An Oasis in the Desert?

Issues and Intricacies Concerning

the Louvre-Abu Dhabi Museum Expansion
Taylor Poulin

You have created a Museum: carefully assemble here every

masterpiece that the Republic [of France] already possess-
es…and let the entire world hasten to deposit its treasures,
its curios, its works; and all the documents of its history: let
it be the archives of the world.1
This statement was penned in 1793 by Comte François Antoine
de Boissy d’Anglas to the museum commission in charge of filling
the newly created Musée Central des Arts in Paris – the future Musée
du Louvre. At the time it was terribly confident, but has become an
accurate description of the museum. The Louvre does indeed con-
tain objects from all over the world and from all stretches of time.
Symbolically, it holds great cultural significance for the French, and,
as supported by its very long history, holds a seminal position in
representing the French national identity. However, recent develop-
ments have seen the Louvre taking steps toward national and inter-
national expansion, with the latter in particular putting this notion
of a unique and intrinsic French identity in jeopardy. Within four
years from now, two satellite museums will be created: the first in
Lens, a small, industrial city north of Paris, and the second on Saadi-
yat Island, off the coast of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.
A satellite of the Louvre built on French soil is not a new con-
cept,2 and thus the Lens museum project is relatively uncontrover-
sial. However, the French reception of the Abu Dhabi endeavor has

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been much more critical and understandably so, as the Louvre rep-
resents both a structure and a collection that are deeply entrenched
in French cultural and national identity. The argument in France
revolves around the motivations of Abu Dhabi in proposing this
expansion, and the resulting consequences for France. The follow-
ing will explain the current situation involving France, Abu Dhabi
and the Louvre from historical and theoretical perspectives, as well
as current opinions of French detractors and Abu Dhabian support-
ers concerning this project. To these ends, I will begin by analyzing
the history of the Louvre as well as providing a brief history of the
early museum network in France, presenting how the museum has
come into its role as a point of national identification for the French.
Next, I will illustrate the present issues concerning the agreement
between the Louvre and Abu Dhabi, and follow this with a discus-
sion of the Louvre-Abu Dhabi agreement. I will look to the power/
knowledge relationship proposed by Michel Foucault to explain pos-
sible motivations and issues surrounding the project, as well as the
postcolonial ideas of Homi Bhabha to explain how, in contrast with
colonization of old, the new satellite may be creating a new type of
colonization. To conclude, I will set the Louvre’s actions against
those of the Guggenheim Museum in New York and the State Her-
mitage Museum in St. Petersburg, Russia, to determine whether or
not the Louvre should embrace a network of international satellites
in the future as could be hypothesized by its involvement with Abu
Dhabi.
The Musée Central des Arts opened its doors to the public on 10
August 1793. Built in 1190 under Philippe Auguste (1165-1223) to
serve as a fortress against invading Normans, the structure known
as the Palais du Louvre had served in some kind of royal or defen-
sive capacity until the late eighteenth century. The move in 1793
toward an open display of what had formerly been a collection re-
served for royals – built carefully by royal ancestors reaching back
to François I (1515-1547) – was a bow to the victory of the French
Revolutionaries, who had fought against the monarchy for an equal
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and fraternal society. In visiting the museum, the French citizen

was to witness the glory of the country exhibited through the now
nationally owned cultural treasures displayed there, and ultimately
to understand himself “as a citizen of history’s most civilized and
advanced nation-state.”3
Indeed, the Louvre’s origin and early development promoted the
country’s newfound freedom, equality, and wealth, offering to the
French people cultural knowledge as well as the ability to identify
themselves as members of a powerful nation. The mission of the
revolutionaries to open the Louvre to general admission was satu-
rated with political undertones. The goal was twofold: to prove,
by successfully opening the Louvre to the people, that this newly
liberated governmental power was greater than any that had come
before it, and to educate the people in a manner conducive to the
Republican leanings of the government.4 Andrew McClellan ex-
plains the opinion of Revolutionary writer Armand Kersaint, author
of Discours sur les monuments publics, on the effects the Louvre as an
open institution would have for the country: “Completing the Lou-
vre, [Kersaint] stated, would demonstrate that the new regime had
accomplished ‘in several years what ten kings and fifty prodigal min-
isters had failed to do in several centuries.’”5 In addition, the gov-
ernment promoted a sense of national ownership of all the cultural
treasures the Louvre contained. “The perception of collective own-
ership helped [to] fashion…the ‘republican mold’ and to confer on
the citizen ‘a national character and the demeanor of a free man.’…
At one and the same time, the museum symbolized the stability of
the state and the triumph of the people.”6
The enormous exhibition mounted in the Louvre at its opening
on 10 August – including over 661 objects, mostly paintings, sculp-
ture and objets d’art7 – was an important statement about the glory
of the arts in France and, in equal measure, about the ability of the
government to provide these beautiful objects for the education of
the country.

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Authority alone was not enough to direct a revolution: the

citizenry had to be molded through direct and willing par-
ticipation. The consent and participation of the people [in
Revolutionary ideals] would be secured through a compre-
hensive system of public instruction….Man had to learn to
be free; he had to be taught to reject his old values and to
place his faith in the future of the Republic.8

The Louvre and its contents were thus representations of the recently
achieved national unity and a step toward fulfilling the Revolution-
ary desire to see France accept its new government. Culture was no
longer reserved for those in positions of authority, but was now ac-
cessible to the entire French public – upper and lower classes. This
was made possible through the successes of the Revolution and the
government’s wish to see the whole country benefit from the knowl-
edge to be had by it.
A few years after the Louvre was made accessible to the pub-
lic, the work of one man enhanced tenfold the collection and
reputation of the museum. Napoleon Bonaparte (Emperor from
1804-1814/15) served France as a general before becoming one of
the country’s most iconic leaders. As a general, he spent several years
battling his way across Europe and Egypt, aiming to secure territory
for his country. With an additional desire to see Paris as the cultural
epitome of Europe, he sent loot, in the form of artwork, from his
conquests back to the city to be displayed in the Louvre.9 However,
feeling that the Louvre was beginning to overflow with the magnifi-
cent works Napoleon shipped back to Paris, then Ministor of Interi-
or, J.A. Chaptal, sent a letter to the Emperor: “It cannot be disputed
that Paris must retain the greatest works in every category. …But
the inhabitants of the provinces may also claim an inviolable share
of the fruits of our conquests and the heritage of French artists.”10
Chaptal proposed the solution of creating museum outposts in the
provinces, located in cities where “sufficient understanding already
exists to afford them adequate appreciation.”11 The cities that met

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Chaptal’s standards were Marseille, Dijon, Caen, Bordeaux, Brus-

sels, Geneva, Mainz,12 Lille, Rouen, Toulouse, Lyon, Nancy, Rennes,
Nantes, and Strasbourg. Agreeing with Chaptal, in 1800 Napoleon
signed a document ordering museums to be built in these cities. The
new museums would receive paintings from the Louvre and ideally
establish cultural and national pride throughout the land.13
The Louvre and its holdings, with its original objectives of edu-
cation and public inclusion and now its incredible, almost unbeliev-
able collection, had set a superb example for how the cultural and
militaristic power of the country could be displayed. Napoleon clear-
ly saw political advantages in displaying artwork throughout France
that had been appropriated from all over Europe. He desired that
his country be the superlative in power and glory – what better way
than by proving he had collected more cultural treasures than even
Paris could hold, including works which were considered elemental
to other countries’ own national heritage? For example, during one
of his Italian conquests Napoleon was able to negotiate the Laocoön
from Rome, bringing it to Paris to be displayed.14 This significant
sculpture, created sometime between 42 and 20 B.C., depicts Lao-
coön and his sons being strangled by snakes for their unsuccessful
efforts to expose the Trojan Horse as an attack on the Trojans by the
Greeks.15 Thought to be created for the Roman emperor Nero, the
sculpture was buried under the streets of Rome until 1506, when it
was rediscovered and appropriately lauded as a work of incredible
beauty and import. “Finding the Laocoön was a dream come true
for well-educated Renaissance artists and patrons who were intent
on restoring Rome to its ancient glory…By March of 1506, Pope
Julius II managed to procure the sculpture for his own antiquities
collection, and in July of the same year he triumphantly transported
the sculpture through the streets of Rome.”16 The sculpture’s dy-
namic, tangled composition influenced many later European artists,
but arguably had the most notable effect on Michelangelo.

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[Michelangelo’s] oeuvre clearly demonstrates that he was

intrigued by the sculpture’s muscular tension and by the
spiraling motion of the central figure as he struggles to free
himself from the strangling snakes. On the Sistine Cha-
pel Ceiling, Michelangelo created numerous figures with
similarly muscular anatomies and placed them in serpen-
tinata positions that recall that of the central figure in the
Laocoön.17
The Laocoön quickly became a major inspiration for many Renais-
sance artists, and when it was carted away to France its loss must
have been felt deeply in Italy.18 However, Napoleon was intent on
his goal. In spreading art around the provinces, the Emperor was
uniting his country on the basis of its cultural supremacy – which
stemmed from the Louvre – and, in a way comparable to the Revo-
lutionaries, offered knowledge, via the provincial museums, which
was ultimately made possible by the power of the government.
The early museum hierarchy that arose in the provinces during
the Napoleonic era was an excellent example of how power was cre-
ated through the diffusion of knowledge. During the nineteenth
century, responsibility for maintaining the direction and control of
these provincial museums was left largely to the local communi-
ty. In his essay “The Bourgeoisie, Cultural Appropriation and the
Art Museum in Nineteenth-Century France,” Daniel Sherman de-
scribes the evolution of the larger provincial museums from neglect-
ed, poorly-assembled collections consisting mostly of art sent by the
government,19 to institutions that had the power to define and in-
fluence the community.20 This was done, he explains, through “a
cast of characters: lawyers, merchants, ship-owners in the port cities,
manufacturers in Rouen and Marseille, a sprinkling of bankers and
real estate developers.” Clearly a powerful group, these members of
the upper class desired to prove their authority as well in the cultural
realm.21 They improved upon the collections with their own money
and rebuilt the museums in ciphered architecture which the learned

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alone could truly appreciate.22 These efforts “present[ed] art as flow-

ing naturally from commerce and industry, the defining activities
of the nineteenth-century city and the source of the political power
of its rulers.”23 The museum was offered to the whole community,
but still maintained a sense of being a product of the elite. While it
seemed democratic on the surface, the museum in general possessed
a sense of a special access to knowledge, and a sense of exclusion.
The French provincial museum is a perfect example of the creation
and production of power, as knowledge was offered freely but in
a dissimulated manner; the upper class was presenting knowledge
masked by an affirmation of their status in society. Where national
identity is concerned, this development could be positioned as the
maintenance of local over national pride. However, I would argue
that if it were not for Napoleon originally effectuating the network
of provincial museums, and his desire to see France linked by a com-
mon awareness of the country’s cultural superiority starting with the
Louvre, then the nineteenth-century local elite would not have had
this avenue through which to exercise powers of cultural influence in
their own society, ultimately boosting the overall cultural authority
of the country.
The years between the Louvre’s early development and its cur-
rent activity saw a great deal of change, occurring simultaneously in
the structuring of the Louvre as well as the notion of national iden-
tity it would produce. The present physical composition of the Lou-
vre – a two-armed U shape – was created in 1871 when the Tuileries
Palace, a vestige of Catherine de Medici (1547-1559), was burned
to the ground by revolutionaries opposed to the ruler at the time,
Napoleon III (1852-1870).24 A little over a hundred years later, the
motley spread of galleries, wings, and museums within the Louvre
were finally united in 1989 with I.M. Pei’s underground entrance,
marked above ground by a seventy foot glass pyramid. The pyramid
sparked an intense debate over the appropriateness of something so
modern placed amidst more traditional, refined architecture. It be-
came evident through the uproar caused by the pyramid that the
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Louvre did indeed seem intrinsically connected to the French iden-

tity; the French were feeling threatened by the loss of the traditional
façade of the Louvre.25
The clash over Pei’s pyramid has since dissipated, but questions
surrounding the cause of the argument linger. How does a structure
with precisely 817 years of existence and a history of display last-
ing over 200 years maintain a sense of the modern day? Is it even
obligated to do so? One could argue that Pei’s pyramid and under-
ground extension were an attempt to bring the Louvre up to date.
At the very least it gave the Louvre a badly needed interior coher-
ence. Recent activities of the Louvre, too, could be seen as fulfilling
a need to emphasize the museum’s importance in the global arena, as
compared to other cultural institutions that have a history of global
expansion: the Guggenheim of New York City and the Hermitage
State Museum in St. Petersburg, for example, each have several satel-
lites and are planning others. The Louvre’s own plans to expand are
currently generating great controversy among the French, with some
critics even going so far as to attack the project on the grounds that
the Louvre is “selling its soul.”26
The specifics of the satellite museum project are described in
the twenty-year contract the Louvre has signed with Abu Dhabi.27
For the duration of the contract, the satellite museum is allowed to
use the name “Louvre,” and will also receive management expertise
and loans of artwork. Originally,28 all the art to be displayed in
the satellite was to come from the Louvre. However, in the con-
tract signed in December 2006, “even if the institution calls itself
the Louvre, all French museums in Paris, such as the Quai Branly,
the Musée d’Orsay, Versailles and the Centre Pompidou, and also
regional museums, could be involved.”29 France, then, will rotate
four temporary shows per year in Abu Dhabi, with each show last-
ing a duration of two to four months for a span of ten years. In
addition, the French museum will loan up to 300 works of art for
semi-permanent display (a span of anywhere from three months to
two years). Meanwhile, learning from the practices and collection
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of the Louvre, Abu Dhabi will work to create its own collection,
management and title. For its part, Abu Dhabi will return roughly
$1.3 billion to France.30
Upon hearing of the potential project and then the actual agree-
ment, critics such as Françoise Cachin, former director of the orga-
nization Museums of France; Roland Recht, professor at the Collège
de France; and Jean Clair, writer and former director of the Picasso
Museum – all three important figures in the Parisian art world – ar-
gued against the Louvre-Abu Dhabi museum because of the dangers
they see in the project, which focus on the potential globalization of
the museum and the inevitable movement of art within such a net-
work. In their joint editorial “Museums are not for sale,” published
in Le Monde in December 2006, the three argued against the trend
of the Guggenheim, which they call an “entertainment business” and
credit with the “disastrous pioneering of the paid exportation of its
collections throughout the entire world.”31 This so-called “pioneer-
ing” has meant that the Guggenheim now boasts branches in Bilbao,
Las Vegas, Berlin and Venice, and is planning satellites in Rio de
Janeiro and Abu Dhabi. The authors support their criticisms of the
developing global network of museums and museum exchange with
an argument for the safety of their cultural masterpieces: “Of course,
it is necessary to loan works of art if their condition allows it and
if their security is guaranteed, but freely…[versus in exchange for
money].”32 The safety of art during travel should be a primary con-
cern in any situation, as the shipment of art to and from museums
all over the world is a given in today’s practice of global exchanges.
These critics’ use of the word “freely,” referring to how art should be
exchanged, is a pointed statement against the money the Louvre is
receiving for this endeavor.
The article maintains that art should be displayed for art’s sake,
and not used for commercial measures: “On the moral plane, the
commercial and media use of masterpieces of national patrimony,
foundations of the history of our culture which the Republic must
show and preserve for future generations, cannot but shock.”33 The
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authors steer the argument toward le patrimoine, the concept of na-

tional patrimony that is of utmost importance to the French. Le pat-
rimoine has its own day of celebration in France, usually occurring
in mid-September, in which public access to museums, opera hous-
es, churches, theaters and other cultural establishments is free; this
practice echoes the fact that the Louvre was open free to the public
even at its birth as a museum in 1793 and supports the importance
of culture to the French. The critics seem to remind their readers of
this importance in ethical terms (“On the moral plane”), indicating
that the present treatment of French art and culture, represented by
the Louvre-Abu Dhabi partnership, should be taken very seriously.
However, the type of exchange that Cachin, Clair and Recht call
for is not the reality of the Abu Dhabi museum project. This newer
type of exchange between museums – money for art, rather than art
for art – is an interesting prospect in the growing world of museum
expansion and museum identification, and it raises many questions.
What does it mean for the intrinsically French identity of the Lou-
vre, that a satellite be placed in Abu Dhabi? What does it mean for
the French people, and any notion of national identity the Louvre
once offered them? To the first question, one could posit the notion
of cultural colonialism – that the Louvre is reaching out to extend
Western influence and culture over the Middle East. While we can-
not exactly view this project from a postcolonial perspective because
the museum has yet to be built, Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial obser-
vations about how colonialism traditionally has functioned paves
the way for more conversation on the topic, and highlights how the
Louvre-Abu Dhabi project is the furthest thing from this function.
Postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and
uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the
contest for political and social authority within the mod-
ern world order. Postcolonial perspectives . . . intervene in
those ideological discourses of modernity that attempt to
give a hegemonic “normality” to the uneven development

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and the differential, often disadvantages, histories of na-

tions, races, communities, peoples.34

The idea of “unequal and uneven forces of cultural representa-

tion” does not necessarily apply in this situation. Abu Dhabi is not
an underdeveloped country that needs “civilizing,” as perhaps has
been argued for countries looking to spread their influence in the
past. France is not forcing the Louvre and its collection of West-
ern art on this Gulf city. Rather, it was per the request of the gov-
ernment of Abu Dhabi that the Louvre take part in the cultural
development of its nation. Bassem Terkawi, the director for tour-
ism development and investment in Abu Dhabi, explained that the
“direction is to position Abu Dhabi as the cultural capital of the
region. We’re trying to bring world-class cultural facilities that are
not available in this part of the world.”35 Indeed, the Louvre will
be joined by the likes of the Guggenheim, the Yale Art School, and
other significant international cultural institutions and schools in
Abu Dhabi. A New York Times article published 10 February 2008
detailed the increasing trend of American universities establishing
full branches of their campuses in the Arabian Gulf. The director
of one of these programs in Abu Dhabi expressed what is evidently
a widespread opinion of growth in the UAE: “We’re very eager to
have a presence here…In the gulf, it’s not what’s here now, it’s what’s
coming. Everybody’s on the way.”36
The reason for this development, according to Reem Al-Hashimy,
the United Arab Emirates representative in the U.S., is that “[The
UAE does not] have the know-how when it comes to putting to-
gether an arts institution, for example…So we know our deficien-
cies, and we look for the best and try to learn from them.”37 This
approach taken by the United Arab Emirates is clearly far removed
from the colonization of the past, which entailed one country or cul-
ture dominating another, usually by force. Pertaining to this tradi-
tional approach toward colonization, the French annexation of Mo-
rocco is a case in point. Hamid Irbouh situates us: “Beginning in

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the nineteenth century, France, Spain and Germany had all shown
a keen interest in colonising [sic] Morocco because of its strategic
position, rich resources, and potential trade.”38 He goes on to ex-
plain how, in 1907, France took control of Morocco by force (or the
majority of it; a smaller portion was seized by Spain), appropriating
control of almost every aspect of the Moroccans’ lives: finances, agri-
culture, military and police, education, urban planning, health, the
fine arts, and the postal service. The only things left to Moroccan di-
rection were charities, the judicial system, and religious education.39
Countless cases of colonization such as this have happened through-
out history, with the majority of these initiated by comparatively
powerful Western countries. However, the Louvre-Abu Dhabi proj-
ect is in effect a new story of colonization, one where the exchange of
money and culture replaces the force of culture over culture.
An idea that runs alongside this “chosen” colonization is the pos-
sibility of a sort of power struggle between these two countries, with
each participant’s major asset – France’s culture, Abu Dhabi’s money
– being pulled back and forth in a political and cultural tug-of-war
of ethics. Michel Foucault’s discussion of power and knowledge pro-
vides a foundation for this idea. Foucault offers a strong argument
for the close connection between knowledge and power. One might
assume this could be a dangerous relationship – the way knowledge
is used to wield power and vice-versa – but the philosopher main-
tains that they must go hand-in-hand.
Behind all knowledge (savoir), behind all attainment of
knowledge (connaissance), what is involved is a struggle for
power. Political power is not absent from knowledge, it
is woven together with it….[T]he political and economic
conditions of existence are not a veil or an obstacle for the
subject of knowledge but the means by which subjects of
knowledge are formed.40

Let us briefly return to the use of power and knowledge in the

nineteenth-century French museum network to explain the current
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positioning of the two elements between Abu Dhabi and the Louvre.
Within the early museum network, power was created and upheld
through the offer of knowledge (represented by culture), situating
those who were able to support culture in the most powerful posi-
tions. Interestingly, the current circumstances see Abu Dhabi doing
the same exact thing, thanks to its substantial financial authority.
Abu Dhabi has recognized the power contained in cultural knowl-
edge; for this emirate thinking about a future beyond oil revenue,
such power revolves not only around the reputation of the Louvre
as a cultural authority, but also around the tourism generated by the
Louvre and the attention that would naturally arrive with a satellite
of the Louvre. Not only is the emirate acquiring knowledge through
the use of its financial power, but it is also establishing itself as a veri-
table superpower of knowledge.
The opinion given by Anna Somers Cocks, the editorial director
of The Art Newspaper, is not unlike that of Foucault in expressing the
inextricable link between knowledge and power. At the same time,
she presents a potential benefit of the situation between the Louvre
and Abu Dhabi. “When Abu Dhabi and Qatar and Dubai start to
want museums and libraries to collaborate with our universities, this
is our opportunity to exercise soft power…to make ourselves known,
to enlarge the areas of common dialogue.”41 The author emphasizes
that the desire of Abu Dhabi to possess Western culture adds to the
esteem of those institutions with which it is cooperating, and helps
develop a broadened arena for international discourse. Taken at its
most basic level – that of renowned institutions aiding a country in
developing its cultural identity – the agreement between the Louvre
and Abu Dhabi could be considered a very welcome handshake be-
tween the West and the Middle East.
However, while Cocks’s viewpoint is helpful in seeing the posi-
tive aspects of this venture, it does not account for the more dif-
ficult issues that surround the Louvre satellite project. Abu Dhabi
is fashioning a cultural identity in the likeness of Western exam-
ples, encouraging a globalization of culture that, at least in the case
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of the Louvre, will lead to the loss of the Louvre’s unique identi-
ty. This is troublesome precisely because the Louvre is not like the
Guggenheim, which has become the poster child for globalization.
The French institution has never intended to create a physical global
presence42 around the world as the Guggenheim or even the Hermit-
age have.
To support this argument, I offer a comparison between the
statements of purpose for the Louvre and the Guggenheim. The
mission statement of the Guggenheim includes the aim to “engage
and educate an increasingly diverse international audience through
its unique network of museums and cultural partnerships.”43 Ad-
ditionally, the Guggenheim Collection has almost always been an
active model for international development. Solomon R. Guggen-
heim began collecting modern art in 1929, creating the Guggen-
heim Foundation in 1937 and receiving permission from the state
of New York to “operate one or more museums.”44 In 1938, daugh-
ter Peggy Guggenheim established an exhibition space in London
called Guggenheim Jeune.45 While the Hermitage Museum in St.
Petersburg may be more like the Louvre in that it too owns a history
integral to the story of Russia, financial difficulties plaguing the in-
stitution have caused the need to create branches around the globe.
In an interview, director Mikhail Piotrovsky admits,
Frankly, our financial situation after the end of commu-
nism was difficult, we experienced a huge drop of subsidy.
Only in the last years we managed to secure the same level
of state subsidy we once had. Branching out is one of our
efforts to get money and make us more independent from
government subsidy.46
Anything close to a mention of international expansion on the Lou-
vre’s website merely states, “The museum of the Louvre…calls upon
itself to welcome in the best way possible its visitors, both national
and foreign, and increasingly strives to offer them closer access to the
collections.”47 Taking this comparison into consideration, as well as
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both the fame of the Guggenheim and the renown of the architects
of the cultural centers that will be built on Saadiyat – the Louvre
by Jean Nouvel, the Guggenheim by Frank Gehry, a maritime mu-
seum by Tadao Ando and a performing arts center by Zaha Hadid
– it becomes evident that the emirate is simply paying for prepack-
aged reputations. Abu Dhabi has proven several times over, through
these costly arrangements with renowned artistic and academic in-
stitutions, that it is able to buy its cultural authority,48 proving that
even though it may not have a deep-rooted Westernized culture the
way Europe does (for now), it can certainly resolve this by wielding
its weighty purchasing power.
Even after explanations have been offered for the possible mo-
tivations behind the agreement between Abu Dhabi and the Lou-
vre, questions linger. Where does the venerable French institution
go from here? Will it turn into a corporate chain similar to the
Guggenheim? This is a legitimate worry, as arts journalist Alan Rid-
ing noted at the first announcement of the project: “So, in one fell
swoop, France has changed direction and is heading down a path
it once disdained, a path pioneered in the 1990s by the Solomon
R. Guggenheim Museum in New York.”49 I would argue that de-
spite the Louvre’s engagement with Abu Dhabi, I do not believe the
Guggenheim’s type of structural globalization is in the Louvre’s fu-
ture. First, as its history exemplifies, the Louvre was not originally
intended to someday include several branches across the globe; rath-
er the network of museums that stemmed from the Louvre during
the Napoleonic era was meant to glorify France to the rest of Europe
– all the while firmly retaining France’s cultural treasures (native or
otherwise) within the nation’s borders. While I acknowledge that a
museum must be flexible and adapt to fulfill the needs and transfor-
mations of its society, such adaptation should not come at the price
of the museum’s inherent identity and history. Because the world is
growing increasingly global and commercial does not mean that the
museum, as keeper of a society’s culture and identity, should natu-
rally follow suit. I also do not see the Louvre following the examples
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of the Guggenheim or the Hermitage because the Louvre does not

require a physical global presence. Unfortunately, the siren song of
money is worth more to an institution based in knowledge, such
as the museum, than one would like to admit, and French critics
are clear in their anger toward their government’s heed to this call.
While the Guggenheim has made a business of selling branches of
its museum and the Hermitage has had to extend its reach due to
financial difficulties, the Louvre seems to have survived quite well
financially prior to the final sum it will receive from Abu Dhabi.
To see more branches of the Louvre rise around the world would be
disappointing; this cultural oasis currently being built in the Abu
Dhabian desert is hopefully the first and the last.

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 An Oas is in t he D e s e r t ?
Issues and Intricacies Concerning the Louvre-Abu Dhabi Museum Expansion

Endnotes
1
Cited in Sylvain Laveissière, Napoléon et le Louvre (Paris: Librairie Arthème
Fayard, 2004), 14. “Vous avez créé un Muséum; rassemblez-y soigneusement
tout ce que la République renferme déjà de chefs-d’oeuvre…et que la terre en-
tière s’empresse d’y venir déposer ses trésors, ses singularités, ses productions;
et tous les titres de son histoire: qu’il soit les archives du globe.” Translation
mine.
2
Concerning these historical branches, I go into further detail on page six.
3
Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1995).
4
Andrew McClellan, Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics and the Origins of the
Modern Museum in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1994), 93.
5
Ibid.
6
McClellan, Inventing the Louvre , 99.
7
Ibid., 95-96.
8
Ibid., 96.
9
McClellan, Inventing the Louvre, 116-17.
10
Cecil Gould, The Trophy of Conquest: the Musée Napoléon and the Creation of
the Louvre (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 76.
11
Ibid., 76.
12
Brussels, Geneva, and Mainz were under French rule at the time.
13
Gould, The Trophy of Conquest, 76.
14
Gould, The Trophy of Conquest, 44.
15
“Laocoön,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008, Encyclopedia Britannica Online,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9047155/Laocoon, (Accessed 10
March 2008).
16
“January 14, 2006: 500th Anniversary of the Finding of the Laocoön on the
Esquiline Hill in Rome,” http://www.idcrome.org/laocoon.htm (Accessed 8
March 2008).
17
Ibid.
18
The sculpture was taken from Italy around 1796 and was returned to Rome
sometime after 1815, when Napoleon’s loss to the Prussians at the Battle of
Waterloo in 1815 provoked the restitution of many of the works he had taken
during his conquest of Europe. See Gould, The Trophy of Conquest, 116-117.
19
Daniel Sherman, “The Bourgeoisie, Cultural Appropriation and the Art
Museum in Nineteenth-Century France,” in The Nineteenth-Century Visual
Culture Reader, ed. Vanessa R. Schwartz and Jeannene M. Przyblyski, (New
York: Routledge, 2004), 132-33. Sherman explains that this chaotic early de-
velopment of museums was due to the envoi system, in which the government
bought paintings from the yearly Paris Salons and shipped them out to the

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journal of undergraduate research

provinces. He goes into further detail about the problems that arose from this
arrangement.
20
Ibid., 134.
21
Sherman, “The Bourgeoisie, Cultural Appropriation ,”134.
22
Ibid., 137, 141.
23
Ibid., 140.
24
http://www.louvre.fr/llv/musee/detail_repere.jsp?CONTENT%3C%3Ecnt_
id=10134198673227002&CURRENT_LLV_PERIODE%3C%3Ecnt_
id=10134198673226962&CURRENT_LLV_
CHRONOLOGIE%3C%3Ecnt_id=10134198673226610&CURRENT_
LLV_REPERE%3C%3Ecnt_id=10134198673227002&FOLDER%3C%
3Efolder_id=9852723696500938&leftPosition=-450 (Accessed 14 October
2007).
25
Jonathan Fenby, “A new angle for a venerable Paris landmark; A glass pyramid
for the Louvre,” The Christian Science Monitor (24 October 1984), LexisNexis,
Notre Dame. http://academic.lexisnexis.com/ Accessed 3 November 2007).
26
Françoise Cachin, Jean Clair and Roland Recht, “Les musées ne sont pas à
vendre,” Le Monde (13 December 2006), Europresse, http://www.bpe.
europresse.com (Accessed 23 May 2007).
27
Jacques Follorou, “Le contrat Abou Dhabi,” Le Monde (11 January 2007),
(Accessed 4 February 2008).
28
“Originally” being when the project was first proposed in 2005. See Follorou
“Le contrat Abou Dhabi.”
29
Follorou, “Le contrat Abou Dhabi.”
30
Alan Riding, “Abu Dhabi Is to Gain A Louvre Of Its Own,” The New York
Times (13 January 2007) http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E
02E5DA1330F930A25752C0A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2
(Accessed 4 December 2007).
31
Cachin, Clair and Recht, “Les musées ne sont pas à vendre.”
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Homi K. Bhabha, “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: The Question of
Agency,” in The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 171.
35
“Emirates Want Louvre Branch in Abu Dhabi,” Asharq Alawsat English Edi-
tion, 1 October 2007, (accessed 18 November 2007).
36
Tamar Lewin, “U.S. Universities Rush to Set Up Outposts Abroad,” The
New York Times (10 February 2008) http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/
education/10global.html?pagewanted=1&hp, (Accessed 10 February 2008).
37
Rachel Boyd, “Arts institute plans intensify,” Yale Daily News, (13 September
2007). http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/21282 (Accessed 4
December 2007).

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38
Hamid Irbouh, Art in the Service of Colonialism: French Art Education in Mo-
rocco, 1912-1956, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005), 3.
39
Ibid., 4.
40
Michel Foucault, Power, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1994), 15 and 32.
41
Cocks, Anna Somers Cocks, “The Louvre’s loans to Abu Dhabi are soft power
in action,” The Art Newspaper 177 (2 August 2007) http://www.theartnewspa-
per.com/article.asp?id=566 (Accessed 4 December 2007).
42
The Louvre does have an agreement with the High Museum of Art in Atlanta,
Georgia, which precedes the Abu Dhabi project. In this arrangement, the
Louvre provides one exhibition per year to the High Museum for three years.
While this presence of the Louvre abroad is significant, I do not consider it an
attempt at establishing a physical presence around the globe, as in the examples
of the Guggenheim and Hermitage networks.
43
“Mission Statement,” http://www.guggenheim.org/mission_statement.html,
(accessed 23 February 2008).
44
“History,” http://www.guggenheim.org/history.html, (accessed 22 February
2008).
45
Ibid.
46
Klaus Müller, “The Concept of Universal Museums [Interview with Mikhail
Piotrovsky, Director of the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia],”
Curator 48 ( no. 1, January 2005), Wilson Web, http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.
com.libproxy.nd.edu/hww/results/results_common.jhtml;hwwilsonid=TK1IA
ZF2L5YJRQA3DIKSFF4ADUNGIIV0 (Accessed 1 February 2007).
47
Henri Loyrette, “Politique et Fonctionnement: Mot du président” (June
2005), http://www.louvre.fr/llv/musee/mission.jsp (Accessed 23 February
2008). “Le musée du Louvre…se mobilisent afin d’accueillir de la façon la
plus satisfaisante possible leurs visiteurs nationaux et étrangers, mais de plus en
plus s’efforcent de leur offrir un accès de proximité aux collections.” Transla-
tion mine.
48
Class discussion, “Theories of Art,” Professor Charles Barber (27 November
2007).
49
Riding, “Abu Dhabi is to Gain A Louvre Of Its Own.”

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