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Lecture 10
Reducing Risk:
No Fire Fire
Table 1: Wealth of House Owner in Dierent Situations. Assuming the owner is a risk-averse, the utility function is concave. u (y ) < 0
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
The insurance premium is equal to the expected payout by the in surance company, and we say the insurance is actuarially fair. Since the person is risk-averse, u(y3 ) > (1 p) u(y1 ) + p u(y2 ). she will choose to buy insurance. If the insurance is actuarially unfair, k > p l. Then y3 < (1 p) y1 + p y2 . We do not know if the person wants to buy or not until we get her specic utility function, but it is easy to imagine she may buy insurance if k is close to pl. Now we consider what is the maximum insurance premium that the companies can charge and the costumer is still willing to buy the insurance. In this case, let y3 be the house owners wealth after being charged the maximum premium. Then, (Figure 1)
u(y3 ) = pu(y2 ) + (1 p)u(y1 ).
So are insurance companies more willing to take risk? If not, why are they willing to sell insurance? The Law of Large Numbers can explain this. Let L be the total loss from n customers, It is a random variable. L The average loss shared by each customer is L n , and E ( n ) = n p. The expected payout for L by the insurance company will be E (L) = n p l When n The probability that the loss shared by each customer is equal to a xed number pl is almost 1. (Figure 2) L = p l) n 1. n Note that this argument only applies to the situation when customers
re accident events are independent.
Example (Illegal parking). Government has two reasonable methods
to punish illegal parking.
Hire more police, get caught almost for sure but ne is low. Hire less police, get caught sometimes but the ne is high. The latter might be more eective since people are risk averse abd are afraid to take risk of being ned to park illegally. P robability (
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
Figure 2: Distribution of
L n
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].
Cite as: Chia-Hui Chen, course materials for 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].