Thought ISSN 2161-2234

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

In Defence of Kantian Humility

Tom McClelland
University of Sussex

Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents such as ourselves. Categorial properties, such as being an object , present a potential threat to KH. Cowling (2010) argues that knowing KH to be true requires knowledge of categorial properties. However, if such properties are shown to be intrinsic properties, then KH is committed to their being unknowable. I defend KH by presenting three alternative responses to this challenge. First, that categorial properties are not properties in the sense relevant to KH. Second, that if they are properties, they are not intrinsic properties. Third, that if they are intrinsic properties, KH is not committed to their being unknowable. I also show how these responses can be applied to a related objection to KH offered by Moore (2001).

DOI:10.1002/tht.9

Kantian Humility Kantian Humility (KH) is an epistemic thesis attributed to Kant by Langton (1998). KH is motivated by three premises: Distinction: Things in themselves are substances that have intrinsic properties; phenomena are relational properties of substances. (Langton 1998, p. 20) Irreducibility: The relations and relational properties of substances are not reducible to the intrinsic properties of substances. (1998, p. 109) Receptivity: Human knowledge depends on sensibility, and sensibility is receptive: we can have knowledge of an object only in so far as it affects us. (1998, p. 23) We know substances exclusively through their powers, which are claimed to be relational properties, but the intrinsic properties of those substances are not deducible from their relational properties.1 Two possible worlds w and w* could be indiscernible with respect to the relational properties of substances but discernible with respect to the intrinsic properties of those substances. Receptivity entails that we could not know which of these two worlds is actual. The three premises thus appear to entail that we have no epistemic access to the intrinsic properties of substances. Hence:
Correspondence to: E-mail: t.mcclelland@sussex.ac.uk
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Kantian Humility: Epistemic agents like ourselves are irremediably ignorant of the intrinsic properties of substances. (Cowling 2010, p. 659) Whether Kant actually held this position will not concern us. Allais explains that [c]ritics seem to be almost entirely agreed in praising Langtons book as a piece of philosophy, but at the same time in thinking that the position she presents cannot be attributed to Kant. (2006, p. 143) The real relevance of KH lies in the fact that its argument . . . proceeds from premises to which . . . many contemporary philosophers would give their assent. (Van Cleve 2002, p. 218) This paper will not rehearse the details of the argument, nor address all the objections raised against. Instead, it will focus on a specic worry about the coherence of KH captured in a recent paper by Cowling (2010).

Cowlings objections Cowlings objections to KH turn on the notion of categorial properties. Ontological categories, such as object , property and event , classify entities at the most general level. An entity falling under an ontological category will possess a corresponding property, such as being an object , being a property or being an event . Though there is debate surrounding what the ultimate ontological categories are, those categories will cover all possible entities. Cowlings objections to KH rest on a claim about the nature of categorial properties: Intrinsicness: The categorial properties of entities are intrinsic. (Cowling 2010, p. 661) In light of the difculties surrounding denitions of intrinsicality, Cowling applies two standard diagnostics to justify Intrinsicness: First, does the property in question differ between duplicates? Second, is the property in question something that can be instantiated in a world where only its bearer exists? (2010, p. 661) The categorial property of being an object appears to satisfy both tests: all duplicates of an object will possess that property, and an object could possess that property in a lonely world. Cowling acknowledges that there are no clear tests for whether other categorial properties such as being a property or being an event are intrinsic. He argues, nonetheless, that [c]ategorial properties are of a uniquely fundamental and unied sort. So, if there is good reason to believe one categorial property like being an object is intrinsic, there is reason to believe that all such categorial properties are intrinsic . . . (2010, p. 662). This leads him to Intrinsicness. Cowling argues that KH has implications for our epistemic access to categorial properties: Categorial Humility: Epistemic agents like ourselves are irremediably ignorant of the categorial properties of entities. (2010, p. 662)
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KH claims we are ignorant of intrinsic properties, but Intrinsicness states categorial properties are intrinsic, therefore KH entails that we cannot know what ontological category any entity falls under. Our world has a certain categorial structureit might be a world of objects and properties, or of Tractarian facts, or of Davidsonian eventsbut KH appears to entail we cannot know which possibility is actual. This implication is supposed to be troubling for KH in two ways. The rst problem is that if an agent knows KH is true, then KH is false. To know KH is to know that there are objects whose intrinsic properties are unknowable. But to know that there are objects is to know that there are entities with the intrinsic property being an object . Due to the intrinsicality of categorial properties, knowing KH to be true would itself be a counter-example to the epistemic limitations it proposes. KH is thus committed to the unknowability of KH. The second problem is that if KH is true, the argument for KH fails. Where the rst problem concerns knowledge of KH itself, this problem concerns knowledge of a premise that motivates KH. Distinction is a claim about the categorial structure of our world. To know Distinction is to know that there are entities with the intrinsic property being an object and entities with the intrinsic property being a property. As such, knowledge of Distinction is a counter-example to KH. KH is thus committed to the unknowability of a premise on which it is founded. If accurate, these objections would not prove that KH is false. Nevertheless, they would show that KH is committed to its own unknowability and to the failure of the argument on which it is based. This would clearly render KH indefensible. It is also worth noting a related objection offered by Moore (2001, p. 118). Moore suggests that having intrinsic properties is an intrinsic property. Since knowledge of Distinction and of KH provide knowledge of this property, proponents of KH are again presented with a threat of incoherence. Having intrinsic properties is not a categorial property, so this objection is distinct to Cowlings, but it clearly runs parallel to Cowlings argument. Cowlings objections, and Moores parallel criticism, constitute a serious challenge to KH. I present three alternative responses to this challenge. These are not intended to constitute a cumulative case against the challenge since, as we will see, the conjunction of these three responses is not coherent. Instead I aim to present a disjunctive argument: one or other of the following responses is accurate, and the accuracy of any of them is sufcient to undermine the challenge. One motivation for presenting a disjunctive argument is that it maps out the logical space of responses available to proponents of KH without putting undue emphasis on my preferred response. First response: categorial features are not properties KH makes a claim about properties, but we must be clear about the sense of property that it deploys. The same goes for the use of property in Distinction. Although there is doubtless some sense of property that would countenance categorial features, I argue that they are not properties in the sense relevant to KH. As Cowling notes, KH supposes that our world has an object-property categorial structure. This object-property
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structure involves two roles. The object role is performed by particular objects while the property role is performed by particular properties. These two entities have a relation (on a loose use of relation that does not demand the relata to be distinct existences) such that the object bears the property. I will label entities that occupy this property-role O-properties. KH must be understood as the claim that we can have no knowledge of intrinsic O-properties. It is concerned specically with our ignorance of the intrinsic properties of objects, rather than the intrinsic features of entities as such. My claim is that categorial properties are not O-properties. If categorial features are not O-properties, then KH does not entail Categorial Humility, and Cowlings objections collapse. Even if being an object is in some sense an intrinsic feature of entities, it is not the kind of intrinsic property that KH would deem unknowable. To see why categorial features are not O-properties, consider those instantiated in worlds without an object-property categorial structure. In a world of Davidsonian events, all events would have the categorial feature being an event . Clearly that feature is not essentially the kind of thing possessed by objects as it is instantiated in this object-free world. There is no property-role for it to occupy because there is no object-property categorial structure in place. The same goes for all the other categorial properties instantiated in worlds with an object-free ontology. As such, at least some categorial features are not O-properties. Building on this, we can make the stronger claim that no categorial features are O-properties, even in worlds that do have an object-property categorial structure. I will consider both being a property and being an object . Of necessity, being a property is a feature possessed exclusively by properties and never by objects. Consequently, it is not the kind of entity that can slot into the property side of the object-property structure. As such, knowing of an entity that it has the feature being a property does not constitute knowledge of an O-property. Even if that categorial feature is intrinsic, it is therefore not the kind of property with which KH or Distinction are concerned. Being an object is the only categorial property that does look like it might be an O-property. After all, it is the kind of feature that must be possessed by objects. However, being possessed by an object is not sufcient for being an O-property. We have at least two reasons to believe that an objects feature of being an object does not exemplify the object-property categorial structure. First, Cowlings argument for Intrinsicness is built on the premise that categorial properties are of a uniquely fundamental and unied sort (2010, p. 662). Applying this to the case at hand, the fact that all other categorial features are not O-properties suggests that being an object is not an O-property either. We know that for all other possible cases, an entitys possession of its categorial features cannot have an object-property categorial structure. Consequently we cannot, by Cowlings own standards, justify treating an entitys possession of the feature being an object as an exception to this rule. The second reason to deny that being an object is an O-property concerns that specic categorial feature. Cowling states that [t]he world has a categorial structurea distribution of categorial properties. (2010, p. 661) Any instance of feature possession
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satisfying the object-property modelsuch as an apples being greenwill thus rely upon our world having an object-property categorial structure, and so on the distribution of categorial properties. That distribution involves entities such as the apple having the feature being an object . If being an object is regarded as an O-propertyi.e. is understood in terms of the object-property structurea problem arises. If the apples property of being an object exemplies the object-property structure, this would itself presuppose an appropriate distribution of categorial properties. The apple could only have the property being an object if it rst had the requisite categorial property of being an object . To avoid a vicious regress we must conclude that being an object is a feature of the apple that makes its place in an object-property structure possible, but does not itself exemplify that structure. In other words, being an object cannot be regarded as an O-property. Being an object is thus something of a red herring. Because it is a feature possessed by objects, it appears to perform the property-role in an object-property categorial structure, but closer scrutiny indicates that this appearance is deceptive. Categorial features, including being an object , are not O-properties. Since KH is concerned only with our ignorance of intrinsic O-properties, knowledge of the categorial features of entities does not constitute a counter-example to KH. Can we offer the same response to Moores example of having intrinsic properties? Moore actually predicts such a response, stating that [p]resumably Langton thinks that having intrinsic properties is not a property at all. (2001, p. 119) He then goes on to criticise that claim, but our notion of O-properties may allow us to rebut his arguments. If having intrinsic properties amounts to nothing more than being an object , we can simply re-run the two arguments above that cast doubt on being an object being an O-property. But Moore asks [w]hy should there not be things . . . whose properties are exclusively relational? (2001, p. 118) A possible reply is that a purely relational ontology is incoherent, but it is better to avoid committing KH to this bold claim. To defend KH, we need only show that a world of pure relations is not a world with an object-property categorial structure. Objects are essentially distinct existences and a pure structuralist world contains no such distinct existences. It may be a substantive feature of our world that it contains entities that are objects rather than entities that are nodes in a relational web. It is not, however, a substantive feature of those objects that they have intrinsic properties, as it is logically impossible for them to fail to have intrinsic properties. Consequently, having intrinsic properties is not the kind of entity that can be an O-property, so knowledge of it is not forbidden by KH. A possible response to the claim that categorial properties (and the property of having intrinsic properties) are not properties in the sense relevant to KH, is to deny that KH is concerned exclusively with O-properties. KH could be understood as holding that we are ignorant of the intrinsic features of entities as such, and is neutral on whether or not the features are properties and the entities are objects. This approach could be motivated by scepticism about the very idea of an object-property structure being anything over and above an entity-feature structure. After all, it is not entirely clear what having an object-property structure amounts to. Regardless of whether this neutral reading of KH is plausible, this is not something that could be used to reinforce the challenge under
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consideration. If it transpires that KH (and Distinction) can be recast in these category neutral terms, or if the notion of an object-property categorial structure was deated, then knowledge of KH (or of Distinction) would no longer require categorial knowledge. In this case, as Cowling himself acknowledges (2010, p. 664), the challenge to KH would collapse. The restriction of KH to O-properties is ultimately a presupposition of the challenge, so is one to which we can help ourselves when responding to that challenge. Second response: categorial properties are not intrinsic The defence of KH outlined in the previous section goes some way to addressing the challenge raised against it. However, the notion of O-properties took us into a contentious region of ontology that makes conclusive verdicts hard to come by. In order to provide a more thorough defence of KH, I will put aside the issue of whether categorial properties are indeed properties, and explore some alternative responses. The response I will consider now is that even if features such as being an object are properties, there are reasons to believe that they are not intrinsic properties. In that case, KH would not be committed to Categorial Humility. Though I will not advocate this proposal, it will be worth our while briey to consider its place in the dialectical landscape. To understand why categorial properties might be regarded as relational, we must attend to the details of Langtons argument for KH. The argument requires the causal properties of objects to be extrinsic (relational) properties. Receptivity states that we know objects through their causal properties, but if causal properties are intrinsic we have no reason to accept KH. The claim that causal properties are relational depends in turn upon a specic understanding of the intrinsic/relational dichotomy. It is implausible that an objects causal properties depend on a relation to other objects. In light of this, Langton proposes that . . . causal powers do depend on something elsebut the something else is not simply the existence of some distinct object, but the existence of certain laws. (1998, p. 118) She suggests that . . . a property is intrinsic just in case something could have it in the absence of other thingsand in the absence of laws. (1998, p. 118) Since causal properties depend upon laws, they come out as extrinsic. This account of the extrinsicality of causal properties could have ramications for the nature of categorial properties. Cowling is right that somethings being an object does not depend upon the existence of distinct objects. It is also plausible that being an object does not depend on the laws of nature. It may, however, depend upon something analogous to laws of nature, and so could be regarded as an extrinsic property for analogous reasons. As discussed, Cowling claims that our world has a certain categorial structure. Since there are possible worlds (at least epistemically possible) with different categorial structures, it is a substantive characteristic of our world that it has the categorial nature it in fact has. Where an entity, such as an apple, has the property of being an object , this property is essentially bound to the categorial structure of the world. In possible worlds without that categorial structure there would be no apple with the property being an object (I leave it open that there are duplicates of the apple in, say, a Davidsonian world of events). Though the apples being an object does not depend on the existence
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of distinct objects, it depends on something distinct from itselfnamely the categorial structure of the world. Just as causal powers are relational because they depend on laws distinct from their bearers, being an object is relational because it depends on categorial structures distinct from its bearers. The categorial structure of the world is doubtless a somewhat peculiar relatum, but then laws of nature are elusive entities as well. What of having intrinsic properties? Moore suggests that once we have acknowledged this as a property, there is . . . nothing to prevent it from being an intrinsic property (2001, p.118). However, if having intrinsic properties is nothing more than being an object , and being an object is a relational property dependent on the categorial structure of the world, then one can rebut Moores claim in the same way. The obvious issue here is that Langtons view offers an implausible account of the extrinsicality of causal powers (Van Cleve 2002), and so could only provide a similarly implausible view of categorial properties. Nevertheless, if one has gone as far as agreeing with this step in Langtons argument, they would have a potential way out of Cowlings objections. Would rejecting the relationality of causal powers mean rejecting KH? I would argue not. Allais shows how we can reach a conclusion of epistemic humility whilst maintaining that objects have their causal powers . . . in virtue of their natures. (2006, p. 155) She explains that [p]owers are properties understood in terms of other things; they are not relations, or extrinsic properties, but a relational way of knowing things. (2006, p. 160) Receptivity means we can only know these properties relationally, thus leaving us ignorant of the intrinsic nature of things. Overall, we probably should not regard categorial properties as extrinsic, but there is a thread within Langtons version of KH that could encourage such a conclusion. Third response: intrinsic categorial properties are not unknowable by KH To complete our inquiry, I will now argue that even if categorial properties are properties in the sense relevant to KH, and even if they are intrinsic properties, KH can still defend itself against Cowlings objections. To understand how, we need to clarify why KH claims that intrinsic properties are unknowable. Distinction claims that all objects must have some intrinsic properties. Though we know objects via their relational properties we can thus deduce that those objects also possess intrinsic properties. The problem is that we cannot deduce which intrinsic properties they have. The idea is that there are a range of mutually exclusive possibilities regarding the intrinsic nature of a specic object, but we can never know which possibility is actual. This is analogous to knowing that the snooker ball in the pocket has some colour, but not knowing which colour it has. Kantian Humility is the impossibility of our acquiring this elusive knowledge-which. Kants own words help clarify things further. He explains that to know a thing as it is in itself is to be able to attribute it distinctive and inner predicates (A565/B593, quoted Langton 1998, p. 11). Inner captures that the unknown properties are intrinsic properties, and distinctive captures that they are properties that differ between objects. Properly understood, KH claims that we cannot know the intrinsic properties that differ between objects. My claim is that, even assuming that categorial features are intrinsic
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properties, they are not distinctive properties. As such, knowledge of intrinsic categorial properties is not forbidden by KH. To see this, consider the central example being an object . This is not a distinctive property because it does not distinguish one object from any other. All objects must have this property. KH claims we are ignorant of those intrinsic properties that locate an object within the logical space of all possible ways an object might be, and the property being an object fails to locate an object within that space. Being an object excludes its bearer from having certain other properties, such as not being an object , or being an event . This species how the object differs from other entities, but does not specify how it differs from other objects. But it is only knowledge of how objects differ from one another intrinsically that KH prohibits. Similarly, knowing that an object has Moores property of having intrinsic properties does not provide you with knowledge of a property that the object might not have had. It tells us nothing about which intrinsic properties an object has, so does not constitute a relevant counter-example to KH. KH can make sense of our knowledge of intrinsic categorial properties in the following way. Two possible worlds indiscernible with respect to their relational properties can be discernible with respect to their distinctive intrinsic properties. However, those two worlds cannot be discernible with respect to their non-distinctive intrinsic properties. In other words, objects with the same relational prole will have the same non-distinctive intrinsic prole. This is a trivial consequence of the fact that non-distinctive intrinsic properties cannot, by denition, differ between objects. Consequently, our knowledge of relational properties is compatible with our deducing the non-distinctive intrinsic properties of objects. Being an object is just such a property, so knowledge of this intrinsic property is compatible with KH. The worries about indiscernible worlds that drive KH simply do not apply to categorial properties. Conclusion When presented with putative cases of known intrinsic properties that are counterexamples to KH, the proponent of KH can respond either that they are not properties, that they are not intrinsic, or that knowledge of them is not a counter-example to KH. With the exception of denying that we have knowledge of the disputed properties, these three possibilities exhaust the options available for KH. We have considered how the potential threat posed by categorial properties might be dealt with in each of these three ways. First, we have reason to believe that categorial properties are not properties in the sense relevant to KH and Distinction. Furthermore, if categorial properties are indeed properties, proponents of KH may be able to make a case for their being relational properties. Finally, even if categorial properties are intrinsic properties, they are not the kind of distinctive intrinsic property that KH regards as unknowable. Furthermore, Moores non-categorial case of having intrinsic properties can be dealt with parallel responses. Though the second of the responses is unlikely to be found compelling, the rst and third constitute a robust defence of KH against this important challenge. They
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also help us to clarify the commitments of an epistemic outlook that is of great historical and contemporary relevance. Notes
1 Following Cowling (2010, p. 659), I will treat substance and object as interchangeable.

References
Allais, L. Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIII.1 (2006): 14369. Cowling, S. Kantian Humility & Ontological Categories. Analysis, 70 (2010): 65965. Langton, R. Kantian Humility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Moore, A. W. Review of Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. The Philosophical Review, 110.1 (2001): 11720. Van Cleve, J. Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXV.1 (2002): 21837.

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