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Bromley London Borough Council vs. Greater London Council and another: A Case Study

Acknowledgement This project entitled Empirical case Study on Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council and another: A Case Study It is submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the Project work for Interpretation of Statutes, DamoDaram Sanjeevaya National Law University. This research work is done by M.Anudeep Reddy, VII Semester , .This research work has been done only for LAW Project purpose only. The assistance and help during the execution of the project has been fully acknowledged. Very thankful to Mr.Prof. Vishnu Kumar, our teacher, for contributing his efforts in building this wonderful piece.

1.) INTRODUCTION 2.) RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2.) NOSCITUR SOCII- APPLICATION OF THE RULE 3.) CASE STUDY 4.) SUBSEQUENT ENGLISH DECISIONS 5.) INDIAN APPLICATION OF NOSCITUR RULE 6.) CONCLUSION 7.) TABLE OF CASES 8.) BIBILOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION Error is never so difficult to be destroyed as when it has its root in Language - Jeremy Bentham[1]. Human experience is made up of thoughts, feelings, actions and sensations. Each of which is experienced in a truly personal way, which is to say that one persons perception of an experience may be completely different from anothers. Yet while we may live in separate worlds, a functioning society needs connectors through which one persons experience can be communicated to another. Barring telepathic communication, the best means of doing so is through the use of language. The world has numerous languages. They differ widely in phonetics, syntax and grammar. However they are all identical in that they are merely sounds put together to communicate a concept. It is not so much the sound but the idea behind the sound that is being communicated. Language is like the painting that attempts to capture the scenery but cannot do so in its fullness. The disease of language is thus inherent in its very nature itself for two main reasons. First, a single event may not be experienced uniformly. Secondly, language is merely a representation of the idea and not the idea itself. A word in itself conveys nothing, atleast nothing in particular. A word has many meanings and may be used in many senses. In order to arrive at the meaning of a particular word, the context in which it is used needs to be examined. Just what the field of context is comprised of is another discourse altogether. Despite the shortcomings of language, its importance is nowhere diminished. Language attempts to make up its limitations by adopting certain rules in respect of grammar and syntax. When language came to be put down in writing for digestion by a larger audience, further rules are necessitated, in order to better help convey to the reader the concept the author wished to convey. Law more than any other profession is dependent on language. It is the use of language and its inherent weaknesses, that is the primary pursuit of law. With the codification of law becoming popular, the need for rules of interpretation is vital. As it is necessary for the Courts in interpreting the law to do so as the legislature intended, maxims of statutory interpretation have evolved to render it such assistance. The maxims of statutory interpretation are interpretative guidelines that are expressed in Latin phrases. Each phrase refers to a s1pecific principle of statutory construction that help the courts interpret legislation. The maxims form a code of statutory grammar that helps us understand patterns of language found in legislative texts. However, the maxims unlike many of the standard rules of grammar, are not hard and fast rules of universal application. They are more akin to rules of statistical probability than to prescriptive rules of grammar that apply in all cases. Rather than binding a court and forcing it to reach a pre-ordained construction of a legislative passage, the maxims simply describe what drafters probably meant through the use of specific patterns of
[1] C K Ogden and I A Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 10th edn., (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1969)

language. For this reason, it is best to regard the maxims as sources of argument rather than as binding rules that force the court to render particular decisions. The first step in interpretation is to follow the conventional rules of language. This is referred to as a linguistic canons of construction. In the words of Benion Linguistic canons of construction are not confined to statutes or even to the field of law. They are based in the rules of logic, grammar, syntax and punctuation and the use of the word as a medium of communication generally. When judges say that the principles of statutory interpretation do not materially differ from the principles applicable to interpretation of documents generally, it is these linguistic canons they have in mind. The linguistic canons of construction are used to arrive at the literal meaning of the enactment.[2] The rule of noscitur a socii, which is the subject of this paper, is a linguistic canon of construction. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Aims and objectives To understand the principle of noscitur a socii, examine its application in the case study and in subsequent English cases. Another aim is to analyse the application of the principle by Indian courts.2 Scope and Limitations The scope of the topic is dominated by English case law, as it is a study of the case in hand and subsequent decisions in the same jurisdiction. The researcher faced a limitation of paucity of material on the principle of noscitur a socii in modern English litigation. Sources The primary sources used are cases both Indian and English. Other sources utilized in this paper include books on statutory interpretation, and an article on the principle itself. Research Questions (1) What is the principle of noscitur a socii? (2) How has this principle been applied in Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council? (3) How has this principle been applied subsequent to the Bromley case? (4) How have Indian courts applied this principle? Noscitur A Socii- meaning & application of the rule The phrase noscitur a sociis literally translated means it is recognised by its associates. A like principle states that noscitur ex socio, qui non cognoscitur ex se- what cannot be known by
2

[2] F A R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 3rd edn., (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1997)

at 897.

itself may be known from its associate. The underlying principle behind the rule as identified by Francis Bacon is as follows- the linking of words suggests treatment of them in the same sense[3]. Maxwell explained the same when he said- this rule means that when two or more words which are susceptible to analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other. [4] There is an assumption that lies at the heart of this rule. We assume that the words have been placed in conjunction with each other for the very reason that they are to be understood in a similar sense. The basis of this assumption is that without the aid of context, sentences would become mere collections of unrelated, ambiguous words, and communication would be virtually impossible. Therefore a word must be read in the context of the words surrounding it, especially if they form a society or socii.3 Noscitur a sociis is the most basic of the maxims of construction and is the source other maxims interpretation. It can be used in almost any problem of construction, as it applies wherever a statutory provision contains a word or phrase that is capable of bearing more than one meaning. The maxim works by comparing the contentious word or phrase with other words or phrases that accompany the language being interpreted. To use a classic example, the word disability has many meanings when taken on its own. It may refer to (a) medical disability, (b) legal disability, or (c) any thing that a person less able to perform a particular task. But when placed in a sentence such as- the insurer will pay an amount of Rs.10 lakh in the event of the insureds illness, disability or death. The association of the word disability with the words death and illness gives the word disability a meaning that is concerned with medical issues. The word disability is coloured by its association with death and illness. This form of interpretation, which is unconsciously performed in the normal usage of the English language, is often referred to as contextual construction, as it requires an examination of the context in which an ambiguous word or phrase is found before deciding on its interpretation.[5] The application of this principle has been summarised wonderfully by Lord Hale in the following mannerThe meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of the words associated with it.[6] The doubtful word spoken of above is usually a general word. It is the general word that takes its colour or meaning from the particular words that surround it. In the opposite when a set of particular words are followed by general words, it may be taken as a sign that this maxim is not to be invoked. For example where a charter party exempts itself from all liability arising from
3

[3] Supra note 1 at 950.

[4] G P Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, (New Delhi: Wadhwa & Co., 2002) at 379. [5] R. N. Graham, In Defence Of Maxims, Stat Law 2001 at 22(45) [from Lexis Nexis]. [6] Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, 10th edn., (New Delhi: Universal Book Traders, 1993) at 396. [7] Ibid at 397.

frosts, floods, strikes and any other unavoidable accidents or hindrances of what kind soever beyond their control. The phrase of what kind so ever indicated to the court that the principle of noscitur socii was not to be applied.[7] JUDCIAL APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN ENGLAND 1. Scales v. Pickering (1828) 4 Bing 448.[8] The statutory provision in question gave the authority the power to break up the soil and pavement of roads, highways, footways, commons, streets, lanes, alleys, passages and public places. The court held that the word footway drew its meaning from the company in which it is found, and hence the power was limited to paved footways in towns and did not extend to a field footpath. Here the word footway was understood by reference to the meaning of its companion words and phrases. As highways, streets and the other listed items tend to refer to developed areas, footway was understood in a similar sense, embracing paved footways but excluding undeveloped trails. Thus the meaning of the term footway was known by its associates. 2. Commissioners v. Savoy Hotel[9] A provision from the Purchase Tax used the expression- manufactured beverages including fruit juices and bottled waters and syrups etc. The question before the court was whether freshly pressed orange juice, fell within the above provision. The phrase fruit juices was interpreted with regard to the meaning of the associate words, and it was held that the fruit juice in the phrase referred only to manufactured juices and therefore did not include freshly pressed juices to which no manufacturing process had been applied. 3. Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd[10] This case provides a classic use of the rule noscitur a sociis. It involved the taxation of a crematorium company under a UK Income Tax Act. The taxpayer, Norwich Crematorium Ltd., sought to deduct expenses incurred in constructing a furnace used to cremate corpses. The provision upon which the taxpayer relied for the deduction permitted tax relief in respect of an industrial building or structure occupied for the purposes of a trade. The tax authorities had disallowed the taxpayers deduction, suggesting that the facilities used by a crematorium could not be considered industrial for the purposes of the relevant legislation. The taxpayer appealed, asking the Court to determine whether or not a crematoriums furnace could be considered an industrial building or structure for the purposes of an income tax statute. The Court addressed this question through the use of contextual interpretation. Industrial building or structure was defined in the relevant statute as a building or structure in use for the purposes of a trade which consists in the manufacture of goods or materials or the subjection of goods or materials to any process. According to the Norwich, the cremation of human remains was a process to which goods or materials (namely, human bodies) were subjected. If this contention was accepted, the structure in which this process took place, i.e the furnace of the Norwich Crematorium, would be an industrial structure for the purposes of the Act, and thus be entitled to the deductions claimed.4
4

[9] [1966] 2 All ER 299.

The Court proceeded to answer the contention by looking at the word materials. While it was true that the human body is composed of materials, that in itself was not found to be enough. The court observed that the word materials did not appear in isolation in the relevant legislation. It was associated with the word goods and a host of other words that imported the notion of goods intended for sale and materials that were used in manufacturing. Applying noscitur a sociis, the Court interpret the word materials by reference to the words and phrases with which it was associated, thus giving the word materials a narrower definition that included only materials that were used in manufacturing. In Stamp J.s opinion: English words derive colour from those which surround them. Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of the sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary or decided cases, and then put back again into the sentence with the meaning which you have assigned to them as separate words, so as to give the sentence or phrase a meaning which as a sentence or phrase it cannot bear without distortion of the English language. That one must construe a word or phrase in a section of an Act of Parliament with all the assistance one can from decided cases and, if one will, from the dictionary, is not in doubt; but having obtained all that assistance, one must not at the end of the day distort that which has to be construed and give it a meaning which in its context one does not think it can possibly bear. Given the context in which the word materials was found, Stamp J. held that the word encompassed only materials that were used in a manufacturing process, not extending to human corpses destined for a crematorium. As a result, Stamp J. held that the consumption by fire of the mortal remains of homo sapiens is not the subjection of goods or materials to a process within the definition of industrial building or structure contained in s. 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act. Norwichs deduction was therefore disallowed. It must be noted that in the above case, the maxim of noscitur socii though applied, is nowhere referred to by its Latin name. This is also the case with numerous other English decisions where the rule is applied but not invoked. While it is an irritation for the student researcher, it is of little consequence in practicality as it is the actual application of the rule that is important. Bennion, in his attempt to codify the law of statutory interpretation has summarised the application of the rule (based on case law) into the foll5owing categories of application: To determine the meaning of a neutral word For example a common word like payment, was recognised by Walton J not to have a settled meaning, therefore he held that it should take its colour from the context in which it was found. To adopt a restricted meaning In London County Council v. Tann[11] the word right was given a restricted meaning not to include the general right of navigation enjoyed by the public at large. It took its meaning from

[10] [1967] 2 All ER 576.

[11] [1954] 1 WLR 371.

the accompanying words in the phrase any right, claim, privilege, franchise, exemption or immunity found in s.179 of the Thames Conservancy Act 1857. To adopt a less usual meaningIn the normal usage the word whisky refers to an alcoholic drink. But when used in the phrase coach, chariot, hearse, chaise, landau and phaeton, gig, whisky, chair or coburg and every other carriage hung on springs[12], it refers to a light two-wheeled one horse carriage. Another application could be to apply a special meaning given the language or context of the situation. For example if the context of the provision is set in a particular specialised profession or foreign country. To determine the extent of the qualifying term. This is applied where a string of words is followed by a general expression that is as much applicable to the first and other words as to the last. Here the expression in question is not limited to the last but applies to all. To resolve an ambiguity In such cases it may be advisable to refer to nearby paragraph to resolve the ambiguity. This is really a watered down application of the rule as the word takes its colour not from its immediate companions but from the statute in parts. BROMLEY LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL V. LONDON COUNCIL AND ANR. CASE STUDY Facts[13] The Labour Part in the run up to the election for the Greater London Council [GLC] issued a manifesto in which it promised that on winning the elections it would cut the fares on Londons buses and tubes by 25%. On winning the said election the Labour led GLC told the London Transport Executive [LTE] to cut the fares by 25%. The LTE did as it was told. In order to finance such a measure, the GLC relied on the London ratepayers, from who it sought a contribution of 69 million. To enforce the same, the GLC made a supplementary precept ordering all the 35 London boroughs to raise the necessary funds. While most boroughs reluctantly complied with the order, one borough, that of Bromley challenged the validity of the entire procedure. They applied to the court for a writ of certiorari quashing the supplementary precept. The case revolved around the interpretation of the Transport (London) Act 1969. The Act lays down the powers and functions of both the GLC and LTE and also the statutory relation between them. The issue at its core was twofold. First whether GLC had the statutory power to make such a fare cut. Secondly, if it did have such a power whether it was reasonably exercised? The answers to the above questions were contingent on the interpretation of S.1 of the Act, which laid down the general duty of the GLC-

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to develop policies, and to encourage, organise and where appropriate, carry out measures, which will promote the provision of integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services for Greater London6. The question before the court was whether the word economic referred to cost effectiveness or whether it meant running the service as a business. This interpretation was vital to the case, as it would be decided on the issue of whether there was a statutory duty to run the service on ordinary business lines. History of the case High Court In the divisional court both Dunn LJ and Philips J found in favour of GLC. The reasoning for the same is unavailable as it is not reported nor given in the judgment. Adversely affected by the decision of the Divisional bench of the High Court, Bromley Borough preferred an appeal to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division. Court of Appeal The judgment of the Court of Appeal was rendered by Lord Denning MR, Lord Oliver and Watkins LJ. The Court of Appeal found against GLC on both counts, namely that of being ultra vires the statutory power and improper discretion in exercise of the same. In examining the conduct of the GLC the court was unanimous in condemning the same as being ill-considered, hasty, unlawful and arbitrary. The court was clear that the GLC had failed to consider the interests of the ratepayers as it was required to do by the statute. It had therefore crossed its statutory authority. The court hence allowed the appeal and passed an order of certiorari quashing the precept issued by GLC. Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeal, GLC appealed to the House of Lords. The appeal was heard by Lord Wilberforce, Lord Diplock, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Scarman and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook.

Contentions of the Parties The respective contentions of the parties were the same as those averred before the lower courts. Bromley, had two main contentionsi) That the precept was beyond the powers of the GLC as defined by the Transport (London) Act, 1969. ii) That even if GLC had the power, the issuance of the precept was an invalid exercise of its discretion under the Act.
6

[12] Simpson v. Teighmouth Bridge Co., (1903) 72 LJKB 204 cited from Supra note 1 at 952.

[13] [1982] 1 All ER 129.

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In support of the above Bromley contended that the LTE must run its undertaking on business principles and as far as applicable must meet its expenses out of fares and internal revenue. While the GLC has the power to make grants in aid of revenue, the same cannot be done with the LTE being encouraged to renounce all effort to avoid a deficit. GLC and LTE, the appellants before the House of Lords, contended that the judgment of Oliver LJ in the Court of Appeal was fallacious as it took the revenue account to mean internally generated only. It was GLCs contention that grants in aid should go into the revenue account and therefore LTEs duty to avoid deficit was only after considering the said grants in aid. Decision of the House of Lords The Law Lords wrote separate judgments that concurred on the outcome of the case, that the appeal be dismissed. In giving its judgment, the Court arrived at the following decision: (1) GLC had the power under S.3 of the Transport (London) Act 1969 to make grants to the LTE for any purpose. (2) The exercise of such power was however circumscribed by the following a) LTEs general duty to run its operations on ordinary business principles. The LTE in submitting and GLC in approving the fare cut had done so without regard to ordinary business principles, and therefore had acted ultra vires. b) GLC was under a statutory obligation to make grants subject to LTEs duty to run atleast on a break-even basis. Therefore GLC was entitled to make grants to LTE only as a necessity to make good unavoidable losses and not to finance a particular social policy. c) GLC owed a fiduciary duty to the rate payers and therefore was obliged to balance that duty with the duty owed to its transport users when making a grant. The decision to extract additional rates, without any attendant improvement in service was a thriftless use of rate payers money and was in breach of the fiduciary duty owed by GLC to its ratepayers. Application of Noscitur Rule

The Noscitur rule is nowhere referred to by the Latin maxim, in any of the judgments rendered. The commentaries however point out to a particular paragraph from Lord Scarmans judgment as having applied the rule. The said paragraph reads as followsAs a matter of English usage, the term economic ( as also the noun economy) has several meanings. They include both that for which the appellants contend and that for which Bromley contend. It is a very useful word: chameleon-like, taking its colour from its surroundings. Lord Scarman a few sentences later makes the following observation- The dictionary may tell us the several meanings the word can have but the word will always take its specific meaning from its surroundings i.e. in this case from the Act read as a whole.

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Having said this however Lord Scarman does not apply the rule as it is. He goes on to point out that reading the act as a whole includes reading in the duty owed by GLC to the ratepayers. Having expanded the context in which the word economic is to be construed in, he arrives at the following interpretation Accordingly I conclude that in S.1(1) of the Act, economic covers not only the requirement that transport services be cost effective but also the requirement that they be provided so as to avoid or diminish the burden on the rate-payers so far as it is practicable to do so. Analysis Lord Scarman in arriving at his construction of the word economic did the following.

Laid down the principle of noscitur socii- a word takes its specific meaning from its surroundings. Expanded the surroundings first to include the whole Act and not just the words in the phrase that surround the word economic. Expanded the surrounding even further by including the duty owed by GLC owed to its rate-payers. The word economic now takes its meaning from its surroundings that have been sufficiently expanded. Hence economic refers not just to cost efficiency but also that services be provided without burdening the rate payer as far as it is practicable to do so.

It is the researchers submission that this is a misapplication of the noscitur rule[14]. A proper application of the rule would have the word economic taking its meaning from the other words in S.1(1) i.e. integrated and efficient. But given that these too are general words, the principle ofnoscitur socii should never have been invoked. It must be remembered that the rule is one of literal construction. By expanding the associates of the word economic to include a general duty to rate payers, Lord Scarman took the principle beyond its normal confines of literal construction to include fuzzy concepts such as purpose and duty. It is submitted that stretching the rule beyond its normal confines is a not only a misapplication of the same but a nonapplication of it as well.7 Later English Decisions This section will make a brief survey of English decisions applying the noscitur rule since the Bromley case. This is by no means an exhaustive list of English decisions on the point, but merely an enquiry at whether there has been any developments in the principle or in the application of it. a) Malvern Hills District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Another[15] While granting outline permission for residential development, the appellant local planning authority stipulated that that no work on the site should be commenced until details of the lay-out of the estate road had been approved by the highway authority and an agreement entered into. No such details were submitted to or approved by the highway authority. Nothing was done on the
7

[14]Lord Scarman, apply principle of noscitur socii

[15] [1982] EGD 1217 (Court of Appeal, Civil Division).

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site by the original applicants for permission, who sold it to new developers. The new developers made preparations for drainage work, bringing pipes and manhole rings on to the site and sending an excavator to the site to excavate a drainage trench, which became bogged down owing to bad weather. They also made preparations for the estate road, putting in pegs to show its centre-line and the line of the pavements on each side. On May 9, 1980, the local planning authority served an enforcement notice on the developers requiring them to cease construction of the road and all building, engineering or other operations. Subsequently, they served a stop notice on them under section 90 of the Act of 1971. The developers appealed to the Secretary of State against the enforcement notice, and the Secretary of State, agreeing with his inspector, allowed the appeal. The case was concerned with the meaning of the word operation occurring S.43 of the Act. Lord Denning M.R. in his dissenting judgment applied the noscitur rule to subsection (2)(d) of S.43 by construing its meaning from its other sub-sub clauses viz., (a) to (e). Lord Denning found that paragraphs (2)(a), (b), (c) and (e), all refer to the actual work that is being done and exclude any acts that are only preparatory to it. Applying the rule of noscitur socii he concluded that paragraph (d) should also be construed not to apply to preparatory acts but only to the actual operation itself. He therefore held that the works of the Developers were not operation within the meaning of the Act as they were merely preparatory to the laying of the road. b) Inglewood Investment Co Ltd v. Forestry Commission[16] In 1921 the defendants were granted land for a term of 999 years by the plaintiffs predecessors in title who reserved to themselves the exclusive right of hunting, shooting, fishing, coursing and sporting over and on the land in respect of all game woodcocks snipe and other wild fowl hares rabbits and fish. The plaintiff now sought a declaration that the defendants were not entitled to hunt or take any deer from the land on the ground that deer fell within the term game and were accordingly within the reservation. Harman J said that if one went through past statutes and authorities it was clear that game had different meanings at different places. In order to arrive at its specific meaning in this particular case, he applied the principle of noscitur socii. The phrase other wild fowl attached as it was to the end of the phrase game woodcocks snipe, according to the judge gave one a feeling that in that collocation of words the draftsman was speaking about feathered creatures. The reference next to hares rabbits which are mammals as apart from game woodcocks snipe and other wild fowl gave a flavour that the whole of the first phrase of that reservation had to do with birds. Therefore the court held that deer were not included within the meaning of the word game in this particular reservation. c) Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v. Ministry of Defence[17] The defendant agreed to pay damages to the plaintiff for the loss of a cargo of the plaintiffs oil arising out of a collision between one of Her Majestys ships and another vessel. Out of interest agreed at 26,020 the defendant retained 7086 as income tax under schedule C pursuant to para 5 of schedule 5 to the Income and Corporation Tax Act 1970 on the ground that the interest constituted public revenue dividends within s.107 of the Act of 1970.

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Harman J applied the rule of noscitur socii and held that the word interest had to be read in the light of its appearance in a definition of dividends and its following words public annuities, dividends and shares of annuities. The bulk of schedule C being concerned with income arising from securities such as gilt-edged securities, it connoted recurrence of payments of interest. Some types of interest were within the definition of public revenue dividends but it was only interest arising on securities which was included. Interest on damages was not a public revenue and so was not subject to the Scheduled C right and duty to deduct tax. The court therefore found in favour of the plaintiff. d) Doncaster Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and another[18]

This case raises a short point of construction under Part 10 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1988 as to whether a drain, running along about half the northern boundary of a site at Doncaster, is a sewer with8in the meaning of the Part. If it is, permission is granted by the general development order for its repair or renewal. If it is not, express planning permission would have been required. One of the parties contended that the word sewer be construed along with main, pipe, cable or other apparatus paying due regard to the principle noscitur a sociis. Since Part 10 was only referring to gas, electricity, water supply and the like, it was argued that the word sewer must be given its ordinary meaning which was- a conduit carrying sewage. The Court however did not find favour with this contention as it stated that an application of thenoscitur rule would not give a restricted meaning to the word sewer as contended by the Appellants. The appeal was therefore dismissed. Application by Indian Courts So far in this paper we have only looked at the principle of noscitur socii as applied by the English courts. In this section an attempt will be made to briefly look at the judicial application of this principle by the Courts in India. In M K Ranganathan v. Government of Madras[19]], s.232 of the Companies Act 1913 was the subject of interpretation. 9The phrase any sale held without leave of the court were
8

[16] Chancery Division (Harman J): 17 November 1987.[from Lexis]

[17] Chancery Division (Harman J): 28 July 1989[from Lexis]. [18] 74 P & CR 428, [1996] 2 PLR 39 (Queens Bench) [from Lexis]
9

[19] AIR 1955 SC 604.

[20] Avtar Singh, Introduciton to Interpretation of Statutes, (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Co., 2001) at 124. [21] AIR 1963 SC 1323.

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construed in the light of the associated words, any attachment, distress or execution put into force. Thus the word sale was given a restricted meaning by the application of the noscitur rule, so as to mean only a sale held by the court and thus excluded a sale effected by a secured creditor outside of the winding up and without the intervention of the Court.[20] Another classic application of the principle is found in State of Rajasthan v. Sri Pal Jain[21]. Here Rule 31 of the Rajasthan Rules of Business, required that proposals for dismissing, removing or compulsory retiring of an Officer be referred to the Governor. In this case compulsory retirement not amounting to punishment was held not to fall within the above phrase, when it was construed in light of the words dismiss and remove, both of which indicated punishment. Thus normal cases of compulsory retirement such as on attaining superannuation age does not fall under Rule 31. In the last 3 decades the apex court in a number of cases before it has applied the rule of noscitur socii in order to arrive at the proper meaning of a word or phrase.[22] In recent cases such as Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd[23]; Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochinv. Mrs. Grace Collis[24]; and in Lokmat Newspapers (P) Ltd v. Shankarprasad[25] the principle has been referred to but not used. There seems to be a growing trend of the rule being referred to by its Latin name, but not really being applied in its true sense. Also there is a tendency of Courts to use the rules of noscitur socii andejusdem generis in close proximity of each other. The apex court drew a distinction between the two rules in the Lokmat Paper case , when it observed that the word discharge and dismissal do not belong to a common genus as one refers to punishment while the other doesnt necessarily have to. Since there was no 10common genus the Court could not apply the rule of ejusdem generis. While it is generally stated that the noscitur rule is wider in its ambit and in fact the source of the ejusdem generis rule, there is no concrete judicial exposition on that point.

[22] See generally Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978 (2) SCC 213), Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. CCE (1990 (3) SCC 447), Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE (1993 Supp. (3) SCC 716, K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy & Ors. vs. K.P. Ballakuraya & anr. (1999 (4) SCC 135). [23] MANU/SC/0239/2002 [manupatra.com]. [24] MANU/SC/0130/2001[manupatra.com]. [25] (1999) 6 SCC 275.
10

[23] MANU/SC/0239/2002 [manupatra.com].

[24] MANU/SC/0130/2001[manupatra.com]. [25] (1999) 6 SCC 275.

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CONCLUSION The rule of noscitur socii while it is simple to explain is sometimes difficult to apply. The times when it is invoked, it is seldom used. And where it is actually applied it is seldom named. A summary of the steps in its application will follow The rule- a thing is known by its associates. There is a general word, or a word whose meaning in that particular context is not clear. The meaning of this word can be arrived at in any of the following ways. By taking the colour of the particular words that surround it. In case of a phrase, by looking at the phrases that precede and follow the phrase in question. In certain circumstances the associates of the word may be in another paragraph or may even be the Act read as a whole. Another approach as witnessed in the Bromley case is to expand the field of associates by taking extraneous factors into consideration. In the case study undertaken, we saw that the extraneous consideration was the duty owed by the council to its rate payers. Thus the word economic acquired the meaning of cost-effectiveness as well as the additional meaning of the quality not to burden the ratepayers. It is the researchers submission that the rule of noscitur socii must be remembered for what it isnamely a literal and internal aid of construction. The approach of Lord Scarman, to include extraneous obligations in the use of the rule, is plainly erroneous, as it is no longer confined to the statute when applied in that manner. English cases after Bromley fortunately havent committed the same mistake. In fact Harman J sets a good example in the two cases discussed as he has employed the principle as near to its text book application as is possible. The researcher hopes to see Indian courts follow the same and take to relying on this simple principle where it is warranted and thus avoid unnecessary expounding on matters that dont need to be dealt with in order to decide the case.

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TABLE OF CASES 1.) Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) 2 SCC 213. 2 .)Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd, [1967] 2 All ER 576. 3 .)Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council and Anr, [1982] 1 All ER 129. 4 )Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochin v. Mrs. Grace Collis, MANU/SC/0130/2001. 5.) Commissioners v. Savoy Hotel, [1966] 2 All ER 299. 6 .) Doncaster Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and another, [1996] 2 PLR 39 (Queens Bench). 7.) Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v. Ministry of Defence, Chancery Division 28 July 1989 8 .) Inglewood Investment Co Ltd v. Forestry Commission, Chancery Division ,17 November 1987. 9 .) K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy & Ors. v. K.P. Ballakuraya & anr. (1999 ) 4 SCC 135. 10 .)Lokmat Newspapers (P) Ltd v. Shankarprasad, (1999) 6 SC 275. 11.) London County Council v. Tann, [1954] 1 WLR 371. 12 .) M K Ranganathan v. Government of Madras, AIR 1955 SC 604. 13 .) Malvern Hills District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Another, [1982] EGD 1217 (Court of Appeal, Civil Division). 14.) Municipal Corporation Ltd, MANU/SC/0239/2002. of Greater Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation

15.) Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE (1993) 3 SCC Supp 716. 16.) Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. CCE (1990) 3 SCC 447 17.) Scales v. Pickering (1828) 4 Bing 448. 18.) Simpson v. Teighmouth Bridge Co., (1903) 72 LJKB 204. 19 .) State of Rajasthan v. Sri Pal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1323

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Bibliography Article R. N. Graham, In Defence Of Maxims, Stat Law 2001 at 22(45) [from Lexis Nexis]. Books 1 Avtar Singh, Introduciton to Interpretation of Statutes, (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Co., 2001). 2 C K Ogden and I A Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 10th edn., (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1969) 3 F A R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 3rd edn., (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1997). 4 G P Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 8th edn., (New Delhi: Wadhwa & Co., 2002). 5 Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, 10th edn., (New Delhi: Universal Book Traders, 1993) 6 Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd edn., (London: Butterworths, 1995). Electronic Sources 1. www.manupatra.com 2. www.lexis.com

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Subject:- Interpretation Of Statutes Topic:- Bromley London Borough Council vs. Greater London Council and another: A Case Study

Submitted by:- M. ANUDEEP REDDY, Roll No:- 200905, VII SEM