable compendium: What is subsumed under classical narratology primarily embraces the work of the French structural-ists (Roland Barthes, Claude Bremond, Tzvetan Todorov, A. J. Greimas, and Grard Genette), but also the German tradition in narrative theory (Eberhard Lmmert and Franz Karl Stanzel) (Abler & Monika, 2010:1-2). While today structuralism is considered applicable outside of linguistics taking its understanding of language and using these principles to investigate cultural and social structures in its genesis in structural linguistics it examines components in their relationships of difference, exchange, [and] substitution (Collins & Mayblin, 2005:57). The key philosophy that emerged was the understanding that nothing existed or could be defined in isolation; that all elements within language gained their definitions through their relationship with other components. The significant result of this mode of thought was that it altered the focus of the search for 'meaning' from the whole to the individual elements. Eventually structuralism's relevance in language came under critique during the 1950's; however its methods were taken to anthropological level garnering widespread interest. This transition from the formalist and structuralist narratologies of the recent past into a study of humanity allowed for the classical linguistic methods, which were now being superseded by more modern disciplines, to be utilised in forming a narratology capable of bringing its expertise to bear on narratives wherever they can be found, which is everywhere (Currie, 1998:1). Although structural linguistics was being criticised in the latter 20th century as an impoverished and thoroughly inadequate conception of language (Chomsky, 1972:20), it was also being recognised during the post-modern and post-structuralist era as a starting point for more sociological study. In the Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory, this change was characterised by an increase of interest in non-literary narratives and by an influx of ideas from other disciplines (Ryan & Van Alphen, 1993:112). One such contributor was the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida. He was hugely responsible for the destabilising of structuralism's logocentric principles, but also developing many 2

of its key claims especially surrounding the interrelation of components. Whilst Derrida derided the search for some Platonic truth, he built upon what structuralist writers had already established in the search for meaning, through the study of the bearing of elements upon each other within a system coining the term: Deconstruction. In his book, Derrida and Deconstruction, Silverman puts forward an explanation of deconstruction's agenda: Deconstruction is concerned with offering an account of what is going on in a text not by seeking out its meaning, or its component parts, or its systematic implications but rather by marking off its relations to other texts, its contexts, its sub-texts (Silverman, 1989:4). Claiming that all elements, styles and forms... figures of speech, metaphors, even layout on the page are never simply present or absent (Derrida, cited in Collins & Mayblin, 2005:12, 70), Derrida proposed, similar to structuralism, that observing the correlations - or the lack thereof between systems was the key to the correct study of them. Counter to structuralism, Derrida sought no external truth; instead proposing that to seek true or real meaning was not only unattainable but also undesirable. A notable opponent to Derrida's deconstruction, and indeed the post-modern and poststructuralist viewpoint in general, is Professor John Searle. Frustrated by the lack of any apparent conclusion or argument presented by post-modernism, Searle sees it as unhelpful and fogging of the pursuit of knowledge. He outlines his key issues with the position below: According to this view, we never attain certain, objective, and universal knowledge at all... it is impossible to have objectivity, because all claims to knowledge are always perspectival; they are always made from a certain subjective point of view it is impossible to have universality, because all science is produced in local, historical circumstances and is subject to all of the constraints imposed by those circumstances (Searle, 2003:5). Searle's frustration is clear. The proposition that the inter-textual nature of not only language, but also knowledge and identity, makes futile any attempt to gain any concrete truth, is clearly nihilistic to him the denial of any external truth cannot be a self-sustaining view and is merely making claims that... under analysis often turn out to be silly or trivial. Indeed he writes 3

that deconstruction is simply a self-justiying enterprise, criticising its patrons as nave - stating they think that since everything is phony anyway, the phoniness of deconstruction is somehow acceptable, indeed commendable (Searle, 1984). His response is to propose a difference between knowledge claims and the representation of knowledge, that the perspectival character of representation and knowledge does not imply that the knowledge claims in question are dependent on the preferences, attitudes, prejudices, predilections, of observers. The existence of objectivity is in no way threatened by the perspectival character of knowledge and representation (Searle, 2003:7). This view concedes that knowledge is vulnerable to prejudice, that its profundity and truth can be distorted but it insists that it is folly to believe that any knowledge cannot be claimed to be independent of the aforementioned corruption. A post-structuralist argument however would put forward the view that the representation of knowledge is all there is there exists no external truths, no external meaning. Knowledge is merely assembled and shared as a simulacrum; subject to an observer's interpretation. Currie states this succinctly, writing that perception of the real world is determined by the particular language through which reality is being seen. Different languages encode the world in different ways, so that reality can be seen as culturally relative (Currie, 1998:36). It is interesting to note that Currie does admit the existence of 'the real'. Of course things exist whether or not they are perceived by sentient observers; but Currie also attaches no value or 'truth' to this world of the real. Instead all meaning is derived purely through the interrelation of cultural interpretations. Rather than being nihilistic, Derrida's view that no element can function without relating to another element which itself is not simply present, becomes the basis for a rich tapestry of correlating and conflicting 'knowledge' that is subject to endless exploration and re-interpretation. The fact that each element is constituted on the basis of the trace in it of the other elements of the system (Derrida, cited in Collins & Mayblin, 2005:70), leads to the rather utopian view that humanity's various cultures are unified and defined through their differences and disagreements as much as their similarities. Once this view is established, what freedom or condemnation, as Searle would have it does it bring? Narratology's transformation and re-appropriation over the last century is in itself a narrative, one linked closely to the development of modern philosophy; which Baudrillard outlines thus:

Over the years, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True have played out a strange game of musical chairs. In the beginning, Good and moral values reign supreme. But then Evil assumes an aesthetic value: ugliness becomes beautiful. This is all swept away by the Real which, being neither beautiful or ugly, becomes true. Objectivity becomes the dominant moral value. But not for long, for in the end the simulacrum and the Virtual win out over all values (Baudrillard, 2003:6). While Baudrillard takes a rather fatalistic view of the rise of the Virtual, he sums up well the crux of post-structuralist narratology's position which is to supersede any existence of the Real in return for an acceptance of a self-reflexive existence. This narrative can be traced throughout language, literature, art, music, politics human identity as a whole. The lack of logocentrism, a lack of any 'truth' to be sought, is something to be preserved and indeed, according Baudrillard, the very cornerstone upon which our survival as a species relies, Only something which has purpose comes to an end, since once that purpose is achieved, all that remains is for it to disappear. The human species has survived only because it has no final purpose. Those who have tried to give it one have generally sent it hurtling to its destruction (Baudrillard, 2003:21). In this chapter then, we have established a suitable definition of narratology and its methodologies. It's linguistic origins have been discussed and its re-appropriation as a sociological study examined. The post-structuralist agenda of denying any universal truth or meaning is key to a narratological study of identity that the emphasis is placed up the relationship of component parts, and the proxemics of that system in relation to others. The issue with the sense of nihilism evoked by post-modernist thinking has been raised and not yet answered the following chapters will discuss whether narratology can give us any solution, or if a solution is even desirable? Analysing the identity is always an introspective exercise undertaken in the hope of shedding more light on what it is to exist as a conscious human being, what it means even to be conscious. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter Two The Point of 'Being' In the previous chapter we ascertained an understanding of contemporary narratology and its relevance to the study of the human identity. The question was also raised as to whether it was able to provide any response to the criticism that it, along with much other post-modern and poststructuralist thought, was in fact empty and inconclusive postulating. Before discussing whether narratology can provide more than mere critique, it must be discussed as to what exactly is the so desperately sought concept: identity. From where does it emerge, and what is the point of it? As an empirical voice - and in opposition to the inconclusivity of deconstructive thinking English philosopher, Roger Scruton's thoughts on the motives of post-modernism and the pursuit of liberty will be brought to bear. In answer, the work of Mark Currie will continue to be used to defend the importance of narratology in preserving the liberty of the identity. To help define liberty, the seminal work of British social and political theorist: Sir Isaiah Berlin will be referred to, in tandem with the work of British philosopher John Stuart Mill. To better understand identity, and its vulnerability to influence, the work of existentialist French philosopher: Jean-Paul Sartre, will be used as a key to understanding the nature of human consciousness and being. To further develop this, the thoughts of German philosopher Martin Heidegger will also be referred to. Once this chapter has explored the susceptibility of identity to oppression or persuasion, narratology's role in forming and protecting the identity can be discussed. Narratology, along with western culture as a whole, underwent dramatic changes in the latter half of the 20th century a change which brought controversy, confusion and irreversible impact on human identity. Whatever label be applied to this cultural revolution be it counter-culturalism, deconstructionism or post-modernism they aim to retain the same core agenda, which is to 'liberate' the student from the oppressive structures of the traditional curriculum, and also from the social institutions which that curriculum covertly endorsed (Scruton, 2012:57). After dramatic increases in scientific discoveries and knowledge of the last century, the rise of power and the institution, and the betrayal of that trust through the examples of the corruption and manipulation of knowledge - shown by the wars and dictators in the 20th century - groups of philosophers and society as a whole began to grow wary of being part of grander narratives and the motivations behind those who promoted them. It was clear that the 'pure knowledge' sought by the Enlightenment, that would bring 6

humanity into the modern as a unified society, was not beyond distortion and nepotism. Currie states a truth that was becoming clear to new thinkers, thatsocial power derives from moral sympathy which is controllable by techniques of information management and not by rectitude (Currie, 1998:22). Knowledge was revealed as something malleable, a means to an end for those with power to influence others. The identity of the self, separate from authority, became of the utmost import and its liberty sacred. Before discussing the importance of narratology in emancipating the identity in pursuit of liberty, first an initial understanding of liberty will be established. Liberty, or freedom, is a state of being that features as a goal in many human ideals or projects in some form or another. Berlin supports this in his work: Two Concepts of Liberty, writing that almost every moralist in human history has praised freedom. However, he also makes clear its ambiguity, like happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, it is a term whose meaning is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist (Berlin, 1969:2). His wording is appropriate, that freedom is unable to 'resist' any interpretation applied to it, meaning it's definition is subject to the intent of its user. It is generally agreed across philosophy that complete freedom is both an impossibility and undesirable for a civilised society. Berlin makes it clear that it was obvious to classical philosophers that'natural' freedom1 would lead to social chaos in which men's minimum needs would not be satisfied; or else the liberties of the weak would be suppressed by the strong (Berlin, 1969:3). The capability of the sentient to sympathise and morally reason, and to also manipulate others' reasoning, results in the extortion of the many for the benefit of the few - based purely on principles such as physical or intellectual strength. An unethical and barbaric system. Mill sought to examine common factors in humanity's approach to establishing society, and although his work agrees with Berlin's need for necessary restraints upon society, statingall that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people, he highlighted the difficulty of establishing what these rules should be. Facing the fact that no two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another, Mill sought to find ubiquity in the methods behind the establishment of these laws, stating rather simply that the likings and dislikings of society are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion (Mill, 1859). He goes on to state that the inefficiency and vulnerability of this methodology lies in its susceptibility to the the whim and manipulation of those 1 a state in which all men could boundlessly interfere with all other men (Berlin, 1969:3) 7

with power and control whose despotic rule interferes with personal freedom and identity. So identity is crucial to withstanding malicious intent and manipulation; and avoiding navety. Narratology's awareness of the importance of narrative in human consciousness exposes the weakness and subjection of that very fact. Currie warns that narrative is one of the ways in which identity, the ideological subject, is manufactured (Currie, 1998:32), but surely this is encouraging? It reinforces the concept that our identities can be protected from corruption by creating our own narratives that we prescribe; rather than being at the mercy of external tyranny. This is however to take a rather modernist view; that we are the masters of our own enlightenment but Currie does not promote an unlocking of the 'real' or an inner potential. A deconstructionist understanding of identity strips it of any internal meaning; revealing that identity is not within us because it only exists as narrative. He argues that identity, or any 'true' meaning, cannot be formed in isolation that all the 'real' is merely a web of interrelation between elements. Sartre puts it thus, [appearances] are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and none of them is privileged (Sartre, 2001:45). Continuing in this vein, Currie proposes that the only way to explain who we are is to tell our own story ... that we learn how to self-narrate from the outside, from other stories, and particularly through the process of identification with other characters (Currie, 1998:17). It is the inescapable symbiosis of existence that makes identity vulnerable to external influence and corruption; yet also what makes us irrevocably human. Sentient consciousness is dependant upon it. This is not to say that the individual is lost in this web of blurred simulacra quite the opposite, it is what enables the forming of one's self. Without this realisation Heidegger suggests that even the individual would be unable to relate himself on his own to a being, to something that remained selfsame, that is, he would be unable to be human (Heidegger, 2010:46). It is interesting to note that Heidegger equates being able to relate to oneself as necessary to being human; that in existing as human one is inherently then able to be aware of one's own consciousness and identity. This view could be summed up in the existentialist phrase coined by Sartre as existence precedes essence, that the 'real' or 'truth' of something is of less import and in fact created by the initial existence of something that through existing a being manufactures its own value. It could however tentatively be suggested that is an oversimplification, even a misinterpretation of Sartre. Discussing consciousness' role in identity, Sartre writes, Consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is consciousness of a 8

being, whose essence implies its existence; that is, in which appearance lays claim to being (Sartre, 2001:62). Initially somewhat enigmatic and impenetrable, Sartre's meaning can be unpacked thus. Sartre initially states that the essence, the true value, of consciousness is only realised through its initial existence that it creates its own essence; in accordance with the traditional existentialist view. However, Sartre then immediately concedes that it is the essence of being the awareness of one's identity and 'real' self that implies our existence as sentient human beings. This simultaneous relationship between our interactions with the world and our consciousness of these experiences is key. Sebastien Gardener, professor at university College London, attempts to explain Sartre's thinking like so, Sartres point is that consciousness must be grasped, not just as involving, but as identical with the relation of intending (Gardener, 2009:45), Consciousness defines its value through its own existence, whilst considering its own existence reflected by its essence. It is this perpetual reflection which constitutes the self and is eventually dissolved in an identity (Sartre, 2001:65). Our identities are formed through the synchronicity of our 'true' self as posited by merely existing as a conscious being, and the effects of the subjection of that self to external narratives upon its existence. An understanding then of narrative's role in defining our identities presents a problem: narratives are logocentric. Writers Jeff Collins and Bill Mayblin, in their work Introducing Derrida, define logocentrism as the drive to ground truth in a single ultimate point an ultimate origin. In searching for the 'real' or the 'true nature of things', Metaphysics ascribed truth to the logos, along with the origin of truth in general. Metaphysics in its search for foundation is logocentric (Collins & Mayblin, 2005:45). Surely this is the point of discovering our identities through grand narratives, of religion, culture or society, that the subject seeks guidance from something outside themselves some pure knowledge that is untouchable from human corruption? We have already established that the consciousness exists as inseparable from experience; where is the error in seeking after metaphysical knowledge to guide us? The problem lies in the perception and the presentation of that knowledge. Lyotard highlights the key issue, that knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? (Lyotard, 1984:9). At the end of chapter one it was ascertained that the 'real' does exist, but holds no inherit value beyond that which consciousness places upon it. Since our consciousness is a being formed through our relationship with other beings, our entire interpretation of the 'real' is authored by others. This 9

awareness allows narratology to warn against legitimising grand narratives, since they hold no value beyond that which is created by people they are no more than an act of authorial ventriloquy where the ventriloquists own polemic can be hidden among the fictional voices of puppets (Currie 1998:19). What, then, is a 'subject' to do? Once one has realised that one's inner life is constituted ... by the illusion that one is a free agent, that they are in fact subject to some greater authority (Currie, 1998:28), what enlightenment does this give us? Surely for narratology to offer any solution is to become a narrative itself, another supposedly metaphysical conclusion that is in fact as vulnerable to all the corruption it itself warns against. We are left unsatisfied, nervous without some kind of emergent truth, yet afraid of drawing any conclusion. It is perhaps the elusive and unwholesome nature of post-modernistic thinking that leads Scruton to dismiss many of its contributors as manufacturers of junk thought (Scruton, 2012:183). Rather conversely to the typical view of post-modernism as anarchical, Scruton claims it as utopian as any institution's attempt to order and change the world as it sees fit. It is guilty of what Scruton calls the 'best case fallacy', which arises when hope prevails over reason, in the presence of an important choice (Scruton, 2012:65). Post-modernism's self-awareness as a a virus ... not a microbe ... neither living or non-living (Derrida, cited in Collins & Mayblin, 2005:16), as something that can never truly be fulfilled, is merely aloofness, an avoidance of responsibility in the face of reason. Scruton argues that they need never turn [their] backs on [their] utopian aims, since utopia itself can never be realised and thus never disproved (Scruton, 2012:70), that its destabilisation of any disciplined thought or metaphysical truth is simply a fortified citadel of nonsense, a circular and self-justifying argument designed to accuse the critic of ignorance or lack of logical skill (Scruton, 2012:181). But is it the job of philosophy to provide conclusive answers? Currie does not argue that post-structuralist's role is to provide an alternative to the corruptible meta-narratives it exposes but merely to make one aware of it. This is in line with Heidegger's thoughts on the purpose of philosophical thinking: Philosophy is not a worldview in the sense of the presentation of a picture of the world that is constructed from the current results of the sciences today ... Making such pictures of the world is not only artificial, derivative, and ineffectual, but is a fundamental delusion about how humanity comes to know of beings as a whole (Heidegger, 2010:8). Philosophy is perhaps much more about understanding ourselves, that we might in turn better understand the reality within which we exist.

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Over the course of this chapter the concept of 'being' has been thoroughly examined, and narrative established as a necessary component of it existence. Based upon the work of Heidegger and Sartre this chapter has also begun to explore the co-dependant relationship between consciousness and narrative that each is formative in the other. However, it has also been highlighted that narrative is informed by external knowledge and experience - thus exposing the subject to manipulation and coercion. The 'liberty' of the identity is at the mercy of the person who's definition of 'liberty' the identity subscribes to. The malleability of knowledge is a prominent danger to the identity. Yet narratology, and post-structuralist thought in general, appears to give no answer once it has pointed this fact out. The objection to the 'phoniness' of post-modernism has been mentioned and has yet to be satisfactorily answered. How can the awareness of the 'real' and 'consciousness' that narratology provides the human mind with, equip it in creating a firmer understanding of the identity, and aid in preserving it sanctity?

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Chapter Three Fractured Stories Now that a better understanding of the nature of 'being' has been established what role does narrative play in forming the identity? Is identity itself a narrative? Or is it the result of one? Using an understanding of narratology's approach to narrative systems, and the conclusions on the nature of consciousness explored in chapter two, this chapter will aim to find a way for narratological thinking to provide a basis for constructing an identity. The work of prominent literary scholar and critic Marie-Laure Ryan will be used to outline the subjectivity of the real, and the role of the consciousness in creating its own interpretation of the 'actual'. Narrative will be suggested as a tool for the construction of the identity, the work of Wolf Werner (Professor of English Language and Literature at the University of Graz, Austria) and Michael Bamberg (Professor of Psychology at Clark University, Massachusettes) will support this claim. However, the universal and teleological nature of their arguments will be challenged by referring to the work of Friedrich Nietzche and his speculations on the source of human ambition, and the work of Peter Raggat, senior lecturer in psychology at James Cook University, Australia. His work on the multiplicity of narrative will be central in concluding the definition of identity and the role narrative has to play. Since narratologys iconoclastic rampage leaves narrative looking weak, malleable and deceptive how are beings to form self-awareness without a constant paranoia as to whether they are subscribing themselves to the will of others? In the introduction to their collection of essays centring on identity within narratives, editors McAdams, Joesselson, and Lieblich, write that we are all storytellers, and we are the stories we tell (McAdams, Josselson, and Lieblich, 2006:3). Similar to Sartres idea of the cyclic conscious, this statement suggests identity is both implied by and posits narrative. Werner draws a similar conclusion, confident that existing as narrative is inherent to human self-realisation. Man can be defined as a 'storytelling animal', driven by an instinctual need and intelligence which makes us the animal which demands an explanation, the animal which asks Why' (Werner, 2003:185). However, post-structuralist narratology has already warned us of the dangers of the human minds insistence in discovering some metaphysical truth as a guide to existence; revealing it as an entirely subjective construct. It has already been discussed that contemporary narratology doesnt seek to deny the existence of the real, but rather deconstruct the value applied to it to change the focus to 12

analysing the value the consciousness seemingly places upon it. Whilst it may be true that only one world exists independently of the human mind, Ryan looks beyond this to what she perceives as the more interesting area of the study, the human minds ability to depart from this world, select another world as actual, and create through further mental acts a network of alternative possible worlds around the new centre (Ryan, 1991:554). Actuality becomes subjective to the individual, who willingly departs from the real and places some other truth at the centre of their reasoning. This departure from the real has already been discussed as the very reason that grandnarratives are to be treated with suspicion. But what are its implications on the individual narrative of identity? A possible conclusion to draw from post-structuralist narratology is that it doesnt dismiss the mode of the narrative as unreliable, but rather shifts the value from the subject of the narrative to the framework of the narrative itself. Ryans point is neatly summed up by Professor of Romance Languages at the university of Pennsylvania, Gerald Prince, in his article: Remarks on Narratology. He discerns Ryans key conclusion to be that narrative texts create a world by depicting particular entities and events and they provide that world with coherence and intelligibility (Prince, 1996:99). Self-reflexive narrative serves to allow the mind to assign its own values to an otherwise valueless world. Ryan expands her argument, stripping the real of any authority, writing that the actual world is simply the world we inhabit, and the term "actual" is indexical, as are the expressions "I," "you," "here," and "now." every possible world is the actual one from the point of view of its inhabitants (Ryan, 1991:554). Narratives are no longer external, grand, intimidating manipulations of knowledge but rather an empowering, internal tool. Once equipped with this tool, does it grant the ego complete emancipation from external influence? Not entirely, rather it provides a frame through which to wittingly interpret other narratives. Bamberg puts this in context, highlighting both the importance of the self-narrative and its reliance on externally provided experience. Engaging in any activity requires acts of self-identification by relying on repertoires that identify and contextualize speakers/writers along varying socio-cultural categories, often compared to mental or linguistic representations (Schemata) that are less fixed depending on context and function (Bamberg, 2012).

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The two important conclusions to draw here are that: firstly, to engage that is to interact with something on equal terms, as opposed to being subjectified by it requires an internal narrative. Secondly however, this narrative is based on accumulated experience gathered from previous social and cultural engagements and the conclusions drawn from them. Schemata refers to the codification of these experiences into narratemes, units that make up a narrative, that contribute to self-identification. Does this reliance of the identity on external socio-cultural inputs weaken the self-narrative? If narrative is to be considered a window which allows the viewer to interpret the world, then we are to believe that identity precedes narrative allowing us to perceive the weaknesses and flaws within the framework and avoid distortion. Narrative, as merely an implement, enables a conscious perception of time and thus contributes to creating and stabilizing a central epistemological category as a basis of human experience (this is the 'experiential function' of narrative) (Werner, 2003:184). By this Werner means that narrative is a method by which we are able to stabilise our position in the world through it we establish epistemological knowledge in the form of experience, as perceived through our narrative voice. The view proposes narrative as a construct of the identity. However, based on the conclusions drawn in chapter two, it would seem impossible to see the relationship between identity and narrative as entirely one directional. Currie sees narrative as crucial to constructing the identity, something agreed upon by Identity and Storys editors. They write, We use the term narrative identity to refer to the stories people construct and tell about themselves to define who they are for themselves and for others (McAdams, Josselson, and Lieblich, 2006:4). Does narrative then precede identity? Do we then not project narratives onto the world so that our consciousness can interpret the actual - rather we establish ourselves within the actual by creating an identity out of experiential narrative. It would seem that identity is formed out of the consciousness doing both creating a network of experiential narrative and what could be termed explanatory narrative. Werner expands upon this concept further, declaring that Narrative does not only relate perceptions to each other. It also, by making them appear as the result of a certain past and/or the starting point of a particular future, provides possibilities of explaining them. Explanatory narrative is based upon knowledge discerned by experiential narrative which is in turn informed by explanatory narrative, continuing ad infinitum. Werner proposes that this function fulfils two purposes key to the forming of human identity; firstly, the desire to connect a given state of affairs to an explanatory past, and secondly, the desire, fear or curiosity to see the end or outcome of certain states, decisions, events 14

etc. in the future. By providing the identity with telicity, Werner draws an interesting conclusion; that these collections and predictions can then be reused as models or 'master-narratives for giving meaning to similar cases, for accounting for the past, or for projecting possible futures (Werner, 2003:185). The identity manifest as its own meta-narrative, informing its future actions based up its self-reflexive interpretation of its past providing purpose and direction. Identity can then be seen as a unifying construct; the result of years of extrapolating narrative to perceive past, present and future a human becomes the writer of their own story. Bamberg breaks this position down as thus: a teller accounts for how s/he (a) has emerged (as character) over time, (b) as different from others (but same), and simultaneously (c) how s/he views her-/himself as a (responsible) agent. Managing these three dilemmas in concert is taken to establish what is essential to identity (Bamberg, 2012). The self clearly splits into different elements, all of which a teller creates their own narrative of giving themselves a situational awareness within existence, a life story. Life stories, therefore, may be seen as bringing different aspects of the self together into a unifying and purpose-giving whole (McAdams, Josselson, and Lieblich, 2006:5). Bamberg writes that the narrators quest for identity or sense of self is motivated primarily by the question Who am I? Similar to Werner, Bamberg supports the view that selfnarrating is inherent to human existence our ability to reflect upon our own purpose. He continues, stating that the goal is rather to condense and unite, to resolve ambiguity, and to deliver answers that lay further inquiry into past and identity to rest (Bamberg, 2012). Uncertainty is the villain that human nature instructionally tries to iron out that identity strives to erase to establish a firmer sense of self. However, did we not in agree chapter one that the victory of contemporary narratological thinking was to expose fallibility of grand narratives? That since we know that any value attributed to the real, by way of a unified teleological purpose, is to navely deny the subjectivity of that truth to alternate interpretations. Nietzsche, writing on human ambition and purpose, discredited the attempt to unify consciousness. He writes, the assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? (Nietzsche. 1968:270). In a mode of thought that was to become central to post-modern thinking, Nietzsche entirely strips the unified truth of any meaning, instead finding value amongst the interplay of the identitys constructive elements. 15

The conclusion leaves behind a helpless schizophrenia, an awareness of life as a linear trajectory narrative, but also aware that any meaning given to it is as valueless as the next construct that any narrative can be deconstructed to inconsequential elements made significant only through the merit given to them via the consciousness observation of their relationships. Nietzsche expresses a frustration similar to Searles anger at deconstructions lack of solution: One would have to know what being is, in order to decide whether this or that is real (e.g., "the facts of consciousness"); in the same way, what certainty is, what knowledge is, and the like. But since we do not know this, a critique of the faculty of knowledge is senseless: how should a tool be able to criticize itself when it can use only itself for the critique? (Nietzsche. 1968:269) It seems we are now left in a state of aporia, scared to commit to any meta-narrative for fear of creating something insubstantial and contrived. This fear though is based upon one potential flaw; as Raggatt points out; it presupposes a narrative that is linear, integrated, and coherent, with all the facts about your life neatly tied together with a golden thread, a single narrative voice (Raggatt, 2006:15). Does there then exist an alternative to this confusion? Seeing identity as a purposeful narrative gives it a driving force guided by a truth that is subjective and not based upon any universal truth since we believe no such thing exists. This is the utopian mind set Scruton criticised, summarised here by Bakhtin as he analyses an identity driven by an ideal: an idea becomes for him an idea-force, omnipotently defining and distorting his consciousness and his life it is not he but the idea that lives (Bakhtin, 1984:22). Since the value is placed upon the object, the components of the life story, the narratemes of conscious, are second in value to the grand-narrative whose value is entirely false. Raggatt understands this, arguing against the idea of the over-arching plot he intends that we adopt quite the opposite, that the story you tell will probably be but one story from a number of possibilities, and therefore the life story could never be encompassed by a monologue I argue that the life story is really more like a conversation of narrators, or perhaps a war of historians in your head (Raggatt, 2006:15-16). Once again value is assigned to the space in between components, rather than the elements themselves meaning found in comparison rather than result. Raggatt is approaching the conclusion that identity is not in itself a narrative, and perhaps not even the descriptor for one single outcome or being but rather the output from the concert of a multitude of narrating conscious. 16

It is true then that narrative plays a key role in the formation of identity, that narratives are inescapably teleological in nature and that it is teleology that most closely meets the human desire mentioned earlier to see the outcome of certain situations (Werner, 2003:187), but that that teleology is not taken as based upon logocentric truth since that truth will be manufactured rather appreciated within the intertextual nature of the narratives. Meaning cannot be found in one narrative and its purpose, since consciousness never gravitates toward itself but is always found in intense relationship with another consciousness. Every experience, every thought is internally dialogic, adorned with polemic, filled with struggle (Bakhtin, 1984:32). Bakhtins conclusion that it is through the dialogue of narrative we derive value allows us to safely and wittingly utilise narrative in forming and analysing identity whilst avoiding utopian naivety. Narratology then can be seen to also be constructive, rather than simply deconstructing things into meaninglessness. The post-structuralist viewpoint both exposes 'truth' as something manufactured, yet allows an observer to find value in the necessarily fractured and abstract nature of narrative without overall telicity. This chapter has delved into the interpretation by contemporary scholars of identity as a singular and linear narrative, but an informed narratological study of said narrative, with an understanding of the multiplicity of the conscious destroys any credibility of the 'grand-narrative' of identity since it then denies the potential of any dialogical thought, leading to ignorance. Reaching a point of self-diagnosed schizophrenia - a clamour of different narratives all treated equally - and then choosing not to unite them under a unified narrative, allows for identity to be formed. Through self-aware and self-reflexive inner-narration informed by external observation and an understanding of one's own conscious allows identity to remain free of some false inner 'truth' derived from a manufactured interpretation of the 'real'.

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Conclusion Post-Post-Structuralism Has the post-modern identity crisis then been solved? Perhaps the question this essay asks is whether there exists any crisis at all. What constructive narratological thinking posits is that the response to a 'reality' revealed as fractured and devoid of any linear solution, is to place value upon the fractured nature of consciousness. Since any teleological goal is a contrivance, yet the telic nature of narrative is inescapable, identity is found in preserving the separation of inner-narratives as opposed to attempting to unify them. In exploring the history of narratology and its transition from a literary area of study to a broad socio-cultural study of humanity, a precursor to our conclusion is foreshadowed. That it is in the forgoing of definitive, singular conclusions and in the re-appropriation and the preservation of the multiplicity of definition that value is found. In the opening chapter we established that contemporary narratatology took the methodologies of a structuralist approach to literature and evolved them in tandem with the development of deconstructivism and the post-modern revolution; refocusing it as an anthropological study. Derrida and Baudrillard's complete dismissal of metaphysic value in the 'real' leads to the 'virtual', meaning as defined by the interplay of created systems. This view is challenged by Searle who argues that empirical truth does still exist and should be pursued, while Currie states that there's no value to empirical 'truth' beyond that which human perception applies to it. The far more interesting and valuable area of the study is the human mind, not the so called 'truth'. This then was the agenda of chapter two to establish a better understanding of exactly what constitutes as the human mind, and why it is so vulnerable to manipulation and coercion. In this chapter Currie argues that a post-structuralist narratological awareness of the identity allows one to be aware of the influence and controllability of 'social power' through the managing of information and knowledge. It is suggested that this awareness seeks to liberate the identity from being institutionalised. However, in looking at the work of prominent British thinkers, Isaiah Berlin and John Stuart Mill, it emerges that liberty is an as malleable concept as any that to make it the object of the identity is to simply subscribe to another contrived falsehood. Narratology reveals all such 'grand-narratives' to be comparable to acts of 'ventriloquy', vehicles for the editing of knowledge but can it then not provide any solution? Roger Scruton's criticism is brought to bear upon this dilemma, dismissing the development of apparently impotent post-modern ideas as 'junk 18

thought'. Whilst chapter two left this challenge unanswered, it did reach a conclusion important to our realisation of the identity: that the formation of conscious narrative is cyclical. That is to say, that consciousness posits narrative to better perceive the real, while simultaneously the consciousness is formed as an understanding of the real as perceived through narrative. Consciousness and narrative are inseparable. The next task then of this dissertation was to explore the consequences of this conclusion. Since while the narrative conscious is a frame through which to interpret the world, that frame is informed by the consciousness' experiential narrative. Thus the vulnerability and susceptibility to exterior and manipulative influence remains. The key argument then proposed in chapter three, based upon the work of Marie-Laure Ryan, is that identity emancipates us to choose the 'actual' that we wish to exist in based upon the cumulative experiential and explanatory narratives informing that decision. The fact that the actual becomes 'indexical' allows narrative to become to tool to take on the 'real'. Wolf Werner and Michael Bamberg both write that a need to understand one's position in a teleological narrative is an inherent need in the human psyche and that the forming of one's identity is to provide stability by drawing together the multitude of self-narratives into one grand-narrative. However, based on the examinations of the previous two chapters, grand-narratives have already been discredited as misguiding. To create a grand-narrative out of the self is to create a goal or conclusion that becomes a metaphysical truth making all other actions logocentric; centred around an impossibility: that there is no 'truth'. Building upon contributions from Friederich Nietzche and Peter Raggat, an alternative is suggested. Identity is not a unification of narratives, rather it is the name given to the fractured whole meaning resides in the spaces in between. Allowing identity to exist as dialogical in nature, in constant flux and transition, allows for external and internal narratives to inform the mind's conclusions. Information is found in the friction between ideas rather than the unification of them, since to unify something is to author meaning where none exists whereas to look at the interplay between two different concepts is to find an understanding and an appreciation of both.

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Narratology then has provided what might loosely be called a solution not by providing any empirical truth - but rather by stripping empiricism of any value, and transferring that 'value' to the accepting of things existing in a constant state of undecidability. Whilst post-modernism maybe have been an apocalypse, a destruction of institutionalised modes of thought, its nihilism is the source for new definitions of identity. Narratology emancipates us not through a grand-narrative of liberty but through allowing to find validation in our varied, exciting and fascinating fractured identity.

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