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2.4 An Eclectic Model


After reviewing the relevant models and showing their shortcomings as regards this work, it is time now to present the model that has been developed on the basis of what has been adopted from the aforementioned models, in addition to the observations made by the researcher herself. The synthetic model can be illustrated as follows: Argumentation is a process which consists of three stages: the confrontation stage, the subsequent argumentation stage, and the concluding stage. It is worthmentioning that though the terminology of the stages is adopted from Van Eemeren and Grootendorsts (1983) model; the term subsequent used to describe the second argumentation stage is adopted from Toulmins phases in order to distinguish it from the whole process of argumentation. Each of these stages has its own devices, as such, each will be discussed in some detail.

2.4.1 The Confrontation Stage


Generally, the confrontation stage includes the violation of the addressees face ( whether positive or negative) which can be defined as something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction (Brown and Levinson, 1978: 66), (See 2.3.3.1.1; and 2.3.3.1.2, for the definitions of positive and negative faces respectively). This violation is attained to by one or more of different strategies which include: insult, accusation, command, and request. These strategies are by no means exhaustive as the data of the work show. The data

64 reveal that the point of incompatibility can be triggered through statement of an unacceptable thought, claim, advice, suggestion, remonstrance, etc. As regards insults, they explicitly show disrespect to and attack on the social image of the other (Cf. 2.3.3.1.1). Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000: 73) reduce an insult to the following three essential elements: First: A prediction about the target (or about some part of her/his social identity, e.g. her/his profession). In other words, the speaker utters something about the addressee or uses words to characterize her/him, or uses epithet to address her/ him. Second: This prediction is perceived as inappropriate and demeaning by the addressee; and Third: The addressee experiences this prediction as intended, i.e. s/he believes that the speaker has made the prediction with the intention of hurting or demeaning her/him. Accusations, in their turn, attack a persons face as well (Cf. 2.3.3.1.2). There is one important thing to be noted about accusation as it occurs in the Benoits strategies: accusation is used as an umbrella term, that is, it does not refer to accusation only. Accusation involves blaming and criticizing as well. This is because, as Al-Khafaji (2009: 17) states, accuse, blame, and criticize share the same illocutionary point. She (ibid.) invokes Downes (1998: 378) and Vandervekin (1990: 179) to explain more how this is so. The three share the same illocutionary point because they have the same prediction of the responsibility for some propositional content which is presupposed to be bad (the preparatory condition). Therefore, accusation in the developed model is used to refer to blaming and criticizing as well.

65 Commands and the remaining strategies will be identified on the basis of their felicity conditions which are listed in Appendix (2). The felicity conditions for requests have been previously mentioned (See 2.2.1 above), so they will not be mentioned in the Appendix.

2.4.2 The Subsequent Argumentation Stage


This second stage involves two important elements: effectiveness and appropriateness. As clarified before (See 2.3.4), these two elements set what is called by Trapp et al. (1986) argumentative competence. Their notion of argumentative competence has been presented in the form of features which should be available in an arguer if s/he is to be regarded argumentatively competent. This means that the argumentative competence as they define it cannot be scaled scientifically. That very thing presents a problem. This problem has been solved by connecting the notion of argumentative competence as introduced by Trapp et al. (1986) to pragmatics. To make it more precise, both effectiveness and appropriateness have been translated into pragmatic terms. Effectiveness will be dealt with first, and then comes appropriateness. 2.4.2.1 Effectiveness If the features of effectiveness have been considered again, an interesting correlation will be discovered between them and a very reputable principle in pragmatics: Grices Cooperative Principle. As Levinson (1983: 101) mentions, Grice suggests a set of over-

arching assumptions guiding the conduct of conversation. These assumptions can be regarded as guidelines for the efficient and effective use of language in

66 conversation to further cooperative ends. These guidelines are identified by Grice via four maxims of conversation which jointly express a general cooperative principle. Verscheueren (1999: 32) quotes the Cooperative Principle (which, as he states, is often referred to in the literature as CP) with its maxims from Grice (1975: 45). The CP reads as follows:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose and direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

The maxims are: 1. The maxim of quantity (i) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange. (ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 2. The maxim of quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true (i) Do not say what you believe to be false. (ii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 3. The maxim of relation (later called relevance): Be relevant. 4. The maxim of manner: Be perspicuous (i) Avoid obscurity of expression (ii) Avoid ambiguity. (iii) (iv) Be brief. Be orderly.

67 In a nutshell, as Levinson (1983: 102) puts it, these are the maxims that specify what interactants have to do if they are to converse in a maximally efficient, rational, cooperative way: they should speak sincerely, relevantly and clearly while providing sufficient information. Yet, as James (1983: 128) asserts, the striking thing about the Gricean Maxims is that speakers flout them much of the time: indeed, a conversation that observed them consistently would be a very dull affair. Trapps (2006:48) view of effectiveness resides in his definition of effective arguers. Effective arguers are those who: - Make clear connections. - Are logical. - Provide support for arguments; and - Explain things clearly. The equation between Trapps features and Grices CP and its maxims is manifested in the following formula: (Each of Trapps features of effective arguers) = (Each of Grices maxims) = Specific terminology of each maxim. So, - (Make clear connections) =( Be relevant) = The relevance maxim. - (Be logical) = (Tell things which are true and to which you have solid evidence) = The quality maxim. - (Provide support for arguments) = (Be as informative as is required) = The quantity maxim.

68 - (Explain things clearly) = (Be brief, clear, and orderly) = The manner maxim. It can be said, then, that according to this study, effective arguing entails keeping to the Gricean CP and its four maxims. 2.4.2.2 Appropriateness Trapps features of appropriateness involve avoid being obnoxious, arrogant and overbearing; insulting or poking fun at others; belittling opponents; trying to prevent others from expressing their points of view, and directing arguments against the other person rather than the persons position (ibid.). On reading these features, another interesting correlation will be identified between them and another famous principle in pragmatics: the Politeness Principle. Politeness is a commonsense phenomenon that has been dealt with by many scholars the first of whom is Lakoff. Lakoff, as Eelen (2001: 2) describes her, is the mother of modern politeness theory because she is the first who has dealt with it from a decidedly pragmatic angle. For Lakoff politeness is a system of interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for conflict and confrontation inherent in all human interchange (Lakoff, 1977: 88). Watts (2003: 50) comments that Lakoffs view of politeness to be developed by societies for the sake of reducing friction in personal interaction leads one to conclude that friction in personal interaction is undesirable. As such societies develop strategies, that is, politeness, to reduce that friction. Politeness, thus, ends up as being a set of norms for cooperative behaviour. Brown and Levinson (1978) develop the term face to show another view of politeness (See 2.4.1 above for the definition of face). The focus in their view of politeness is on the speaker.

69 Leech (1983: 79-103), on his part, develops still another view of politeness residing in what he calls self (i.e. the speaker), and other (i.e. the hearer). He (ibid.: 131-2) proposes six maxims to sustain his view: tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy. The focus in his view of politeness is put on the hearer. In sum, whatever the view might be, politeness always remains the principle which must be available in interaction if that interaction is to be considered successful. In the case of arguing, politeness is, actually, at risk. This is mainly because of the fact that the speech acts used in that process such as commanding, insulting, criticizing, etc. are intrinsically attacking ones face (i.e. facethreatening acts, to use the terminology of Brown and Levinson 1978). So, there appears to be an unavoidable clash between expressing and defending disagreement and protecting the face-wants of the other(s) (Kline, 1986: 241). This should not drive one to think that politeness plays a weak (or no) role in arguing; per contra, arguments, as demonstrated by Kopperschmidt (1986: 182), not only demand participants who are able and ready to argue, but also the preconditions established by a social framework that delegitimate the inclination to use pressure (my italics). Kline (1986: 244) agrees with Kopperschmidt on the necessity of politeness. She denotes that the smoothness of interaction rests upon an equilibrium of face respect that interactants pay to one another. Yet, as she has pointed out before (See above), this interactional equilibrium is difficult to maintain especially in arguing. Kline (ibid.) attempts to posit a solution for this problem by postulating that the clash between arguing and dealing with face-

70 threat leads arguers to weigh the pay-offs (e.g. obtaining concessions, being clear and efficient, or winning approval) and trade-offs (e.g. embarrassing or hurting ones opponent) of arguing. This means, as Kline concludes, that it is a matter of personal decision whether arguers choose to: a. avoid disagreeing entirely and thereby they prevent any face loss; and b. argue for their views directly, indirectly, or even with specific politeness strategies to redress their opponents face-loss. There are many different views of politeness, and so are the models of politeness. The most common of these models have been referred to in the beginning of this sub-section [ See Eelen (2001) for more theories of politeness]. Of these models Lakoffs will be chosen. This is because her model is part of a general system of interactional style which classifies peoples interactional behaviour according to how they handle interpersonal relationships (Eelen, 2001: 49) (my italics). Since any novel is built on a network of interpersonal relationships, and since the data of this work are taken from novels, then Lakoffs model seems suitable. Eelen (ibid.: 3) points out that Lakoffs model of politeness is summarized in three rules: 1. Impersonality (Distance): Dont impose. 2. Hesitancy (Deference): Give options; and 3. Informality (Camaraderie): Make A feel good, be friendly. James (1980: 129-30) gives an illustrative account of each of these rules. The first rule has to do with not intruding on the addressees privacy or embarrassing her/him with the citation of unmentionables. If one has to intrude, a permission should be asked for while so doing, e.g.

71 (16) May I ask you what this car cost you? The gist of the second rule is to let the addressee make his own decisions. This rule is activated, for the majority of cases, when commands are issued. If a master says to his servant Its chilly in this room, the latter will act to redress his employers discomfort by closing a window, for instance, without feeling servility. The third rule has to do with establishing rapport, camaraderie, a sense of equality or respect, distance, and a recognition of inequality between the addresser and the addressee. It must be noted that this rule has converse realizations according to the real statuses of the addresser (i.e. the speaker S) and the addressee (i.e. the hearer H). If S is of a higher or equal status to H, the use of familiar or solidarity forms of address on her/his part will put H at ease. But the converse does not hold: if S is of a lower status than H, then S must not use familiar or solidarity forms. Lakoffs rules of politeness are linguistically realized by many strategies called modality markers. Modality markers are, as is indicated by Al-Hindawy (1999: 96), various devices which conversationalists may appeal to so that they can convey the right degree of politeness to their partners. They are classified into downgraders and upgraders depending on whether they decrease or increase imposition. Since arguing involves imposition, then it is only downgraders that are of particular relevance to it. Al-Hindawy (ibid.: 97-104) elucidates, by depending on House and Kasper (1981: 166-70) , and Trosborg (1995: 209-18), these markers more clearly. He argues that these markers either signal an internal modification ( the structure of which can be slipped into the structure of the main act), or an external

72 modification ( which has a separate structure and thus external modifiers are usually longer and more explicit). These two types of modification have been illustrated by Al-Hindawy (ibid.) as follows: 2.4.2.2.1 Internal Modification Downgraders that have to do with internal modification include different syntactic and functional mitigating devices. 2.4.2.2.1.1 Syntactic Downgraders The following syntactic downgraders are listed within this label: a. Question: A question is often more polite than a statement or command as it is the most indirect device ( and in the English culture indirect devices are more polite than direct ones (Al-Hindawy, ibid.: 96)). As the first example is more polite than the second: (17) Can you give me a ride? (18) You can give me a ride. b. Past tense/ negation: These devices are polite because they give the addressee the impression of having freedom in deciding what type of response is required (and so they are the actual realizations of Lakoffs first rule), e.g.: (19) Could you come with me? (20) Couldnt you come with me? c. Tag questions: In trying to smoothen the impact of imposition, speakers may appeal to a tag question, e.g.

73 (21) Give me that book, will/wont you? d. Conditional clause: This is another device of mitigating imposition, e.g.: (22) How much did you pay for your house, if I may ask. e. Embedding: In this downgrader, the impositive act is embedded in a clause that reflects the attitude of the initiator of that act. Embedding shows: (23) Tentativeness: As in, I wonder whether you can explain this matter to me. (24) Appreciation: As in, I would be thankful if you could help me. (25) Subjectivity: As in, I guess you dont mind coming home with me.

2.4.2.2.1.2 Functional Downgraders This type of downgraders include a number of devices: a. Impersonalizing devices: These involve the use of mechanisms in which no explicit reference is made to the performer of the action. This is called agent indirection. The following shows how the use of the pronoun you is avoided: (26) Pass us the newspaper. (i.e. Pass me the newspaper) b. Politeness markers: These include expressions such as please, kindly, and so kind as to; or the use of such titles as sir, Mr., Madame, etc. These markers indicate deference to the hearer ( and so they are the actual realizations of Lakoffs second rule), e.g. (27) Would you be so kind as to give me your book?

74 (28) Excuse me, sir, can you tell me the time? c. Consultative devices: These include such expressions as Would you mind, Do you think, Do you object, etc., e.g. (29) Would you mind giving me a hand? d. Downtoners: These include such modifiers as just, simply, possibly, perhaps, rather, etc., to downtone the impositive force of the speech acts, e.g. (30) Just tell come with me, will you? (31) You might send me a copy of the letter, possibly. e. Understatements: These markers have to do with understating, or to some degree, minimizing some aspects of the impositive act, e.g. (32) May I have your attention for a minute? f. Interpersonal markers: These are devices that reveal the speakers intention to establish and maintain good and lovely interpersonal relationships ( and so they are the actual realizations of Lakoffs third rule). They are classified into: - Cajolers: which attract the hearers attention, interest, understanding, etc. They include such expressions as you know, you see, I mean, etc. - Appealers: which are intended to stimulate the hearer to respond willingly. These include: right, okay, etc. - In-group language means: which are used to show rapport and equality. They include the use of address terms (e.g. first names), endearments (e.g.

75 dear, darling), and the inclusive we which can be used to mean you or me, as in the examples below: (33) Lets go on with dinner, eh? (i.e. you) (34) Give us a break. (i.e. me)

2.4.2.2.2 External Modification Downgraders that are concerned with externally modifying imposition are of the following types: a. Preparators: speakers use devices to prepare the listeners for the utterance to be issued. Preparators fall into three kinds: - Preparing the content: Such preparators are used to give a clue to the hearer that what follows is a directive by means of expressing the speakers attitude towards the directive, or the proposition referred to in it. Typical examples of such preparators are the so-called attention getters such as Excuse me, Im sorry, You know something, etc .,e.g. (35) Excuse me please, what time is it? - Checking availability: Other preparators are employed to check that the speech act to be issued is indeed within the limits of possible. This type is sometimes called enquirers and sometimes pre-sequences, e.g. (36) Are you busy right now? (37) I wonder if you could spare a moment.

76 - Asserting the preconditions: This last type of preparators is used to assert the precondition that the speaker has the right, owing to her/his superiority, that the hearer do something, e.g. (38) Ive got something for you to do, you can start type these letters right now. b. Disarmers: These devices include statements which (like the other downgraders) reduce the impact of imposition by softening the recipients attitude and motivating her/him to respond willingly, e.g. (39) I hate bothering you but. (40) I hope Im not intruding. (41) Im sorry to disturb you but. c. Supportive reasons: One other way of showing politeness is by giving reasons for issuing a speech act. Presenting an explanation, a justification, etc., might help the addressee grasp the reason behind issuing a speech act, the thing which may lead the addressee to comply willingly with it, e.g. (42) Could you pass me the salt, please? I cant reach it. After reviewing and showing all about the Politeness Principle ( and showing the model that is adopted in this study, i.e. Lakoffs), it can be explicitly concluded that, according to the present work, arguing appropriately entails keeping to the Politeness Principle (PP). Consequently, argumentative competence has been differently identified, in this work, from the original version launched by Trapp et al. (1986). Argumentative competence, here, means keeping to the CP and its maxims, and keeping to the PP. These two principles are very important in face-to-face interaction owing to the fact that the CP serves to open

77 the channel of communication and the PP helps in keeping it open (Leech, 1983: 82). Interestingly, the notion of argumentative competence, as developed by this work, seems to be associated with the notion of pragmatic competence presented by Lakoff (1973), which involves ones being clear and polite. The clarity requirement is accounted for by keeping to the Gricean maxims (i.e. arguing effectively according to this study), whereas the politeness requirement accords with keeping to the Politeness Principle (i.e. arguing appropriately according to this study). There remains one last thing, which has been pointed out by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 32), to be mentioned concerning argumentative competence to end the discussion on the second subsequent argumentation stage. Argumentative competence is of a relative character, that is to say, a person may be very competent in dealing with certain argumentative situations in a proper way, but less competent in dealing with other argumentative situations or some aspects of certain situations and not with others. This leads one to conclude that a persons competence should be measured on the basis of the type of context to which that competence should be applied. More obviously, the competence of arguing in legal or demonstrative situations (which are more conventionalized and institutionalized), for instance, should not be thought to be the same competence that is required in personal conversations with friends or acquaintances ( which are less conventionalized and non-institutionalized). For example, if a lawyer has kept to the notion of argumentative competence as is presented in this study (especially that part of keeping to the CP and its maxims), then his client will get imprisoned soon! Simply, this is so because one of the maxims of the CP requires speakers to

78 tell the truth, the thing which is always eschewed in the majority of legal situations. Accordingly, argumentative competence should not always be taken to entail keeping to the CP and its maxims, and keeping to the PP in all contexts. In some contexts, it might entail violating the CP and its maxims, for instance; and thats why it has been indicated that in this study argumentative competence means keeping to the CP and its maxims, and keeping to the PP.

2.4.3 The Concluding Stage


This is the final stage which terminates the whole process of argumentation. It includes strategies via which this stage is described as positive or negative. As denoted before (See 2.4 above), the strategies of concluding argumentation are adopted from Benoit and Benoits (2006) strategies of getting into and out of arguments, in addition to the researchers observations. The concluding stage might end with one of the following positive strategies: agreement (Cf. 2.3.3.2.2), apology (Cf. 2.3.3.2.3), or combination of both (Cf. 2.3.3.2.4). It is worth mentioning that these strategies are considered positive because adopting them entails that the main point of incompatibility (disagreement) is resolved. On the other hand, the concluding stage becomes negative when the point of incompatibility is not resolved. This occurs if one of the following strategies is adopted: physical or psychological disengagement (Cf. 2.3.3.2.1), disagreement ( which is not mentioned in the Benoits strategies though it is a very possible strategy with which an argumentation may end; this is so because

79 disagreement is the main reason behind engaging in argumentation), or verbal aggression, that is, verbally attacking the person per se instead of the standpoint adopted (Cf. 2.3.4). Walton (2004: 106) calls verbal personal attacks quarrel. The term quarrel seems more accurate than verbal aggression. This becomes evident when the meaning of quarrel is checked in the dictionary: quarrel: an angry argument or disagreement between people, often about a personal matter (Hornby, 2002: s.v. quarrel). Therefore, the third strategy of concluding the process of argumentation is quarrel (which has the same notion of verbal aggression as presented by Trapp (2006) but with a more accurate terminology). A combination of two (or more) of these strategies is also possible, as is the case with the combination of apology and agreement, i.e. the fourth strategy of getting out of argumentation is a combination of strategies. There are two last things which deserve to be pointed out about this final stage: 1. Although the division of negative and positive concluding has not been explicitly indicated in the Benoits strategies, yet it is right there. This can be proved when taking into regards, again, the ways arguers may choose to get out of arguments, i.e. terminating the interaction (which is negative); or reestablishing the norm of cooperation (which is positive). 2. Though verbal aggression (or more accurately quarrel) is not one of the strategies of the Benoits (2006) ( actually, it has been proposed by Trapp (2006)); it is added to the strategies of concluding argumentation in the eclectic model. This is so because of the fact that the Benoits (2006) strategies are the most common ones among the interactants ( who represent

80 kinds which do not all resemble those in the novels under investigation , as mentioned before, See 2.3.3.2.4 above) with whom their research is conducted. If this very strategy does not occur with those which they have found, it by no means indicates that it does not exist or its occurrence is not possible. For more clarification, the above discussed model (which will be used for analyzing the data of this work later on) is schematically introduced in Figure (5) below, where each arrow ( ) is to be read as by means of. Thus,

the confrontation stage is triggered by means of face violation which is done by means of insult, accusation, command, request, etc., and this leads to the subsequent argumentation stage which is performed by means of arguing effectively, appropriately or both, and this, in turn, leads to the concluding stage which can be either positive or negative. The former is achieved by means of agreement, apology, or combination of both, while the latter is attained at by means of physical or psychological disengagement, disagreement, quarrel, or combination of strategies.