RELIGIOUS SECTS UNIFIED BY POLITICAL TURMOIL BY MICHAEL GREENE 1134 W. Loyola Ave. #1299 Chicago, IL 60626 616.822.

0731

HIST 300 009 Dr. Hakan zolu

Historians and political analysts have often speculated that a religious sectarian divide is at the heart of conflicts in the political history of Iraq. This is an important topic particularly during the current reconstruction of Iraq, as different factions are given power and leaders attempt to minimize discord. However, the administrators of this reconstruction effort fail to see that sectarian differences are not the driving forces at work in present-day Iraq. This essay will show that tensions between the Sunni and Shi'i have been minimal throughout Iraq's history, and that the current conflicts are products of a history of external dominance by secular forces. First, the reasoning behind the sectarian divide argument will be given and analyzed in historical context. Secondly, the Sunni and Shi'i reactions to the current occupation will be given, and compared with their reactions to the British occupation preceding the mandate. Finally, the argument will be made that the best hope of long-lasting unity in Iraq would come from a removal of American occupation. Since the late Ottoman period, the leaders of the area now known as Iraq have been predominantly Sunni Muslims. There are a number of reasons for this, but the primary one is that the Ottoman Empire itself had a Sunni leadership. In addition, the Ottomans felt threatened by the Persians, now Iranians, who were Shi'ites and held a border with the the three wilayets which would become Iraq. Since they placed their colleagues in power during their reign over the wilayets, they began a trend that continues today. After the British invaded these provinces during the First World War, they needed Iraqi officials who had experience in administrative affairs. Very few Shi'ites had any administrative roles up until this point, so the British had no choice but to install Sunni leadership in their fabricated state.1 All of the upper-level positions in the military were given to Sunnis, as
1 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 45.

well as most of the higher administrative positions. They were set in this way in order that the British might benefit from their patronage, and so that the British could trust the strength of their bureaucratic system, having come from the Ottoman system. Gertrude Bell, oriental secretary to the British commissioner, was a notable dissident of this system, and advocated direct rule by the Iraqis, a system of rule which this essay will also advocate. Additionally, many of the richest persons in Iraq were Sunnis, and the poorest Shi'ites. This stems from the fact that the Shi'i of Iraq had maintained an agrarian lifestyle ever since their conversion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. After their conversion, they settled down in areas around the major shrine cities, and many of these former nomads began cultivating the land while retaining their tribal structure.2 Unfortunately for them, land tenure under the Ottoman and British was dangerously skewed towards the benefit of the landowners. Most landlords consumed rather than invested, and played an essentially parasitic role in the economy, according to Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett. 3 They go on to state that these tendencies were a direct result of British policies during the mandate. In addition, the sharecropping practices the predominantly Sunni landlords employed led to a cycle of poverty and indebtedness. Since many of the farmers in Iraq had come from a communal system, they were unprepared for the need to buy seed and animals for their fields. The rates at which they were lent money were exorbitant, and so the farmers became more and more deeply indebted.4 Even when they were lent money by their Shi'i tribal leaders, this still caused a great divide between the Sunni and Shi'i groups,
2 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 25-30. 3 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 32 4 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 33

economically. There may have been a few Shi'ites to profit from this scheme, but they were hurting their own community in the end, since the majority of Shi'ites lost economic power. Thus, it was not specific actions on the part of the Sunni minority that subjugated the Shi'i majority. The actions of their external rulers, combined with the economic constraints placed upon both groups, served to divide them socioeconomically. Nakash blames the establishment of the Iraqi monarchy for the manifest struggle between the Sunni and the Shi'i leaders surrounding the collapse of the 1920 revolt.5 There were indisputable tensions between the sects, as is to be expected of any groups with opposing viewpoints on an issue (in this case, religion). However, they maintained a degree of political unity throughout Iraq's history which continues today. They were politically unified when the British came during World War I. Both sects wished for a change in regime, and they believed the British would allow for this. Things quickly changed for the worse when, as was previously mentioned, the British imposed a ruling class based on their own interests, composed primarily of Sunni leaders. The resulting tensions were a direct result of British policy. The Sunni Shi'i unity is perhaps most evident in the period surrounding the War with Iran in the 1980s. Iranian

influence in Iraq was at its height during this time, as the leaders of the revolution there attempted to stir up their Shi'i brethren in southern Iraq.6 However, the Ba'ath leadership over-estimated the degree to which the Iraqi Shi'i population was in sympathy with, or prepared to support, the establishment of a theocratic regime in Iraq.7 In reality, the

5 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 75. 6 David Menashri, The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 219. 7 Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 257.

Shi'ites living in Iraq were unprovoked by the Iranian instigations. The uprisings in the south were limited, and many of the Shi'ites involved had actually come from Iran and should not, for all practical purposes, be considered Iraqi Shi'ites.8 A counterexample to this idea of Shi'i devotion to the state comes only a few years later, following the first Gulf War. After having been subjected to abuse by Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath leadership since they were seen as rebels, the southern Shi'ites (along with the Kurds in the north) sparked full blown rebellions. These came to a violent end through the remaining military forces after the end of the Gulf War, but the rebellion puts a hole into the argument that there has always been political unity between the Sunni and the Shi'i. In this encounter, the Shi'ites are seen as committing a crime against the state as secessionists. However, it must be remembered that these uprisings were encouraged by the United States and its allies.9 The rebels can hardly be blamed for trying to overthrow Hussein, something the United States would be more successful with just over a decade later. When the United States entered Iraq in 2003, it did not receive nearly as much paramilitary support as the British had received nearly ninety years prior, nor did it receive the amount it expected. However, the political unity displayed among the Iraqi people is very impressive. Sunni and Shi'i clerics alike issued fatwas emphasizing that loyalty to Iraq was more important than ethnic and sectarian differences. They also denounced any form of occupation by a foreign power. They had banners which read 'No Sunni. No Shi'i. Only One Islamic Nation.10 Political polarization in the country took yet another
8 David Menashri, The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 227. 9 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 289 10 Judith S. Yaphe, "War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?" Middle East Journal 57 , no. 3 (Summer, 2003), 382.

turn in the past year. After April 9, 2003, polarization shifted gradually from opposing or supporting the Ba'ath regime to that of engaging or opposing the occupational authority.11 A mainstream current of peaceful engagement and institutional politics emerged, although it has been largely ignored in news accounts, which have focused on the growing violence in early 2004. This broad current is now polarizing along new lines: secular versus Islamic, centralist versus federal, and traditional versus modern.12 These issues were created by the abrupt deposition of the former leadership, Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party, with little apparent conversation between the possible post-Saddam leaders and the coalition governments. These are issues which will not be solved by an American occupation, but which need to be resolved in the context of combined Sunni, Shi'i, and Kurdish leadership in an independent Iraq. The desire of the American administration to resolve these issues is noble, but the British struggled with similar issues. The British also had protection of their oil program in sight, as the Americans now do. This essay proposes that unless the American occupation is cleanly abandoned, strife will prevail in Iraq for years to come, just as it did following the years under the British mandate. One of the things the US is worried about in conceding direct rule to the Iraqis is the possible creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Iraq, such as that in Iran. Indeed, the banners mentioned by Yaphe above would suggest that's a goal of both Sunni and Shi'i leaders. Moreover, The coalition's willingness to treat clerics as authority figures has likewise reinforced the role of religion and the clergy in post-Saddam Iraq.13 Yet this seems unlikely. The Sunni and
11 Faleh Abdul-Jabar, "Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy," United States Institute of Peace Special Report 120 (May, 2004), 12. 12 Faleh Abdul-Jabar, "Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy," United States Institute of Peace Special Report 120 (May, 2004), 12. 13 Michael Eisenstadt, Sitting on Bayonets, The National Interest 76 (Summer, 2004), 104.

Shi'i have been shown to display political unity, but there are still fundamental religious differences between the two groups. This, combined with the presence of Jewish and Christian populations and the United Nations watching over developments, makes a consensual Islamic state highly unlikely.14 It remains to be seen whether the alliances between Sunni and Shi'i leaders in denouncing the American occupation would continue after they left, but looking back on the political unity they have displayed throughout Iraq's short history, one can only be optimistic.

14 Michael Eisenstadt, Sitting on Bayonets, The National Interest 76 (Summer, 2004), 104.

Bibliography Abdul-Jabar, Faleh. "Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy." United States Institute of Peace Special Report 120 (May, 2004), 118. Abdul-Jabar analyzes how politics are shaping the current reconstruction of Iraq. He focuses on the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council, analyzing their goals and effectiveness. He shows how the institutional and social components of Iraqi society are affecting these political bodies. Eisenstadt, Michael. Sitting on Bayonets. The National Interest 76 (Summer, 2004), 101106. Eisenstadt documents America's Postwar Challenges in Iraq illustrating his displeasure with the current actions of the Bush administration, and raising questions about possible outcomes for the state of Iraq. Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003. Iraq Since 1958 presents an overview of the history of Iraq, particularly the socioeconomic history. As the title suggests, its focus is largely the period since the Revolution of 14 July 1958. The authors convey the circumstances which allowed the Ba'ath to rise to power, and this updated edition offers insight into the possible future of Iraq. Menashri, David. The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. Menashri sees two main goals of the Iranian Revolution: maintaining power, and spreading its distinctive ideology based on Shi'i teachings. The work focuses on Iran's internal affairs, but also features a section on the War with Iraq, and the goal of Iran to impress their revolution on the Iraqi Shi'is. Nakash, Yitzhak. The Shi'is of Iraq. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. This work focuses primarily on the conversion of the Shi'is during the late 19th and early 20th century. It has relatively little content on the period after 1958, although it ends with speculation on the future of the Shi'is in post-Saddam Iraq. It is a study of the forces which brought Shi'i Islam to Iraq, and those that propagated it to the majority of Iraqis.

Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Tripp's work attempts to cover all angles of Iraq's history, touching on ancient history but ranging primarily from the caliphate to the pending (as of 2002) American military pursuits. It glosses over many of the details, but offers an unbiased, accessible account of the history of Iraq. Yaphe, Judith S. "War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?" Middle East Journal 57 , no. 3 (Summer, 2003), 381-399. Yaphe's essay discusses the present occupation of Iraq, and the British occupation of Iraq during the 1920s. It examines the lessons the present administration could learn from the British occupation, and the effects of Iraqi religion and culture on both occupations.