26

2.2.3 The Accurate Characterization of Argumentation as a Speech Act

As Jacobs (1989: 348) and Walton (1992: 173-4) point out, the most refined, explicit and complete treatment of argumentation within the framework of the speech act theory has been developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983). First, they (i.e. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst) have defined argumentation as a complex of illocutionary acts on the sentence level which constitute, as a unit at a higher textual level, the illocutionary act complex of argumentation (Van Eemeren et al., 1993: 5). They have stated that those elementary speech acts belong in principle to the category of assertions. One might wonder here: why assertions in principle; cannot one show her/his opinion through non-assertive speech acts? Van Eemeren (2001: 18) answers this question by giving the following example: (5) Lets take an umbrella, or do you want to get wet? Considered literally, Van Eemeren (ibid.) comments, what the speaker does, at first glance, is making a proposal and asking a (rhetorical) question. A closer inspection shows that there is a standpoint which is implicit: We should take an umbrella for we do not want to get wet. This might justify why the phrase in principle has been used in relating the

elementary illocutionary acts to assertions because in one way or another the opinion will be expressed as a speech act belonging to the category of assertives. Part of their characterization of argumentation, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst state that it should be linked in a specific manner to another speech act (i.e. the speech act of advancing a standpoint) because unless

27 they are related to a standpoint, verbal utterances cannot constitute an argumentation (Van Eemeren, 1986: 205). By so thinking, they agree with Quasthoff (1978: 6-7) who asserts that argumentation as a kind of verbal interaction is more than an ordinary sequence of speech acts such as statement or justification. He clarifies his idea more by invoking the example given by Nowakowska (1973: 136), in which the relationship between the complex action of arguing and its constituent speech acts is very much resembled to the relationship between toasting a piece of bread and making breakfast:
Thus, preparing breakfast may be treated as a single action, or may be decomposed into a string of actions, depending on what time-results one wants to consider. Thus, if one of the elements of S (the set of results) is to be burning [sic!] a piece of toast, then preparing breakfast must be treated not as a single action but as a set of strings of actions, some of which lead to the time-results toast burnt at time t and some of which do not.

As far as the felicity conditions for the speech act of advancing a standpoint are concerned, Houtlosser (2001: 32) proposes the following: 1- The propositional content condition a- the propositional content of the standpoint consists of an expressed opinion O. b- O consists of one or more utterances. 2- The essential condition Advancing a standpoint counts as taking responsibility for a positive position in respect to O, i.e. as assuming an obligation to defend a positive position in respect to O, if requested to do so.

28 3- The Preparatory conditions a- speaker S believes that listener L does not (already, at face value, completely) accept O. b- S believes that he can justify O for L with the help of arguments.

4- The sincerity conditions a- S believes that O is the case. b- S has the intention to justify O for L with the help of arguments, if requested to do so.

Second, fitting argumentation into the frame work of the speech act theory means that it must have a set of felicity conditions, so following Searles system, Gilbert (1997:17) comments, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst specify the happiness conditions of both pro and contraargumentation. Third, for the sake of an accurate characterization, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have treated argumentation in relation to both: its communicative level and its interactional level.

2.2.3.1 Argumentation on the Communicative Level

It has been made clear before (See 2.2.2 above) that the communicative level of a speech act is associated with its understanding by the listener. Such understanding can be manifested by means of a set of felicity conditions which must be met if that speech act is to be happy. As it is well-known, the notion of felicity conditions stems from Austin (1962) and has been developed by Searle (1969). Van Eemeren and

29 Grootendorst (1983) have made a distinction among Searles felicity conditions: identity conditions (i.e. the propositional content condition and the essential condition) which help the listener recognize the performance of a particular speech act (e.g. promise, request, argumentation, etc.); and correctness conditions (i.e. the preparatory conditions and the sincerity conditions) which constitute the correct performance of a speech act. For them, unlike Searle, the happy performance of argumentation comprises both the identity (recognizability) conditions and the correctness conditions. This distinction is necessary, as Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992b: 30) point out, because an illocution could be recognized (as a particular illocution) but that by no means indicates that a particular speech act has been correctly performed. The felicity conditions for argumentation have a kind of peculiarity : they are the conditions which in principle have consequences for both speaker and listener (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 40). That is to say, they are the conditions which the speaker has to fulfill if the constellation of utterances one makes is to be regarded as argumentation; and they are the conditions that the listener may regard as having been met when he treats that constellation as argumentation. However, following the Searlean system, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983: 42-6; 1992a: 589-90; 1992b: 4-5) offer the following felicity conditions for both pro and contra-argumentation. It should be stressed, again, that argumentation is linked to the speech act of advancing a standpoint in which an opinion O is expressed, hence the felicity conditions are formed with respect to that O.

30 For pro-argumentation the felicity conditions (i.e. the identity conditions (the first pair) and the correctness conditions (the second pair)) are: 1- The propositional content condition: utterances u1,,un together constitute a constellation of expressed propositions (elementary speech acts) C (E1,,En) in which a commitment is undertaken to the propositions expressed. 2- The essential condition: the uttering of C (E1,,En) counts as an attempt on the part of the speaker, S, to justify to the listener, L, i.e. to convince L of the acceptability of O. 3- The preparatory conditions: a- S believes that L does not accept the opinion in advance (without reservation, wholly). b- S believes that L will accept the expressed propositions E1,,En. c- S believes that L will accept the constellation C (E1,,En) as a justification of O. 4- The sincerity conditions: a- S believes O. b- S believes E1,,En. c- S believes that C (E1,,En) constitutes a justification of O. As for contra-argumentation, the felicity conditions read as follows: 1- The propositional content condition: utterances u1,,un together constitute a constellation of expressed propositions (elementary speech acts) C (E1,,En) in which a commitment is undertaken to the

31 propositions expressed. (It can be noticed that the propositional content condition is the same for both pro and contra-argumentation). 2- The essential condition: the uttering of C (E1,,En) counts as an attempt on the part of S to refute to L, i.e. to convince L of the unacceptability of O.

3- The preparatory conditions: a- S believes that L accepts O as it stands (more or less, wholly or partly). b- S believes that L will accept the expressed propositions E1,,En. c- S believes that L will accept the constellation C (E1,,En) as a refutation of O. 4- The sincerity conditions: a- S does not believe O. b- S believes E1,,En. c- S believes that C (E1,,En) constitutes a refutation of O. The consequences of non-fulfillment of these conditions range from a partial failure of the complex speech act of argumentation to a total failure. Partial failure means that the illocutionary act complex of argumentation has taken place (i.e. has been performed), but the act is superfluous (if the first preparatory condition has not been met), pointless (if either the second or third preparatory conditions have not been met), and manipulatory (if the sincerity conditions have not been met). Total failure, on the other hand, is either the result of non-fulfillment of the propositional content condition (because in such a case no illocutionary act has been performed); or non-fulfillment of the essential condition (in which case another illocutionary act might have been expressed) (Van Eemeren and

32 Grootendorst, 1992a: 592). To put it more concisely, as Jacobs (1989: 349) states, if the identity conditions have not been met, the complex speech act of arguing will misfire; it will be either pointless or misleading if the correctness conditions have not been met. This fact sheds a light on the significance of all the conditions for a complete and happy performance of any illocutionary act (complex), and not only on part of them (i.e. the correctness conditions for a happy illocutionary act, especially for Searle).

2.2.3.2 Argumentation on the Interactional Level

As could be noticed from the felicity conditions just reviewed, the performance of argumentation is not only intended to make the listener understand that the constellation of utterances put forward by the speaker forms that speech act, but also it seeks something else: convincing the listener of the (un)acceptability of a particular standpoint. The wording of the essential condition (for both pro and contraargumentation) of the illocutionary act complex of argumentation (on the communicative level) indicates explicitly what perlocutionary act (on the interactional level) is intended in performing it: The uttering of C (E1,,En) counts as an attempt by S to convince L of the (un)acceptability of O. The relation between arguing (as an illocution) and convincing (as a perlocution) needs to be investigated one step further. This might be done by raising the following question: Can arguing and convincing be considered as one act (i.e. as two facets for the same coin, since performing argumentation implies an attempt to convince, and making an attempt to

33 convince implies argumentation), or can they be considered as two distinct acts? The answer to this question manifests itself in practice: it is wellknown that arguing is not the same as convincing: one can simply say We had a prolonged argumentation, yet she could not convince me. This means that argumentation might succeed on the communicative level in that the listener could recognize the constellation of utterances as argumentation, but the attempt to convince might fail (i.e. argumentation has failed on the interactional level). This leads us to decide that arguing and convincing are two distinct acts, yet it does not mean that there is no relation between them, per contra they are specifically related: the one act (arguing) is the means whereby the end, i.e. the other act (convincing) is achieved. Cohen (1973) calls perlocutions that are in this specific way related to illocutions associated (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992a: 594). Though arguing and convincing are two associated acts, their happiness conditions are different. Arguing (as an illocutionary act) is happy if the listener understands the constellation of utterances put by the speaker as an attempt to convince him of the (un)acceptability of an opinion. As a perlocutionary act, convincing is happy if the speaker (by his argumentation) has indeed convinced the listener of the (un)acceptability of that opinion and, thus, the listener endorses the viewpoint of the speaker. In other words, convincing is happy if the speaker has achieved his intended effect in making the listener accept the expressed opinion (in case of proargumentation) or reject it (in case of contra-argumentation) (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 50). To put it more strongly, the difference between arguing and convincing is caused by the possible discrepancy between the opinion ascribed to the listener by the speaker (which is manifested in the

34 second and third preparatory conditions) and the opinion actually held by the listener (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992a: 593). It has been mentioned before that the interactional level of any speech act is associated with acceptance (See 2.2.2), yet nothing, so far, has been mentioned about acceptance. At first glance, convincing might be considered as the only perlocutionary act that is associated with arguing, then where will acceptance be? This question is answered by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983: 69; 1992a: 594-7) in which they state that acceptance is an inherent perlocutionary effect that is aimed at in performing all illocutionary act (complexes). But what does acceptance mean? First, acceptance is regarded as the inherent perlocutionary effect of any illocution and as such it is the minimal perlocution: it is minimal because it is not the real intended act which the speaker would like the listener to perform (though in some speech acts , e.g. promise, acceptance is the only perlocutionary effect required by the listener). This is supported by the fact that speakers will not be satisfied by merely making listeners accept their illocutions; rather, they want them to perform some farreaching perlocutionary effect. This last kind (i.e. the far-reaching one) is called the optimal perlocution which may consist of a particular state of mind of the listener (of which conviction is a kind) or one or more speech acts of whatever kind which have to be performed by the listener (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992a: 594). Second, by acceptance is not meant being convinced in the full psychological sense of the word; it amounts to no more nor less than agreeing to the point of view being defended in the argumentation: it is free from any psychological connotations. More clearly, acceptance is

35 conceived of as an illocutionary act which implies that the listener explicitly expresses that he concurs with the expressed propositions E1,,En and with the justification or refutation function of the constellation C (E1,,En) with respect to the opinion O and that he therefore accepts or does not accept O (ibid.: 595). This last identification of acceptance makes it possible to think of it as tentative and of passing and personal significance. Actually, this is true, yet by accepting (or rejecting) the speakers argumentation, the listener is committed to his acceptance or rejection, since the illocutionary force of accept or reject is of course to commit the speaker positively or negatively to the propositional content of his utterance, the direction of fit is from worldto-words and the sincerity condition relates to the speakers intention (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983: 71). To elaborate on the notion of committedness, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (ibid.:71-2) list the felicity conditions (i.e. the identity and correctness conditions) which apply to the illocutionary acts of accept and reject ( this notion becomes more obvious in the sincerity conditions): 1- The propositional content condition: the speech utterance in which acceptance or rejection is expressed must have as its propositional content the opinion to which the argumentation relates. 2- The essential condition: the utterance must count as an acceptance or rejection of the expressed opinion. 3- The preparatory condition: the person performing the illocution (i.e. the listener) must believe that the person performing the illocutionary act complex of argumentation (i.e. the speaker) is thereby making a serious attempt to convince him of the (un)acceptability of an expressed opinion.

36 4- The sincerity conditions: a- the speaker (who acted as a listener during argumentation) believes that the propositions expressed in the argumentation are acceptable. b- the argumentative constellation is a justification or refutation of the expressed opinion; and c- the expressed opinion, depending on these grounds, must be accepted or rejected, as the case may be. It might be seen, then, that performing argumentation (by the speaker) gives the listener the right to hold the speaker to O, to E1,,En, and to C (E1,,En) which justifies or refutes O. The acceptance of argumentation, on the other hand, gives the listener (i.e. the person who acted as speaker during argumentation) the same right to hold the speaker (i.e. the person who acted as listener during argumentation) to the same opinion, propositions and the justification or refutation function of the constellation of propositions (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992a: 5956). The relationship between argumentation (as an illocutionary act complex) and the two associated perlocutions (i.e. acceptance (minimal) and convincing (optimal)) are shown in Figure (4) below as given by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a: 597):