Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations

Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations
February 2011
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily representtheofficialpositionoftheDepartmentofDefense. The DSB Advisory Group on Defense Intelligence Task Force on Counter Insurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations completed its informationgatheringinJanuary2011. ThisreportisUNCLASSIFIEDandreleasabletothepublic.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 203013140
DEFENSESCIENCE
BOARD
February23,2011
MEMORANDUMFORTHECHAIRMAN,DEFENSESCIENCEBOARD SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Defense Intelligence Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance(ISR)Operations Attached is the final report of the DSB Task Force on Defense Intelligence, Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operationsstudy.TheTaskForcewasaskedtoidentifyhowDepartmentofDefense (DoD) intelligence can most effectively support COIN operations. The principal objective of the Terms of Reference was to influence investment decisions by recommending appropriate intelligence capabilities to assess insurgencies, understand a population in their environment, and support COIN operations. To arrive at the principal objective the Terms of Reference (TOR) requested the Task Force address five areas to include the developing role of DoD ISR in COIN operations, to include relevant customers and their respective requirements; allocation of DoD ISR resources to support COIN capabilities; changes to the ISR process to improve support to COIN; immediate improvements in network agility and information sharing across mission partners conducting COIN; and emerging technologiesandmethodologieslikelytoprovidethehighestpayoff. To respond to the TOR, the Task Force reviewed existing literature and met with more than 100 senior and midlevel officials and representatives from across DoD, the Intelligence Community (IC), industry, nonprofit community, and academia involved in irregular warfare, COIN, ISR, and related activities. The Task Force examined the multiphase COIN challenge, which includes the need to continue to support COIN operations in Afghanistan; prepare for emerging and urgent COIN ISR operations that will have to be met using current resources; and building a capability to deal with longterm COIN scenarios using new concepts of operations (CONOPS)andresources. BasedonitsinvestigationtheTaskForcearrivedatthefollowingobservations: DoDlacksacommonunderstandingofCOIN DoDhasassumedresponsibilityforCOINISRbydefault
DoD ISR is narrowly interpreted to mean technical intelligence collection by airborneplatforms ISR capabilities have not been applied effectively against COIN operations thatdealwithpopulationsinpartbecauseacomprehensivesetofintelligence requirementsforCOINdoesnotexist TheU.S.Governmentisnotinvestingadequatelyinthedevelopmentofsocial andbehavioralscienceinformationthatiscriticallyimportanttoCOIN ISR support for COIN is currently being overshadowed by counterterrorism andforceprotectionrequirements IncreasingthefocusofISRforCOINonincipientinsurgencieswouldprovide more wholeofgovernment options and reduce the need for major commitmentofmilitaryforces New S&T solutions must address the crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and associated communications caused by the deluge of sensordata New and emergingtechnologies and techniquescan beemployed toimprove ourunderstandingofCOINenvironments
The attached report provides the rationale for the Task Forces findings and recommendations, responds to five specific TOR tasks, and notes substantial policy guidance on aspects of COIN and ISR as well as numerous and inconsistent definitionsofkeytermsassociatedwiththestudy. We appreciate the contributions made by the Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, industry, and academia who took the time to provide us with their knowledge and expertise; the members of this study; the Executive Secretary; the DSBSecretariatanditsmilitaryassistant.
TABLEOFCONTENTS i
TABLEOFCONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: TASKING AND KEY FINDINGS..............................................................iv 1. 2. 3. INTRODUCTION,TASKING,ANDSTUDYSTRUCTURE .....................................................11 DEFININGCOINANDISR.............................................................................................20 TORTASKS.....................................................................................................................25 3.1. TORTASK1:WHATISTHEDEVELOPINGROLEOFDODISRINCOIN OPERATIONS;WHOARETHECUSTOMERSANDWHATARETHEREQUIREMENTS?.............25 3.1.1. 3.1.2. 3.1.3. DEVELOPINGROLEOFDODISRINCOINOPERATIONS...............................26 WHOARETHECUSTOMERS? ............................................................................29 WHATARETHEREQUIREMENTS?....................................................................29
3.2. TORTASK2:WHATISTHERECOMMENDEDALLOCATIONANDUSEOFDODISR RESOURCESTOSUSTAINCOINCAPABILITYALONGWITHOTHERCOMPETING ...........................................................33 INTELLIGENCEREQUIREMENTS,FOREXAMPLECT? 3.2.1. 3.2.2. 3.2.3. THEDIVERSITYOFINTELLIGENCEMISSIONNEEDS........................................33 MISSIONBASEDNEEDSSHOULDDRIVEEFFECTSBASEDISR........................35 AFORMALAPPROACHTONEEDBASEDANALYSIS.......................................37
3.3. TORTASK3:WHATCHANGESCANBEMADEINTHEISRPROCESSTOIMPROVE SUPPORTTOCOIN? ............................................................................................................38 3.3.1. ISRSUPPORTTOTRADITIONALCOINACTIVITIES .........................................38
3.3.2. ISRINSUPPORTOFWHOLEOFGOVERNMENT,POPULATIONCENTRICCOIN INITIATIVES.....................................................................................................................42 3.4. TORTASK4:WHATCANBEDONEINTHEIMMEDIATEFUTURETOIMPROVE

NETWORKAGILITYANDINFORMATIONSHARINGACROSSTHEBROADSPECTRUMOF MISSIONPARTNERSCONDUCTINGCOINANDDURINGTHEPROMOTIONOFREGIONAL
...........................................................................................................................49 STABILITY? 3.4.1. 3.4.2. THECURRENTSITUATION...............................................................................49 IMPROVEMENTSINTHEIMMEDIATEFUTURE..................................................50
ii COINISROPERATIONS
3.5. TORTASK5:WHATEMERGINGTECHNOLOGIESANDMETHODOLOGIES, COMBINATIONSOFSENSORS,ANDINVESTMENTSININFORMATIONFUSIONANDANALYSIS ARELIKELYTOPROVIDETHEHIGHESTPAYOFF?................................................................52 3.5.1. 3.5.2. 3.5.3. 3.5.4. 3.5.5. 3.5.6. 3.5.7. 3.5.8. 3.5.9. COMPUTATIONALSOCIALSCIENCES/SOCIALNETWORKANALYSIS ..............52 BEHAVIORMODELINGANDSIMULATION.......................................................52 NATURALRESOURCEMONITORING ................................................................54 OVERHEADVIDEOSURVEILLANCE..................................................................55 IMPROVEMENTSTOCHARACTERIZINGTERRAIN............................................56 PROCESSING,EXPLOITATION,ANDDISSEMINATION(PED)...........................56 HUMANTERRAINDATACOLLECTIONANDMANAGEMENT.........................58 TERRESTRIALSENSORWEBS.............................................................................58 BIOMETRICS......................................................................................................59
3.5.10. NATURALLANGUAGEPROCESSING................................................................59 3.5.11. OPERATIONSRESEARCH..................................................................................59 3.5.12. CROSSDOMAINTECHNOLOGIES.....................................................................60 4. 5. FINDINGSANDRECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................61 COSTCONSIDERATIONS.................................................................................................68
APPENDIXA.TERMSOFREFERENCE ......................................................................................69 APPENDIXB.TASKFORCEMEMBERSHIP...............................................................................71 APPENDIXC.BRIEFINGSRECEIVED ........................................................................................72 APPENDIXD.SOMEUSEFULCANDIDATEMETRICS..............................................................75 APPENDIXE.METRICSUSEDBYINSURGENTS.......................................................................89 APPENDIXG.DEFINITIONS....................................................................................................97 APPENDIXH.ACRONYMS....................................................................................................105 APPENDIXI.BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................110

TABLEOFCONTENTS iii
LISTOFFIGURESANDTABLES FIGURE1.TORANDDERIVEDTASKS.................................................................................12 FIGURE2.STUDYCONTEXTTWOIMPERATIVES..................................................................15 FIGURE3.POSSIBLECOINCHALLENGES...........................................................................16 FIGURE4.ADVANTAGESANDDISADVANTAGESOFMOVINGLEFTOFBANG..................17 FIGURE5.COINANDTHECONFLICTSPECTRUM.................................................................18 FIGURE6.DESIREDCHANGEINISRTASKINGPROCESS.......................................................36 FIGURE7.EFFECTSBASEDISRTASKINGPROCESS................................................................36 TABLE1.DEFINITIONSOFCOIN...........................................................................................21 TABLE2.DEFINITIONSOFISR................................................................................................22 TABLE3.SELECTEDISRSOURCESFORIRREGULARWARFARE..............................................27 TABLE4.TRADITIONALWARFAREVS.IRREGULARWARFARESURVEILLANCE ....................28
iv COINISROPERATIONS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: TASKING AND KEY FINDINGS

Why this study was conducted. This report was conducted at the request of then Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), The Honorable James R. Clapper, and assigned by the Defense Science Board (DSB) to its Permanent Defense Intelligence Task Force. This request followed the publication of Major General Michael T. Flynns blueprint paper on intelligence support to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan.Inhispaper,MGFlynnprovidedacandidassessmentofintelligencesupport: Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are andhowtheymightbeinfluenced,incuriousaboutthecorrelationsbetweenvarious developmentprojectsandthelevelsofcooperationamongvillagers,anddisengaged from people in the best position to find answers whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high leveldecisionmakersseekingtheknowledgetowageasuccessfulcounterinsurgency.1 MG Flynns comments come at a time when Department of Defense (DoD) resource constraintsandchallengesarebecomingmoreevident,evenastheDepartmentfacesawide range of prospective COIN operations in the future. As a result, the Department must take into account what it has learned in recent and current COIN operations, the need to continue supporting current operations as effectively as possible, and the challenges of preparing for the future. This report represents an effort to understandthe balance that will berequiredtomeetthesechallenges,andtoplanaccordingly. This study comes at an important moment in the evolution of United States (U.S.) national security. A Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study examined the need to put capabilities in place to prepare ona Governmentwide basis for hostilities, as well as the need to diminish U.S. military involvement in those activities in an orderly and effective manner.2 The report noted the need for capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction; strategic communication; knowledge, understanding and intelligence; and identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare.3 The price of not having these capabilities in place or of not planning to use these capabilities was still unfolding as that study was written. The enormous cost of not fielding these capabilities is clear today. Its a price the U.S. is paying in lives and in national treasure. The 2004 report noted the wide set of requirements that must be met to address the full lifecycle of hostilities. This study takes into account the observations and recommendations of that effort, extending its recommendationsintoconceptstoenhancethecapabilitiesoftheU.S.Government(USG)in
1 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant inAfghanistan(Washington,DC:CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity,January2010):7.Emphasisadded. 2
Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities (Washington, DC: DefenseScienceBoard,December2004). Ibid.,v.Emphasisadded.
EXECUTIVESUMMARY v
general, and the Intelligence Community (IC) in particular, to put in place intelligence capabilities that support emerging requirements for COIN operations throughout the entire lifecycleofthoseoperations,fromplanning,toexit. Finally, the pertinence of this report is amplified by the words of Secretary of Defense RobertGates,whonotedinanaddressattheUnitedStatesMilitary AcademyatWestPoint that the U.S. Army and the rest of the U.S. Government need capabilities to prevent festering problems from growing into fullblown crises which require costly and controversiallargescaleAmericanmilitaryintervention.4 As the nation builds a new national security structure that addresses both global challenges and fiscal realities, these capabilities will be difficult to obtain. This report makes specific recommendations regarding the ISR approaches and resources needed to gain these COIN capabilities. Terms of Reference (TOR). The USD(I)s TOR for the study (Appendix A) identified five tasks: What is the developing role of DoD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)inCOINoperations;whoarethecustomersandwhataretherequirements? What is the recommended allocation and use of DoD ISR resources to sustain COIN capability along with other competing intelligence requirements, for example, counterterrorism? WhatchangescanbemadetotheISRprocesstoimprovesupporttoCOIN? What can be done in the immediate future to improve network agility and information sharing across the broad spectrum of mission partners conducting COINandduringthepromotionofregionalstability? What emerging methodologies and technologies, combinations of sensors, and investments in information fusion and analysis are likely to provide the highest payoff? Study Methodology. Over the last six months the Task Force conducted a comprehensive literature review on issues relevant to the TOR, and met with more than 100 senior and midlevel officials and representatives from across the DoD Components, the IC, industry, academia,andthenonprofitcommunity.TheseexpertsinCOIN,irregularwarfare,andISR included serving and retired military officers from fourstar generals to noncommissioned officers, field commanders, and senior civilian leaders and policymakers. The Task Force also engaged intelligence collection and analysis experts, physical scientists, engineers,
Robert Gates, Speech to the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY (Washington, DC: Office of the AssistanceSecretaryofDefenseforPublicAffairsPressRelease,February25,2011).
vi COINISROPERATIONS
social scientists, and a variety of leading think tank scholars. A complete listing of briefings receivedbytheTaskForcecanbefoundinAppendixC. Key Findings. Underlying this studys key findings is the multiphase COIN challenge: the needtocontinuesupportingCOINoperationsinAfghanistan;simultaneouslypreparingfor emerging and urgent COIN scenarios that will have to be met using existing resources; and building a capability to deal with longterm COIN scenarios using new Concept of Operations(CONOPS)andresources.Keyfindingsarepresentedinsummarybelow,andin detailinSection4,whichalsoprovidesrecommendations. 1.DoDlacksacommonunderstandingofCOIN. The lack of a single authoritative definition of COIN is impeding a common understanding and unified approach to COIN operations within the DoD and across the USG. AccompanyingthislackofdefinitionisamultiplicityofCOINCONOPS. 2.DoDassumedresponsibilityforCOINISRbydefault. Despite a national strategy and civilmilitary campaign plan that calls for a wholeof government, populationcentric approach to COIN, the USG is not employing all elements of national power in the planning and conduct of COIN operations. DoD assumed responsibility for virtually all COIN intelligence requirements by default. Indeed, apart frombeingasignatorytothe2009U.S.GovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuide,theDepartment ofStatehasshownlittleevidentinterestinbuildingorsupportingthepartnershipdescribed bytheGuide.5ThislackofpartnershipimpedesprogresstowardawiderapproachtoCOIN. 3. DoD and IC officials tend to focus narrowly on airborne technical collection capabilitiesandsystemsratherthanonthewidercapabilitiesneededtosupportCOIN. Thisobservationissupportedbythefactthattechnicalcollectionplatformscommandlarger portions of the budget and produce more immediate effects rather than longer term, foundational information for populationcentric operations. The Task Force notes that discussions with DoD senior officials regarding ISR for COIN turned frequently to the subject of technical collection systems and capabilities while excluding other collection sources (e.g. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT)) and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) issues. The Defense Science Boards Summer Study of 2010 noted that in 2009 DoD represented 62 percent of the requirements for OSINT, but provided only 3 percent of OSINT funding.6 The lack of attention to OSINT isbuttressedbythereportsfindingthatin2009DoDhadonly14percentoftheICsOSINT manpower, and funded that proportion largely through Defense budget supplementals.7
5 6
UnitedStatesGovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuide(Washington,DC:USG,January2009).
Report of the Defense Science Board 2010 Summer Study on Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces (Washington,DC:DefenseScienceBoard,January2011):66.
7
Ibid.
EXECUTIVESUMMARY vii
Overall, these problems tend to exclude valuable sources of social and behavioral science data,includinghumangeography. 4. ISR capabilities have not been applied effectively against COIN operations that deal with populations in part because a comprehensive set of intelligence requirements for COINdoesnotexist. The defense intelligence community has not translated those aspects of commanders intent dealing with COIN into intelligence requirements, though the United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan describes in detail the need to focus on population security, governance, and economic development.8 The reasonsforthisapparentreluctancetoengageonthisissuearevaried,butonekeyreasonis that intelligence agencies, at least those in the Washington, D.C. area, tend to be reactive, waiting for questions to be asked, rather than trying to anticipate them. This approach may betooconservativeinaperiodofrapidsocialchange,promotedbyinstantcommunications. 5. The USG is not investing adequately in the development of social and behavioral scienceinformationthatiscriticallyimportantforCOIN. Many, if not most, specific COIN ISR requirements are populationcentric and are not exclusively solvable with hardware or hard, physical science scientific and technical (S&T) solutions. One senior intelligence officer with years of field experience pointed out that 80 percent of useful operational data for COIN does not come from legacy intelligence disciplines. Good intelligence on COIN exists outside the traditional intelligence organizations. Anthropological, sociocultural, historical, human geographical, educational, public health, and many other types of social and behavioral science data and information are needed to develop a deep understanding of populations. Such data, collected and analyzedusingthescientificmethod,isvitaltoCOINsuccess. 6. ISR support for COIN is currently overshadowed by counterterrorism (CT) and force protectionrequirements. In real terms, ISR support of COIN is not as high a priority for the Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies as CT and force protection, thus adversely impacting the effectiveness of COIN operations. COIN is not necessarily an alternative to CT;someISRrequirementsarecommontobothkindsofoperations,butCOIN,particularly populationcentricCOIN,requiressomeISRofitsown. 7. COIN ISR has not been addressed early in the conflict spectrum and has not sufficiently included a wholeofgovernment approach. The lack of focus on incipient insurgencies limits options and increases risk of unrecoverable COIN problems, despite thecommitmentofmajormilitaryforces.
8 United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan:UnitedStatesEmbassyKabul/USFOR,August2009).
viii COINISROPERATIONS
Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949. Despite that fact, following the Vietnam War and through the balance of the Cold War, the U.S. military establishment turned its back on insurgency, refusing to consider operations against insurgents as anything other than a lesserincluded caseforforcesstructuredforandpreparedtofighttwomajortheaterwars.9 Historical studies of insurgencies over the years highlight the fact that insurgencies are more likely if a state cannot provide fundamental services and if the population believes they are at risk. In addition, other factors, such as the quality of leadership in a particular country and that countrys political culture can be important factors in whether or not an insurgency develops. The Task Force does not propose that any specific combination of factors will result in an insurgency. Nonetheless, recent history can be instructive. Colombia, for example, has been gripped by a tenacious insurgency, even as the drug trade has imperiled that governments ability to govern effectively. Colombias strong political leadership,however,hasmadeeffectiveuseof U.S.securityanddevelopmentassistance,as wellasthepoliticalanddiplomaticsupportofU.S.leaders.Asaresult,theU.S.hasnotbeen compelled to commit substantial U.S. forces to combat an insurgency and defend the sovereign prerogatives of Colombias government. In contrast, the years leading up to 9/11 witnessed little U.S. government involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, U.S. information sources in Afghanistan were limited, which constrained U.S. potential to help shape in Afghanistan a situation less dangerous to U.S. interests. Theevents of9/11 leftthe U.S. with fewoptionsinAfghanistan;combataregimethatallowedterroriststoattackus,orlivewith a dangerous status quo. The Task Force therefore judges that early intervention prior to an insurgencytakingholdwouldgivetheU.S.moreoptionsandreducethelikelihoodofmajor combatintervention.10 Inlightofthisrecord,itistheviewoftheTaskForcethatirregularwarfareandinsurgencies will continue to be an enduring challenge to regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Emerging and enduring COIN issues need attention now. Addressing potential insurgencies in their incipient phase (i.e., left of bang) will provide policymakers and commanders more wholeofgovernment options and a better prospect for deterring or preventing the need for combat operations. Building a collection and analytic effort left of bang also provides the means for sustained, consistent, and more effective ISR support should an insurgency become active. This makes necessary a more focused approach to COIN intelligence support, including a National Intelligence Manager (NIM) for COIN, intelligence requirements directed specifically to COIN (including populationcentric knowledge), and a strategic indications and warning (I&W) model to enable early
Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency(SantaMonica,CA:TheRANDCorporation,2010):xiii.
10 The Task Force reviewed 53 case studies of insurgencies. In every case the actions taken were reactive and occurred after the insurgency had taken hold. See Kalev I. Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Military Review(MayJune2005):812.
EXECUTIVESUMMARY ix
implementation of wholeofgovernment options. Some I&W indicators are probably alreadyavailable. a. Effective COIN, and intelligence for COIN, must reflect a wholeofgovernment effort andwholeofgovernmentcapabilities. As noted in the 2004 DSB Summer Study, the U.S. requires the means to transition into an out of hostilities. Nowhere is this need more salient than for COIN. Addressing the entire lifecycleofCOINrequiresknowledgemanagementcapabilitiesthatserveawidevarietyof U.S. Government departments and agencies (DoD, Department of State, the Intelligence Community, etc.) A NIM for COIN would be able to facilitate efficient and effective intelligence support to COIN enabling a knowledge management capability that supports wholeofgovernment efforts and which would encourage use of a broader range of informationsourcesthatgobeyondlegacyintelligencecollection. 8. The deluge of sensor data is creating a crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and associated communication, as well as an increasing need for advancedanalysisthataddressesbehaviorofgroupsandtheculturalframeworkofgroup decisions. The insatiable demand for information and emphasis on collection is producing a deluge of data,overwhelmingtheabilitytoprovideuseful,actionableintelligenceinatimelymanner. This crisis in PED is exacerbated by planned and programmed collection assets and demands new S&T solutions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ISR support for COIN. Moreover, there is a need to develop and train people to do Advanced Analysis and this mustbedonemuchearlierinthecareersofthebestanalysts.Thislevelofanalysisisneeded at the very front end of any future conflict, not several years down the road. Training for Advanced Analysis would start at the very beginning of an analysts career and continue throughouthis/hercareer.Itincludeslanguage,deepculturalawareness,andselectformsof environmental training which encourages and supports analysis on the health of a region. Analystsneedtomakeprogresstounderstandtheculturefirsthandandtheyneedtoreturn to critical assignments within their intelligence agency. More and more, the analysts will need to be placed in the field in order to be best postured for intelligence operations and conflictsastheyarise. 9. New and emerging technologies and techniques can be employed to improve understandingofCOINenvironments. Technologies are emerging to improve understanding of the physical attributes (mineral resources,climates,geographies,includingculturalgeography),aswellasthosepertinentto identifying pattern of life activities of groups and individuals. Technologies can relate these attributes to incipient and real insurgencies. New analytic technologies hold the promise of scaling up the ability to filter raw data, identify meaning patterns of activity, and present analysts with material useful to understanding COIN situations, thus allowing analysts to performrealanalysis,ratherthanexhaustthemselvescullingrawdata.Technologycanalso
x COINISROPERATIONS
be employed to understand what is normal in a particular environment, helping to spot trends that represent anomalies that may portend longterm changes and the rise of instability.
1.INTRODUCTION,TASKING,ANDSTUDYSTRUCTURE
11
1. INTRODUCTION,TASKING,ANDSTUDYSTRUCTURE
This report conveys the findings and recommendations of the Permanent Defense Intelligence Task Force (Task Force or TF) of the Defense Science Board relative to ISR in support of COIN operations. This report is submitted in response to the Terms of Reference of March 8, 2010, provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).AcopyoftheTORisprovidedinAppendixAtothisreport. ThisstudycomesatanimportantmomentintheevolutionofU.S.nationalsecurity.Astudy published by the Defense Science Board in 2004, examined the need to put capabilities in place to prepare on a Governmentwide basis for hostilities, as well as to diminish U.S. military involvement in those activities in an orderly and effective manner. 11 The 2004 report noted the need for capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction; strategic communication;knowledge,understandingandintelligence;andidentification,location,and tracking for asymmetric warfare.12 The price of not having these capabilities in place, or planning to use these capabilities was still unfolding as that study was written. The enormousdimensionsofthatpricearecleartoday.ItsapricetheU.S.ispayinginlivesand innationaltreasure.The2004reportnotedthewidesetofrequirementsthatmustbemetto address the full lifecycle of hostilities. This study takes into account the observations and recommendations of that report, extending its recommendations into concepts to enhance the capabilities of the USG in general, and the IC in particular, to put in place intelligence capabilities that support emerging requirements for COIN operations throughout the entire lifecycleofthoseoperations,fromplanning,toexit. The TOR directed the Task Force to provide findings that can be used to influence ISR investment decisions as they relate to COIN. Although the TOR emphasized science and technology given their potentially significant contribution to intelligence support to COIN, theTORalsodirectedtheTaskForcetoassessinsurgenciesandunderstandapopulation in their environment. The TOR also noted that host nation civilian sentiment critically impacts COIN success, indicating anthropological and sociocultural factors must also be addressed. These factors, and the multidimensional, coalition nature of COIN operations, have implications for the scope of this Task Forces efforts, a point made clear by the discussions offered in Sections 3.1.2 (Who are the customers?) and 3.2.1 (The diversity of intelligencemission.),andelsewhereinSection3. TheTORposedfivespecificquestionsfortheTaskForcetoaddress: 1. What is thedeveloping role of DoDISR in COIN operations; who are the customers, andwhataretherequirements?
11 12
ReportoftheDefenseScienceBoard2004SummerStudyonTransitiontoandfromHostilities. Ibid.,v.Emphasisadded.
12 COINISROPERATIONS
2. What is the recommended allocation and use of DoD ISR resources to sustain COIN capability along with other competing intelligence requirements, for example, counterterrorism? 3. WhatchangescanbemadetotheISRprocesstoimprovesupporttoCOIN? 4. What can be done in the immediate future to improve network agility and information sharing across the broad spectrum of mission partners conducting COINandduringthepromotionofregionalstability? 5. What emerging methodologies and technologies, combinations of sensors, and investments in information fusion and analysis are likely to provide the highest payoff? WiththeconcurrenceoftheOUSD(I),theTaskForce(membersareidentifiedinAppendixB of this report) chose a broad interpretation of the TOR as reflected in the derived questions shown in red in Figure 1. As the TF examined the TORs five specific tasks, it developed thesederivedquestionswhichitbelievedwerenecessaryadjunctstothefivebasictasks.
FIGURE1.TORANDDERIVEDTASKS
The five specific tasks in the TOR on first glance seemed straight forward. As the Task Force began to examine the first task (What is the developing role of DoD ISR in COIN ops?), the Task Force decided to use an authoritative definition for each termISR and COINtoestablishaclearbaselineforwhattoaddressinthestudy.
13
The Task Force found several inconsistent definitions for the term COIN included in a variety of authoritative sources, as well as differing CONOPS. These different definitions allow DoD organizations and IC members to choose the one(s) they like best, causing confusion and different interpretations among decisionmakers and operators. These differences are significant when one tries to relate COIN to other military actions; e.g., counterterrorism,irregularwarfare,andforceprotection. DoD ISR also has a number of definitions. In its simplest form, DoD ISR is used by most DoD and IC members to mean technical collection from manned or unmanned airborne platforms like the MQ9/Reaper, RQ 4/Global Hawk, or MC12/Liberty. This view, when applied to COIN, tends to exclude other traditional sources of intelligence; e.g., OSINT and HUMINT. It also ignores and precludes the use of other extremely valuable sources of data and knowledge from the social sciences that have particular utility for COIN. These terms, and a description of how the Task Force used them, are addressed in greaterdetailinSection2ofthereport. The second part of the first task (who are the customers and what are the requirements?) also raises some very significant issues. A number of different U.S. policy documents state the need for a wholeofgovernment approach to national security challenges.13 For example, a number of U.S. policy documents give the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) prominent COIN responsibilities. In the preface to the 2009 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Administrator of the USAID, the Counselor oftheDepartmentofStatenotes: Irregularwarfareisfarmorevariedthanconventionalconflict:hencetheimportance of an intellectual framework that is coherent enough to provide guidance, and flexibleenoughtoadapttocircumstances.Counterinsurgencyplacesgreatdemands on the ability of bureaucracies to work together, with allies, and increasingly, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). That it is cosigned by the leaders of the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development says a great deal about the partnership between these and other departments that has been, and will be, required if we are to succeed in the future. Although much of our ability to knit together lines of effort arises from the field, there is an important role for policyrelevant thought about first order questions. ThisGuideprovidesthat.14 TheGuidesprefacealsonotes:
13
See Appendix F for a more detailed explanation of the wholeofgovernment concept from the 2010 National SecurityStrategy. UnitedStatesGovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuide.
14
American counterinsurgency practice rests on a number of assumptions: that the decisive effort is rarely military (although security is the essential prerequisite for success); that our efforts must be directed to the creation of local and national governmentalstructuresthatwillservetheirpopulations,and,overtime,replacethe efforts of foreign partners; that superior knowledge, and in particular, understanding of the human terrain is essential; and that we must have the patiencetopersevereinwhatwillnecessarilyprovelongstruggles.15 Despite these words, the absence of the necessary DoS and other resources and capabilities means that the burden of conducting most COIN operations fell to the DoD by default. Hence, the DoD acquired a series of new (or at least nontraditional) ISR requirements for COIN operations that may or may not match well with their capabilities and Tactics, Techniques,andProcedures(TTP).AsonelooksatspecificCOINISRrequirements,onecan conclude that many, if not most, are populationcentric and are not readily solvable with hardwareorevenhard,physicalscienceS&Tsolutions. The Task Force discovered that although ISR for COIN in Afghanistan gets considerable lip service, most senior civilian and military leaders take a fairly constrained view, concluding that more technical collectors (e.g., Reapers or Predators) will answer the requirements. Nontraditional sources of military ISR get very little support in terms of funding, manpower, or tasking priorities. In Afghanistan, the priority for DoD ISR for COIN is overshadowedbyISRrequirementsforCTandforceprotection. TheTaskForcediscernedtwoimperativesfortheneartermandfutureISRrequirementsfor COIN.TheconflictinAfghanistanisandshouldbethetopcurrentpriority.TheTFmakesa number of nearterm recommendations to improve ISR support for COIN/CT operations in Afghanistan. However, as the U.S. phases down combat operations and moves toward a 2014 withdrawal of most forces from Afghanistan, the TF concluded that in the post Afghanistanenvironment,COINwillbeanenduringissuefortheU.S.Thissecondpriority, emergingCOINchallenges,shouldbeplannedfornowsothatagradualshiftinemphasis can occur as operations in Afghanistan draw down. The Task Force notes, however, that several potential COIN scenarios may require U.S. engagement with resources substantially thesameasthoseinusetoday.AswitnessedintherecentMiddleEastunrest,thesesurprise scenariosmayeruptevenastheU.S.undertakestheshiftshowninFigure2.
15
Ibid.
15
FIGURE2.STUDYCONTEXTTWOIMPERATIVES
The TF makes a number of recommendations with respect to these emerging COIN challenges, even as the U.S. may have to deal with more urgent COIN scenarios. The Task Force believes now is the time to consider how to address COIN intelligence requirements forthefuture.AstheU.S.GovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuidesprefacenotes:Whetherthe United States should engage in any particular counterinsurgency is a matter of political choice, but that it will engage in such conflicts during the decades to come is a near certainty.16 ISR for COIN may differ from country to country, but there are some generic basic ISR requirements (that underlie the Task Forces findings and recommendations) that can be identified and then modified to suit a specific country depending on current strategic requirements. The Task Force identified, as illustrated in Figure 3, a representative list of countries that currently pose a potential COIN challenge. Some of these countries may representanemergingCOINchallenge,whileothersmaybecomemoreurgent.Itshouldbe emphasized that this list is provided for illustrative purposes and does not necessarily represent any assessment by the DoD or the IC regarding emerging COIN situations, nor is thelistinpriorityorder.Settingtheactualprioritieswouldbeaverydynamicprocessbased oncurrentnationalsecurityobjectives.
16
Ibid.,v.
FIGURE3.POSSIBLECOINCHALLENGES
The Task Force observed that economic crises, climate change, demographic pressures, resource scarcity, or poor governance could cause these states (or others) to fail or become so weak that they become targets for aggressors/insurgents. The Task Force believes that a governments loss of its ability to exercise sovereign prerogatives in important regions, including border areas, allowing an insurgency to gain critical mass, may represent an important COIN predictor. Instability can assume regional dimensions rapidly. Information, global information infrastructure, and social media can amplify the speed, intensity, and momentum of events that challenge regime stability. The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass effects in the hands of more nations and nonstate actors further complicates the matter. Such areas could become sanctuaries from which to launch attacksontheU.S.homeland,recruitpersonnel,andfinance,train,andsupplyoperations. Therefore, in addition to S&T, the TF chose to examine thecontributions that social sciences (including anthropology and sociology) can make to ensuring effective ISR support to COIN, as well as the investments that might be made in human resources/professional development. The Task Forces considerations were influenced as well by discussions that illustrated differences among the current COINoperations (Afghanistan and Iraq), and past and prospective COIN operations such as in Vietnam, the Horn of Africa, Lebanon, or Mexico. The Task Force concluded that if U.S. policy is to deter and prevent COIN situations from becomingmajorconflictsmoreemphasisshouldbeplacedleftofbang(beforetheneedto
17
makeamajorcommitmentofcombattroops)andwhiletheinsurgencyisstillinitsincipient phase.Asthe2011NationalMilitaryStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmericanotes:Preventing wars is as important as winning them, and far less costly. 17 There are many reasons to consider this shift to left of bang. Figure 4 summarizes the key advantages and disadvantagesofmakingthisshift.
FIGURE4.ADVANTAGESANDDISADVANTAGESOFMOVINGLEFTOFBANG
ShouldtheU.S.movetoaleftofbangapproachtoCOIN,usefulindicatorstohelppredict insurgency scenarios and deal with them early are needed, thus making indications and warnings (I&W) indicators an important component of future COIN planning and operations (see Figure 5). It is important to note that it is possible to have simultaneous operations(e.g.,COIN,CT,conventional,etc.)dependingonthedefinition(s)chosen.
17
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining Americas Military Leadership (Washington,DC:ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,8February2011):7.
FIGURE5.COINANDTHECONFLICTSPECTRUM
During the Cold War, the U.S. was able to develop a strategic I&W model that was well understood. It produced clearly defined intelligence requirements intended to prevent a surprisenuclearattack.ItdroveISRphysicaltechnologies,collectionmethods,andanalysis; it yielded key indicators (principally military in nature); and it required activity norms todiscoversignificantchanges. It is the Task Forces belief that a similar strategic I&W model can be designed for COIN. This model would need new and different ISR requirements; a clear understanding of the environment critical to determining causes/origins of problem(s); and the addition of social sciences to the physical sciences. Key indicators will most likely be nonmilitary such as political, economic, social, and loss of government sovereign prerogatives in key regions. Such an approach would require a wholeofgovernment plan to determine requirements, collection,analytical,anddisseminationpriorities. While a populationcentric approach to Afghanistan appears wellsuited to the village based nature of Afghan society, a different approach may be required to counter insurgencies that draw their strength from drug cartels or other motivating forces. Nonetheless, recent COIN thinking has been influenced greatly by the populationcentric viewofCOIN,onethatemphasizessocial,political,andculturalcontextasmuchasdetailed information about the adversary. As MG Flynn notes, tendency to overemphasize detailed informationabouttheenemyattheexpenseofthepolitical,economic,andculturalenvironment18
18
Flynn,etal.,FixingIntel,7.
19
This view of current COIN doctrine appears to exert more or less influence on military leaders, depending on their orientation and experience. While this Task Force does not expressanopiniononCOINdoctrineandconceptsofoperations,itviewsthesocialsciences as important to understanding target populations, the role of insurgencies within and connected to these populations, and the need to separate the interests of target populations from those of insurgencies. The Task Force also notes that postWorld War II scientific research included work in the development of organizational design and dynamics and systems analysis as ways to approach results driven military operations and the efficient allocationofresourcestoachieveresults. In general, the Task Force views U.S. counterinsurgency as an effort to deny success to insurgentmovementswhowouldusetheterritorytheycontroltoendangerthesafetyofthe United States and its allies. As a result, the scope of the Task Forces considerationincluded the wide range of potential COIN scenarios and operations; a wide variety of science, technology, and other resources; and a view that science includes the use of the scientific method of hypothesis generation, data collection, and analysis associated with the social sciences. Any left of bang approach to COIN will require the use of social sciences in ISR, inadditiontotheapplicationofthephysicalsciences.
2. DEFININGCOINANDISR
The Task Force reviewed current policy, doctrine, strategy, and plans that establish the vision, objectives, guidelines, and responsibilities within the USG and the DoD for COIN; other aspects of irregular warfare including CT, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), and stability operations (SO); as well as ISR. The purpose of the reviewwastoestablishaclearbaselineforthisstudy. In reviewing these authoritative sources, the Task Force found that there is substantial policy guidance on key aspects of COIN and ISR as well as numerous, and inconsistent definitions of the key terms associated with this study. Examples of these discrepancies are displayedinTables1and2.
2.DEFININGCOINANDISR
21
Counterinsurgency(COIN)
Definition
1Theblendofcomprehensivecivilianandmilitaryeffortsdesignedto simultaneouslycontaininsurgencyandaddressitsrootcauses.Unlike conventionalwarfare,nonmilitarymeansareoftenthemosteffective elements,withmilitaryforcesplayinganenablingrole. 2Thosemilitary,paramilitary,political,economic,psychological,andcivic actionstakenbyagovernmenttodefeatinsurgency.
Source
U.S.GovernmentInteragencyCOIN Guide(Jan2009) JointPublication(JP)102 DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryof MilitaryandAssociatedTerms(April 2001,amended2010)
3Comprehensivecivilianandmilitaryeffortstakentodefeataninsurgency JP324COINOperations(Oct2009) andtoaddressanycoregrievances. 4Acounterinsurgencycampaignisamixofoffensive,defensive,and stabilityoperationsconductedalongmultiplelinesofoperations. 5COINoperationsincludesupportingaHostNationsmilitary, paramilitary,political,economic,psychological,andcivicactionstakento defeataninsurgency.Avoidingthecreationofnewinsurgentsandforcing existinginsurgentstoendtheirparticipationisvitaltodefeatingan insurgency.COINoperationsoftenincludesecurityassistanceprograms suchasforeignmilitarysalesprograms,theforeignmilitaryfinancing program,andinternationalmilitarytrainingandeducationprograms. SevenkeyCOINLinesofEffort:
1)Establishcivilsecurity 2)Establishcivilcontrol 3)SupportHNsecurityforces 4)Supporttogovernance 5)Restoreessentialservices 6)Supporttoeconomicandinfrastructuredevelopment 7)Conductinformationengagement
ArmyFieldManual(FM)324 Counterinsurgency(Dec2006)
FMI324.2TacticsinCOIN(March 2009)
6SupporttoCOINisdefinedassupportprovidedtoagovernmentinthe military,paramilitary,political,economic,psychological,andcivicactionit undertakestodefeatinsurgency(JP102).Implicitinthisdefinitionisa legitimatepartnernation(PN)governmentinpowerwithsomecapacityto directandconductCOINoperations.SupporttoCOINcanincludeindirect support,directsupport(notinvolvingcombat)anddirectsupport(involving combat). 7Thesetofpolitical,economic,social,military,lawenforcement,civiland psychologicalactivitieswiththeaimtodefeatinsurgencyandaddressany coregrievances. 8AttributesofCOIN:
Politicalprimacy(andaclearlydefinedpoliticalobjective) Itisastruggleforthepopulation,notagainstthepopulation Therelevanceoflegitimacy Intelligencedrivesoperations Unityofeffort(therequirementofacoordinatedgovernmentstructure) Neutralizetheinsurgencyandisolatetheinsurgentsfromtheirsupport Prepareforaprotractedcampaign Securityundertheruleoflawisessential Handoverresponsibilitytothelocalforcesassoonaspracticable Learnandadaptquickly
AirForceDoctrineDocument(AFDD) 23IrregularWarfare(August2007)
BiSCJointOperationsGuidelines (JOG)10/01(NATO)(May2010)
AlliedJointDoctrine(AJP)3.4.4Joint DoctrineforCOIN(NATOpubon COIN)(Nov2008)
TABLE1.DEFINITIONSOFCOIN
Intelligence,Surveillance,andReconnaissance(ISR)
Definition
1Anactivitythatsynchronizesandintegratestheplanningand operationofsensors,assets,andprocessing,exploitation,and disseminationsystemsindirectsupportofcurrentandfutureoperations. Thisisanintegratedintelligenceandoperationsfunction. 2Intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceisanactivitythat synchronizesandintegratestheplanningandoperationofsensors, assets,andprocessing,exploitation,anddisseminationofsystemsin directsupportofcurrentandfutureoperations.Thisisanintegrated intelligenceandoperationsfunction.ForArmyforces,thiscombinedarms operationfocusesonpriorityintelligencerequirementswhileanswering thecommanderscriticalinformationrequirements.(JP201containsISR doctrine.)ThroughISR,commandersandstaffscontinuouslyplan,task, andemploycollectionassetsandforces.Thesecollect,process,and disseminatetimelyandaccurateinformation,combatinformation,and intelligencetosatisfythecommanderscriticalinformationrequirements (CCIR)andotherintelligencerequirements.Whennecessary,ISRassets mayfocusonspecialrequirements,suchasinformationrequiredfor personnelrecoveryoperations.Itsupportsfullspectrumoperations throughfourtasks:ISRsynchronization,ISRintegration,Surveillance, Reconnaissance. 3Thepurposeofintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR) operationsduringaCOINistodeveloptheintelligenceneededtoaddress theissuesdrivingtheinsurgency.Severalfactorsareparticularly importantforISRoperationsinCOINenvironments.Theseincludethe following:afocusonthelocalpopulace;collectionoccurringatall echelons;localizednatureofinsurgencies. 4ThegoalofISRoperationsistoprovideaccurate,relevant,andtimely intelligencetodecisionmakers.TheAirForcebestachievesthisgoal througheffectiveemploymentofISRcapabilities,andbycapitalizingon theinteroperabilityexistingamongourISRsystems,aswellasnon traditionalsources,tocreatesynergythroughintegration. 5Surveillanceandreconnaissancerefertothemeansbywhichthe informationisobserved.Surveillanceissystematicobservationto collectwhateverdataisavailable,whilereconnaissanceisaspecific missionperformedtoobtainspecificdata.
Source
JP102DictionaryofMilitaryand AssociatedTerms(April2001, amended2010) FM30Operations(Feb2008)
FM324Counterinsurgency(Dec 2006)
AFDD29ISR(Jul2007)
MilitaryTransformation: IntelligenceSurveillance,and Reconnaissance(Jan2003)
TABLE2.DEFINITIONSOFISR
Asindicatedpreviously,differentdefinitionsoftermsandassociatedinterpretationsoftheir meaning allow the DoD components, including the intelligence components of the military departmentsandcombatantcommandsandthecombatsupportagenciesthatarepartofthe IC, to choose the one(s) they prefer. This, in turn, produces a lack of clarity and causes confusionaboutwhatismeantbybothCOINandISR. Somedefenseofficials,forexample, neitherdifferentiateCOINfromotherirregular warfare operations such as CT nor distinguish it from traditional kinetic military operations. While irregular warfare can be conducted independently or in combination with traditional warfare (see Figure 5), COIN is part of a spectrum of irregular warfare activities and
2.DEFININGCOINANDISR
23
operations including CT, UW, FID, and SO. However, real distinctions exist among traditional warfare and irregular warfare and the failure to understand the differences between COIN, CT, force protection, and conventional strike operations has adverse consequencesfortheexecutionofU.S.nationalsecuritypolicyandstrategy.Thisfailurehas a deleterious effect on the DoD and ICs understanding of the intelligence requirements for effectivesupportofU.S.,multinational,andcoalitionCOINoperations. The Task Force discovered a similar lack of clarity and confusion within and between DoD components and the IC about the term ISR. The aggregation of ISR is itself somewhat confusing since it equates the importance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In fact, intelligence is the objective of ISR, and surveillance and reconnaissance are carried outtocontributetothatobjective. Moreover (and as noted previously), the Task Force found that some equate Defense ISR with technical collection in general and manned and unmanned aircraft in particular. Such misinterpretation unnecessarily constrains the view of policymakers, planners, and warfighters to a relatively narrow set of technical collection platforms rather than the broad array of assets resourced by the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), much less the overall capabilitiesandcapacityofthenationsintelligenceenterprise. ISR for COIN (and ISR in general) includes all intelligence disciplines, all sources of information, and all aspects of the process of collecting data and turning it into operationally useful intelligence upon which to establish context, create knowledge, and informdecisionsandactions.Itencompassesplanninganddirectionofintelligence,mission and collection management, tasking, human and technical collection, processing, exploitation, production, and dissemination. Moreover, with respect to OSINT it includes nontraditional sources of political, sociocultural, behavioral, economic, and other social scienceinformationfoundinthepublicandprivatesectors. Forthepurposesofthisstudy,theTaskForceusedthedefinitionsfoundinJointPublication (JP)102,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms:19 Irregular Warfare (IW): A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirectandasymmetricapproaches,thoughitmayemploythefullrangeofmilitary and other capacities, in order to erode an adversarys power, influence, and will. (246) Insurgency: The organized use of subversion or violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgencycanalsorefertothegroupitself.(233)
19
JP 102 Department of Defense Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 2010).
Counterinsurgency (COIN): Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken todefeataninsurgencyandtoaddressanycoregrievances.(111) Counterterrorism (CT): Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terroristnetworks.(113) Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the productandtotheorganizationsengagedinsuchactivity.(234) Surveillance: The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.(456) Reconnaissance:Amissionundertakentoobtain,byvisualobservationorother detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographiccharacteristicsofaparticulararea.(393) ISR: An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operationsfunction.(237) Insummary,influencingforeigngovernmentsandpopulationsisacomplexandinherently political activity. The military role in irregular warfare campaigns in general, and COIN in particular requires the ability to plan, conduct, and sustain integrated operations of interagency and multinational civilian and military organizations to support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries. In other words, it requires thewholeofgovernmentapproachdescribedbytheSecretariesofStateandDefenseinthe U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. While U.S. forces are superbly trained in the traditionalaspectsofviolentcombat,theseirregularwarfareandCOINcampaignsmayfail if waged by military means alone. Given that it is USG policy to deter and counter insurgencies,thenthedefenseintelligencecommunityshouldplacemoreemphasisonleft of bang before the need for a large commitment of U.S. combat troops while an insurgency is still in an incipient stage of development, and that the wholeofgovernment approach should be given the capabilities necessary to succeed. ISR should be crafted and resourcedtosupportthisapproach.
3.TORTASKS
25
3. TORTASKS
3.1. TORTASK1:WHATISTHEDEVELOPINGROLEOFDODISRINCOIN OPERATIONS;WHOARETHECUSTOMERSANDWHATARETHEREQUIREMENTS?
AkeyobjectiveoftheTaskForcewastoexaminethedevelopingroleofdefenseintelligence inCOINoperations,andtoidentifythecustomersandrequirementsforCOIN. The Task Force recognizes that the global security environment is complex, uncertain, and dangerous. Threats to the United States, its allies, and regional stability may arise from weak or failing states as well as failed states and ungoverned areas. Poor governance, resource scarcity, economic crises, and even climate change could exacerbate such instability.Nonstateadversarieswill,ofcourse,seektoexploitsuch circumstancesfortheir own ends. Throughout history this has always been the case. Indeed, the majority of conflicts involved a state fighting a nonstate actor.20 As recent and ongoing conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate, adversaries may choose to employ both traditionalandirregularmodesofwarfareconcurrentlytoachievetheirpoliticalobjectives. The DoD in general and the defense intelligence community in particular, must recognize that irregular warfare is strategically important in an era of hybrid or multimodal armed conflict. Consequently, the Task Force notes that in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, it is DoD policy to maintain capabilities and capacity so that the Department is as effective in irregular warfare as it is in traditional warfare to ensure that, whendirected,itcan: 1. Identify and prevent or defeat irregular threats from state and nonstate actors acrossoperationalareasandenvironments. 2.ExtendU.S.reachintodeniedareasanduncertainenvironmentsbyoperatingwith andthroughindigenousforeignforces. 3. Train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contributeforcestooperationselsewhere. 4. Through direct or indirect means, and on a large scale when required, support a foreigngovernmentorpopulationthreatenedbyirregularadversaries. 5. Create a safe, secure environment in fragile states and, if required, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure restoration, and humanitarianrelief.21
20
Sebastian L.v. Gorka and David Kilcullen, An Actorcentric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference BetweenCOINandCounterinsurgency,JointForceQuarterlyNo.60(Winter2011):17. DepartmentofDefenseDirective3000.07:IrregularWarfare(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,1December 2008):2.
21
TheUSD(I)isassignedresponsibilityto: a. Maintain standards and guide the development of capabilities and capacity for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and assessment of operational areas and environments that may serve as safe havens for irregular threats. b. Advance intelligence and information partnerships with interagency and international partners, as appropriate, to identify and prevent or defeat irregular threatsfromstateandnonstateactorsacrossoperationalareasandenvironments. c. In accordance with strategic guidance documents, improve allsource collection to identify irregular threats from state and nonstate actors. Ensure timely information dissemination from the strategic to the tactical level, recognizing that irregular warfare places particular reliance on releasable products to facilitate working with foreignsecuritypartners. d. Manage the development of appropriate analytical intelligence models, tools, and datatoprovideintelligencesupporttoU.S.ArmedForcesforirregularwarfare. e. Incorporate into intelligence products information derived from social and behavioralsciencesourcesinthepublicandprivatesectors.
f. Project activity patterns on a regional and global scale for analyzing both friendly
andadversaryhumannetworksthroughmodelingandsimulationcapabilities. g. In conjunction with the CCDRs, prioritize capabilities to identify, locate, track, and target adversary networks, cells, and individuals in order to neutralize their influenceandoperationalcapacity. h. Promote intelligence and counterintelligence career paths that attract and retain the quantity and quality of personnel with irregular warfarerelevant skills, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under SecretaryofDefenseforPersonnelandReadiness(USD(P&R)).22 There is a substantial gap between the policy guidance and its implementation. This report examinesthosereasons,includingtheexigenciesofongoingcombatoperations.
3.1.1. DEVELOPINGROLEOFDODISRINCOINOPERATIONS
SincetheendoftheColdWar,thefocusofthedefenseintelligencecommunityhaschanged to address new threats to U.S. national interests. In addition to the large formations of relatively static targets comprising the armed forces and supporting infrastructure of an adversarial state, the defense intelligence community must now focus on small, dispersed targets that characterize such nonstate actors as terrorist and insurgent networks. It may
22
Ibid.,6.
3.TORTASKS
27
alsoneedtosupportwholeofgovernmentCOINstrategies,aswellassupporttheeffortsof allies with which the U.S. may desire to work with in meeting COIN challenges around the world.Section3.4.1notesthatnetworksofalliesandNGOsareoftenincompatiblewithU.S. systems, thus hindering operations that require resources beyond those of the U.S. government. ThesethreatsandneedsdonothaveacommondoctrineorCONOPS.Theyhaveneitherbig signatures to observe nor enduring signals to intercept. They conceal themselves within the local population and utilize global communications, finance, and telecommunications infrastructures to help command, control, and execute their operations. These threats are hidden, masked, and fleeting. Moreover, counteracting these threats and denying them the ability to achieve their politicalmilitary objectives requires new and different types and combinationsofintelligence/information. Addressing these new threats thus requires intelligence/information not only from traditional intelligence sources and methods, but also from all echelons of warfighters as well as nontraditional sources. There is no dominant or single intelligence discipline or source of information to solve the challenges posed by COIN operations. Indeed, allsource andmultiINTintelligenceisessentialforachievingthepersistent,predictive,activitybased ISRrequiredtosuccessfullycounteraninsurgencyasshowninTable3.
SelectedISRSourcesforIW
COMINT ELINT FISINT EOIMINT(e.g.,PAN,MSI,FMV) RADARIMINT RFMASINT EOMASINT RADARMASINT GeophysicalMASINT Posteventforensics Human/CulturalGeography GMTI ThermalAnalysis CyberActivity HUMINTInterrogation SourceOperations Debriefings Biometrics HumanGeography/TerrainAnalysis DocumentExploitation(DOCEX) Debriefings SocialGroup/NetworkDynamics
TABLE3.SELECTEDISRSOURCESFORIRREGULARWARFARE
UnliketraditionalISR, wherethefocustypicallyisonthelocationofananticipatedactivity, ISR for irregular warfare must focus on discovering the unknown activity of an adversary, characterizing it, and exploiting it. For support of COIN operations it also requires a clear and sustained focus on populationcentric activities such as governance, development, and local population sometimes before the start of hostilities. This demands a thorough understanding of historical, sociocultural, economic, educational, and environmental aspectsoftheareaofoperationsinadditiontopoliticalandmilitaryfactorsandtrends.This in turn requires more basic or fundamental intelligence as well as associated social,
behavioral,andpoliticalsciencesinformationfromsourcesinthepublicandprivatesectors. Table4comparesandcontrastsotheraspectsofISRfortraditionalversusirregularwarfare.
TraditionalWarfarevs.IrregularWarfareSurveillance
WarTimeHorizon PersistentISR TraditionalWarfareConcepts RelativelyShortDecisiveBattles UnblinkingEye IrregularWarfareParadigm LongWar Smartcollectionmanagementbasedon thefrequencyofchange ActivitySurveillance,multiINTPED, Exploitationandcollectionnolonger temporallysynchronized Georegistertodiscover Activitiesandtransactionsdriven Understandmysteries;Unravel networks Weeks/months MultiINT
rd
PersistentSurveillance Georegistration CollectionFocus Intentofcollection CollectionPeriod PEDphilosophy ExploitationProcess PEDProducts Targets TargetSignatures TargetIdentifier DataTagging Sensorutilization DoctrineandTTPs Training Informationsharing
SingleSensor24/7,IMINTPED Discoverytogeoregister Targetdriven Findremainedpiecestoapuzzle Minutes/hours IMINT 1 ,2 ,3 phaseexploitation IPB/BDA/Overwatch MilitaryOrderofBattle Sovietstylemilitarysignatures BENumber StovepipedwithinINT Notintegrated WellEstablished SingleINTspecialization Needtoknow
st nd
Timephased,layeredapproach,Real timeandforensics PEDmaynotyieldafinishedintelligence product Peopleandnetworks Nonconventionalsignaturessuchas organizationalstructure, communications,movement ProperName Metadatataggedtolinksensorto activitytogeoreferencetoaction Fullyintegrated Newconcepts,learningwhiledoing MultiINTOpsIntelspecialization Needtoshare/multiINTsynergy
TABLE4.TRADITIONALWARFAREVS.IRREGULARWARFARESURVEILLANCE
Asnotedabove,therearemajorgapsinISRcapabilitiesandcapacitiesforCOINoperations, particularly in populationfocused collection and analysis. Moreover, there is an absence of analytical capability that adheres to methodologies of modern social science and psychological research techniques and assessment tools. The absence of this expertise in the field denies analysts, planners, and operators an important what if tool for assessing the consequencesofplans. To that end, the Task Force focused on how ISR can support those aspects of COIN, as defined in the broadest sense. The Task Force appreciates the pitfalls of considering the application of DoD ISR capabilities that go beyond traditional military operations, but there
3.TORTASKS
29
isanimplicitneedtoapplysomeISRcapabilitiesagainstaspectsofCOINthatareprimarily civilian in nature. If winning over the local populace is the goal, then the U.S. must employ ISRcapabilitiesinapopulationcentricmannerwithout,however,precludingISRsinherent valueindealingwithinsurgentsthroughkineticmeans. In particular, a key developing role of Defense ISR in COIN and other irregular warfare related network operations is to provide activitybased intelligence (ABI). ABI is cross discipline and multiINT and is applicable both to physical and nonphysical activities and transactions, including sociocultural beliefs and behaviors, financial transactions, open source information, and cyber activities. It lends itself to understanding patterns of life, largersocialnetworks,andunusualorsuspiciousactivity. The blending of ABI with wide area surveillance, human geography, and other capabilities appears to be a particularly promising path for DoD ISR to support COIN operations. Such ablendwillhelpsupport: Detection,geolocation,andcharacterizationoftransactions/activities; Identificationandgeolocationoftheentitiesconductingtransactions/activities; Identificationandgeolocationofnetworksamongactors/entities; DevelopmentofpatternsoflifesupportingI&W,predictiveanalysis,andcounter denialanddeception;and Understandingthebroaderinteractionsbetween/amongnetworks.
3.1.2. WHOARETHECUSTOMERS?
The Task Force believes that the commanders and warfighters of U.S. military forces planningandconductingCOINoperationsarenolongertheonlycustomersoftheDoDISR enterprise. In order to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain the integrated operations of interagency and multinational civilian and military organizations in support of a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries, there must be an understanding of the broader array of defense intelligence customers, and some customers outside of the DoD (consistent with the approach described in the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide). Customers include other U.S. Government departments and agencies, foreign security partners, and selected international and nongovernmental organizations. In Afghanistan today, for example, the set of customers for defense intelligence includes the Department of State, USAID, Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),andaplethoraofNGOsinadditiontothecoalitionforces
3.1.3. WHATARETHEREQUIREMENTS?
Based on assimilated data and received briefings, the Task Force believes that ISR capabilities in Afghanistan are primarily employed in support of force protection and CT
missions. As a result, many aspects of the COIN campaign, broadly defined, are relatively underserved by ISR, including intelligence that supports achieving the transformative effects called for by the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, as well as to support to stability operationsandforeigninternaldefense. TosaythatISRunderservedtheseaspectsofCOINisnotmeantasacriticismofhowISRis operating today. In many respects, ISR is enormously successful in supporting the operationsofU.S.forcestodefeatterroristsandinsurgents. Why have ISR capabilities not been applied consistently against those aspects of COIN operations that deal with populations? One member of the Task Force, who interviewed intelligencemanagers,collectionmanagers,andintelligenceanalystsatthreeoftheregional commandsinlate2010,concludedthat: The United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan had not been widely read, dissected, and mapped into specific intelligence requirements or translated into integrated concepts of operation. Intelligence shops had not yet received a demand signal from commanders in the fieldforthistypeofdataandanalysis.Competingneedsforforceprotectionandthe find, fix, and finish mission made reallocation of intelligence resources against the broaderCOINmissionsproblematic. ISR in COIN has always been a tough job, and it becomes nearly impossible to do well if support to kinetic missions is not balanced with support to efforts focused on population security,economicdevelopment,andgovernance. There are many intelligence requirements on the books pertinent to supporting the broad missionsofCOIN,butfewexamplesofhowintelligencecollectionandanalysisareactually targeted to answer these questions. There are fewer that describe the direct and indirect signatures that should be collected and analyzed, and none at all that propose improvements in ISR operations. In a similar vein, ISR requirements left of bang and for wholeofgovernmenteffortshaveyettobewelldescribed. One set of requirements that could be used as a point of departure for guiding future ISR operations are the detailed tasks outlined in the United States Government Integrated Civilian Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (also cited as the McChrystal/Eikenberry campaign plan). There are 116 such tasks (called Main Efforts) that are associated with the Transformative Effects called for in the plan. Each of these tasks could be mapped into specific observables, both direct and indirect, that would become part of an ISR collection and analysis plan. To illustrate how this might be done, the Task Force considered the key issueofpopulationsecurity.
3.TORTASKS
31
AchievingsecurityofthepopulationisthefirststepinaCOINcampaign.InAfghanistan,as in any region subject toan insurgency, the people must feelfree from violence and coercion by insurgents, criminals, and terrorists, and must come to trust the security forces of the government to protect them. The challenges to achieving this level of security in Afghanistanaresubstantial: Thereareinsufficientforcespresent(AfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF)and ISAF)tosecurepopulationcenters. AfghanNationalPolice(ANP)developmenthaslaggedduetocorruptionandabuse, poorqualityandethnicbalanceofrecruits,highcasualtyrates,attrition,inadequate logistics,poorleadership,insufficientANSFcooperation,andunderresourcingand mentoring. Internationalmilitaryactionresultinginciviliancasualtiesexacerbatedpopular insecurityandincreasedalienation.
To remedy these shortfalls and create a secure environment for the population, the McChrystal/Eikenberrycampaignplancalledfortwelvetaskstobeexecuted: CommunityLevelTasks: Establishbasingandconductoperationsforsecuritypresenceincriticalareas. Reduceciviliancasualtiesandotheractsthatcreateoppositionamongthe population. ReformandmentorANPunitstoprotectcommunitiesandestablishruleoflaw. EnsureequalaccesstoANPrecruitmentforallpopulationgroupsthroughpolitical outreach. MobilizesupportandtrustforANSFefforts.
ProvincialLevelTasks: BuildandmentorCOINcapableAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)todefeatinternal threatsandsupporttheANPasnecessary. ImproveANSFinteroperability,coordination,cooperation,andmutualsupport, particularlyANAinsupportoftheANPincontestedareas. PlaceAfghansinchargeofoperationsworkingtowardstransferofleadsecurity responsibility.
NationalLevelTasks: DevelopMinistryofDefense(MOD),ANAandMinistryoftheInterior(MOI) capacityforaccountability,interoperability,andoversight.
DevelopstrategiesandincentivestomitigatehighlevelsofANSFattrition.
TasksatallLevels: SupportreductionofANSFcorruptionandabuse. Improve border security efforts to stem cross border flow of insurgents and insurgentlogistics.23
Each of these tasks implies designing a set of ISR tasks. For example, the first two tasks at the Community Level call for establishing basing and a security presence in critical areas andreducingciviliancasualties(presumablyfrombothinsurgentsandcoalitionforces).ISR support would require such basic data as physical assessments of terrain, lines of sight, and access to key infrastructure. Equally important would be the evaluation of normal population movement patterns and activities, characterization of changes in patterns, and anunderstandingofhowactivitiesvaryinthecourseofadayorweek. Reducing population casualties would entail determining the proximity of insurgent activities to civilian homes and businesses. However, it might also mean developing an ISR strategy to proactively detect threats against key local leaders and representatives of local government, warning criteria for transmitting threats to Afghans who are targeted, the capability to track local leaders during threat periods, and procedures for search and rescue oflocals.SuchaneffortwouldneedtobeworkedoutwithlocalAfghanpolice. ISR operational planning will need to take into account protection of sources and methods, sharing policies, and operational limitations in the local environment. While each of these issues will require a dedicated effort to resolve, the most important point in this example is that ISR use should be balanced between find, fix, and finish (F3) missions and direct supporttomonitorthesecurityofpopulationsandkeyindividuals.
23
UnitedStatesIntegratedCivilianMilitaryCampaignPlanforSupporttoAfghanistan,5.
3.TORTASKS
33
3.2. TORTASK2:WHATISTHERECOMMENDEDALLOCATIONANDUSEOFDOD ISRRESOURCESTOSUSTAINCOINCAPABILITYALONGWITHOTHER COMPETINGINTELLIGENCEREQUIREMENTS,FOREXAMPLECT?

3.2.1. THEDIVERSITYOFINTELLIGENCEMISSIONNEEDS
As long as the U.S. has ongoing combat operations and the need to interdict terrorist operationsagainstU.S.forcesandthehomeland,thenCTisthehighestpriority.Yetthecase forbalancingtheintelligenceneedsofaCOINorpopulationcentricplanwiththosefocused on counterterrorism is laid out clearly in the ISAF Commanders Counterinsurgency Guidance. The Guidance focuses on explaining why conventional military operations cannot defeat the insurgencyinAfghanistan.GENMcChrystalwrotethatthemathdoesntaddup: From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaveseightremaining:102=8.Fromtheinsurgentstandpoint,thosetwokilledwere likely related to many others who will want vengeance. If civilian casualties occurred,thatnumberwillbemuchhigher.Therefore,thedeathoftwocreatesmore willingrecruits:10minus2equals20(ormore)ratherthan8.24 For this basic reason, GEN McChrystal called for military and civilian officials to take a different, more populationcentric path. With this approach, coalition troops must become, andbeseenasprovidingapositiveforceinthecommunity,shieldingthepeoplefromharm, andfosteringstability.Thismeansputtinglessemphasisnotonlyonusingforcebutalsoon force protection measures (such as body armor and heavily armored vehicles), which distancethesecurityforcesfromthepopulation.Italsoentailsplacingamuchhigherdegree of intelligence support on the protection of critical local leaders and key individuals to ensure they can survive and execute the political and economic goals associated with counteringtheinsurgents. In addition to these tactical reasons, putting more emphasis on COIN operations is strategically important as it creates the potential for creating left of bang detection and effectswhichmayprecludeorminimizethenecessityoffuturekineticoperationsandcreate moreoptionsforseniorleaderstocurbprogressiontowardconflict. More generally, the diversity of intelligence needs is a consequence of COINs presence within the spectrum of irregular warfare operations the DoD must be prepared to conduct. CT, COIN, and CounterImprovised Explosive Device (CIED) efforts are all counter network operations. The mission objectives of each are distinct and their associated information needs are different, yet overlapping. Planned and executed properly, the different types of counternetwork operations will produce synergistic benefits. Conversely,
24
Stanley A. McChrystal and Michael T. Hall, ISAF Commanders Counterinsurgency Guidance (Kabul, Afghanistan:InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce/U.S.ForcesAfghanistan,August2009),2.
they will create problems if planned and conducted without regard for the relationships amongCOIN,CT,andCIEDoperations. The complexity of COIN and other counternetwork operations requires a strategic rather than ad hoc approach to ISR mission management. The intelligence requirements to support apopulationcentricCOINstrategyaredifferentfromthosetocounterterroristnetworks.In particular,thescaleandgranularityofinformationrequiredtoassesspatternsofbehaviorat local, tribal, and societal levels and comprehend that activity are different. An array of collection assets and sensor phenomenology as well as associated tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities are being employed to obtain and understand pertinent data and information. These capabilities are typically not being orchestrated in a way to ensure that critical questions about the COIN campaign can be answered. Unfortunately, the COIN campaign appears to be a secondary, or perhaps tertiary, priority for ISR, behind force protection and CT. COIN undertaken left of bang however, offers the potential to diminish the need for subsequent force protection and even CT operations. As the 2011 National Military Strategy notes: While such [CT] operations disrupt in the shortterm, they cannot be decisive and do not constitute a viable longterm strategy for combatingextremism.25 The Task Forces investigation of ISR operations today found a high degree of emphasis on missionsthatinvolvetherapiddefeatofterroristnetworksthroughtheeffectiveapplication of F3 tactics. The Task Force did not find a clear articulation of the desired balance between those missions and the missions that are specified in the McChrystal/Eikenberry campaign plan.26 The defense intelligence culture is evolving slowly to meet the demands of supporting multimodal, hybrid operations (and wholeofgovernment operations). That culture is primarily focused on targeteering and weaponeering to enable U.S. military forces to destroy enemy combatants and their warmaking capacity. In addition, DoD tradecraft and cultureseparatetargeteersandgeneralanalysts.Thereisinsufficientattentiontotheneedto provide intelligence support of complex operations and counteract hybrid, multimodal conflict. As the COIN problem becomes more strategic and prevalent, the expertise of operators needs to be more closely coupled with the general analyst and with analysts in fieldsrangingfromtargetanalysisandmissionplanningtothesocialsciences. Finally, the need to address COIN counterintelligence requirements requires more emphasis. Hard lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention other environments (from Algeria to Lebanon) underscore the sophisticated intelligence capabilities of insurgent movements. These capabilities provide insurgents the means to infiltrate government entities left of bang, to anticipate the military operations of the governments they fight,
25
TheNationalMilitaryStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,6.
26UnitedStatesGovernmentIntegratedCivilianMilitaryCampaignPlanforSupporttoAfghanistan.
3.TORTASKS
35
and to deploy technologies (including signals intelligence and imagery) in support of their own objectives. U.S. forces in Afghanistan have witnessed firsthand the ability of insurgents to conduct human intelligence operations. Press reports suggest that Hezbollah forces in Lebanon received Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and may have received Iranian support in their operation. Given these developments, U.S. COIN operations must include the ability to counter insurgency intelligence capabilities and maintainasustainedinformationadvantagethroughoutallphasesofCOINoperations.
3.2.2. MISSIONBASEDNEEDSSHOULDDRIVEEFFECTSBASEDISR
Conventional operations and CT generally require a more simple approach to intelligence than COIN. With kineticcentric operations, it is important to identify the target, develop precise coordinates and use an appropriate weapon to minimize collateral damage. With COIN,theintelligenceproblemismorecomplexanddrivesamoresubtlestrategicplanthat seeks an overall effect where the population impact of an action is important: how will the population react to the targets elimination, will they react differently to the method (e.g., moresensitivetodronemissilestrikesthansniperfire),willtheoperationnegativelyimpact a local political balance, how will it affect future HUMINT information gathering relationships? COIN ISR does not have an identifiable endpoint in terms of collection. With CT, ISR assets are reallocated once the target is identified and engaged upon. With COIN, ISR continues over an indefinite period of time to understand the behavior of an individual, group, or population and assess how behavior changes as the COIN campaign unfolds.27 This patternsoflife development is anintelligenceintensive effort. Furthermore, the range of intelligence needed to be effective is drastically broader for COIN, including intelligence dependent on cultural factors that cannot be provided by overhead sensors alone. As the commanders emphasis shifts from conventional operations to CT and to COIN, ISR needstoshiftfromtargetcollectionmanagementtoeffectsbasedmanagement.WithCOIN, ISR becomes more complex and the analyst is required to understand and merge more and more diverse data sources to fully understand the impacts and consequence of a COIN operation. Further, intelligence analysis is driven toward a populationcentric approach where the centers of gravity, as perceived by the population, must be identified and understood in order to assess the true impact of an emergent event to derive meaningful information to inform decisionmakers. To accomplish this, Collection Management (and, ultimately Mission Management) needs to shift toward meeting needbased requirements where users describe a need to the intelligence enterprise that it is tied directly to security, governance, or economic components of a COIN campaign plan and where Collection Managers then
27
The Task Force observes that group can denote different entities. For example, while groups in Iraq are often characterized in terms of religious and ethnic affiliation, village groups in Afghanistan appear more relevanttopopulationanalysis.
planacoordinatedISRstrategyforachievingadesiredeffect,thatis,theneededknowledge to execute a component of the COIN plan. This shift forces a more dynamic relationship between the user, enterprise, and collection platform, and drives a coordinated effort across intelligence agencies that goes beyond simple targeting missions that can typically be described as the F3 mission of CT. Figure 6 below illustrates this difference and how that leads to a different set of questions that must be answered by the intelligence collector and analyst. The process flow on the left is used more commonly and the flow on the right is whattheTaskForceviewsasneededparticularlyinacomplexCOINcontext.
FIGURE6.DESIREDCHANGEINISRTASKINGPROCESS
Figure 6 captures the key changes needed but is simplistic. A more desired end state is illustratedinFigure7.
FIGURE7.EFFECTSBASEDISRTASKINGPROCESS
By focusing efforts toward achieving an effect, multiplatform collection strategies will be refined, the intent of the user will be satisfied, and inappropriate ISR requests caused by lack of user knowledge on ISR capabilities is nullified. Effectsbased ISR enables analysts to be more innovative and creative in developing collection strategies and fusing multiINT
3.TORTASKS
37
data streams. To free up the analyst to problemsolve and strategically plan, automated methods must be developed (or improved) to focus the analyst more quickly on questionableactivityandautomatedtoolsbuilttoaccomplishroutinebookkeepingtasks. A feedback mechanismis critical to successful effectsbased ISR to assure user intent is met. Ideally, this feedback mechanism involves a realtime communications link between the user, analyst, and collector to facilitate immediate reattack of a target deck while the platform is still in the area of interest. This realtime collaboration also allows the folding in ofemergentopportunitiesofhigherprioritytotheuser.
3.2.3. AFORMALAPPROACHTONEEDBASEDANALYSIS
It is important to allocate ISR resources based on a rigorous portfolio management process thatbalancesdesiredoperationalneedstodayandthoseanticipatedinthefuture.COINISR requirements should be seen in the context of the full spectrum of irregular warfare ISR requirements. In addition, COIN ISR requirements should be seen in the context of the ISR requirements for hybrid, multimodal security operations. The Task Force believes that there is substantial overlap in theISR resources required along this spectrum. However, the budget process has failed to recognize COIN operations as distinct from CT, CIED and other irregular warfare requirements. This caused the ISR requirements process to skew against, and in some cases, overlook important COINrelated ISR capabilities, resulting in anunderinvestmentofPhase0andPhase1COINoperationISRrequirementsastheyrelate to incipient insurgencies and populationcentric security operations. Applying a formal portfolio management approach would ensure a more rigorous and transparent process by which ISR resource allocations can be made in support of COIN and all other interrelated modesofsecurityoperations. Such a process can be applied at a number of echelons from, for example, a specific ISR missionplan,tothePEDprocess,totheoverallISRmissionarchitecture,ortostrategylevel for major ISR acquisition decisions. In each case, the key is to start with the objectives and determine the best option rather than the more tempting practice of starting with the familiar option. As noted in a previous DSB report, the use of formal decisionsupport approaches (including systems analysis and operations research) can aid in the development of an ISR portfolio, as well as in the selection of specific resources to achieve specificpurposes.28 FollowingsuchanapproachwillhelpensurethatthecomplexityofCOINISRrequirements is fully appreciated, and that these requirements are given proper attention in the resource allocation process. Such an approach can help balance COIN and other requirements, and allowISRresourcestobeacquiredandmanagedinthecontextofthewiderrequirementsof amorecomplex,wholeofgovernmentapproach.
28
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Intelligence Operations Research Applications for Intelligence, Surveillance,andReconnaissance(Washington,DC:DefenseScienceBoard,January2009).
3.3. TORTASK3:WHATCHANGESCANBEMADEINTHEISRPROCESSTO IMPROVESUPPORTTOCOIN?

As noted previously, there exists an increasing emphasis on the use of a populationcentric approach to defeating insurgencies and improving the likelihood that the governments the U.S. supports will gain the respect and allegiance of the populations they intend to govern. However, the current ISR process does not reflect this approach, focusing instead on the needtoachievekineticeffects. This current, traditional approach will continue to be an important part of the nations approach to COIN. At the same time, ISR approaches and resources must also address the need to support populationcentric strategies to COIN. The Task Forces recommendations include the need to better balance ISR resources between both missions, where priority is given to troops in combat and then shifts back to the populationcentric aspects of COIN when combat ends. If more resources are applied to COIN left of bang, fewer resources mightbeneededlaterforbothapproaches. Consequently,theTaskForcesresponsetothisTORquestionisframedintwoways: Discussionsthatrelatetophysicalphenomenologyassociatedwithtraditional counterinsurgencyoperationsaspracticedtodayinAfghanistan;and Discussionsthatrelatetotheapplicationofsocialsciences,largelyinthecontextof wholeofgovernment,populationcentricapproachestoCOIN.
3.3.1. ISRSUPPORTTOTRADITIONALCOINACTIVITIES
There appears to be no effective overarching, interagency COIN strategy, commitment, or coordination mechanism, despite the mandate by government leaders to adopt a wholeof governmentapproach.COINoperationsappeartobeassignedtoDoDbecauseofitsgreater capacity to meet the COIN challenge than other government agencies. Other USG entities (e.g.,DoS,USAID,Treasury,Commerce)donothavetheresourcestocarryoutthismission today; nor do they have the perception that COIN is among their primary responsibilities. The Task Force raises these points to describe the environment in which the IC finds itself andthenatureofthecustomerdemandsplacedonit. One of the implications of this situation is that there exists a lack of defense intelligence emphasis on operations planning and support for Phase 0 shaping and deterrence activities (see the earlier discussion on the phases of insurgencies in Section 3.2.3). The defense intelligence community is understandably focused on support of ongoing combat operations. Intelligence resources are allocated to support current operational priorities rather than Phase 0 shaping and deterrence activities in other areas of the world. Operational planning that drives intellectual effort and capability requirements for future
3.TORTASKS
39
contingencies was deemphasized because of the demands of current operations and a planningprocessthatdoesnotfocusonthepreventionofinsurgencies. The relatively low priorities assigned to covering the early phases of insurgencies (when insurgentsareestablishingtheirdominationofalocalpopulationorestablishingthemselves attheexpenseofagovernmentssovereignprerogatives)havehadaveryrealimpactonthe effectiveness of intelligence to warn of insurgent threats. For example, if an analyst has an innovative idea on how ISR might be applied to identify the early stages of an insurgency where not much is happening, the analyst must first link the concept to an existing CommandersCONOP;otherwisenothingwillgetdone.Inthefield,ISRassetsaresoscarce thattheyareallocatedtolocationswherethingsareknown,ratherthanplaceswherethings arerelativelyunknown.Intelligenceanalystsdiscoveredthroughpainfulexperiencethatthe lack of activity in an area does not mean there is nothing of interest about which to be concerned. In 20042005, for example, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) intelligence analysts were providing allsource analytical support to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)76. Two brigades were deployed in the east of Afghanistan (one north and one south). The Taliban attacked every night in the east, so all of the limited ISR assets were allocated to track the enemy there. This meant that the interior of the country went largely uncovered, and as a result, during this period analysts missed how the insurgents wererebuildingthemselvesthere. Tohelpremedythisproblem,regionalcommandsshouldsetasidesomeportionofassetsto focus on strategic changes that might be underway in regions where insurgencies are starting to take hold, even if there are few direct observations indicating that this is happening. The Task Force learned that those components of the IC responsible for COIN are constantly struggling to have some ISR resources available to track trends that are evolving over long periods of time as well as for discovering emerging threats (as opposed to only supporting tactical operations and force protection). Mission managers need to dedicate at least some resources to this strategic function and design a campaign plan that explains how these ISR assets would be used to inform the strategic components of the COINfight,evenifmostoftheresourcesarealignedwiththetacticalfight. Even if the problem of allocating collection assets to strategic issues is solved, the overarching problem of understanding collection requirements will remain, as a requirements template for COIN ISR does not appear to exist. The Task Force found that within the IC there was no formalized set of ISR requirements for COIN (specifically in Afghanistan) nor was there an attempt to disaggregate and assign them, identify the gaps, developmetrics,allocateresources,andaddressprogress.ItappearsthattheUSGIntegrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan was not formally addressed by the IC as an ISR requirements document, and ISR resources were not allocated necessarily to support it. More generally, the IC appears to have no structured requirements acceptance and management process for assessing, negotiating, acting upon, and overseeing a specific customers intelligence needs when they are expressed in terms customers understand,
rather than in terms familiar to the IC; that is, they are articulated in customerspeak rather than ICspeak. Some customers do not know how to communicate formally with the IC to ensure their requirements are addressed. As a result, COIN intelligence requirements are not materially impacting ISR collections. As evidence, the Task Force notes that the defense intelligence community has not translated the commanders intent as stated in the USG Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan into intelligence requirements to support COIN operations. Although this plan was promulgated to articulatethestrategyandtasksrequiredtoachieveU.S.andalliedCOINobjectives,thereis no associated set of intelligence requirements derived to support execution of the plan. Nor is there a standing template of intelligence requirements to support COIN operations in general. Looking at the problem from the ICs perspective, there are no mechanisms for systematicallyrecordingandfollowinguponthesatisfactionofintelligencerequirementsas they pertain to the different components of a COIN campaign. For example, the requirements database called COLISEUM does not provide the context behind requests for information. As a result, most requirements are levied outside the COLISEUM process throughoneononediscussionsandemails. To remedy this situation, the Task Force recommends that the DNI and the USD(I) undertake a comprehensive inventory of intelligence requirementsas they pertain toCOIN, including who originated the requirements, how they are recorded and distributed to the IC, the priority, and an assessment of how well the IC is servicing those requirements. Such an inventory should serve as the first step in developing a comprehensive, systematic process for guiding IC collection and analysis to support customer needs with respect to COIN. The information needs of COIN and other complex operations require a mix of collection capabilitiesfrommanyintelligencedisciplines.Currentmethodsforplanningandfinancing future conflicts are largely driven by planning for Major Combat Operations (MCOs). This leads to an imbalance of future investment weighted toward large collection systems. This includes wide area persistent surveillance capabilities, full motion video (FMV), signals intelligence(SIGINT),groundmovingtargetindication(GMTI),laserdetectionandranging, computer network exploitation, financial intelligence (FININT), document exploitation, HUMINT,andbiometrics.DoDfieldedandprogrammedavastarrayoftechnicalcollection capabilitiesthatcanbeemployedeffectivelytomeetthetraditionalCOINchallenge. HUMINT and Special Operations Forces (SOF) that are assigned in a particular country or region over an extended period of time are particularly valuable assets for collecting information to support COIN operations. Case officers and Special Forces personnel who are immersed in the language and culture of a particular society are critical sources for collecting information to keep a finger on the pulse of a population and support COIN operations. For example, the Marine Corps Expeditionary Intelligence Road Map (now in draft)
3.TORTASKS
41
highlights the need for archiving and modeling social dynamics within particular cultures; effectively bringing together the work of hundreds of analysts for use by the United States Marine Corps (USMC). This work must be encouraged and allowed to grow. But often this is not happening. One senior intelligence officer with years of field experience pointed out that mid level managers at major intelligence agencies do not encourage language training ortoursinthefield,andinsomecasesdiscouragethesealtogether.TheTaskForceoutlined throughout this report some recommendations, which if implemented in a sustained manner,willhelpimprovetheICsabilitytounderstandandreportonlocalcultures. In recent years the DoDs ISR collection investment necessarily focused on meeting the requirements of the current conflict, resulting in the procurement of a suite of sensors and platforms that are optimized for collection in desert and mountainous terrains. Moreover, these sensors are largely designed (and employed) to support F3 operations that are necessary for conducting CT and combat operations. This emphasis leaves DoD potentially short in the ability to collect in other types of terrain. (e.g. jungle) as well as other phases of the COIN mission (e.g., where insurgents may be starting to turn a population group). In addition, the mass of data being collected by the platforms and sensors currently in use is forcingtheneedtobuildamoreeffectivePEDcapability,onethatprovidesswifterforensics to examine and analyze antecedent activities, allows for allsource analysis, and makes better use of bandwidth and communication capabilities. Substantial efforts of DoDs ISR Task Force are underway to address this problem, but new PED systems and TTPs must be employed to handle the flood of new collection data. This will necessitate massive changes in culture to permit more automation, the discarding of less useful data, and the acceptance ofnewformatsofISRreporting. Within the current operational environment, there are few effective, temporallyacceptable methodologies for the integration (or fusion) of current levels of data streaming from the many spacebased, airborne, mobile, in situ, and terrestrial remote sensors, let alone real time integration. This impedes DoDs ability to leverage multiple, networked sensor/platform combinations in a timely fashion to achieve dominant situational awareness. This fusion problem will only be exacerbated by the flood of data from new collectionsystemsabouttobefielded. Efforts are underway to correct the massive problems of data access. The Information SharingIntegratedProductTeam(IPT),establishedundertheauspicesoftheUSD(I),forthe purpose of synchronizing information sharing initiatives in support of ISAF requirements and United States forces in Afghanistan, made substantial progress. However, the ISR Task Force should visit each of the main dissemination nodes (such as the Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS)) to determine the extent to which analysts there have the necessary tools to execute their basic COIN mission and make necessary quick fix investments to remedyshortfalls. In addition, the portfolio analysis approach described in the previous section would also help establish a better, shortterm portfolio and balance of ISR resources for current COIN
operations. Over time, expanded simulation, gaming, and field testing should be employed tosupportassessmentsofhowISRcollectionandanalysiscanbeimprovedasitappliestoa COIN campaign. For example, collection geometries of target areas are different for each region where insurgencies exist or could take root. For instance, Afghanistan is predominately rural, with high elevations, widely dispersed long and narrow settlements, andfewvehicles;whileIraqhasonelargedenselypopulatedurbanarea,wherevehiclesare attractivetargetsfortracking. To facilitate this simulation effort, DoD might consider modifying or constructing a test range in mountainous terrain designed to assess COIN issues. Such a range might include widelydispersed villages to facilitate and evaluate new collection and sampling strategies,aswellastotestalternativesecurityCONOPSandpolicies. Finally, there is no apparent formal IC process for assessing IC performance against a customers allsource requirements (i.e., metrics) specifically for COIN and measuring the opportunity cost for implementing such new requirements.29 Further, metrics that evaluateprogressoftheinsurgency,asseenfromtheviewpointoftheinsurgentleadership, are a critical and often overlooked intelligence requirement.30 This red perspective analysis must draw upon a deep understanding of the values and goals of insurgent leadership. A review of potential metrics for intelligence support to COIN should be undertaken by USD(I) (and perhaps the DNI) as part of an overall audit of intelligence requirements.
3.3.2. ISRINSUPPORTOFWHOLEOFGOVERNMENT,POPULATIONCENTRICCOIN INITIATIVES

Almost all definitions of COIN operations call for the involvement and constructive participationofthewholeofgovernment,withcivilianagenciesintheleadandthemilitary in a supporting role an approach outlined by the 2009 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. The active and constructive participation and leadership of allies, NGOs, a target nations legitimate government, and the affected population, as well as the military, working together based on a coherent strategy is the most likely path to achieving U.S. COIN objectives. DoD leaders should make the case for such a strategy and work with leaders of other agencies to create the capacity for a wholeofgovernment approach. ISR resource planning should take into account the needs of a wholeofgovernment approach, andtheneedtosupportDoDandnonDoDcomponents. In a similar vein, ISR resource planning should accommodate emerging populationcentric concepts as well. DoD has taken some steps in this direction. Studies on patternsoflife and
29 30
SeeAppendixEforexamplesofsuchmetrics. SeeAppendixFforsomeexamplesofinsurgentmetrics.
3.TORTASKS
43
the use of human terrain intelligence yielded operational benefits in recent COIN campaigns.ADefenseScienceBoard2006SummerStudynoted: Human terrain preparation will enable U.S. forces to better understand how individuals, groups, societies and nations behave, and then use this information to (1) improve the performance of U.S. forces and (2) understand and shape behaviors ofothersinpre,intra,andpostconflictsituations.31 The DSBs 2006 report, MG Flynns observations concerning Afghanistan, and GEN McChrystals efforts to bolster the use of these concepts underscore the need for more aggressive adoption throughout the DoD. The 2006 DSB report noted that Human Terrain Preparationshouldreceivepriorityattentionaswellasacontinuouslearningenvironment for training and professional military education.32 In spite of these recurring observations about the criticality of this kind of intelligence most DoD ISR assts remain illsuited to this kind of cultural, linguisticallybased sociological, anthropological collection and reporting. In some quarters, there exists resistance to the recognition that populationcentric approaches are useful, and that thesocial sciences necessary to enable these approaches can effectively contribute to COIN. In this regard, the following discussion addresses some of the needs and challenges facing DoDs ISR enterprise if it uses social sciences to more effectivelyaddresssomeoftheseunfulfilledrequirements. To be clear, research and analysis in the social sciences is far different from the legacy F3 missionsnormallyassociatedwithISR.However,ifDoDISRisnotpreparedtosupportthis researchandanalysis,howwillitgetdone?And,ifthereisaneedforgettingoutinfrontof insurgenciesbeforetheytakeroot,shouldtherenotbeaprocessinplacetoidentifyregional problems before they become full blown and require the massive cost of a military intervention? Seen in this light, investments in ISR analytical capabilities that employ the social sciences seem reasonable. However, the DoD has a long way to go before it has a meaningful analytic cadre that can produce these assessments. An informal survey at one agency revealed that analysts operated largely by induction, studying and gaining familiarity with a country/region, and specific instances of an event and its analogues. Very little, if any deductive analyses using standard research techniques from social science, anthropological, orpsychologicaldisciplineswereemployed. If DoD places a new emphasis on understanding sociopsychological and anthropological phenomena among societies affected or targeted by insurgencies, analysts will have to operate with a better balance of regional knowledge and theoretical/methodological
31
Report of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors (Washington, DC;DefenseScienceBoard,2006),xii. Ibid.,13.
32
competence.Theregionalexpertisewillcontinuetobeessential,butwillhavetogrowmore specific and deeper as a basis for understanding the customs, culture, values, and semiotics of a society to see the insurgents and insurgencyas well as coalition forces and actions through the populations eyes. The masterful and rigorous use of theory (e.g., of social adaptation, of governance and democratization, economic development, and group dynamics) will be necessary to help analysts understand and predict events beyond what is familiarorcoveredintheirexperience. If the IC wants to augment its expertise in social science and anthropological research techniques for use in COIN campaigns, it must rely on colleges and universities to train futureanalystsinhowtoethicallygatherandprocessdatafrompopulationsthataresubject to insurgencies. However, academia is illequipped to do this and is likely to be pre disposedtolookatthismissionwithambivalence. Academic ambivalence in military matters has deep roots. The American Anthropological Association(AAA)andotherelementsofthesocialsciencesdisciplinestendtoavoidefforts inwhichtheirresearchisusedtoenablecoerciveactivities,suchasmilitaryoperations.Asa result, social scientists tend to avoid situations in which their work may be structured explicitly to support those operations. The AAA appears aware, however, of the potential utility of the work of social scientists in understanding environments important to U.S. national security. This study recognizes the importance of social scientists research and the utilityofthatresearchtohelpplannersunderstandtheenvironmentsinwhichtheyoperate. Thenatureofthedebatetakingplaceamongsocialscientistswashighlightedbytheworkof theCommissionontheEngagementofAnthropologywiththeU.S.SecurityandIntelligence Communities. The Commission looked at the work of the Armys Human Terrain System (HTS)andconcludedthat: While we stress that constructive engagement between anthropology and the military is possible, (the Commission) suggests that the AAA emphasize the incompatibility of HTS with disciplinary ethics and practice for job seekers and that it further recognize the problem of allowing HTS to define the meaning of anthropologywithinDoD.33 Additional engagement between social science practitioners and the IC will be necessary if COINistogainfurtherbenefitfromtheuseofthesedisciplines. In addition, a University Department Head noted to the Task Force that most colleges and universitiesarenolongerinterestedinsupportingsocialscience,anthropological,economic, or even political science research on those regions in which insurgencies take root. Today, academic interests are on the consequences of globalization, on applying models based on
33
Final Report on the Armys Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program (Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and IntelligenceCommunities,14October2009),4.
3.TORTASKS
45
rational choice (decisions that are based on economic interests), and on the relationship between state and nonstate actors. Area studies departments have largely been closed down,inpartbecausefundingdriedupandinpartbecausemodelsofhumanbehaviorthat are currently in favor treat cultural, religious, or regional affiliations as largely irrelevant. 34 The lack of academic disciplines with a regionalfocus is a major reason why MG Flynn issuedacallfortheintelligenceequivalentofDoDsAfghanHandsProgram.35 Enlisting the aid of nationally recognized experts in psychological assessment of individual differences,theDoDandtheICcouldassesstheiranalyticcorpsonthesedimensionsforthe purpose of selecting and assigning analysts to the COIN missions. By a similar token, educational psychologists and training professionals might aid in designing curricula and training modules to help analysts develop and enhance these capabilities. They could also design curricula for training intelligence analysts in cultural assessment using the latest scientificfindingsonculturaldynamicsandcomparativecultures. Colleges and universities have yet to sense a demand signal from the DoD (or the USG generally) for a major investment in area studies, whether on Afghanistan, Somalia, Indonesia, Mali, the Philippines or even those parts of India that are home to the Naxalite insurgents. At best, academia has created virtual area programs that represent a hodge podge of courses from existing departments (Economics, Social Science, Political Science, and the like), coupled to language training. This is not nearly enough. The absence of academic support for research and analysis on regional problems that could lead to future insurgenciesposesacrediblevulnerabilitytoU.S.nationalsecurityposture. Nonetheless, there exist pockets of excellence throughout DoD (e.g., the Defense Language Institute, USMC University) that provide very high quality and relevant training and education in the areas of language skill and cultural awareness for military personnel that are preparing for deployment or focusing on immediate defense priorities. That said, DoD and its primary feeder, academia, lack the capacity to meet the demand for people with advanced language skills and cultural awareness for the current conflict. The shortcomings are even greater for the many languages and areas of the world where the next COIN situationmightoccur. The Task Force recognizes that the U.S. Army has made great efforts to incorporate social science andbehavioral science intoCOIN planning via theHTS. The HTS was developed in response to gaps in commanders and staffs understanding of the local population and culture, and its impact on operational decisions; and poor transfer of sociocultural knowledgetofollowon units.TheHTSapproachistoplacetheexpertiseandexperienceof social scientists and regional experts, coupled with reachback, opensource research,
34
Chinaareastudiesarethetypicalexceptiontothisrule.
35 AFPAK Hands (APH) program is located within the Joint Staff PakistanAfghanistan Coordinating Cell (PACC).ThepurposeoftheprogramistodevelopacadreofAFPAKsubjectmatterexperts.
directly in support of deployed units engaging in fullspectrum operations. This program is the first instance in which social science research, analysis, and advising has been done systematically, on a large scale, and at the operational level. Human Terrain Teams advise brigadesoneconomicdevelopment,politicalsystems,andtribalstructures;trainbrigadesas requested; and conduct research on topics of interest to the brigade staff. However, further development and application of ISR capabilities rooted in the social sciences will require a better understanding of the concerns of practitioners in these fields, ways to address their concerns,andmorerigorousanalysisofdatagatheredinthefield. As good as these initiatives are, the IC still has a long way to go to prepare its analysts to answer thequestions pertaining to COIN that are asked of them. The Task Force found that intelligence components in the field often adhere to preferences in analytic tradecraft that can get in the way of addressing populationfocused COIN issues. Some of these tradecraft preferencesinclude: Placing more stock in quantitative methodological rigor over qualitative local knowledge; A tendency to misinterpret culturallycoded signals within the broader intelligence chatter; Apreferenceforinputmetricsratherthanresultsorientedoutputmetrics;and Implicitly accepting Western concepts of statebuilding, which prompts a focus on topdown institutional structures rather than a bottomup approach of societal indicators.
Each of these preferences is familiar in one degree or another to the seasoned intelligence officer and in many ways is perfectly reasonable given, for example, the experience that analysts bring to the job and the understandable desire to rely on specific, quantifiable data in order to get it right. But these preferences can lead to very real shortfalls in preparing assessments that address the populationcentric issues of COIN. Understanding population behavior and determining who has power and who does not often has an historical basis that requires a greater depth of knowledge of a village, district, or province than can be acquired through the snapshots of village life gleaned from traditional intelligence sources.Somethingmoreisneeded. As useful as the HTS was in supporting operations directed against the insurgents, it was lessuseful inthosemissionsfocusedonsecurity requirementsoflocalvillagers,governance issues, and social control, particularly in Afghanistans villagecentric environment. What seems to be missing is a structured approach to documenting and analyzing trends in the behavior of population groups at the local level and understanding how villagers organize to govern themselvesin effect using social control assessments to explain how each political actor influences the behavior of population groups to support both attack planning
3.TORTASKS
47
and civil initiatives; and to measure and affect a governments capacity to govern legitimatelyatthelocallevel.ThisproblemisparticularlyevidentinAfghanistan. This shortfall was illuminated by one scholar who conducted extensive field research in Afghanistan, identifying and diagnosing the inherent tensions between Community Development Councils (CDCs) and customary organizations at the village level (village elders, mullahs, and government representatives). CDCs, which are promoted at the nationallevelbytheMinistryofRuralRehabilitationandDevelopment,facilitatetheflowof resources at the local level. However, they also can have the effect of creating parallel structures of governmental control that may not be accepted by the local population. This researcher concluded that decentralized state building, not under the control of a national ministry, would actually improve the prospect for state development and would provide a moreeffectivepathforcounteringinsurgents. Despite best efforts, critical gaps remain in the USGs knowledge about why people join insurgenciesandwhytheychoosetoleave.ThiscriticalquestionofwhyrequirestheUSG to develop a deeper understanding of cultural dynamics that can only come through field researchdoneonasystematicbasiswithsocialsciencetechniquesandprocedures. The DoD needs to understand how to gather information on local attitudes and beliefs. Polling firms know how to do this. The DoD should understand how they go about gathering information, how they understand and assess the environment, and their process for sharing that data. The DoD can reach out to private sector firms as well as social science researchers in academia (a good model for doing this is, for example, the Rich Contextual Understanding Project sponsored by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,TechnologyandLogistics(AT&L)). A foundation on which to build does exist. The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program representsaresourcethatmeritsadditionalinvestment.FAOscanbringtoCOINoperations in all phases, deep understanding of the populations and geographic elements subject to insurgent and COIN operations. FAOs, however, are seen to suffer from a lack of career prospects, given their deep specialization. Effective COIN planning and ISR would benefit significantly from a strengthened FAO cadre, one that rewards sustained specialization in regionsandcountriesinwhichU.S.interestsareatstake. All of this will take time, but some important steps can and should be taken in the near term. To that end, the Task Force proposes a measured approach that would help lay the frameworkformovingtowardawholeofgovernmentsolution: The USD(I), in collaboration with the DNI, should develop a strategic plan for developing links and processes to both the academic community and the USG civilian agencies, specifically to rally resources for populationcentric counterinsurgency efforts intended to forestall active insurgencies. This strategic planwouldhaveasitstopprioritythefollowinggoals:
o DoD and the government generally should increase investment in social science disciplines (anthropology, ethnography, human geography, sociology, social psychology, political science, and economics) to inform a wholeofgovernment approach to understanding local cultures and customs and to support future COINcampaigns. Similar investments should be made in both basic and applied field research, followingtheguidelinesofthespecificacademicdiscipline. In the near term, improve cultural intelligence by adopting best practices across DoD intelligence components. The USD(I) should take a detailed look at the Marine Corps Expeditionary Intelligence Road Map (and other, similar initiatives) to determine which elements of cultural training, social science modeling, and databasearchivingcouldbeadoptedbythelargerIC. DoD should establish a long term commitment to grow area studies expertise by funding programs and endowing area studies chairs at academic institutions nationwide. This recommendation will be even more effective if it is accompanied by a supporting infrastructure that provides field researchers with thetoolsandtechniquestoassesslocalgovernanceandeconomicconditionsand tointeracteffectivelywithlocalpopulations.
o o
3.TORTASKS
49
3.4. TORTASK4:WHATCANBEDONEINTHEIMMEDIATEFUTURETOIMPROVE
NETWORKAGILITYANDINFORMATIONSHARINGACROSSTHEBROAD SPECTRUMOFMISSIONPARTNERSCONDUCTINGCOINANDDURINGTHE PROMOTIONOFREGIONALSTABILITY?
3.4.1. THECURRENTSITUATION
A multiplicity of ISR platforms supports U.S. intelligence collection activities around the globe today. The numbers and variety of sensors and platforms are steadily increasing, especiallyinAfghanistan.Moreover,DoDhasfieldedandprogrammedacquisitionofavast array of technical collection platforms and capabilities that can be employed effectively to address collection support for irregular warfare. Because ofthe immediacy and criticality of the current conflicts, DoD has not balanced technical collection capabilities with the PED required to more broadly make sense of the data and employ it effectively to support the operationallevelplanningandexecutionacrossallphasesofCOINoperations. The DoD is also seeing a dramatic growth in the variety, velocity, and volume of data collectedbydefenseISRplatforms.However,therapidincreaseofcollecteddatawillnotbe operationally useful without the ability to store, process, exploit, and disseminate this data. The programmed expansion of broad area, full motion video and other advanced sensors will further exacerbate this problem. Communications bandwidth remains an operational constraint both for pushing intelligence out to the tactical edge and for reach back from the theater of operations. Current collection generates data that greatly exceeds the ability to organize, store, and process it. Moreover, this PED gap will grow quickly as new platforms andsensorscomeintouse. This deficiency results in serious missed opportunities for the nation. First, these processing shortfalls limit the Departments ability to use that data to answer a commanders existing Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and other important requirements, especially for historical and trend analysis, and for any questions that would benefit from automated (or even semiautomated) fusion of massive, noisy, data. Second, these massive data are collected around the world using a wide range of observational phenomenon. It is entirely possiblethatthedatathatendsuponthefloorcouldbeusedtoimprovetheU.S.sability togeneratefoundationdataaroundtheglobe. Another major impediment in the current processing shortfall is the shortage of cleared personnel proficient in the languages and cultures of interest. The shortfall becomes more pronounced when considering high risk regions that are not currently the center of attention. In consequence, the defense intelligence community does not have the foreign language and culture depth and breadth necessary to plan and support COIN operations. Foreign language proficiency is essential to gain perspective and comprehend the thinking and values of foreign political cultures. The shortage of foreign language skills adversely
affects, among other things, the exploitation of HUMINT, SIGINT, and document exploitation. The DoD is only beginning to make investments in enterprise level planning and execution of the intelligence information infrastructure so that oversight is provided and Services are held to standards. The recently created Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E) is a step in the right direction. In addition, Servicespecific data sharing networksmustbecomeinteroperablewithothernetworksanddatamustbediscoverable. Finally,dataonCOINcollectedby intelligencesystemsarenotaccessiblesufficientlybythe civilian and coalition components that need it. At the policy level, security rules and classification of information prevent sharing. At the technical level, the networks of allies and NGOs are often incompatible with U.S. systems, thereby limiting connectivity even when policy challenges are overcome. The USD(I) Information Sharing IPT has outlined some 400 specific findings that should be translated into action in areas that cover dissemination and discovery, using metadata to facilitate information sharing, achieving common security standards, supporting a Battlefield Information, Collection, and Exploitation System (BICES), augmenting support to foreign disclosure procedures, and improvingknowledgemanagementresources.Onespecificpositiveexampleofinformation sharing that is being put into place under USD(I) auspices is UnityNet. UnityNet seeks to encourage a selfsustaining, open sharing environment that provides open source data sharing for NGOs, coalition partners, and intelligence analysts alike. UnityNet is an environment where unclassified information can be pushed and shared without the constraints of classified networks. It also affords a mechanism to reach out to populations subject to insurgencies and provide them access to the global community via the Internet, therebyaddingameasureofstabilitytoafflictedregions. The need for information sharing is challenged by recent experience with information releases through WikiLeaks. Nonetheless, better security measures (including the use of stronger cybersecurity techniques and counterintelligence practices) can enable wider information sharing without exposing sensitive information to unauthorized dissemination and exposure; complex COIN operations simply cannot succeed without rich information sharing.
3.4.2. IMPROVEMENTSINTHEIMMEDIATEFUTURE
It is important to recognize the intensity of the resource limitations under which the DoD is operating, the growing severity of these limitations, and the enormous costs to sustain current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The Task Force is aware of the demands of operational commanders for additional support in terms of more and more collection platforms and sensor systems. Given these intense pressures, it is difficult to imagine undertaking fundamentally new initiatives in the immediate future. However, improvements modest in their cost can be undertaken immediately. These improvements include more use of systems analysis, operations research, and planning efforts to improve the efficiencies of TTPs and limited ISR resources, and better interService coordination to
3.TORTASKS
51
achieve efficiencies in interoperability of Servicespecific systems. The Task Force strongly endorses the work of the ISR Task Force in improving the PED situation in the light of the coming enormous growth in collection data, and in responding as best they can to the demands of operational commanders. Training of ISR personnel particularly interactive training wherein trainers can learn efficiencies from students who have relevant practical experiencecanalsobeusedtoimproveperformancewithcurrentorfewerresources. ISR commanders should reassess the balance between need to know and need to share in their own commands to ensure that the right intelligence is placed in the hands of all the people who need it, and arbitrary security restrictions are waived locally when required for successfulcompletionofthemission. The Task Force recognizes that dealing with insurgencies will also require access to a wide rangeofinformationthattypicallyisnotderivedfromtraditionalintelligencesources.These sourcesofinformationwouldinclude,forexample,socialsciencedatadevelopedfromfield research,datacollectedbycivilianreconstructionteamsthataredeployedaspartofaCOIN effort, or data published in open source or by third parties (medical personnel, religious leaders, local business leaders, law enforcement, etc.). Mechanisms to collect, store, process, andsharethesedatawillbeneededtoenableCOINmissions. Finally, to whatever degree is possible in the nearterm, ISR officers should take the time and expand their efforts to become more knowledgeable in the human terrain and cultural features of their areas of responsibility in order to be more responsive to operational commanders. This knowledge will enable them to provide those supported commanders a richer understanding of the situation an understanding that includes the context in which decisionmustbemadeaswellasthenumbersofthingsinthearea.
3.5. TORTASK5:WHATEMERGINGTECHNOLOGIESANDMETHODOLOGIES, COMBINATIONSOFSENSORS,ANDINVESTMENTSININFORMATIONFUSION ANDANALYSISARELIKELYTOPROVIDETHEHIGHESTPAYOFF?

Section 1 of this report provides an illustrative list of countries that represent a wide spectrum of different potential COIN environments. When considering the ISR capabilities neededforpopulationcentricoperations(toincludeCT,COIN,FID,SO,andUW),planners must take into account this wide range of different environments. Nevertheless, there are a number of ISRrelated technologies, methodologies and bodies of scientific knowledge that prove useful in support of different TTPs, at different operational phases, over different geographies,andinverydifferentkindsofpopulationcentricoperations.Theopportunities to advance these capabilities by expanding scientific and technical frontiers would ultimatelyyieldbenefitsjustaswidely.
3.5.1. COMPUTATIONALSOCIALSCIENCES/SOCIALNETWORKANALYSIS
All populationcentric operations require not only the ability to positively identify individuals within the population, but also to understand social structure in terms of the social relationships among the population. In the process of protecting the population from nefarious actors, various counternetwork operations must be undertaken. In order to conduct these efficiently, and without unnecessary collateral damage, social network analysis driven by the computational social sciences is critical. Advancing the frontiers of socialscienceandtechnologythroughadditionalinvestmentwouldhavehighleverage. While these social networks can be derived in many ways, and through many different methodologies, increasingly the Internet and social media are critical sources of social network analysis data in societies that are not only literate, but also connected to the Internet. Monitoring the blogosphere and other social media across many different cultures and languages is emerging as a critical dimension of the computational social sciences and socialnetworkanalysis.Investmentinsuchactivitiesiswarrantedinordertobepreparedto dealwithpopulationcentricoperations.Itisimportanttonote,however,thattheusefulness of this data is linked to the ability to employ the social sciences for its analysis, to spot meaningfultrends,andtoderivevalidhypothesispertinenttoCOINchallenges.
3.5.2. BEHAVIORMODELINGANDSIMULATION
There is a major shortfall in the availability and maturity of modeling and simulation capabilities that support the planning, rehearsal, execution, and evaluation of population centric operations. This shortfall crosses every dimension of the modeling and simulation value chain. The biggest gaps exist in the analysis tools that would support plan development for Phase 0 operations. These tools include valid models that emphasize the economic,diplomatic,andsocialinterventionsthatcouldpreventanascentinsurgencyfrom
3.TORTASKS
53
maturing. Social simulations such as multiagent simulations show promise in this area but require further investment. Required investments should include foundation data on populations, human networks, geography, and other economic and social characteristics.36 Humanintheloop simulations are beginning to be fielded to support very basic cultural training in support of the current conflict. However, these simulations do not generalize to other environments and require further investment to make them useful for the next potentialconflict. The key characteristic of COIN is its populationcentric orientation. One tool to better understand and anticipate the actions of a population is behavioral modeling and simulation.Thekeychallengestothisare: 1) Modeling strategy matching the problem to the real world: Difficulties in this area are created either by inattention to the real world being modeled or by unrealistic expectation about how much of the world can be modeled and how close a match betweenthemodelandworldisfeasible. 2) Verification, validation, and accreditation: These important functions often are made moredifficultbyexpectationsthatverification,validation,andaccreditation(VV&A) as it has been defined for the validation of models of physical systems can be usefullyapplied. 3) Modeling tactics designing the internal structure of the model: Problems are sometimes generated by unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the social, organizational, cultural, and individual behavior domains, and sometimes by a failure to deliberately and thoughtfully match the scope of the model to the scope of thephenomenatobemodeled. 4) Differences between modeling physical phenomena and human behavior dealing with uncertainty and adaption: Problems arise from unrealistic expectation of how much uncertainty reduction is plausible in modeling human and organization behavior, as well as from poor choices in handling the changing nature of human structures and processes. 5) Combining components and federating models: Problems arise from the way in which linkages within and across levels of analysis change the nature of system operation. They occur when creating multilevel models and when linking together more specializedmodelsofbehaviorintoafederationofmodels.37
Andreas Tolk and Lakhmi C. Jain, eds., Studies in Computational Intelligence, Vol. 168, Complex Systems in KnowledgeBased Environments: Theory, Models and Applications, Principles for Effectively Representing Heterogeneous Populations in MultiAgent Simulations, by Daniel T. Maxwell and Kathleen M. Carley (New York,NY:Springer,2009):199228.
36 37 Greg L. Zacharias, Jean MacMillan, and Susan B. Van Hemel, eds., Behavioral Modeling and Simulations: From IndividualstoSocieties(Washington,DC:TheNationalAcademiesPress,2008):3.
The Department would benefit from more basic and applied research in automated tools and techniques that reason with massive amounts of data including unstructured text. Such work would support the creation of a social radar sensor whose output could be fused with more traditional sensor outputs to more efficiently and effectively improve population focused situational awareness. There are a number of efforts currently underway that show promise in this area. Two examples, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) and the Office of Naval Researchs (ONR) Human Social Culture Behavioral Modeling Program (HSCB) represent attempts to exploit unstructured data.38 Although these efforts and others do not yet meet immediate operational needs, they represent the promise this data may hold in addressing theCOINchallenge,bothinthenearfutureandinthelongterm. Finally, technology can also be employed to understand what is normal in a particular environment,thushelpingspottrendsthatrepresentanomaliesthatmayportendlongterm changesandtheriseofinstability.
3.5.3. NATURALRESOURCEMONITORING
Increasingly, populationcentric operations will be needed in nascent resource conflicts, whether based on water crises, agricultural stress, environmental stress, or rents to be achieved from precious mineral resources. Understanding agricultural and hydrological dynamics via remote sensing, terrestrial monitoring and predictive modeling could be essentialtounderstandingincipientorstabilizingsocialdynamics.Acropfailureor awater crisis could precipitate insurgency, or undermine hard won stabilization efforts. Environmental distress that could undermine traditional industry (dependent on fishing, and the like) could do the same. To foresee such crises allows commanders and decision makers to allocate resources that might prevent a widespread population crisis and resultantinsurgency. Such crises, of course, are often driven by rapidly growing populations which outgrow the natural carrying capacity of the land they occupy. Population bulges are being observed in many unstable geographies as a key factor in driving instability. Monitoring population demographics as an organic part of the natural resource framework is key in anticipating difficultsecuritysituationsbeforetheyhappen. Also,understandingmineraldepositswithinaregioniscritical.Theymustbeunderstoodin terms of the global mineral/mining industrys understanding, as they establish the market and market price for such resources. They must also be understood in terms of the local powerbrokers understanding, as they could be used to instigate security crises that provide them tactical advantage over such resources. Rare earth minerals could be geopolitical flashpoints in regions of the world where vulnerable populations are used as
38
MichaelMaybury,SocialSensing,HumanSocialCultureBehavioralModelingProgram(Summer2010):6.
3.TORTASKS
55
pawns.Monitoringsuchminerals,andeventheimpactoftheirmining,onthelargernatural resources/population dynamics framework is critical to ward off unnecessary population centricoperations.
3.5.4. OVERHEADVIDEOSURVEILLANCE
Overhead video surveillance is one capability that is widely applicable across the entire spectrumofpopulationcentricoperations.However,itisclearthattechnologicalchallenges related to persistence, spatiotemporally coincident multiphenomenological collection, and realtime PED (including communication) limit the effectiveness of overhead video surveillancewithregardtoparticularclassesofpopulationcentricrequirements. Not all overhead FMV is the same, certainly in terms of its applicability to population centric operations. Different combinations of sensors, platforms, communications, and PED can provide different fields of view, different resolutions (both natively and at the point of exploitation), different geolocational accuracies, different phenomenological crosssections (ElectroOptical (EO), Infrared (IR), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)/GMTI, Spectral, SIGINT, etc.), different levels of persistence, and different degrees of timeliness. Earlier forms of FMV offered a narrow field of view, moderate resolution, poor geolocational accuracy, phenomenologically simple (EO only) data, with little persistence, but with real time data downlink. This constellation of capability required that multiple FMV assets be coordinated, either to maintain persistence as each platform completed its feasible on stationdwelltime,ortotrackmultipletargetsdispersingfromagivensurveillancelocation. Whether dealing with targeted kill/capture operations, or monitoring human dynamics within a population, commanders are demanding longer persistence, wider field of view, better resolution, better geolocational accuracy, and multiple phenomenologies, all with realtimedownlink. CapabilitiessuchasDARPAsArgusarecertainlymovinginthisdirection.However,Argus is a platformagnostic sensor package, which has observational characteristics that are bound to the achievement of airborne persistence at a certain altitude. Persistence, then, requires advancement in airborne platforms that offer the kind of size, weight and power (SWaP) characteristics needed to achieve long dwell. Persistence of such a capability (or even of more than one such capability in a given airspace) also then requires high bandwidth communications solutions that fall outside of the traditional RF domain, as battlefield spectrum is increasingly saturated. Persistence over such a wide area field of view requires computerassisted tracking of both vehicles and dismounts, as otherwise the exploitationofthisdatawillbehumanintensive,andwillnotscale. Consensus appears to exist for the achievement of such a persistent, wide field of view, highresolution, geospatiallyaccurate, multiphenomenology, realtime downlinked overhead surveillance capability with a computeraided tracking solution. This capability would be of use across operational phases and across different kinds of populationcentric operations. Yet, it would require not only substantial technological leaps, but also the
commoditization of such technology, if the defense and intelligence communities are to effectively (and costeffectively) field the needed number of combat air patrols (CAPs) of suchacapability.
3.5.5. IMPROVEMENTSTOCHARACTERIZINGTERRAIN
Whenconductingpopulationcentricoperations,missionplanning,rehearsal,andexecution all depend upon the availability of humanscale terrain data particularly when operations are arrayed over urban and complex terrain. Both LiDAR and SAR technologies have been harnessed in order to generate large volumes of terrain data of such scales, though many scientific and technical limitations prevent such terrain data from becoming ubiquitous. Older photogrammetric techniques are still viable when stereo imagery is available, but achieving humanscale terrain models of useful post spacing or better is still a technical challengewithcommercialsatelliteimagery. Such terrain data is of great value in augmenting full motion video processing, which often requires highresolution base imagery and terrain data in order to be properly registered. It isalsocriticaltoeffectivelygeolocatingSIGINTatahumanscale. Technologies for extracting 3D features from such high resolution terrain data have been developed under DARPA and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) efforts,buttherearestillconsiderabletechnologicalhurdlestobeovercomebeforeaLiDAR or SAR collect can be transformed in nearreal time into an actionable missionplanning, rehearsal, and execution dataset. The management of such data (for instance the LiDAR .las point cloud with gridded terrain surfaces, 3D feature data, and behavioral data must be imputedtothesefeatures,e.g.,doormovements)isatechnologicalfrontieritself,whichwill requireconsiderablework. In the end, the realization of a force structure capable of succeeding at the full spectrum of populationcentric operations will require the existence of high resolution 3D terrain data overtheextentofthispopulation,andanyadjacenthavensfornefariousactors. The value conveyed by traditional ISR phenomenologies is highly dependent upon the availability of foundational data of the requisite scale, over which the ISR data can be arrayed. In the case of COIN ISR, this foundational data includes humanscale data of the physical and built terrain. In general, the ability of ISR assets to successfully support COIN dependsontheavailabilityofsuchfoundationaldata,whichisoftencollectednotbytheIC, butbythetopographicengineeringcommunity.
3.5.6. PROCESSING,EXPLOITATION,ANDDISSEMINATION(PED)
Too often, PED is used as a monolithic catchall category to address everything beyond a sensor and platform. This often serves to obscure the actual technology, policy, and tradecraft challenges that face the effective use of a particular sensor for a particular
3.TORTASKS
57
mission. Often, the term PED is narrowly applied to the realms of imagery intelligence (IMINT) (including FMV) and SIGINT, providing inadequate focus to the challenges posed byatrulycrossorganization,multimission,multiINTrequirement. Different aspects of PED and some persistent technical challenges in the realm of PED are addressedbelow.
3.5.6.1PEDCloudComputing
Within the DoD and IC, there exists a lack of cloud computing capability (e.g., processing and storage) available on the key warfighting networks (e.g., SIPRNet, JWICS) for the deployment of ISR PED both at the tactical edge and within backoffice datacenter environments. Cloud computing offers the potential to gain resource efficiencies in a number of services (storage, processing, analytic applications). Secure cloud architectures areemergingthatmaymeritdeploymentbytheDoDandIC.
3.5.6.2PEDSpatioTemporal
The critical process of data fusion fundamentally requires a consistent spatiotemporal framework for organizing and indexing the data flowing from each intelligence and operationaldatasource.WhileitisnowwidelyrecognizedthatSIGINTismademuchmore powerful when geolocated and exploited with the coincident geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) (e.g., IMINT, FMV, Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G), human geography, etc.), it unfortunately has not been recognized that data from all INTs and operational sources would be much more valuable (particularly in support of population centricoperations)whenmanagedandfusedwithinacommonspatiotemporalcontext.All data and analytic products should be discoverable, browsable, and accessible both spatially and temporally. This would provide a PED that offers critical context to operators and analysts attempting to make sense of new incoming streams of data. Only then can PED infrastructureshelpoperatorsandanalyststounderstandthestory.
3.5.6.3PEDCrossDomainandClassification
There is an unhealthy redundancy with which data is hosted across the national security community.Dataisbeingoverclassifiedbyplacingitonnetworksofahigherclassification than the data. Combat commanders are invested with the authority and discretion to adjust the classification of data as needed in support of operational exigencies, however the complexityandrigidityoftheirinformationsystemsmakeitdifficulttogetelectroniccopies of these data from one domain to the other. The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) was established to mainstream Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 503 PL4 and PL5 cross domain solutions that could reduce unnecessary redundancy and generate
more efficient data release/declassification.39 However, theUCDMO has had less impact on the crossdomain capability of everyday networks then is needed, and further effort and priorityshouldbeappliedinthisarea.
3.5.7. HUMANTERRAINDATACOLLECTIONANDMANAGEMENT
There are still enormous challenges in the realm of human terrain data management. Standardized and wellaccepted data schemas have yet to be developed for use in various deployed capabilities, particularly schemas that are temporallyenabled, allowing operators andanalyststotrackchangeovertime,andeventounderstandhistoricaldynamicsthatare relevant to present data human dynamics. Perhaps most importantly, human terrain data is largely not managed geospatially. Spatiotemporal management of human terrain data is key to effective commander decisionsupport. Mission planning, rehearsal and execution of populationcentric operations fundamentally requires that the human terrain be arrayed across the high resolution 3D physical and built terrain. Without this, military commanders andotherUSGleaderscannotexpecttosuccessfullyengageinanIntelligencePreparationof theBattlefield(IPB)likeprocessthatcouldsupportpopulationcentricoperations. Other social science frameworks, such as behavioral theories from anthropology and sentiment observation strategies (from polling and survey disciplines) also have important implications for the development of human terrain data management solutions. In the end, however, all such social science frameworks must support spatiotemporal encoding and analysisifitistorealizeitspotentialtocommanders,operators,anddecisionmakers.
3.5.8. TERRESTRIALSENSORWEBS
Inpopulationcentricoperationsofallkinds,itisimportanttocloselymonitorwhatisgoing on over large tracts of land. However, in some cases, the achievement of persistence over a particular environment may not be feasible. Even if feasible, there is additional observational power that can be drawn from the deployment of distributed sensorwebs of mobile,insitu,andremoteterrestrialsensorsarrayedacrossalandscape.40 While defense/intelligence research and development (R&D) investment resulted in standardsbased frameworks, such as the Open Geospatial Consortiums Sensor Web Enablement (OGC SWE) web services architecture, relatively little investment has been
IntelligenceCommunityDirectiveNumber503:IntelligenceCommunityInformationTechnologySystemsSecurity,Risk Management, Certification and Accreditation (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, September15,2008).
39
The 2004 Summer Study dedicated an entire chapter to identification, location, and tracking in asymmetric warfare (153), which noted that surveillance of people, things, and activities required to populate the databases needed for identification, location, and tracking will require persistence beyond that typical of many of todays ISRsensors.
40
3.TORTASKS
59
made in ensuring that all Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED) have implemented OGC SWE interoperability specifications, in addition to legacy ApplicationProgramInterfaces(APIs).TheachievementofOGCinteroperabilityingeneral, and OGC SWE interoperability in particular, would have enormous mission benefits, ensuringthateachspacebased,airborne,mobile,insitu,andterrestrialremotesensorcould be accessed as webaccessible services which can flexibly be redeployed and re orchestrated in support of new mission challenges. As populationcentric operations must adapt as the people adapt their behavior, it is important to have all kinds of ISR assets available for use outside of their particular TCPED stovepipes. Interoperability of each sensor at the network level is important, but interoperability of each sensor as a web accessible service that complies with international, industrydriven, governmentsponsored technicalstandardssuchasOGCSWEisevenmorevital.
3.5.9. BIOMETRICS
In all phases of dealing with insurgencies, positive identification is necessary to effectively separate insurgents from the regular population. Historically, such positive identification was achieved by provisioning identification documents which were easily forged until the inclusion of rudimentary biometrics such as a finger print and/or photograph. As various forms of biometric technology emerged, positive identification has come to depend upon multiple forms of biometric authentication such as fingerprints, retina scans, and DNA samples. Great strides have been made in the realm of biometric measurement, storage and recall. However, distributing multiform biometric authentication technologies to the point of service of the most basic administrative processes has yet to take hold, undermining positive identification at critical junctures. In some cases, biometric enrollment has been used,butidentificationcardshavenotbeenprovisionedbasedonthisbiometricenrollment. Moreover, there is often a lack of a larger identification infrastructure which might tie identity to all an individuals transactions. Only when each individual entity can be resolved, and all transactions are tied back to each unique entity, can the necessary positive identificationbeavailablefortheconductofpopulationcentricoperations.
3.5.10. NATURALLANGUAGEPROCESSING
Inliteratesocieties,andparticularlyinconnectedsocieties,analystsandoperatorswilloften be faced with large volumes of textual data that they must tackle in the course of their operations.Themoreconnectedtheyare,themorelikelythisdatawillcomeindigitalform. Whilenaturallanguageprocessingtechnologiesforthematicclusteringandentityextraction have become quite mature for English, they are less mature in many of the languages used inareasoftheworldthatarelikelycandidatesforpopulationcentricoperations.
3.5.11. OPERATIONSRESEARCH
As COIN intelligence requirements are defined, enormous challenges emerge as to their realization.HowcanISRresourcesbeoptimizedagainstsuchadynamicchallenge?
Operations Research (OR) is the application of advanced analytical methods to help make betterdecisions.41ORhascontributedtomilitaryandISRissuessinceitsinception.Asearly as 1942, the first president of the Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS), Phillip Morse, organized the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG) for the US Navy who were faced with the problem of Nazi German Uboat attacks on transatlantic shipping. That Morses group was an important factor in winning the war is fairly obvious to everyone who knows anything about the insideofthewar,wrotehistorianJohnBurchard.42 While the current challenges are certainly unique, one must draw upon the lessons learned on how to apply OR to ISR challenges. Previous deliberations of the Intelligence Task Force oftheDefenseScienceBoardonjustthissubjectfoundthatOperationsResearchrepresents a powerful tool to help improve the quality of investment decision making by illuminating key issues, assumptions, and sources of information yet Operations Research is applied inconsistently throughout the Defense and ISR communities and each lacks standard OR processes and practices, and consistent organizational models or commitments.43 This is stillthecase.
3.5.12. CROSSDOMAINTECHNOLOGIES
Though it is often stated that information sharing is more of a policy, cultural or leadership issue,andlessofatechnicalissue,theDoDandIntelligenceCommunityisstillveryanemic in its use of ICD 503 PL5 cross domain security technologies that would allow data to flow more readily across security domains (of course, based on security markings). Mission environmentsarestilldominatedbycollidingnetworks,eachofwhichhasslightlydifferent security caveats that prevent information sharing, or make it prohibitively difficult. In recent years, substantial technical leaps have been made in cross domain technologies, removing the traditional bandwidth bottlenecks. Interesting implementations of such technologies have enabled email from multiple security domains to arrive in a single high side inbox, even with the ability to seamlessly reply. The widespread application of such crossdomaintechnologieswouldvastlyimproveinformationsharing,andhasthepotential forvastcostsavingsintheareaofnetworkexpenditures.
41 For a summary of operations research as a field of practice, see: http://www.informs.org/About INFORMS/AboutOperationsResearch. 42
JohnBurchard,Q.E.D:MITinWorldWarII(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1948):92.
43 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Intelligence Operations Research Applications to Intelligence, Surveillance,andReconnaissance,3.
4.FINDINGSANDRECOMMENDATIONS
61
4. FINDINGSANDRECOMMENDATIONS
Section 3 conveys detailed observations and findings concerning a wide range of issues. This section provides the Task Forces most significant summary findings, as well as pertinentrecommendations. 1. DoDlacksacommonunderstandingofCOIN. The lack of a single authoritative definition of COIN is impeding a common understanding and unified approach to COIN operations within the DoD and across the USG. AccompanyingthislackofdefinitionisamultiplicityofCOINCONOPS. Recommendation The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), in coordination with the Chairman, JointChiefsofStaff(CJCS),shouldpromulgateajointdefinitionofCOINanduseittocreate a common understanding across the DoD Components and the USG. As a starting point, USD(P) should consider the 2009 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, signed by the SecretariesofStateandDefense,andtheAdministratoroftheUSAID. 2. DoDhasassumedresponsibilityforCOINISRbydefault. Despite a national strategy and civilmilitary campaign plan that calls for a wholeof government, populationcentric approach to COIN, the USG is not employing all elements of national power in the planning and conduct of COIN operations. DoD has assumed responsibility for virtually all COIN intelligence requirements by default. Indeed, apart frombeingasignatorytothe2009U.S.GovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuide,theDepartment ofStatehasshownlittleevidentinterestinbuildingorsupportingthepartnershipdescribed bytheGuide.ThislackofpartnershipimpedesprogresstowardwiderapproachtoCOIN. Recommendation The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff should advocate the need for a comprehensive, wholeofgovernment approach to COIN with the National Security Council (NSC). The Secretary of Defense should look to the 2009 U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgencyasastartingpointforthisapproach. The (USD(I)) should work with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to provide policy, guidance, and resources that enhance national and departmental IC support for COIN. 3. DoD and IC officials tend to focus narrowly on airborne technical collection capabilitiesandsystemsratherthanonthewidercapabilitiesneededtosupportCOIN. Thisobservationissupportedbythefactthattechnicalcollectionplatformscommandlarger portions of the budget and produce more immediate effects rather than longer term, foundational information for populationcentric operations. The Task Force notes that
discussions with DoD senior officials regarding ISR for COIN turned frequently to the subject of technical collection systems and capabilities while excluding other collection sources (e.g. OSINT, HUMINT) and PED issues. The Defense Science Boards Summer Studyof2010notedthatin2009DoDrepresented62percentoftherequirementsforOSINT, but provided only 3 percent of OSINT funding.44 The lack of attention to OSINT is buttressed by the reports finding that in 2009 DoD had only 14 percent of the ICs OSINT manpower, and funded that proportion largely through Defense budget supplementals.45 Overall, these problems tend to exclude valuable sources of social and behavioral science data,includinghumangeography. Recommendation The USD(I), in coordination with the Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Service intelligence chiefs, should ensure policymakers, planners, warfighters and other users understand the breadth and depth of defenseISRrequirements,shortfalls,andcapabilitiesnecessarytosupportCOINoperations moreeffectively.Thisrecommendationcouldbebestimplementedbyasingleauthority,for exampletheproposedNationalIntelligenceManager(NIM)forIrregularWarfare/COIN. 4 ISR capabilities have not been applied effectively against COIN operations that deal with populations in part because a comprehensive set of intelligence requirements for COINdoesnotexist. The defense intelligence community has not translated those aspects of commanders intent dealing with COIN into intelligence requirements, though the United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan describes in detail the need to focus on population security, governance, and economic development. The reasons for this apparent reluctance to engage on this issue are varied, but one key reason is that intelligenceagencies,atleastthoseintheWashingtonD.C.area,tendtobereactive,waiting for questions to be asked, rather than trying to anticipate them. This approach may be too conservativeinaperiodofrapidsocialchange,promotedbyinstantcommunications. Recommendation The defense intelligence community should develop a set of highlevel intelligence requirements for COIN that encompass the need to support current and nearterm operations, as well as populationcentric and wholeofgovernment approaches to COIN. In doing so, the defense intelligence community should look to the 2009 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, as a starting point for doctrine that can be used to drive highlevel
44 45
ReportoftheDefenseScienceBoard2010SummerStudyonEnhancingAdaptabilityofU.S.MilitaryForces,66. Ibid.
63
requirements. This recommendation could be best implemented by a single authority, for exampletheproposedNIMforIrregularWarfare/COIN. Inaddition,seniorintelligencemanagersshouldhavethenecessaryexperiencetoanticipate the needs of their customers. So as part of this recommendation, the Task Force suggests thatseniorintelligenceofficers(SES,O6)serveforwardforaperiodoftimeas,forexample, a Deputy J2 or a Fusion Cell Director. Even if for only shorter deployments (i.e., 3 to 4 months at a time) this would be worth doing. These officers, having had this experience, would be able to drive intelligence analysis and support back in Washington, DC to anticipateproblemsandfindcreativesolutions.TheDoDshouldbepreparedtodothisona consistentbasisoverprolongedperiodsoftime(yearsifnecessary). 5. The USG is not investing adequately in the development of social and behavioral scienceinformationthatiscriticallyimportantforCOIN. Many, if not most, specific COIN ISR requirements are populationcentric and are not exclusively solvable with hardware or hard, physical science S&T solutions. One senior intelligence officer with years of field experience pointed out that 80 percent of useful operational data for COIN does not come from legacy intelligence disciplines. Good intelligence on COIN exists outside the traditional intelligence organizations. Anthropological, sociocultural, historical, human geographical, educational, public health, and many other types of social and behavioral science data and information are needed to develop a deep understanding of populations. Such data, collected and analyzed using the scientificmethod,isvitaltoCOINsuccess. Recommendation The DoD and IC should undertake discussions with authoritative representatives of the social sciences (e.g., the American Anthropological Association) to develop concepts by which the social sciences can be employed to gain sufficient understanding of the environments in which COIN operations might take place. DoD and the IC should develop and implement a program to support academic institutionsnationwidein building research capabilities regarding countries and regions in which COIN operations might take place. DoD should build a stronger Foreign Area Officer program and more favorable career prospects for officers who engage in sustained country and regionspecific specialization. TheUSD(I),USD(P),USD(AT&L),andtheDNIshouldjointlydevelopthiscapability. 6. ISR support for COIN is currently overshadowed by CT and force protection requirements In real terms, ISR support of COIN is not as high a priority for the Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies as CT and force protection, adversely impacting the effectiveness of COIN operations. COIN is not necessarily an alternative to CT;someISRrequirementsarecommontobothkindsofoperations,butCOIN,particularly populationcentricCOIN,requiressomeISRofitsown.
Recommendation TheUSD(I)shouldensuretheMilitaryIntelligenceProgram(MIP)andNationalIntelligence Program(NIP)intelligenceresourcesareallocatedtoenhancesupportofCOIN. TheUSD(I),incoordinationwiththeUSD(AT&L),USDComptroller(C),AssistantSecretary of Defense for Special Operations / LowIntensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SOLIC&IC), and the DNI should ensure that the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and the U.S Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are acquiring the ISR capabilities identifiedinthisstudytosupportCOIN. 7. COIN ISR has not been addressed early in the conflict spectrum and has not sufficiently included a wholeofgovernment approach. The lack of focus on incipient insurgencies limits options and increases risk of unrecoverable COIN problems, despite thecommitmentofmajormilitaryforces. Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949. Despite that fact, following the Vietnam War and through the balance of the Cold War, the U.S. military establishment turned its back on insurgency, refusing to consider operations against insurgents as anything other than a lesserincluded caseforforcesstructuredforandpreparedtofighttwomajortheaterwars.46 Historical studies of insurgencies over the years highlight the fact that insurgencies are more likely if a state cannot provide fundamental services and if the population believes they are at risk. In addition, other factors, such as the quality of leadership in a particular country and that countrys political culture can be important factors in whether or not an insurgency develops. The Task Force does not propose that any specific combination of factors will result in an insurgency. Nonetheless, recent history can be instructive. Colombia,forexample, hasbeengrippedbyatenaciousinsurgency,andthedrugtradehas imperiled that governments ability to govern effectively. Colombias strong political leadership,however,hasmadeeffectiveuseof U.S.securityanddevelopmentassistance,as wellasthepoliticalanddiplomaticsupportofU.S.leaders.Asaresult,theU.S.hasnotbeen compelled to commit substantial U.S. forces to combat an insurgency and defend the sovereign prerogatives of Colombias government. In contrast, the years leading up to 9/11 witnessed little U.S. government involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, U.S. information sources in Afghanistan were limited, which constrained U.S. potential to help shape in Afghanistan a situation less dangerous to U.S. interests. Theevents of9/11 leftthe U.S. with few options in Afghanistan; combat a regime that allowed the terrorists to attack, or live withadangerousstatus quo.TheTaskForcethereforejudgesthatearlyinterventionpriorto an insurgency taking hold would give the U.S. more options and reduce the likelihood of majorcombatintervention.47
46 47
Paul,etal.,VictoryHasaThousandFathers. SeeKalevI.Sepp,BestPracticesinCounterinsurgency,MilitaryReview(MayJune2005).
65
InlightofthisrecorditistheviewoftheTaskForcethatirregularwarfareandinsurgencies will be an enduring challenge to regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Emerging and enduring COIN issues need attention now. Addressing potential insurgencies in their incipient phase (i.e., left of bang) will provide policymakers and commanders more wholeofgovernment options and a better prospect for deterring or preventing the need for combat operations. Building a collection and analytic effort left of bang also provides the means for sustained, consistent, and more effective ISR support should an insurgency become active. This makes necessary a more focused approach to COIN intelligence support, including a NIM for COIN, intelligence requirements directed specifically to COIN (including populationcentric knowledge), and a strategic indications andwarning(I&W)modeltoenableearlyimplementationofwholeofgovernmentoptions. SomeI&Windicatorsareprobablyalreadyavailable. Recommendation The USD(I) should work with the DNI to create a NIM for Irregular Warfare (including COIN) USD(I), in coordination with the DNI, develop a comprehensive Indications and Warning systemforCOIN a. Effective COIN, and intelligence for COIN, must reflect a wholeofgovernment effort andwholeofgovernmentcapabilities. As noted in the 2004 DSB Summer Study, the U.S. requires the means to transition into an out of hostilities. Nowhere is this need more salient than for COIN. Addressing the entire lifecycleofCOINrequiresknowledgemanagementcapabilitiesthatserveawidevarietyof U.S. Government departments and agencies (DoD, Department of State, the Intelligence Community, etc.) A NIM for COIN would be able to facilitate efficient and effective intelligence support to COIN enabling a knowledge management capability that supports wholeofgovernment efforts and which would encourage use of a broader range of informationsourcesthatgobeyondlegacyintelligencecollection. Recommendation There exists little appetite for new government departments and agencies, despite the need tobuildandemploycapabilitiesfor COINtheU.S.doesnotyetpossess.However, building a wholeofgovernment intelligence capability for COIN (and other COIN capabilities) can be facilitated by creating a virtual community of COIN experts from throughout the government, and possibly beyond the government to the academic world. Information technology exists today to build virtual communities of experts. Such technology can be used to build a community of COIN experts that could constitute, a Governmentwide, criticalmassofplanningandintelligenceexperts.Buildingsuchavirtualcommunitywould also provide a wider group of experts to identify I&W pertaining to COIN scenarios more swiftly than is possible today. Some of these technologies have already been employed by the ODNI. The use of these technologies would be a swift way to assemble the critical mass
of experts needed in a manner consistent with the governments emphasis on using enterprise information technology to make more effective and rational government components. The NIM for COIN could start this virtual community, given access to sufficient enterprise information technologies and infrastructure. In doing so, however, the NIM should include the widest possible community of potential experts throughout the IC, and at all levels. As a further step the NIM could advocate the standup of an Institute of Intelligence for Behavioral Analysis that focuses on performing advanced analysis of group andsocialnetworksinregionssusceptibletoinsurgencies. TheTaskForcerecognizestheimportanceandmeritoforganizationalandprocesssolutions that would integrate all departments of government to support COIN campaigns as recommended in the 2004 DSB Summer Study. The Task Force applauds this goal, and in light of the painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, sees the need as more urgent than ever. The Task Force also recognize however, it is beyond the its charter which focuses on improvementstoISRforCOIN.48 8. The deluge of sensor data is creating a crisis in processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and associated communication, as well as an increasing need for advancedanalysisthataddressesbehaviorofgroupsandtheculturalframeworkofgroup decisions. The insatiable demand for information and emphasis on collection is producing a deluge of data,overwhelmingtheabilitytoprovideuseful,actionableintelligenceinatimelymanner. This crisis in PED is being exacerbated by planned and programmed collection assets and demands new S&T solutions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ISR support for COIN. Moreover, there is a need to develop and train people to do Advanced Analysis and this mustbedonemuchearlierinthecareersofthebestanalysts.Thislevelofanalysisisneeded at the very front end of any future conflict, not several years down the road. Training for Advanced Analysis would start at the very beginning of an analysts career and continue throughouthis/hercareer.Itincludeslanguage,deepculturalawareness,andselectformsof environmental training which encourages and supports analysis on the health of a region. Analystsneedtomakeprogresstounderstandtheculturefirsthandandtheyneedtoreturn to critical assignments within their intelligence agency. More and more, the analysts will need to be placed in the field in order to be best postured for intelligence operations and conflictsastheyarise.
TheTaskForcealsoconsideredtherecommendationsofthe2009DSBstudyonhumandynamics.See:Reportof the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, March2009).
48
67
Recommendation The USD(I), in coordination with USD(AT&L), Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and DNI should create a focused PED initiative to make more effective its use of the increasingvelocity,volume,andvarietyofdata. Attheverystartofanynewcollectionprogram,theUSD(I)andtheDNIshouldensurethat PEDrequirementsarefullyunderstoodandfundedaspartoftheoverallprograminitiative. A number of technologies, ranging from better use of communication bandwidth to cloud computing,areavailabletosupportthisrecommendation. Moreover, the USD(I) and the DNI should implement a plan to develop and train the best people to do Advanced Analysis. Training for Advanced Analysis would start at the very beginning of an analysts career and continue throughout the career. It should encompass language, deep cultural awareness, and select forms of environmental training which encouragesandsupportsanalysisonthehealthofaregion.Analystsinthisprogramwould goforwardtounderstandaculturefirsthandandthenreturntocriticalassignmentswithin their intelligence agency, posturing the IC for intelligence operations and conflicts as they arise. 9. New and emerging technologies and techniques can be employed to improve understandingofCOINenvironments. Technologies are emerging, for example, to improve understanding of the physical attributes (mineral resources, climates, geographies, including cultural geography) as well as those pertinent to identifying pattern of life activities of groups and individuals, and relate theseattributes to incipient and real insurgencies. New analytic technologies hold the promise of scaling up the ability to filter raw data, identify meaning patterns of activity, and present analysts with material useful to understanding COIN situations, thus allowing analysts to perform real analysis, rather than exhaust themselves culling raw data. Technology can also be employed to understand what is normal in a particular environment, helping to spot trends that represent anomalies that may portend longterm changesandtheriseofinstability. Recommendation The USD(I), through the ISR Task Force, should undertake acquisition of these technologies and integrate these technologies into wholeofgovernment approaches to COIN. The USD(I) should focus on the acquisition of those technologies for which development has alreadyoccurredorhasalreadyadvancedsignificantly.TheUSD(I)shouldalsoemploynew technologies for data fusion, natural language processing, and information sharing to build amoreholisticapproachtounderstandingandanalyzingCOINenvironments.
5. COSTCONSIDERATIONS
The adjustments associated with the findings and recommendations described in Section 4 represent a significant change in the manner in which intelligence support to COIN operations is considered. These adjustments give additional emphasis to building the infrastructure associated with regional and countryspecific research and the social sciences. Such costs, while not negligible, would be hardly material in comparison to the costsassociatedwithtechnicalcollectionsystems. Nonetheless, this report does not represent a rigorous effort to derive the costs of implementing these recommendations, nor does it attempt to enter the trade space in which investment in these capabilities would be offset by savings associated with cuts to current capabilities. Although there exists broad recognition that COIN represents a whole ofgovernment and populationcentric challenge, specific intelligence requirements associated with meeting this challenge have yet to be developed. The notional list of countries provided in Section 1 represents a possible starting point for crafting a transition in intelligence requirements from todays approach to COIN to the emerging population centric approach advocated by MG Flynn and others. At the core of that transition lays the changeinrequirementsthatwouldmakepossibleamorepreciseestimateofcosts. However, cost savings are almost certain. Populationcentric approaches (that rely on populationcentric intelligence) would significantly reduce the likelihood of costly, major combat operations. Building a national infrastructure of country and regionspecific experts, reinvigorating the Foreign Area Officer program, and establishing COIN intelligence programs within the major intelligence agencies would represent a fraction of thecostofamajormilitaryinterventiontocounterafutureinsurgency.Thecostsassociated with improving portions of PED are also relatively modest. Cloud computing and virtualization technologies are now available commercially, and the IC is already experimentingwiththesetechnologies,aswellaswithcommercialdatacentertechnologies. Indeed, a Federal effort underway now to consolidate data centers may prove instructive toward consolidating and rationalizing the use of information technology for information sharingandcollaboration.
APPENDIXA.TERMSOFREFERENCE
69
APPENDIXA.TERMSOFREFERENCE
APPENDIXB.TASKFORCEMEMBERSHIP
71
APPENDIXB.TASKFORCEMEMBERSHIP
COCHAIRMEN
Dr.RobertLucky Maj.Gen.RichardOLear,USAF(Ret.)
PrivateConsultant PrivateConsultant CentraTechnologies,Inc LockheedMartin JHU/APL U.S.GeospatialIntelligenceFoundation KaDSCI,LLC GlimmerglassNetworks PrivateConsultant TechnologyStrategies&Alliances MITRECorporation PrivateConsultant CSC ANSER PrivateConsultant OUSD(I)/PP&R,ISRPrograms DefenseScienceBoard DefenseScienceBoard OUSD(I)/PP&R,ISRPrograms(Scitor) SAIC SAIC
MEMBERS
Mr.TomBehling Mr.MarcBerkowitz Mr.JackKeane Mr.KeithMasback Dr.DanMaxwell Mr.KeithMay Mr.KenMcGruther Mr.HowardSchue Dr.LesServi Dr.ChrisTucker Mr.SamuelS.Visner
SENIORREVIEWERS
Dr.RuthDavid Dr.BillSchneider
EXECUTIVESECRETARY
Col.JohnJScottWinstead,USAF
DSBSECRETARIAT
Mr.BrianHughes Maj.MikeWarner,USAF
SUPPORTSTAFF
Mr.JimmyHyatt Ms.TammyjeanBeatty Ms.AmelyMoore
APPENDIXC.BRIEFINGSRECEIVED
Briefer
Mr.CollinAgee Mr.DonAlexander TheHonorableCharlieAllen ColFritzBarth,USMC Mr.ChrisBaumgart Mr.WinstonBeauchamp Mr.BertBerliey Dr.JenniferBrickMurtazashvili Mr.LarryBurgess LTGRonaldBurgess Dr.KathleenCarley Mr.MarkClark Mr.RobertClemens Mr.RichComfort Mr.JoeCzika Ms.DaviDAgostino Mr.AlDiLeonardo Mr.ThomasFerguson MGMichaelFlynn,USA Dr.KerryFosher Mr.AlexGliksman Mr.JeffGreen Mr.JimmyGreene
Organization
NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) LockheedMartin
NationalSecurityAgency(NSA) TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity/AppliedPhysicsLab (JHU/APL) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) GraduateSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs, UniversityofPittsburgh DeputyUnderSecretaryofDefense,HUMINT, Counterintelligence,&Security,USD(I) Director,DefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA) CarnegieMellonUniversity Director,IntelligenceAnalysis,CollectionandOperations ChiefofNavalOperations AirForceResearchLab(AFRL) NationalGroundIntelligenceCenter(NGIC) SecurityStrategiesandApplicationsInternational,LLC U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO) SKOPE UnderSecretaryofDefenseforIntelligence(Acting) AwaitingAssignmentatODNI USMCCenterforAdvancedOperationalCulture Learning SecurityStrategiesandApplicationsInternational,LLC OSDGeneralCounsel NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA)
APPENDIXC.BRIEFINGSRECEIVED
73
Briefer
CAPTJamesHamblet,USN COLSharonHamilton COLDerekHarvey,USA(Ret.) Mr.RichHaver Mr.ChuckHavener Gen.MikeHayden,USAF(Ret.) MAJTrevorHough,USA Prof.KarlJackson Dr.DanKaufman Mr.DenisKaufman Mr.TimKelly Lt.Gen.CraigKoziol,USAF Mr.HowardLarrabee Dr.BobbyLaurine DirectorLetitiaLong Mr.EdwardLoxtercamp Mr.JimMartin Dr.MarkMaybury GENStanleyMcChrystal,USA(Ret.) Mr.TomMcCormick Mr.KevinP.Meiners
Organization
JointStaffPakistanAfghanistanCoordinationCell DirectorHumanTerrainSystemsTRADOCG2 DirectoroftheAfghanistanPakistanCenterofExcellence atU.S.CentralCommand
SecurityStrategiesandApplicationsInternational,LLC
Director,SKOPE Director,AsianStudiesandDirector,SoutheastAsia StudiesatJohnsHopkins DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA) DefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA) OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicy (OUSD(P)) Director,ISRTaskForce NationalSecurityAgency(NSA) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) Director,NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) ISRTaskForce AssistantDeputyUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPortfolio, ProgramsandResources(ADUSD(PP&R)) MITRE
NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) DeputyUnderSecretaryofDefense(acting)forPortfolio, Programs&Resources,OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryof Defense(Intelligence) NationalGroundIntelligenceCenter(NGIC) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity
Mr.PaulMeinshausen Mr.OrrinMills LTCJohnNagl,USA(Ret.)
Briefer
Mr.RandolphNunes Mr.SeanOBrien Mr.JohnOrem Mr.JohnOswald Maj.Gen.JimPoss,USAF Dr.RichardRees Lt.Col.FrankRuggeri,USAF Dr.PeteRustan Mr.JohnScali Ms.JeanShepherd Ms. LisaSpuria Dr.LarryStotts Mr.NeilTipton TheHonorableMikeVickers Mr.PatrickWarfle Mr.PaulWeise Dr.LintonWells Dr.MichaelWertheimer Ms.MicheleWeslanderQuaid Mr.KevinWest Mr.ShaunWheeler Mr.JeffreyWhite Ms.LynnWright Mr.RyanYoho LTGRichardZahner,USA
Organization
NationalGroundIntelligenceCenter(NGIC) DARPA Director,ISRProgramsDivisionOSD(CA&PE) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) AssistantDeputyChiefofStaff,USAFIntelligence, Surveillance,andReconnaissance CENTRATechnology,Inc. ISRTaskForce NationalReconnaissanceOffice(NRO) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA) ISRTaskForce AssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSpecialOperations/Low IntensityConflict,andInterdependentCapabilities NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) NationalDefenseUniversity(NDU) NationalSecurityAgency(NSA) ISRTaskForce DefenseIntelInfoEnterprise(DIIE) NationalGroundIntelligenceCenter(NGIC) NationalSecurityAgency(NSA) DefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA) ISRTaskForce U.S.ArmyDeputyChiefofStaff,G2
APPENDIXD.SOMEUSEFULCANDIDATEMETRICS
75
APPENDIXD.SOMEUSEFULCANDIDATEMETRICS49
Metrics for understanding progress in a COIN campaign can be divided into four categories, based on the four key elements in any counterinsurgency: the population, the supported (host nation) government, the security forces (military and police), and the enemy.Aselectionofpossiblemetricsincludesthefollowing:
Populationrelatedindicators
Voluntary reporting. The number of unsolicited tipoffs from the population, in relation to insurgent activity, can indicate popular confidence in the security forces and willingness to support the government. This indicator must be verified by assessingthepercentageoftipoffsthatprovetobeaccurate. IEDs reported versus IEDs found. Reporting of IEDs is an important subset of the voluntary reporting metric, because accurate reporting indicates that the population is willing to act voluntarily to protect the security forces. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) account for roughly 50% of ISAF casualties in Afghanistan. Yet approximately 80% of IEDs discovered are spotted through a basic visual check, often by an Afghan. Variations in the percentage of IEDs accurately reported by AfghansmaythereforecorrelatewithlocalsupportforISAFandthegovernment. Price of exotic vegetables. Afghanistan is an agricultural economy, and crop diversity varies markedly across the country. Given the freemarket economics of agricultural production in Afghanistan, risk and cost factors the opportunity cost ofgrowing acrop,theriskoftransportingitacrossinsecureroads,theriskofselling itatmarketandoftransportingmoneyhomeagaintendtobeautomaticallypriced intothecostoffruitsandvegetables.Thusfluctuationsinoverallmarketpricesmay be a surrogate metric for general popular confidence and security. In particular, exotic vegetables those grown outside a particular district and that have to be transportedfurtheratgreaterriskinordertobesoldinthatdistrictcanbeauseful telltalemarker. Transportation prices. Again, Afghanistans trucking companies tend to price risk and cost the risk of insurgent attack, IED risk, kidnapping or robbery risk, and the costs of bribes, kickbacks and other forms of corruption into the cost of transportation on the countrys roads. Thus, variations over time in the cost of transporting a standard load on a given route can indicate the level of public perception of security, and the level of corruption and criminality, along that route.
49
David Kilkullen, Measuring Progress in Afghanistan, (Kabul, Afghanistan: December 2009): 618, http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/Documents/Measuring%20Progress%20Afghanistan%20%282%29.pdf
Like all other indicators, variations over time are more significant than the absolute cost. Progress of NGO construction projects. Numerous NGOs are engaged in construction projects across Afghanistan, using local materials and labor. Unlike government projects (which the insurgents may attack on principle), NGO projects tend to go well when they have access to lowcost materials and an adequate labor supply, and they tend to suffer when costs rise due to insecurity. Thus, NGOs running multiple projects at different points across the country may have a fairly clear idea of security conditions and confidence levels, based on the degree of progressintheirprojects. Influence of Taliban versus government courts. Taliban mobile courts operate across much of the south and east of the country, providing dispute resolution, mediation andShariabasedruleoflawservicestothelocalpopulation,makingjudgmentsthat are enforced by local Taliban vigilante cells that operate much like insurgent police. Rule of law and locallevel governance has developed into a major insurgent focus over the past two years. Public willingness to seek, accept and abide by judgments from Taliban courts may indicate popular support for the insurgents, or it may simply reflect a default choice in the absence of an alternative for example, in districts where there are no local government courts (most of the south) or where traditional tribal courts have been displaced. The range of movement and number of cases heard by Taliban courts, compared against the number of cases brought in local government courts, may indicate whether the population sees the governmentortheinsurgentsasfairer,swifterormoreabletosolvetheirproblems. Participation rate in programs. More generally, both the government and the insurgents run a range of community programs, economic programs and political activitiesthatseekpopularparticipation.Therateofparticipationinprogramsvaries between villages and, within the same village, over time. While it is generally difficult to gauge participation in enemy programs with great precision, participationinAfghangovernmentorcoalitionprogramsiseasiertotrackandmay indicate the degree to which the local community perceives the Afghan government asalegitimateactorwiththeabilitytoaddressitsproblems. Taxation collection. A classical counterinsurgency metric is taxation collection, specifically the compliance rate with government taxation programs versus the rate of payment of insurgent taxes. In Afghanistan, while the insurgents have a robust, predictabletaxationsystemacrossmostofthecountry,thegovernmentdoesnotand collects hardly any taxes at the local level. By contrast, corrupt officials and police collect illegal tolls and taxes at checkpoints. Thus there is a threeway comparison: between insurgent taxation (where a high degree of local compliance indicates a highdegreeofinsurgentcontrol),governmenttaxation(wheretheemergenceofany fair and predictable system would represent an improvement in government
77
effectiveness) and illegal extortion (which indicates the level of corruption of key localofficialsandmaycorrelatetopopularrageanddiscontent). AfghanonAfghan violence. Unlike statistics that track violence against the coalition, AfghanonAfghan violence (whether caused by insurgent action, the actionsofgovernmentofficialsandsecurityforces,orcriminality)isagoodindicator ofpublicsecurity.Inareaswherethereisahighlevelof AfghanonAfghanviolence the population is very unlikely to feel safe enough to put their weapons down and join in peaceful negotiation or support for the government. Likewise, a spike in AfghanonAfghan violence in a particular area probably correlates to a drop in publicconfidence. Rate of new business formation and loan repayment. The number of new local businesses being formed each month, along with the rate of loan repayment to local moneylenders, can be an indicator of public confidence and economic growth. In Afghanistan the rate of smallbusiness formation is typically low, while the rate of repayment is usually fairly high. Both indicators, however, fluctuate in line with availability of capital and confidence in the future of Afghanistan. They also tend to vary markedly between urban and rural areas, and the contrasting numbers may serve as a measure of how public perceptions differ in the cities and larger towns, compared to smaller villages. The urban/rural divide is a longstanding social cleavage in Afghanistan, one that the Taliban has exploited in the past, and is worth trackingclosely. Urban construction newstart rate. Especially in urban areas, the rate of new starts on construction projects (especially residential housing and markets) can be an important surrogate indicator for popular confidence in the future. People who lack asenseofsecurityandanexpectationthatthefuturewillbebetterthanthepasttend to be less willing to invest in major construction projects. Like other indicators, fluctuations in the newstart rate over time may be more telling than the absolute numberofnewstartsinanygivenareaatanyonetime. Percentageoflocalpeoplewithsecuretitletotheirhouseandland.Landreformisa longstanding issue in many parts of Afghanistan. Land ownership was a major flashpoint in the SovietAfghan war, and back into the nineteenth century. In many areas there are complicated land disputes that are exploited by corrupt powerbrokers.TheTalibanhavesometimesactedasmediatorsandsoughttoresolve these disputes justly in order to further their influence, while at other times they have deliberately exacerbated and exploited land disputes to gain the allegiance of local people on one side of the dispute. A key part of public confidence and perceptionofstabilityishavingsecuretitletolandandotherproperty.Thereforethe percentageofpeopleinagivendistrictwhohavesecuretitletotheirpropertycanbe an indication of stability, whereas a large number of unresolved or powerlocked landortitledisputescanindicatepotentialforinstabilityandinsurgentexploitation.
HostNationGovernmentindicators
Assassination and kidnapping rate. The assassination and kidnapping rate of local officials, tribal elders, district notables and ordinary people in a district can be an indicator of instability. For example, a province where local subdistrict governors, police officials or other government representatives are frequently assassinated, or where there is a high turnover in local people in positions of authority, may be experiencing a concerted insurgent push to displace or destroy a local elite. In generalterms,ahighrateofthistypealsoindicatesahighdegreeofinstability,even in the absence of overt insurgent activity. Conversely however, a low assassination orkidnappingratedoesnotnecessarilyindicatethatadistrictisprogovernmenta district with a low assassination rate, that also produces low levels of voluntary reportingandhasalowviolencelevel,maysimplybeanenemydistrictthatisstable underinsurgentcontrol. Civilian accessibility. While military accessibility (discussed above) is not a good indicator of insurgent activity, civilian accessibility is a better measure. If local officialsareunabletotravelorworkinagivenarea,ormustdosowithanescort,or arefrequentlykidnappedorassassinated,orthelocalpopulationavoidsanarea,this tends to indicate insurgent or criminal presence. Even in the absence of insurgent violence directed at coalition forces or Afghan security forces, nogo areas for civiliangovernmentofficialstendtoindicateahighdegreeofinsurgentcontrol. Where local officials sleep. A large proportion of Afghan government officials currently do not sleep in the districts for which they are responsible district governorsmaysleepintheprovincialcapital,whilesomeprovincialgovernorssleep in Kabul or in their home districts in other provinces. In some cases, when a local officialdoesnotsleepinhisassigneddistrict,thismayindicatealackofsecurityand high threat, in which case the district is likely to be heavily insurgentcontested or even insurgentcontrolled. In other cases, the official may sleep with his own kin group in a different district out of personal preference, indicating that he may be acting as an absentee governor or may have been appointed as an outsider to controlthedistrict,ratherthanrepresentingit.Ineithercasetheofficialinquestionis less likely to be seen as legitimate and effective by the local population. Thus changes in this indicator may indicate changes in local perceptions of the government. Officials business interests. It is often useful to map officials business interests and those of their relatives and tribal kinship groups (ownership of companies, bids for coalitionorAfghancontracts,controloflocalproductionresources)againstincidents of violence and unrest in districts for which they are responsible. Determining these interests can be difficult (though the local population usually knows them) but can
79
be revealing incidents of violence against USAID construction projects, for example, may be insurgentinspired, or may simply reflect the efforts of an official, who owns a rival company, to undermine a project with a view to eventually taking itover.Anofficialwhosetribeorfamilyisapartytoalandorwaterdispute,orwho hasbusinessinterestsinaparticularpieceofland,mayalsobeanillegitimatebroker in the eyesof the local population, who may turn to the Taliban for relief. Likewise, officialswhoengageenergeticallyincounternarcoticsoperationsbutsimultaneously ownsubstantialpoppyfieldsinotherpartsofthecountrymaysimplybeeliminating theirrivalscropstofurthertheirowninterests.Adistrictbasedregisterofofficials assets, regularly updated, can therefore be a very useful tool for interpreting incidentsofviolence. Percentageofofficialspurchasingtheirpositions.Manylocalgovernmentofficialsin parts of Afghanistan gain their official positions through an informal (and illegal) system of patronage and nepotism, where they purchase their positions for a substantial sum, paid to a higherlevel official, often a relative. This system creates incentives for corruption, since these officials must now recoup their investment through extorting money from the population, and may have to pass kickbacks to their patron. They have essentially purchased a license to exploit, and over time government positions come to be seen as opportunities to fleece the population, ratherthantoserveAfghanistan.Obviously,thiscreatesenormousopportunitiesfor the insurgents to exploit. In a given district, therefore, a high percentage of officials owing their positions to the illegal purchase system tends to correlate with a high degree of corruption, and may correlate with higherthannormal willingness by the populationtocollaboratewiththeinsurgents. Budget execution. The rate of budget execution (how much of their allocated budget line ministries, provincial and central government officials, and local councils are actuallyabletospend)isapotentialindicatorforgovernmenteffectiveness.Districts where allocated funds are being spent in a timely manner are more likely to be receiving an adequate level of government services, local officials are likely to be more capable managers, the absorptive capacity of the local economy is likely to be higher, and corruption may be lower. Conversely, districts that do not execute their budget effectively may be suffering from poorquality officials, lack of economic capacity,andalesserdegreeofessentialservices.Coalitionunitsmayalsobeatfault the tendency to dump CERP funds on underperforming districts through block grants can generate the appearance of a shortterm quick fix, but can also have an addictive effect that causes local officials to sit on their own funds while letting the foreigners spend, and may create habits of dependency that ultimately undermine theeffectivenessofthelocaleconomy. Capital Flight. During the period of intense uncertainty in late 2009, as Afghans anxiouslyawaitedtheU.S.decisiononwhichstrategytoselectandwhetherornotto reinforcetheeffort,wesawmillionsofdollarsleavingthecountryonaweeklybasis,
as Afghans shifted their assets outside the country in expectation of instability and possible civil war. When this type of behavior spikes, as it did in late 2009, this may indicate a significant lack of confidence in the future and public uncertainty. Changes in the rate of capital movement outside the country may track closely with changes in public confidence, and hence in the credibility and legitimacy of Afghan governmentandinternationalcommunityeffortsintheeyesoflocalelites. Rateofantiinsurgentlashkarformation.Districtsthatareopposedtotheinsurgents but also distrustful of the government tend to have a high rate of formation of lashkars (tribal or district militias) that seek to protect the community against all comers. Thus, the formation of antiinsurgent militias in a given area may indicate that the population distrusts both the government and the insurgents, and is a possible indicator of swing voter behavior or autarkic a plague on all your housesattitudesonthepartoflocalcommunityleaders. Public safety function. The side that performs the public safety function protecting thepopulationfromcrimeandviolencetendstobeseenasthemorelegitimateand effective. Given the high level of police corruption and abuse in some parts of Afghanistan, many of our interlocutors scoff at the idea of going to the police for protection. By contrast, the Taliban have been carefully building a reputation for swift, harsh, but fair punishment of criminals, and for protecting local people from abuse. The Taliban maintain a published legal code, the layeha, which binds both TalibanunitsandpopulationstoasetofstandardsenforcedbylocalTalibancells.In Kandahar and some other centers, the Taliban maintain a public safety hotline (akin to a 911 call center) that local people can call in an emergency, to confirm or deny Taliban involvement in an incident, or seek Taliban assistance. These behaviors, coupled with a moderate to high level of abuse by local officials and police, may indicatethatthelocalpopulationseestheinsurgentsasmorelegitimateandeffective thanthegovernmentinagivenarea.
SecurityForceindicators
Kill ratio. While raw body count is a poor indicator, kill ratio (the ratio between casualties inflicted and casualties suffered) can be a useful indicator of a units confidence, aggression and willingness to close with the enemy. However, in assessing this metric it is essential to control for civilian casualties, escalationoffire (EOF) incidents, and other possible indicators (discussed below) that a given unit is engaging in brutality or abuse. Kills resulting from indirect fires (artillery or mortars),airstrikes,orkillsbysupportingcoalitionunitsalsodonotcount.Theonly data relevant to this indicator are confirmed kills/captures, directly inflicted by the unit in question, on positively identified insurgents actually engaging in combat operations. Like many metrics, the absolute number of kills or captures at any given moment is less important than secondorder data relating to trends over time. If a units kill ratio is improving, this may indicate greater confidence, better dominance
81
overagivenareaandbetterintelligence,andpossiblyacloserrelationshipwithlocal populations. But like other indicators, kill ratio must be interpreted in relation to otherdatabeforethiscanbeknown. Win/loss ratio. At the most general level, units that consistently win their engagements inflicting more losses than they suffer, retaining possession of disputed ground and protecting key population groups are usually performing better than units that consistently lose. In practice, however, most security force unitswinmostengagementsagainstinsurgents,sothatchangesinthewinlossratio over time are more significant than the absolute proportion of wins to losses. Again, in calculating this ratio, it is essential to control for engagements won due to artillery/airsupportorcoalitionforceintervention,asthesedonotcountinassessing theunititself. Kill versus wound/capture ratio. In a standard combat engagement, for every one enemy killed, we expect to see 3 to 5 enemy wounded or captured. This is of course simply a general guideline, but some Afghan security force units consistently kill four or five enemy to one wounded or captured. This abnormal killtowound ratio bears closer investigation. It may be that the enemy always fights to the death, or that Afghan units have a remarkably high level of marksmanship, though field observation and anecdotal evidence suggests neither of these is the case. It may also be that these units are relying on airpower and artillery and that this is generating this anomalous ratio. Alternatively, a killtowound ratio of 45:1 (rather than the normal 1:35) may indicate that units are engaging in extrajudicial killings, or posthumously deeming dead civilians to be enemy. There is insufficient evidence at this time to be certain, but as an indicator of possible security force brutality this needstobecloselytracked. Detainee guilt ratio. A units detainee guilt ratio is the proportion of individuals detained who, on subsequent investigation, turn out to be closely and genuinely linked to the insurgency. A unit that has a low detainee guilt ratio may be arresting lots of local militaryage males, but if most of these are innocent it can be having a sharply negative effect on local support, and may even be producing insurgents as innocent detainees become radicalized in temporary detention. Conversely, a unit that has a high detainee guilt ratio is detaining mainly individuals who are genuinely linked to the insurgency, and this is a surrogate indicator that its intelligence is high quality, its methods are showing appropriate restraint, and it is probably gaining the confidence of the local population by developing a reputation foraccuracyandeffectiveness. Recruitment versus desertion rates. In order to grow Afghan security forces, huge efforts have been made in recruitment and retention. Yet desertion rates are also high so high, for example, that in RCSouth between June and September, total ANP numbers actually shrank when police killed, wounded, missing and absent
without leave (AWOL) were taken into account. In general, when an organizations recruitment rates are higher than its desertion rates, morale can be said to be functionally adequate. When desertion rates rise, along with other indicators like increased sickness rates and shortterm AWOL, organizational morale is likely to be dropping. Shortterm AWOL is not a reliable indicator in itself, however, because in countries like Afghanistan where recruits have little or no access to a banking system,theytendtogoAWOLafterpaydaytotaketheirpayhome. Proportion of ghost employees. Most Afghan military and police units have a proportion of ghost employees on their books. These are fictional employees whose pay the unit commander claims from higher headquarters, but then puts aside for his personal use. In most cases, these ghost employees generate corrupt income for senior officers. While this practice is unlikely to be stamped out any time soon, the proportion of ghost employees ina unit, andtheway this number changes over time, may indicate the degree of corruption of the commanders concerned. It does not necessarily indicate poor morale it may do so if unit members feel they are being exploited, but in some cases they see the practice as legitimate: in a society without robust social security or veterans pensions, some units use ghost employees tocreateapooloffundsthatgotothewelfareofincapacitatedpoliceorsoldiersand thefamiliesofthosekilledinaction. Location at start of firefight. Every firefight in Afghanistan is played out in front of an audience, and has a political and military meaning in the eyes of that audience. Afghan elders frequently call coalition commanders at the end of an engagement in order to offer their playbyplay commentary on a firefight that has just ended. One of the key elements in how the population interprets a firefight is the location of opposing forces. For example, if security forces are located in a population center, standing with the population at the start of an engagement, and the enemy attacks downfromthehills,thenthepopulationfrequentlyseemstointerprettheinsurgents as the aggressors and security forces as their protectors. Thus, even if the insurgents win the firefight, they may lose politically by pushing the population into our arms. Conversely, when security forces attack into a village or valley, even if acting on solid intelligence, the population sometimes perceives them as the aggressors, and may side with the insurgents. This is especially so in night attacks, surprise attacks, or engagements in remote terrain where rural populations are traditionally suspicious of strangers. If a unit is consistently located in close proximity to protectedpopulationsatthestartoffirefights,andconsistentlywinsthosefirefights, this may indicate that the unit is gaining credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the population. EOF incidents and CIVCAS. Units that consistently get involved in escalationof force incidents (where troops fire on civilians who fail to stop at roadblocks, drive too close to convoys or otherwise appear threatening), or inflict significant numbers of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) may have an overly aggressive attitude to the local
83
population and may be placing too little emphasis on protecting civilians. They may also be overly nervous and frightened of their environment, making them trigger happy. Almost certainly, units that frequently kill or wound civilians lack a close relationship with the local population, lack viable local partners and lack a good informationnetwork,makingthemmorevulnerabletoinsurgentattacks. Duration of operations. Singleday operations, where a unit sleeps every night in its fortified base and only goes out in the daylight, tend to indicate lack of confidence, lack of energy, or the existence of a tacit (or possibly even explicit) liveandletlive deal with the insurgents. Single day, largeunit sweep operations (daylight search operations, cordonandknock sweeps or shortduration raiding operations) may also be having a negative effect in their own right. A unit that consistently conducts multiday operations, up to several weeks at a time, and lives in its area of responsibility rather than merely visiting it, tends over time to develop a closer rapport with the local population, becomes more familiar with local enemy groups, andprotectsitspopulationwhiledominatingitsareamoreeffectively. Nightoperations.Ifagivenunitfrequentlyoperatesbynight,orstaysoutforseveral nights on operations, this may indicate that the unit is dominating its area of operations, is confident in its environment, and has the upper hand. In particular, if night operations tend to be protective (e.g. ambushing potential enemy routes used to infiltrate population centers and intimidate governmentaligned population groups) then they may contribute to a popular feeling of safety and normality, and hence may bring the local population to the government side. On the other hand, if night operations are aggressive (raiding, hardknock search operations, or use of air strikes and indirect fires to deny areas to insurgents) the same operations may actuallycontributetoafeelingofinsecurityonthepartofthepopulation,andhence mayhaveadestabilizingeffectonthedistrict. Smallunit operations. Units that mount a larger number of smaller unit operations (at squad, platoon or company level, depending on the local threat profile) tend to cover a greater area within their area of responsibility, with greater thoroughness. Willingnesstoconductmultiplesmallunitoperationsalsoindicatesagreaterdegree ofconfidenceandanexpectationofdefeatingtheenemyifencountered. Combined action operations. Operations involving combined action where coalition units intimately partner with local military, police, civilian authorities and coalition civilian agencies down to smallunit level tend to indicate improved performance by all partners in the action. Coalition forces tend to perform better because they have access to local knowledge, language skills and situational awareness. Local military forces can access coalition fires, intelligence, mobility, medical support and other enablers, and have a constant professional exemplar in the presence of coalition troops. Local police are relieved of the burden of direct combatwithmainforceinsurgentsandcanfocusontheirpolicingrole,andtheyare
constantly monitored, reducing the risk of corrupt or abusive behavior. Local and coalition civilian authorities and agencies are able to operate in higherthreat environments as part of a combined action team, giving them greater reach and endurance, better protection, and the ability to demonstrate responsible leadership anddeliveressentialservicestothepopulation. Dismounted operations. If a unit frequently operates on foot, this may be an indicatorthatitismoreconfidentinitsenvironment,hasgreaterreachacrossitsarea of responsibility (much of which, in Afghanistan, may be out of reach of the road system), and has a better rapport with local populations. Anecdotal evidence and data from other campaigns suggests that units that operate dismounted may also be less vulnerable to roadside IEDs, though this is yet to be confirmed in the Afghan context. Conversely, units that always operate from the supposed safety of road bound armored vehicles may be predictable (due to always following a limited number of roads), may be easily ambushed, and may lack rapport with the population, which may see them as alien, strange or cowardly. The roadside IED is clearly a military weapon, but it is also a political weapon used by the insurgents to separatethesecurityforcesfromthepopulation.Dismountedoperationscanredress this separation. In practice, due to the size of Afghanistan and the lack of friendly troops, almost all operations commence with a road or air move to a jumpingoff point, from which units may proceed dismounted. The positive effects of dismounted operations may improve the relationship between the unit and the population across its whole area of responsibility, however, not just in the actual areaswhereitoperatesdismounted. Driving technique. The driving style of a unit whether drivers push civilian vehicles out of their way, whether they wait their turn in traffic, how aggressively they force civilian cars back from convoys, whether or not they illuminate passing trafficwithlasersights,whethertheyhogthecenterlaneoftheroadordrive inlane is a good atmospheric indicator of a units attitude to the population, and hence of the populations likely attitude to that unit. Units that drive rudely, alienate the population and disrupt traffic and commerce with aggressive driving techniques usuallyhavepoorcommunityrapport. Reliance on air and artillery support. If a unit relies too heavily on air strikes, artillery and mortar fire, and other forms of nonorganic support in most of its engagements,thismayindicatelackofconfidenceandunwillingnesstoengagewith the enemy or the local population. It also creates conditions that may lead to increased CIVCAS or collateral property damage, as the unit is employing area weapons that it does not control, rather than organic directfire weapons. This tendencycanbeassessedbycomparingthesizeofunitsengagedinagivenseriesof combat actions with how often they call on nonorganic fires: if a unit consistently drawsonindirectfireevenwhenengagingmuchsmallerenemygroups,itmayhave a confidence problem. Conversely, if the unit regularly gets into situations where its
85
small units encounter large enemy groups and have to be rescued by indirect fire, it may be overreaching, or may be overmatched in its area of operations and require reinforcement. Patternsetting and telegraphing moves to the enemy. Units that set patterns always moving on set routes, always leaving or entering bases from the same direction at the same time, selecting the same overwatch positions on patrol after patrol, or developing standard ambush positions or observation posts tend to becomemorevulnerabletoinsurgentambushes,IEDsandattacks.Likewise,ifaunit has a tendency to accidentally telegraph its moves to the enemy (say, by always massing helicopters in the same way before a raid) it may be more vulnerable to being outmaneuvered by the insurgents. On the other hand, telegraphing moves to the population is often appropriate in Afghanistan: even the Taliban rarely move from one valley or village to another without seeking community permission, and coalitionunitscanmessagelocalpopulationswearecomingintoyourvalleynext month,youhavetendaystoexpeltheenemyfromyourvillagesorwewillbeforced to mount a clearance operation in order to force the enemy to move without fighting. This does not always work, but it is a technique that is familiar to Afghans asitisoftenusedintheirtraditionalformsofconflict,andmayhaveapositiveeffect insomecircumstances. Possessionofthehighgroundatdawn.TheAfghancampaign,inadditiontobeinga counterinsurgency, a stabilization operation and a competition for governance, is also a classic mountain warfare campaign, especially in RCNorth, RCEast and some parts of RCsSouth,West andCapital. As such the basic tenets of mountain warfare tactics apply, including control of the high ground, maintenance of wide fields of observation from key terrain, dominance of peaks overlooking key routes, ability to bring plunging fire onto identified enemy positions and ability to move on the high ground at night. Units that consistently hold the high ground at dawn tend to demonstrate a mastery of this form of warfare, while units that are consistently overlookedbytheenemyatfirstlighttendtostruggleinthisenvironment.
Enemyindicators
Hightechnology inserts. The Taliban are generally a lowtech guerrilla force, but they do possess and deploy some hightechnology capabilities: satellite phones, accurized weapons, sniper optics, and (in some parts of the country) hightech components for improvised explosive devices. Presence of these hightech inserts in a given insurgent group may indicate that it has access to better funding or greater supportfromexternalsponsors,andsucha unitismorelikelytobeafulltimemain forceTalibancolumn,ratherthanalocal(Tier2)guerrillagroup. Insurgent medical health. The health of individual insurgent detainees is also an indicator of the nature of the insurgent organization in a given area. Local guerrillas
tend to suffer numerous health problems ranging from malnutrition through malaria, tuberculosis, leishmaniasis and other parasitic diseases, to diabetes, respiratorytractinfectionsandotherchronichealthproblems.Theirhealthproblems tend to track those of the local population in a given area. Main force units, on the other hand, often have a better general level of health and insurgents based in Pakistan or directly sponsored by external agencies may have received inoculations or other medical support in both cases, the healthier an insurgent the more likely heistohavereceivedexternalassistance. Presence of specialist teams and foreign advisers. Some Taliban mainforce units work with specialist teams snipers, heavy machinegun and mortar teams, rocket teams, specialized reconnaissance teams, intelligence teams, media/propaganda teams, and so on. They also often include foreigners (i.e. of nonAfghan origin) and occasionally foreign advisors (usually Pakistani or central Asian in origin). The presence of these specialized teams, and especially of foreign advisers, in a given districtmayindicatethatamainforceenemycolumnisworkinginthedistrict. Insurgent villageoforigin. There is an extremely important difference between insurgents who originate from villages within the same district where they fight (local guerrillas) and insurgents who fight outside their districtoforigin. Local guerrillas are often parttime fighters, they frequently switch sides in the conflict based on local (tribal or economic) motivation, and more generally are part of the fabricoflocalsociety.Ifasecurityforceunitistostabilizeagivendistrict,itneedsto defeat these local guerrillas but it must also emphasize reintegration, reconciliation, andwinningoverthesegroups,whichafterallrepresentkeymembersofsocietythe unit is trying to stabilize. Thus, attempts to destroy local guerrillas outright can backfirebyalienatingcommunities,creatingbloodfeudsthatperpetuatetheconflict. On the other hand, insurgents who operate outside their districtoforigin, or even originate from outside the country, can be deemed foreign fighters in the eyes of the community. They often lack tribal ties or rapport with the community, and shouldbetargetedwithmaximumlethality,asruthlesslyaslegallypermissible.Asa foreign body within local society, these fighters can be killed and captured intensively (as long as targeting is accurate and avoids innocent civilians) without disrupting our relationship with the locals. Indeed, local communities may actually feel safer and may partner more closely with units that ruthlessly target foreign origininsurgents,whileseekingtoreintegrateandreconcilewithlocalguerrillas. Firsttofire ratio. The firsttofire ratio is a key indicator of which side controls the initiation of firefights, and is a useful surrogate metric to determine which side possesses the tactical initiative. If our side fires first in most firefights, this likely indicates that we are ambushing the enemy (or mounting preplanned attacks) more frequently than we are being ambushed. This in turn may indicate that our side has bettersituationalawarenessandaccesstointelligenceonenemymovementsthanthe insurgents, and it certainly indicates that we have the initiative and the enemy may
87
be reacting to us. Most importantly, the side that initiates the majority of firefights tends to control the loss rate, and this can be checked by mapping insurgent losses against which side fired first in the engagements where those losses were suffered if the insurgents are losing most of their casualties in firefights they initiate themselves, then they are in control of their own loss rate and can simply stop picking fights if their losses become unsustainable, and restart operations once they recover. If they are losing most of their casualties in engagements we initiate, then we control their loss rate and can force them below replenishment level and ultimatelydestroythenetworkinquestion. Priceofblackmarketweaponsandammunition.Afghanistanhasasubstantialblack market in weapons, ammunition, explosives and other military equipment. As in any other free market, the price of weaponry on this black market reflects supply (availability of weapons) and demand (the rate of arming or rearming among population groups and the insurgent requirements for weapons to support their operations).Thuspricefluctuationsovertimeespeciallyinstandardweaponssuch as Chinese or Romanian AKs, or in commodities such as 7.62mm short AK rounds can indicate changes in insurgent operational tempo, an increase in community demand(duetoinsecurity)oradropinsupplyduetoimprovedinterdiction. Insurgentkill/captureversussurrenderratio.Alargernumberofdefectors,deserters or surrenders on the part of an insurgent group may indicate a drop in that units morale. Conversely, unwillingness to surrender fighting until killed or captured on the part of insurgent fighters can indicate high motivation. Analysts can seek indicationsofaninsurgentnetworksmoralebycomparing changesovertimeinthe insurgent kill/capture rate with changes in the surrender/desertion rate. These ratios should also be considered in relation to the insurgent recruitment and retention rate if a units loss rate is high but it has no difficulty obtaining local recruits then it is likelytobeexperiencingahighdegreeoflocalsupport. Midlevel insurgent casualties. The insurgents loss rate is also a useful indicator, especially in relation to losses in the middle tiers of the insurgent organization the level below the senior leadership group, comprising planners, operational facilitators, technical specialists, trainers, recruiters, financiers, and lowerlevel operational commanders. Killing senior leaders may not actually damage the insurgency particularly, especially if senior leaders who are killed are simply replaced by younger, hungrier, more radical and more operationally experienced leadersfromthenextgeneration.Likewise,theinsurgentscan(anddo)expecttolose a significant number of footsoldiers, and to replace them relatively easily with minimum disruption. On the other hand, killing or capturing the insurgent middle management tier can do significant damage to the organization, while leaving senior leaders intact and perhaps even convincing them over time that their campaign is futile, and without killing large numbers of lowertier fighters and sympathizerswhomaybegoodcandidatesforreintegration.Thustheinsurgentloss
rate at the middle level of the network is an especially important indicator of the networkshealthandresilience.
APPENDIXE.METRICSUSEDBYINSURGENTS
89
APPENDIXE.METRICSUSEDBYINSURGENTS50
Metric1:VictorycanbeunderstoodasthePerpetuityofFighting.
The influential Saudi militant, the late Yusuf alUyayree, elucidates this longterm perspectiveinhisworksMeaningsofVictoryandLossinJihaadandTheFutureofIraqand the Arabian Peninsula. This understanding is a cultural pillar of the global jihadi trend, which,basedonitsinterpretationofthesacredsources,seesitselfasthetrue,victorioussect that will fight until the end of days. This idea of victory is also apparent in the Creed of the GlobalIslamicMediaFront,aprimaryoutletoftheglobaljihadimovement:Webelievethat the victorious sect will be the sect of learning and jihad. We believe that jihad will continue until the Day of Judgment, with every pious man or wrongdoer, in every time and place, with an imam or without an imam. It will continue with a single individual or more. No tyrants injustice or naysayers discouragement will halt it. We believe that jihad in Gods way is the legitimate and sound way that will enable the Ummah to resume an Islamic life andestablishawellguidedcaliphateaccordingtotheprogramoftheProphet.
Metric 2: Victory is Found in Obeying the Obligation to Fight Islams Enemies, NotintheOutcomeofBattle.
AnwaralAwlakiformerlyassociatedwithanIslamiccenterinFallsChurch,Virginia,and a past chaplain at George Washington Universitydelivered a lecture on alUyayrees works in which he explained this understanding in poignant terms. In the transcription of his lecture, titled Constants on the Path of Jihad, alAwlaki stated: Victory is not what we are accountable for; we are accountable for whether or not we are doingwhat Allah commands. We fight Jihad becauseit is hard [obligatory] on us; we are not fightingto win or loose [sic]. If we broaden our perspective,we will come to realize that whoeverrides the peak of Islam (Jihad) [parenthesesand emphasis in original] can never loose [sic]and will always win but not always win inphysical victory.This definition has implications forjihadis at the collective and individual levels.At the collective level, adhering to this dutyresults in overt obedience to and thereforeguidance by Allah. When mujahideen(those who believe they are fighting in Godspath) embrace this obligation and absorb thisguidance, tangible strategic success for theummahthe global Muslim communityisbelieved to follow. The establishment of thestate of Israel and regional regimes is generallyviewed by jihadis as a byproduct of neglectingthis obligation. At the individual level, a rational decisionto exchange love for worldly comforts forthe love of battle and to overcome Satan andthose who hinder one from fighting representsmore than simple obedience: it is a purifying,ennobling act. One hour of jihad in Allahspath, according to a famous hadith belovedby Abdullah Azzam, architect of the Afghanjihad, is
50
Jeffrey B. Cozzens, Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture, Joint Forces Quarterly No. 52 (Winter 2009): 86 91.
better than 60 years of praying. Ascase studies of jihadis in the United Kingdomand elsewhereattest,someyoungIslamistsalsoseejihadasasocialriteofpassage.
Metric3:TheInstitutionalizationofaCultureofMartyrdomIsaVictory.
Accordingto exponents of global jihad such as AbuAyman alHilali, martyrdom is the greatestvictory a mujahid can have. AlHilali andothers argue that martyrdom operations offera direct route to Paradise, the most effectivemeans to strike adversaries, and the loftiestform of witness. And as illustrated by WestPoints Sinjar Records, a collection of nearly 700foreign fighter biographies from Iraq, the ideathat martyrdom is synonymous with victory formany jihadis goes well beyond theory. Whenal Qaeda in Iraq bureaucrats queried foreignfighters as to why they came to Iraq, or whatduty they hoped to perform, 217 of the 389 whoresponded (56.3 percent) indicated a desire formartyrdom,whereas166projectedtheirrolesasfighter(orsomethingsimilar).
Metric 4: Victory Comes by PinpointingIslams Enemies through the Refining ProcessofJihad,andThusMaintainingItsIdentity.

SayfadDin alAnsari, another online jihadistrategist, argued this point explicitly in a2002 essayonthe9/11attacks:OurIslamiccommunityhasbeensubjectedtoadangerousprocess of narcosis. As a result, ithas lost the vigilance that comes from faith andfallen into a deep slumber. The most dangerousconsequence of this is that most Muslims canno longer distinguish between their enemiesand their friends. The fallout from choosingpeace and normalizationhascausedagreatconfusionofideas.Theresultantsituationposesagenuine threat to our very identity. [The 9/11 attacks] came to move this warfrom the shadows out into the open, to makethe community aware of the enemy. It revealedthe perils that surround us in a way that everyonecan understand. The attacks succeededin laying bare theenemyssoulandtalkofanewcrusadewithallthehistoricalbaggagethephraseentails. ItbecamecleartoeveryonethatthisisacampaignagainstMuslimsmorethanawaragainst the mujahidin. Islam itselfis the target. The raid showed just how fragile isthe supposed coexistence of Muslims andCrusaders. Fighting, alAnsari argues, is equivalentto maintaining the ummahs identity againstinternal and external threats; it is the ultimatemeans to enjoin the good and forbid the evil. As the everpopular jihadi author MuhammadalMaqdisi contends in The Religion ofAbraham, it is simply not enough to renouncetyrantsverbally.
Metric 5: Establishing Pride, Brotherhood,and Unity in the Face of Threats to theUmmahIsaFormofVictory.

Abu Ubayd alQirshi, another popular militant strategistwho wrote a pseudoscholarly essay completewith notes, The Impossible Becomes Possible,advances this point forcefully:With the New York and Washington raids, alQaida established a model of a proud Islamicmentality. This outlook does not view anythingas impossible. AlQaida
APPENDIXE.METRICSUSEDBYINSURGENTS
91
embodies Islamic unity. Bloodfrom all the countries of the Islamic communityhas mixed togetherinthejihadthatalQaidaleadswithnodistinctionbetweenArabandnonArab.In and of itself, this is a step on theroad to Islamic unity and the destruction of thecolonialist treaties that have torn the bodyof the Islamic community apart. [W]ith absolute trust in God, a willingnessto die in Gods path, patience, and generosityof spirit these qualities undoubtedlylead to victory. While generally a pragmatic authorconcerned more with jihadi strategic studiesthan theology, alQirshis view of brotherhoodand unity echoes theperspectivesofmanysalafis,militantorotherwise:preservingtheintegrityandpurityof Islam in the face ofcontemporary intraIslamic strife (fitnah),syncretistic practices, and external threats isof paramount importance. None of these canbe confronted apart from a unified and self sacrificialmethodology (the latter of whichalQirshi and al Qaeda believe tobeassociatedwithviolenceandmartyrdom).
Metric 6: Creating a Parity of Sufferingwith Islams EnemiesEspecially the JewsandCrusadersIsaVictory.

According toSaudi cleric Nasr alFahd and al Qaeda spokesmanSuleiman Abu Geith (among others),upholding the sharia principle of repaymentin kind (almuamala bil mithl) not only justifiesbut also demands the murder of millionsof al Qaedas enemies to avenge the millionsof Muslims killed at their hands. AlFahdwhose wellknown fatawa (religious opinions)concerning the legitimacy of the Talibanregime and the destruction of the Buddhastatues in Afghanistanwere widely circulatedonlinepublished on May 21, 2003, a fatwajustifying the use of nuclear weapons (as wellas other weapons of mass destruction) againstthe enemies of Islam. AlFahd wrote:The attack against it by WMD [which alFahdexplicitly defined as nuclear, chemical, orbiological] is accepted, since Allah said: If youare attacked you should attack your aggressor byidentical force. Whoever looks at the Americanaggression against the Muslims and their landsin recent decades concludes that it is permissible. They have killed about ten millionMuslims, and destroyedcountlesslands.Iftheywouldbebombedinawaythatwouldkilltenmillionsof them and destroy their landsitis obviously permitted, with no need for evidence. Terrorismincluding that involvingWMDis seen by authors such as Abu Geithand al Fahd as being among the most expedientmethods for achieving the reciprocalsuffering (andthus,victory)forwhichtheirreadingofIslamiclawcalls.
Metric 7: Victory Is Seen in the MaladiesAfflicting Gods Enemies, EspeciallyEconomicRecessionandNaturalDisasters.

AlUyayree writes that economic hardshipsamong Allahs enemies are sure signs of Hisfavor upon the mujahideen and harbingers oftheir impending victory. Furthermore, wesee in the writings of other extremists thatnatural disasters such as Hurricane Katrinaare believed to foreshadow the imminent collapseof the West and victory for the Islamicvanguardovertheunbelievers.
Metric 8: The Presence of Miracles inJihad Foretells of Victory for the Mujahideen.
Abdullah Azzams book on miracles in theAfghan jihad, The Signs of Rahmaan in theJihaad of the Afghana most viewed publicationon the extremistleaning Makhtabah.netonline booksellerillustrates this point, as doesa mountain of online jihadi writings coveringthe miraculous events of the battle of Fallujah,and the supernatural in contemporaryAfghanistan.
Metric9:ThePromotionoftheHeroicTemplateIsItselfVictory.
The jihadi literaturereminds us ad nauseam that victory doesnot depend on individual leaders; those whotrust in men rather than Allah will eventuallysuffer moral, if not material, defeat. Instead,victory comes by emulating the heroes offightingthose who leave everything behindto make their blood cheap for the ummahand by enduring the temporary and refiningtrial of their absence. We are reminded thatjihadi leaders themselves aspire to martyrdomwhen Allah wills it. As a testament to thisnotion, we see the wills, elegies, and eulogiesof jihadis published and distributed onan almost industrial scale. Their message isconsistent: Obey Allah as I did, avenge theummah, and enter Paradise. .
APPENDIXF.SELECTEDEXTRACTSREGARDINGWHOLEOFGOVERNMENT
93
APPROACHFROMNATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGY,MAY201051
Tosucceed,wemustbalanceandintegrateallelementsofAmericanpowerandupdateour national security capacity for the 21st century. We must maintain our militarys conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must be modernized, and our civilian expeditionary capacity strengthened, to support the full breadth of our priorities. Our intelligence and homeland security efforts must be integrated with our national security policies, and those of our allies and partners. And our ability to synchronize our actions while communicating effectively with foreign publics must be enhanced to sustain global support. Successful engagement will depend upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American power. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic disease, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance. Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue militarytomilitary ties with a broad range of governments. We will continue to foster economic and financial transactions to advance our shared prosperity. And our intelligence and law enforcement agencies must cooperate effectively with foreign governments to anticipate events, respond tocrises,andprovidesafetyandsecurity.
StrengtheningNationalCapacityAWholeofGovernmentApproach
To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. Our military must maintain its conventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weapons exist, our nuclear deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats, preserve access to the global commons, and strengthen partners. We must invest in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global partners. Our intelligence capabilities must continuously evolve to identify and characterize conventional and asymmetric threats and provide timely insight. Andwe must integrate our approach to homeland security with our broader national security approach. Weareimprovingtheintegrationofskillsandcapabilitieswithinourmilitaryandcivilian institutions,sotheycomplementeachotherandoperateseamlessly.Wearealsoimproving
51
Emphasisadded.
coordinatedplanningandpolicymakingandmustbuildourcapacityinkeyareaswherewe fall short. This requires close cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement andmonitor operations,policies,andstrategies.Toinitiatethiseffort,theWhiteHousemergedthestaffs oftheNationalSecurityCouncilandHomelandSecurityCouncil. However, work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination. Defense: We are strengthening our military to ensure that it can prevail in todays wars; to preventanddeterthreatsagainsttheUnitedStates,itsinterests,andouralliesandpartners; and prepare to defend the United States in a wide range of contingencies against state and nonstate actors. We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations. This includes preparing for increasingly sophisticated adversaries, deterring and defeating aggression in antiaccess environments, and defending the United States and supporting civil authorities at home. The most valuable component of our national defense is the men and women who make up Americas allvolunteer force. They have shown tremendous resilience, adaptability, and capacity for innovation, and we will provide our service members with the resources that they need to succeed and rededicate ourselves to providing support and care for wounded warriors, veterans, and military families.Wemustsettheforceonapathtosustainabledeploymentcyclesandpreserveand enhance the longterm viability of our force through successful recruitment, retention, and recognitionofthosewhoserve. Diplomacy:Diplomacyisasfundamentaltoournationalsecurityasourdefensecapability. Our diplomats are the first line of engagement, listening to our partners, learning from them, building respect for one another, and seeking common ground. Diplomats, developmentexperts,andothersintheUnited States Government must be able to work side by side to support a common agenda. New skills are needed to foster effective interaction to convene, connect, and mobilize not only other governments and international organizations, but also nonstate actors such as corporations, foundations, nongovernmental organizations, universities, think tanks, and faithbased organizations, all of whom increasingly have a distinct role to play on both diplomatic and development issues. To accomplish these goals our diplomatic personnel and missions must be expanded at home and abroad to support the increasingly transnational nature of 21st century security challenges. And we must provide the
95
appropriate authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs and grow the civilian expeditionary capacity required to assist governments on a diverse arrayofissues. Economic: Our economic institutions are crucial components of our national capacity and our economic instruments are the bedrock of sustainable national growth, prosperity and influence. The Office of Management and Budget, Departments of the Treasury, State, Commerce, Energy, and Agriculture, United States Trade Representative, Federal Reserve Board, and other institutions help manage our currency, trade, foreign investment, deficit, inflation, productivity, and national competitiveness. Remaining a vibrant 21st century economicpoweralsorequiresclosecooperationbetweenandamongdevelopednationsand emerging markets because of the interdependent nature of the global economy. America like other nationsis dependent upon overseas markets to sell its exports and maintain access to scarce commodities and resources. Thus, finding overlapping mutual economic interestswithothernationsandmaintainingthoseeconomicrelationshipsarekeyelements ofournationalsecuritystrategy. Development: Development is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative. We are focusingonassistingdevelopingcountriesandtheirpeopletomanagesecuritythreats,reap the benefits of global economic expansion, and set in place accountable and democratic institutions that serve basic human needs. Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks; build a stable, inclusive global economy with new sources of prosperity; advance democracy and human rights;andultimatelypositionourselvestobetteraddresskeyglobalchallengesbygrowing the ranks of prosperous, capable, and democratic states that can be our partners in the decades ahead. To do this, we are expanding our civilian development capability; engaging with international financial institutions that leverage our resources and advance our objectives; pursuing a development budget that more deliberately reflects our policies and our strategy, not sector earmarks; and ensuring that our policy instruments are aligned in supportofdevelopmentobjectives. Homeland Security: Homeland security traces its roots to traditional and historic functions of government and society, such as civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border patrol, and immigration. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the foundation of the Department of Homeland Security, these functions have taken on new organization and urgency. Homeland security, therefore, strives to adapt these traditional functions to confront new threats and evolving hazards. It is not simply about government action alone, but rather about the collective strength of the entire country. Our approach relies on our shared efforts to identify and interdict threats; deny hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders; maintain effective control of our physical borders; safeguard lawful trade and travel into and out of the United States; disrupt and dismantle transnational terrorist, and criminal organizations; and ensure our national resilience in the face of the
threat and hazards. Taken together, these efforts must support a homeland that is safe and secure from terrorism and other hazards and in which American interests, aspirations, and wayoflifecanthrive. Intelligence: Our countrys safety and prosperity depend on the quality of the intelligence we collect and the analysis we produce, our ability to evaluate and share this information in a timely manner, and our ability to counter intelligence threats. This is as true for the strategic intelligence that informs executive decisions as it is for intelligence support to homeland security, state, local, and tribal governments, our troops, and critical national missions. We are working to better integrate the Intelligence Community, while also enhancing the capabilities of our Intelligence Community members. We are strengthening our partnerships with foreign intelligence services and sustaining strong ties with our close allies.AndwecontinuetoinvestinthemenandwomenoftheIntelligenceCommunity. Strategic Communications: Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoplesnot just elitesaround the world. Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will be perceived. We must also use a broad range of methodsforcommunicatingwithforeignpublics,includingnewmedia. The American People and the Private Sector: The ideas, values, energy, creativity, and resilience of our citizens are Americas greatest resource. We will support the development of prepared, vigilant, and engaged communities and underscore that our citizens are the heart of a resilient country. And we must tap the ingenuity outside government through strategic partnerships with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and communitybased organizations. Such partnerships are critical to U.S. success at home and abroad, and we will support them through enhanced opportunities for engagement, coordination,transparency,andinformationsharing.
APPENDIXG.DEFINITIONS
97
IrregularWarfare(IW)OperationsandActivities
(JointOperatingConcept(JOC)v1.0(Sept2007))
Term Definition A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversarys power, influence, and will. (JointPublication(JP)102;JP1) 1. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 102) 2. An organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. However, insurgencies goals may be more limited. Insurgencies generally followarevolutionarydoctrineandusearmedforceasaninstrumentofpolicy. (FM 10020, 1990) 3. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of an established government or societal structure, or the expulsion of a foreign military presence, through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (Proposed byU.S.SpecialOperationsCommand) 2. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can alsorefertothegroupitself.(JP324,2009) Counterinsurgency(COIN) SeeTable1.DefinitionsofCOIN. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogateforceswhoareorganized,trained,equipped,supported,anddirected in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventionalassistedrecovery.AlsocalledUW.(JP102;JP305) 1. The calculated use or threat of unlawful political violence against noncombatants, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies throughfear.(Proposed) Terrorism 2. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1 02;JP307.2) Actionstakendirectlyagainstterroristnetworksandindirectlytoinfluenceand render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. AlsocalledCT.Seealsoantiterrorism;combatingterrorism;terrorism.(JP326) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.(JP322)
IrregularWarfare
Insurgency
UnconventionalWarfare (UW)
Counterterrorism(CT)
Foreigninternaldefense (FID)
IrregularWarfare(IW)OperationsandActivities
(JointOperatingConcept(JOC)v1.0(Sept2007))
Term Definition StabilityOps: 1. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructurereconstruction,andhumanitarianrelief.(JP102;JP30) 2. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions. (DODD 3000.05, Nov2005) Stabilization,security, transition,and reconstructionoperations (SSTRO) 3. Stability Operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DoDI3000.05,Sep2009) 4. Leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establishasafeandsecureenvironment;facilitatereconciliationamonglocalor regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civilian authority. (FMI307StabilityOperations,Oct2008) MilitarySupporttoSecurity,Transition,andReconstruction: Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainablepeacewhileadvancingU.S.interests.(DODD3000.05,2005) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originators objectives. Also calledPSYOP.(JP313.2;JP102) The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also computer network operations; electronic warfare; military deception; operationssecurity;psychologicaloperations.(JP313;JP102)
Psychologicaloperations (PSYOP)
Informationoperations(IO)
99
StabilityOps
Definition Source Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. Theyshallbegivenprioritycomparabletocombatoperationsandbe DoDD3000.05(Nov2005) explicitlyaddressedandintegratedacrossallDoDactivitiesincluding doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership,personnel,facilities,andplanning. Stability Operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national DoDI3000.05(Sep2009) power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction,andhumanitarianrelief. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental JP102;JP30(revisedMarch2010): services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliationamonglocalorregionaladversaries;establishpolitical, FMI307StabilityOperations(Oct2008): legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition ofresponsibilitytoalegitimatecivilianauthority.
ForeignInternalDefense
Definition Source Participationbycivilianandmilitaryagenciesofagovernmentinany of the action programs taken by another government or other JP102;JP322ForeignInternalDefense designated organization to free and protect its society from (July2010) subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to itssecurity. Participationbycivilianandmilitaryagenciesofagovernmentinany of the action programs taken by another government or other DoDD3000.07IrregularWarfare(IW) designated organization to free and protect its society from (Dec2008) subversion,lawlessness,andinsurgency. Participationbycivilianandmilitaryagenciesofagovernmentinany of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to itssecurity. Classified. JP102;AirForceDoctrineDocument (AFDD)23.1ForeignInternalDefense (Sep2007) FM305.202SpecialForceForeign InternalDefenseOperations(Feb2007)
UnconventionalWarfare
Definition Source A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who JP102;JP305(Dec2003) are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.AlsocalledUW. Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, FM305(Feb2008) subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (JP 305). Within the U.S. military, conduct of unconventional warfare is a highly specialized special operations force mission. Special operations forces may conduct unconventional warfare as partofaseparateoperationorwithinacampaign. Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or FM305.201,SpecialForcesUnconventional Warfare;FM305.130(Sep2008) conventionalmilitaryoperations.
101
Counterterrorism(CT)
Definition Source Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to JP102(April2001,amended2010) terroristnetworks.AlsocalledCT.(FM324referencesthisdefinition.)

Actions,includingantiterrorismandcounterterrorism(CT),takento opposeterrorismthroughouttheentirethreatspectrum. Actionstakendirectlyagainstterroristnetworksandindirectlyto influenceandrenderglobalandregionalenvironmentsinhospitable toterroristnetworks. ObjectivesthwartordefeatterroristattacksagainsttheU.S.,our partnernations(PNs),andinterests;attackanddisruptterrorist networksabroadsoastocauseadversariestobeincapableor unwillingtoattacktheU.S.homeland,allies,orinterests;deny terroristnetworksWMD;establishconditionsthatallowPNsto governtheirterritoryeffectivelyanddefeatterrorists;anddenya hospitableenvironmenttoviolentextremists
JP326(Nov2009)
Operationsthatincludetheoffensivemeasurestakentoprevent,deter, preempt,andrespondtoterrorism.
AirForceDoctrineDocument (AFDD)23IrregularWarfare (August2007)
Lead our nations effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and NCTCStrategicIntent20092013 integratingallinstrumentsofnationalpowertoensureunityofeffort. Theprimarymissionofthe Officeof the Coordinator forCounterterrorism (S/CT) is to forge partnerships with nonstate actors, multilateral organizations, and foreign governments to advance the counterterrorism OfficeoftheCoordinatorfor objectives and national security of the United States. Working with our CounterterrorismDepartmentof U.S. Government counterterrorism team, S/CT takes a leading role in State developing coordinated strategies to defeat terrorists abroad and in securingthecooperationofinternationalpartners.
Intelligence
Definition Source The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information JP102(April2001,amended2010); concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or AFDD29 elements,orareasofactualorpotentialoperations.Thetermisalso applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizationsengagedinsuchactivity. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or JP20JointIntelligence(June2007) elements,orareasofactualorpotentialoperations.Thetermisalso applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizationsengagedinsuchactivity. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The FM20Intelligence(March2010) term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity (JP 20). The Army generatesintelligencethroughtheintelligencewarfightingfunction. Theintelligencewarfightingfunctionistherelatedtasksandsystems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. It includes tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and is driven by the commander. (See chapter 7.) Intelligence is more than just collection. It is a continuous process that involves FM30Operations(February2008) analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. The intelligence warfighting function includes the following tasks: Support to force generation. Support to situational understanding; conduct ISR; provide intelligence support totargetingandinformationcapabilities. COIN is an intelligencedriven endeavor. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate understanding of the operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host nation, and insurgents. Commanders require accurate intelligence about these three areas to best address the issues driving the insurgency. Both FM324Counterinsurgency(Dec2006) insurgents and counterinsurgents require an effective intelligence capability to be successful. Both attempt to create and maintain intelligence networks while trying to neutralize their opponents intelligencecapabilities.
103
Surveillance
Definition Source The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, JP102(April2001,amended2010) aural,electronic,photographic,orothermeans. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace [sic], surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things,byvisual,aural,electronic,photographic,orother means. (JP 102) The Air Force perspective emphasizes that surveillance operations are sustained operations AFDD29ISR(July2007) designed to gather information by a collector, or series of collectors, having timely response and persistent observation capabilities, a long dwell time and clear continuouscollection. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things byvisual,aural,electronic,photographic,orothermeans (JP 30). Other means may include but are not limited to FM20Intelligence(March2010) spacebased systems and special CBRN, artillery, engineer, special operations forces, and air defense equipment. Surveillance involves observing an area to collectinformation. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, o r things, byvisual,aural,electronic,photographic,orothermeans FM30Operations(February2008) (JP 102). Surveillance involves observing an area to collectinformation.
Reconnaissance
Definition Source Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or JP102(April2001, potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or amended2010) geographiccharacteristicsofaparticulararea. Special Reconnaissance. SOF may conduct SR into insurgent strongholds or sanctuaries. Activities within SR include environmental reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance,targetandthreatassessment,andpoststrikereconnaissance Insurgent Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Insurgents have their own reconnaissance and surveillance networks. Because they usually blend well with the populace, insurgents can execute reconnaissance without easily being JP324COINOperations identified. They also have an early warning system composed of citizens who (Oct2009) inform them of counterinsurgent movements. Identifying the techniques and weaknesses of enemy reconnaissance and surveillance enables commanders to detectsignsofinsurgentpreparationsandtosurpriseinsurgentsbyneutralizing their early warning systems. Thus, sophisticated counter ISR efforts may be required.
Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 102) The Air Force perspective AFDD29ISR(July2007) emphasizes that reconnaissance operations are transitory in nature and generally designed to collect information for a specified time by a collector that does not dwelloverthetargetorinthearea. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 20). Other detection methods FM20(March2010) include signals, imagery, and measurement of signatures or other technical characteristics. This task includes performing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance. It also includes engineer reconnaissance (including infrastructurereconnaissanceandenvironmentalreconnaissance). Units performing reconnaissance collect information to confirm or deny current intelligence or predictions. This information may concern the terrain, weather, and population characteristics of a particular area as well the enemy. Reconnaissance normally precedes execution of the overall operation and extends throughout the areaofoperations.Itbeginsasearlyasthesituation,politicaldirection,andrulesof FM30(Feb2008) engagement permit. Reconnaissance can locate mobile enemy command and control assetssuch as command posts, communications nodes, and satellite terminalsfor neutralization, attack, or destruction. Reconnaissance can detect patterns of behavior exhibited by people in the objective area. Commanders at all echelonsincorporatereconnaissanceintotheiroperations.
APPENDIXH.ACRONYMS
105
APPENDIXH.ACRONYMS
AAA ABI ACTD AFDD AFPAK AJP ANA ANP ANSF API ASD ASD(SO/LIC&IC) ASWORG AWOL BA BICES CAP CCDR CDCs CENTCOM CIED CIVCAS CJCS CJTF COIN COMINT CONOPS CT AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation ActivitybasedIntelligence AdvancedConceptTechnologyDemonstration AirForceDoctrineDocument Afghanistan/Pakistan AlliedJointDocument AfghanNationalArmy AfghanNationalPolice AfghanNationalSecurityForces ApplicationProgramInterface AssistantSecretaryofDefense AssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSpecialOperations/Low IntensityConflictandInterdependentCapabilities AntisubmarineWarfareOperationsResearchGroup AbsentWithoutLeave BattlespaceAwareness BattlefieldInformation,Collection,andExploitationSystem CombatAirPatrol CombatantCommander CommunityDevelopmentCouncils UnitedStatesCentralCommand CounterImprovisedExplosiveDevice CivilianCasualties ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff CombinedJointTaskForce Counterinsurgency CommunicationsIntelligence ConceptofOperations Counterterrorism
DARPA DCGS DI2E DIA DNI DOCEX DoD DoS DSB ELINT EO EOF F3 FAO FID FININT FISINT FM FMV GEOINT GMTI HSCB HTS HUMINT I&W IC ICD ICEWS IEDs IMINT
DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency
DistributedCommonGroundSystems DefenseIntelligenceInformationEnterprise DefenseIntelligenceAgency DirectorofNationalIntelligence DocumentExploitation DepartmentofDefense DepartmentofState DefenseScienceBoard ElectromagneticIntelligence Electrooptical Escalationoffire Find,Fix,andFinish ForeignAreaOfficer ForeignInternalDefense FinancialIntelligence ForeignInstrumentationSignalsIntelligence FieldManual FullMotionVideo GeospatialIntelligence GroundMovingTargetIndicator
HumanSocial,CultureandBehaviorModelingProgram
HumanTerrainSystem HumanIntelligence IndicationsandWarnings IntelligenceCommunity IntelligenceCommunityDirective IntegratedCrisisEarlyWarningSystem ImprovisedExplosiveDevice ImageryIntelligence
APPENDIXH.ACRONYMS
107
INFORMS INT IPB IPT IR ISAF ISR JOG JP JS LiDAR MASINT MC&G MCO MIP MOD MOI NGA NGO NIM NIP NRO NSA NSC ODNI OEF OGCSWE ONR OR OSINT InstituteforOperationsResearchandtheManagementSciences Intelligence IntelligencePreparationoftheBattlefield IntegratedProductTeam Infrared InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce Intelligence,Surveillance,andReconnaissance JointOperationsGuidance JointPublication JointStaff LightDetectionAndRanging MeasurementandSignatureIntelligence Mapping,Charting,andGeodesy MajorCombatOperations MilitaryIntelligenceProgram MinistryofDefense MinistryoftheInterior NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency NonGovernmentalOrganization NationalIntelligenceManager NationalIntelligenceProgram NationalReconnaissanceOffice NationalSecurityAgency NationalSecurityCouncil OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence OperationEnduringFreedom OpenGeospatialConsortiumsSensorWebEnablement OfficeofNavalResearch OperationsResearch OpenSourceIntelligence
OUSD(I) PCPAD PED PIR PRT R&D RC RF S&T SAR SIGINT SO SOF SWaP TCPED TOR TTP UAVs UCDMO U.S. USA USAF USAID USCENTCOM USD(AT&L) USD(C) USD(I) USD(P&R) USD(P) OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforIntelligence Planninganddirection;Collection;Processingandexploitation, Analysisandproduction;Dissemination Processing,Exploitation,Dissemination PriorityIntelligenceRequirement ProvisionalReconstructionTeam ResearchandDevelopment RegionalCommand RadioFrequency ScienceandTechnology SyntheticApertureRadar SignalsIntelligence StabilityOperations SpecialOperationsForces Size,weight,andpower Tasking,Collection,Processing,Exploitation,andDissemination TermsofReference Tactics,Techniques,andProcedures UnmannedAerialVehicle UnifiedCrossDomainManagementOffice UnitedStates UnitedStatesArmy UnitedStatesAirForce UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment UnitedStatesCentralCommand UnderSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,Technology,and Logistics UnderSecretaryofDefenseComptroller UnderSecretaryofDefenseforIntelligence UnderSecretaryofDefenseforPersonnelandReadiness UnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicy
APPENDIXH.ACRONYMS
109
USG USMC USN USSOCOM UW VV&A WAPS UnitedStatesGovernment UnitedStatesMarineCorps UnitedStatesNavy UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand UnconventionalWarfare Verification,Validation,andAccreditation WideAreaPersistentSurveillance
APPENDIXI.BIBLIOGRAPHY
Afghanistans Security Environment. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 5 May2010. Allen,Patrick.UnderstandingLocalActorBasesofPower.IOJournal.August2010. Batson, Douglas E. Napoleonic Knowhow for Stability Operations In Modern Military Geography, ed. Francis A. Galgano and Eugene J. Palka. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. Best, Richard A. Jr. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Acquisitions: Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional ResearchService,June2010. Brannen, Kate. Draft of U.S. Army Ops Concept Continues Break from Past Doctrine. DefenseNews(July7,2010). Bunker,Robert.TheUglyTruth:InsurgenciesareBrutal.SmallWarsJournal(2010). Burchard,John.Q.E.D.:MITinWorldWarII.Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1948. CJCSM3500.04E:UniversalJointTaskManual.Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,Joint ChiefsofStaff,25August2008. Clapper, James. Leading the IC: A ReSet. Washington, DC: Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence,August2010. Cohen,RaphaelS.ATaleofTwoManuals.PRISMVol.2No.1(2010):87100. Condra, Luke N., Joseph H. Felter, Radha K. Iyengar, and Jacob N. Shapiro. The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington, DC: National Bureau of EconomicResearch,July2010. Cooper, Helene and Mark Landler. Targeted Killing is New U.S. Focus in Afghanistan. TheNewYorkTimes(31July2010). Cordesman, Anthony H. The Afghan War: Metrics, Narratives, and Winning the War. Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,7June2010. CounterinsurgencyFM324.Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheArmy,December2006. Cozzens, Jeffrey B. Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture. Joint Force Quarterly No. 52 (Winter2009):8691.
111
Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among UnmannedAircraftSystems.Washington,DC:GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,July 2009. DefenseIntelligenceStrategy.Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,2010. Demarest, Geoff. Lets Take the French Experience in Algeria Out of U.S. CounterinsurgencyDoctrine.MilitaryReview(JulyAugust2010). Department of Defense Directive 3000.07: Irregular Warfare. Washington, DC: Department of Defense,1December2008. Diehl,Jackson.ASurgeofProblemsinAfghanistan.TheWashingtonPost(14June2010). Dilanian, Ken. Study Says Rules Aimed at Curbing Afghan Civilian Casualties Also ReduceAttacksonU.S.Troops.TheLosAngelesTimes(3August2010). Donovan, G. Murphy. Signals and Noise in Intelligence. Small Wars Journal (27 August 2010). Douglas, Ian A. Law Enforcement Technology in Counterinsurgency Operations: Is CLEARtheRightTool?Graduatethesis,GeorgetownUniversity,16April2010. Ehrhard, Thomas P. Air Force UAVs: A Secret History. Portland, ME: The Mitchell Institute:July2010. Eikenberry, KarlandStanleyMcChrystal.U.S.GovernmentIntegrated CivilMilitaryCampaign PlanforAfghanistan.Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,27July2010. Felter, Joseph H. III. Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: A Case for Empirical Study of Counterinsurgency.Ph.D.diss.,StanfordUniversity,June2005. Final Report of the American Anthropological Association Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities. Arlington, VA: AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation,4November2007. Final Report on the Armys Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program. Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association Commission on the Engagement of AnthropologywiththeU.S.SecurityandIntelligenceCommunities,14October2009. AvailableontheInternetat: http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/commissions/CEAUSSIC/upload/CEAUSSIC_HTS_Fin al_Report.pdf. Fitzsimmons, Michael F. Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency Strategy. Ph.D. diss.,UniversityofMaryland,2009.
Flynn,MichaelT.,MattPottinger,andPaulD.Batchelor.FixingIntel:ABlueprintforMaking Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,January2010. Flynn, Michael T., Rich Juergens and Thomas L. Cantrell. Employing ISR Special OperationsForcesBestPractices.JointForceQuarterlyNo.50(Fall2008):5661. Francis, David. Want to Know How the War in Afghanistan is Going? Watch Kandahar. TheChristianScienceMonitor(21October2010). Fussell, Christopher, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen. What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?Monterrey,CA:U.S.NavalPostgraduateSchool,2010. Gabbay, Michael. Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq. CTC Sentinel(March2008). Gorka,SebastianL.v.andDavidKilcullen.AnActorcentricTheoryofWar:Understanding the Difference Between COIN and Counterinsurgency. Joint Force Quarterly No. 60 (Winter2011):1418. Hughes, Patrick M. Guerilla WarBack Again? Mobil Riverine Force Association, 22 July 2003. Available on the Internet at: http://www.mrfa.org/article4.htm. Last accessed 25January2011. Ignatius, David. Petraeus Rewrites the Playbook in Afghanistan. The Washington Post (19 October2010). Intelligence Community Directive Number 503: Intelligence Community Information Technology Systems Security, Risk Mangement, Certification and Accreditation. Washington, DC: OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,September15,2008. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements. Washington, DC: GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,January2010. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Overarching Guidance is Needed to Advance Information Sharing. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, March 2010. IntelUnderFire:CanORHelpWintheAfghanWar?ORMSToday(June2010). IrregularWarfare(IW)JointOperatingConcept(JOC)Version1.0.Washington,DC:Department ofDefense,JointChiefsofStaff,11September2007. Jones, Seth G. The Rise of Afghanistans Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad. International SecurityVol.32No.4(Spring2008):740.
113
JP 102 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April2010. JP324CounterinsurgencyOperations.Washington,DC:TheJointStaff,5October2009. Kagan, Frederick. Were Not the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Weekly Standard (21 August 2009). Kaplan, Edward H., Moshe Kress and Roberto Szechtman. Confronting Entrenched Insurgents.INFORMSOperationsResearch(MarchApril2010). Kaplan, Fred. A New Plan for Afghanistan: Less Counterinsurgency, More Killing and Capturing.Slate(13October2010). ________.TheTransformer.ForeignPolicy(SeptemberOctober2010). Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. CRS ReporttoCongress.Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,29June2010. Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration. Washington, DC: GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,9June2010. Kilcullen,David.MeasuringProgressinAfghanistan.Kabul,Afghanistan:December 2009.AvailableontheInternetat: http://hts.army.mil/Documents/Measuring%20Progress%20Afghanistan%20(2).pdf. Kress, Moshe, and Roberto Szechtman. Why Defeating Insurgencies is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations A BestCase Scenario. INFORMS OperationsResearch(MayJune2009). Latif, S. Amer. An Analytical Study of the Kurdish Workers Party. PKK) as an Insurgent Movement.Graduatethesis,CatholicUniversityofAmerica,1999. Le Sage, Andre. Africas Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement. StrategicForum(May2010). Litchfield, John D. Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army SchoolofAdvancedMilitaryStudies,2010. Mattis,James.FeedbackontheDSBReportonUnderstandingHumanDynamics.(12June 2009).
McChrystal, Stanley A. and Michael T. Hall. ISAF Commanders Counterinsurgency Guidance. Kabul,Afghanistan:InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce/U.S.ForcesAfghanistan, August2009. Murphy, Kate. Web Photos that Reveal Secrets, Like Where You Live. New York Times (August11,2010):B6. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining Americas Military Leadership.Washington,DC:ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,8February2011. NationalSecurityStrategy.Washington,DC:TheWhiteHouse,May2010. OBrien, Sean P. Crisis Early Warning and Decision Support: Contemporary Approaches andThoughtsonFutureResearch.InternationalStudiesReviewVol.12No.1(March 2010):87104. Olsen, Eric T. Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare. Special Warfare (September October2010). Orem,JohnandHughChen.ANewStrategicBalance:TheImplicationsforISR. Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill. Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of SuccessinCounterinsurgency.SantaMonica,CA:TheRANDCorporation,2010. Petraeus, David H. CENTCOM Update. Washington, DC: The Center for a New AmericanSecurity,11June2009. ________. COMISAFs Counterinsurgency Guidance. Kabul, Afghanistan: International SecurityAssistanceForce/U.S.ForcesAfghanistan,1August2010. Political Military Policy Planning Team. Program Overview. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010. Available on the Internet at: www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt.LastAccessedJanuary24,2011. The QDR in Perspective: Meeting Americas National Security Needs in the 21st Century. Washington,DC:QDRIndependentReviewPanel,2010. Rempe, Dennis M. Counterinsurgency in Colombia: A U.S. National Security Perspective, 19581966.Ph.D.diss.,TheUniversityofMiami,May2002. Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to Hostilities. Washington, DC:DefenseScienceBoard,December2004. Report of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors.Washington,DC:DefenseScienceBoard,February2007.
115
Report of the Defense Science Board Advisory Group on Defense Intelligence Operations Research Applications for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Washington, DC: DefenseScienceBoard,January2009. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Biometrics. Washington, DC: Defense ScienceBoard,March2007. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Biometrics Modalities Matrix. Washington,DC:DefenseScienceBoard,March2007. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Intelligence Operations Research Applications to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Washington, DC: Defense Science Board,January2009. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff.Washington,DC:DefenseScienceBoard,March2009. Reportofthe DefenseScienceBoardTaskForceon UnderstandingHuman Dynamics. Washington, DC:DefenseScienceBoard,March2009. Rubin, Alissa J. French General Mixes Formula for a Bit of Afghan Calm. The New York Times(13October2010). Schmitt, Eric, Helene Cooper, and David Sanger. U.S. Military to Press for Slower Afghan Drawdown.TheNewYorkTimes(11August2010). Sepp,KalevI.BestPracticesinCounterinsurgency.MilitaryReview(MayJune2005):812. Shane, Scott, Mark Mazzetti and Robert F. Worth, Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on TwoContinents.TheNewYorkTimes(14August2010). Shanker, Thomas, and Eric Schmitt. U.S. Intelligence Puts New Focus on Afghan Graft. TheNewYorkTimes(12June2010). Shilling, Adam. NationBuilding, Stability Operations and Prophylactic COIN. Ft. Belvoir, VA: CenterforArmyAnalysis,5May2010. Silber, Mitchell D. and Arvin Bhatt. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. New York,NY:NYPDIntelligenceDivision,2007. Sirak,MichaelC.ISRRevolution.AirForceMagazine(June2010):3642. SOCOM Commander Concerned Over Direction of Pentagon COIN Strategy. Inside the Navy(31May2010).
Stein,Jeff.GAOAgainSlamsU.S.NationalSecurityAgencies.TheWashingtonPost(9June 2010). Sticha, Paul J. Dennis M. Buede and Richard L. Rees. Its the People, Stupid: The Role of Personality and Situational Variables in Predicting Decisionmaker Behavior. Presentation to the 73rd Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, 4 January2006. TacticalPersistentSurveillance.Washington,DC:U.S.ArmyIntelligenceCenter,25September 2007. Thomas, Jason. The Cognitive Dissonance of COIN: Right Doctrine, Wrong War. Small WarsJournal(13August2010). Thompson,GaryH.andDavidW.Muench.UnityNet:AGloballyDeployableSensorforWhite Information.Washington,DC:DefenseIntelligenceAgency,5May2010. Tirpak, John A. Beyond Reachback: New ISR Systems and Techniques Put Awesome Intel attheFingertipsofPracticallyanyWarfighter.AirForceMagazine(March2009). UnitedStatesGovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuide.Washington,DC:USG,January2009. United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. Kabul, Afghanistan: Embassy of the United States of America and U.S. Forces Afghanistan,August10,2009. UnmannedAircraftSystems:AdditionalActionsNeededtoImproveManagementandIntegrationof DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs. Washington, DC: Government AccountabilityOffice,November2008. Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities.Washington,DC:GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,July2007. Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a ResultsOriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories. Washington, DC: Government AccountabilityOffice,March2010. Worobec, Stephen F. International Narcotics Control in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia.Ph.D.diss.,TheClaremontInstitute,1984. ****

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Report of the

Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3.3. TORTASK3:WHATCHANGESCANBEMADEINTHEISRPROCESSTOIMPROVE SUPPORTTOCOIN? ............................................................................................................38 3.3.1. ISRSUPPORTTOTRADITIONALCOINACTIVITIES .........................................38

3.3.2. ISRINSUPPORTOFWHOLEOFGOVERNMENT,POPULATIONCENTRICCOIN INITIATIVES.....................................................................................................................42 3.4. TORTASK4:WHATCANBEDONEINTHEIMMEDIATEFUTURETOIMPROVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: TASKING AND KEY FINDINGS

AlliedJointDoctrine(AJP)3.4.4Joint DoctrineforCOIN(NATOpubon COIN)(Nov2008)

MilitaryTransformation: IntelligenceSurveillance,and Reconnaissance(Jan2003)

NationalLevelTasks: DevelopMinistryofDefense(MOD),ANAandMinistryoftheInterior(MOI) capacityforaccountability,interoperability,andoversight.

3.2. TORTASK2:WHATISTHERECOMMENDEDALLOCATIONANDUSEOFDOD ISRRESOURCESTOSUSTAINCOINCAPABILITYALONGWITHOTHER COMPETINGINTELLIGENCEREQUIREMENTS,FOREXAMPLECT?

3.3. TORTASK3:WHATCHANGESCANBEMADEINTHEISRPROCESSTO IMPROVESUPPORTTOCOIN?

3.3.2. ISRINSUPPORTOFWHOLEOFGOVERNMENT,POPULATIONCENTRICCOIN INITIATIVES

3.5. TORTASK5:WHATEMERGINGTECHNOLOGIESANDMETHODOLOGIES, COMBINATIONSOFSENSORS,ANDINVESTMENTSININFORMATIONFUSION ANDANALYSISARELIKELYTOPROVIDETHEHIGHESTPAYOFF?

41 For a summary of operations research as a field of practice, see: http://www.informs.org/About INFORMS/AboutOperationsResearch. 42

NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) DeputyUnderSecretaryofDefense(acting)forPortfolio, Programs&Resources,OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryof Defense(Intelligence) NationalGroundIntelligenceCenter(NGIC) NationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency(NGA) CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity

Mr.PaulMeinshausen Mr.OrrinMills LTCJohnNagl,USA(Ret.)

Metric 4: Victory Comes by PinpointingIslams Enemies through the Refining ProcessofJihad,andThusMaintainingItsIdentity.

Metric 5: Establishing Pride, Brotherhood,and Unity in the Face of Threats to theUmmahIsaFormofVictory.

Metric 6: Creating a Parity of Sufferingwith Islams EnemiesEspecially the JewsandCrusadersIsaVictory.

Metric 7: Victory Is Seen in the MaladiesAfflicting Gods Enemies, EspeciallyEconomicRecessionandNaturalDisasters.

AirForceDoctrineDocument (AFDD)23IrregularWarfare (August2007)

You might also like