On That In Which Beauty Consists

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti N.B. The reader will observe that on many pages where I have text in parallel columns, there is a wide gap of blank space. For whatever reason, this is the result of Scribds conversion process and not in my original. The program also does not support my SGreek font. For these and any other anomalies in the layout of the text I apologize in advance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF BEAUTY. II. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO PLATO. III. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE. IV. ON DISPOSITION. V. ON SYMMETRY. VI. ON BEAUTY AS CONSISTING IN A DUE PROPORTION OR SYMMETRY OF THE PARTS TO THE WHOLE AND OF THE PARTS TO EACH OTHER. VII. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.
VIII. ON THE PERFECT.

IX. SUMMARY STATEMENTS PERTAINING TO BEAUTY. X. SUPPLEMENT: II. ON CLARITAS OR LUSTRE IN RELATION TO GLORIA. XI. FORM AND FIGURE IN RELATION TO CLARITAS. XII. THE PRINCIPAL MEANINGS OF TO KALON AND TO AISCHROS.

I. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF BEAUTY. 1. Primary Texts. Cf. Plato, Laws II (668d669e) (tr. Thomas Pangle, rev. B.A.M.):
Ath. What then, if someone doesnt know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: [would he ever know,] for instance, whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts, how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order, and also the colors and shapes, or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated? (emphasis added)

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIII. 3 (1078a 311078b 6) (tr. W. D. Ross, rev. B.A.M.):
Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do [35] not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i.e. the beautiful) as in [5] some sense a cause. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.14
14

Apparently an unfulfilled promise. (emphasis added)

Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 1 (641b 16-23; 642a 14- 30) (tr. William H Ogle):
And that the heaven, if it had an origin, was evolved and is maintained by such a cause, there is therefore even more reason to believe, than that mortal animals so originated. For order and definiteness are much more plainly manifest in the celestial bodies than in our own frame; while change and chance are characteristic of the perishable things of earth. [20] Yet there are some who, while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature, nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity; the heaven, in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible! <> It is plain then that there are two modes of causation, and that [15] both of these must, so far as possible, be taken into account in explaining the works of nature, or that at any rate an attempt must be made to include them both; and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about nature. For primary cause constitutes the nature of an animal much more than does its matter. There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this, and following the [20] guidance of fact, finds himself constrained to speak of the ratio (logos) as constituting the essence and real nature of things. Such, for instance, is the case when he explains what is a bone. For he does not merely describe its material, and say it is this one element, or those two or three elements, or a compound of all the elements, but states the ratio (logos) of their combination. As with a bone, so manifestly is it with the flesh and all other similar parts.

[25] The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method of treatment was, that they were not in possession of the notion of essence, nor of any definition of substance. The first who came near it was Democritus, and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science, but was merely brought to it, spite of himself, by constraint of facts. In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. But at this period men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind. [30] (emphasis added)

Cf. also Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I. 5 (645a 23-25):

(tr. William H. Ogle) Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in natures works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful. (tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle) Indeed, things which are formed not by chance but for the sake of something exist in the works of nature [25] most of all, and the end for whose sake a thing is formed or came to be has the rank of nobility [or beauty, to kalos].

N.B. As is clear from the mention of disorder in the first passage from Aristotle cited above, the form of the beautiful at issue here is that of taxis or order; for a thing cannot have its species when the parts of an integral whole are put together in just any way; the possession of such orderliness importing an absence of haphazard. For what the Philosopher speaks of as the primary cause, cf. Aristotle, De An., II. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle):
[B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth, and these [i.e. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire, and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing.1

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XI. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (tr. W. D. Ross):

As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities, e.g. [30] weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitative and [35] continuous, and does not consider them in any other respect, and examines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these, and the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others, [1061b] and the ratios of others; but yet we posit one and the same science of all these thingsgeometry)the same is true with regard to being. (emphasis added)

2. Comparison of texts.
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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 18, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.): For each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude, which belongs to it according to the species of its proper virtue, is lacking to it. Now just as any natural thing possesses a determinate measure of natural magnitude according to continuous quantity, as is said in the second book of the De Anima [II. 4, 416a 15ff.], so also any thing possesses a determinate quantity of its natural virtue. But, as Aristotle states, the possession of a determinate quantity of magnitude is a function of the ratio of the elements composing the thing. Consequently, inasmuch as a thing composed of elements is marked by a limit and a certain ratio with respect to those elements, it will possess those forms of the beautiful called symmetry and order. From the foregoing, one sees how definiteness arises from symmetry, which in turn involves order. See further below.

Aristotle, Meta., XIII. 3 (1078a 371078b 1) (tr. W. D. Ross) The chief forms of beauty are order [taxis] and

Aristotle, Meta., XI. 3 (1061a 36-b 1) (tr. W. D. Ross) and [as the mathematician] examines the relative positions [tas pros allla theseis] of some and the attributes of these,

symmetry [or commensurability, summetria] and the commensurabilities and incommen[1078b] and surabilities [tas summetrias kai asummetrias] of others, [1061b] definiteness [or the limited, to horismenon], and the ratios [tn de tous logous] of others. which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. [the relation of ratio to limit being indicated by De Anima, II. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. H. G. Apostle): [B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth, and these [i.e. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire, and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing.

For an elaboration of Empedocless understanding of the ratio of the elements, cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, II. 7 (331 37-333b 22) (tr. H. H. Joachim):
A further objection to the theory of Empedocles is that it makes even growth impossible, unless it be increase by addition. For his Fire increases by Fire: And [333b] Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether. These, however, are cases of addition: but it is not by addition that growing things are believed to increase. And it is far more difficult for him to account for the coming-to-be which occurs in nature. For the things which come-to-be by natural process all do so either [5] always or for the most part in a given way; while any exceptionsany results which are in accordance neither with the invariable nor with the general ruleare products of chance and spontaneity [luck]. Then what is the cause determining that man comes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) comes-to-be from wheat, either invariably or generally? Are we to say Bone comes-to-be if the elements be put together in such-and such a manner? For, according to his own statements, nothing comes- [10] to-be from their coming together as chance has it, but only from their coming together in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this [proportional coming together]? Presumably not Fire or Earth. But neither is it Love and Strife: for the former is a cause of association only, and the latter only of dissociation. No: the cause in question is the essential nature of each thingnot merely to quote his words) a mingling and a [15] divorce of what has been combined. And chance, not proportion, is the name given to these occurrences; 19 for things can be combined as chance has it. The cause, therefore, of the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence to nature is that they are in such-and-such a determinate condition: and it is this which constitutes the nature of each thinga nature about which he says nothing. What he says, therefore, tells us nothing About Nature.20 Moreover, it is this which is both the excellence of each thing and its good: whereas he assigns the whole credit to the combining. (And yet [20] the elements at all events are dissociated not by Strife, but by Love: since the elements are by nature prior to the god, and they too are god.) (emphasis added)

19 20

See Empedocles, frag. 8 Diels-Kranz. About Nature (peri\ fu/seoj) was the title of Empedocles scientific poem,

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951), Book II, lect. 8 (in part):
TEXT 415b28416a18 BOOK II, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED THE VEGETATIVE PRINCIPLE CONTINUED TWO ERRORS REFUTED Empedocles is mistaken here, adding that growth occurs in plants by their sending a root downwards, because earth is by nature below, and also upwards because of fire. 324 Nor did he understand aright up and down; for these are not for all things the same as for the Universe; but roots of plants correspond to the head, in animals, if it is permissible to identify organs by their functions. For we reckon those organs to be the same which perform the same operations. 325-7 Besides, what holds fire and earth together if they tend in contrary directions? They must come apart if there is nothing to prevent this. But if there is such a thing, it must be the soul; and be also the cause of growth and nourishment. 328 Now it seems to some that the nature of fire is the sole cause of growth and nutrition; for it certainly seems to be the only one of the bodies and elements that is self-nourishing and selfincreasing. Whence the notion that it is this that is operative in plants and animals. 329-30 It is indeed a concomitant cause, but the cause absolutely is not fire, but rather the soul. For the increase of fire is infinite so long as there is anything combustible. But there are limitations to all things that subsist naturally, and some definite principle governs their dimensions and growth. And this belongs to the soul, not to fire, and to a specific principle rather than to matter. 331-2 ST. THOMASS COMMENTARY LECTIO EIGHT 324. The Philosopher has just shown that the activities we call vegetative have their origin in the soul. He now proceeds to refute two errors on this subject, which he deals with respectively in two sections; the second of which begins at Now it seems to some that the nature of fire. In the first section he begins by stating the error, and then, at Nor did he understand attacks it. Regarding the error itself, we should note that just as Empedocles refused to explain other cases of purposeful arrangement in Nature by any natural finalityfor example he said that animals had the sort of feet they have, not in order to help them to walk, but simply because the matter of that part of their bodies happened to be arranged in that sort of way; so also the growth of living things he ascribed merely to the motion of light and heavy bodies. Observing that living things increase their size in different directions, e.g. up and downas is evident in plants, which thrust their roots down and their branches uphe said that the downward growth of plants was due to the earth in their composition, which is heavy and therefore necessarily tends downwards; whilst their upward growth was due to fire which, being light, must tend upwards. <>

 329. Next, at Now it seems to some, he states another theory; which, at It is indeed he then disproves. Unlike the theory of Empedocles, which put the causes of growth and nutrition in both earth and fire, this theory ascribes them only to fire. 330. The reason given is that the cause of anythings modifications or motion would appear to be whatever had such modifications or motions essentiallye.g. fire, being essentially hot, is the cause of heat in things that contain other elements as well; and in the same way earth is the cause of heaviness. Now of the elements fire alone seems to feed itself and to grow ; if we take these terms in a superficial sense. Therefore fire alone would seem to cause growth and nutrition in plants and animals. But whether fire really feeds itself and grows will be made clear later. 331. Then he attacks the above opinion. But note its grain of truth. All food has to be cooked, and this is done by fire, so that fire does play a part in nutrition, and consequently in growth also; not indeed as the principal agent (which is the soul) but as a secondary, instrumental agent. To say then that fire is a sort of concurrent or instrumental cause of growth and nutrition is true. But it cannot be the principal cause or agent, as he goes on to show. 332. The principal agent in any action is that which imposes the term or natural limit upon what is done; thus in artificial things like boxes or houses the limit or term is fixed, not by the instruments used in the work, but by the art itself. The instruments, as such, are quite indifferent as to whether they are used to produce a thing of this shape and quantity or of that. A saw, as such, can be used to cut wood for a door or a bench or a house, and in any quantity you please; and if it cuts wood in this or that particular shape and quantity, this is due to the man who uses it. Now in Nature each thing obviously has certain limits to its size and its increase; each thing grows to a certain fixed pattern. For as each species of thing requires its own accidental modifications, so it needs its own measure of quantity, though some margin must be left to material differences and other individual factors. Men are not all equal in size. But there is a limit both to their largeness and their littleness; and whatever determines this limit is the true principal cause of growth. But this cannot be fire, because the growth of fire has no naturally fixed limits; it would spread to infinity if an infinite amount of fuel were supplied to it. Clearly, then, fire is not the chief cause of growth and nutrition, but rather the soul. And this is reasonable enough, for the quantitative limits of material things are fixed by formthe specific principlerather than matter. Now the soul of a living being is to the elements it contains as form is to matter; the soul, then, rather than fire, sets the term and natural limit to size and growth.1

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 7 (1450b 341451a 15 (tr. B.A.M. based on Theodore Buckley):
Further still, since that which is beautiful, whether it be an animal or anything else which is composed of certain things, should not only [35] have these things arranged, but also not just any chance sizefor the beautiful consists in size and orderhence, neither can any very small animal be beautiful; for the contemplation of it is confused, since it is effected in a
1

For the related notion that a natural body is not infinitely divisible with respect to quantity, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Physic., lect. 9, n. 9 (tr. William Wallace, O.P.): Although a body, understood mathematically, is infinitely divisible, a natural body is not divisible to infinity. For in a mathematical body all that is considered is quantity, and in this there is nothing that is repugnant to division, whereas in a natural body there is a natural form that requires a determinate quantity, just as it requires other accidents. Wherefore quantity cannot be found under the species of flesh unless within certain determined limits.

nearly insensible time; nor yet a very large animal; [1451a] for it is not contemplated at once, but its being one and a whole escapes the view of the onlookers; such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stadia [in length]. And so, as in bodies and in animals there should be size, but such as can be easily seen; so also in plots, there should be length, but this such as can be [5] easily remembered. But the definition of the length with reference to contests and the senses does not fall under the consideration of art. For if it were necessary to perform a hundred tragedies, the performance would have to be regulated by a waterclock, as they are said to have been at one time. But the definition according to the nature of the thing is this, that the plot is [10] always more beautiful the greater it is, if at the same time it is perspicuous. But in order to define it simply, one may say, in whatever extent, in successive incidents in accordance with likelihood or necessity, a change from bad fortune to good fortune or from good fortune to bad fortune takes place, is a [15] sufficient limit of the size.

Cf. Aristotle, Top., III. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed. & tr. Loeb):
And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored; for example, health is better than strength or beauty. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold, in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature, whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]; for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones, and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs.1

3. According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the third it must be said that the beautiful is the same as the good, differing only in account. For, since the good is what all things desire, it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it; but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it. And for this reason those senses especially look to the beautiful that are the most knowing, namely, sight and hearing, the servants of reason, for we call sights and sounds beautiful. But in the sensibles belonging to the other senses we do not use the name beautiful, for we do not call tastes or smells beautiful. And so it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power, so that that is called good simply which is pleasing to the appetitebut that is called beautiful the very apprehension of which pleases.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the first it must be said that the beautiful and the good are the same in subject because they are founded on the same thing, namely, the form, and for this reason the good is praised as beautiful. But they differ in account. For the good properly regards the appetite; for the good is what all things desire. And so it has the account of an end, for the appetite is, so to speak, a certain movement toward a thing. But the beautiful regards a knowing power, for things which please by being seen are called beautiful. For this reason beauty consists in a due proportion,2 since the sense is delighted in things that are duly proportioned, as in things similar to itself. For the sense, and indeed every knowing power, is a certain ratio. And
1

Cf. Plato, Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. B. Jowett): Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight. 2 Note that debita proportio primarily means having the membra or limbs of the body commensurate.

because knowledge comes about by assimilation, but similitude [likeness] regards the form, beauty properly pertains to the notion of a formal cause.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 180, art. 2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the third it must be said that beauty, as has been said above, consists in a certain lustre and due proportion. Now both of these are found in reason as in a root, to which pertains both a manifesting light and the ordering of a due proportion in other things.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 31, q. 2, art 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
But according to Dionysius (De Div. Nom., c. 4), two things come together in the account of beauty, namely, consonance and lustre. For he says that God is the cause of all beauty insofar as He is the cause of consonance and lustre, just as we say that men are beautiful who have proportionate members and a resplendent color. To the these two the Philosopher adds a third where he says that beauty does not exist except in a sizable body (Nic. Ethic., IV.6); and so small men can be called commensurate [or well-proportioned] and good-looking, but not beautiful.

4. On bodily beauty. Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., iv, xiii (tr. B.A.M.):
Of the body there is a certain fitting arrangement of the members accompanied by a certain agreeableness of color which is called beauty.

Cf. St. Augustine of Hippo, City of God, XXII. 19 (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.):
For all bodily beauty consists in the agreement of the parts, together with a certain agreeableness of color. Where there is no agreement, the eye is offended, either because there is something lacking, or too small, or too large. And thus there shall be no deformity resulting from want of agreement in that state in which all that is wrong is corrected, and all that is defective supplied from resources the Creator knows of, and all that is excessive removed without destroying the integrity of the substance. And as for the pleasant color, how conspicuous shall it be where the just shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father! Matthew 13:43 This brightness we must rather believe to have been concealed from the eyes of the disciples when Christ rose, than to have been lacking.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said that, as may be gathered from the words of Dionysius ( De Div. Nom., c. iv), in the account of the beautiful or becoming both lustre and due proportion come togetherfor he says that God is called beautiful as the cause of the consonance and lustre of the universe. For this reason the beauty of the body consists in this, that a man have the members of his body well-proportioned, together with a certain due lustre of color. And likewise spiritual beauty consists in this, that a mans conversation, or his action, be well proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Dionysii de Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color. And so proportionally in the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre, whether spiritual or bodily, and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 44, q. 3, art. 1a, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said to the first question that in the human body there can be a twofold deformity. In one way from the lack of any limb [or member, membri]: thus we say that mutilated things are ugly; for in them there is a lack of due proportion to the whole. And deformity of this kind, without a doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole, as was said above when the integrity of the resurrected body was treated of. In another way deformity arises from an undue disposition of the parts, either an undue quantity, or quality, or situation [or position, situ]which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with a due proportion of the parts to the whole. Concerning these kinds of deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes are the cause of deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master in the text says (Sent. iv, D, 44).

Cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Edition (Cambridge, 1913), I. 98:
For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry of the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace, so this propriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed.

5. Bodily beauty in sum. According to Cicero, of the body there is a certain fitting arrangement of the members accompanied by a certain agreeableness of color which is called beauty (Cicero, Tusc. Disp., iv, xiii). In the same vein, St. Augustine says that all bodily beauty consists in the agreement of the parts, together with a certain agreeableness of color (De civitate Dei, CXXII, xix; XI, xxii). Likewise, St. Thomas Aquinas states that the beauty of the body consists in this, that a man have the members of his body well-proportioned, together with a certain due lustre of color. For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color. But note that, by a fitting arrangement of the members, Cicero presumably means the same as Plato, where the latter states that: At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole? (Plato, Phaedrus 264c, tr. B. Jowett) This species of beauty is that of order, and corresponds to a due disposition of parts in a whole, or disposition simply. The agreement of parts spoken of by St. Augustine, on the other hand, appears to pertain to their mutual adaptation; whereas St. Thomas speaks of a due disposition in quantity, where a part is neither too big nor too small in reference to the whole,1 and a due disposition in situation, which pertains
1

Cf. Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. B. Jowett): Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight.

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to the order among the parts, as we have already said. Unmentioned in the foregoing texts is the possession of a due disposition with respect to shape or figure, which, like claritas, pertains to quality. 6. On deformity in the body. Cf. St. Augustine of Hippo, City of God, Book XXII:
Chapter 19.That All Bodily Blemishes Which Mar Human Beauty in This Life Shall Be Removed in the Resurrection, the Natural Substance of the Body Remaining, But the Quality and Quantity of It Being Altered So as to Produce Beauty. What am I to say now about the hair and nails? Once it is understood that no part of the body shall so perish as to produce deformity in the body, it is at the same time understood that such things as would have produced a deformity by their excessive proportions shall be added to the total bulk of the body, not to parts in which the beauty of the proportion would thus be marred. Just as if, after making a vessel of clay, one wished to make it over again of the same clay, it would not be necessary that the same portion of the clay which had formed the handle should again form the new handle, or that what had formed the bottom should again do so, but only that the whole clay should go to make up the whole new vessel, and that no part of it should be left unused. Wherefore, if the hair that has been cropped and the nails that have been cut would cause a deformity were they to be restored to their places, they shall not be restored; and yet no one will lose these parts at the resurrection, for they shall be changed into the same flesh, their substance being so altered as to preserve the proportion of the various parts of the body. However, what our Lord said, Not a hair of your head shall perish, might more suitably be interpreted of the number, and not of the length of the hairs, as He elsewhere says, The hairs of your head are all numbered. Luke 12:7 Nor would I say this because I suppose that any part naturally belonging to the body can perish, but that whatever deformity was in it, and served to exhibit the penal condition in which we mortals are, should be restored in such a way that, while the substance is entirely preserved, the deformity shall perish. For if even a human workman, who has, for some reason, made a deformed statue, can recast it and make it very beautiful, and this without suffering any part of the substance, but only the deformity to be lost,if he can, for example, remove some unbecoming or disproportionate part, not by cutting off and separating this part from the whole, but by so breaking down and mixing up the whole as to get rid of the blemish without diminishing the quantity of his material,shall we not think as highly of the almighty Worker? Shall He not be able to remove and abolish all deformities of the human body, whether common ones or rare and monstrous, which, though in keeping with this miserable life, are yet not to be thought of in connection with that future blessedness; and shall He not be able so to remove them that, while the natural but unseemly blemishes are put an end to, the natural substance shall suffer no diminution? And consequently overgrown and emaciated persons need not fear that they shall be in heaven of such a figure as they would not be even in this world if they could help it. For all bodily beauty consists in the proportion of the parts, together with a certain agreeableness of color. Where there is no proportion, the eye is offended, either because there is something awanting, or too small, or too large. And thus there shall be no deformity resulting from want of proportion in that state in which all that is wrong is corrected, and all that is defective supplied from resources the Creator wots of, and all that is excessive removed without destroying the integrity of the substance. And as for the pleasant color, how conspicuous shall it be where the just shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their

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Father! Matthew 13:43 This brightness we must rather believe to have been concealed from the eyes of the disciples when Christ rose, than to have been awanting. For weak human eyesight could not bear it, and it was necessary that they should so look upon Him as to be able to recognize Him. For this purpose also He allowed them to touch the marks of His wounds, and also ate and drank,not because He needed nourishment, but because He could take it if He wished. Now, when an object, though present, is invisible to persons who see other things which are present, as we say that that brightness was present but invisible by those who saw other things, this is called in Greek ; and our Latin translators, for want of a better word, have rendered this ccitas (blindness) in the book of Genesis. This blindness the men of Sodom suffered when they sought the just Lots gate and could not find it. But if it had been blindness, that is to say, if they could see nothing, then they would not have asked for the gate by which they might enter the house, but for guides who might lead them away. But the love we bear to the blessed martyrs causes us, I know not how, to desire to see in the heavenly kingdom the marks of the wounds which they received for the name of Christ, and possibly we shall see them. For this will not be a deformity, but a mark of honor, and will add lustre to their appearance, and a spiritual, if not a bodily beauty. And yet we need not believe that they to whom it has been said, Not a hair of your head shall perish, shall, in the resurrection, want such of their members as they have been deprived of in their martyrdom. But if it will be seemly in that new kingdom to have some marks of these wounds still visible in that immortal flesh, the places where they have been wounded or mutilated shall retain the scars without any of the members being lost. While, therefore, it is quite true that no blemishes which the body has sustained shall appear in the resurrection, yet we are not to reckon or name these marks of virtue blemishes.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 44, q. 3, art. 1a, c.: Parallel translations:
(tr. English Dominican Fathers) (tr. B.A.M.)

I answer that, Deformity in the human body is I reply that it must be said to the first question of two kinds. that in the human body there can be a twofold deformity. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say In one way from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed, because he that mutilated things are ugly; for in them there lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. is a lack of due proportion to the whole. Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or placewhich deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion And deformity of this kind, without a doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole, as was said above when the integrity of the resurrected body was treated of. In another way deformity arises from an undue disposition of the parts, either an undue quantity, or quality, or situationwhich deformity is, moreover, incompatible with a due proportion of the parts to the whole. Concerning these kinds of deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes are the cause of deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful

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xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44).

(Enchiridion xcii) as the Master in the text says (Sent. iv, D, 44).

7. The principles of deformity and of its opposite, being well-formed:

Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. one arises from the lack of a limb, = lack of wholeness (defectus integritas)

another deformity arises from the undue = lack of due proportion (defectus debita disposition of the parts proportio) deformity arising from the lack of a limb: thus = lack of due proportion of the parts to the we say that mutilated things are deformed, whole because in them there is a lack of due proportion to the whole deformity arising from the undue disposition of the parts: by reason of undue quantity, quality, or situation (or position) which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole Hence, one may surmise that well-formedness in the human body will be of two kinds: one will arise from the possession of all the = possession of wholeness (integritas) limbs, = possession of due proportion (debita another from the due disposition of the parts proportio) well-formedness arising from the possession of = possession of due proportion of the parts to all the limbs: thus we say that wholes are well- the whole formed, because in them there is a due proportion to the whole well-formedness arising from the disposition of the parts: by reason of due quantity, quality, or situation (or position) which loveliness is, moreover, compatible with due proportion of parts to whole due = possession of due disposition in quantity = possession of due disposition in quality = possession of due disposition in situation or position = lack of due disposition in quantity = lack of due disposition in quality = lack of due disposition in situation or position

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8. On beauty in sum. beauty consists in a due proportion of the parts to the whole (= integrity or perfection) according to situation or position (= order) to each other (= consonance or due proportion) according to quantity (= symmetry, understood as commensurability) according to quality (= luster or brilliance [claritas], having to do with luminosity or intelligibility) in shape or figure (= the limited or definiteness) in color or coloring (which exists in a surface) 9. Divisions of beauty. 1. Into its species or specific parts: (a) order (b) symmetry (c) the limited or definiteness 2. Into its constituents or quasi-integral parts: (a) wholeness or integrity (b) due proportion or consonance (c) lustre or brilliance (etc.) Note here that beauty regards commensuration and what is becoming inasmuch as it consists in a due proportion of the parts to the whole with respect to quantity, which is what symmetry consists in.

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II. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO PLATO. 1. The role of symmetry or proportion and color. Plato, Soph., 235d-e.
(tr. F. M. Cornford). STRANGER: One art that I see contained in it is the making of likenesses (ei)kastikh/). The perfect example of this consists in creating a copy that conforms to the proportions of the original [kata tas tou paradeigmatos summetrias tis] in all three [e] dimensions1 and giving moreover the proper color to every part [eti chrmata apodidous ta proskonta hekastois].2 (ed. John Burnet; tr. H. N. Fowler). Stranger I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, [235e] the appropriate colors to each part.3

2. Two principles of the beautiful according to Plato, Soph., 235d-e: In order to produce an accurate imitation, one must preserve the proportions of the original [kata tas tou paradeigmatos summetrias tis] in length, breadth, and depth, as well as give the appropriate colors to each part [chrmata apodidous ta proskonta hekastois].

3. The three greatest forms of the beautiful as touched upon by Plato. Cf. Plato, Laws II (668d669e) (tr. Thomas Pangle, rev. B.A.M.).
Ath. What then, if someone doesnt know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: [would he ever know,] for instance, whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts, how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order, and also the colors and shapes, or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated?4
1

For if the proper proportions are not preservered, then the thing will be ugly: cf. Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. B. Jowett): Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight. Cf. also Sophist 228b-c (tr. F. M Cornford): Str. And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry? Theaet. Clearly of the want of symmetry. Hence symmetry in the parts of the body consists in having an appropriate size relative to the wholewhich consists in hitting the mark aimed at by nature (in making a thing) or by art (in making a likeness of a thing). 2 On the role of symmetry and color in bodily beauty, see the texts of Cicero, Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas given below. 3 Xenos. mian men tn eikastikn horn en auti technn. esti d' haut malista hopotan kata tas tou paradeigmatos summetrias tis en mkei kai platei kai bathei, kai pros [235e] toutois eti chrmata apodidous ta proskonta hekastois, tn tou mimmatos genesin apergaztai. 4 Athnaios: ti oun ei tis kai en toutois agnooi tn memimmenn hoti pot' estin hekaston tn smatn; ar' an pote to ge orths autn eirgasmenon gnoi; leg de to toionde, hoion tous arithmous tou smatos kai

15

4. In sum. whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body [= symmetry] and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts [= order] how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order [also = order] the colors and shapes [= the limited] or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way [= lack of order]

Cf. Plato, Laws II (668d 669b) (tr. R. G. Bury):

Ath. He who does not know what is done correctly would never be able to know what is done well or badly, would he? But I have not put this very clearly. Perhaps it would be clearer if put this way Kl. How? Ath. There are of course myriad images which are visible to our eye. Kl. Yes. Ath. What then, if someone doesnt know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: doesnt he have to know whether the imitation captures the number and the arrangement [668e] of each of the parts, how many there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order, and also the colors and shapes, or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated? Kl. How could he? Ath. What if we were to know that the thing that has been painted or sculpted is a human being, and that all his own parts [669a], colors, and shapes have been captured by the art? Does it follow necessarily that whoever knows about these things also readily knows whether the work is beautiful or just where it is deficient in beauty? Kl. That would mean, stranger, that all of us, so to speak, know what is beautiful in any paint-ings of living things. Ath. What you say is very correct. Isnt it the case, then, that with regard to each image, in painting and music and in all the rest, the person who is going to be a prudent judge must have three kinds of knowledge? He must know [669b] first what the thing is, and then know how correctly, and thenthe third thinghow well, any of the images of it in words, melodies, and rhythms are produced. Kl. Thats likely, anyway.

hekastn tn mern [668e] tas theseis ei echei, hosoi te eisin kai hopoia par' hopoia autn keimena tn proskousan taxin apeilphenkai eti d chrmata te kai schmata panta tauta tetaragmens eirgastai: mn dokei taut' an pote diagnnai tis to parapan agnon hoti pot' esti to memimmenon zion.

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Cf. Plato, Timaeus 87c-88c (tr. B. Jowett):

There is a corresponding inquiry concerning the mode of treatment [c] by which the mind and the body are to be preserved, about which it is meet and right that I should say a word in turn; for it is more our duty to speak of the good than of the evil. Everything that is good is fair, and the animal fair is not without proportion, and the animal which is to be fair must have due proportion. Now we perceive lesser symmetries or proportions and reason about them, but of the highest and greatest we take no heed; for there is no proportion or disproportion [d] more productive of health and disease, and virtue and vice, than that between soul and body. This however we do not perceive, nor do we reflect that when a weak or small frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul, or conversely, when a little soul is encased in a large body, then the whole animal is not fair, for it lacks the most important of all sym-metries; but the due proportion of mind and body is the fairest and loveliest of all sights to him who has the seeing eye. Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight, and also, when doing its share of work, is much distressed and makes convulsive efforts, and often stumbles through awkwardness, and is the cause of infinite evil to its own selfin like manner we should conceive of the double nature which we call the living being; and when in this compound there is an impassioned soul more powerful than the body, that [88a] soul, I say, convulses and fills with disorders the whole inner nature of man; and when eager in the pursuit of some sort of learning or study, causes wasting; or again, when teaching or disputing in private or in public, and strifes and con-troversies arise, inflames and dissolves the composite frame of man and introduces rheums; and the nature of this phenomenon is not understood by most professors of medicine, who ascribe it to the opposite of the real cause. And once more, when a body large and too strong for the soul is united to a small and weak intelligence, then inasmuch as there are two desires natural to [b] manone of food for the sake of the body, and one of wisdom for the sake of the diviner part of usthen, I say, the motions of the stronger, getting the better and increasing their own power, but making the soul dull, and stupid, and forgetful, engender ignorance, which is the greatest of diseases. There is one protection against both kinds of disproportionthat we should not move the body without the soul or the soul without the body, and thus they will be on their guard [c] against each other, and be healthy and well balanced. And therefore the mathematician or any one else whose thoughts are much absorbed in some intellectual pursuit, must allow his body also to have due exercise, and practice gymnastic; and he who is careful to fashion the body, should in turn impart to the soul its proper motions, and should cultivate music and all philosophy, if he would deserve to be called truly fair and truly good.

5. On being perfect and whole according to Plato. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 32d-34b (Loeb tr.) (excerpts):
[32d] ...first, that it might be, so far as possible, a Living Creature, perfect and whole, with all its parts perfect; and next, that it might be One,... [33a] He fashioned it to be One single Whole, compounded of all wholes, perfect and ageless and unailing. [33b] And he bestowed on it the shape which was befitting and akin. Now for that Living Creature which is designed to embrace within itself all living creatures the fitting shape will be that which comprises within itself all the shapes there are; wherefore He wrought it into a round, in the shape of a sphere, equidistant in all directions from the center to the extremities, which of all shapes is the most perfect and the most self-similar, since He deemed that the similar is infinitely fairer than the dissimilar. And on the outside round about, it was all made smooth with great exactness, and that for many reasons. [34a] He spun it round uniformly in the

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same spot and within itself and made it move revolving in a circle. [34b] He made it smooth and even and equal on all sides from the center, a whole and perfect body compounded of perfect bodies, And in the midst thereof He set Soul, which He stretched throughout the whole of it, and therewith He enveloped also the exterior of its body; and as a Circle revolving in a circle....

Cf. Plato, Timaeus 32d-33b (tr. B. Jowett):

Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements; for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. His intention was, in the first place, [d] that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of [33] perfect parts: secondly, that it should be one, leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created: and also that it should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. Considering that if heat and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared, they decompose them, and by bringing diseases and old age upon them, make them waste away1 for this cause and on these grounds he made the world one whole, having every part entire, and being therefore perfect and [b] not liable to old age and disease. And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural.

Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 264a-e ff. (tr. B. Jowett):

SOCRATES: Read, that I may have his exact words. PHAEDRUS: You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over. SOCRATES: Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus? PHAEDRUS: [b] Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end. SOCRATES: Then as to the other topics are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition? PHAEDRUS: You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight [c] into his principles of composition.
1

Cf. Alcmaon Fr. 4, from Atius V30,1: Health is conserved by equal balance (isonomia) among the powers wet and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet, etc., disease being produced by the sole dominance (monarchia) of one among them, for the sole dominance of either one of them would be destructive [of the other]. And illness comes about by an excess of heat or cold, from too much or too little food, and in the blood or marrow of the brain . . . health is the proportionate mixture (symmetron krasin) of the qualities. (Alcmaon, or Alcmeon, of Croton was a physician who flourished in the early fifth century.) Observations such as this lie at the root of traditional philosophys understanding of beauty as a hexis or disposition. See further Aristotle, Topics, III. 1 (116b 19-23) and associated texts, quoted below.

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SOCRATES: At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole? PHAEDRUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian. PHAEDRUS: [d] What is there remarkable in the epitaph? SOCRATES: It is as follows: I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas; So long as water flows and tall trees grow, So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding, I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below. [e] Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference. PHAEDRUS: You are making fun of that oration of ours.

Cf. the following from a web site (quoting Plato, Phaedrus 264c, tr. Harold N. Fowler):
Socrates gives the speaker specific instructions: Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work (264C).

6. The meaning of symmetry according to The Oxford English Dictionary:

Symmetry 1. Mutual relation of the parts of something in respect of magnitude and position; relative measurement and arrangement of parts; proportion. 2. Due or just proportion; harmony of parts with each other and the whole; fitting, regular, or balanced arrangement and relation of parts or elements; the condition or quality of being wellproportioned or well-balanced. In stricter use (approaching or passing into 3 b): Exact correspondence in size and position of opposite parts; equable distribution of parts about a dividing line or centre. (As an attribute either of the whole, or of the parts composing it.) 3 b. Geom. etc. Exact correspondence in position of the several points or parts of a figure or body with reference to a dividing line, plane, or point (or a number of lines or planes); arrangement of all the points of a figure or system in pairs (or sets) so that those of each pair (or set) are at equal distances on opposite sides of such line, plane, or point.

N.B. The first two definitions given here show the appropriateness of translating summetria by proportion. They also show that symmetry pertains first of all to size and order. But for the way in which these attributes enter into the consideration of a work of art, cf. the following:

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Cf. M. Bill. The Mathematical Way of Thinking in the Visual Art of Our Time, The Visual Mind: Art and Mathematics, M. Emmer, editor, Leonardo Books-MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993:
Now in every work of [visual] art the basis of its composition is geometry or in other words the means of determining the mutual relationship of its component parts either on plane or in space.... And again, since it is mathematics which lends significance to these relationships, it is only a natural step from having perceived them to desiring to portray them. This, in brief, is the genesis of a work of art.

7. Plato on beauty in sum. (a) beginning and end (order as consisting in a before and after; transposition of parts should make a difference to the nature): for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting Then as to the other topics are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference. (b) a body, head, and feet (a middle, beginning, and end) (parts adapted to one another and to the whole):1 every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole (c) succession or connection (continuous and one): but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian On these observations, cf. Aristotle, Parts of Animals (641b 21-24) (tr. William Ogle): Yet there are some who, while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature, nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity; the heaven, in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible! Cf. ibid.: Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in natures works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful. Note: The form of the beautiful at issue here is that of taxis or order; for the parts of an integral whole cannot be put together in just any way; such an orderliness importing an absence of haphazard. Cf. nature is not episodic,
1

Such a thing being a whole having size, hence an order in its parts (= position as dispositio).

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like a bad tragedy. Cf. a whole is what has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.): For some things are called one not by reason of indivision or solely by reason of continuity, but because they are whole and perfect insofar as they have some one species, not in the sense of a homogeneous subject, but that which consists in a certain totality requiring a determinate order of parts. Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 21, n. 21 (tr. B.A.M.): For when it is so that in a quantity there is an order of parts, because there is a beginning, a middle, and an end there, in which the account of position consists, every such continuous whole must have position in its parts. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 29d-34a (tr. B. Jowett):
Tim. Let me tell you then why the creator made this [e] world of generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all [30] things should be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the other. Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest; [b] and the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God. [e] This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? It would be an unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings, [d] just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature. Are we right in [31] saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? There must be one only, if the created copy is to accord with the original. For that which includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in that case there would be need of another living being which would include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included them. In order then that the world might be solitary, like the perfect animal, the creator made not [b] two worlds or an infinite number of them; but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven. Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also visible and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire, or tangible which has no solidity, and nothing is solid without earth. Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things cannot be rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond of union [e] between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. For whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when the mean is to the [32] first term as the last term is to the

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meanthen the mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become the same with one another will be all one. If the universal frame had been created a surface only and having no depth, a single mean would have sufficed to bind together itself and the other terms; but now, as the [b] world must be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth); and thus he bound and put together a visible and [c] tangible heaven. And for these reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created, and it was harmonised by proportion, and therefore has the spirit of friendship; and having been reconciled to itself, it was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer. Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements; for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. His intention was, in the first place, [d] that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of [33] perfect parts: secondly, that it should be one, leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created: and also that it should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. Considering that if heat and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared, they decompose them, and by bringing diseases and old age upon them, make them waste awayfor this cause and on these grounds he made the world one whole, having every part entire, and being therefore perfect and [b] not liable to old age and disease. And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural. Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals, that figure was suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a lathe, having its extremes in every direction equidistant from the centre, the most perfect and the most like itself of all figures; for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike. This he finished off, making the [c] surface smooth all around for many reasons; in the first place, because the living being had no need of eyes when there was nothing remaining outside him to be seen; nor of ears when there was nothing to be heard; and there was no surrounding atmosphere to be breathed; nor would there have been any use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested, since there was nothing which went from him or came into him: for there was nothing beside him. Of design he was created thus, his own waste providing his own food, and all that he did or suffered taking [d] place in and by himself. For the Creator conceived that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything; and, as he had no need to take anything or defend himself against any one, the Creator did not think it necessary to bestow upon [34] him hands: nor had he any need of feet, nor of the whole apparatus of walking; but the movement suited to his spherical form was assigned to him, being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and intelligence; and he was made to move in the same manner and on the same spot, within his own limits revolving in a circle. All the other six motions were taken away from him, and he was made not to partake of their deviations. And as this circular movement required no feet, the universe was created without legs and without feet. Such was the whole plan of the eternal God about the god that was to be, to whom for this reason he gave a body, smooth and even, having a surface in every direction equidistant from the centre, a body entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the centre he put the soul, which he diffused throughout the body, making it also to be the exterior environment of it; and he made the universe a circle moving in a circle, one and solitary, yet by reason of its excellence able to converse with itself, and needing no other friendship or acquaintance. Having these purposes in view he created the world a blessed god.

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8. On good harmony, good rhythm, and good color. Cf. Plato, Laws II (655a-b) (ed. Perseus; tr. Thomas Pangle):
It should be noted, though, that music includes postures and tunes, since music involves rhythm and harmony; now one can speak of good rhythm and good harmony, but one cannot correctly apply to either tune or posture and image good coloras the chorus teachers, speaking in images, do. On the other hand, with regard to the posture or tune of the coward and the courageous man, it is correct to call what pertains to cowards ugly. To avoid our getting involved in a very lengthy discussion of all these things, lets simply let all the postures and tunes that belong to virtue of the soul or of the body (whether they belong to virtue itself or to an image of it) be beautiful, and those belonging to vice be entirely the opposite.

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III. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE. 1. The three greatest forms of the beautiful. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIII. 3 (1078a 311078b 6) (tr. W. D. Ross, rev. B.A.M.):
Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do [35] not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i.e. the beautiful) as in [5] some sense a cause. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.14
14

Apparently an unfulfilled promise. (emphasis added)

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIII. 3 (1078a 311078b 6) (ed. W. D. Ross; tr. Hugh Tredennick):
epei de to agathon kai to kalon heteron (to men gar aei en praxei, to de kalon kai en tois akintois), hoi phaskontes ouden legein tas mathmatikas epistmas peri kalou agathou pseudontai. And since goodness is distinct from beauty (for it is always in actions that goodness is present, whereas beauty is also in immovable things), they are in error who assert that the mathematical sciences tell us nothing about beauty or goodness;

legousi gar kai deiknuousi malista: [35] ou gar for they describe and manifest these qualities in ei m onomazousi ta d' erga kai tous logous the highest degree, since it does not follow, deiknuousin, ou legousi peri autn. because they manifest the effects and principles of beauty and goodness without naming them, that they do not treat of these qualities. tou de kalou megista eid taxis kai summetria kai to hrismenon, [1078b][1] ha malista mathmatikai epistmai. deiknuousin The main species of beauty are orderly arrangement, proportion, and definiteness;

hai [1078b][1] and these are especially manifested by the mathematical sciences. And inasmuch as it is evident that these (I mean, e.g., orderly arrangement and definiteness) are causes of many things, obviously they must also to some extent treat of the cause in this sense, i.e. the cause in the sense of the Beautiful.

kai epei ge polln aitia phainetai tauta (leg d' hoion h taxis kai to hrismenon), dlon hoti legoien an kai tn toiautn aitian tn [5] hs to kalon aition tropon tina.

mallon de gnrims en allois peri autn But we shall deal with this subject more eroumen. explicitly elsewhere.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XI. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (tr. W. D. Ross): 24

As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities, e.g. [30] weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitative and [35] continuous, and does not consider them in any other respect, and examines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these, and the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others, [1061b] and the ratios of others; but yet we posit one and the same science of all these thingsgeometry)the same is true with regard to being.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XI. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (ed. W. D. Ross; tr. Hugh Tredennick):
kathaper d' ho mathmatikos peri ta ex And just as the mathematician makes a study of aphaireses tn therian poieitai abstractions (perieln gar panta [30] ta aisthta therei, hoion baros kai kouphotta kai sklrotta kai tounantion, eti de kai thermotta kai psuchrotta kai tas allas aisthtas enantiseis, monon de kataleipei to poson kai suneches, tn men eph' hen tn d' epi duo tn d' epi tria, kai ta path ta toutn hi posa esti [35] kai sunech, kai ou kath' heteron ti therei, kai tn men tas pros allla theseis skopei kai ta tautais huparchonta, [1061b][1] tn asummetrias, de tas summetrias (for in his investigations he first abstracts everything that is sensible, such as weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and all other sensible contrarieties, leaving only quantity and continuity sometimes in one, sometimes in two and sometimes in three dimensions and their affections qua quantitative and continuous, and does not study them with respect to any other thing; and in some cases investigates the relative positions of things and the properties of these,

kai [1061b][1] and in others their commensurability or incommensurability,

tn de tous logous, all' homs mian pantn kai and in others their ratios; yet nevertheless we tn autn tithemen epistmn tn gemetrikn ), hold that there is one and the same science of all ton auton d tropon echei kai peri to on. these things, viz. geometry), so it is the same with regard to Being.

2. Comparison of texts.
Aristotle, Meta., XIII. 3 (1078a 371078b 1) (tr. W. D. Ross) The chief forms of beauty are order [taxis] and Aristotle, Meta., XI. 3 (1061a 36-b 1) (tr. W. D. Ross) and [as the mathematician] examines the relative positions [tas pros allla theseis] of some and the attributes of these,

symmetry [or commensurability, summetria] and the commensurabilities and incommensura[1078b] and bilities [tas summetrias kai asummetrias] of others, [1061b]

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definiteness [or the limited, to horismenon], and the ratios [tn de tous logous] of others. which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. [the relation of ratio to limit being indicated by De Anima, II. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. H. G. Apostle): [B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth, and these [i.e. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire, and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIII. 3 (1078a 37-1078b 2) (ed. Tredennick; tr. Duane Berquist):
tou de kalou megista eid taxis kai summetria The greatest forms of the beautiful are order and kai to hrismenon, [1078b][1] ha malista deik- symmetry and the limited, which the mathenuousin hai mathmatikai epistmai. matical sciences especially show.

3. In sum. Symmetry has to do with the parts of an integral whole being commensurate that is, possessing their due measure with respect to quantity. Cf. the analogy with health: just as there must be a proper balance of humours in a body for it is to be healthy (for if one humour were to be excessive, the animal would be ill), so also for a body to be beautiful there must be a proper measure of the parts with respect to quantity; for if a limb were too large, the animal would be ugly (Cf. Plato, Timaeus 87 d-e: Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight.). How does the notion of admitting (or not admitting) a common measure arise? Inasmuch as it is most proper to quantity to be either or equal or unequal, the consideration of the relative sizes or ratios of magnitudes in geometry will necessarily make this notion manifest to the understanding. Note that color and lustre have no place in a consideration of the beauty pertaining to mathematicals, which are abstracted from sensible matter, and so their surfaces have no color. 4. On the notion of the limited. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., V. 17 (1022a 5-14) (tr. Joe Sachs; rev. B.A.M.):
Limit means the extremity of each thing, understood as the first thing outside of which there is nothing to find and the first thing inside of which everything belonging to it is, which is also the form of a magnitude or of something that has magnitude; and it means the end of each thing (and of this sort is that toward which its motion or action tends, but not that from which it starts, though sometimes it is both and consists of that from which as well as that toward which), and that for the sake of which it is, and the substance of each thing, and what it is for each thing to be; for the latter is a limit of knowledge, and if of [10] the knowledge, also of the thing. It is evident, then, that in however many ways beginning is said, limit too is said, and in yet more ways; for a beginning is a limit, but not every limit is a beginning. (emphasis added)

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5. The four ways in which limit is said: the form [or end, or terminus] of a magnitude or of a thing having magnitude: i.e. the end points of a line, or the shape or figure of a surface or body, coming under the fourth species of quality [the last thing taken in respect of quantity] the end [or extreme] of a motion or operation; e.g. being as the limit of coming to be [the last thing taken in respect of virtue or power] that for the sake of which it is; e.g. the final cause (and form) [the last thing in intention] the substance of each thing [the essence or definition] [the last thing in knowledge]

where a quantity comes to an end: a point, a line, a surface where a virtue or power comes to an end: coming to be where an intention comes to an end: that for the sake of which, which is also the form where knowledge comes to an end: the substance or what it is of a thing 6. On limit and ratio. Cf. Aristotle, De An., II. 4 (416a 14-20) (tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle):
Now fire is in some way a joint cause; however it is not the cause without qualification. [15] Rather is it the soul which is the cause. For the growth of fire proceeds indefinitely, as long as there is fuel to be burned; but a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth, and these [i.e. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire, and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Caelo, lect. 20. n. 7:

LB2 LC20N.-7 manifestum est autem quod continens est But it is obvious that the thing containing is honorabilius contento, et finis quam finitum: more honorable than the thing contained, and the limit [more honorable] than the limited, quia contentum et finitum pertinent ad rationem the reason being that the contained and the limimateriae, ted pertain to the notion of matter, esse autem continens et finiens, ad rationem but to be containing and limiting, to the notion formae, quae est substantia totius consistentiae of form, which is the substance of the whole rerum. consistence of things.
1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 18, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.): For each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude, which belongs to it according to the species of its proper virtue, is lacking to it. Now just as any natural thing possesses a determinate measure of natural magnitude according to continuous quantity, as is said in the second book of the De Anima [II. 4, 416a 15ff.], so also any thing possesses a determinate quantity of its natural virtue. But, as Aristotle states, the possession of a determinate quantity of magnitude is a function of the ratio of the elements composing the thing. Consequently, inasmuch as a thing composed of elements is marked by a limit and a certain ratio with respect to those elements, it will possess those forms of the beautiful called symmetry and order. From the foregoing, one sees how definiteness arises from symmetry, which in turn involves order.

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Cf. St. Thomas: a thing is determinata when it has attained that to which it is ordained, which is itproper term. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In X Ethic., lect 3, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB10LC-3N.-8 sed tamen neque etiam delectationes quae secundum se recipiunt magis et minus ratione suae mixtionis, oportet non esse determinatas, neque bonas. nihil enim prohibet quin delectatio recipiens magis et minus sit determinata, sicut et sanitas. huiusmodi enim determinata dici possunt, For things of this sort may be called deterinquantum aliqualiter attingunt id ad quod mined insofar as they somehow attain to that to ordinantur, licet possent propinquius attingere. which they are ordained, although they may get nearer to it. sicut commixtio humorum habet rationem In the same way a mixing together of humours sanitatis ex eo quod attingit convenientiam has the character of health by reason of the fact humanae naturae; that it attains an agreement with human nature et ex hoc dicitur determinata, quasi proprium for from this a thing is called determined as terminum attingens. attaining its proper term.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima:

[80612] Sentencia De anima, lib. 2 l. 8 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit videtur autem ponit aliam positionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit eam. Secundo improbat, ibi, hoc autem concausa, et cetera. Sciendum est autem, quod haec opinio differt in hoc a prima, quod prima attribuebat causam augmenti et alimenti diversis elementis, scilicet igni et terrae: haec autem attribuit eorum causam igni tantum. [80613] Sentencia De anima, lib. 2 l. 8 n. 7 Et movebantur ad hoc hac ratione. Quia illud videtur esse principium alicuius passionis vel motus in aliquo, secundum quod se habet illam passionem vel motum: sicut ignis, qui secundum se calidus est, est causa caloris in rebus mixtis; et terra, quae secundum se est gravis, est causa gravitatis in eis. Inter autem elementa videtur solus ignis nutriri et augeri, si superficialiter de nutrimento et augmento loquamur. Solus igitur ignis videtur esse faciens augmentum et alimentum in plantis et animalibus. Utrum vero ignis nutriatur et augeatur, inferius erit manifestum. [80614] Sentencia De anima, lib. 2 l. 8 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit hoc autem improbat praedictam positionem. Sciendum tamen est, quod praedicta positio aliquid habet veritatis. Necesse est enim omne alimentum decoqui: quod quidem fit per ignem: unde ignis aliquo modo operatur ad alimentum, et per consequens ad augmentum: non quidem sicut agens principale, hoc enim est animae; sed sicut agens secundarium et instrumentale. Et ideo dicere, quod ignis quodammodo concausa est augmenti et alimenti, sicut instrumentum concausa est principalis agentis, verum est; non tamen est principaliter causa ut principale agens, sed hoc modo causa est anima: quod sic probat.

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[80615] Sentencia De anima, lib. 2 l. 8 n. 9 Illud est principale in qualibet actione a quo imponitur terminus et ratio ei quod fit; sicut patet in artificialibus, quod terminus vel ratio arcae vel domui non imponitur ab instrumentis, sed ab ipsa arte. Nam instrumenta se habent differenter ut cooperentur ad hanc formam vel quantitatem, vel aliam. Serra enim quantum est de se, apta est ad secandum lignum, secundum quod competit et ostio, et scamno, et domui, et in quacumque quantitate; sed quod sic secetur lignum, quod sit aptum ad talem formam et ad talem quantitatem, est ex virtute artis. Manifestum est autem, quod in omnibus quae sunt secundum naturam, est certus terminus, et determinata ratio magnitudinis et augmenti: sicut enim cuilibet speciei debentur aliqua accidentia propria, ita et propria quantitas, licet cum aliqua latitudine propter diversitatem materiae, et alias causas individuales; non enim omnes homines sunt unius quantitatis. Sed tamen est aliqua quantitas tam magna, ultra quam species humana non porrigitur; et alia quantitas tam parva, ultra quam homo non invenitur. Illud igitur quod est causa determinationis magnitudinis et augmenti est principalis causa augmenti. [Now it is obvious that in all things that are according to nature there is a certain term, and a determinate ratio of size and growth; for just as in any species certain proper accidents are due, so also proper quantities, although there is some latitude by reason of a diversity of matter. But there is nonetheless a certain quantity beyond which the human species cannot go; and there is another quantity so small beyond which a man cannot be found. That, therefore, which is the cause of the determination of size and growth is the principal cause of growth.] Hoc autem non est ignis. Manifestum est enim, quod ignis augmentum non est usque ad determinatam quantitatem, sed in infinitum extenditur, si in infinitum materia combustibilis inveniatur. Manifestum est igitur, quod ignis non est principale agens in augmento et alimento, sed magis anima. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit; quia determinatio quantitatis in rebus naturalibus est ex forma, quae est principium speciei, magis quam ex materia. Anima autem comparatur ad elementa, quae sunt in corpore vivente, sicut forma ad materiam. Magis igitur terminus et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti est ab anima, quam ab igne. [It is therefore obvious that fire is not the principle agent in growth and nutrition, but rather the soul. And this happens reasonably, the reason being that the determination of quantity in natural things comes from the form, which is the principle of the species, rather than from the matter. But the soul is compared to the elements, which are in the living body, as form to matter. Therefore the limit and ratio of size and growth is more from the soul than from fire.]

7. The greatest forms of the beautiful in sum. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIII. 3 (1078a 361078b 1) (tr. W. D. Ross, rev. B.A.M.):
The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness , which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree.

8. On order and definiteness. Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 1 (641b 16642a 30) (tr. William H Ogle):
And that the heaven, if it had an origin, was evolved and is maintained by such a cause, there is therefore even more reason to believe, than that mortal animals so originated. For

29

order and definiteness are much more plainly manifest in the celestial bodies than in our own frame; while change and chance are characteristic of the perishable things of earth. [20] Yet there are some who, while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature, nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity; the heaven, in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible! Again, whenever there is plainly some final end, to which a motion tends should nothing stand in the way, we always say that such final [25] end is the aim or purpose of the motion; and from this it is evident that there must be a something or other really existing, corresponding to what we call by the name of Nature. For a given seed does not give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each seed springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny. And thus it is the seed that is the ruling influence and fabricator of the offspring. For these it is by nature, the offspring being at [30] any rate that which in nature will spring from it. At the same time the offspring is anterior to the seed; for seed and perfected progeny are related as the developmental process and the result. Anterior, however, to both seed and product is the organism from which the seed was [35] derived. For every seed implies two organisms, the parent and the progeny. For seed or seed is both the seed of the organism from which it came, of the horse, for instance, from which it was derived, and the seed of the organism that will eventually arise from it, of the mule, for example, which is developed from the seed of the horse. The same seed then is the seed both of the horse and of the mule, though in different ways as here set forth. Moreover, the seed is potentially that which will spring from it, and the relation of potentiality to actuality we know. [642a] There are then two causes, namely, necessity and the final end. For many things are produced, simply as the results of necessity. It may, however, be asked, of what mode of necessity are we speaking when [5] we say this. For it can be of neither of those two modes which are set forth in the philosophical treatises. There is, however, the third mode, in such things at any rate as are generated. For instance, we say that food is necessary; because an animal cannot possibly do without it. This third mode is what may be called hypothetical necessity. Here [10] is another example of it. If a piece of wood is to be split with an axe, the axe must of necessity be hard; and, if hard, must of necessity be made of bronze or iron. Now exactly in the same way the body, which like the axe is an instrumentfor both the body as a whole and its several parts individually have definite operations for which they are madejust in the same way, I say, the body, if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such a character, and made of such and such materials. It is plain then that there are two modes of causation, and that [15] both of these must, so far as possible, be taken into account in explaining the works of nature, or that at any rate an attempt must be made to include them both; and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about nature. For primary cause constitutes the nature of an animal much more than does its matter. There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this, and following the [20] guidance of fact, finds himself constrained to speak of the ratio (logos) as constituting the essence and real nature of things. Such, for instance, is the case when he explains what is a bone. For he does not merely describe its material, and say it is this one element, or those two or three elements, or a compound of all the elements, but states the ratio (logos) of their combination. As with a bone, so manifestly is it with the flesh and all other similar parts. [25] The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method of treatment was, that they were not in possession of the notion of essence, nor of any definition of substance. The first who came near it was Democritus, and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science, but was merely brought to it, spite of himself, by constraint of facts. In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. But at this period men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind. [30]

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9. On order and definiteness and the relation of ratio to definiteness or the limit. Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I. 5 (645a 23-25):
(tr. William H. Ogle) Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in natures works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful. (tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle) Indeed, things which are formed not by chance but for the sake of something exist in the works of nature [25] most of all, and the end for whose sake a thing is formed or came to be has the rank of nobility [or beauty, to kalos].

N.B. As is clear from the mention of disorder in the first text cited above, the form of the beautiful at issue here is that of taxis or order; for a thing cannot have its species when the parts of an integral whole are put together in just any way; the possession of such orderliness importing an absence of haphazard. Cf. Aristotle, De An., II. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle):
[B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth, and these [i.e. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire, and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing.

10. Order in relation to the possession of unity. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., V. 6 (1016b 13-17) (tr. W. D. Ross; slightly rev. B.A.M.):
While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together just any way we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their [15] continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form [which is to possess order]. This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is whole and complete.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

And he says that sometimes some things are called one solely by reason of continuity, but sometimes not, except something be a whole and perfect; which, in fact, happens when it has some one species, not indeed as a homogeneous subject is called one species [like the silver of a drinking vessel],1 which pertains to the second mode set forth earlier, but according as the species consists in a certain totality requiring a determinate order of parts; just as it is clear that we do not call something one, like a work produced by art, when we observe the parts of a shoe composed in any way whatsoever, except perhaps according as one is taken for the continuous; but we do say all the parts of a shoe are one when they are so composed that there is a shoe and it have some one species, namely, of a shoe.2
1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 3, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.): For it must be understood that sometimes one thing is of one matter simply, like the silver of a drinking vessel; and then the form corresponding to such a matter can be called a species.

31

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., V. 25 (1024a 1-5) (tr. W. D. Ross):

Again (3) of quanta that have a beginning and a middle and an end, those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals, and those to which it does, wholes. Those which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. These are the things whose nature remains the same after transposition, but whose form does not, e.g. wax or a coat; they are called both wholes and totals; for they [5] have both characteristics.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 21, n. 21 (tr. B.A.M.):

For when it is so that in a quantity there is an order of parts, because there is a beginning, a middle, and an end there, in which the account of position consists, every such continuous whole must have position in its parts.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 8 (1451a 30-35) (tr. B.A.M.):

Accordingly, just as in the other imitative arts, one imitation must be of one thing, so also the plot, since it is the imitation of an action, must be of one thing, and this a whole; and the parts of the thing must be so constituted that when some one part is transposed or removed it makes a difference in the sense that the whole is changed; for what makes [35] no noticeable difference when it is present or not present is no part of the whole.1

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 7 (1450b 26-33) (tr. B.A.M.):

But a whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which itself is not of necessity after anything else, but something else naturally is or comes to be after it. An end, conversely, is that which naturally is after something else, either [30] of necessity or for the most part, but nothing else after this. A middle is that which itself is after something else and another thing after it. A well-constructed plot, then, should not begin or end just anywhere, but should use the species mentioned.

Cf. Iamblichus of Chalcis, Theological Principles of Arithmetic (Theologumena Arithmeticae) (quoted from the Ancient Greek Scientists Web Site):
[T]he number three is the first odd number and is therefore perfect, for it is the first to indicate a whole that has a beginning, a middle, and an end.

11. That, as with an animal, the beauty of a plot consists in size and order. Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 7 (1450b 341451a 15 (tr. B.A.M. based on Buckley):

...et dicit, quod quandoque aliqua dicuntur unum propter solam continuitatem, quandoque vero non, nisi sit aliquod totum et perfectum; quod quidem contingit quando habet aliquam unam speciem, non quidem sicut subiectum homogeneum dicitur unum specie quod pertinet ad secundum modum positum prius, sed secundum quod species in quadam totalitate consistit requirens determinatum ordinem partium; sicut patet quod non dicimus unum aliquid, ut artificiatum, quando videmus partes calceamenti qualitercumque compositas, nisi forte secundum quod accipitur unum pro continuo; sed tunc dicimus esse unum omnes partes calceamenti, quando sic sunt compositae, quod sit calceamentum et habeat aliquam unam speciem, scilicet calceamenti. 1 Cf. Metaph., V. 25 (1024a 1-5), quoted above.

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Further still, since that which is beautiful, whether it be an animal or anything else which is composed of certain things, should not only [35] have these things arranged,2 but also not just any chance sizefor the beautiful consists in size and orderhence, neither can any very small animal be beautiful; for the contemplation of it is confused, since it is effected in a nearly insensible time; nor yet a very large animal; [1451a] for it is not contemplated at once, but its being one and a whole escapes the view of the onlookers; such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stadia [in length]. And so, as in bodies and in animals there should be size, but such as can be easily seen; so also in plots, there should be length, but this such as can be [5] easily remembered. But the definition of the length with reference to contests and the senses does not fall under the consideration of art. For if it were necessary to perform a hundred tragedies, the performance would have to be regulated by a water-clock, as they are said to have been at one time. But the definition according to the nature of the thing is this, that the plot is [10] always more beautiful the greater it is, if at the same time it is perspicuous. But in order to define it simply, one may say, in whatever extent, in successive incidents in accordance with likelihood or necessity, a change from bad fortune to good fortune or from good fortune to bad fortune takes place, is a [15] sufficient limit of the size.

N.B. On the foregoing matters, see my paper Perfect and Whole: Aristotles Poetics on the Structure of the Plot (Papers In Poetics 1). 12. That, in the case of an animal, beauty consists in a certain symmetry of the limbs. Cf. Aristotle, Top., III. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed. & tr. Loeb):
And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored; for example, health is better than strength or beauty. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold, in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature, whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]; for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones, and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs.2

13. Beauty according to Aristotle. Cf. James Mark Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902), s.v. Beauty and The Beautiful:
2

With respect to the order in which the beauty of a plot consists, Aristotle afterwards states that: Accordingly, just as in the other imitative arts, one imitation must be of one thing, so also the plot, since it is the imitation of an action, must be of one thing, and this a whole; and the parts of the thing must be so constituted that when some one part is transposed or removed it makes a difference in the sense that the whole is changed; for what makes [35] no noticeable difference when it is present or not present is no part of the whole (Poet., 8, 1451a 30-35, tr. B.A.M.). Cf. also On the Parts of Animals I. 1 (641b 21-24) (tr. William Ogle): Yet there are some who, while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature, nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity; the heaven, in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible!; whereas [a]bsence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in natures works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful (ibid., ch.5, 645a 23-25), that form being order. 2 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. B. Jowett): Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight.

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Aristotle treats beauty only incidentally. Its main characteristics are said to be order, symmetry, definite limitation, and hence it is not alien to mathematics. A certain magnitude is also a condition of beauty, especially in the human form. 1 Small men may be well proportioned, but cannot be called beautiful. Subjective definitions are also given: the beautiful is chosen for itself and is worthy of praise (like the good); or, that good which is pleasant because good.2 The virtues, or rather the excellences or admired qualities, are said to be beautiful, especially the crowning quality of nobility of soul, which is a kind of lustre of beauty. Real beauty is also distinguished from a beauty which has reference only to desire, as manifested in sexual preference.

Cf. Otto Neumaier, What Is the Subject of Aesthetics? (excerpt):

(i) In his Poetics, Aristotle remarks that to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order, and therefore impossible either in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity; or in a creature of vast size - one, say, 1,000 miles long - as in that case, instead of the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder.[20] (ii) Another perspective is chosen by Aristotle in his Rhetoric where he declares anything as beautiful which, being desirable in itself, is at the same time worthy of praise, or which, being good, is pleasant because it is good.[21] Notes. 20. Aristotle (Poet 1450b37ff.). This definition conforms to the one given by Aristotle (Meta 1078a36) where he states that the main species of beauty are orderly arrangement, proportion, and definiteness; and these are especially manifested by the mathematical sciences. In the same sense it is emphasised by Aristotle (Part 645a23ff.) that no animal lacks beauty, and this is so because of the way in which its parts form a whole: Just as in discussing a house, it is the whole figure and form of the house which concerns us, not merely the bricks and mortar and timber; so in Natural science, it is the composite thing, the thing as a whole, which primarily concerns us, not the materials of it, which are not found apart from the thing itself whose materials they are. Similar attempts at defining the notion of beauty can be found, e.g., in Hospers (1967), Volkelt (1905) and Ziff (1953); I will come back to Ziff later. 21. Aristotle (Rhet 1366a33f.). As I mentioned before, the Greek expression t kaln has originally been translated by J.H. Freese in this context as the noble, which I changed in the above quote to beautiful for reasons of consistency. In any case, it is this definition that has been taken up by Kant (1790: 6, 9) in his definition of beauty, whereas Bolzanos (1845: 14) more complex definition is a combination of this definition with the one given in the Poetics.

14. Aristotle on the three goods of the body. [From a website]:

But Aristotle, an early witness to this topic, spells this out in greater detail: The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies. . .
1

Notice how Baldwin treats magnitude as an additional attribute of beauty, when it actually enters into symmetry. 2 Cf. Rhet. I. 9 (1366a33ff.), but this is the noble or honorable good, not the beautiful, which is defined as that which pleases upon being seen.

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Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertions of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving someone else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin or grip him; thus you must be strong in all those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size (stature) is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one's movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence (athletic powers) of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer; he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an 'all-round' athlete (Rhet I.1361b 3-27). Aristotle describes a male warrior and/or athlete who embodies what is needed to be a public figure in his culture and gain public honor. Health = use of one's body; beauty = endurance and exertion in contests; strength = power to impose ones will. Such a person is able to do heroic deeds, to act assertively, and to claim honor and respect.

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. I. 5 (1366a33f.) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts):

The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are healthy as we are told Herodicus was; and these no one can congratulate on their health, for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do. Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip him; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one's movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an all-round athlete.

15. That the beautiful involves a combination of the best parts. Cf. Aristotle, Pol., III. 11 (1281b 1-14):
(tr. Benjamin Jowett) (tr. Carnes Lord)

35

For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together, they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a figure of their mind and disposition.

The many, of whom none is individually an excellent man, nevertheless can when joined together be betternot as individuals but all togetherthan those [who are best], just as dinners contributed [by many] can be better than those equipped from a single expenditure. For because they are many, each can have a part of virtue and prudence, and on their joining together, the multitude, with its many feet and hands, and having many senses, becomes like a single human being, and so also with respect to character and mind.

Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand Thus the many are also better judges of the one part, and some another, and among them works of music and the poets; some [appreciate] they understand the whole. a certain part, and all of them all the parts. There is a similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities, because in them the scattered elements are combined, although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture. But it is in this that the excellent men differ from each of the many individually, just as some assert beautiful persons differ from those who are not beautiful, and things painted by art from genuine things, by bringing together things scattered and separated into one; for taken separately, at any rate, this persons eye will be more beautiful than the painted one, as will another part of another person.

Cf. Peter of Auvergne, In III Politic., lect. VIII, n. 425 (tr. B.A.M.):
About this I understand that the painter wishing to paint through art, for instance, an image of a man, considers the good disposition of the eyes in such a one, omitting the bad dispositions of the other members; similarly, he considers the good disposition of the hands in another omitting the bad dispositions in the other members; and so he considers the better dispositions of the other members in diverse [men] and omits the ugly: then from all such things he has gathered, he makes an image more beautiful than any of those from which he takes something. And it is clear that any of those from which he takes something has something of beauty, but not simply; but what has been taken from them is beautiful simply. And similarly in what has been proposed, anyone whatever of such a multitude has something of virtue, but is not virtuous simply: but that which simply has been gathered from them, is virtuous simply. And this is what he means when he says artistically, from the fact that those things indeed simply taken are gathered into one, and that image which at the same time is composed from parts well disposed in diverse existing things, is more beautiful than anyone whatever of those in which a beautiful eye is found in one, but in another a beautiful hand: For it happens well to find separately one having a more beautiful eye than in the painting, although in other things he would be lacking; similarly, someone having a [more] beautiful hand than has been painted, although in other things he would be lacking; [and] similarly in the other particulars.

Cf. Notes on the foregoing by Fr. Robert Sokolowski:1

1

Taken from the Internet.

36

(1) when many come together, as a whole, they have more virtue than a few...the multitude becomes as one man with many feet and arms and having many perceptions, [this is also true of the many with respect to ethos and dianoia. So even in regard to ethics and thinking the multitude is better than individuals and spoudaious.] (2) the superiority of individuals is by the gathering of those scattered outside into one, and one or the other might be superior to others when apart. note the interesting remark about a painting: that it collects the best from various real things and puts them together into one. The idealization of a painting.

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IV. ON DISPOSITION. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., V. 19 (1022 b 1-2) (ed. W. D. Ross; tr. B.A.M.):
[1022b] Disposition means the order belonging to a thing having parts, either according to place, or according to power, or according to form [i.e. species]. For it must be a kind of position, as indeed is clear from the name, disposition.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 20, nn. 1-3 (tr. B.A.M.):
n. 1. Since in one way according to which signifies position, consequently the Philosopher proceeds to the name of disposition. And he sets down the ratio communis of the name disposition, saying that disposition is nothing other than the order of parts in a thing having parts. And he gives the ways in which disposition is said, which are three. The first of these is according to the order of parts in place. And in this way disposition or site is a certain predicament.2 n. 2. The second way is according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue; and in this way disposition is placed in the first species of quality. For something is said to be disposed in this way as, for instance, according to health or sickness, from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue.3 n. 3. In the third way, according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole; and in this way disposition or site is placed [as] a difference in the genus of quantity. For it is said that there is one quantity having position, as line, surface, body and place; but another not having it, as number and time. He also shows that the name disposition signifies order. For it signifies position, as the very imposition of the name demonstrates: but order belongs to the notion of position.4

according to the order of parts in place (e.g. lying, sitting, standing = the predicament situs) according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue (e.g. healthy, beautiful, strong = the first species of quality; a hexis) according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole (e.g. before, after = a difference on the genus of quantity)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
1

dia/qesij le/getai tou= e)/xontoj me/rh ta/cij h)\ kata\ to/pon h)\ kata\ du/namin h)\ kat' ei)=doj: qe/sin ga\r dei= tina\ ei)=nai, w(/sper kai\ tou)/noma dhloi= h( dia/qesij.
2

quia uno modo secundum quod positionem significat, ideo consequenter philosophus prosequitur de nomine dispositionis; et ponit rationem communem huius nominis dispositio, dicens, quod dispositio nihil est aliud quam ordo partium in habente partes. ponit autem modos quibus dicitur dispositio: qui sunt tres. quorum primus est secundum ordinem partium in loco. et sic dispositio sive situs est quoddam praedicamentum. 3 secundus modus est, prout ordo partium attenditur secundum potentiam sive virtutem; et sic dispositio ponitur in prima specie qualitatis. dicitur enim aliquid hoc modo esse dispositum, utputa secundum sanitatem vel aegritudinem, ex eo quod partes eius habent ordinem in virtute activa vel passiva. 4 tertius modus est, prout ordo partium attenditur secundum speciem et figuram totius; et sic dispositio sive situs ponitur differentia in genere quantitatis. dicitur enim quod quantitas alia est habens positionem, ut linea, superficies, corpus et locus; alia non habens, ut numerus et tempus ostendit etiam quod hoc nomen dispositio, ordinem significet. significat enim positionem, sicut ipsa nominis impositio demonstrat: de ratione autem positionis est ordo.

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To the third it must be said that disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts, but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, either in place, or in power, or in species. In saying this, as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says in place, and this belongs to the predicament site, which is the order of parts in place: when he says in power, he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness, such as inchoate science and virtue: and when he says, in species, he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits, such as perfected science and virtue.1

1. Comparison of texts.
(In V Meta.) LB5LC20N.-1 Since in one way according to which signifies position, consequently the Philosopher proceeds to the name disposition. And he sets down the ratio communis of the To the third it must be said that disposition name disposition, saying that disposition is does always, indeed, imply an order of that no-thing other than the order of parts in a thing which has parts, having parts. And he gives the ways in which disposition is but this happens in three ways, as the said, which are three. Philosopher goes on at once to say: namely, either as to place, or as to power, or as to species. In saying this, as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, he includes all dispositions: The first of these is according to the order of bodily dispositions, when he says as to place, parts in place. And in this way disposition or and this belongs to the predicament position, situation is a certain predicament. which is the order of parts in place: B5LC20N.-2 The second way is according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue; and in this way disposition is placed in the first species of quality. For something is said to be disposed in this way
1

(Summa Theol., Ia-IIae) QU49 AR1 RA3

when he says as to power, he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness, such as inchoate science and virtue:

ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem. in quo, ut simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete.

39

as, for instance, according to health or sickness, from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue. LB5LC20N.-3 In the third way, according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole; and when he says, as to species, he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits, such as perfected science and virtue.

and in this way disposition or situation is N.B. For a discussion attempting to reconcile placed (as) a difference in the genus of quantity. these two explanations, see further below. For it is said that there is one quantity having (B.A.M.) position, as line, surface, body and place; but another not having it, as number and time. LB5LC20N.-4 He also shows that the name disposition signifies order. For it signifies position, as the very imposition of the name demonstrates: but order belongs to the notion of position.

40

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 3, cap. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):
But a continuous quantity has position, although not every one. It should be noted that position is the same thing as an order of parts in place, and this is one of the ten predicaments, which is also called situation, which will be discussed below. In another way, position means an order of parts in a whole: and in this way position is a difference of quantity.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 54, art. 1 c. (in part) (tr. B.A.M.).
I reply that it must be said that, as was said above, habits are certain dispositions of something existing in potency to something, either to the nature, or to an operation or an end of the nature. And, in fact, with respect to those habits which are dispositions, it is obvious that many can exist in one subject, from the fact that the parts of one subject can be taken in diverse ways, according to the disposition of which they are called habits. For instance, if the parts of the human body taken be the humours, according as they are disposed in accordance with human nature there is the habit or disposition of health. But if similar parts such as the nerves, bones, and flesh are taken, their disposition in an order to the nature is strength or a good condition. But if the limbs are taken, as the hand and foot and the like, their disposition agreeing with the nature is beauty. And in this way there are many habits and dispositions in the same thing.2

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 5, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said that each thing is called good to the extent that it is perfect, for thus it is the object of appetite, as was said above. But that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection. Now since each thing is what it is through its own formbut the form [necessarily] presupposes certain things, and certain things necessarily follow on itin order for something to be perfect and good, it is necessary that it have a form, as well as the things presupposed to it, and the things which follow on it. Now presupposed to the form is a determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by mode, for which reason it is said that a measure establishes beforehand a mode.3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art 2, c., ad 1 (tr. B.A.M):
1

TR3 CP04 habet autem quantitas continua positionem, licet non omnis. notandum, quod positio idem est quod ordo partium in loco, et haec est unum de decem praedicamentis, quae etiam dicitur situs, de quo infra dicetur. alio modo dicitur positio ordo partium in toto: et sic positio est differentia quantitatis. 2 respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. et de illis quidem habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus dicuntur. sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes humores, prout disponuntur secundum naturam humanam, est habitus vel dispositio sanitatis, si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo. et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. 3 respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam, et hoc significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit.

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c. [F]or, properly, quality implies a certain mode of a substance. However, as St. Augustine says (Super gen. ad litteram), a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand, for which reason it implies a certain determination according to some measure. And so, just as that according to which the potency of matter is determined according to substantial being is called a quality, which is the difference of substanceso that according to which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental being is called an accidental quality, which is also a certain difference, as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics V (ch. 14, 1020a 33). The mode or determination of a subject according to accidental being, however, can be taken either in an order to the nature of the subject itself, or according to the action and passion which follow on the principles of the nature, which are matter and form; or according to quantity. If, however, the mode or determination of the subject be taken according to quantity, thus there is the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, according to its ratio, is without motion, and without the ratio of good and bad, therefore, it does not belong to the fourth species of quality that something be good or bad, passing swiftly or slowly.1 But the mode or determination of a subject according to action and passion is considered in the second and third species of quality. And so in both is considered that something is done easily or with difficulty, or that it be passing swiftly or enduring. But in these things is not considered something pertaining to the ratios of good or bad, because motions and passions do not have the ratio of ends; good and bad, however, are said with respect to an end. But the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition; for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. 3, 246b 23), speaking of the habits of the soul and body, that they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i.e. an activity]; by of the perfect, however, I mean what is disposed according to nature. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be, as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. 7, 198b 3), thus, in the first species there is considered both good and bad, and also movable with ease or with difficulty, according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. 20, 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. And in the second book the Ethics (ch. 5, 1105b 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i.e. with respect to] our passions. For when the mode is suitable to the nature of the thing, then it has the ratio of the good; however, when it is not suitable, then it has the ratio of the bad. And because nature is that which is considered first in a thing, so habits are placed in the first species of quality.2
1

proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. modus autem est, ut dicit augustinus, super gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per philosophum in v metaphys.. modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem. si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens.modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis. 2 et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim philosophus, in vii physic., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis, quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. et

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ad 1. To the first, therefore, it must be said that disposition implies a certain order, as has been said. And so something is not said to be disposed by a quality except in an order to something. And if well or badly be added, which belongs to the notion of habit, this must be considered in the order to the nature, which is the end. And so, according to figure [shape], or according to hot or cold, something is not said to be well or badly disposed, except according to an order to the nature of the thing, according as it is suitable or not suitable. And so, both figures themselves and passible qualities, according as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing, belong to habits or dispositions; for figure, as it befits the nature of a thing, and color, pertain to beauty; hot and cold, however, according as they suit the nature of the thing, pertain to health. And in this way, hotness and coldness are placed by the Philosopher in the first species of quality.1

2. In sum. an order of parts in place, and this is one of the ten predicaments an order of parts in a whole: and in this way position is a difference of quantity

The ratio communis of the name disposition is this: disposition is nothing other than the order of parts in a thing having parts. The first meaning of disposition constitutes the predicament situs, which consists in an order of parts according to (or in) place; e.g. standing, sitting, lying down, and the like. The second meaning is to be understood as a hexis, which consists in the order of parts according to power or virtue; and in this way disposition is placed in the first species of quality. For something is said to be disposed in this way as, for instance, according to health or sickness, from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue. The third meaning is that which enters into a schema, and so consists in the order of parts according to the species and figure of the whole, which is a difference of continuous quantity; e.g. to the right of, to the left of, above, below, before, be-hind, and the like. 3. On the three kinds of disposition.
quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid, ut dicitur in ii physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. unde in v metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. et in ii ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male. quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis. 1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis. unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanitatem. et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.

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In his commentary on the Metaphysics, St. Thomas explains the third meaning of dispositio as follows: In the third way, according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole; and in this way disposition or situation is placed [as] a difference in the genus of quantity. For it is said that there is one quantity having position, as line, surface, body and place; but another not having it, as number and time. But in the Summa, he explains as to species as meaning perfect dispositions, which are called habits, such as perfected science and virtue. Although the agreement between the two explanations of Aristotles third meaning of diathesis is not readily apparent, it may be manifested as follows: In the first text, he exemplifies the second meaning of dispositio by the difference in the species of quantity, having position vs. not having position (cf. In V Meta.); but in the second, following the division of Simplicius, he gives as his example perfected science and virtue (cf. the Summa text). Now to understand their equivalence, one must consider that the example of positio given in the first text, the order of parts according to form or species, which is a difference of continuous quantity, means to the right of, to the left of, above, below, before, behind, and the like. According to such differences, one quantity differs from another in kind. Now just as there is a before and after in geometrical objects, so there is a before and after in geometrical science; that is, in the discourse of reason (for which see my separate discussion of before and after), on account of which one science or virtue will also differ from another in kind. Cf. Michael Augros, Scrapboo5, n. 2:
2) SOME GENERA UNNAMED. Posterior Analytics, Commentary, L.II, l.XIII, n 535. Non enim cuilibet rationi est nomen impositum: et inde est quod multa sunt innominata tam in generibus quam in speciebus. For example, there must be genera between quality and the four species into which Aristotle and St. Thomas divide that genus, since one never divides into four, but they have no name (see I-II Q49 A2). Habit and disposition is the first species of quality, then natural abilities, then sensible qualities, then figure or shape. The meaning of quality in general is an accidental mode of determination in a substance, which can follow upon either the parts of the essence of that substance (matter and form), or from the action and passion resulting from matter and form, or from the quantity in the substance. Thus St. Thomas first divides into three. The third part of the division (quantity) gives rise to the fourth species of quality (figure or shape). The second part of the division (action and passion) gives rise to the second and third species of quality (natural ability, which does not act upon the senses, sensible qualities, which do act upon the senses). The third part of the division (regards the substance, or the very nature itself) gives rise to the first species of quality (habit and disposition), which is first because it regards the nature. Hence the first division under quality would be pertaining to and immediately determining the nature itself and not so pertaining to the nature.

4. On the second meaning. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 20, n. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
n. 2. The second way is according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue; and in this way disposition is placed in the first species of quality. For something is

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said to be disposed in this way as, for instance, according to health or sickness, from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art 2, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M):
To the first, therefore, it must be said that disposition implies a certain order, as has been said. And so something is not said to be disposed by a quality except in an order to something. And if well or badly be added, which belongs to the notion of habit, this must be considered in the order to the nature, which is the end. And so, according to figure [shape], or according to hot or cold, something is not said to be well or badly disposed, except according to an order to the nature of the thing, according as it is suitable or not suitable. And so, both figures themselves and passible qualities, according as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing, belong to habits or dispositions; for figure, as it befits the nature of a thing, and color, pertain to beauty; hot and cold, however, accord-ing as they suit the nature of the thing, pertain to health. And in this way, hotness and cold-ness are placed by the Philosopher in the first species of quality. 2

5. On the third meaning. Cp. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 22, art. 1, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (Question [6], Article [4]). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (Question [21], Article [4]). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (Question [19], Article [4]), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are directednamely, remem-brance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneselfas for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of lifeor in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Mt. 24:45), a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family.
1

secundus modus est, prout ordo partium attenditur secundum potentiam sive virtutem; et sic dispositio ponitur in prima specie qualitatis. dicitur enim aliquid hoc modo esse dispositum, utputa secundum sanitatem vel aegritudinem, ex eo quod partes eius habent ordinem in virtute activa vel passiva. 2 ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis. unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanitatem. et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.

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In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things: which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.1 (emphasis added)

in one way, disposition means the order of things towards an end in another, it means the order of parts in the whole

6. On beauty as a species of disposition. Cf. Aristotle, Top., III. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed. & tr. Loeb):
And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored; for example, health is better than strength or beauty. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold, in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature, whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]; for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones, and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs.

health: inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold strength: in sinews and bones beauty: in a certain symmetry of the limbs (i.e. a due disposition of the limbs)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentes, II, cp. 64, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
Furthermore, the notion of harmony befits the qualities of the body rather than those of the soul: for health is a certain harmony of the humours; strength, of the sinews and bones; beauty, of the limbs and colors.2

health: a certain harmony of the humours strength: of the sinews and bones

Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere providentiam in Deo. Omne enim bonum quod est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, ut supra ostensum est. In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue in finem ultimum, qui est bonitas divina, ut supra habitum est. Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie providentia est. Est enim principalis pars prudentiae, ad quam aliae duae partes ordinantur, scilicet memoria praeteritorum, et intelligentia praesentium; prout ex praeteritis memoratis, et praesentibus intellectis, coniectamus de futuris providendis. Prudentiae autem proprium est, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., ordinare alia in finem; sive respectu sui ipsius, sicut dicitur homo prudens, qui bene ordinat actus suos ad finem vitae suae; sive respectu aliorum sibi subiectorum in familia vel civitate vel regno, secundum quem modum dicitur Matt. XXIV, fidelis servus et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam. Secundum quem modum prudentia vel providentia Deo convenire potest, nam in ipso Deo nihil est in finem ordinabile, cum ipse sit finis ultimus. Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem, providentia in Deo nominatur. Unde Boetius, IV de Consol., dicit quod providentia est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto. 2 adhuc. ratio harmoniae magis convenit qualitatibus corporis quam animae: nam sanitas est harmonia quaedam humorum; fortitudo, nervorum et ossium; pulchritudo, membrorum et colorum.

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beauty: of the limbs and colors

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.):

But through a knowledge of harmony it is more fitting to arrive at knowledge of the accidents of the body; so that if we want to know health, we would say that it is a balanced [equalized] and tempered [temperate] complexion [mixing together] of the humors and qualities in the body: and thus of the other bodily powers.1

Cf. Alcmaeon Fr. 4, from Atius V30,1.:2

Health is conserved by equal balance (isonomia) among the powerswet and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet, etc., disease being produced by the sole dominance (monarchia) of one among them, for the sole dominance of either one of them would be destructive [of the other]. And illness comes about by an excess of heat or cold, from too much or too little food, and in the blood or marrow of the brain . . . health is the proportionate mixture (symmetron krasin) of the qualities.

7. Supplement: St. Augustine of Hippo: From De Ordine, (tr. Robert Russell; in Hofstadter and Kuhns, ed. Philosophies of Art and Beauty, The University of Chicago Press, 1964):
In so far as we have been able to investigate, we now detect certain traces of reason in the senses, and with regard to sight and hearing, we find it in pleasure itself. Other senses however, usually demand this attribute, not because of the pleasure they afford, but on account of something else; for a purposeful act is the characteristic of a rational animal With regard to the eyes, that is usually called beautiful, in which the harmony of parts is wont to be called reasonable; and with regard to the ears, when we say that a harmony is reasonable and that a rhythmic poem is reasonably composed, we properly call it sweet. But we are not wont to pronounce it reasonable, when the color in beautiful objects allures us or when a vibrant chord sounds pure and liquid, so to speak. We must therefore acknowledge that in the pleasure of those senses, what pertains to reason is that in which there is a certain rhythmic measure. Wherefore considering carefully the parts of this very building, we cannot but be displeased because we see one doorway towards the side and another situated almost, but not exactly in the middle. In things constructed, a proportion of parts that is faulty, without any compelling necessity, unquestionably seems to inflict, as it were, a kind of injury upon ones gaze. But the fact that three windows inside, one in the middle and two at the sides, pour light at equal intervals on the bathing placehow much that delights and enraptures us as we gaze attentively, is a thing already manifest, and need not be shown to you in many words. In their own terminology, architects themselves call this design; and they say that parts unsymmetrically placed, are without design. This is very general; it pervades all the arts and creations of man. Who indeed does not see that in songsand we likewise say that in them there is a sweetness that pertains to the ears rhythm is the producer of all this sweetness? But when an actor is dancing, although a certain rhythmic movement of his limbs may indeed afford delight by that same rhythm, yet, since to the attentive spectators all his gestures are signs of things, the dance itself is called reasonable, because it aptly signifies and exhibits something over and above the delight of the senses. And even if he should represent a winged Venus and a cloaked Cupid, how
1

sed per cognitionem harmoniae magis congruit venire in cognitionem accidentium corporum; ut si velimus cognoscere sanitatem, dicemus quod est complexio adaequata et contemperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore: et sic de aliis corporeis virtutibus. 2 Taken from the Internet.

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skillfully so ever he may depict it by a wonderful movement and posture of the body, he does not seem to offend the eyes; but through the eyes he would offend the mind, to which those signs of things are exhibited. The eyes would be offended it the movements were not graceful; for that pertains to the sense, in which the soul perceives delight precisely because it is united with the body. Therefore delight of the sense is one thing; delight through the senses is something else. There are then three classes of things in which that something reasonable is to be seen. One is in actions directed towards an end; the second in discourse; the third, in pleasure. The first admonishes us to do nothing without purpose; the second, to teach correctly; the last, to find delight in contemplation. (175-6) From this stage, reason advanced to the province of the eyes. And scanning the earth and the heavens, it realized that nothing pleased it but beauty; and in beauty, design; and in design dimensions; and in dimensions, number. (180)

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V. ON SYMMETRY. 1. Some definitions. Cf. Liddell-Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. summetria:

I. commensurability. II. symmetry, due proportion (LSJ)

Cf. Websters Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc:

Symmetry. A due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other.

Cf. the following from a web site:

[T]he word originally had a somewhat different meaning: symmetry = syn together + metron measure, suggesting the notion of commensurability.

Cf. Glossary of Terms, ARTH 209, History of Greek and Roman Art, Fall, 2003.1:
Symmetria: the commensurability of all the parts of the statue to one another and to the whole. Symmetria is a fundamental idea in Greek art, philosophy, and science. It is directly connected to the desire to find an order behind the flux of experience. In achieving symmetria, kalos is produced.

Cf. Hermann Weyl, Symmetry (Princeton, 1952; 7th ed. 1973), p. 3:

If I am not mistaken, the word symmetry is used in our everyday language in two meanings. In the one sense symmetric means something like well-proportioned, wellbalanced, and symmetry denotes that sort of concordance of several parts by which they integrate into a whole. Beauty is bound up with symmetry. Thus Polykleitos, who wrote a book on proportion and whom the ancients praised for the harmonious perfection of his sculptures, uses the word, and Drer follows him in setting down a canon of proportions for the human figure. In this sense the idea is by no means restricted to spatial objects; the synonym harmony points more toward its acoustical and musical than its geometric applications. Ebenmass is a good German equivalent for the Greek symmetry; for like this it carries also the connotation of middle measure, the mean toward which the virtuous should strive in their actions according to Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, and which Galen in De temperamentis describes as that state of mind which is equally removed from both extremes.... The image of the balance provides a natural link to the second sense in which the word symmetry is used in modern times: bilateral symmetry, the symmetry of left and right, which is so conspicuous in the structure of the higher animals, especially the human body.64 [64]. WEYL, supra note 31, at 34. [= HERMANN WEYL, SYMMETRY, 340 (7th ed. 1973) (reprinting Dr. Weyls 1952 lectures at Princeton)]

Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary:

(http://employees.oneonta.edu/farberas/arth/ARTH209/glossary.html [11/1/04])

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Commensurable 1. 1. Of numbers or magnitudes: Having, or reducible to, a common measure: divisible without remainder by the same quantity. Also, in wider sense, measurable by the same standard or scale of values. Commensurate 1. Having the same measure; of equal extent, duration, or magnitude: coextensive. 2. Of corresponding extent, magnitude, or degree; proportionate, adequate. 4. Characterised by a common measure. Symmetry 1. Mutual relation of the parts of something in respect of magnitude and position; relative measurement and arrangement of parts; proportion. 2. Due or just proportion; harmony of parts with each other and the whole; fitting, regular, or balanced arrangement and relation of parts or elements; the condition or quality of being wellproportioned or well-balanced. In stricter use (approaching or passing into 3 b): Exact correspondence in size and position of opposite parts; equable distribution of parts about a dividing line or centre. (As an attribute either of the whole, or of the parts composing it.) 3 b. Geom. etc. Exact correspondence in position of the several points or parts of a figure or body with reference to a dividing line, plane, or point (or a number of lines or planes); arrangement of all the points of a figure or system in pairs (or sets) so that those of each pair (or set) are at equal distances on opposite sides of such line, plane, or point.

Cf. The Concise Oxford Dictionary:

Symmetry n. 1. (beauty resulting from) right proportion between the parts of the body or any whole, balance, congruity, harmony. 2. such structure as allows of an objects being divided by a point or line or plane or radiating lines or planes into two or more parts exactly the same in size and shape and similar in position relatively to the dividing point etc., repetition of exactly similar parts facing each other or a centre; [fr Gk. summetria: sum like + metron measure.]

Cf. Websters Revised Unabridged Dictionary ( 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc.):

Symmetry. A due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other.

Cf. the following from a web site:

Symmetry \Symme*try\, n. [L. symmetria, Gr. ?; sy`n with, together + ? a measure: cf. F. sym['e]trie. See Syn-, and Meter rhythm.] 1. A due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other; adaptation of the form or dimensions of the several parts of a thing to each other; the union and conformity of the members of a work to the whole. 2. (Biol.) The law of likeness; similarity of structure; regularity in form and arrangement; orderly and similar distribution of parts, such that an animal may be divided into parts which are structurally symmetrical. Note: Bilateral symmetry, or two-sidedness, in vertebrates, etc., is that in which the body can be divided into symmetrical halves by a vertical plane passing through the middle; radial symmetry, as in echinoderms, is that in which the individual parts are arranged symmetrically around a central axis; serial symmetry, or zonal symmetry, as in earthworms, is that in which the segments or metameres of the body are disposed in a zonal manner one after the other in a longitudinal axis. This last is sometimes called metamerism. 3. (Bot.) (a) Equality in the number of parts of the successive circles in a flower. (b) Likeness in the form and size of floral organs of the same kind; regularity. Axis of symmetry. (Geom.) See under Axis.

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Respective symmetry, that disposition of parts in which only the opposite sides are equal to each other. Source: Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc. symmetry P Pronunciation Key (s m -tr ) n. pl. symmetries Exact correspondence of form and constituent configuration on opposite sides of a dividing line or plane or about a center or an axis. See Synonyms at proportion. A relationship of characteristic correspondence, equivalence, or identity among constituents of an entity or between different entities: the narrative symmetry of the novel. Beauty as a result of balance or harmonious arrangement. [Latin symmetria, from Greek summetri , from summetros, of like measure : sun-, syn+ metron, measure; see m -2 in Indo-European Roots.] Source: The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition Copyright 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Main Entry: symmetry Pronunciation: 'sim-&-trE Function: noun Inflected Form: plural tries 1 : correspondence in size, shape, and relative position of parts on opposite sides of a dividing line or median plane or about a center or axis see BILATERAL SYMMETRY,
RADIAL SYMMETRY

2 : the property of remaining invariant under certain changes (as of orientation in space, of the sign of the electric charge, of parity, or of the direction of time flow) used of physical phenomena and of equations describing them Source: Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary, 2002 Merriam-Webster, Inc. symmetry n 1: (mathematics) an attribute of a shape or relation; exact correspondence of form on opposite sides of a dividing line or plane [syn: symmetricalness, correspondence, balance] [ant: asymmetry] 2: balance among the parts of something [syn: proportion] [ant: disproportion] 3: (physics) the property of being isotropic; having the same value when measured in different directions [syn: isotropy] [ant: anisotropy]

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Source: WordNet 2.0, 2003 Princeton University

Cf. Art and Science Electronic Journal of ISIS-Symmetry: Visual Mathematics: A Missing Link; 2.2 Hellenistic Age, 3rd c. B.C. - 1st c. B.C:1
Symmetria in mathematics and in visual arts (and some difficulties with the sectio aurea) Let us see first the Greek concept symmetria. With great probability this term was introduced by the Pythagoreans during the study of commensurable versus incommensurable lengths. Then, the expression symmetria was adopted by the sculptor Polykleitos and later used by Plato and Aristotle in both senses: commensurability in geometry and good proportion in the visual arts. Since Aristotle considered symmetria (proportion) as one of the three main species of beauty, together with order (taxis) and limitation (horismenon), this concept became prominent in aesthetics (Metaphysica, 1078 a 35 - b 1). There were some interesting debates that helped to refine the aesthetical aspects of symmetria by extending its measurable elements with subjective ones. Then, at the end of the period, Vitruvius used the Latinized symmetria and its derivatives 85 times in his book on architecture (here we consider the modern reconstruction of the text on the basis of the surviving medieval manuscripts). Vitruvius made a slight distinction between symmetria and proportio, the theoretical and the practical aspects of the same question. Parallel, Euclid and the mathematicians also dealt with symmetria. Their focus was the symmetria versus asymmetria dichotomy in the sense of commensurability versus incommensurability. They extended the topic of linear symmetry (commensurability in length) with dynamic symmetry (commensurability in squares). The study of regular and later semi-regular polyhedra had a climax in the works of Euclid and Archimedes although these figures were not linked to the Greek symmetria. On the other hand, both topics, commensurability in squares and regular polyhedra, contributed to the modern geometrical concept of symmetry, where a figure is analyzed in terms of its equivalent parts (from the 17th c.). At the end of the Hellenistic Age the term symmetria almost disappeared from the language of mathematics and aesthetics. The original meanings of the Greek symmetria were usually described not by the Latinized term, but by other expressions, for example by - commensuratio (mathematics and philosophy) - proportio (art and aesthetics).

Cf. Professor Franklin Toker, A Sourcebook for Introduction to the History of Western Art, Greek Art:2
Proportion the relation of one part to another in a work of art and of each part to the whole in size, height, width, length, and depth. A canon of proportion is an established norm: deviations from that would be called tall, short, thick, thin, etc.

2. On summetria (symmetry; due proportion) in sum. The first meaning: commensurability. The second meaning: due proportion. The third meaning: bilateral symmetry (Weyl): Cf. OED: Exact correspondence in position of the several points or parts of a figure or body with reference to a dividing line, plane, or point (or a number of lines or planes); arrangement of all the

1 2

(www.mi.sanu.ac.yu/vismath/denes/den4.htm [4/21/05]) (http://vrcoll.fa.pitt.edu/ftoker/tokerfile/0010sb01-10.html [10/29/04])

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points of a figure or system in pairs (or sets) so that those of each pair (or set) are at equal distances on opposite sides of such line, plane, or point. According to its first imposition, symmetry means having the same measure, and so is synonymous with commensurable; properly speaking, it is a due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other (Websters Revised Unabridged Dictionary) that is, the correct proportion of the parts of a thing, and the beauty resulting from this. Cf. the following: From an internet article:
Symmetry is the cornerstone of modern physics. It is a concept that is familiar to many. The Canadian Oxford Dictionary defines it as a correct proportion of the parts of a thing, balance, harmony and beauty resulting from this. Clearly symmetry and beauty seem to be naturally connected. This connection between symmetry and beauty is also present in Physics. Theories with the greatest amount of symmetry are considered to be the most beautiful or desirable. In fact, as I will argue towards the end, aesthetics based on symmetry seems to be taking an increasingly (and perhaps disproportionately) important role in determining the course of modern physics. Department of Mathematics, LSU Baton Rouge. Math 4005: Geometry. 1 II.E. Addendum: Ratio and Proportion Ratio Numerous definitions of the word ratio can be found. .The earliest use of the word ratio cited in the Oxford English Dictionary is from Barrow's 1660 translation of Euclid's Elements, Book V, Definition 3: Ratio (or rate) is the mutual habitude or respect of two magnitudes of the same kind each to other, according to quantity. The Greek word for ratio is logos. In Heaths translation of Euclid, Definition V.3 reads: A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of the same kind. The Oxford English Dictionary itself includes the following under the entry for ratio: 2. a. Math. The relation between two similar magnitudes in respect of quantity, determined by the number of times one contains the other (integrally or fractionally). <> Proportion The notion of proportion is often used together with ratio. . The Oxford English Dictionary includes the following under the entry for proportion: II. In technical senses. 9. Math. An equality of ratios, esp. of geometrical ratios; a relation among quantities such that the quotient of the first divided by the second is equal to that of the third divided by the fourth. In Heaths translation of Euclid, the term proportional is defined in Definition V.6:
1

(https://www.math.lsu.edu/~madden/M4005s2004/Similarity/ratio-proportion.htm [4/21/08])

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Let magnitudes which have the same ratio be called proportional. The Greek word translated as proportional is analogon. According to Heath, this is identical in meaning to the two-word phrase ana logon, which may be translated in proportion. Euclids definition seems consistent with the idea expressed in the dictionary definition above. Proportion is clearly used in this sense in Proposition VI:2. Euclid and Real Numbers In modern mathematics, a proportions are sometimes written: a is to b as c is to d (or a:b::c:d). Here, a,b,c and d might be any positive numbers, and accordingly a/b and c/d would also be numbers. The proportion is true if the two numbers a/b and c/d are equal. In Euclids mathematics, the comparison of ratios is not such a simple process . Definition V.5 gives conditions for two ratios to be the same. This involves an indefinite number of comparisons. <> We can translate Definition V.5 into modern terminology as follows: a is to b as c is to d means: for any positive integers m and n, ma > nb iff mc > nd. The latter condition has the same meaning as: for any positive integers m and n, a/b > n/m iff c/d >n/m. Thus, Euclid's definition implies that we should call the ratios a:b and c:d the same if a/b and c/d exceed exactly the same rational numbers. Euclid, however, could not have phrased his definition this way. He did not think of the process of dividing one magnitude by another as yielding a number. He did not have any conception of a/b as a number. He would have viewed it as a comparison. In this respect, his fundamental conceptual framework differed from ours. (See the quotation from Wu, above. [omitted here])

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VI. ON BEAUTY AS CONSISTING IN A DUE PROPORTION OR SYMMETRY OF THE PARTS TO THE WHOLE AND OF THE PARTS TO EACH OTHER. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead I, vi, 1:1
What is it that impresses you when you look at something, attracts you, captivates you, and fills you with joy? The general opinion, I may say, is that it is the interrelation of parts toward one another and toward the whole, with the added element of good color, which constitutes beauty as perceived by the eye; in other words, that beauty in visible things as in everything else consists of symmetry and proportion. In their eyes, nothing simple and devoid of parts can be beautiful, only a composite.

Cf. Robert Grosseteste, Comm. in Div. Nom. (quoted in Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, p. 48):
For beauty is a concordance and fittingness of a thing to itself and of all its individual parts to themselves and to each other and to the whole, and of that whole to all things.

1. According to Werner Heisenberg:

The following refers to an essay by Werner Karl Heisenberg in Across the Frontier, published by Harper, 1974, p. 183. Heisenberg crystallizes the notion remarkably when he notes, Beauty is the proper conformity of the parts to one another and to the whole.Like the Sonnets or the Bill of Rights, Heisenbergs 15-word remark smacks of such precision that one could imagine less eloquent thinkers writing entire books without ever arriving at the core truth Heisenberg lighted upon. Mark K. Anderson, Beauty and the Paradigm, originally published in the Shakespeare Oxford Newsletter, Summer 1997 and Fall 1997/Winter 1998

I say: Those things are commensurate which are measurable by the same magnitude as a unit. (B.A.M., after H. G. Apostle, Aristotles Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 62) Cf. Henry George Liddell. Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon:
summetr-ia , h, commensurability, opp. asummetria, Arist.Metaph.1061b1, cf. 1004b11, EN1133b18; pros tn s. tn kath' hmas anthrpn in comparison with, measured by the standard of . ., PMonac.6.39 (vi A.D.). II. symmetry, due proportion, one of the characteristics of beauty and goodness, biou summetrii by harmony of life, Democr. 191, cf. Pl.Phlb.64e sq.; h nuktos pros hmeran s. Id.R.530a; h pros allla s. Id.Sph.228c; of exercise to food, Hp.Vict.1.2; trophs kai aeros Thphr.CP2.9.13 ; s. tn lambanomenn Sor.1.94 ; sitin te kai pomatn Gal.6.7 ; tn pharmakn Id.13.988 ; kata mian s. in a fixed proportion, Id.6.272; para tn s. out of proportion, Arist.Pol.1308b12; but s. pros ti, also, proportion calculated to produce . . , Pl.Ti.66d; h tn kaln s. Id.Sph.235e; hugieian en . . s. thermn kai psuchrn tithemen Arist.Ph.246b5 , cf. Gal.6.13,15, al.; h tou tn gamn chronou s. suitability, Pl.Lg.925a: pl., hai s. the proportions, Id.Ti.87d, Sph. 235d, 236a. b. suitable relation, convenient size, porn Epicur. Ep.2p.49U. : pl., s. kai harmoniai tn . . porn Id.Fr.250 .
1

(http://vrcoll.fa.pitt.edu/ftoker/tokerfile/0010sb01-10.html [10/29/04])

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2. a woman's robe without a train, PSI4.341.7 (iii B.C.), Poll.7.54, Hsch.

2. According to St. Thomas Aquinas: due To each one is due what is his own; or again, ...it is due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 21, art. 1, c.) proportion the habitude or relation of one quantity to another (or generally, of one thing to another) (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 12, art. 1, ad 4) Cf. E. William Sockey, Religious Freedom and Human Rights, p. 213:
As St. Thomas Aquinas explains in the Summa Theologica, (Q. 21, A. 1): To each one is due what is his own; that is, each one has a right to that which belongs to him. In the same Question and Article of the Summa, St. Thomas says: ...it is due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it. And he explains that where we are considering the works of God, what is due to each thing is due to it according to the divine wisdom. Now whatever is ordered to man as belonging to his human nature is his by right. This is especially evident in the case of those things without which man could not achieve the purpose for which he was made. We thus say that every man has the right to life, the right to liberty (rightly understood), the right to chose his own vocation, and on the highest plane, the right to worship God.

3. On debitum, or what is due. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 21, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. English Dominican Fathers; slightly rev. B.A.M.):
To the third, it must be said that to each one is due what is his own. Now that which is ordered to him is said to be his own, just as the servant to the master, and not conversely; for that is free which exists for its own sake. In the name of debt, therefore, is implied a certain order of exigency or necessity of [i.e. belonging to] the one to which it [sc. the debt] is ordered.1 Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is ordered to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, Gods justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however
1

Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique debetur quod suum est. Dicitur autem esse suum alicuius, quod ad ipsum ordinatur; sicut servus est domini, et non e converso; nam liberum est quod sui causa est. In nomine ergo debiti, importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius ad quod ordinatur.

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is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not ordered to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness.1

4. In sum. to each one is due (debetur) what is his own (quod suum est) (i.e. what belongs to him) what is ordered to him is said to be his own (dicitur esse suum alicuius) therefore to each one is due what is ordered to him e.g. it is due to a man that he have hands and that other animals should serve him because these things are ordered to him

Hence a proportion will be due when it consists in what is ordered to a thing: e.g. when it has all its parts, and in the right order, and with the right size and shape, and with the appropriate coloring and brilliance. (Note that what is ordered to a thing pertains either to its essence or to its operation.) N.B. According to St. Thomas, figure or shape and color, insofar as they befit the nature of the thing, pertain to beauty as coming under the first species of disposition (cp. St. Thomas, SCG II: the members and the colors). To the foregoing I add: a due disposition of the parts according to order (or before and after, in those things where there is a beginning, a middle, and an end) and size (being neither too big nor too small with respect to the whole) also pertains to beauty in this sense. Hence, that proportion is due which is ordered to the thing possessing it by its final and agent cause, the purpose of which is to make it good. a due proportion = summetria what is due to a thing what is owed to it by nature Cf. Thomas-Lexikon, s.v. debituus, a, um:

Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. Unus, quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum, sicut partes ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, et unaquaeque res ad suum finem. Alius ordo, quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum. Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione divina, aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo; aut secundum quod aliquid debetur rei creatae. Et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat, et secundum hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, secundum quam reddit sibi quod sibi debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae, quod habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur, sicut homini, quod habeat manus, et quod ei alia animalia serviant. Et sic etiam Deus operatur iustitiam, quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo, quia hoc unicuique debetur, quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur, sed potius alia in ipsum. Et ideo iustitia quandoque dicitur in Deo condecentia suae bonitatis; quandoque vero retributio pro meritis. Et utrumque modum tangit Anselmus, dicens, cum punis malos, iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, quia bonitati tuae condecens est.

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a) sein sollend, sich gebhrend, sich gehrend, schuldig, pflichtmig, erforderlich, notwendig, synonym mit iustus und necessarius (), der Gegensatz zu indebitus (): in nomine ergo debiti importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius, ad quod ordinatur, th. I. 21. 1 ad 3; vgl. ib. I. II. 99; 5 c; quod autem ad perfectionem alicuius requiritur, est debitum unicuique1, cg. I. 93; quod debitum sive necessitas sumatur, ib. II. 29; videtur debitum et necessarium, pot. 3. 16 c; debitum quandam subiectionem et obligationem importat, ib. 10. 4 ad 8.

Zu actio debita actio sub a; zu actus d. actus sub b; zu circumstantia d. circumstantia; zu commensuratio d. commensuratio; zu complexio d. complexio sub b; zu dispositio d. dispositio sub d; zu finis d. finis sub b; zu forma d. forma sub b; zu materia d. materia sub c; zu mensura d. mensura; zu modus d. modus sub b; zu movere per modum d. movere; zu operatio d. operatio sub b; zu oppositio d. oppositio sub a; zu ordo d. ordo sub a; zu perfectio d. perfectio sub b; zu petitio d. petitio sub a; zu praeparatio d. praeparatio sub a; zu proportio d. proportio; zu quantitas d. quantitas. Ex debito (th. I. II. 98. 4 ad 2; cg. II. 44; verit. 23. 6 ad 6) = schuldiger- oder pflichtmigerweise. Arten des debitum in diesem Sinne sind: 1. debitum amicabile sive amicitiae (th. II. II. 23. 3 ad 1; 78. 2 ad 2) = die Pflicht der Freundschaft. 2. d. amicitiae, d. amicabile. 3. d. caritatis & d. iuris sive iustitiae (ib. 78. 2 ad 2; 188. 4 ad 4; cg. II. 28) = die Pflicht der Liebe und die der Gerechtigkeit. 4. d. causae finalis & d. causae formalis (pot. 3. 16 c) = das der Zweckursache und das der formalen Ursache Gebhrende. 5. d. causae formalis, d. causae finalis. 6. d. condicionale sive condicionatum sive condicionis (cg. II. 29) = das bedingt Notwendige. 7. d. condicionis, d. condicionale. 8. d. congruitatis sive convenientiae sive per modum condecentiae sive secundum quandam decentiam & d. necessitatis sive secundum necessitatem (th. III. 64. 5 ad 3; cg. II. 28; 4 sent. 5. 2. 2. 1 ad 1) = das Sich-Gebhrende der Angemessenheit oder Schicklichkeit und das der Notwendigkeit. 9. d. coniugii sive matrimonii (4 sent. 32. 1. 2. 1 ad 3 & 4 ob. 1) = die eheliche Pflicht. 10. d. convenientiae, d. congruitatis. 11. d. essendi (pot. 3. 16 c) = die Notwendigkeit des Seins. 12. d. ex eo, quod ipse exhibet & d. propter necessitatem (th. II. II. 187. 4 c) = dasjenige, was jemand gebhrt, weil er etwas gibt (sive sit aliquid temporale sive spirituale, ib.), und dasjenige, was ihm gebhrt, weil er es notwendig hat. 13. d. ex merito proveniens & d. secundum condicionem naturae (ib. I. II. 111. 1 ad 2) = dasjenige, was jemand auf Grund eines Verdienstes, und dasjenige, was ihm gem der Beschaffenheit seiner Natur (vgl. d. secundum se) gebhrt (puta si dicamus, debitum esse homini, quod habeat rationem et alia, quae ad humanam pertinent naturam, ib.). 14. d. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem sive propter aliud & d. per se sive secundum se (ib. II. II. 44. 1 c; cg. II. 28; quodl. 5. 10. 19 c) = dasjenige, was einem Dinge zufolge seiner Hinordnung zu etwas Anderm oder wegen eines andern, und dasjenige, was ihm als solchem oder gem seiner selbst gebhrt (vgl. d. secundum condicionem naturae) bzw. zu tun obliegt (per se quidem debitum est in unoquoque negotio id, quod est

But what is required for the perfection of something is due to each thing.

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finis, quia habet rationem per se boni, propter aliud autem est debitum id, quod ordinatur ad finem; sicut medico per se debitum est ut sanet, propter aliud autem, ut medicinam det ad sanandum, th. II. II. 44. 1 c). 15. d. honestatis sive morale & d. legale (ib. I. II. 99. 5 c; II. II. 23. 3 ad 1; 77. 1 ob. 3; 80. 1 c; 102. 2 ad 2; 106. 4 ad 1; 107. 1 c; 109. 3 c; 117. 5 ad 1) = das gem der Schicklichkeit oder Sittlichkeit und das gem einem positiven Gesetze sein Sollende, m. a. W. die moralische und die gesetzliche Pflicht (debitum quidem legale est, ad quod reddendum aliquis lege adstringitur, . . . debitum autem morale est, quod aliquis debet ex honestate virtutis, ib. II. II. 80. 1 c); vgl. d. secundum regulam legis determinantis. 16. d. iuris, d. caritatis. 17. d. iustitiae, . 18. d. legale, d. honestatis. 19. d. matrimonii, d. coniugii. 20. d. morale, d. honestatis. 21. d. mortis (ib. III. 46. 11 ad 1) = die Notwendigkeit, zu sterben. 22. d. multitudinis & d. unius (ib. II. II. 152. 2 ad 1) = die Pflicht der Mehrheit oder Menge als solcher und die des Einzelnen. 23. d. necessitatis, d. congruitatis. 24. d. oboedientiae (quodl. 2. 5. 9 c) = die Pflicht des Gehorsams. 25. d. per modum condecentiae, d. congruitatis. 26. d. per se, d. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem. 27. d. poenae (th. I. II. 87. 6 c) = die Pflicht (zur Ableistung) der Strafe. 28. d. propter aliud, d. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem. 29. d. propter necessitatem, d. ex eo, quod ipse exhibet. 30. d. secundum condicionem naturae, d. ex merito proveniens. 31. d. secundum necessitatem, d. congruitatis. 32. d. secundum quandam decentiam, . 33. d. secundum regulam legis determinantis & d. secundum regulam rationis (ib. 99. 5 c) = die Pflicht gem der Regel des bestimmenden Gesetzes und die gem der Regel der Vernunft, m. a. W. die gesetzliche und die moralische Pflicht; vgl. d. honestatis. 34. d. secundum regulam rationis, d. secundum regulam legis determinantis. 35. d. secundum se, d. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem. 36. d. servitutis (4 sent. 32. 1. 2. 1 ad 3) = die aus der Knechtschaft entspringende Pflicht. 37. d. unius, d. multitudinis. b) eheliche Pflicht (= debitum coniugii sive matrimonii; vgl. sub a): uterque coniugum alteri debitum reddere tenetur, 4 sent. 32 div.; quantum ad redditionem debiti omnes conveniunt, quodl. 10. 5. 11 c. 5. That proportion is said in two ways. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 12, art. 1, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU12 AR1 RA4 ad quartum dicendum quod proportio dicitur To the fourth it must be said that proportion is dupliciter. said in two ways. uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad In one way, [proportion means] a certain alteram; secundum quod duplum, triplum et habitude [or state of being related; or relaaequale sunt species proportionis. tionship] of one quantity to another, in the way in which the double, the triple, and the equal are species of proportion. alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum In another way, proportion means any habproportio dicitur. itude of one thing to another. et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad deum, And in this way there can be a proportion of the

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inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad creature to God, inasmuch as it stands as effect causam, et ut potentia ad actum. to cause, and as potency to act. et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus proportion- And in this respect the created understanding natus esse potest ad cognoscendum deum. can be proportioned to knowing God.

6. Proportio used as a synonym for ratio. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Meta., lect. 7, n. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1LC-7N.10 deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit Then when he says, Furthermore, he gives the secundum motivum. second motive. considerabant enim passiones harmoniarum, For they considered the passions of harmonies, consonantiarum musicalium et earum rationes, of musical consonances and their ratios, that is scilicet proportiones, ex natura numerorum. to say, proportions, from the nature of numbers.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Meta., lect. 16, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1LC16N.-4 si autem dicatur quod haec sensibilia sunt But if it is said that these sensibles are certain quaedam rationes, idest proportiones numer- ratios, i.e. proportions of numbers, and in this orum, et per hunc modum numeri sunt causae way numbers are causes of these sensibles, horum sensibilium, sicut videmus in symphoniis, idest in musicis consonantiis, quia numeri dicuntur esse causae consonantiarum, inquantum proportiones numerales, quae applicantur sonis, consonantias reddunt: just as we see in symphoniae, i.e. in the consonances of music, since numbers are said to be the causes of consonances, inasmuch as numeral proportions which are applied to sounds give back consonances:

palam est quod oportebat praeter ipsos numeros it is clear that beyond the numbers themselves it in sensibilibus ponere aliquod unum secundum will be necessary to place in sensibles somegenus, cui applicantur proportiones numerales: thing one according to genus to which numeral proportions are applied: ut scilicet eorum, quae sunt illius generis proportiones, sensibilia constituant; sicut praeter proportiones numerales in consonantiis inveniuntur soni. so that, namely, the proportions of those things which belong to that genus constitute sensibles, just as in addition to the numeral proportions in consonances sounds are found.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1 LC-9N.-9 nec etiam potest dici harmonia secundum Nor can it even be called a harmony according proportionem corporum commixtorum ex to the proportion of bodies mixed from concontrariis. traries.

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et hoc duplici ratione.

And this for two reasons.

una ratio est, quia diversa proportio invenitur in One reason is that a different proportion is diversis partibus corporis: found in different parts of the body. nam commixtio elementorum non habet eamdem rationem, idest proportionem, secundum quam est caro, et secundum quam est os: For a mixture of elements does not have the same ratiothat is, proportionaccording to which it is flesh, and according to which it is bone.

ergo in diversis partibus erunt diversae animae Therefore in different parts there will be secundum diversam proportionem et different souls according to a different promultiplicationem partium animalis. portion and the multiplication of the parts of the animal.

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7. On proportionalitas (proportionality): a bringing together of two proportions. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. An., lect. 12, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 LC12N.-8 circa primum sciendum est quod proportio est With respect to the first, it must be understood habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram, sicut sex that a proportion is the habitude of one quantity ad tria se habent in proportione dupla. to another, as six stands to three in the duple proportion. proportionalitas proportionum. vero est collatio duarum But a proportionality is a bringing together of two proportions.

quae, si sit disiuncta, habet quatuor terminos; ut If such a proportion is disjunct, it has four hic: terms, as follows: sicut se habent quatuor ad duo, ita sex ad tria: as four is to two, so is six to three: but if it is si vero sit coniuncta, habet tres terminos: nam conjunct, it has three terms: for we use one as uno utitur ut duobus; ut hic: two, as follows: sicut se habent octo ad quatuor, ita quatuor ad duo. as eight is to four, so is four to two.

patet autem quod in proportione duo termini se Now it is clear that in a proportion two terms habent ut antecedentia; duo vero ut stand as antecedents, but two as consequents, as consequentia; ut hic: follows: sicut se habent quatuor ad duo, ita se habent sex as four is to two, so is six to three; ad tria; sex et quatuor sunt antecedentia: tria vero et duo six and four are antecedents, but three and two sunt consequentia. are consequents. permutata ergo proportio est quando A proportion, then, is changed when the antecedentia invicem conferuntur, et antecedents are exchanged for each other, and consequentia similiter. ut si dicam: likewise the consequents, as if I were to say sicut se habent quatuor ad duo, ita se habent sex as four is to two, so is six to three; therefore, as ad tria; ergo sicut se habent quatuor ad sex, ita four is to six, so is two to three. se habent duo ad tria.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In X Ethic., lect. 3, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

Now when there is some form which implies in its own account a certain proportion of many things ordered to one, such a form also according to its proper account admits of more and less. This is clear in health and in beauty, each of which import a proportion agreeing with the nature of that which is called beautiful or healthy. And because a proportion of this kind can be more or less in agreement [or suitable, conveniens], for this reason the very beauty or health considered in itself is said according to more and less. And from this it is clear that unity insofar as something is determinate is the reason why something does not admit of more and less.

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N.B. To which I add, where there is a proportion of many things ordered to one, agreeing with the nature of a thing, there is symmetry, in the sense of due proportion ( debita proportio). (B.A.M.) Cf. Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation, n. 13, p. 20: As radiance comes from form, so proportion or harmony comes from the ordering of a thing to an end. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa- IIae, q. 19, art. 1, c.: Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia- IIae, q. 21, art. 1, c.: I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.

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8. Note on habit. Recall that for there to be a habit, it is necessary (1) that that which is disposed be other than that to which it is disposed; and thus hold itself to it as potency to act [i.e. the limbs and colors are disposed to an accidental form called a harmony or consonance]; (2) that that which is in potency to another be determinable in many ways, and to diverse things; and (3) that many things concur [= come together] for the sake of disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potency, which can be made commensurate to it in diverse ways, so that it is thus disposed well or badly to a form or an operation. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 4, c., tr. B.A.M.) what is disposed are a things composing parts of an animal, its limbs and colors of a statue or sculpture, the same of a painting, its colors and configurations of an imitation of an action, things done or suffered the subject is one species, not as a homogeneous subject, but as a totality consisting in a determinate order of parts Re: the many things composing an integral whole must be made commensurate to one of those things to which it is in potency, the most important of which is the things nature. In this requirement lies the seed of the notion of summetria.

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9. Summary on disposition. (a) That a disposition is a certain order of parts: Disposition means the order belonging to a thing having parts, either according to place, or according to power, or according to form [i.e. species]. For it must be a kind of position, as indeed is clear from the name, disposition. (Aristotle, Metaph., V. 19, 1022 b 1-2, tr. B.A.M.) (b) That the kind of totality in which beauty consists requires a determinate order of parts with respect to the species and figure of the whole: While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form [or species]; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together in just any way we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form [or species]. (Aristotle, Metaph., V. 6, 1016b 11-17, tr. W. D. Ross; slightly rev. B.A.M.) But the species consists in a certain totality requiring a determinate order of parts; just as it is clear that we do not say something is one, like a work of art, when we observe the parts of a shoe composed in any way whatsoever. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.) (c) That where there is a beginning, a middle, and an end, every such continuous whole must have position in its parts: For when it is so that in a quantity there is an order of parts, because there is a beginning, a middle, and an end there, in which the account of position consists, every such continuous whole must have position in its parts. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 21, n. 21, tr. B.A.M.) (d) That harmony (which is essential to beauty) is not a form but a but a disposition of the matter for a form (cf. the teaching that beauty is a kind of disposition, from which it follows that beauty is an accidental rather than a substantial form): But this does not follow, since a proportion of this sort [sc. constituting a harmony] is not a form, as they believed, but rather a disposition of the matter for a form. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, n. 13, tr. B.A.M.) (e) In works of art: that the form of the whole in which beauty consists is an accidental form (and this is a form which is composition and order): For when a whole consists of parts, the form of the whole which does not give being to the individual parts is a form which is composition and order, like the form of a house, and such a form is accidental. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 76, art. 8, c., tr. B.A.M.) 65

VII. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU27 AR1 RA3 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem To the third it must be said that the beautiful is bono, sola ratione differens. the same as the good, differing only in account. cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. For, since the good is what all things desire, it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it; but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it. And for this reason those senses especially look to the beautiful that are the most knowing, namely, sight and hearing, the servants of reason, for we call sights and sounds beautiful.

in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non But in the sensibles belonging to the other utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus senses we do not use the name beautiful, for pulchros sapores aut odores. we do not call tastes or smells beautiful. et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; And so it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power, so that that is called good simply which is pleasing to the appetite

pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa appre- but that is called beautiful the very apprehensio placet. hension of which pleases.

the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power beauty is that the very apprehension of which pleases

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU5 AR4 RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. To the first it must be said that the beautiful and the good are the same in subject because they are founded on the same thing, namely, the form, and for this reason the good is praised as beautiful.

sed ratione differunt. nam bonum proprie But they differ in account. For the good respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia properly regards the appetite; for the good is appetunt. what all things desire. et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est And so it has the account of an end, for the quasi quidam motus ad rem. appetite is, so to speak, a certain movement toward a thing.

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pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, But the beautiful regards a knowing power, for pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. things which please by being seen are called beautiful. unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, For this reason beauty consists in a due quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportion, since the sense is delighted in things proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; that are duly proportioned, as in things similar to itself. nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus For the sense, and indeed every power capable cognoscitiva. of knowing, is a certain ratio. et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, And because knowledge comes about by similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum assimilation, but similitude [or likeness] regards proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis. the form, beauty properly pertains to the account of a formal cause.

beauty consists in a due proportion (as elsewhere explained, this primarily means having the membra or limbs of the body well-proportioned)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 180, art. 2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU180 AR2 RA3 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut To the third it must be said that beauty, as has supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et been said above, consists in a certain lustre and debita proportione. due proportion. utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione Now both of these are found in reason as in a invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen root, to which pertains both a manifesting light manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis and the ordering of a due proportion in other ordinare. things.

lustre due proportion a manifesting light the ordering of due proportion

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 31, q. 2, art 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
DS31QU2 AR1- CO ad rationem autem pulchritudinis duo con- But according to Dionysius (De Div. Nom., c. currunt, secundum dionysium, scilicet 4), two things come together in the account of consonantia et claritas. beauty, namely, consonance and lustre. dicit enim, quod deus est causa omnis pulchritudinis inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis, sicut dicimus homines pulchros qui habent membra proportionata et splendentem colorem. For he says that God is the cause of all beauty insofar as He is the cause of consonance and lustre, just as we say that men are beautiful who have proportionate members and a resplendent color.

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his duobus addit tertium philosophus ubi dicit, quod pulchritudo non est nisi in magno corpore; unde parvi homines possunt dici commensurati et formosi, sed non pulchri.

To the these two the Philosopher adds a third where he says that beauty does not exist except in a sizable body (Nic. Ethic., IV.6); and so small men can be called commensurate [or well-proportioned] and good-looking, but not beautiful.

consonance (= proportionate members or a due commensuration of members; = a due disposition according to quantity) lustre (= a resplendent color, or a bright color; = a due disposition according to quality) a sizable body (= a due disposition in quantity according to a lower limit)

Note that, in the case of the plot, Aristotle considers a due disposition in quantity with respect to an upper limit, which must be of such size as to be taken in at a glance. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Ethic., lect. 8, n. 738 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB4LC-8N.-738 (ed. Marietti) tertio ibi qui enim ostendit quod magnanamitas dignificet seipsum magnis. ille enim qui est dignus parvis, et his seipsum dignificat, potest dici temperatus, prout termperantia sumitur pro quaecumque moderatione. non tamen potest dici magnanimus: Third, where he says, He who is worthy of small things, he shows that magnanimity makes itself worthy of great things. For he who is worthy of small things, and makes himself worthy of them, can be called temperate, according as temperance is taken for any sort of moderation. But he cannot be called magnanimous:

quia magnanimitas consistit in quadam for magnanimity consists in a certain magnitude magnitudine, sicut pulchritudo proprie consistit [or greatness, i.e. size], just as beauty properly in corpore magno. consists in a sizable body. unde illi qui sunt parvi, possunt dicit formosi And so those who are small can be called goodpropter decentiam coloris et propter debitam looking by reason of an appropriate color and commensurationem membrorum, by reason of a due commensuration of the limbs [or members], non tamen possunt dici magnitudinis defectum. pulchri propter yet they cannot be called beautiful by reason of a lack of size.

a sizable body a due commensuration of the limbs or members certain things cannot be called beautiful by reason of a lack of size

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU145 AR2 CO

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respondeo dicendum quod, sicut accipi potest ex verbis dionysii, iv cap. de div. nom., ad rationem pulchri, sive decori, concurrit et claritas et debita proportio, dicit enim quod deus dicitur pulcher sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa. unde pulchritudo corporis in hoc consistit quod homo habeat membra corporis bene proportionata, cum quadam debiti coloris claritate. et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis, sive actio eius, sit bene proportionata secundum spiritualem rationis claritatem.

I reply that it must be said that, as may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (De Div. Nom., c. iv), in the account of the beautiful or becoming both lustre and due proportion come togetherfor he says that God is called beautiful as the cause of the consonance and lustre of the universe. For this reason the beauty of the body consists in this, that a man have the limbs [or members] of his body well-proportioned, together with a certain due lustre of color. And likewise spiritual beauty consists in this, that a mans conversation, or his action, be well proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason.

lustre due proportion (having the limbs or members of the body well-proportioned) spritual beauty consists in a mans conversation or action being proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Dionysii de Div. Nom., cp. 4, lect. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):
CP4LC-5 sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus, propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habet clarum et nitidum colorem. unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum, quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum, secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum. For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color. And so proportionally in the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre, whether spiritual or bodily, and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion.

each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre whether spiritual or bodily and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 39, art. 8, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU39 AR8 CO nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. For three things are required for beauty.

primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae First, wholeness or perfectionfor those things enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. that are truncated are ugly by this very fact.

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et debita proportio sive consonantia.

And a due proportion or consonance.

et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem And again lustre, and so those things that have nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur. a bright color are said to be beautiful.

wholeness or perfection due proportion or consonance lustre (a bright color)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 26, q. 2, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
DS26 QU2 AR4- CO respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est integritas. una quae attenditur secundum perfectionem primam, quae consistit in ipso esse rei; alia quae attenditur secundum perfectionem secundam, quae consistit in operatione. I reply that it must be said that there is a twofold wholeness: one which is looked to according to first perfection, which consists in the very essence of a thing; the other which is looked to according to second perfection, which consists in an activity.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS27 QU1 AR4-CO in rebus omnibus duplex perfectio invenitur; In all things a twofold perfection is found; una qua in se subsistit; alia qua ad res alias one by which it subsists in itself, another by ordinatur; which it is ordered to other things; et utraque perfectio in rebus materialibus terminata et finita est; quia et formam unam determinatam habet, per quam in una tantum specie est; and in material things each perfection is terminated and finite, since it also has one determinate form through which it exists in one species;

et etiam per determinatam virtutem ad res and also through a determinate power it has an quasdam sibi proportionatas inclinationem habet inclination and order to certain things proporet ordinem, sicut grave ad centrum. tionate to it, as the heavy [is inclined and ordered] to the center.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 1, n. 159 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1LC-1N.-159 (ed. Marietti) deinde cum dicit quinimmo et ostendit And then when he says, Nay, rather, he shows operationes secundum virtutem non solum sunt that activities in accord with virtue are not only delectabiles, sed etiam pulchrae et bonae. pleasing, but also beautiful and good. delectabiles quidem sunt in ordine ad operantem For they are pleasing in an order to the one cui conveniunt secundum proprium habitum. doing them to whom they belong by virtue of a proper habit.

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pulchrae autem secundum ordinem debitum But they are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstantiarum quasi quarumdam partium. circumstances as it were of certain parts. nam in debita commensuratione pulchritudo consistit. partium, For beauty consists in a due commensuration of parts. But they are good by virtue of an order to an end.

bonae autem sunt secundum ordinem ad finem.

activities in accord with virtue are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstances for beauty consists in a due commensuration of parts

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentes, II, c. 64, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
adhuc. ratio harmoniae magis qualitatibus corporis quam animae: convenit Furthermore, the notion of harmony befits the qualities of the body rather than those of the soul: for health is a certain harmony of the humours; strength, of the sinews and bones; beauty, of the limbs [or members] and colors.

nam sanitas est harmonia quaedam humorum; fortitudo, nervorum et ossium; pulchritudo, membrorum et colorum.

beauty consists in a certain harmony of the limbs [or members] and colors Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Psalm., ps. 44, n. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
respondeo. dicendum, quod pulchritudo, sanitas, I reply that it must be said that beauty, health, et hujusmodi, dicuntur quodammodo per and the like are said in some way through a respectum ad aliquid: respect to something: quia aliqua contemperatio humorum facit since a certain contemperation [or mutual sanitatem in puero, quae non facit in sene: tempering] of humours produces health in a boy, which it does not do in an old man: aliqua est enim sanitas leoni, quae est mors for there is a certain health of the lion, which is homini. death to a man. unde sanitas est proportio humorum comparatione ad talem naturam. in And so health is a proportion of humours in comparison to some nature.

et similiter pulchritudo consistit in proportione And likewise beauty consists in a proportion of membrorum et colorum. the limbs [or members] and of colors. et ideo alia est pulchritudo unius, alia alterius.... And so the beauty of one thing is other that that of another thing....

beauty is said in some way through a respect to something beauty consists in a proportion of the limbs or members and of colors 71

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In X Ethic., lect. 3, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB10LC-3N.-5 quando autem est aliqua forma quae in sui ratione importat quamdam proportionem multorum ordinatorum ad unum, talis forma etiam secundum propriam rationem recipit magis et minus. Now when there is some form which implies in its own account a certain proportion of many things ordered to one, such a form also according to its proper account admits of more and less.

sicut patet de sanitate et pulchritudine; quorum This is clear in health and in beauty, each of utrumque importat proportionem convenientem which imply a proportion agreeing with the naturae eius quod dicitur pulchrum vel sanum. nature of that which is called beautiful or healthy. et quia huiusmodi proportio potest esse vel magis vel minus conveniens, inde est quod ipsa pulchritudo vel sanitas in se considerata dicitur secundum magis et minus. And because a proportion of this kind can be more or less suitable, for this reason the very beauty or health considered in itself is said according to more and less.

et ex hoc patet quod unitas secundum quam And from this it is clear that unity insofar as aliquid est determinatum est causa quod aliquid something is determinate is the reason why non recipiat magis et minus. something does not admit of more and less. quia ergo delectatio recipit magis et minus, Since, then, pleasure admits of more and less, it videbatur non esse aliquid determinatum et per will not appear to be something determinate and consequens non esse de genere bonorum. consequently not to belong to the genus of the good.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 5, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU5 AR5 CO respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque I reply that it must be said that each thing is dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, called good to the extent that it is perfect, sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. for thus it is the object of appetite, as was said above.

perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest But that is called perfect to which nothing is secundum modum suae perfectionis. lacking according to the mode of its perfection. cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est, per Now since each thing is what it is through its suam formam; own form forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et but the form (necessarily) presupposes certain quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; things, and certain things necessarily follow on it ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. in order for something to be perfect and good, it is necessary that it have a form, as well as the things presupposed to it, and the things which follow on it.

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praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam, et hoc signifycatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit.

Now presupposed to the form is a determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by mode, for which reason it is said that a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU49 AR2 C proprie enim qualitas importat quendam [F]or, properly, quality implies a certain modum substantiae. mode of a substance. modus autem est, ut dicit augustinus, super gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. However, as St. Augustine says (Super gen. ad litteram), a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand, for which reason it implies a certain determination according to some measure.

et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur And so, just as that according to which the potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale potency of matter is determined according to dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; substantial being is called a quality, which is the difference of substance ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per philosophum in v metaphys.. so that according to which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental being is called an accidental quality, which is also a certain difference, as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics V (ch. 14, 1020a 33).

modus autem sive determinatio subiecti The mode or determination of a subject secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in according to accidental being, however, can be ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; taken either in an order to the nature of the subject itself; vel secundum actionem et passionem quae or according to the action and passion which consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt follow on the principles of the nature, which are materia et forma; matter and form; vel secundum quantitatem. or according to quantity.

si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio If, however, the mode or determination of the subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta subject be taken according to quantity, thus species qualitatis. there is the fourth species of quality.1 et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est And because quantity, according to its ratio, is sine motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; without motion, and without the ratio of good and bad, ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet therefore, it does not belong to the fourth quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde species of quality that something be good or transiens. bad, passing swiftly or slowly. modus autem sive determinatio subiecti But the mode or determination of a subject secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in according to action and passion is considered in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis. the second and third species of quality. 2
1

This is figura, figure or shape, which is a quality around a quantity (qualitas circa quantitatem, = St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 2), and so which implies the termination of a quantity (importat terminationem quantitatis) (ibid., lect. 5, n. 3).

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et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid And so in both is considered that something is facile vel difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens done easily or with difficulty, or that it be aut diuturnum. passing swiftly or enduring. non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens But in these things is not considered something ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et pertaining to the ratios of good or bad, because passiones non habent rationem finis, motions and passions do not have the ratio of ends; bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad good and bad, however, are said with respect to finem. an end. sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad But the mode and determination of a subject in naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, first species of quality, which is habit and disposition; dicit enim philosophus, in vii physic., loquens for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. 3, de habitibus animae et corporis, quod 246b 23), speaking of the habits of the soul and body, that sunt dispositiones optimum; quaedam perfecti ad they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i.e. an activity];

dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum by of the perfect, however, I mean what is secundum naturam. disposed according to nature. et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid, ut dicitur in ii physic. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be, as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. 7, 198b 3), thus, in the first species there is considered both good and bad, and also movable with ease or with difficulty, according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion.

ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.

unde in v metaphys. philosophus definit And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam 20, 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a aliquis disponitur bene vel male. disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. et in ii ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum And in the second book the Ethics (ch. 5, 1105b quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male. 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i.e. with respect to] our passions.
2

These are natural ability and inability (natural capacity or power and natural incapacity or lack of power, also called impotence) (second species) and passible or affective quality and passion or affection (third species), the latter being a quality in virtue of which a thing can be altered; for example, whiteness and blackness, sweetness and bitterness, heaviness and lightness, and all the others of this sort. (Aristotle, Metaph., V, 21, 1022b 15-17, tr. H. G. Apostle).

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quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, For when the mode is suitable to the nature of tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non the thing, then it has the ratio of the good; convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. however, when it is not suitable, then it has the ratio of the bad. et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur And because nature is that which is considered in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species first in a thing, so habits are placed in the first qualitatis. species of quality. QU49 AR2 RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio To the first, therefore, it must be said that ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. disposition implies a certain order, as has been said. unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. And so something is not said to be disposed by a quality except in an order to something.

et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad And if well or badly be added, which rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo belongs to the notion of habit, this must be ad naturam, quae est finis. considered in the order to the nature, which is the end. unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; And so, according to figure [or shape], or according to hot or cold, something is not said to be well or badly disposed, except according to an order to the nature of the thing, according as it is suitable or not suitable. And so, both figures themselves and passible qualities, according as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing, belong to habits or dispositions; for figure, as it befits the nature of a thing, and color, pertain to beauty;

calor autem et frigus, secundum quod hot and cold, however, according as they suit conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanitatem. the nature of the thing, pertain to health. et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a And in this way, hotness and coldness are philosopho in prima specie qualitatis. placed by the Philosopher in the first species of quality.

disposition implies a certain order figure, as it befits the nature of a thing, and color, pertain to beauty

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 54, art. 1 c. (in part) (tr. B.A.M.):
QU54 AR1 CO respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. et de illis quidem habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus dicuntur. I reply that it must be said that, as was said above, habits are certain dispositions of something existing in potency to something, either to the nature, or to an operation or an end of the nature. And, in fact, with respect to those habits which are dispositions, it is obvious that many can exist in one subject, from the fact that the parts of one subject can be taken in diverse ways, according to the disposition of which they are called habits.

sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes For instance, if the humours are taken [as] parts humores, prout disponuntur secundum naturam of the human body, according as they are humanam, est habitus vel dispositio sanitatis, disposed in accordance with human nature, there is the habit or disposition of health si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo. et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. But if similar parts such as the nerves, bones, and flesh are taken, their disposition in an order to the nature is strength or a good condition, but if the limbs are taken, as the hand and foot and the like, their disposition agreeing with the nature is beauty. And in this way there are many habits and dispositions in the same thing.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1 LC-9N.-6 sed per cognitionem harmoniae magis congruit venire in cognitionem accidentium corporum; ut si velimus cognoscere sanitatem, dicemus quod est complexio adaequata et contemperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore: et sic de aliis corporeis virtutibus. But through a knowledge of harmony it is more fitting to arrive at knowledge of the accidents of the body; so that if we want to know health, we would say that it is a balanced [equalized] and tempered [temperate] complexion [mixing together] of the humors and qualities in the body: and thus of the other bodily powers.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, nn. 3-9 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 LC-9N.-3 secundo cum dicit etenim harmoniam ponit rationem huiusmodi opinionis; dicens, quod harmonia est complexio et proportio et temperamentum contrariorum in compositis et mixtis. et haec proportio, quae est inter ista contraria, dicitur harmonia, et forma illius compositi. Secondly, when he says, For a harmony, he gives the reason for opinions of this sort, saying that a harmony is a complexion and a proportion and a temperament of contraries in composed and mixed things. And this proportion which exists among these contraries is called a harmony and the form of the composite.

unde, cum anima sit quaedam forma, dicebant And so, since the soul is a certain form, they ipsam esse harmoniam. said it is a harmony. dicitur autem haec opinio fuisse cuiusdam This opinion is said to have belonged to a dynarchi et simiatis et empedoclis. certain Dinarchus, to Simiatus, and to Empedocles. LB1 LC-9N.-4 consequenter cum dicit et quidem disputat Consequently when he says, And indeed, he contra opinionem praedictam. disputes against the aforesaid opinion. Et circa hoc duo facit. And about this he does three things.

primo enim disputat generaliter ad positionem First, he disputes generally against the position dictorum philosophorum. of the philosophers mentioned. secundo vero in speciali ad ponentem, scilicet But second, (he disputes) in particular against contra empedoclem, ibi, investigabit autem hoc the one holding it, namely, against Empedoetc.. cles, at But this will be investigated, etc. ad positionem autem obiicit quatuor rationibus: quarum prima talis est. constat quod harmonia proprie dicta est consonantia in sonis: sed isti transumpserunt istud nomen ad omnem debitam proportionem, tam in rebus compositis ex diversis partibus quam in commixtis ex contrariis. Now he objects to this position by four arguments, of which the first goes like this: It cannot be doubted that harmony properly so called is a consonance in sounds, but they have transferred this name to every due proportion, in things composed from different parts as well as in those mixed from contraries.

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secundum hoc ergo harmonia duo potest dicere: quia vel ipsam compositionem aut commixtionem, vel proportionem illius compositionis seu commixtionis. sed constat quod neutrum istorum est anima; ergo anima non est harmonia. quod autem anima non sit compositio sive proportio compo-sitionis, patet.

According to this [position], then, one can call two things a harmony: either the composition or mixture itself, or the proportion of that composition or mixture. But it cannot be denied that the soul is neither of these; so the soul is not a harmony. But that the soul is not the composition or the proportion of a composition is clear.

isti enim accipiunt animam, ut substantiam For these men take the soul as a certain subquamdam; sed illa duo sunt accidentia; non stance; but those two things are accidents; so ergo idem sunt. they are not the same. LB1 LC-9N.-5 secundam rationem ponit cum dicit amplius He gives the second reason when he says, But autem quae talis est. rather, which is of this sort. constat quod omnes philosophi dicunt quod anima movet: sed harmonia non movet, immo relinquitur ex movente, et sequitur: sicut ex motu chordarum, qui est per musicam, relinquitur harmonia quaedam in sono. It is certain that all the philosophers say that the soul moves [another] [and so comes before a motion]; but a harmony does not move [another], rather it remains from the thing moving it, and follows upon it; as from the motion of strings, which is [caused] by a musician, a certain harmony in sound remains.

et ex applicatione et contemperatione partium a Also, from the adjustment and contemperation componente relinquitur proportio quaedam in [or mutual tempering] of the parts by the one composito. composing [them], a certain proportion remains in the thing composed. ergo si anima est harmonia, et haec relinquitur So if the soul is a harmony, and this remains ex harmonizatore, oportebit ponere aliam from the harmonizer, it will be necessary to animam, quae harmonizet. posit another soul that harmonizes. LB1 LC-9N.-6 tertiam rationem ponit cum dicit congruit He gives the third argument when he says But autem quae talis est. it agrees, which goes like this. philosophus dicit in quarto physicorum. quicumque assignat definitionem seu naturam rei, oportet quod illa assignatio, si sufficiens est, conveniat operationibus et passionibus illius rei: tunc enim definitur optime quid est res, quoniam non solum cognoscimus substantiam et naturam ipsius rei, sed etiam passiones et accidentia eius. The Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Physics: whoever assigns the definition or nature of a thing, it is necessary that that assignation, if it is adequate, agree with the activities and passions [or properties] of that thing: for then what the thing is is best defined, since we will not only know the substance and nature of the thing itself, but also its passions and accidents.

si ergo anima est harmonia quaedam, oportet If, then, the soul is a sort of harmony, it is quod per cognitionem harmoniae deveniamus necessary that through the knowledge of har-

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in cognitionem et operationum, et accidentium mony we arrive at knowledge of both the animae. activities and the accidents of the soul. sed hoc est valde difficile, ut puta si velimus operationes animae in harmoniam referre. But this is very difficult as, for example, if we wish to compare the activities of the soul to a harmony.

cuius enim harmoniae erit sentire, et cuius For what of harmony will it be to sense, and of amare aut odire, et intelligere? what to love, or to hate, or to understand? sed per cognitionem harmoniae magis congruit venire in cognitionem accidentium corporum; ut si velimus cognoscere sanitatem, dicemus quod est complexio adaequata et contemperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore: et sic de aliis corporeis virtutibus. et sic harmonia magis esse attribuenda corpori quam animae. LB1 LC-9N.-7 quartam rationem ponit cum dicit amplius He gives the fourth reason when he says, But, autem quae talis est. further, which is of this sort: harmonia invenitur aliquando in compositis et habentibus compositionem et motum; quia quando haec sic invicem simul ponuntur et ordinantur, ut nullum congeneum praetermittatur, idest ut nullus defectus eiusdem generis ibi sit, tunc illae partes dicuntur bene harmonizatae, Sometimes harmony is found in composed things and in things having both composition and motion, because when these1 are so placed and ordered to each other at the same time that nothing homogeneous be omitted, i.e. so that no lack of things the same in genus2 be there, then those parts are called well-harmonized, But through the knowledge of harmony it is fitting rather to arrive at knowledge of the accidents of bodies, so that if we wish to know health, we shall say that it is a balanced and mutually tempered complexion of humours and of qualities in the body: and thus about the other bodily powers. And thus harmony is to be attributed to the body rather than to the soul.

et compositio ipsarum vocatur harmonia, sicut and their composition is called a harmony, as in ligna et lapides, et alia corpora naturalia. wood and stones, and other natural bodies. sic etiam et chordae, quando bene ordinatae sunt, vel fistulae, ut ex inde consonantia sonorum resultet, dicuntur bene harmonizatae; et huius consonantia dicitur harmonia, et hoc modo proprie dicitur harmonia.
1 2

So also strings, when they are well ordered, or flutes, so that from them a consonance of sounds result, are called well harmonized; and a harmony of this sort is called consonance, and in this way harmony is said properly.3

I.e. the parts of things having composition. I.e. so that it lack none of its parts the same in kind. Such, for instance, are the contraries in mixed bodies, which are called homogeneous because they are things furthest apart in the same genus. 3 Cf. the definition given above (lect. 9, n. 4): harmony properly so called is a consonance in sounds . But, as St. Thomas has already noted (ibid., n. 5), in addition to being said of a composite, harmony can also be said of the proportion that remains in the parts when these are so placed and ordered to one another that they produce such a sound. In this sense, a harmony is a tuning or attunement (or temperament, or intonation). According to the different sequences of intervals it make take, such a harmony may also be called a mode or scale, like the Dorian, Phrygian, or Lydian modes, or the major and minor scales of modern musical theory. St. Thomas customarily refers to them as consonantiae musicae, as at In Psalm. 32, n. 2 where the phrase names the Phrygian and other modes of this sort.

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Cf. the definition of consonance given by Aristotle and St. Thomas: Consonantia est ratio, idest, proportio in numerum secundum acutum et grave (In II Post. Anal., lect. 1 n. 8). Compare also In II Physic., lect. v, n. 4: Nam proportiones numerales applicatae ad sonos sicut materiam, consonantias musicales constituunt.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In X Ethic., lect 3, n. 8 (tr. Litzinger/B.A.M.):

LB10LC-3N.-8 sed tamen neque etiam delectationes quae secundum se recipiunt magis et minus ratione suae mixtionis, oportet non esse determinatas, neque bonas. Nevertheless, neither is it necessary that pleasures, which in themselves admit of more and less by reason of their admixture, are not determinate or good.

nihil enim prohibet quin delectatio recipiens For nothing prevents pleasure, which allows of magis et minus sit determinata, sicut et sanitas. more and less, from being determinateas health is in fact. huiusmodi enim determinata dici possunt, For things of this sort may be called inquantum aliqualiter attingunt id ad quod determined insofar as they somehow attain to ordinantur, licet possent propinquius attingere. that to which they are ordered, although they may get nearer to it. sicut commixtio humorum habet rationem In the same way a mixing together of humours sanitatis ex eo quod attingit convenientiam has the character of health by reason of the fact humanae naturae; that it attains an agreement with human nature et ex hoc dicitur determinata, quasi proprium for from this a thing is called determined as terminum attingens. attaining its proper term.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Caelo, lect. 20. n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB2 LC20N.-7 manifestum est autem quod continens est But it is obvious that the thing containing is honorabilius contento, et finis quam finitum: more honorable than the thing contained, and the limit [more honorable] than the limited, quia contentum et finitum pertinent ad rationem the reason being that the contained and the materiae, limited pertain to the notion of matter, esse autem continens et finiens, ad rationem but to be containing and limiting, to the notion formae, quae est substantia totius consistentiae of form, which is the substance of the whole rerum. consistence of things.

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VIII. ON THE PERFECT. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
First therefore it is necessary to consider that perfect is said in many ways. For something is perfect simply [simpliciter]; but something is called perfect in a certain respect [secundum quid]. Simply perfect is that which attains to the end which belongs to it according to its proper notion. That however can be called perfect in a certain respect which attains to the end of any of those things which are concomitant to its proper notion, just as an animal is said to be perfect simply when it attains to its end, such that nothing is lacking to it of those things which constitute the integrity of animal life; for example, when nothing of the number and disposition of its limbs is lacking to it, and the powers by which the operations of animal life are perfected. On the other hand, an animal can be called perfect in a certain respect if it be perfect in anything concomitant; for example, if it be perfect in whiteness, or in odour, or in any other thing of the sort.1

simply perfect is that which attains to the end which belongs to it according to its proper notion...just as an animal is said to be perfect simply when it attains to its end, such that nothing is lacking to it of those things which constitute the integrity of animal life; for example, when nothing of the number and disposition of its limbs is lacking to it, and the powers by which the operations of animal life are perfected that can be called perfect in a certain respect which attains to the end of any of those things which are concomitant to its proper notion...(just as) an animal can be called perfect in a certain respect if it be perfect in anything concomitant; for example, if it be perfect in whiteness, or in odour, or in any other thing of the sort

1. On virtue as a disposition of the perfect for the best. Cf. Aristotle, Phys., VII. 3 (246a 30-246b 27) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):
[30] Indeed, neither is [alteration] in habits. For the habits are virtues and vices, and every virtue and vice is among the relatives, just as health is a certain [246b 20] balance of the hot and the cold, either of things within [the body] or in relation to what contains. So too good and strength are in relation to something. For they are certain dispositions of the best [thing] to the finest [action]. I call the best, however, what saves and is disposed in regard to nature. Since, therefore, the virtues and the vices are among [those things that are] related to something, and these [25] are not comings to be [generations], nor is there coming to be from these, nor, generally, is there alteration of these, it is apparent that there is no alteration at all in the case of habits.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art 2, c., ad 1 (tr. B.A.M):
1

Primum igitur considerare oportet, quod perfectum multipliciter dicitur. Est enim aliquid simpliciter perfectum; aliquid vero dicitur perfectum secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem perfectum est quod attingit ad finem eius quod ei competit secundum propriam rationem; secundum quid autem perfectum dici potest quod attingit ad finem alicuius eorum quae concomitantur propriam rationem: sicut animal simpliciter dicitur esse perfectum, quando ad hunc finem perducitur ut nihil ei desit ex his quae integritatem animalis vitae constituunt: puta cum nihil ei deficit ex numero et dispositione membrorum, et debita corporis quantitate, et virtutibus quibus operationes animalis vitae perficiuntur; secundum quid autem perfectum animal potest dici si sit perfectum in aliquo concomitanti, puta si sit perfectum in albedine, aut in odore, aut in aliquo huiusmodi.

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But the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition; for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. 3, 246b 23), speaking of the habits of the soul and body, that they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i.e. an activity]; by of the perfect, however, I mean what is disposed according to nature. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be, as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. 7, 198b 3), thus, in the first species there is considered both good and bad, and also movable with ease or with difficulty, according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. 20, 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. And in the second book of the Ethics (ch. 5, 1105b 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i.e. with respect to] our passions. For when the mode is suitable to the nature of the thing, then it has the account of the good; however, when it is not suitable, then it has the account of the bad. And because nature is that which is considered first in a thing, so habits are placed in the first species of quality. 1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145. art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said that, as Isidore says, Honorable [honestas] expresses, so to speak, the state of honor. Wherefore from this it appears that something is called honestum or honorable which is worthy of honor. But honor, as was said above, is owed to excellence. But the excellence of man is chiefly considered with regard to virtue, since it is the disposition of the perfect for the best, as is said in the Physics (VII, 3, 246b 23).2 And so the honorable, properly speaking, is referred to the same thing as virtue.3

2. In sum. A thing is called perfect when it has acquired or attained its proper excellence or virtue; for when anything acquires its proper excellence, we call it perfect.

et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim philosophus, in vii physic., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis, quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid, ut dicitur in ii physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. unde in v metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. et in ii ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male. quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis. 2 That is, it is the disposition of the perfect, not in the sense of that which has attained its end, but of that which is disposed according to nature, and the best is its proper activity, as St. Thomas elsewhere explains (cf. In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 6). 3 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum, quod est honore dignum. Honor autem, ut supra dictum est, excellentiae debetur. Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute.
1

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The perfect can mean (1) that which has attained its nature; (2) that which is disposed according to nature; the former has reference to the form and the what it was to be; the latter, to virtue. the disposition of the perfect for the best is virtue the thing disposed according to nature the best activity in accordance with that nature the opposites of these pertain to defect or vice when a thing is disposed contrary to nature for the worst activity in accordance with that depravity it is vicious good is from a whole cause, evil from any defect If a virtue of the body is a bodily excellence, then a vice of the body will be a bodily defect.

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IX. SUMMARY STATEMENTS PERTAINING TO BEAUTY. 1. On beauty in a living thing. For something like an animal to be beautiful, it must possess a due disposition with respect to perfection and wholeness or integrity, and hence unity, as well as with respect to situation, to quantity, and to quality. (a) A due disposition with respect to perfection and wholeness or integrity : it must so possess all of its parts that none of them are outside of it or missing, in which case it will be perfect and whole; it must also so possess them as to make up a unity between them, in which case it will be one. (b) A due disposition with respect to order: its parts must be so arranged as to allow the whole to possess its proper species, such that there is a beginning, a middle, and an end there, and hence exhibit a before and after, with the result that, a part being taken away or transposed, the whole will be changed. (c) A due disposition with respect to quantity: its parts must be of such size that they will be commensurate both with respect to each other and the whole, being neither too big nor too small, but such as to be taken in at a glance and, as with the plot of tragedy, easily retained in the memory. (d) A due disposition with respect to quality: its parts must be of the appropriate sort: with respect to the third and fourth species of quality: with respect to the third species, it must have the appropriate coloring; with respect to the fourth, it must have the appropriate boundary; to take an example, for a geometrical object to be a circle, it must be contained by a circular line; for a drawing to be the image of a horse, it must have the shape of that animal, and so on. Further, it must attain the limit of its quantity, both dimensive and virtualthat is, of power or excellence, both of which pertain to quality.1 2. On whole and perfect and limit. whole: that of which nothing is outside nothing is absent perfect: that outside of which it is not possible to find any, even one, of its parts limit (the extremity of each thing) the first thing outside of which there is nothing to be found and the first thing inside of which everything belonging to it is
1

N.B. To be perfect and to be well disposed with respect to quality come together in this: the possession of the form which produces the what it was to be of the thingthat is, which makes the thing to be the sort of thing it was meant to be, thereby constituting the species of the beautiful called the limited or determinate. Note that when the thing in question has a characteristic work or operation, it must be well disposed with respect to power; but this pertains to arte or excellence, rather than to kalos or beauty.

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3. Some brief observations on beauty taken from St. Thomas Aquinas. Beauty consists in a due proportion. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1) Again, beauty consists in a form implying a certain proportion of many things ordered to one. (In X Ethic., lect. 3, n. 5) Now beauty is the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing with respect to the members and colors, and this pertains to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition. (Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art 2, ad 1) But a disposition is an order of parts in a thing having parts, according to place, to power, or to form or species, with beauty being an instance of the last kind, an order of parts according to form or species, or the form or figure of the whole. (Aristotle, Metaph., V. 19, 1022 b 1-2) But that according to which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental being is called an accidental quality, which is also a certain difference, as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics V (ch. 14, 1020a 33). (St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., c.) But the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition; for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. 3, 246b 23), speaking of the habits of the soul and body, that they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i.e. an activity]; by of the perfect, however, I mean what is disposed according to nature. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be, as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. 7, 198b 3), thus, in the first species there is considered both good and bad, and also movable with ease or with difficulty, according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. 20, 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. And in the second book the Ethics (ch. 5, 1105b 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i.e. with respect to] our passions. For when the mode is suitable to the nature of the thing, then it has the ratio of the good; however, when it is not suitable, then it has the ratio of the bad. And because nature is that which is considered first in a thing, so habits are placed in the first species of quality. ( Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art 2, c.) N.B. I say: in one way symmetry may be understood as the due proportion or habitude of one thing to another according as this is suitable to the form or nature of the thing taken as its end.

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4. On beauty considered as a due proportion. Beauty consists in a due proportion (debita proportio) of the parts to the whole, and of the parts composing the whole to each other: 1. of the parts to the whole, which pertains to integritas, integrity, or perfectio, perfection (a thing being integral or whole, and perfect when it is not missing any of its parts); 2. of the parts composing the whole to each other, which pertains to a due disposition of the members or limbsthat is, of certain secondary constituents(a) according to place or situation, (b) according to quantity, (c) and according to quality: (a) according to position, which pertains to the notion of order ( taxis, ordo, which consists in the before and after of things, and so which has to do with the relative positions of the parts of a whole; cf. the third meaning of disposition as an order of parts, in a thing having parts, according to the species or figure of the whole), (b) according to quantity, which pertains to the notion of symmetry (summetria) understood as commensurability (which has to do with the relative sizes of the parts, and hence with their admissibility of a common measure or not), and (c) according to quality; which pertains to limitation or definiteness, embracing the shape or figure of the thing as well as its color: (1) the shape or figure (morphe, schema) of the thing (in things perceptible to sense) or what is analogous to this in intelligible things, which makes them the sort of thing they are, and so pertains to quality; e.g. a boundary which, being where a thing comes to an end, pertains to the notion of the limited or definiteness (to hrismenon, being bounded), and (2) its color or coloring (chroma) and (3) its lustre (claritas, also brilliance, radiance, or splendor, which may be understood as an excellence of the color of a thing) or the analog of this in what is intelligible rather than sensible, i.e. its intelligibility. 5. Divisions of beauty. 3. Into its species or specific parts: (a) order (b) symmetry (c) the limited or definiteness 4. Into its constituents or quasi-integral parts: (a) wholeness or integrity (b) due proportion or consonance (c) lustre or brilliance (etc.) 88

6. On beauty in sum. (a) As known by what it does: beauty is that which pleases upon being seen beauty is that the very apprehension of which pleases (b) As known by what it is: beauty is grasped by the senses, especially sight and hearing, which are the most knowing senses and the senses which minister to reason but a sense power is a ratio; therefore beauty consists in a ratio of some sort the sort of ratio in which beauty consists is a due proportion (i.e. a consonance or harmony) beauty consists in a due proportion of the parts to the whole (= integrity or perfection) to each other (= consonance or due proportion) according to situation or position (= order) according to quantity (= symmetry, understood as commensurability) according to quality (=the limited or definiteness) in shape or figure (= being well-formed or good looking) in color or coloring (which exists in a surface) in lustre or brilliance (which pertains to the color) (= luminosity or intelligibility) beauty pertains to the notion of a formal cause beauty consists in a habit or disposition (where many things are ordered to one), which is the first species of quality (although parts of beauty are in the third and fourth species) beauty consists in a due disposition of the parts with reference to the nature considered as an end beauty as a disposition in the second sense, which is an order of parts according to power or virtue beauty admits of more or less beauty is the same in subject with the good beauty may be sensible or intelligible intelligible beauty may be observed in both speculative and practical matters moral beauty consists in a due proportion of circumstances 89

7. Principal observations on beauty. Cf. Plato, Laws II (668d669e) (tr. Thomas Pangle, rev. B.A.M.):
Ath. What then, if someone doesnt know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: [would he ever know,] for instance, whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts, how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order, and also the colors and shapes, or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated?

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIII. 3 (1078a 311078b 6) (tr. W. D. Ross, rev. B.A.M.):
Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do [35] not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i.e. the beautiful) as in [5] some sense a cause. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.14
14

Apparently an unfulfilled promise.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XI. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (tr. W. D. Ross):

As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities, e.g. [30] weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitative and [35] continuous, and does not consider them in any other respect, and examines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these, and the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others, [1061b] and the ratios of others; but yet we posit one and the same science of all these thingsgeometry)the same is true with regard to being.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 7 (1450b 341451a 15 (tr. B.A.M. based on Buckley):
Further still, since that which is beautiful, whether it be an animal or anything else which is composed of certain things, should not only [35] have these things arranged, but also not just any chance sizefor the beautiful consists in size and orderhence, neither can any very small animal be beautiful; for the contemplation of it is confused, since it is effected in a nearly insensible time; nor yet a very large animal; [1451a] for it is not contemplated at once, but its being one and a whole escapes the view of the onlookers; such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stadia [in length]. And so, as in bodies and in animals there should be size, but such as can be easily seen; so also in plots, there should be length, but this such as can be [5] easily remembered. But the definition of the length with reference to contests and the senses does not fall under the consideration of art. For if it were necessary to perform a hundred tragedies, the performance would have to be regulated by a water-

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clock, as they are said to have been at one time. But the definition according to the nature of the thing is this, that the plot is [10] always more beautiful the greater it is, if at the same time it is perspicuous. But in order to define it simply, one may say, in whatever extent, in successive incidents in accordance with likelihood or necessity, a change from bad fortune to good fortune or from good fortune to bad fortune takes place, is a [15] sufficient limit of the size.

Cf. Aristotle, Top., III. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed. & tr. Loeb):
And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored; for example, health is better than strength or beauty. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold, in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature, whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]; for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones, and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the third it must be said that the beautiful is the same as the good, differing only in account. For, since the good is what all things desire, it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it; but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it. And for this reason those senses especially look to the beautiful that are the most knowing, namely, sight and hearing, the servants of reason, for we call sights and sounds beautiful. But in the sensibles belonging to the other senses we do not use the name beautiful, for we do not call tastes or smells beautiful. And so it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power, so that that is called good simply which is pleasing to the appetitebut that is called beautiful the very apprehension of which pleases.2

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the first it must be said that the beautiful and the good are the same in subject because they are founded on the same thing, namely, the form, and for this reason the good is praised as beautiful. But they differ in account. For the good properly regards the appetite; for the good is what all things desire. And so it has the account of an end, for the appetite is, so to speak, a certain movement toward a thing. But the beautiful regards a knowing power, for things which please by being seen are called beautiful. For this reason beauty consists in a due proportion, since the sense is delighted in things that are duly proportioned, as in things similar to itself. For the sense, and indeed every knowing power, is a certain ratio. And because knowledge comes about by assimilation, but similitude [likeness] regards the form, beauty properly pertains to the notion of a formal cause.3
1

Cf. Plato, Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. B. Jowett): Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight. 2 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet. 3 ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. sed ratione differunt. nam

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 180, art. 2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the third it must be said that beauty, as has been said above, consists in a certain lustre and due proportion. Now both of these are found in reason as in a root, to which pertains both a manifesting light and the ordering of a due proportion in other things.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 31, q. 2, art 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
But according to Dionysius (De Div. Nom., c. 4), two things come together in the account of beauty, namely, consonance and lustre. For he says that God is the cause of all beauty insofar as He is the cause of consonance and lustre, just as we say that men are beautiful who have proportionate members and a resplendent color. To the these two the Philosopher adds a third where he says that beauty does not exist except in a sizable body (Nic. Ethic., IV.6); and so small men can be called commensurate [or well-proportioned] and good-looking, but not beautiful.2

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said that, as may be gathered from the words of Dionysius ( De Div. Nom., c. iv), in the account of the beautiful or becoming both lustre and due proportion come togetherfor he says that God is called beautiful as the cause of the consonance and lustre of the universe. For this reason the beauty of the body consists in this, that a man have the members of his body well-proportioned, together with a certain due lustre of color.3 And likewise spiritual beauty consists in this, that a mans conversation, or his action, be well proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason.4

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Dionysii de Div. Nom., cp. 4, lect. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):
For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color.5 And so proportionally in
bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis. 1 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare. 2 ad rationem autem pulchritudinis duo concurrunt, secundum dionysium, scilicet consonantia et claritas.dicit enim, quod deus est causa omnis pulchritudinis inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis, sicut dicimus homines pulchros qui habent membra proportionata et splendentem colorem. his duobus addit tertium philosophus ubi dicit, quod pulchritudo non est nisi in magno corpore; unde parvi homines possunt dici commensurati et formosi, sed non pulchri. 3 respondeo dicendum quod, sicut accipi potest ex verbis dionysii, iv cap. de div. nom., ad rationem pulchri, sive decori, concurrit et claritas et debita proportio, dicit enim quod deus dicitur pulcher sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa. unde pulchritudo corporis in hoc consistit quod homo habeat membra corporis bene proportionata, cum quadam debiti coloris claritate. 4 et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis, sive actio eius, sit bene proportionata secundum spiritualem rationis claritatem. 5 sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus, propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habet clarum et nitidum colorem.

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the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre, whether spiritual or bodily, and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 44, q. 3, art. 1a, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said to the first question that in the human body there can be a twofold deformity. In one way from the lack of any limb [or member, membri]: thus we say that mutilated things are ugly; for in them there is a lack of due proportion to the whole. And deformity of this kind, without a doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole, as was said above when the integrity of the resurrected body was treated of. In another way deformity arises from an undue disposition of the parts, either an undue quantity, or quality, or situation [or position, situ]which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with a due proportion of the parts to the whole. Concerning these kinds of deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes are the cause of deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master in the text says (Sent. iv, D, 44).2

8. Some names of beauty: decor, seemliness suavitas, sweetness, charm venustas, loveliness, graciousness formositas, well-formedness, the state of having good looks elegans, graceful
beautiful beautifully beautify beauty = = = = speciosus, decorus, formosus, bellus pulchre, formose decoro formositas, forma, decor, pulchritudo, venustas

lovely pretty cute becoming comely well-formed good looking sweet graceful
1

unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum, quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum, secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum. 2 respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod in corpore humano potest esse deformitas dupliciter. uno modo ex defectu alicujus membri, sicut mutilatos turpes dicimus; deest enim eis debita proportio ad totum; et de tali deformitate nulli dubium est quod in corporibus damnatorum non erit; quia omnia corpora tam bonorum quam malorum integra resurgent, ut supra dictum est cum de integritate corporum resurgentium ageretur. alio modo deformitas contingit ex indebita partium dispositione, vel indebita quantitate vel qualitate vel situ, quae etiam proportionem debitam partium ad totum non patitur; et de talibus deformitatibus et similibus defectibus, sicut sunt febres et hujusmodi aegritudines, quae interdum sunt deformitatis causae, augustinus indeterminatum et sub dubio relinquit in ench., ut magister in littera dicit.

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elegant charming charm sweetness appeal allure attractiveness agreeableness

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X. SUPPLEMENT: ON CLARITAS OR LUSTRE IN RELATION TO GLORIA. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Suppl., q. 85, art. 1, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers).
I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome [lucida], on account of the authority of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we have often remarked (Question [84], Article [1]), it is better to say that this clarity will result from the overflow of the souls glory into the body. For whatever is received into anything is received not according to the mode of the source whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. 15:41). Thus in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory says on Job 28:17, Gold or crystal cannot equal it.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 132, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
Glory signifies a certain lustre [claritas], and so to be glorified [glorificari] is the same as to be made illustrious [clarificari], as Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.).2 Now lustre [claritas] involves a certain seemliness [or propriety, decorem],3 as well as display [or manifestation, manifestationem].

Cf. In IV Sent., dist. 44, q. 2, art. 4, qc. 1, c.: Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod corpora sanctorum fore lucida post resurrectionem ponere oportet propter auctoritatem Scripturae quae hoc promittit. Sed causam hujusmodi claritatis quidam attribuunt quintae essentiae, quae tunc dominabitur in corpore humano. Sed quia hoc est absurdum, ut saepe dictum est; ideo melius est ut dicatur quod claritas illa causabitur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, non recipitur per modum influentis, sed per modum recipientis; et ita claritas quae est in anima ut spiritualis, recipitur in corpore ut corporalis; et ideo secundum quod anima erit majoris claritatis secundum majus meritum, ita etiam erit differentia claritatis in corpore, ut patet per apostolum 1 Corinth. 15; et ita in corpore glorioso cognoscetur gloria animae, sicut in vitro cognoscitur color corporis quod continetur in vase vitreo, ut Gregorius dicit super illud Job 28: non adaequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum. 2 Cf. St. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, Tractate 104 (John 17:1), sec. 3 (= NPNF 1-07, tr. Gibb/Innes): But His glory begins with the clause where he says, Wherefore God also has exalted Him; and reaches on to the words, is in the glory of God the Father.For even the noun itself, if the language of the Greek codices be examined, from which the apostolic epistles have been translated into Latin, which in the latter is read, glory, is in the former read, o/ : whence we have the verb derived in Greek for the purpose of saying here, o/ (glorify), which the Latin translator renders by clarifica (make illustrious), although he might as well have said glorifica (glorify), which is the same in meaning. And for the same reason, in the apostles epistle where we find gloria, claritas might have been used; for by so doing, the meaning would have been equally preserved. But not to depart from the sound of the words, just as clarificatio (the making lustrous) is derived from claritas (lustre), so is glorificatio (the making glorious) from gloria (glory). In order, then, that the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, might be made lustrous or glorious by His resurrection, He was first humbled by suffering; for had He not died, He would not have risen from the dead. Humility is the earning of glory; glory, the reward of humility. 3 Decorem being the same as honestum according to St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.): For something is called honorable, as has been said, inasmuch as it involves a certain decorem [= propriety, seemliness] from the ordination of reason (Dicitur enim aliquid honestum, sicut dictum est, inquantum habet quendam decorem ex ordinatione rationis).

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Whence the name of glory properly implies the display of something as regards its appearing seemly [decorum] among men, whether it be some bodily good, or a spiritual one.1 But since that which is lustrous simply [simpliciter clarum] can be seen by many, as well as by those who are far awayfor this reason by the name of glory is properly designated that someones good come into the notice and the approval of many....2

1. Note on gloria and claritas. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, Glory signifies a certain lustre [claritas], and so to be glorified [glorificari] is the same as to be made illustrious [clarificari], as Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.). But, in the case of the resurrected body, claritas results from the overflow of the spiritual glory of the soul into the body. Likewise in a thing of beauty, its claritas or lustre will result from an overflow of something comparable to glory arising from that in it which is analogous to the soul, namely, its form. But one must consider what pertains to form as figure, as well as to the substantial form where this is present (i.e. in things which exist by nature, such as an animal), for which, see below. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Suppl., q. 85, art. 1, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers, modified):
...[T]his claritas will result from the overflow of the souls glory into the body.3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 2, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
Glory is nothing other than distinguished notice [clara notitia] accompanied by praise [cum laude].4

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 103, art. 1, ad 3. (tr. B.A.M.):
Glory is the effect of honor and praise, for by the fact that we give testimony to someones goodness, his goodness gains distinction [clarescit] in the notice of many, and the name of glory implies this; for glory means something like distinction [claria].5
1

For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color. And so proportionally in the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre, whether spiritual or bodily, and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion.; sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus, propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habet clarum et nitidum colorem. unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum, quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum, secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In Dionysii de Div. Nom., cp. 4, lect. 5, tr. B.A.M.) 2 Gloria claritatem quandam significat, unde glorificari idem est quod clarificari, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet, et manifestationem. Et ideo nomen gloriae proprie importat manifestationem alicuius de hoc quod apud homines decorum videtur, sive illud sit bonum aliquod corporale, sive spirituale. Quia vero illud quod simpliciter clarum est, a multis conspici potest et a remotis, ideo proprie per nomen gloriae designatur quod bonum alicuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem.... 3 ...claritas illa causabitur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus. 4 gloria nihil aliud est, quam clara notitia cum laude. 5 gloria est effectus honoris et laudis, quia ex hoc, quod testificamur de bonitate alicuius, clarescit bonitas eius in notitia plurimorum, et hoc importat nomen gloriae, nam gloria dicitur quasi claria.

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2. Note on the foregoing. Note that I have translated the noun claria by distinction and the verb clarescit as gains distinction in view of their subject, which is decorem, the seemly or becoming, understood as an excellence worthy of approbation (for which, see below), and so as what stands out or is outstanding; but what is outstanding, when brought to notice, is distinct, or something which gains distinction, as with the fame of a celebrated concert pianist or any other virtuoso. Note also that clarus implies what is seen from a distance and hence what is widely known. 3. On an excellence worthy of approbation as entering into the definition of beauty. Cf. Pliny, Historia Naturalis, XXXV, xxxvi.64:
Reprehenditur tamen [Zeuxis] ceu grandior in capitibus articulisque, alioqui tantus diligentia, ut Agragantinis facturus tabulam, quam in templo Iunonis Laciniae publice dicarent, inspexerit virgines eorum nudas et quinque elegerit, ut quod in quaque laudatissimum esset pictura redderet. [Zeuxis]

examined the young maidens of that place naked, and selected five, in order to render in his painting what is most praiseworthy in each.

Note how the foregoing text makes clear how in a thing of beauty what is most praiseworthy (laudatissimum) corresponds to what is decorem. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 1, n. 159 (tr. B.A.M.):
And then when he says, Nay, rather, he shows that activities in accord with virtue are not only pleasing, but also beautiful and good. For they are pleasing in an order to the one doing them to whom they belong by virtue of a proper habit. But they are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstances as it were of certain parts. For beauty consists in a due commensuration of parts. But they are good by virtue of an order to an end.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145. art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said that, as Isidore says, Honorable [honestas] expresses, so to speak, the state of honor. Wherefore from this it appears that something is called honestum which is worthy of honor. But honor, as was said above, is owed to excellence. But the excellence of man is chiefly considered with regard to virtue, since it is the disposition of the perfect for the best, as is said in the Physics (VII, 3, 246b 23).2And so the honorable, properly speaking, is referred to the same thing as virtue.3
1

deinde cum dicit quinimmo et ostendit operationes secundum virtutem non solum sunt delectabiles, sed etiam pulchrae et bonae.delectabiles quidem sunt in ordine ad operantem cui conveniunt secundum proprium habitum. pulchrae autem secundum ordinem debitum circumstantiarum quasi quarumdam partium. nam in debita commensuratione partium, pulchritudo consistit. bonae autem sunt secundum ordinem ad finem. 2 That is, it is the disposition of the perfect, not in the sense of that which has attained its end, but of that which is disposed according to nature, and the best is its proper activity, as St. Thomas elsewhere explains (cf. In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 6). 3 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum, quod est honore dignum. Honor autem, ut supra dictum est, excellentiae debetur.

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4. On the honorable good in sum.

HONESTUM (THE HONORABLE GOOD, EXPRESSING SO TO SPEAK THE STATE OF HONOR). (1) That which is good according to reason, having pleasure attached to it (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 5, n. 58); (2) that which is desirable for its own sake, being a moral excellence rendering its possessor worthy of honor (cf. Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q, 145, art. 1, c.); (3) that good which is desirable for its own sake, expressing, so to speak, the state of honor as having, by reason of its spiritual beauty, a certain excellence deserving of honor (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 2, obj. 2; ibid. art. 3, c.); (4) an integral part of temperance whereby one loves the beauty of that virtue (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 4); (5) that virtue which moderates in accordance with reason everything pertaining to man (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 1, c.); (6) a certain spiritual beauty accruing to a thing insofar as it is regulated by reason (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 3, c.); (7) the Latin equivalent of to kalon as the noble or admirable good (B.A.M.). 5. The definition of claritas. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, claritas or lustre may be understood as the manifestationthat is, the making public, or publicly knownof the excellences of a thingthat is, of whatever in a thing is worthy of approbation, which, in the passages immediately at issue, are certain virtues, principally the moral ones. One can easily see, however, that the term naturally would be applied both to the intellectual virtues as well as to any bodily or physical excellences a person or thing might possess. In fact, the very name of lustre, being taken from a sensible quality, would have the latter sense as its first meaning, particularly in the case of a gemstone. (On this sense see further below.) 6. Some expressions relevant to the interpretation of claritas: outstanding, famous; famed, renowned prominent; preeminent; eminent, celebrated conspicuous; distinguished; distinct a shining example widely-known notice; public notice notorious; noted; noteworthy an x of note a stand out a star having star quality having ones praises sung far and wide a famous person, a superstar, a luminary a leading light my star pupil destined for stardom
Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute.

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Decorus, a, um [adj.] Decor, decoris [n.] what is seemly or becoming (Deferrari) [= honestum; the honorable good and hence virtue] the fitting, the appropriate, the becoming what is worthy of esteem or admiration; hence an excellence virtue understood as the disposition of the perfect for the best, or rather an ensemble of virtues, whether bodily or spiritual manifestatio light (that which makes manifest) all that makes manifest is light argument understood as the middle term that which reduces a knowing power from ability to act that which illuminates a sense power or the intellect lucid pellucid clear diaphanous easily understood intelligible perspicuous whatever is grasped with ease glory and lustre sensible intelligible activities in accord with virtue are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstances as it were of certain parts schema (arrangement, configuration) chroma (color, coloring) light = that which makes manifest to sight color = that which is seen, the object of sight claritas is not light but a light-like quality of color claritas pertains to intelligibility in the sense of perspicuity easily held in memory = intelligible = claritas 99

Cf. Michael Augros, Scrapboo7:

4) Is beauty something other than the shapes and colors and proportions in a face? Is it some other quality added on? No. It is these qualities and the order among them in some whole.

7. Some contemporary Thomists on claritas. Cf. Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation:
Each form has its own light or radiance (claritas) which it imparts to the being of which it is the form. In this sense the form of a thing gives it its beauty; A forma rei est decor eius, St. Thomas remarks. (pp.9-10) [In III Sent., d 23, q. 3, a. 1, qu.1, sed contra. See In Div. Nom., n. 339.] ....It is easy to recognize the effulgence or luminosity of a being as an integral factor in its beauty. There is beauty in a sunset, in a dream or fantasy, a logical argument, an heroic deed, because each in its own way shines before us, lights up our senses, imagination, or mind and thereby gives us pleasure. Besides radiance or luminosity, harmony or proportion is essential to the beautiful. (p.10) [Cf. n. 13, p. 20: As radiance comes from form, so proportion or harmony comes from the ordering of a thing to an end.]

Cf. Vernon J. Bourke, The Pocket Aquinas, p. 261:

clarity (a special quality of brilliant appeal).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 132, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
Now lustre [claritas] involves a certain seemliness [decorem], as well as display [or manifestation, manifestationem].1

Claritas is the refulgence of a body. It has reference to the intensity or remission of the color. But it is a shining outward, rather than inward. Brightness pertains to color, which exists in the surface of a body as its limit or boundary.

Both brightness and color are in the third species of quality, whereas as shape or figure, which is a quality around a quantity (of which a surface is one), constitutes the fourth species. 8. The etymology of the word for form. Beauty is the splendor of form shining on proportionate matter. St. Albert the Great, De Pulchro et Bono
1

Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet, et manifestationem.

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Cf. JustThomism (a Website).

What form means. One way to understand the English word form is to consider its opposite, the formless. The formless is the dark, the shifting, the unknowable, the airy, the undistinct, etc. When Genesis describes the world before creation as without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the waters of the deep, it draws to mind the right image of the formless as what lacks being [void] and is unknown [the waters of the deep without light]. Now since the formless first brings to mind to be dark and unintelligible, one of the original meanings of form traces back to the Greek morphe, which derives from the Indo-European root mer-bh meaning to shine or to sparkle. This sense did not transfer into the English word form, but it is a single idea that stands behind all of the meanings, and a meaning that, again, is implied in the meaning of the word formless This shining or sparkling is both the splendor of existing (which gives us the sense of to form which means to cause to be) and of being intelligible (for what is known is brought to light). The word form also denotes the complete and the perfect, for what has been formed has been completed, and what has been reformed has been brought back to some original splendor or goodness. Published in: Uncategorized on March 17, 2007 at 6:02 pm Comments (0)

9. Excerpts from various web sites: 1. The deep, divine, sense of to gleam, to sparkle is revealed by the etymology of the word FORM, deriving from the Indo-European root mer-bh, meaning gleam. Some cognate American English words relating to form and shape [e.g. MORPHOLOGY] are based on the Greek morphe, which once implied outward appearance and beauty. 2. The Indo-European root for the word FORM is mer-bh which means, precisely, to sparkle, to gleam, although evolving through the Greek morphe, this has come to focus on distinguishing the aspect of change.The word GLEAM derives from a different IndoEuropean root ghel(2), that has given birth to a large word group, including GOLD, GUILDER, YELLOW, GLEE and ZIRCON, CHLORO(phyl), CHLORINE, GALL, and CHOLERA, GLANCE, GLASS, GLIMPSE, GLISTEN, GLITTER, GLIDE, GLISSADE and GLOAMING. 3. The Indo-European root of the modern English word form and its analogues in other languages is apparently mer-bh- or mer-gwh-, to gleam, sparkle ... 4. 101

Proto-IE: * merbh -, *bhermMeaning: shape Old Greek: morph f. `usserliche (krperliche) Gestalt, Form, schne Gestalt, Anmut, a-merphs <amerphes> `ugly (Hes.) Latin: forma f. `Form (Guss-, Modellform); Gebilde, Geprge, Gestalt, Art; Asseres, Figur; Idee, Vorstellung References: WH (differently in Pok.) 5. The O-grade form of its Indo-European root, mer-bh, gives us the Greek morphe (form, beauty), as well as, ultimately, morph, morpheme, morpho, morphosis. 6. Morphe- (also in metamorphosis) means to gleam or sparkle with an appearance seen as beauty. 7. morphe-form, shape, figure, appearance; beauty, grace 9. The order of meanings of the word for form in sum. to gleam, to sparkle, hence, to gleam or sparkle with an appearance seen as beauty, hence, an appearance seen as beauty, hence, appearance (the look of something); beauty Some cognate American English words relating to form and shape...are based on the Greek morphe, which once implied outward appearance and beauty.

Hence a word that began its career meaning gleam or sparkle comes to mean form by way of appearance and beauty. Note also that the look of something comes to be identified with its shape or figure, understood as its form, as is indicated by the following: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):
Now for the evidence supporting these arguments one must consider that among all the qualities, figures [or shapes] more than anything else follow on and reveal the species of things. This is most evident in plants and animals, in which no more certain judgement of the diversity of species can be made than by the diversity of figures. And this is so because, just as among the other accidents quantities stand nearest to substance, so figure, which is a quality around a quantity, stands nearest to the form of the substance.1
1

ad evidentiam autem harum rationum considerandum est, quod inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime consequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum. quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo certiori iudicio diversitas specierum diiudicari potest, quam diversitate figurarum. et hoc ideo, quia sicut quantitas propinquissime se habet ad substantiam inter alia accidentia, ita figura, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, propinquissime se habet ad formam substantiae. unde sicut posuerunt aliqui dimensiones esse

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XI. FORM AND FIGURE IN RELATION TO CLARITAS. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M):
Where it must be considered that form and figure differ from each other in this, that figure implies the termination of quantity, for it is the figure which is comprehended by a boundary or boundaries: but form means what gives specific being to the work of art; for the form of works of art are accidents.1

N.B. Hence I say that the form which gives specific being to the work of art, or to the thing existing by nature as the case may be, is the source of its lustre (cf. St. Albert, quoted above). Further, the form which gives specific being to the thing is the same as its nature; but nature is something of the divine art in things; but the divine art is a kind of reason. With these observations in mind, consider the following: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Phys., lect. 3, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.):
In this way, then, what first and foremost contains each thing is its per se place; but of this sort is the term at which each thing is bounded; it therefore follows that place first and foremost is the term of a thing. But the form is the term [or limit] of each thing, the reason being that by the form the matter of each thing is terminated at its proper being, and by the magnitude to its determinate measure. For the quantities of things follow upon their forms.2

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 45, art. 1, obj. 2 & ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
obj. 2. Further, figure is in the fourth species of quality, whereas lustre is in the third, since it is a sensible quality. Therefore the assumption of lustre by Christ ought not to be called transfiguration.3 ad 2. To the second it must be said that figure is considered in relation to the extremity of a body; for the figure is what is comprehended by a boundary or boundaries [Euclid, bk i, def. xiv]. And so everything which is considered in relation to the extremity of a body appears to pertain to the figure in some way. Now as is the case with the color, so too the lustre of a non-transparent [i.e. opaque] body is observed in its surface. And so the assumption of lustre is called transfiguration.4

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 189, art. 2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

substantiam rerum, ita posuerunt aliqui figuras esse substantiales formas. 1 ubi considerandum est quod forma et figura in hoc ab invicem differunt, quod figura importat terminationem quantitatis; est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur: forma vero dicitur, quae dat esse specificum artificiato; formae enim artificiatorum sunt accidentia. 2 Sic ergo illud quod primo et per se continet unumquodque, est per se locus eius; huiusmodi autem est terminus ad quem res terminatur; sequitur ergo quod locus proprie et per se sit terminus rei. Forma autem est terminus uniuscuiusque: quia per formam terminatur materia uniuscuiusque ad proprium esse, et magnitudo ad determinatam mensuram: quantitates enim rerum consequuntur formas earum. 3 Praeterea, figura est in quarta specie qualitatis, claritas autem est in tertia, cum sit sensibilis qualitas. Assumptio ergo claritatis a Christo transfiguratio dici non debet. 4 Ad secundum dicendum quod figura circa extremitatem corporis consideratur, est enim figura quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur. Et ideo omnia illa quae circa extremitatem corporis considerantur ad figuram quodammodo pertinere videntur. Sicut autem color, ita et claritas corporis non transparentis in eius superficie attenditur. Et ideo assumptio claritatis transfiguratio dicitur.

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To the third it must be said that beauty, as has been said above, consists in a certain lustre and due proportion. Now both of these are found in reason as in a root, to which pertains both a manifesting light and the ordering of a due proportion in other things.1

lustre due proportion a manifesting light the ordering of due proportion

1. The definition of light. Light. 1. Properly speaking, that which makes manifest to the sense of sight. 2. Commonly speaking, that which makes manifest to any knowing power. (St. Thomas Aquinas); 3. that which reduces a knowing power from ability to act (Aristotle). 2. In sum. gloria (glory) claritas (lustre) claritas (lustre) decorem (which is the same as honestum, the honorable good) manifestatio (display or manifestation) glory a display or manifestation (in which it is like light) of what appears estimable among men (or the many) (and so consisting in virtue) hence glory comprehends the coming into the awareness and the approval of the many of a mans excellent qualities 3. On manifestation and the estimable. to manifest or to make manifest is proper to light but what appears estimable is a good, especially the good which consists in virtue cf. the honorable good cf. the good which is sensible (the admired) that which is worthy of honor that which is worthy of commendation or admiration the good understood as virtue: virtue is the disposition of the perfect for the best
1

ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare..

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N.B. So wherever there is something estimable or worthy of admiration coming into the knowledge or awareness of the many there is lustre. In the case of a sensible thing, that quality will therefore be analogous to the estimable so understood, which quality is quite literally the reflection of light coming from its surface. Cf. the following definitions: 4. On lustre as a sensible quality (in which case it enters into the definition of beauty). According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, lustre means: 1. 2. 3. 9. Soft reflected light; sheen. Brilliance or radiance of light; brightness. Glory, radiance, distinction, or splendor, as of achievement, reputation, or beauty. The appearance of a mineral surface judged by its brilliance and ability to reflect light.

Whereas the third meaning is the one St. Thomas is speaking about, the ninth is the more known, and hence furnishes a natural starting point for any exposition. We observe that lustre names a kind of radiance or diffusion of lightthat is, it is not just light, but something of which light is the principal component; that something being a kind of movement outward to the eye, especially insofar as what is moved is reflected. Note the idea of distinction: a man in possession of admirable qualities is a man of distinction; but distinctness pertains to lustre: distinction or distinctness pertains to merit but merit is due or owed to estimable qualities clarus (bright) claria (splendor, distinction) claritas (lustre) nitor, nitidum (brightness, splendor) fulgor (lightning, flash, splendor) 5. Thomas-Lexikon, s.v. gloria. b) Ruhm, Berhmtheit, Herrlichkeit, Verherrlichung, der Gegensatz zu ignominia (mal. 9. 1 c): gloria nihil aliud est, quam clara notitia (BekanntSein) cum laude, th. I. II. 2. 3 c; gloria est effectus honoris et laudis, quia ex hoc, quod testificamur de bonitate alicuius, clarescit bonitas eius in notitia plurimorum, et hoc importat (bedeutet) nomen gloriae, nam gloria dicitur quasi claria, ib. II. II. 103. 1 ad 3; gloria claritatem quandam significat, unde glorificari idem est, quod clarificari, ut Augustinus dicit; . . . claritas autem et decor quandam habent manifestationem alicuius de hoc, quod apud homines decorum videtur, sive illud sit bonum corporale aliquod sive spirituale; quia vero illud, quod simpliciter (schlechtweg) clarum est, a multis conspici potest et a remotis, ideo proprie per nomen gloriae 105

designatur, quod bonum alicuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem, ib. 132. 1 c; vgl. cg. III. 29; mal. 9. 1 c.

ber den Unterschied zwischen gloria & honor honor. Als Arten der gloria gehren hierher: 1. gloria caelestis sive patriae (th. III. 22. 2 c; 45. 4 c) = die himmlische Herrlichkeit oder die Herrlichkeit des (himmlischen) Vaterlandes. 2. g. Dei sive divina & g. mundana (th. I. 70. 2 c; cg. IV. 55) = die Herrlichkeit Gottes und die der Welt oder die gttliche und die weltliche Herrlichkeit. 3. g. divina, g. Dei. 4. g. inanis sive vana & g. vera (th. I. II. 84. 4 c; II. II. 112. 2 c; 132. 1-5 c; cg. III. 63; mal. 9. 1 ob. 10, c, ad 5 & 10 & 2 c) = der eitle und der wahre Ruhm (tripliciter potest dici gloria vana. Primo quidem, quando aliquis gloriatur falso, puta (z. B.) de bono, quod non habet . . . Secundo dicitur gloria vana, quando aliquis gloriatur de aliquo bono, quod de facili transit . . . Tertio modo dicitur gloria vana, quando gloria hominis non ordinatur ad debitum finem. Est enim homini naturale, quod appetat cognitionem veritatis, quia per hoc perficitur eius intellectus, sed quod aliquis appetat bonum suum ab aliquo cognosci, non est appetitus perfectionis, unde habet quandam vanitatem, prout hoc non est utile ad aliquem finem. Potest autem laudabiliter ordinari ad tria. Primo quidem ad gloriam Dei; per hoc enim, quod bonum alicuius manifestatur, glorificatur Deus, cuius est principaliter illud bonum sicut primi auctoris . . . Secundo est utile ad proximorum salutem, qui bonum alicuius cognoscentes aedificantur ad imitandum . . . Tertio modo ordinari potest ad utilitatem ipsius hominis, qui, dum considerat bona sua ab aliis laudari, de his gratias agit et firmius in eis persistit . . . Si quis ergo appetat manifestationem suorum bonorum, vel etiam in huiusmodi manifestatione delectetur non propter aliquod trium praedictorum, erit gloria vana, mal. 9. 1 c; gloria . . . vera, quae in cognitione Dei consistit, ib. ad 5). 5. g. mundana, g. Dei. 6. g. naturalis & g. spiritualis (Ps. 7 b) = der natrliche und der geistige Ruhm (des Menschen, nmlich seine Ebenbildlichkeit mit Gott und sein gutes Gewissen). 7. g. patriae, g. caelestis. 8. g. spiritualis, g. naturalis. 9. g. supererogationis (th. II. II. 81. 6 ad 3) = der Ruhm, etwas ber das Geforderte oder Notwendige hinaus geleistet zu haben. 10. g. vana, g. inanis. 11. g. vera, . 12. g. vitae aeternae (ib. I. 20. 4 ad 3) = die Herrlichkeit des ewigen Lebens. Die filiae d. i. die Sprsslinge der inanis gloria, welche eine von den sieben Haupttodsnden (vgl. ib. II. II. 132. 4 c) ist und sich von der superbia unterscheidet ( superbia sub a), sind: inoboedientia (Ungehorsam), iactantia (Prahlerei), hypocrisis (), contentio (), pertinacia (Halsstarrigkeit), discordia (), novitatum praesumptio () ; vgl. ib. 37. 2 t; 38. 2 c; 132. 5 c; mal. 9. 3 c.

b) himmlische Herrlichkeit, berirdische Verklrung: perfecti sunt in gratia vel gloria, th. I. 61 pr.; vgl. ib. 62 pr.; gloria, quae nihil est aliud, quam gratia consummata, ib. 95. 1 ob. 6; vgl. ib. I. II. 67. 4 ad 2; beatitudo in sacra Scriptura frequentissime gloria nominatur, cg. III. 63; vgl. ib. IV. 8.

Zu bonum gloriae bonus sub c; zu claritas g. claritas sub c; zu cognitio g. cognitio sub b; zu comprehensio g. comprehensio sub b; zu dilectio g. dilectio sub a; zu dominus g. dominus; zu donum g. donum sub a; zu esse g. 106

 esse; zu imago g. imago sub a; zu immortalitas g. immortalitas; zu impassibilitas g. impassibilitas; zu incorruptibile secundum g. incorruptibilis; zu libertas g. libertas sub a; zu lumen g. sive divinae g. lumen; zu lux g. lux sub a; zu operatio g. operatio sub b; zu perfectio g. perfectio sub b; zu potestas g. potestas sub b; zu retributio g. retributio; zu similitudo g. similitudo sub a; zu status g. sive g. consummatae status sub c; zu visio g. visio sub a; zu vita g. vita sub a.

Arten der gloria in diesem Sinne sind: 1. gloria accidentalis & g. essentialis (mal. 7. 11 ad 6) = die nebenschliche oder unwesentliche und die wesentliche Herrlichkeit im Himmel. 2. g. animae sive spiritualis & g. corporis sive corporalis (th. I. 66. 3 c; 73. 1 ad 3; II. II. 18. 2 ad 4) = die berirdische Verklrung der Seele und die des Krpers oder die geistige und die krperliche berirdische Verklrung. 3. g. claritatis (cg. IV. 86) = die in der Klarheit oder im Lichtschein des Krpers bestehende berirdische Verklrung. 4. g. corporalis, g. animae. 5. g. corporis, . 6. g. creata (verit. 29. 1 a) = die geschaffene berirdische Herrlichkeit. 7. g. essentialis, g. accidentalis. 8. g. finalis sive futura (th. III. 45. 4 c; cg. IV. 91) = die schlieliche oder zuknftige Herrlichkeit (quae est in caelis. cg. IV. 91). 9. g. futura, g. finalis. 10. g. perfecta (pot. 4. 2 ad 11) = die vollendete oder vollkommene berirdische Verklrung. 11. g. spiritualis, g. animae.

6. The agent intellect as light. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III. 5 (tr. Mark Smillie):
Since further, just as in every nature, there is something which is indeed the matter of each genus, and is in potency all those things [in the genus], and there is another which is a cause and productive because all those things are in its making, as art stands to matter, these different things also must exist in the soul. And so there is an intellect of such a kind to become everything, and another of such a kind to make [it] into everything, as in the manner of a fixed disposition, such as how light acts. For in some sense, light too makes colors existing in potency, colors existing in act. And this separable, and impassible, and unmixed intellect is a substantial being in act. For the agent is always superior to the patient, and the principle (originating force) is always superior to the matter. Again, knowledge in act is identical to the thing [known]; but knowledge in potency, is prior in time in the one thing [individual]. However, it is not entirely [prior] in time. It [the intellect or the agent intellect?] sometimes does not know, but it is not sometimes knowing. This intellect alone is separated, which it is truly. And this alone is immortal and continuous. It does not remember, moreover, because, it is impassible; the passive intellect is destructtible, and without this, the soul understands nothing.

7. In sum. The agent intellect, we are told, stands to the potential intellect as art to its material or light to colors. But claritas is the property of that which results from the action of what is manifestative. That is, where (or whenever) light illuminates, claritas results. 107

Claritas is both transparency and luminosity. to be manifestative is to reduce a knowing power from potency to act to be decorous is to be worthy of approbation

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 132, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
Now lustre [claritas] involves a certain estimable quality [or propriety, decorem], as well as display [manifestationem].1

the integral parts of claritas or lustre the possession of admirable qualities the coming into public notice an illustrious man I say: this good which enters into the awareness and approbation of many is, in way, the honestum or honorable good, which is a spiritual excellence; but in another way, it is a certain sensible excellence which is worthy of admiration. decor decorousness fittingness appropriateness worthy of approbation or admiration the admirable but what is worthy of approbation is honorable or commendable but what makes manifest is light Hence the notion of claritas involves the notes of being worthy of esteem as well as informing the knowing power. That is, beauty is said to have lustre insofar as it is admirable or worthy of esteem, as well as capable of lighting up the mind or the senses. Cf. Aristotle on making an impact on the senses that goes beyond the nature of the poetic art (end of Chapter 15). what is honestum in the case of the physical or bodily as well as the spiritual the latter is a moral excellence; the former a bodily honor is given to spiritual excellence (a war hero) admiration is given to the bodily (a beauty pageant winner) cf. Jane Austen (cited below) on someone being much admired
1

Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet, et manifestationem.

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I say that claritas is the same as lustre or an illustrious reputation. a shining example of fidelity cf. praeclarus as meaning famous or celebrated, but also preeminently clear approbation light is that which makes manifest to the sense of sight the honorable is that which is desirable for its own sake, being a moral excellence rendering its possessor worthy of honor to manifest as by light: cf. the active intellect: it manifests something to the knowing power by reducing it from potency to act decor > becoming > spiritually beautiful > the honestum and the admirable: what is worthy of approbation

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8. On light. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. 13, q. 1, art. 2:

DS13QU1 AR2-TT utrum lux proprie inveniatur in spiritualibus. DS13QU1 AR2- AG1 ad secundum sic proceditur. One proceeds to the second as follows. Whether light is found properly in spiritual things.

videtur quod lux proprie in spiritualibus It seems that light is found properly in spiritual inveniatur. things. primo per id quod dicitur joan. 1, 9: erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; quod de deo intelligitur, qui maxime spiritualis est. First, by what is said in John 1:9: He was the true light enlightening every man on coming into this world, which must be understood of God, who is spiritual to the greatest extent.

ergo videtur quod lux proprie in spiritualibus It seems, then, that light is properly found in substantiis inveniatur. spiritual substances. DS13QU1 AR2- AG2 praeterea, augustinus dicit: non christus sic Further, Augustine says, Christ is not called dicitur lux quomodo dicitur lapis; light in the same way He is called a stone; sed illud proprie, hoc utique figurative. but <He is called> the one properly, the other, perhaps figuratively.

non autem christus proprie diceretur lux, nisi But light would not be said properly of Christ lux proprie in spiritualibus inveniretur. unless light were properly found in spiritual ergo etc.. things. DS13QU1 AR2- AG3 Therefore, etc.

praeterea, inter alias creaturas spiritualis Further, among the other creatures the spiritual substantia nobilior est, quasi deo proximior. substance is nobler, as being nearer to God. sed non est probabile, scripturam divinam But it is not likely that divine Scripture would nobilissimae creaturae creationem subticuisse. have placed the creation of the noblest creature under [that of the less noble, sc. the bodily]. cum ergo de creatione angelorum mentionem non faciat, videtur quod ad litteram et proprie per lucis productionem creatio naturae angelicae sit intelligenda. DS13QU1 AR2- AG4 praeterea, luci convenit maxime activum esse; Further, to be active belongs to light most of all, Since, then, it does not mention the creation of the angels, it seems that, according to the literal sense and properly, by the production of light the creation of the angelic nature is to be understood.

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unde luci attribuitur diffusivum esse.

for which reason to be diffusive is attributed to light.

sed actio convenit verius spiritualibus quam But action more truly belongs to spiritual things corporalibus. than to the bodily. ergo et lux. DS13QU1 AR2- AG5 praeterea, actus proprius lucis est manifestare. sed manifestatio magis proprie spiritualibus, ubi est nobilior cognitio. est Further, the proper act of light is to manifest. in But manifestation is more properly in spiritual things where there is a nobler knowledge. It seems, then, that light is more truly found in them. And so then light.

ergo videtur quod et lux verius in eis inveniatur. DS13QU1 AR2- SC-1 sed contra est quod dicit ambrosius, qui inter ea quae transumptive de deo dicuntur, ponit splendorem qui contingit ex multiplicatione luminis. ergo videtur quod lux in spiritualibus non nisi metaphorice inveniatur. DS13QU1 AR2- SC-2

But to the contrary is what Ambrose says, who, among those things said of God by a proportional transfer, puts down the splendor that comes about from a multiplication of light. It seems, then, that light is not found in spiritual things except metaphorically.

praeterea, dionysius dicit, quod deus dicitur Further, Dionysius says that light is said of God lumen ex hoc quod similitudo ejus maxime from this, that with respect to causality a likeresultat in radio solari quantum ad causalitatem. ness of Him most results in a ray of the sun. sed omne nomen quod dicitur de deo per But every name said of God by a likeness taken similitudinem a creatura corporali sumptam, from a bodily creature belongs to Him metaconvenit sibi metaphorice. phorically. ergo etc.. DS13QU1 AR2- CO respondeo dicendum, quod in hoc videtur esse quaedam diversitas inter sanctos. I reply that it must be said that on this matter there seems to be a certain diversity among the Saints. Therefore, etc.

augustinus enim videtur velle, quod lux in For Augustine seems to wish that light be found spiritualibus verius inveniatur quam in more truly in spiritual things than in bodily corporalibus. ones.

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sed ambrosius et dionysius videntur velle, quod But Ambrose and Dionysius seem to wish that it in spiritualibus non nisi metaphorice inveniatur. not be found in spiritual things except metaphorically. et hoc quidem videtur magis verum; quia nihil And this seems the more true, because nothing per se sensibile spiritualibus convenit nisi sensible per se belongs to spiritual things except metaphorice, metaphorically, quia quamvis aliquid commune possit inveniri analogice in spiritualibus et corporalibus, non tamen aliquid per se sensibile, ut patet in ente, et calore; the reason being that, although something common can be found analogously in spiritual and bodily things, still, not something sensible per se, as is clear in being and heat.

ens enim non est per se sensibile, quod utrique For being, which is common to both, is not commune est; calor autem quod per se sensibile sensible per se; but heat, which is sensible per est, in spiritualibus proprie non invenitur. se, is not properly found in spiritual things. unde cum lux sit qualitas per se visibilis, et species quaedam determinata in sensibilibus; non potest dici in spiritualibus nisi vel aequivoce vel metaphorice. And so, since light is a quality visible per se, and a certain determinate species in sensible things, it cannot be said in spiritual things except either equivocally or metaphorically.

sciendum tamen, quod transferuntur corporalia Still, it must be understood that bodily things in spiritualia per quamdam similitudinem, quae are carried over to the spiritual by a certain likequidem est similitudo proportionabilitatis; ness, which is in fact a likeness of proportionability. et hanc similitudinem oportet reducere in And this likeness must be reduced to some aliquam communitatem univocationis, vel community of univocity or analogy; and this is analogiae; et sic est in proposito: the case in the point at issue: dicitur enim lux in spiritualibus illud quod ita se habet ad manifestationem intellectivam sicut se habet lux corporalis ad manifestationem sensitivam. manifestatio autem verius est in spiritualibus; et quantum ad hoc, verum est dictum augustini, quod lux verius est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus, non secundum propriam rationem lucis, sed secundum rationem manifestationis, prout dicitur in canonica joannis, quod omne quod manifestatur, lumen est; For that is called light in spiritual things that stands to intellectual manifestation in the same way as bodily light stands to sensible manifestation. But manifestation is more truly found in spiritual things. And with respect to this, what Augustine says is true, that light is more truly in spiritual things than in the bodily, not according to the proper account of light, but according to the account of manifestation, as it is said in the Canonical Epistle of John, that everything that is manifested is light.1

per quem modum omne quod manifestum est, In this way everything that is manifest is called clarum dicitur, et omne occultum obscurum. clear, and everything hidden, obscure. DS13QU1 AR2- RA1
1

The attribution of this quotation is mistaken; it is actually Ephesians, v:13.

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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 67, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.).
QU67 AR1 CO respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine I reply that it must be said that it is appropriate dupliciter convenit loqui, to speak of a name in two ways: uno modo, secundum primam eius in one way according to its first imposition; in impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum another way, according to the use of the name. nominis. sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo This is clear in the case of the name sight, impositum est ad significandum actum sensus which was first imposed in order to signify the visus; act of the sense of sight, sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum but by reason of the dignity and certitude of this sense, according to common usage, the name has been extended to all knowledge (obtained through) the other senses.

(dicimus enim, vide quomodo sapit, vel (For we say: see how it tastes, or how it quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum); smells, or how warm it is). et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus, And finally, (the name of sight has been secundum illud matth. v, beati mundo corde, extended) even to the knowledge of the quoniam ipsi deum videbunt. intellect, as in Matt., 5:8: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. et similiter dicendum est de nomine lucis. And the same thing must be said in the case of the name light.

nam primo quidem est institutum ad For it was first instituted in order to signify that significandum id quod facit manifestationem in which produces a manifestation in the sense of sensu visus, sight. postmodum autem extensum est ad signify- Afterwards, it was extended to signify that candum omne illud quod facit manifestationem which produces a manifestation according to secundum quamcumque cognitionem. knowledge of any kind. si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum If, then, the name light be taken according to suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in its first imposition, it is said metaphorically in spiritualibus dicitur, ut ambrosius dicit. spiritual things, as Ambrose says. si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu But if it be taken according as it has been loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extended in common usage to every instance of extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur. manifestation, in this way it is said properly in spiritual things.

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9. On color (chroma). (a) On the four primary colors.

Pythagoreans (A) Atius (plac. I) H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (4.ed. Berlin 1965) 313 Plutarchi Ept. I,15, 1-7) Color is the visible corporeal quality. The Pythagoreans call the visible surface of the body skin-color...The followers of Pythagoras (regard) white, black, red and yellow as the elementary colors (the families of colors). The differences of the colors (of bodies?) derive from what mixtures of the elements are involved.

Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo ad Alex. (396b 8-19) (ed. Loeb; tr. Furley, rev. B.A.M.):
i)/swj de\ kai\ tw=n e)nanti/wn h( fu/sij gli/xetai kai\ e)k tou/twn a)potelei= to\ su/mfwnon, ou)k e)k tw=n o(moi/wn, w(/sper a)me/lei to\ a)/rren suh/ngage pro\j to\ qh=lu kai\ ou)x e(ka/teron pro\j to\ o(mo/fulon, kai\ th\n prw/thn o(mo/noian dia\ tw=n e)nanti/wn shnh=yen, ou) dia\ tw=n o(moi/wn. e)/oike de\ kai\ h( te/xnh th\n fu/sin mimoume/nh tou=to poiei=n. zwgrafi/a me\n ga\r leukw=n te kai\ mela/nwn, w)xrw=n te kai\ e)ruqrw=n, xrwma/twn e)gkerasame/nh fu/seij ta\j ei)ko/naj toi=j prohgoume/noij a)pete/lese sumfw/nouj, mousikh\ de\ o)cei=j a(/ma kai\ barei=j, makrou/j te kai\ braxei=j fqo/ggouj mi/casa e)n diafo/roij fwnai=j mi/an a)pete/lesen a(rmoni/an, grammatikh\ de\ e)k fwnhe/ntwn kai\ a(fw/vwn gramma/twn kra=sin poihsame/nh th\n o(/lhn te/xnhn a)p) au)tw=n sunesth/sato.

But perhaps it may be that nature has a liking for contraries and perfects a consonance from them and not from similar things, just as she has joined the male to the female, and not each of them to another of the same sex, thus making the first concord not through similar things, but through contraries. But art, it seems, also does this by imitating nature. For painting by mixing the nature of colors white and black, yellow and red, perfects images that accord with their prototypes;

but music simultaneously mixes sounds high and low, long and short, and perfects a single harmony in different sounds;

but grammar by making a mixture from the letters of vowels and consonants composes out of them the whole of its art.

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10. That color comes from light received in a limited body. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Comp. Theol., I, cp. 43. (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 CP-43 inveniuntur autem quaedam quae ex aliis Now certain things that proceed from other procedunt, perfectam eorum speciem non things are found not to follow after the perfect consequi, ex quibus procedunt. species of those things from which they proceed. uno modo sicut in generationibus aequivocis: a In one way, as in equivocal generations: for a sole enim non generatur sol, sed quoddam sun is not generated from the sun, but a certain animal. animal. ut ergo talis imperfectio a generatione divina Therefore, that an imperfection of this kind be excludatur, confitemur natum deum de deo. excluded from divine generation, we confess God born of God. alio modo quod procedit ex aliquo, differt ab eo propter defectum puritatis, dum scilicet ab eo quod est in se simplex et purum, per applicationem ad extraneam materiam aliquid producitur a prima specie deficiens: sicut ex domo quae est in mente artificis, fit domus quae est in materia; In another way, what proceeds from something differs from it because of a lack of purity, when, that is, from what is simple and pure in itself by an application to exterior matter something is produced falling short of the first species: as a house in matter comes from a house in the mind of an artisan;

et a lumine recepto in corpore terminato, fit and color comes from light received in a limited color; body; et ex igne adiuncto aliis elementis, fit mixtum; and a mixed thing comes from fire joined to the other elements;

et ex radio per oppositionem corporis opaci, fit and a shadow comes from a ray [of light] by the umbra. opposition of an opaque body. ut hoc ergo a divina generatione excludatur, Therefore, that this be excluded from divine additur lumen de lumine. generation, light from light is added. tertio modo quod ex aliquo procedit, non In a third way what proceeds from something consequitur speciem eius propter defectum does not follow after its species because of a veritatis, lack of truth quia scilicet non vere recipit eius naturam, sed quamdam eius similitudinem tantum, sicut imago in speculo vel sculptura, aut etiam similitudo rei in intellectu vel sensu. because, namely, it does not truly receive its nature, but only a certain likeness of it, like an image in a mirror or a sculpture, or even the likeness of a thing in the intellect or sense.

non enim imago hominis dicitur verus homo, For the image of a man is not called a true man, sed similitudo; nec lapis est anima, ut dicit but a likeness; nor is a stone the soul, as the philosophus, sed species lapidis. Philosopher says (De Anima, III, 8 (431b 29).), but the species of the stone.

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ut igitur haec a divina generatione excludantur, That, then, these things be excluded from the additur: deum verum de deo vero. divine generation, it is added: true God from true God. secundum naturam etiam impossibile est It is also impossible for the Word to differ from verbum a deo differre, cum hoc sit deo naturale God according to nature, since this is natural to quod se ipsum intelligat. God, that he understand Himself. habet enim omnis intellectus aliqua quae For every understanding has something which it naturaliter intelligit, sicut intellectus noster naturally understands, as our understanding has habet prima principia. the first principles. multo ergo magis deus, cuius intelligere est Therefore, much more does God, whose suum esse, seipsum naturaliter intelligit. understanding is His own essence, understand Himself naturally. verbum ergo ipsius naturaliter ex ipso est, non sicut ea quae praeter naturalem originem procedunt, ut a nobis procedunt res artificiales, quas facere dicimur. quae vero naturaliter a nobis procedunt, dicimur generare, ut filius. Therefore the Word itself is from Him by nature, not in the manner of those things which proceed beyond a natural origin, but as artificial things proceed from us, which we say are made. But those which proceed from us by nature nature we say are generated [begotten], like a son.

ne igitur dei verbum non naturaliter a deo Therefore, lest the Word of God be understood procedere intelligatur, sed secundum potestatem to proceed from God not by nature, but suae voluntatis, additur: genitum, non factum. according to the power of His will, it is added: Begotten, not made.

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11. Some dictionary definitions pertaining to lustre: Rogets New Millenium Thesaurus, s.v. illustrious. Notes: illustrative means clarifying by use of examples or serving to demonstrate, while illustrious means widely known and esteemed or having or conferring glory.
Modern Language Association (MLA):
illustrious. Rogets New Millennium Thesaurus, First Edition (v 1.3.1). Lexico Publishing Group, LLC. 03 Apr. 2007. <Thesaurus.com http://thesaurus.reference.com/browse/illustrious>.

The Oxford English Dictionary. Bright A. adj. (in general, the opposite of dull.) 1. Shining; emitting, reflecting, or pervaded by much light. 2. Clear or luminous to the mental perception. 4. Of vivid or brilliant colour; used also with names of colour, as bright red. Brilliance 1. Intense or sparkling brightness or radiance, lustre, splendour. Brilliant 1. Brightly shining, glittering, sparkling, lustrous. Radiance 1. Light shining with diverging rays; hence, brilliant light, vivid brightness, splendour. Radiant 1. Sending out rays of light; shining brightly. Shine 1. Brightness or radiance shed by a luminary or an illuminant. Shine intr. 1. Of a heavenly body or an object that is alight: To shed beams of bright light: to give out light so as to illuminate; to be radiant. Splendour. 1. Great brightness; brilliant light or lustre. Lustre: the visual property of something that shines with reflected light shininess, sheen, luster, lustre is a kind of:

radiance, radiancy, shine, effulgence, refulgence, refulgency the quality of being bright and sending out rays of light

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition Copyright 2004, 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. luster n.

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Soft reflected light; sheen. Brilliance or radiance of light; brightness. Glory, radiance, distinction, or splendor, as of achievement, reputation, or beauty. A glass pendant, especially on a chandelier. A decorative object, such as a chandelier, that gives off light. Any of various substances, such as wax or glaze, used to give an object a gloss or polish. 7. The surface glossiness of ceramic ware after glazing, especially the metallic sheen of lusterware. 8. A fabric, such as alpaca, having a glossy surface. 9. The appearance of a mineral surface judged by its brilliance and ability to reflect light. Rogets II: The New Thesaurus, Third Edition by the Editors of the American Heritage Dictionary Copyright 1995 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. luster noun 1. A radiant brightness or glow, usually due to light reflected from a smooth surface: burnish, glaze, gloss, polish, sheen, shine, sleekness. See light/darkness. 2. A position of exalted widely recognized importance: distinction, eminence, eminency, fame, glory, illustriousness, mark, notability, note, preeminence, prestige, prominence, prominency, renown. See important/unimportant, knowledge/ignorance, respect/contempt/standing. Lustre (mineralogy) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search For other senses of this word, see lustre. Lustre (American English: luster) is a description of the way light interacts with the surface of a crystal, rock, or mineral. For example, a diamond is said to have an adamantine lustre and pyrite is said to have a metallic lustre. The word lustre traces its origins back to the Latin word lux, meaning light, and generally implies radiance, gloss, or brilliance. Other descriptive terms used for gems include vitreous, like glass; resinous, like amber; waxy, like jade; greasy, like soapstone; pearly; and silky. The term is also used to describe other items with a particular sheen (for example, fabric, especially silk and satin, or metals).

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12. Readings pertaining to lustre. Cf. George Eliot, Adam Bede (1859) =, Ch. XII:
Not an heroic strain; nevertheless Arthur felt himself very heroic as he strode towards the stables to give his orders about the horses. His own approbation was necessary to him, and it was not an approbation to be enjoyed quite gratuitously; it must be won by a fair amount of merit. He had never yet forfeited that approbation, and he had considerable reliance on his own virtues. No young man could confess his faults more candidly; candour was one of his favourite virtues; and how can a mans candour be seen in all its lustre unless he has a few failings to talk of?

Cf. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3: 1472 (1833):

1472. Considering the nature of the duties, the extent of the information, and the solid wisdom and experience required in the executive department, no one can reasonably doubt the propriety of some qualification of age. That, which has been selected, is the middle age of life, by which period the character and talents of individuals are generally known, and fully developed; and opportunities have usually been afforded for public service, and for experience in the public councils. The faculties of the mind, if they have not then attained to their highest maturity, are in full vigour, and hastening towards their ripest state. The judgment, acting upon large materials, has, by that time, attained a solid cast; and the principles, which form the character, and the integrity, which gives lustre to the virtues of life, must then, if ever, have acquired public confidence and approbation.

Cf. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1984), p. 64:
To attain to this envied situation, the candidates for fortune too frequently abandon the paths of virtue; for unhappily, the road, which leads to the one, and that which leads to the other, lie sometimes in very opposite directions. But the ambitious man flatters himself that, in the splendid situation to which he advances, he will have so many means of commanding the respect and admiration of mankind and will be enabled to act with such superior propriety and grace that the luster of his future conduct will entirely cover, or efface, the foulness of the steps by which he arrived at that elevation.

Cf. Joseph Addison. The Spectator 225:

But further, this Desire of Fame naturally betrays the ambitious Man into such Indecencies as are a lessening to his Reputation. He is still afraid lest any of his Actions should be thrown away in private, lest his Deserts should be concealed from the Notice of the World, or receive any Disadvantage from the Reports which others make of them. This often sets him on empty Boasts and Ostentations of himself, and betrays him into vain fantastick Recitals of his own Performances: His Discourse generally leans one Way, and, whatever is the Subject of it, tends obliquely either to the detracting from others, or to the extolling of himself. Vanity is the natural Weakness of an ambitious Man, which exposes him to the secret Scorn and Derision of those he converses with, and ruins the Character he is so industrious to advance by it. For tho his Actions are never so glorious, they lose their Lustre when they are drawn at large, and set to show by his own Hand; and as the World is more apt to find fault than to commend, the Boast will probably be censured when the great Action that occasioned it is forgotten.

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13. Lustre and repute. Cf. Ada Cambridge (1844-1926), A Wifes Protest:1
16. I go to church; I go to court; No breath of scandal flaws The lustre of my fair repute; For I obey the laws.

Cf. Blurtit.com:
Q. What does the name Gloria mean?

A. Gloria is a name generally used for a female. The name gloria has a Latin origin and
means glory in English. Thus, if you or someone you know is named Gloria then her name means honour and lustre. Her name symbolizes distinction, mark, repute, high repute, nobility, clat, notoriety, popularity, and prestige. She has a golden aura in her name.

Cf. Competing Interests and the Courts (Cyberlibel):2

Protection of reputation seems to be gaining prominence over the freedom of expression. As stated in the landmark decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology the Supreme Court of Canada stated that defamation laws are a reasonable limit on free speech in Canada, Cory J. wrote that: Although much has been very properly been said and written about the importance of freedom of expression, little has been written of the importance of reputation. Yet, to most people, their good reputation is to be cherished above all. A good reputation is closely related to the innate worthiness and dignity of the individual. It is an attribute that must, just as much as freedom of expression, be protected by societys laws... Democracy has always recognized and cherished the fundamental importance of the individual. That importance must, in turn, be based upon the good repute of a person. It is that good repute which enhances an individuals sense of worth and value. False allegations can so very quickly and completely destroy a good reputation. A reputation tarnished by libel can seldom regain its former lustre. A democratic society, therefore, has an interest in ensuring that its members can enjoy and protect their good reputation so long as it is merited... Although it is not specifically mentioned in the Charter, the good reputation of the individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a concept which underlies all of the Charter rights. It follows that the protection of the good reputation of an individual is of fundamental importance to our democratic society... The publication of defamatory comments constitutes an invasion of the individuals personal privacy and is an affront to that persons dignity. The protection of a persons reputation is indeed worthy of protection in our democratic society....24 24. [1995] S.C.R. 1130 at 1175-1179

1
2

(http://www.blurtit.com/q541024.html [3/30/07]) (http://www.angelfire.com/ca2/defamation/cyberlibel.html [3/30/07])

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14. On being admired. Cf. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (1813), ch. 3:
The evening altogether passed off pleasantly to the whole family. Mrs. Bennet had seen her eldest daughter much admired by the Netherfield party. Mr. Bingley had danced with her twice, and she had been distinguished by his sisters. Jane was as much gratified by this as her mother could be, though in a quieter way. Elizabeth felt Janes pleasure. Mary had heard herself mentioned to Miss Bingley as the most accomplished girl in the neighbourhood; and Catherine and Lydia had been fortunate enough to be never without partners, which was all that they had yet learnt to care for at a ball. They returned therefore, in good spirits to Longbourn, the village where they lived, and of which they were the principal inhabitants. They found Mr. Bennet still up. With a book, he was regardless of time; and on the present occasion he had a good deal of curiosity as to the event of an evening which had raised such splendid expectations. He had rather hoped that all his wifes views on the stranger would be disappointed; but he soon found that he had a very different story to hear. Oh! my dear Mr. Bennet, as she entered the room, we have had a most delightful evening, a most excellent ball. I wish you had been there. Jane was so admired, nothing could be like it. Every body said how well she looked; and Mr. Bingley thought her quite beautiful, and danced with her twice. Only think of that my dear; he actually danced with her twice; and she was the only creature in the room that he asked a second time. First of all, he asked Miss Lucas. I was so vexed to see him stand up with her; but, however, he did not admire her at all: indeed, nobody can, you know; and he seemed quite struck with Jane as she was going down the dance. So, he enquired who she was, and got introduced, and asked her for the two next. Then, the two third he danced with Miss King, and the two fourth with Maria Lucas, and the two fifth with Jane again, and the two sixth with Lizzy, and the Boulanger. (emphasis added)

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XII. THE PRINCIPAL MEANINGS OF TO KALON AND TO AISCHROS. (a) As being the same in subject as good (agathon, bonus) and bad or evil (kakon, malus). The good is that which all things desire.1 The bad (or evil) is that which all things avoid.2 (b) As meaning the honorable or noble and the dishonorable or ignoble. The honorable (or noble) is that which, being desired for its own sake, is praised.3 The dishonorable (or ignoble) is that which, being abhorred for its own sake, is blamed. (c) As being the same in subject with the three kinds of good and bad or evil. (1) But the end has the character of the good. But good is divided into three: the useful, the pleasing, and the honorable (or noble), two of which, namely, the pleasing and the honorable, have the character of ends because each is desirable for its own sake. But that is called honorable which is good according to reason, which, in fact, has pleasure attached to it. Whence the pleasing, which is divided against the honorable, is pleasing according to sense.4 (2) For these two (goods) are desirable for their own sakes: the honorable (or noble) indeed according to the rational appetite; the pleasing according to the sensitive appetite.
1

Bonum est quod omnia appetunt. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 4, c., tr. B.A.M.) Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth., I, 1 (1094a 3): ta)gaqo/n, ou(= pa/nt' e)fi/etai, the good is that at which all things aim. But, as the Philosopher goes on to say: ei) dh/ ti te/loj e)sti\ tw=n praktw=n o(\ di' au(to\
boulo/meqa, ta)=lla de\ dia\ tou=to, kai\ mh\ (20) pa/nta di' e(/teron ai(rou/meqa pro/eisi ga\r ou(/tw g' ei)j a)/peiron, w(/st' ei)=nai kenh\n kai\ matai/an th\n o)/recin, dh=lon w(j tou=t' a)\n ei)/h ta)gaqo\n kai\ to\ a)/riston, If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we wish for its

own sake (everything else being wished for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good (1094a 19-22, tr. W. D. Ross, rev. B.A.M.), from which it follows that the good is that which all things desire. 2 That is, the bad or evil is that which all things fly from, or abhor, or feel an aversion to. N.B. This account is implied by the foregoing definition. 3 kalo\n me\n ou)=n e)stin o(\ a)\n di' au(to\ ai(reto\n o)\n e)paineto\n h)=?. (Aristotle, Rhet. I, 9, 1366a 34-37, tr. B.A.M.) 4 Finis autem habet rationem boni. bonus autem in tria dividitur: in utile, delectibile et honestum. quorum duo, scilicet delectibile et honestum, habent rationem finis, quia utrumque est appetibile propter seipsum. honestum autem dicitur, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quod quidem habet delectationem annexam. unde delectabile, quod contra honestum dividitur, est delectibile secundum sensum. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 5, n. 58, tr. B.A.M.)

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But the useful is referred to either one.5 (3) For not everything is loved indiscriminately because what is evil, to the extent that it is of this sort, is not loved, but, just as what is seen is visible, so what is loved is lovable, which, in fact, is either what is good per se, namely, the honorable (or noble good)or it is the pleasing or the useful (good). But the third, namely, the useful (good) seems to be that through which the honorable or pleasing good is arrived at. And so the honorable and pleasing goods are lovable for their own sakes as ends, but the useful is lovable on account of another, as that which is for an end. But the good and the pleasing, if they be taken commonly, are not distinguished from each other in subject, but only in meaning. For something is called good insofar as it is perfect and an object of appetite in and of itself. But something is called pleasing insofar as the appetite rests in it.2 (4) And he says that there are three things which fall under human choice, namely, the good, i.e. the honorable (or noble); the helping, i.e. the useful; and the pleasing. To these, three things are contrary, namely, the evil, i.e. the vicious, which is opposed to the honorable; the harmful, which is opposed to the useful; and the painful, which is opposed to the pleasing. Now with respect to these things the good man disposes himself rightly, but the evil man errs (sins, misses the mark): and principally with respect to pleasure, which is more common among the things mentioned, by a twofold community.3 (d) As meaning the beautiful (kalon, pulcher) and the ugly (aischros, deformis). The beautiful is that which pleases upon being seen.4
5

Haec enim duo sunt propter se appetibilia. honestum quidem secundum apptetitum rationalem. delectabile secundum apptetitum sensitivum. utile autem refertur ad utrumque. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Ethic., lect. 4, n. 10, tr. B.A.M.) 2 Non enim quodcumque indifferenter amatur, quia malum in quantum huiusmodi non amatur, sed, sicut videtur visibile, ita amatur amabile, quod quidem est vel per se bonum, scilicet honestum, vel delectabile vel utile. hoc autem tertium, scilicet utile, videtur esse id per quod pervenitur ad bonum honestum vel delectabile, unde bonum honestum et delectabile sunt propter se amabilia ut fines, utile autem est amabile propter alterum, sicut id quod est ad finem. bonum autem et delectabile si communiter sumerentur, non distinguerentur subiecto abinvicem, sed solum ratione. nam bonum dicitur aliquid secundum quod est in se perfectum et appetibile. delectabile autem secundum quod in eo quiescit appetitus. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In VIII Ethic., lect. 2, n. 2, tr. B.A.M.) 3 Et dicit, quod tria sunt, quae cadunt sub electione humana: scilicet bonum, idest honestum; conferens, idest utile; et delectabile. quibus tria contrariantur: scilicet malum, idest vitium, quod opponitur honesto; nocivum, quod opponitur utili; et triste, quod opponitur delectabile. circa omnia autem haec bonus recte se habet, malus autem homo peccat: et praecipue circa delectationem, quae est communior inter praedicta, duplici communitate. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Ethic., lect. 3, n. 9, tr. B.A.M.) 4 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1: Pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent, For those things are called beautiful which please when seen. (tr. B.A.M.) Cf. Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 1, ad 3: Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus,

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The ugly is that which displeases upon being seen. (e) As being the same as virtue (arete, virtus) and vice (poneria, vitia). If this is the honorable (or noble), namely, that which, being desired for its own sake, is praised, then virtue must of necessity be honorable (or noble), for, being good, it is worthy of praise. Virtue, it would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving good things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases.1 But if this is the dishonorable (or ignoble), namely, that which, being avoided for its own sake, is blamed, then vice must of necessity be dishonorable or ignoble, for, being bad, it is worthy of blame. Vice, then, would be a faculty of providing and preserving bad things, a faculty productive of many and great harms, in fact, of all things in all cases.2 (f) As the object of admiration (thaumazein, admiratio) or of shame (aischune, verecundia), it is the admirable or honorable (kalon, honestum) and the disgraceful (aischros, turpitudo) or some disgrace (aischos, turpis). The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute.3 The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute).4 (g) As the object of admiration or of shame, considered as a certain act. The sort of admirable deed which is virtuous consists in the conformity of a voluntary act.5 The sort of disgrace which is vicious consists in the deformity of a voluntary act.6
sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus, For, since the good is what all things desire, it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it, but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it, from which it follows that the beautiful is that which quiets desire upon being seen.
1

ei) de\ [35] tou=to/ e)sti to\ kalo/n, a)na/gkh th\n a)reth\n kalo\n ei)=nai: a)gaqo\n ga\r o)\n e)paineto/n e)stin. a)reth\ d' e)sti\ me\n du/namij w(j dokei= poristikh\ a)gaqw=n kai\ fulaktikh/, kai\ du/namij eu)ergetikh\ pollw=n kai\ mega/lwn, kai\ pa/ntwn peri\ pa/nta. (Aristotle, Rhet., I, 9,

1365b 35-37, tr. W. Rhys Roberts, rev. B.A.M.) 2 I have derived this definition from that of the honorable just given. 3 Ditto. 4 Cf. Aristotle, Rhet., II, 6, 1383b 14-20: e)/stw dh\ ai)sxu/nh lu/ph tij h)\ taraxh\ peri\ ta\ ei)j
a)doci/an faino/mena fe/rein tw=n kakw=n, h)\ paro/ntwn h)\ gegono/twn h)\ mello/ntwn, h( d' a)naisxunti/a [15] o)ligwri/a tij kai\ a)pa/qeia peri\ ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta. ei) dh/ e)stin ai)sxu/nh h( o(risqei=sa, a)na/gkh ai)sxu/nesqai e)pi\ toi=j toiou/toij tw=n kakw=n o(/sa ai)sxra\ dokei= ei)=nai h)\ au)tw=? h)\ w(=n fronti/zei , Now shame is some pain or disturbance over evils present,

past, or to come [15] which are thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute); but shamelessness, a certain indifference and insensibility about such things. But if shame is what has been defined, to be ashamed necessarily has to do with such evils as are thought to be disgraceful either for oneself or for those about whom one has a regard (tr. B.A.M.), from which it follows that the disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). 5 This definition is derived form the definition of the vicious disgrace given next. 6 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 144, art. 2, c.: una quidem vitiosa, quae scilicet consistit in deformitate actus voluntarii, One (sort of disgrace is), in fact, vicious, which consists in the

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(h) As being the same in subject as good and bad or evil. The good is that which all things desire (and hence pursue). The bad (or evil) is that which all things avoid (or feel an aversion to, and hence fly from). (i) As meaning the honorable or noble and the dishonorable or ignoble. The honorable (or noble) is that which, being desired for its own sake, is praised. The dishonorable (or ignoble) is that which, being abhorred for its own sake, is blamed. (j) The honorable, the pleasing, and the useful goods. The honorable (or noble) good is that which is desirable for its own sake, being good according to reason and the rational appetite, and having pleasure attached to it. The pleasing good is that which is desirable for its own sake, being good according to sense and the sensible appetite. The useful good is that which is desirable for the sake of the other two, being referred to either one as that through which the honorable or pleasing good is arrived at. (k) The three evils contrary to these goods. The vicious evil is that which is opposed to the honorable good. The painful evil is that which is opposed to the pleasing good. The harmful evil is that which is opposed to the useful good. (l) As meaning the beautiful and the ugly. The beautiful is that which pleasesi.e., quiets desireupon being seen. The ugly is that which displeasesi.e., excites aversionupon being seen. (m) As the object of admiration or of shame. The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute. The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). (n) As the object of admiration or of shame, considered as a certain act.

deformity of a voluntary act. (tr. B.A.M.)

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The sort of admirable deed which is virtuous consists in the beauty of a voluntary act. The sort of disgrace which is vicious consists in the deformity of a voluntary act. (o) As the object of shame (aischune, verecundia) or of admiration (thaumazein, admiratio), it is the disgraceful and the admirable or honorable. The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute).1 The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute. Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 3, ad 1: The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Nic. Ethic., II, 3). (tr. B.A.M.) Why the pleasing good appropriates the name pleasure: Sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia , Sensible things are more known to us than intelligible things (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 31, art. 5, c., tr. B.A.M.). (p) As the object of shame (aischune, verecundia) or of admiration (thaumazein, admiratio), it is the disgraceful (aischros, turpitudo) or some disgrace (aischos, turpis) and the admirable or honorable (kalon, honestum). The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute).2 The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute.

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet., II, 6, 1383b 14-20: e)/stw dh\ ai)sxu/nh lu/ph tij h)\ taraxh\ peri\ ta\ ei)j a)doci/an faino/mena fe/rein tw=n kakw=n, h)\ paro/ntwn h)\ gegono/twn h)\ mello/ntwn, h( d' a)naisxunti/a [15] o)ligwri/a tij kai\ a)pa/qeia peri\ ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta. ei) dh/ e)stin ai)sxu/nh h( o(risqei=sa, a)na/gkh ai)sxu/nesqai e)pi\ toi=j toiou/toij tw=n kakw=n o(/sa ai)sxra\ dokei= ei)=nai h)\ au)tw=? h)\ w(=n fronti/zei , Now shame is some pain or disturbance over evils present, past, or to come [15] which are thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute); but shamelessness, a certain indifference and insensibility about such things. But if shame is what has been defined, to be ashamed necessarily has to do with such evils as are thought to be disgraceful either for oneself or for those about whom one has a regard (tr. B.A.M.), from which it follows that the disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). 2 Cf. Aristotle, Rhet., II, 6, 1383b 14-20: e)/stw dh\ ai)sxu/nh lu/ph tij h)\ taraxh\ peri\ ta\ ei)j
a)doci/an faino/mena fe/rein tw=n kakw=n, h)\ paro/ntwn h)\ gegono/twn h)\ mello/ntwn, h( d' a)naisxunti/a [15] o)ligwri/a tij kai\ a)pa/qeia peri\ ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta. ei) dh/ e)stin ai)sxu/nh h( o(risqei=sa, a)na/gkh ai)sxu/nesqai e)pi\ toi=j toiou/toij tw=n kakw=n o(/sa ai)sxra\ dokei= ei)=nai h)\ au)tw=? h)\ w(=n fronti/zei , Now shame is some pain or disturbance over evils present,

past, or to come [15] which are thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute); but shamelessness, a certain indifference and insensibility about such things. But if shame is what has been defined, to be ashamed necessarily has to do with such evils as are thought to be disgraceful either for oneself or for those about whom one has a regard (tr. B.A.M.), from which it follows that the disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute).

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On That In Which Beauty Consists

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All Rights Reserved. See also: Perfect and Whole: Aristotles Poetics on the Structure of the Plot (Papers In Poetics 1)

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