10

2.2 Argumentation: A Speech-Act Perspective

In the previous section, argumentation has been shown as a verbal human activity whereby arguments are exchanged in order to reach some kind of conclusion. Viewing argumentation like that, i.e. as a human action done with words, makes it fall within the scope of the well-known speech act theory initiated by Austin (1962) and advanced by Searle 1965, 1969, 1975. Worded differently, since argumentation seems to be a preeminently verbal activity, so it is one to which the speech act theory must apply (Blair, 1986: 192). To make it more obvious, the core of the speech act theory is that the uttering of a sentence is, or is part of, an action within the framework of social institutions and conventions. In other words, saying is (part of) doing, or words are (part of) deeds (Huang, 2007: 93). Although this theory offers the most effective and promising theoretical framework for the functional analysis of language (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 19; Jacobs, 1989: 345), yet in the way in which it has been originally conceived, this theory is inadequate to characterize argumentation (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992a: 583). To clarify and elaborate, the definition of argumentation will be recalled as it facilitates the task of showing why the speech act theory is not suitable enough to analyze argumentation (See p. 7). The key word in this definition is constellation. Similarly, Hample (2005: 245) believes that argumentation is a network of things- claim, support (reason) and a connection between the two, at least. Making a claim, Hample proceeds, is the speech act of asserting, and offering support (reason) and connecting it to the claim are other assertions (i.e. other speech acts). Being a collection of

11 speech acts makes it impossible for argumentation to be treated like single speech acts (e.g. promise, statement, advice, etc.). Put another way, the speech acts as used by Austin and Searle are insufficiently complex to be applied to argumentation which requires interaction between individual units (Gilbert, 1997: 19). To solve this complication, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) suggest to diagnose the difficulties first, and then to find the solution. They introduce some amendments to the basic theory of speech acts for the sake of a proper characterization of the speech act of argumentation. To understand what has been already discussed, some details are needed in relation to the theory of speech acts (2.2.1), the place of argumentation in the theoretical framework of this theory (2.2.1.1), the amendments of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2.2.2), and , finally, the accurate characterization of argumentation as a speech act (2.2.3).

2.2.1 The Basic Theory of Speech Acts

Historically speaking, the German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is the first to say that the meaning of language depends on its actual use. For him, in ordinary life, language is used like a language game because it consists of rules which, when followed, result in doing things. Like ordinary games, such as chess, each language game has its own rules the application of which leads to a different result (Littlejohn, 2003: 77-8). In spite of the fact that the speech act theory has been foreshadowed by Wittgenstein, it is usually attributed to the Oxford philosopher Austin with his How to Do Things with Words (1962). His ideas, then, have been

12 refined, systematized and advanced by his pupil, the American philosopher, Searle (1965, 1969, 1975). Broadly speaking, Austin starts his widely cited work by distinguishing between statements which he prefers to call constatives and another type of utterances which he calls performatives (Al-Hindawy, 1999: 7). The former are the descriptive sentences that until Austin were the principal concern of philosophers of language sentences that seem to be employed mainly for saying something rather than doing something (Sadock, 2006: 54); thus, they lend themselves to truth-falsehood values. The latter refer to those sentences the utterance of which denotes performing an action, thus they are either happy or unhappy depending on whether they meet a set of happiness or felicity conditions: a set of rules which are associated with the valid performance of a speech act (Jacobs, 2002: 231). It is the limitedness of Austins felicity conditions to produce happily the ritual and archetypal performatives only (e.g. to christen, to wed) that has motivated Searle to produce another set of felicity conditions that can cover all kinds of speech acts. Perhaps, this is the main reason why scholars, when dealing with speech act theory, refer more to Searles theory than to Austins. Generally speaking, Searles felicity conditions are of four types: a- The propositional content condition: the utterance must express propositional content appropriate to its force. For example, promises must refer to future states, while reports of occurrences must not refer to future states. b- The preparatory condition: the speaker must have adequate justification for undertaking to achieve the underlying objective and

13 must believe that performing the speech act itself will help lead to the achievement of the objective. c- The sincerity condition: the speaker must actually believe, want, and intend anything represented as believed, wanted, or intended. d- The essential condition: making the utterance must count as an expression of a certain objective, within some set of social understandings (Van Eemeren et al., 1993: 3). To provide an illustrative example, an utterance is taken as a request if it meets the following conditions: a- It must predicate a future action of the addressee (the propositional condition); b- The speaker believes that the hearer is able to do the requested act; that the speaker has reason to want the act performed, and that it is not obvious that the hearer would ordinarily do that act without being requested to do so (the preparatory condition); c- The speaker wants the hearer to do the requested action (the sincerity condition); d- A request counts as an attempt to get the hearer to perform the action (the essential condition) (Jacobs, 1989: 346). Roughly speaking, Austin and Searle divide a speech act into three basic components (acts) which are mutually interdependent and which occur simultaneously: 1- Locutionary act: the act of saying something. 2- Illocutionary act: the act done in saying something. 3- Perlocutionary act: the act done by saying something. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 26)

14 For them, the central act (component) of a speech act is the illocutionary one because it holds the real sense of the act intended by the speaker. Searle, himself, has certified that by informing us that his What is a Speech Act? can equally hold the title What is an Illocutionary Act? (1971, 39; cited in ibid.: 20). As such, this act has received different taxonomies by Austin and Searle in addition to other scholars (See for instance, Katz 1977, and Bach and Harnish 1979). It is argued, as stated in Al-Hindawy (1999: 42), that Searles taxonomy is the best available one because it is tied to a theory. The most important criterion of Searles taxonomy is called direction of fit: this has to do with whether the words are supposed to fit the facts of the world or whether the world is supposed to come to fit the words. There are four values: words-to-world, world-to-words, neither, and both (Sadock, 2006: 65). By depending on this criterion, Searle distinguishes five functions of using language under which five classes of speech acts are classified. The functions are: 1- Saying how something is; 2- Trying to get people to do something, 3- Committing ourselves to doing something; 4- Expressing sentiments or attitudes; and 5- Bringing about changes in reality. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 22) The classes of speech acts are: 1- Representatives (assertives): the fit is between words and world. 2- Directives: the fit is between world and words. 3- Commisives: the fit is between world and words. 4- Expressives: there is no fit.

15 5- Declarations: the fit is two-valued (words-to-world and world-towords). (Cited in Al-Hindawy, 1999: 42-3)

2.2.1.1 Characterization of the Speech Act of Argumentation

The goal behind this sub-section is to identify the place of argumentation in the theoretical framework of the speech act theory outlined in the previous sub-section. The first theorist who has paid attention to argumentation is Austin (even though he characterizes it rather inaccurately). He considers argumentation to be the illocutionary act of saying and the perlocutionary act of convincing (1976:102; cited in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 30). Searle and Cohen, on their part, agree with Austin in looking at argumentation as an illocutionary act with convincing as its perlocutionary act. Similarly, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) attempt to treat argumentation as an illocutionary act, yet they show a major problem by considering argumentation like any other illocutionary act (e.g. promise, request, etc.). As they (ibid.: 34) state, the basic theory of speech acts (which is developed by Searle as a further extension of Austins) relates exclusively to minimal units of communicative language corresponding to the linguistic units called sentences. According to Searle, there is a one-to-one relation between the utterance of a particular sentence and the performance of a particular illocutionary act. In other words, for Searle the complete sentence is the characteristic grammatical form of the illocutionary act (ibid.: 31).

16 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983: 31-4, 1992a: 586-7, 1992b: 28-9) and Grootendorst (1992: 659) Searles one-to-one correlation: 1- Unlike promise, statement, or advice (for example), argumentation does not consist of one single sentence only; rather, argumentation consists at least of two elements(one is expressed and the other is not). In principle, argumentation consists of more than one sentence: (1) Shed better not take driving lessons because she is already 61, she panics easily, and she will never be able to buy a car out of her pension. On the other hand, sentences like those below are complete promise, statement, and advice respectively (1992b: 28): (2) Tomorrow Ill knock down that wall for you; (3) Its stopped raining; (4) The best thing you can do is go and lie for a while. 2- Since argumentation is a constellation of sentences, those very sentences have two illocutionary forces simultaneously. To put it in another way, the uttering of the sentences that together form an argumentation implies that with the uttering of each individual sentence a new specific illocutionary act is performed which is a different one from arguing, i.e. they have two different functions at the same time. For example, someone who defends the standpoint shed better not take driving lessons by saying She is already 61, she panics easily, she will never be able to buy a car out of her pension has uttered three sentences that together constitute the argumentation, but each of these utterances individually has a different communicative function (in addition to that of argumentation): it is also an assertion, a statement, or whatsoever. make a triple criticism to

17 Actually, this very criticism to Searles correlation needs to be considered one step further. Are not sentences with double illocutionary force considered indirect speech acts by Searle? If so (and they are) , then argumentation can be regarded an indirect speech act as well (since its sentences have two illocutionary forces simultaneously), and their attack becomes pointless. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983: 32-3) consider this assumption an over hasty conclusion. They offer two reasons for this: a- Unlike argumentation, indirect speech acts do not have to consist of more than one sentence (indeed, they do consist of only one sentence). b- In indirect speech acts the double illocutionary force has a highly specific function which it does not have in argumentation. In indirect speech acts the literal meaning determines the secondary force only, whereas the primary force is not made known overtly (for reasons of politeness, perhaps) but it is inferred from the literal meaning by means of idiomatic and other conventions. As far as argumentation goes, there is no need for any such ambiguity. 3- The third difficulty presents itself in the point that the uttering together of particular sentences (a constellation) cannot always be regarded to make an argumentation; there is one necessary condition that must be met if that constellation is to be looked at as argumentation: those sentences must be linked to the uttering of another sentence (another speech act) in a specific manner, that is, it must be linked to the expressed opinion (the standpoint) to which an argumentation refers. This means that the speech act constellation constituting argumentation cannot stand by itself. On the other hand, speech acts like promise, advice, etc., need not be linked to another speech act in a special way.

18 Normally, diagnosing a defect (as it were) is not sufficient by itself for that defect to be repaired; solutions have to be offered. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are no exception in this regard. They do not find it enough to say that Searles correlation does not apply to argumentation; they have offered a satisfactory solution for this problem. They have made a distinction between illocutionary forces made at sentence level, and illocutionary forces made at a higher textual level. They refer to the former as elementary illocutions (related to the uttering of sentences each of which individually has a particular force (1992a: 587)); the latter are referred to as compound illocutions or illocutionary act complexes (related to the uttering of sentences which together constitute a particular textual whole that can be allocated its own illocutionary force (ibid.)) To conclude, argumentation can be defined from the perspective of speech act theory as an illocutionary act complex composed of elementary illocutions (which for the majority of cases belong to the category of assertives) which at the sentence level maintain a one-to-one relation with sentences. The total constellation of elementary illocutions constitutes the illocutionary act complex of argumentation, which at a higher textual level maintains, as a single whole, a one-to-one relation with a sentence

sequence. This means that Searles one-to-one correlation still holds with the difference that argumentation does not stand in a one-to-one relation with individual sentences, but to a combination of sentences ordered into a sequence (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 34).

19

2.2.2 The Amendments of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983)

These amendments have been proposed, as they point out, in order to make it possible to arrive at the accurate characterization of the speech act of argumentation and to formulate its felicity conditions that have to be met if advancing a constellation of utterances is to be accounted for as argumentation. This has been done due to the fact that the basic theory is determined wholly to deal with individual sentences and not with larger units of text (such as argumentation). The amendments which have been stated in Van Eemeren and Grootendorsts (1983: 20-8) can be summarized as follows: 1- For them, a complete speech act consists of the illocutionary act as well as the perlocutionary act. In other words, the perlocutionary act is as important as the illocutionary act due to the fact that by performing a speech act the speaker not only wants the listener to understand the act performed but also to elicit certain kind of verbal response (act) in return. Figure (2) below shows what they (ibid.) consider a complete speech act to be. 2- They have made a clear distinction between communicative and interactional aspects of language, unlike Searle who deals exclusively with communicative aspects. The communicative aspect has to do with the illocutionary effects of a speech act; the interactional aspect has to do with the prlocutionary effects. In their view, it is necessary to analyze the speech act of argumentation in terms of both its communicative and interactional aspects. Apparently, they have made this distinction for the sake of reviving the perlocutionary effects of a speech act.

20

Figure

is

found

here

ramram

21 Actually, they have based this distinction on Wunderlinchs observation that the performance of speech acts cannot be treated as oneway traffic between a speaker and a listener; rather, the speech act acquires its significance in the further progress of the communication between the two (ibid: 23). For Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, when performing a speech act, the speaker not only wants his words to be understood; but also wants them to be accepted as well (even if this acceptance may in the first instance be no more than acceptance on approval); otherwise, the speech act has no relevance to the listener and thus it cannot be regarded happy. To put it more obviously, the communicative aspect is associated with the understanding of a particular speech act; the interactional aspect, in its turn, is associated with the acceptance of that same speech act ( communicative = understanding; interactional = acceptance). According to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (ibid.), this view applies pre-eminently to argumentation in which arguments are designed to elicit verbally externalized illocutionary and perlocutionary effects that are immediately related to the speech acts performed there. The word immediately needs more clarification here. The use of this word in the context in which it has occurred indicates that there are other perlocutionary effects (other than acceptance) that follow from the illocutionary effects; for Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, this is the case really. As a matter of fact, they draw a distinction between those immediate perlocutionary effects and the more comprehensive effects of speech acts on the further behaviour (such as thought processes and emotional life of interlocutors) which can be referred to as perlocutionary effects. In other words, they have proposed a terminological and conceptual distinction between inherent perlocutionary effects (which consist

22 exclusively of the acceptance of the speech act by the listener) and consecutive perlocutionary consequences (effects) ( which comprise all other consequences of the speech act). The distinctions just mentioned are illustrated in Figure (3) below with reference to examples.

speech act

communicative aspects illocution illocutionary effect perlocution

interactional aspects inherent consecutive

perlocutionary perlocutionary effect consequence enrolling for a new course desisting from a position to a point of view

example 1 example 2

advising

understanding the advice

cheering up

accepting the advice

arguing

understanding the argumentation understanding the request

convincing

accepting the argumentation

example 3

requesting

persuading

accepting the request

abandoning the intention to leave

example 4

informing

understanding the information understanding the warning

instructing

accepting the information

henceforth using contraceptives

example 5

warning

alarming

accepting the warning

keeping mouth shut

Figure (3) Illustration of Communicative and Interactional Aspects of Language (Following Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 25)

23 3- In the first part of their reviving movement of perlocutions, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst distinguish several kinds of perlocutionary effects depending on whether they have occurred accidentally (i.e. they are not brought about on the basis of understanding of an illocutionary act) or they are intended by the speaker. Actually, the distinction between accidental and intended perlocutionary effects has been first introduced by Austin (1962: 118) but with a different terminology: accidental perlocutions are termed sequel; those that are intended are called object. For example, the act of warning may achieve its perlocutionary object of alerting, and also has the perlocutionary sequel of alarming (ibid.). Before going any further in talking about the different kinds of perlocutions, it seems necessary to show on what criterion they distinguish between intended and unintended effects. The term act, for them, is reserved for conscious, purposive activity founded on rational considerations; so bringing about any kind of unintended consequences cannot be considered perlocutionary acts. A ready-and-rough criterion for distinguishing between these two is whether the speaker can reasonably be asked to provide her/his reason for causing the effect or consequences in question. They refer to a perlocutionary act only where that is possible. They (ibid: 27) distinguish four kinds of unintended

perlocutionary effects (in other words, non illocutionary perlocutionary effects): a- An utterance perlocution: This is the kind of perlocution which happens regardless of the content and force of what is uttered. It stems merely from the manner in which the speech act is uttered. For example, a pupil may flinch simply because his teacher shouts at him.

24 b- A propositional perlocution: In contrary to the first, this kind of perlocution is startled by the proposition (or part of it) that is expressed in the speech act. For instance, someone may jump because he hears his name linked with that of someone with whom he is in love, without having sufficiently recognized the illocutionary act. c- A force perlocution: As the name suggests, the force of the speech act is what startles that perlocution. For example, a pupil may be startled by a civilized, anti-authoritarian teacher suddenly launching into a tirade of screamed orders in the middle of a dictation (without the pupil being fully aware of what is happening). d- A contextual perlocution: It is that kind of acts in which neither utterance nor propositional acts play a role; rather, it is a matter of verbal causes. It is possible, for example, for a pupil to be startled by the teacher, having made an admission to him during a confidential conversation, suddenly addressing him as mister so-and-so. No doubt, the primary concern is with the illocutionary perlocutions: those perlocutions which are realized on the basis of the understanding of an illocutionary act. 4- Finally, the second part of their intensive concentration on perlocutions manifests itself in a further distinction they draw between perlocutionary effects brought about by a rational decision by the listener and those which are not. In other words, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are very

concerned to distinguish between rational decisions by the listener that are a result of considerations intended by communicators, and those that are either accidental or intended to achieve other non-rational effect, e.g. arouse the listeners emotions (Gilbert, 1997: 19).

25 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983: 28) point out that Searle considers that performance of perlocutionary act as the result of illocutions which bring about effects on the listeners actions, beliefs, thoughts, etc., without distinguishing between the effects in which a listener plays an active role (reacting rationally, i.e. on rational grounds) and those effects in which this is not the case. As such, for Searle the listener always plays a passive role as far as perlocutionary effects are concerned, and this, in turn, indicates that no account has been taken by him (Searle) of the interactional aspect of language. For Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (ibid.), on the other hand, the listener is expected to decide on rational grounds whether or not s/he should allow the perlocutionary effect desired by the speaker to be brought about, i.e. whether s/he regards the performance or non-performance of the act required of her/him as acceptable. Of course, it becomes very clear from the listeners reactions to what extent the speaker has succeeded in his perlocutionary purpose.