Jo!

tova 10
602 00 Brno
Czech Republic
www.ispo.fss.muni.cz
Populism in the Balkans
Case of Serbia
Institute for Comparative Political Research
Faculty of Social Studies
Masaryk University
WP-2007/4
Hana Vykoupilov (vykoupilova@fss.muni.cz)
V"ra Stojarov (stojarova@fss.muni.cz)
The paper has been elaborated in the framework of the Ministry of education, youth and physical
education research project Political Parties and the Interest Representation in the Contemporary
European Democracies (the code No. MSM0021622407).
4th ECPR General Conference
University of Pisa
6-8 September 2007
1
PopuIism in the BaIkans
Case of Serbia
1

Working Paper for the ECPR Conference in Pisa, 6-9 September 2007


Hana Vykoupilov - Vra Stojarov
2


The aim of the article is to analv:e the populism in Serbia. The text will focus on those
political parties who were founded in the beginning of the 1990's and kept their position in
the partv svstem up to now (SRS, SPS, DSS, DS). SPO, important partv during the whole
transition period, which did not gain anv seats in the last parliamentarv elections, will be
analv:ed as well.

Keywords:
Populism, Serbia, Serbian Radical Partv, Serbian Renewal Movement, Socialist Partv of
Serbia, Democratic Partv, Democratic Partv of Serbia
Introduction

Populism is one oI the phenomena which can be understood in many ways. There are
diIIerent concepts and approaches, diIIerent authors emphasize diIIerent Iactors linked to
populism. One can ask whether there is some common base on which the concept oI populism
is Iounded.
The aim oI this article is to make a short overview oI the diIIerent concepts oI
populism, Iind some common characteristics oI this phenomenon and examine them in the
reality oI Serbian party system. Journalists and political observers oIten label most oI the
Serbian political parties as 'populists. However, could this really be said about all oI the
political parties in the spectrum, or is it only simpliIication and ambiguity oI the journalist
world? What means do Serbian political parties use in order to gain support? In this article,
we will try to Iind answers to these questions while Iocusing on Serbian political parties and
investigating level oI populism oI those.
Most oI the current relevant political parties in Serbia were Iounded in the period oI
1989-1992. The most important party in the 1990s was the Serbian Socialistic Party (SPS)

1
This paper has been undertaken as part oI the Research Project Political Parties and Representation oI Interests
in Contemporary European Democracies` (code MSM0021622407).
2
Vra Stojarova and Hana Vykoupilova work as analytic researchers at the Institute Ior Comparative Political
Research, Faculty oI Social Science Masaryk University, Jostova 10, 602 00, Czech republic. E-mail:
stojarovaIss.muni.cz, vykoupilovaIss.muni.cz.
2
which was led the whole time since its Ioundation in July 1990
3
by Slobodan Milosevic. AIter
his passing, Ivica Dacic was elected president oI the party. The strongest political party,
which was in certain periods sitting in the government coalition together with SPS, is
currently the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). The party is since its Ioundation in 1992 led by
Vojislav Sesejl; since his indictment by ICTY the party is Iormally led by Tomislav Nikolic.
One oI the main political parties being in opposition towards the Milosevic regime was
Democratic Party (DS) which was led since 1994 by the pro-western oriented Zoran Djindjic.
The diIIerence in the personal opinions about the Serbian Iuture caused that the nationalistic
wing split in 1992 Irom DS and created Democratic Party oI Serbia (DSS) led since then by
Vojislav Kostunica. Another important opposition party during the Milosevic regime was the
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) oI Vuk Draskovic. The party wants to restore the
monarchy and uses quite oIten the nationalistic rhetoric. One Iraction oI SPO led by Velimir
Ilic split and created New Serbia (NS) in 1997. This party has been in coalitions either with
SPO or recently with DSS. Another quite new party is G17 which was created Irom the
economic think-tank in 2002. Last but not least we have to mention the minor political parties
which succeeded in the last elections by creating coalition: Civil union oI Serbia (GSS),
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Social Democratic Union (SDU) and League oI Social
Democrats oI Vojvodina (LSV). The GSS was mainly associated with Vesna Pesic and in
April 2007 the party merged with LDP.
For the purpose oI this text, the parties which were Iounded in the beginning oI the
1990s and kept their position in the party system up to now will be taken into account. Even
though SPO did not gain even one seat last elections it was one oI the main parties in the past
and played important role in the opposition towards Milosevic regime and thereIore it was
included in the analysis as well. ThereIore, the text will Iocus on the programmes oI these
political parties: SPS, SRS, SPO, DSS and DS. The aim oI the article is to analyse populism
on Serbian political scene since 2000 the populist Ieatures oI the previous authoritarian
regime will be mentioned as well in order to give an overall picture oI the Serbian political
scene since the beginning oI transition. The political programmes oI the political parties will
be used as primary sources accompanied with the publications oI the parties, promotional
leaIlets and interviews given to media.

3
The Union oI Serbian Communists and the Socialistic Union oI Serbian Workers created united and created
SPS in July 1990.
3
1. PopuIism - main features and characteristics

De Raadt, Hollanders and Krouwel (2004) summed up in their article two main approaches to
conceptualisation oI populism. First, populism is considered as a political tactics or strategy,
second approach is to understand populism as an ideology. De Raadt, Hollanders and
Krouwel emphasize the importance oI the second approach; they consider populism as an
ideology based on 'hostility to representative democracy. Comprehending populism as a
kind oI political style or tactics means to admit that all political parties can behave
'sometimes in populist manner (Mudde 2002, podle de Raadt etc. 1998). On the other hand,
a level oI populism can be analyzed by suitable selection oI 'populist characteristics.
Canovan (1999) describes populism as a kind oI revolt against established structures in
the name oI (the) people. The kind oI a revolt depends on a target oI this revolt. According to
Canovan the revolt is led not only against those who are in power, but also against values oI
those elites. Populism is characterized by one authority, which is the people; it depends on a
situation oI populist rhetoric about 'united people or just 'our people. Describing a political
style oI populist, Canovan speaks about simple, direct style. Populists Iormulate problems and
issues very simply and also their solutions are very simple and very understandable to
'everyone. Canovan than uses a very important term 'populist mood, which contents
emotions, enthusiasm oI populists, populists eIIort to include not only people interested in
politics, but also those who are not involved in politics oI their countries, revivalist accent and
oI course a very important Iacto which is a charismatic leader. Populists personalised
leadership very strongly, and the leader is the channel oI communication with public.
Paul Taggart (2004) Iound other characteristics bundled to populism. First oI all he
speaks about strong hostility to politics oI representation. Populists call Ior direct democracy,
direct communication, and identiIy themselves with a 'heartland. A content oI this term is
however very diIIicult to deIine; Taggart speaks about 'a territory oI the imagination. In his
words '|t|he heartland is that place, embodying the positive aspects oI everyday liIe.
(Taggart 95). According to Taggart, populism emerges in a time oI some kind oI crisis, when
things are changing, when rules oI a game are not clear, when an uncertainty exists, etc. This
is the right moment Ior populists to oIIer simple Iormulations, easy solutions and 'help in
orientation. Taggart emphasises that populism or better to say populist movements are
'episodic, as a reaction to a crisis which is a stimulus Ior existence oI such a movement, and
also as a reaction to change in the leadership. Taggart thereIore speaks about selI-limited
quality oI populism. Bundled to previous characteristics, Taggart uses a term 'chameleonic,
Naformtovno: neni zvraznn
Naformtovno: zvraznn
Odstranno: (Canovan 1981; Taggart
2000)
Odstranno: .
Odstranno: S
Odstranno: ?
Odstranno: it reIers to a right and Iair
past, to homeland Ior the people
Koment [vs1]: Zmenila jsem vetu,
ale nevim jestli jsem nahodou nezmnila
meaning, tak se na to radsi mrknete..
4
which indicates that populism, or precisely to say a concrete Iorm oI such a phenomenon is
dependent on a context, on an environment, and a concrete situation and Ior those reasons is
very diIIicult to Iind some more concrete characteristics and deIinitions. According this
statement, populism cannot be characterised by some key values, because it has not such
values, or is does not create such values.

2. PopuIism - main characteristics

We will Iocus on six Ieatures oI populism, we consider as the most important. We will
examine a role oI the people, oI the revolt, negativism, oI a charismatic leader in maniIestos
oI Iive Serbian parties, as well as a level oI simplicity and straightness in Iormulations and
solutions to problems, which those parties have been presenting. Our concentration will be
also on chameleonic nature oI those Iormations - we will investigate how they have been
changing their positions and opinions in dependence oI an existing context. According those
six indicators, we will investigate a level oI populism by Iive Serbian parties. The threshold
Ior populism was set up at 2/3: party can be labelled as 'populist only iI at least Iour oI six
characteristics can be indicated.

2.1 The people

Our Iirst indicator is the role oI people in parties maniIestos. 'The people is considered as a
homogenize mass oI 'ordinary man (de Raadt, Hollanders, Krouwel 2004). Populists speak
in the name oI 'the people, they act in the name oI 'the people, and they make decisions in
the name oI 'the people. 'The people is the highest authority to which reIerences are made
by populists.
2.2 The revolt

Our second indicator oI populism presents the revolt against established structures, against
elites and their values. As we already mentioned, populists are strongly against any Iorm oI
representative democracy, which means they are very strongly against any 'structure which
represents this kind oI democracy. By those 'structures populists mean also media, or
academics (Canovan 1999). Second reason to be 'against is that populists make strong
Naformtovno: Pismo: neni Tucn
Odstranno: and tradition
Koment [vs2]: Tradition nema
smysl v simplicity a stejne tak
negativismus je neco jinyho nez revolta,
dala bych to zvlast, resp. sedm kategorii,
je to strasne lehce napadnutelny a hned
by nam nadavali...
Odstranno: s
5
distinction between 'pure people and 'corrupted elite (established structures). This is the
only 'cleavage populists see within the society (Mudde 2002, 2004).
Populists call Ior Iorms oI direct democracy: reIerendums, direct elections, consultations, etc.
(de Raadt, Hollanders, Krouwel 2004).
2.3 Negativism
Along with the revolt goes other characteristic which is generall negativism. As Paul Taggart
says, '|t|he negative drive oI populism is apparent in many ways becuase populists are always
much clearer about what they are against than what they are Ior. (Taggart 2002:72). Overall
negativism can be seen in populists claims against taxation, clientelism, immigration,
European project (Taggart 2002:72), globalization or every other issue exploitable Ior
populist rhetoric.
2.4 Charismatic leader

The role oI charismatic leader means that a Iormation (a party, but rather a movement) exists
on a charisma oI this person. A charismatic leader is the person who articulates demands and
communicates 'directly to 'the people. The strong role oI a leadership implies serious
problems with a change on the post oI the leader. The problem oI successors signiIies a Iactor
due which we can speak about, by words oI Taggart (2004) 'episodic nature oI populism, or
populist movement.
2.5 Emotions, simplicity, straightness

Emotions, simplicity and straightness used by populists in communication to 'the people is
our Iourth indicator oI populism. As was already mentioned, populist rhetoric is simple,
straight, Iull oI emotions and reIerences to 'the people, to the 'ideal state which means 'all
the people are involved in political decision making, etc.
2.6 Chameleonic nature

Finally the last indicator is the chameleonic nature, as Paul Taggart named the Ieature, that
populists change in dependence oI the context and reality in which they exist. Precisely this
means, that a content oI a revolt changes during the time as well as a target oI a revolt
changes that a content oI populist rhetoric changes depending on a current situation, etc.

Naformtovno: Nadpis 2, Doleva,
Radkovani: jednoduch
Koment [vs3]: Proc
international???
Odstranno: Along with the revolt
described above, we investigate also a
general level oI negativism presented in
parties` maniIestos. We consider the
negativism as a Iorm oI revolt against
inter-national structures and elites.
Odstranno: 3
Odstranno: 4
Odstranno: Populists very oIten reIer
to 'long-lasting tradition, so closely
known to 'every ordinary man.
Odstranno: 5
6
4. PopuIism in Serbian parties manifestos
4.1 The people

The people in Socialist Party of Serbia mean not only Serbs or Serbs and their allies, but
mainly the average people workers and peasants. SPS did not bother to adapt to a new post-
cold war situation and did not change its dictionary at all, thereIore we can Iind in its
programme proletariat, bourgeoisie, heroism oI inhabitants and oI course newly the protection
oI nation against the new maIia regime. 'We are the partv of people who work in order to
live, we are the partv of people who love their countrv, we are antiglobalist partv, we are
antifascist partv, and we are Socialist partv of Serbia`' (Programska deklaracija SPS 2006:
9)
Synonym Ior the people in the programme oI Serbian Radical Party could be the
Serbian nation. SRS strives Ior the uniIication oI all Serbian territories and protection oI all
Serbs, thereIore uniIication oI Serbia, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina,
Montenegro (SRS does not talk about Montenegrin nation), oI course Kosovo and iI
Macedonia wished it could be part as well. (The Macedonian nation was recognized Irom the
Serbian side only aIter the WWII, beIore then were Macedonian perceived Irom the Serbian
side as Serbs.) One oI the newest books oI SRS is called 'Roman-catholic Serbs so called
Croats (Srbi rimokatolici tako:vani Hrvati) where the existence oI Croatian nation is denied,
thereIore there would be no wonder iI SRS once wanted uniIication with the whole Croatia
4
.
Some radicals go even Iurther and claim that once on the territory oI Romania Serbs lived
thereIore the Greater Serbia shall encompass Romania as well
5
. Very nice example (out oI
thousands) can be Iound in the Sesejls book Hunting the Heretic (Hafka na Jeretika) where
Sesejl is saying that Slovenes have no right to secede due to the Iact that there is no precedent
with sovereign independent Slovenian state in the history, blames them Ior having war with
the Serbs and Iollows: 'Well, let the Slovenes go it will be better for them, better for us. And
for us Serbs, it means million and half less outraged enemies less within the state borders`.
(Sesejl 2000: 917)

4
The blame is usually put on the Roman-Catholic church as seen Irom another title oI Vojislav Sesejl book:
Roman-Catholic criminal project oI skilIul Croatian nation. (Rimokatolicki :locinacki profekat vestacke hrvatske
nacife).
5
Conversation with the representative oI government oI Republika Srpska Krajina Slobodan Jarcevic. Belgrade
3.5.2007. One oI the last books oI Mr. Jarcevic Ex-Serbs. Roman-Catholics, Muslims, Romanians,
Montenegrins (Bivsi Srbi. Rimokatolici, Muslimani, Rumuni, Crnogorci) gives the historical reasons Ior Greater
Serbia and explains that Croats, Bosniaks, Romanians and Montenegrins used to be Serbs being in charge oI
ancient Illyria.
Odstranno: and behaviour???
(co s tm udIme, behaviour je
prece asi nejvc popuIistick, nez
cancy v programech???)
7
The rhetoric oI Serbian Renewal Movement is no more that radical as it used to be in
the last decade oI the 20
th
century. The only thing which could be Iound in the programme is
the statement that SPO is 'national partv, which believes in the Serbian tradition and faith
which were protecting Serbian nation when it was threatened in the historv`. (Program SPO
2001: 3) The nationalistic Ieeling can be seen Irom the status oI SPO when the symbol oI SPO
is deIined as hand with three Iingers and the emblem oI SPO is three words on the Serbian
Ilag: S symbolizing tinders (ocil or, ognfila) on the national coat oI arms, P symbolizing
safkaca (typical chetnicks hat) and O symbolizing heart and tears. Vuk Draskovic also
demands the rehabilitation oI Drazo Mihajlovic, the chetnik leader Irom the WWII. (Statut
SPO 1998: 1)
BeautiIul example oI populism oI Democratic Party of Serbia can be Iound in the
interview with Vojislav Kostunica Irom August 2000 answering the question about the look
oI his election campaign 'Part of the campaign will be so called 'Walking campaign`
(pesacka kampanfa) direct meetings, conversations with the ordinarv world.After ten
vears we have to show that the people who listen to common world and come to see the
ordinarv people do exist.` (Intervju: dr. Vojislav Kostunica, predsednicki kandidat 2000)
The only thing which we could Iound in the programme oI Democratic Party dealing
with the people was the claim that aIter the dissolution oI Austro-Hungarian empire it was not
possible to create democratic multiethnic state and 'thats whv Balkan was the most tragic
European region during the whole 20
th
centurv and Serbian nation one of the most tragic
European nations`. (Program Demokratske Stranke 2001: 6) Otherwise the programmes talk
more about the need Ior change in the Serbian society and there is no us and them. (cI. Za
bolji zivot 2007)
4.2 Revolt against the established structures

The revolt against the established structures in Serbia has two dimensions: the internal and the
external one. Until the end oI Milosevic era, the external dimension was Iar more important.
The then president oI Serbia and Iormer president oI Yugoslavia was using populist means
against the international established structures EU, NATO, OSCE which were presented as
enemies oI the Serbian nation: 'The international organisations are interfering into the
internal affairs. The new world order has imperialistic character, and its principle is the
dominance of West over South and East. The main argument is power and Yugoslavia is one
of the first victims of this New World Order`. (Osnove programa socialisticke partije Srbije
8
1992: art. 9.2) The internal dimension was in Milosevic era perIormed Irom time to time by
SRS depended whether Sesejl party was part oI the SPS government or went into the
opposition and oI course by the democratic opposition. UnIortunately, there is no category in
the undemocratic regime such as populist authoritarian regime the Milosevic regime
presents populist authoritarian regime par excellence.
The situation aIter 2000 is very similar; the external dimension is the relation oI
Serbia towards the outside world or to be precise with NATO and ICTY while the internal
dimension is the revolt against the new internal structures. The relation towards outside world
is not only populistically used, we can say it creates cleavage in the Serbian society: FOR and
AGAINST the cooperation with the international community
6
. Serbian Radical Party does
not mention ICTY in its programme; however its stance towards ICTY is quite clear. One oI
the last publications oI the party is called Either Carla`s Witness or death (Ili Karlin svedok ili
smrt) and basically the publication tries to convince the reader that the people indicted by
ICTY are tortured in the prison so they would tell 'the truth. The cover oI the book has photo
oI Carla del Ponte depicted as vampire. One oI other motto usually used in this relation is
'Sve sta vredi u Hagu sedi` (Everything that has some value is sitting in Hague). Socialist
Party of Serbia sees the ICTY as 'political and not independent institution formed with the
aim to punish and satani:e the Serbian nation. The cooperation with ICTY is big burden and
we have to take care of state and national dignitv. The crimes have to be individuali:ed and it
has to be secured that the nation and state would not be labelled through the manipulation
and falsification as protagonists of genocide. The process of Slobodan Milosevic shows the
inequalitv, selective truth and infringement of international laws so the credibilitv of this
institution becomes in question.` (Programska deklaracija sedmog kongresa Socialisticke
partije Srbije 2006: 11-12) The programme declaration Irom the 4
th
SPS congress attacks the
European leItist parties who supported 'genocidal NATO aggression. The KFOR and UNMIK
missions are fust mere instruments who should accomplish the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo
from Serbs, Montenegrins and other non-Albanian inhabitants`. (SPS mart 1996 - Iebruar
2000 godine, 2000: art. 15) Serbian Renewal Movement strives Ior Iuture oI Serbia and not
Ior digging into the past, because there is a risk that 'we would make again the mistakes of
previous regime which would cause conflicts and left Serbia in the narrowest borders on the

6
SPO and SRS are against the cooperation with ICTY. SPO, NS and DSS are somewhere in the middle position
talking on one hand about ICTY as political institution, but on the other hand about the need to cooperate. The
modest group (DS, G17, LDP, LDV and SDU) talks about the national reconciliation, the need to look at and
deal with the past and about the need to cooperate with ICTY. The most pro-ICTY is the LDP which openly
talks about genocide committed by Serbs.

9
peripherv of Europe and the Balkan.`(Program SPO 2001: 7) Democratic Party of Serbia is
quite critical towards the ICTY and states that 'even though he ICTY is more of political
rather than legal institution and it is easv to transform it into the instrument of the political
powers, the cooperation with Tribunal presents our obligation which we can not dispose of.`
However, DSS states that the cooperation with Hague has to be legally regulated and shall be
done with national dignity. (Program DSS 2005: 6)
Democratic Party wants to Iully cooperate with ICTY and is ready to deal with the
crimes Irom the past. The programme deals mainly with the integration into the EU, however
mentions Euro Atlantic structures as whole and the need Ior compromise in the Kosovo issue.
The internal dimension is obviously perIormed by the oppositional parties or better
to say those who were in power in Milosevic era. Socialist Party of Serbia attacks in all its
programme declaration the post-Milosevic regime claiming that the regime is based on the
cooperation oI politics with maIia. 'We were keeping an eve on the Serbian transition for ten
vears and those who came after use who came after use onlv succeeded in six vears to create
great social differences in the societv, unemplovment and povertv.The armv of poor and
unemploved lives in fear and without hope`. (Programska deklaracija sedmog kongresa
Socialisticke partije Srbije 2006: 3) The Serbian Radical Party which won last two elections
(but does not have any coalitional potential) does not really attack the current regime in its
programme. However, the monthly journal oI the party Jelika Srbifa (Great Serbia) regularly
attacks the current government and portraits them as traitors collaborating with the external
enemies, selling the Serbian dignity, Serbian lands and listening to the external insinuators.
4.3 Negativism

During the Milosevic era, the pro-regime newspapers, text-books and historical publications
were concentrating on denunciation oI all nations which were once Serbian enemies. Croats
(very oIten in the context oI Roman-Catholic Church) were depicted as traitors oI the
Yugoslav idea, as nationalists, ultrashovinists or bloodthirsty enemies longing Ior the
genocide oI the Serbian nation. The Serbian TV was broadcasting the documents about the
ethnic cleansing in Croatia and was comparing Tudjman with Ante Pavelic. The attention was
paid to the 'Independent state Croatia, concentration camp Jasenovac, Croatian spring and
anti-Serbian Croatian nationalism Irom the 1970s. The same happened to the Albanians
which were blamed Irom the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in order to annex Kosovo to Albania.
Negatively was perceived Germany as well as the culprit oI the WWII, or Austro-Hungarian
Koment [vs4]: Neoddelovala bych
to, revolta je proti established structures,
zatimco negativismus je proti cemukoliv
a komukoliv
Odstranno: 4.2.1 Negativism
During the Milosevic era, the pro-regime
newspapers, text-books and historical
publications were concentrating on
denunciation oI all nations which were
once Serbian enemies. Croats (very oIten
in the context oI Roman-Catholic
Church) were depicted as traitors oI the
Yugoslav idea, as nationalists,
ultrashovinists or bloodthirsty enemies
longing Ior the genocide oI the Serbian
nation. The Serbian TV was broadcasting
the documents about the ethnic cleansing
in Croatia and was comparing Tudjman
with Ante Pavelic. The attention was paid
to the 'Independent state Croatia,
concentration camp Jasenovac, Croatian
spring and anti-Serbian Croatian
nationalism Irom the 1970s. The same
happened to the Albanians which were
blamed Irom the ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo in order to annex Kosovo to
Albania. Negatively was perceived
Germany as well as the culprit oI the
WWII, or Austro-Hungarian empire.
Bosniaks were depicted as
Mohammedans who are trying to install
djamahuria Bosna and Herzegovina.
Serbs were portrayed as greatest victims
oI the whole history.
Current rhetoric oI Socialist Party of
Serbia is aimed against ICTY (it accuses
ICTY Irom the death oI Slobodan
Milosevic), accuses current government
and its Iight against people close to the
socialistic party, stands against globalism,
against the dominance oI international
law which has not been not approved in
the parliament, against Iascism, against
NATO aggression and against all who are
humiliating the Serbian nation.
(Programska deklaracija SPS 2006)
The programme oI Serbian Radical
Party is negative immediately Irom the
beginning when it states that the Serbian
nation is divided into three states due to
the traditional Serbian enemies Croats
and Muslims; it demands the return oI
reIugees and uniIication oI the Serbian
territories. (Program SRS, article 7) SRS
is probably most active in publishing
journals and books in which the party
attacks the Albanians who are committing
genocide on the Serbian nation, the
international community who is helping
them and who wants to destroy the
Serbian nation, the current government
quislings cooperating with the
international community etc. The main
idea oI SRS on-going campaign is that
who is not with us is against us or better
to say who is not Serb is against us. Quite
symptomatic is that the Carla del Ponte,
Marti Ahtisaari and others are usually
photographed in not very Iashioned and
nice way.
Vojislav Kostunica is well known Ior his
critic oI international community:
'Western politics, mainlv USA, were
eating out of Milosevic hand up to now.
Sometimes thev were supporting him and
... [1|
10
empire. Bosniaks were depicted as Mohammedans who are trying to install djamahuria Bosna
and Herzegovina. Serbs were portrayed as greatest victims oI the whole history.
Current rhetoric oI Socialist Party of Serbia is aimed against ICTY (it accuses ICTY
Irom the death oI Slobodan Milosevic), accuses current government and its Iight against
people close to the socialistic party, stands against globalism, against the dominance oI
international law which has not been not approved in the parliament, against Iascism, against
NATO aggression and against all who are humiliating the Serbian nation. (Programska
deklaracija SPS 2006)
The programme oI Serbian Radical Party is negative immediately Irom the
beginning when it states that the Serbian nation is divided into three states due to the
traditional Serbian enemies Croats and Muslims; it demands the return oI reIugees and
uniIication oI the Serbian territories. (Program SRS, article 7) SRS is probably most active in
publishing journals and books in which the party attacks the Albanians who are committing
genocide on the Serbian nation, the international community who is helping them and who
wants to destroy the Serbian nation, the current government quislings cooperating with the
international community etc. The main idea oI SRS on-going campaign is that who is not with
us is against us or better to say who is not Serb is against us. Quite symptomatic is that the
Carla del Ponte, Marti Ahtisaari and others are usually photographed in not very Iashioned
and nice way.
Vojislav Kostunica is well known Ior his critic oI international community: 'Western
politics, mainlv USA, were eating out of Milosevic hand up to now. Sometimes thev were
supporting him and sometimes thev were attacking him. In certain sense was Milosevic
created bv America`. (Intervju: dr. Vojislav Kostunica, predsednicki kandidat 2000) The
leader oI Democratic Party of Serbia very oIten attacks the 'unwelcome protectorate in
Kosovo, US politics or the politicisation oI ICTY. One oI the last attacks was against George
Bush during his visit in June in Europe. (See http://www.dss.org.yu/vesti/vest.php?id4433)
Serbian Renewal Movement was the most visible anti-Milosevic party. However,
since the time Draskovic took part in the 'democratic government the antagonism did not
turn against any other enemy.
There is nothing we could call negativism either in the political programme or in
politics oI Democratic Party besides the common rivalry with the other political parties and
besides the statements that the party is against all who move Serbia away Irom the strategic
aim integration into the EU. (Strategija promena 2006: 8)
Naformtovno: Normalni
11
4.4 Charismatic leader

The phenomenon oI Slobodan Milosevic is quite well known and does not have to be
described in details. Having communist background
7
, Milosevic was elected as a President oI
the Socialist Party oI Serbia (SPS) in 1990 and has remained in that post until his death in
2001
8
. Since 1989 he was serving the posts oI president oI Socialist Republic oI Serbia,
president oI Republic oI Serbia and president oI Federal Republic oI Yugoslavia respectively.
Following his deIeat in the Federal Republic oI Yugoslavia`s presidential election oI
September 2000, Milosevic relinquished his position on 6 October 2000 and halI-year later
28.6.2001 was sent to Hague. Milosevic gained his popularity in Serbian society with his
initiation oI the bureaucratic revolution and with the organisation oI the mass demonstrations
where he used the Serbian mythology.
9
Probably most known is his statement Irom 1987
when speaking to the Serbian demonstrators in Kosovo: ,Nobodv can beat vou'. This
sentence made him to become protector oI the Kosovo Serbs.
10
Milosevic spent almost 13
hours in discussion with the demonstrating Serbs and accepted their opinion about the Kosovo
issue. Using the Tito rhetoric he became new Tito: ,He adopted the most important elements
of Tito technologv of governing. he used the direct contact with masses in order to get rid of
his enemies, accepting the demands of the masses in order to remove their source of
dissatisfaction and used the re-established unitv of 'partv and people` for elimination of the
opposition.` (Stpanek 2005:214) Milosevic did not only have respect within the Serbian
community, but he was highly recognized in the international community until the break in
1998.
There is no doubt about charisma oI the leader oI SRS Vojislav Sesejl. Symptomatic
is that the people around him keep collecting and publishing everything he says in public in
his name, thereIore the CV oI Vojislav Sesejl encompasses enormous amount oI publications.
Similarly as Milosevic, Seselj is having juristic background and has been leading his party
since the Ioundation until today. Since its leaving Ior Hague, party elected second leader who
shall substitute Sesejl while being in Hague Tomislav Nikolic. The charisma oI SRS leader
is clearly seen when looking at the ICTY records Irom the trial.
Vojislav Kostunica, the leader oI Democratic party oI Serbia, again having juristic
background has been in the leadership oI DSS again since the beginning. In 2000 Kostunica

7
In 1959, Milosevic joined the League oI Communists oI Yugoslavia, in 1986 was elected as a Chairman oI the
Presidium oI the Central Committee oI the League oI Communists oI Serbia and re-elected in 1988.
8
Except during the period 24 May 1991 to 24 October 1992.
9
The demonstrations were accompanied by the relicts oI tzar Lazar and were organized at Vidovdan.
10
For the Iirst time the people chanted: ,Slobo-slobodo'. (Sloboda means in Serbian Ireedom).
Odstranno: 3
12
was elected president oI Republic oI Serbia and since 2003 he has been prime minister oI the
country. He is probably the strongest person Irom the governmental coalition and can enIorce
everything he wants. Since the assassination oI Zoran Djindjic
11
he has no real strong
charismatic and relevant opponent who would criticise him Irom the democrats.
The leader oI Serbian Renewal Movement Vuk Draskovic is lawyer, writer and again
he has been in the leadership oI the party since the beginning. During Milosevic era,
Draskovic and his charismatic wiIe were many times imprisoned and couple oI times he
became object oI an assassination as well
12
. The nationalism oI Draskovic is not that strong
any more as it was in the last decade oI the last century. SPO was initially Iounded not only
by Draskovic but by one oI his best Iriends Sesejl as well. However, because two strong
personalities can not lead one party, the Sesejl leIt and Iounded SRS year later. The Iriendship
was preserved as we can guess Irom the Iact, that Draskovic is sometimes ask to review
Sesejls books
13
.
When talking about charismatic leaders related to the Democratic Party, one must not
Iorget the most exceptional person who was in the leadership since 1994. Zoran Djindjic had
very strong personality and was Iighting his whole liIe Ior modern Serbia re-integrated in
Europe.
14
He was assassinated in 2003 aIter serving two years on the post oI the prime
minister
15
. His successor Boris Tadic swop the place with Vojislav Kostunica and was
elected as president oI Serbia while Kostunica became prime minister. As already mentioned
above, Boris Tadic is a strong personality within his own party, however his compromising
character does not enable him to compete with Kostunicas policy.
4.5 Emotions, simplicity, straightness - Balkan wars

Emotions are usually used in the programmes when talking about the past wars and the Serbs
are depicted as victims who suIIered, martyrs who were killed, murdered, tortured while the
other nations were committing genocide on the Serbian nation. Simplicity is usually linked to

11
Djindjic (leader oI DS) pushed the handing over oI Milosevic to Hague through, while Kostunica was against.
12
Draskovic was called in the 1990s King of the streets.
13
Among others the book Hunting the heretic (Hajka na jeretika) was reviewed by Draskovic.
14
.Really amazing is that the Serbian nationalist, one oI the authors oI Memorandum oI Serbian Academy oI
Science, Dobrica Cosic is praising Djindjic on the cover oI book composed Irom Djindjic texts. See Djindjic
2007.
15
Basically there are two versions oI the assassination. The Iirst version claims that Djindjic was assassinated
because he handed Milosevic over to Hague and because he was too modern, too pro-europe, too much Ior the
cooperation with ICTY and too much against the organized crime. The second version talks about his connection
to the organized crime and about the settling the accounts between two maIia groups. However, when talking to
the Serbian people, most oI them utter a sigh : 'If Dfindfic was alive, evervthing would be different`.
Odstranno: 4
13
the solution oI unsolvable problems such as Kosovo while straightness is seen Irom the
speeches aimed at the international community or at current political establishment.
Emotions, simplicity and straightness were typical Ior the whole time oI the Milosevic
regime. The Socialist Party of Serbia did not get rid oI these Ieatures and its declarations
remain very emotional, simple and straight. The example could be seen in the last programme
declaration: 'Kosmet became the most ethnicallv clean territorv in Europe after the constant
terror, persecuting remained Serbs, Montenegrins and other non-Albanian inhabitants and
the hindrance to return of refugees and IDPs.SPS supports the highest autonomv for Kosovo
within the Serbian borders as possible solution.`. The programme goes Iurther on and
attacks: 'SPS stronglv opposes the dissemination of defeatism and the creation of such image,
that the final solution for Kosovo has been alreadv found, that the onlv option is
independence and that Kosovo was lost in 1999 etc. Kosovo was defended from the
aggression of Albanian terrorists and NATO and all who in Serbia support surrendering of
Kosovo to the Albanian separatists, thev support high treason as well`. (Programska
deklaracija sedmog kongresa Socialisticke partije Srbije 2006: 11-12) The great opportunity
Ior bringing up emotions was the passing and Iuneral oI Slobodan Milosevic. The speakers
were talking about their deceased leader as national hero and labelling the representatives oI
western countries and then government as criminals and traitors while the guard oI honour
was controversially composed oI children (till the age oI 13) wearing Serbian uniIorms.
Simple solutions can be seen in the politics oI SPS towards the high unemployment politics
oI Iull employment. (Osnove programa SPS 1992: art. 5.1)
Serbian Radical Party uses emotions very oIten. Typical example could be the
broadcasting oI the Iilm The truth (Istina)
16
in Sava Center and inviting the Iamilies oI the
murdered victims oI the war into the session and applauding them when looking at the tears in
their eyes. Simple solution Ior the problems could be seen in its demand oI the abolition oI the
autonomy oI Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija. (Program SRS article 7) Serbian radical
party is probably the most straight party regarding its stance towards anything, the typical
examples could be depicted in the ICTY records oI the Sesejl trial.
The kind oI emotional and straight statement can be Iound in the programme oI
Serbian Renewal Movement regarding the return oI Serbian troops and Serbian nation into
Kosovo: 'The expelled Serbs will return after the armv`. (Program SPO 2001: 6) One oI
other many examples oI bringing emotions is the press conIerence oI Vuk Draskovic in

16
The Iilm shall give ,truth about the crimes in the Balkan wars.
14
Bratislava answering the question about his alleged nationalism: 'Have vou ever heard about
Milenkovicova? She was a wonder child being in the age of 16. She was supposed to
represent Serbia on the world Olvmpics in math but never came there she was killed bv the
bomb. What was her crime? What is the crime of thousands of Serbian civilians who were
killed bv NATO bombs?`
17
(Tiskova konference Juka Draskovice v Bratislav 1999) The
book I do not want to get angrv (Necu da lutim) written by Draskovic wiIe Danica is Iull oI
emotions as well depicting the daily liIe during the war times. (Draskovic 2002)
The simple solution oI Democratic Party of Serbia regarding Kosovo issue is again
the demand Ior the Iull implementation oI Resolution oI UN SC 1244. 'Kosovo and Metohifa,
which is currentlv under the UN unwelcome protectorate forms the indivisible and integral
part of our countrv. We demand from SC that instead of declarations it requests UNMIK
and KFOR to pursue concrete steps to stop the Albanian terror`. (Program DSS 2005: 3)
Vojislav Kostunica can be straight as well: 'USA has the right to support the states and
nations as part of its national interest but does not have the right to give something as a
present which is not their propertv. America has to find different wav to show their support
and love to the Albanians than to give them the Serbian territorv`
18
.
Emotions in Democratic party could be Iound only in context oI the assassination oI
Zoran Djindjic but the party does not really uses emotions when talking about the past oI
Serbia and does not use the criminal-victim optic.
4.6 Chameleonic nature

Probably the clearest example oI chameleonic nature is the Socialist Party of Serbia during
the wars. Milosevic was always playing the role oI peace-maker Ior the international
community, promising to persuade Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plans, and the role oI
protector oI Serbian nation in Croatia and in Bosnia convincing Karadzic not to accept the
international dictate and create hindrances such as reIerendum as conditions Ior the approval
oI the peace plan. Basically the same could be said about the declared boycott oI Yugoslavia
against Republika Srpska theatre Ior the international community which Milosevic used in
order to get rid oI sanctions against Yugoslavia. In practise, the borders were porous and

17
Draskovic goes on about the Albanian terrorists who are killing and kidnapping Serbs, collaborating with the
Islamic Iundamentalists Irom Albania who burned to death six month old Serbian baby and claiming to Kosovo
to be part oI Serbia.
18
Kostunica povodom stava SAD o ne:avisnosti Kosmeta. Zasto da Amerika poklanfa srpske teritorife.
11.6.2007. Available online at
http://www.dss.org.yu/vesti/vest.php?id4409.
Odstranno: 4.4.1 Tradition, past

Most oI the Serbian political parties reIer

to the traditions oI the Serbian nation and
the traditional role oI the church.
However, even though most oI the parties
devote whole parts oI the programme to
the church, all oI them demand the
secularisation state. Socialist party of
Serbia states that 'the Socialists have
high moralitv, which distinguishes them
from other parties`. (Programska
deklaracija 2006:9) SPS keeps
mentioning the lasting values oI its
programmes, the great personality oI
Slobodan Milosevic, recalls the stability
oI the world in the Cold War period.
However, the party is stuck in the past
due to the negativism and enemies not
due to the traditions. Party demands the
division oI the state and the church.
The Serbian Radical Party wants to
develop 'the motion of patriotism which
would strengthen the democratic view on
the world`. The protection of the national
tradition has to be the concern of the
state as well as educational, cultural,
scientific as well as art institutions.
(Program SRS: article 3-4) The SRS
states that the party members oI the party
are religious people which are tolerant to
other religious communities. The article
97 oI the programme mentions morality
and the need to Iollow the Ten
Commandments which would be in order
with Orthodox-Christian tradition.
Monarchic Serbian renewal movement
deIines itselI as national party oI liberal,
civic and democratic decisions. 'We are
national partv, because we believe in the
Serbian tradition and faith which were
protecting Serbian nation. (Program
SPO 2001: 1) Regarding the position oI
he party towards the Serbian orthodox
church SPO states:' We believe that the
Christian vision of men and societv forces
for the moral and responsible politics,
where the faiths and state have to work
independentlv, so that the state would not
interfere into the politics and the politics
would not interfere into the state affairs`.
(Program SPO 2001: 3)
The newest programme oI Democratic
Party of Serbia was developed beIore
the Montenegrin separation and DSS in
that time demanded that the name oI the
country shall keep the Serbian name and
that the Ilags oI the country shall be
identical with the Ilags oI the republics.
DSS demands to include in the pre-
schools, basic schools as well as high
schools curricula the national questions
and wishes to re-establish the social
status oI the Serbian Orthodox Church in
the society and state which it had
throughout the history.` (Program DSS
2005: 3) DSS demands that all crimes
commited should be examined and the
Serbian ones should be compared to those
committed in Thunderbolt (Blesk), Storm
(Oluja), Sarajevo, Tuzla etc. and thinks
that the mass graves Irom the WWII
should be open. (Deklaracija o osudi
ratnih zlocina na prostoru nekadasje
Odstranno: 5
... [2|
15
Milosevic kept sending to RS the Iinancial as well as material support. The same situation
arose in 1998 in context oI OSCE mission to Kosovo. The mission was authorized by
Milosevic, however the Iight about the mission mandate started aIter its launching with
Milosevic reIusing to have implicitly watching oI human rights in such a mission. The
situation is nicely summed up in the statement oI Iormer USA president Bill Clinton: 'Balkan
graves are Iilled with the unIulIilled promises oI president Milosevic. Now we have to
concentrate not only what Milosevic says, but mainly what he does. (Balkan report 1998:
n. 41)
The chameleonic nature oI Serbian Radical Party could be seen only partially in its
moving during Milosevic Irom the (in)Iormal coalition with SPS into the opposition
19
. This
manoeuvring created space Ior the party so it could criticises the decisions and acts oI
Slobodan Milosevic and not to become responsible Ior those. However, seen Irom the bigger
perspective, the party has not changed its discourse since the Ioundation. The programme
remains much more the same it is anti-programme against all who harm the Serbian nation.
During the 1992-1995 the enemies were the Croats, Muslims and the international
community, while in 1998-1999 the antagonism was aimed at Albanians and NATO.
One more party seems to have rather chameleonic nature the Serbian Renewal
Movement. Draskovic portrayed himselI the whole 1990s as martyr and the victim oI
Milosevic regime and suddenly in January 1999 he accepted a post oI the minister in the
Milosevic government one oI the excellent tricks oI Milosevic in order to show the
international community the democratic Ieatures oI the regime. However, on 29
th
April 1999
was expelled Irom the government. Even though great nationalist during the 1990s, since
having the post oI minister oI Ioreign aIIairs in the new democratic government, he started to
support the cooperation with ICTY and bow and scrape to the international community. May
be he was aIraid to Iollow one oI his Iriends to Hague due to his past support to the Serbian
paramilitary groups in BiH? However, his Ieinting was probably too much Ior the Serbian
voters and SPO did not succeed at all in the last elections in 2007.
There is nothing really what could be called chameleonic nature in the politics oI
Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia. Both parties are quite consistent in their
policies; the Iirst one clearly progressive and pro-western, while the later traditional and
slightly nationalistic.


19
1992 SRS in inIormal coalition with SPS; 1993 SRS in Iormal opposition; 1998 coalition oI SRS and SPS;
1999 SRS leIt coalition.
16
PopuIism in Serbia

Close examination oI the characteristics oI populism in Serbian parties maniIestos shows that
parties diIIer in the level oI populism. There are only two parties which can be labelled as
Iully populist. Those parties are Socialist Party oI Serbia (SPS) and Serbian Radical Party
(SRS). In the maniIestos oI both oI them strong reIerence to the role oI the people and to the
revolt against established structures were Iound. Both oI them are substantively linked to the
person oI a charismatic leader, who was Slobodan Milosevic in the case oI SPS and Vojislav
Sesejl in the case oI SRS. Communication style oI both SPS and SRS is direct, simple, and
Iull oI emotions. Chameleonic nature is also a signiIicant Ieature Ior both oI them.
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and Democratic Party oI Serbia (DSS) cannot be
labelled as Iully populist, however still IulIil our threshold oI Iour indicators. Both oI them
reIer strongly to the people in their maniIestos; both oI them are signiIicantly direct and
simple in their way oI communication. Also the category oI chameleonic nature is present at
SPO behaviour. Neither in the maniIesto oI SPO, nor in the maniIesto oI DSS a reIerence to
some kind oI revolt was noticed this observance is kind oI clear having in mind both parties
were sitting in the government aIter the Iall oI Milosevic regime. There is a diIIerence in
another category negativism. Here, no reIerence was recorded in the SPO maniIesto; on the
other hand, according the maniIesto oI Democratic Party oI Serbia we can conclude, that
negativism against inter-national structures is part oI a political strategy oI DSS.
The only party which cannot be labelled as populist at all is the Democratic Party
(DS). According our investigation, none oI those Iive characteristics oI populism belong to
DS except one which is the charismatic leader.

Table 1. Level of populism in Serbian parties' manifestos
Naformtovno: Odsazeni: Prvni
radek: 0"
Koment [vs5]: Tohle bych sloucila
s conclusion
Odstranno: ConcIusion - p
Odstranno: In this article we worked
with Iive characteristics oI populism and
investigated their presence in parties`
maniIestos. We Iocused on reIerences to
'the people, to the revolt, to the
existence oI charismatic leader, to the
emotions, simplicity and straightness in
communication and to the chameleonic
nature oI those parties. We investigated
parties which had been Iounded in the
beginning oI the 1990s and kept their
position in the party system up to now.
Those parties were Socialist Party oI
Serbia (SPS), Serbian radical party
(SRS), Serbian renewal movement
(SPO), Democratic Party oI Serbia (DSS)
and Democratic Party (DS).
Koment [vs6]: Kdyz to je tzky,
kdyz byli proti milosevicovi, tak tam
revolta byla a po milosevicovi byli
vzdycky ve vlad, takze proc by
revoltovali, takze tohle stoji na vode a
jinak vykazujou populisticky prvky v tech
jinejch kategoriich.krom toho SPO je
kam vitr tam plast, takze od cervna maj
vladu a predpokladam, ze od te doby co
je SPO mimo kormidlo, tak zacne
revoltovat.
Odstranno: the sub-category oI the
revolt
Koment [vs7]: Pani, tohle bych
vyhodila, nedavala bych si takovy cile,
ktery nemuzem naprosto dokazat a ktery
nam okamzite vyvrati, proste je to case
study populismu v srbsku a hotovo a
zatim z toho nic nebudem vyvozovat co
se tyka konceptualizace populismu, spis z
toho vyvozujem zavery co se tykaj
populismu v srbsku.
Odstranno:
Our Iindings lead us to make several
important remarks on populism in Serbia.
First, we used 'negativism as a sub-
category oI broader characteristic called
'revolt. The case oI DSS lead us to a
question iI negativism can be considered
as a sub-category oI revolt, there was no
reIerence to revolt in the DSS maniIesto,
on the other hand there as a strong
negativism in the party program. Despite
this exception we consist those two
characteristics can be bound iI we
understand to negativism as a kind oI
revolt against inter-national structures.
Second, a person oI charismatic
leadership can be measured as a 'core
characteristic oI Serbian political parties.
For all oI the investigated parties a person
oI the charismatic leader is extremely
important one. Third, other characteristics
important Ior most oI the investigated
parties are the people, and emotions
simplicity straightness along with
reIerences to tradition.
17

PEOPLE REVOLT NEGATIVISM CHARISMATIC
LEADER
EMOTIONS
SIMPLICITY
STRAIGHTNESS

CHAMELEONIC
NATURE
SPS +
SRS +
SPO +
DSS -
DS -

Our Iindings lead us to make several remarks on populism in Serbia, which need to be
veriIied Iurther in Iuture studies on populism in Serbia. First, a person oI charismatic
leadership can be measured as a 'core characteristic oI Serbian political parties. For all oI the
investigated parties a person oI the charismatic leader is extremely important one. Second,
other characteristics important Ior most oI the investigated parties are the people, and
emotions simplicity straightness. Third, strong negativism plays an important role in
parties` maniIestos and rhetoric. And Iinally Iour oI Iive strongest parties which were set up
in the early 1990s and survived the turmoil oI transIormation can be seen as populist.
ConcIusion

In this article we worked with six characteristics oI populism and investigated their presence
in Serbian parties` maniIestos. We Iocused on reIerences to 'the people, to the revolt,
negativism, to the existence oI charismatic leader, to the emotions, simplicity and straightness
in communication and to the chameleonic nature oI those parties. We investigated parties
which had been Iounded in the beginning oI the 1990s and kept their position in the party
system up to now. Those parties were Socialist Party oI Serbia (SPS), Serbian Radical Party
(SRS), Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party oI Serbia (DSS) and
Democratic Party (DS).
According our Iindings SPS and SRS can be considered as Iully populist; both oI them
were strong in all oI the Iive characteristics we investigated. SPO and DSS IulIil the
requirement oI at least Iour oI Iive indicators and thereIore can be labels as populist as well.
DS is the only party which cannot be labelled as populist at all, although one oI the
characteristic the charismatic leader - was present.
Naformtovno: Pismo: Tucn
Naformtovno: Pismo: Tucn
Naformtovno: Pismo: Tucn
Naformtovno: Pismo: Tucn
Naformtovno: Pismo: Tucn
Naformtovno: Nadpis 1
Naformtovno: neni zvraznn
Koment [vsS]: Pani, tohle bych
vyhodila, nedavala bych si takovy cile,
ktery nemuzem naprosto dokazat a ktery
nam okamzite vyvrati, proste je to case
study populismu v srbsku a hotovo a
zatim z toho nic nebudem vyvozovat co
se tyka konceptualizace populismu, spis z
toho vyvozujem zavery co se tykaj
populismu v srbsku.
18
Our Iindings lead us to conclude by reIerence to strong role oI charismatic leadership
in Serbian party system; second, more generally we can conclude that all oI the Serbian
political parties, except the DS, reIer strongly to high number characteristics oI populism we
worked with.
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211098.html (19.2.2002)
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president oI republic oI Serbia Boris Tadic about the Iormation oI two entities
Serbian and Albanian entity on Kosovo and Metohija) Available online at
http://www.tanjug.co.yu/Predlog/deIault.aspx
Program Demokratske Stranke. Osposobiti Srbifu :a sance i i:a:ove 21 veka.
(Programme oI DS) Demokratska stranka. Beograd 5.10.2001.
Program Demokratske Stranke Srbife. (Programme oI DSS) Demokratska stranka
Srbije. Beograd 2005.
Program Srpskog pokreta obnove. (Programme oI SPO) Srpski pokret obnove.
Beograd 2001.
Program Stranke Nova Srbifa. (Programme oI Nova Srbija) Nova Srbija. Cacak 2005.
Program Srpske radikalne stranke. (Programme oI SRS) Word document Irom SRS,
not dated.
Programska deklaracifa Sedmog kongresa Socialisticke partife Srbife. (Programme
declaration oI 7th congress oI Socialistic party oI Serbia) Socialisticka partija Srbije.
Beograd 2006. Available online at http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/progdekl7.pdI
Naformtovno: Odsazeni: Prvni
radek: 0.+9"
Naformtovno: Pismo: neni
Kurziva
Naformtovno: Odrazky a
cislovani
Naformtovno: Pismo: neni
Kurziva
Naformtovno: Anglictina (velka
Britanie)
Naformtovno: Anglictina (velka
Britanie)
Naformtovno: Odrazky a
cislovani
Naformtovno: Pismo: neni
Kurziva
Naformtovno: Pismo: neni
Kurziva
Odstranno: In this article we
examined the level oI populism by Iive
Serbian political parties. We choose the
case oI Serbia as a case very oIten
labelled by political observers as populist.
Populism in this text is not considered as
an ideology, rather as a political style or
strategy.
Odstranno: presented
Koment [vs9]: Chybi vam vase
zdroje
19
Osnove programa Socialisticke partife Srbife. ( Foundation programme oI SPS) I.
Kongres SPS Beograd 1990. Available online at:
http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/1kprogosnove.pdI
Osnove programa Socialisticke partife Srbife. (Basic programme oI SPS) II. Kongres
SPS Beograd. 23-24. 10 1992 Available online at:
http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/2kprogosn.pdI
de Raadt, J., Hollanders, D., Krouwel, A. Jarieties of Populism. An Analvsis of the
Programmatic Character of Six European Parties. Working Papers Political Science
No. 2004/04, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
SPS Mart 1996-Februar 2000 godine. (SPS Irom March 1996- February 2000) IV.
Kongres SPS Beograd. 17.2.2000. Available online at:
http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/4konizv.pdI
Statut Srpskog pokreta obnove. (Status oI SPO) Srpski pokret obnove. Beograd 1998.
Strategifa promena. (Strategy Ior change) Demokratska stranka. Politicki savet.
Beograd 2006. ISBN 86-7856-002-9
Sesejl, Vojislav. Hafka na heretika. (Hunt Ior heretic) Beograd 2000. Srpska
radikalna stranka. ISBN 86-7402-057-7.
Sesejl, Vojislav. Ili Karlin svedok ili smrt. (Either Carlas witness or death) Beograd
2007. ISBN 978-86-7886-017-1.
STPANEK, Vaclav. Nikdo vas nesmi bit.(Nobodv can beat vou) In: Mainus, P.
(ed.) Slavista s dusi basnika. Sbornik k sedmdesatinam Ivana Dorovskeho. Brno:
Albert, 2005, s. 214.
Taggart, Paul. Populism. Open University Press, Buckingham, Philadelphia: 2000.
Taggart, Paul. Populism and the Pathology oI Representative Politics. In Meny, Yves
and Surel Yves (eds). Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Palgrave 2002.
Taggart, Paul. 'Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe.
Journal of Political Ideologies 9(3) October 2004: 269-288.
Tiskova konference Juka Draskovice v Bratislav 1999. (Press conIerence oI Vuk
Draskovic in Bratislava 1999). Tlacove konIerencie politickych stran a hnuti. Vydava
agentura Monitor. Editor Mgr. SteIan Sugar. 30
th
September 1999. Available online at:
http://www.blisty.cz/Iiles/isarc/9909/19990930a.html
Za bolfi ivot' I:borni program Demokratske stranke 2007. (For better liIe/ Electoral
programme oI DS 2007) Demokratska stranka. Available online at
http://www.ds.org.yu/sr/dokumenti/programdszaboljizivot2007.pdI



Internet:
http://www.srs.org.yu/ (Srpska radikalna stranka, Serbian Radical Party, SRS)
http://www.ds.org.yu (Demokratska stranka, Democratic Party, DS)
http://www.dss.org.yu (Demokratska stranka Srbije, Democratic Party oI Serbia, DSS)
http://www.spo.org.yu/ (Srpski pokret obnove, Serbian Renewal Movement, SPO)
http://www.sps.org.yu (Socialisticka Partija Srbije, Socialist Party oI Serbia, SPS)
http://www.ns.org.yu/ (Nova Srbija, New Serbia, NS)
http://www.g17plus.org.yu/ (G17 plus)
http://www.ldp.org.yu (Liberalno demokratska partija, Liberal Democratic Party, LDP)
http://www.lsv.org.yu/index1.php (Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine, League oI Social
Democrats oI Vojvodina, LDV)
Naformtovno: Odrazky a
cislovani
Naformtovno: Pismo: neni
Kurziva, Anglictina (velka Britanie)
Naformtovno: Anglictina (velka
Britanie)
Naformtovno: Anglictina (velka
Britanie)
Naformtovno: Odrazky a
cislovani
Naformtovno: Pismo: neni
Kurziva
Naformtovno: Standardni pismo
odstavce, Polstina
Naformtovno: Polstina
Naformtovno: Polstina
Naformtovno: Polstina
20
http://www.srpskinacionalisti.com/ (Srpski nacionalisti, Serbian nationalists)
http://www.rIerl.org/balkan-report/1998/10/41-211098.html Balkan report. 21. 10. 1998, N.
41
http://www.vojislavseselj.org.yu/ (Vojislav Seselj)
http://www.antiglobalizam.com/ (Antiglobalisticka politika)
http://www.anti-glob.ru/ (Antiglob)





Strnka 9: [1] Odstranno vykoupilova 10.S.2007 14:47:00
4.2.1 Negativism|vs1|
During the Milosevic era, the pro-regime newspapers, text-books and historical publications
were concentrating on denunciation oI all nations which were once Serbian enemies. Croats
(very oIten in the context oI Roman-Catholic Church) were depicted as traitors oI the
Yugoslav idea, as nationalists, ultrashovinists or bloodthirsty enemies longing Ior the
genocide oI the Serbian nation. The Serbian TV was broadcasting the documents about the
ethnic cleansing in Croatia and was comparing Tudjman with Ante Pavelic. The attention was
paid to the 'Independent state Croatia, concentration camp Jasenovac, Croatian spring and
anti-Serbian Croatian nationalism Irom the 1970s. The same happened to the Albanians
which were blamed Irom the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in order to annex Kosovo to Albania.
Negatively was perceived Germany as well as the culprit oI the WWII, or Austro-Hungarian
empire. Bosniaks were depicted as Mohammedans who are trying to install djamahuria Bosna
and Herzegovina. Serbs were portrayed as greatest victims oI the whole history.
Current rhetoric oI Socialist Party of Serbia is aimed against ICTY (it accuses ICTY
Irom the death oI Slobodan Milosevic), accuses current government and its Iight against
people close to the socialistic party, stands against globalism, against the dominance oI
international law which has not been not approved in the parliament, against Iascism, against
NATO aggression and against all who are humiliating the Serbian nation. (Programska
deklaracija SPS 2006)
The programme oI Serbian Radical Party is negative immediately Irom the
beginning when it states that the Serbian nation is divided into three states due to the
traditional Serbian enemies Croats and Muslims; it demands the return oI reIugees and
uniIication oI the Serbian territories. (Program SRS, article 7) SRS is probably most active in
publishing journals and books in which the party attacks the Albanians who are committing
genocide on the Serbian nation, the international community who is helping them and who
wants to destroy the Serbian nation, the current government quislings cooperating with the
international community etc. The main idea oI SRS on-going campaign is that who is not with
us is against us or better to say who is not Serb is against us. Quite symptomatic is that the
Carla del Ponte, Marti Ahtisaari and others are usually photographed in not very Iashioned
and nice way.
Vojislav Kostunica is well known Ior his critic oI international community: 'Western
politics, mainlv USA, were eating out of Milosevic hand up to now. Sometimes thev were
supporting him and sometimes thev were attacking him. In certain sense was Milosevic
created bv America`. (Intervju: dr. Vojislav Kostunica, predsednicki kandidat 2000) The
leader oI Democratic Party of Serbia very oIten attacks the 'unwelcome protectorate in
Kosovo, US politics or the politicisation oI ICTY. One oI the last attacks was against George
Bush during his visit in June in Europe. (See http://www.dss.org.yu/vesti/vest.php?id4433)
Serbian Renewal Movement was the most visible anti-Milosevic party. However,
since the time Draskovic took part in the 'democratic government the antagonism did not
turn against any other enemy.
There is nothing we could call negativism either in the political programme or in
politics oI Democratic Party besides the common rivalry with the other political parties and
besides the statements that the party is against all who move Serbia away Irom the strategic
aim integration into the EU. (Strategija promena 2006: 8)

Strnka 14: [2] Odstranno vykoupilova 15.S.2007 11:35:00
4.4.1 Tradition, past

Most oI the Serbian political parties reIer to the traditions oI the Serbian nation and the
traditional role oI the church. However, even though most oI the parties devote whole parts oI
the programme to the church, all oI them demand the secularisation state. Socialist party of
Serbia states that 'the Socialists have high moralitv, which distinguishes them from other
parties`. (Programska deklaracija 2006:9) SPS keeps mentioning the lasting values oI its
programmes, the great personality oI Slobodan Milosevic, recalls the stability oI the world in
the Cold War period. However, the party is stuck in the past due to the negativism and
enemies not due to the traditions. Party demands the division oI the state and the church.
The Serbian Radical Party wants to develop 'the motion of patriotism which would
strengthen the democratic view on the world`. The protection of the national tradition has to
be the concern of the state as well as educational, cultural, scientific as well as art
institutions. (Program SRS: article 3-4) The SRS states that the party members oI the party are
religious people which are tolerant to other religious communities. The article 97 oI the
programme mentions morality and the need to Iollow the Ten Commandments which would
be in order with Orthodox-Christian tradition.
Monarchic Serbian renewal movement deIines itselI as national party oI liberal, civic
and democratic decisions. 'We are national partv, because we believe in the Serbian tradition
and faith which were protecting Serbian nation. (Program SPO 2001: 1) Regarding the
position oI he party towards the Serbian orthodox church SPO states:' We believe that the
Christian vision of men and societv forces for the moral and responsible politics, where the
faiths and state have to work independentlv, so that the state would not interfere into the
politics and the politics would not interfere into the state affairs`. (Program SPO 2001: 3)
The newest programme oI Democratic Party of Serbia was developed beIore the
Montenegrin separation and DSS in that time demanded that the name oI the country shall
keep the Serbian name and that the Ilags oI the country shall be identical with the Ilags oI the
republics. DSS demands to include in the pre-schools, basic schools as well as high schools
curricula the national questions and wishes to re-establish the social status oI the Serbian
Orthodox Church in the society and state which it had throughout the history.` (Program
DSS 2005: 3) DSS demands that all crimes commited should be examined and the Serbian
ones should be compared to those committed in Thunderbolt (Blesk), Storm (Oluja), Sarajevo,
Tuzla etc. and thinks that the mass graves Irom the WWII should be open. (Deklaracija o
osudi ratnih zlocina na prostoru nekadasje Jugoslavije 2005)
Democratic Party does not really deal with the past and presents itselI as modern and
progressive party heading towards modern Serbia. (Program Demokratske Stranke 2001:6)
Past is seen as something Serbia has to get rid oI and head towards the Iuture. The classical
example oI this iI the Iilm oI DS available on the party website Not that long time ago (Ne
tako davno) in which the shots Irom the tragic past can be seen.