300635036

29/11/2012

Why did Oslo fail?

Ever since the 1967 war, nearly every single US President has had a plan to resolve the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. But the sequels to a war which only lasted 6 days, had yet to finish. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict originated in 1948, when the Israeli state was founded, and as such, the peace plans are still in full throttle. The consequences of the 6 day war, when Israel occupied Gaza, the Sinai, east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, have resulted in an on-going peace process in which the Oslo accords only form one part. (Jones, D (1999). p 52.) However this is not to say that some facets of the conflict in all of its senses (whether the Arab-Israeli conflict or notably the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) have not been resolved, for example the Jordanian-Israeli Peace agreement at a diplomatic levels has fostered warm relations. (Golan, G (2007) p1.) This paper will, after describing the elements to the lengthy Oslo accords, pin down the different facets which exacerbated mistrust and ultimately brought the peace process to a standstill. It will also explain what brought Oslo to its supposed dead end. Many people have adhered to one of two different frameworks to analyse the failure of the Oslo process, Jonathan Rynhold states that there is a Liberalist framework and a Realist framework. The Accords in themselves according to the liberalist point of view promoted a great opportunity for mature political relations. The liberals believe that what really failed was the negotiators behaviour and their failure to implement the accords properly. The realist approach however, believes that there were intrinsic constraints in the process and that the two parties ideologies were not compatible. (Rynhold, J. (2008 March). The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?. Mideast Security and Policy Studies. I (No. 76), p5-26.) However both these views fail to consider the fact that the wording, actors and length of these accords each exacerbated difficulties in the negotiations. Even if each political party had their own agendas, Jews and Palestinians had been living alongside each other not long before and peace was the ultimate solution for the everyday citizen. The interim periods of the accords 5 years; during this 5 year period the Oslo accords were drawn up which in its-self defines the long drawn out framework of these accords1. Even though this period was meant for gradual integration of the communities, it allowed for deadlines that might not be met, constant amendments to the accords and in some cases, failure to implement them. The 1992 elections which brought Yitzhak Rabin and the Labour party back to power in the 1992 election, paving the way to Oslo - he used the term window of opportunity for peace . (Golan, G (2007). p1.) The idea behind the interim period was the concept that the two conflicting sides were not yet ready for a full peace agreement, and that there was a need for an interim report. If these two mediating sides had agreed to come to a peaceful solution- in actual fact there would have been no need for an interim period because the economic integration and land settlements could have been done in a shorter amount of time. Rabins Labour party government was advocating a land for peace and - the first Intifada arose at the same time aided by the support of the public and global sympathy, which led the Israelis to view the crisis as ever dynamic and in search for a conclusion. This shows that the Israeli government at the time was keen to bring the process to a conclusion just as much as the Palestinians were. The occupation by the Israelis in Gaza could not be expected to continue without a cry for freedom on the Palestinian side. It seems that the ideology was flawed and that some Jews view of Zionism was of an Israeli (Jewish State) without Palestinians having the right to return. This Jewish ideology is flawed because it contemplates no change despite an understanding of the deep rooted view of the Palestinians. However this did not mean that the Israeli Labour party did not want to see peace but this does show that there were inherent conflicting ideologies on both sides (Golan, G (2007) . p11.)
1

1. The letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO 9, 10 and September 1993. 2. Declaration of Principles on interim Self-Government Arrangement (Oslo I) -13 September 1993. 3. {Paris} Protocol on Economic Relations -29 April 1994. 4. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities- 29 August 1994 (additional agreement 28 august 1995). 5. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II)-28th September 1995. 6. Protocol concerning the Redeployment in Hebron- 15 January 1996. 7. Wye River Memorandum- 23 October 1998. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum-4th September 1999.

300635036 29/11/2012 The ambiguity of expressions used in the this 5 year interim period did not aid with the negation of these accords either, words like just and mutual legitimate and political rights instead of national rights were used all aiding in perverting the peace process. This meant that more often than not the interpretation of these agreements was more of an issue than implementation. And although these DOPs (declaration of principles) were set to last 5 years because the Israelis in the past had been known to drag out peace negotiations, there was no absolute guarantee that there would be a final agreement reached by both parties, and the already established Israeli state was certainly in more of a regionally secure position. The process of Palestinian selfGovernment was to be set in stages - first the delegations of governing powers would be transferred to the Palestinians; secondly the transfer of some sort of civil authority e.g. taxes etc. Thirdly the gradual implementation of election procedures. And finally fourthly the most important factor which should have been resolved more promptly was the issue of refugees, settlements, security and borders.
Examples of how the wording of each accord meant different things to different parties can be seen in (Article IV) which stipulated that all the territories of Gaza and the West Bank were to be governed by the same governing body. It was aimed to prevent annexations by the Israelis through road buildings and settlements. But the Israeli foreign minister at the time interpreted the West Bank as disputed territory and this did not necessarily mean withdrawal from all the West Bank. (Golan, G (2007) p18.) Out of all the parts of these accords the most important one was quite appropriately the first, the establishment of mutual recognition between the Israelis and Palestinians. These are of historical significance because it was the first time the modern Israeli State had even accepted the existence of such a state. Arafat had accepted that Israel had the right to exist and have its own security. Territory lost in 1967, in signing these agreements only secured the right to have the lands lost in 1967 returned and not the whole of Israel. Israel only recognised the PLO as representing a people and not merely a refugee population and no longer denied that they didnt have a right to their own state. Dan Rabinowitz who follows the views of Edward Said, believes that despite the accords the West had a different view on the Middle East, that democratization was not going to sweep across the east, and that the Accords were inherently flawed as these conflicting narratives and premium of peace were set first, (Dan Rabinowitz you feel However if it was only because of the communicators inabilities to reach a conclusion to these accords, it does not mean that the accords were inherently flawed, because by nature the accords had good intentions and if they had been implemented either more quickly or with greater willingness on both sides, perhaps these accords would not have reached such a bleak deadlock. ( Dan Rabinowitz. (2005). Belated Occupation, Advanced Militarization: Edward Said's Critique of the Oslo Process Revisited. Chicago Journals. 31 (No 2), p. 505-511.) Five years ago, Yitzhak Rabin brought peace to Israel." This statement was issued by the organisers of the Pace Now campaign which took place September 12th 1997 in the Israeli capital. Peace had existed to a greater extent before the Oslo accords, which lies in the simple fact that since 1993, more Israelis had suffered at the hands of terror than a decade prior. (2007). Oslo, The Oslo Accords. Available: http://www.peacefaq.com/oslo.html. Last accessed 12/11/2012.) The Paris Protocol was a good initiative of economic integration; whose theory was to foster over time more healthy relations between the two groups. It established connections of taxes. However the following agreements, Gaza Strip-Jericho Area Agreement 4 May 1994. The Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 29 August 1994 did not constitute as a part of the DOP and were primarily the result of delays, disagreements and haggling over the implementation process. The Gaza Jericho agreement for example was probably in retaliation against the Hamas Jihad attacks after the signing of the DOP.( Shomali Qustandi. L'accord et le dsaccord dans les textes d'Oslo. In: Mots, mars 1997, N50. pp. 8-22) Oslo I and Oslo II in them-selves were good ideas, because they saw popular support to these provisions and fostered hundreds of joint projects at a grassroots level, such as the sharing of pre-schools and joint business ventures. Unfortunately groups mentioned before such as Hamas were viewed by the Jewish state as part of the Palestinian nostalgia for a people search of identity and therefore constituting them not being ready for peace. However it is true that Oslo II did not mean Israel had lost any control over some of these

300635036 29/11/2012 territories. In addition to this this short period of time actually saw the expansion of Israeli settlements to that which had been agreed upon, and an increase of military check points, settler violence on the Israeli side had also occurred - 29 Muslims died at the mosque of Hebron by the hands of Baruch Goldstein and Israeli extremist. This decade also saw the advanced militarization of Israel Dan Rabinowitz states the following While the IDF had been careful not to become embroiled in party politics or in direct power brokerage, it nevertheless became involved in geopolitics through its interpretation of the Oslo process in ways hitherto unknown. This was complicated further by the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in July 2000. (Dan Rabinowitz. (2005). Belated Occupation, Advanced Militarization: Edward Said's Critique of the Oslo Process Revisited. Chicago Journals. 31 (No 2), p. 505-511.)
This middle period of the Oslo accords saw a considerable breakdown of trust between the two parties, which were consequently worsened when after the assassination of Rabin and the Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories with Jihad attacks which killed an estimated 64 people in 1996, the peace plans were essentially brought to a standstill and from then on commitment to the plan on the Israeli had severely worsened. The The Hebron Protocol was intended by Benyamin Netanyahu (the newly elected Israeli Prime minister), to resume commitment to the on-going peace process, with the support of the USA, and the Oslo accords. The intervention of King Hussein of Jordan brought about the signing of this document on 17 January. The principles of the (Hebron Protocol?) accord were to increase international presence in the region through the implementation of Temporary International Presence (TIPH). This finally led to the presence of International troops; this is of significant historical value seeing as it was the first right wing government had given away land of what it considered to be Eretz-Isreal to the Palestinians. However even though the Israelis did withdraw from about 80% of Hebron - again there was a unwillingness to comply with other stipulated accords such as the safe passage of return for Palestinians and the settlements in West bank, which continued to increase, as they are still doing today. (Golan, G (2007) P24.) For Netanyahus sake, he did continue discussions on settlements, although contradicting himself with regard to some of the occupied territories return, and continuing with the building of more settlements, he did agree with the peace process. Interestingly enough, he did state at times that the Oslo accords were based on a flawed plan. The Netanyahu period, without taking into account the Hebron Protocol and the Wye River Accords, showed the diminished work at peacekeeping which therefore intensified the gap of relations between the two parties. For example Nabil Shaath, blamed Netanyahu for the failure of Camp David II in July 2000, because he broke negotiation practices, which although were very fragile at the time, had not yet ceased to exist. (Mara Mercedes Guzmn Almansa. (2011). Anlisis del fracaso del proceso de paz de oslo entre Israel y el pueblo Palestino desde el punto de vista religioso: casos Gush Emunim y Hammas. 1993 2000. Relaciones Internacionales Bogot d.c., 2011. I, p 9-50.) In Conclusion, the failure of the Oslo accords does adhere to the liberalist point of view in the sense that the constant change of Israeli leadership daw different parties personal interests, putting constraints on how the accords were to be implemented. The realist point of view also has its legitimacy in that the Ideology of Zionism was in direct opposition to the will of the Palestinians, namely being a Palestinian state. However this negate the fact that during the interim period there was great integration at a grass-roots level which could have continued had the accords been implemented and finalized more rapidly. The Oslo accords were the most practical approach to the peace-making at the time, but the extremist groups such as Hammas, the political parties leaders blessed with the roles of negotiating peace also precipitated these negotiations to become ever more wild and lead to failure. Arafat did not do himself any favours by supporting the Iraq invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf crisis which angered many of the Arab States. The lengthy drawn out period of these accords made the process last until 2000 and not 1998, and even then peace had not been achieved. Since then we have an increase in Israeli settlements and the death toll increase on both sides. Hopefully the recent return of suicide bombers in 2012 by the Israeli government, with see further cooperation between the two sides, and this conflict will be able to reach a positive conclusion. Wordcount excluding references and quotes: 2191 References

300635036 29/11/2012 Mara Mercedes Guzmn Almansa. (2011). Anlisis del fracaso del proceso de paz de oslo entre Israel y el pueblo Palestino desde el punto de vista religioso: casos Gush Emunim y Hammas. 1993 2000. Relaciones Internacionales Bogot d.c., 2011. I, p 9-50. Jones, D (1999). Cosmopolitan mediation? Conflict resolution and the Oslo Accords. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 52. Golan, G (2007). Israel and Palestine Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. p1. Dan Rabinowitz. (2005). Belated Occupation, Advanced Militarization: Edward Said's Critique of the Oslo Process Revisited. Chicago Journals. 31 (No 2), p. 505-511. Rynhold, J. (2008 March). The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?. Mideast Security and Policy Studies. I (No. 76), p5-26. Shomali Qustandi. L'accord et le dsaccord dans les textes d'Oslo. In: Mots, mars 1997, N50. pp. 8-22.: 10.3406/mots.1997.2302 Availible:http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/mots_02436450_1997_num_50_1_2302 (2007). Oslo, The Oslo Accords. Available: http://www.peacefaq.com/oslo.html. Last accessed 12/11/2012.