A.

CONCEPT OF STATE

Jan 25, 1962: Lau Yuen Yeung married Moya Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen. Feb 28, 1962: Final date of visa expiration. Commissioner of Immigration ordered plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Phils, cause her arrest and immediate deportation. Plaintiff brings this action to court for issuance of writ of injunction. Court hearing 10 months after the marriage: Plaintiff is 7 mos pregnant. Furthermore, she was found unable to write either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor except for one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her bros/sisters-in-law. ISSUES: 1. WON plaintiff may be deemed a Phil citizen by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino 2. If affirmative, WON her marriage to co-plaintiff justified or excused her failure to depart from the Phils before date of expiration of visa. HELD: Judgment dismissing petition for injunction reversed and set aside. Lau Yuen Yeung declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moya Lim. RATIO: 1. Alien woman who marries a Fil citizen, native-born or naturalized, ipso facto becomes a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Phils under Sec 4 of C.A. 473. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Phil citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Fil citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under Sec.4. The basis of the judgment is Sec 15 of the Naturalization Law, w/c in turn was taken directly, copied verbatim and adopted from its American counterpart. From the history of the law traced in the case, it is shown that the American provision shows intent to remove racial requirements for naturalization. Hence, settled is the rule in statutory construction that laws if modelled and copied from another state law must be understood and construed in the jurisdiction which they were taken. 1. Yes, there is no reason why an alien who has been in the Phils as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become Filipino should be required to still leave the Phils for a foreign country, only to apply for a re-entry and undergo the same process of showing that he is entitled to come back. Consider the case of minor children of an alien who is naturalized: It is obvious that they become ipso facto citizens of the Phils. It is unreasonable that they still have to be taken abroad so that they have a right to have permanent residence here. Naturalization of an alien visitor as a Phil citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon the person ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including entitlement to permanently stay in the Phils outside the orbit of authority of the Comm of Immigration because the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to Phil citizens. In reference, Sec 9 of the Immigration Act states: An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Phils permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must first depart voluntarily to some foreign country & procure from the appropriate Phil consul the proper visa & thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Phil port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance w/ the requirements of this Act. IMPLICATIONS OF MOYA LIM YAO RULING:

State is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. It refers to the set of governing and supportive institutions that have sovereignty over a definite territory and population. Nation is a body of people who share a real or imagined common history, culture, language or ethnic origin, who typically inhabit a particular country or territory. The development and conceptualization of the nation is closely related to the development of modern industrial states and nationalist movements in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, although nationalists would trace nations into the past along an uninterrupted lines of historical narrative. I. People

Citizenship Is a membership in a political community with all its adjoining rights and responsibilities Distinguished from Nationality Citizenship is a legal status in a political institution such as a city or a state. The relationship between a citizen and the institution that confers this status is formal, and in contemporary liberaldemocratic models includes both a set of rights that the citizen possesses by virtue of this relationship, and a set of obligations or duties that they owe to that institution and their fellow citizens in return. Nationality denotes informal membership in or identification with a particular nation (which is not a synonym for country or state). While nationality is sometimes conferred as a legal status (see below), it and nations are properly understood as social categories, characterised by at least a common language, culture and territory, and sometimes also by a common religious faith and a purportedly shared ancestry. II. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; [2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and [4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. III. Citizens of the Philippines MO YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION Appeal from a decision of CFI of Manila FACTS: Feb 1961: Ms Lau Yuen Yeung, HK Chinese, applied for a passport temporary visa to enter Phils as non-immigrant. Purpose of pleasure trip was to visit her great grand uncle Lau Ching Ping for a month. March 1961: Visa granted. Expiration date after 1 month April 13, 1961. Visas expiry extended many times. Date of her arrival: bond of P1,000 filed by Asher Cheng to ensure her departure before visa expires.

It finally settled the long drawn controversy over the citizenship status of alien women who marry Philippine citizens. It reversed former rulings (i.e. Burca ruling) wherein alien women who marry Filipino citizens do not acquire automatically Philippine citizenship. Under the new doctrine, an alien woman marrying a Filipino citizen should not be disqualified from becoming a citizen. Moreover, she need not prove that she possesses all the qualifications. Moreover, this ruling is more consistent with the spirit of family solidarity as manifested in the CC (Art 52) unlike the Burca ruling which in effect divides and separates H from W in giving all the qualifications and requirements to become a naturalized citizen. However, this new ruling might be used as a convenient means of circumventing the restrictive policies of the Phil Naturalization Law. But in case of doubt, the naturalization law should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the govt and against the applicant for citizenship. Dissenting Opinion, J Reyes: The adoption of similar rulings in the American courts is tenable if and only if the Phil statute had been in its entirety a reproduction of the American model. The spirit of the American law, decidedly favorable to the absorption of immigrants is not in our Consti and laws. IV. Election of Philippine citizenship

If affirmative, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar. HELD: Court denies Vicente D Chings application for admission to the Philippine Bar RATIO: 1& 2) No, Chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he was already 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June 99. He was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority. Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and jurisprudence compel the Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process. V. Doctrine of implied election

CO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL Nature: Petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives FACTS: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held where petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr where among the candidates for the position of representative in the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar. Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent on the grounds that Ong is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. November 6, 1989 the HRET found for the private respondent November 12, 1989 Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration. February 22, 1989, HRET denied motion, hence, these petitions for certiorari. ISSUES: 1. When may the SC inquire into the acts of the HRET under its constitutional grants of power?

IN RE: VICENTE CHING Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar. FACTS: April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 98 Bar Examinations. Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC. April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was further required to submit more proof of citizenship. July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance. OSG commented that Ching being the legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence. Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from OSG): 1st the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen 2nd election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means a reasonable time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayo case, and may be extended up to 7 yrs, from the Cuenco case ISSUES: WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time

Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 17: the HRET and SET shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals. Lazatin v. HRET: so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Courtthe power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." Robles v. HRET, Morrero v. Bocar and under the Constitution (Article VIII, Section 1): Judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference except in the exercise of this Court's so-called

extraordinary jurisdiction upon a clear showing of a decision was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or upon a denial of due process, or a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. 2. WON Jose Ong Jr. is a Filipino Citizen

Constitution, Art IV Sec. 1: The following are citizens of the Philippines: Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. The Court interprets Section 1(3) as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women as shown in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission where Mr. Rodrigo stated: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive. There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary because he was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Jose Ong Jr. did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons

In 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. In 1905, Jose Ong Chuan, private respondents father, was born in China and brought by Ong Te to Samar in 1915. In 1932, Jose Ong Chuan married a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. They had 8 children, one of whom is the private respondent, born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country had put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. Eventually they expanded and set-up in Binondo, Manila. February 15, 1954 Jose Ong Chuan filed with the CFI Samar an application for naturalization On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. Decision was declared final and executory on May 15, 1957, and Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, and a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. At that time, private respondent was a minor of 9 years After elementary Ong Jr. went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. He graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. He looked for work in Manila and found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila but frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days. Twice during those years, their house was gutted by fire but it was both times reconstructed. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Con-Con. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, as a natural born Filipino. The Con-Con had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. 1984 and 1986 elections of 1984 and 1986 he registered himself as voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections. In 1987, he decided to run in the elections for representative in the 2nd district of Northern Samar where he was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress.

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine WON the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen. Another reason why HRET did not commit manifest grave abuse of discretion: same issue of natural-born citizenship already been decided by the Con-Con of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies by virtue of Phil. Bill of 1902 where inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen. And under Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain, those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy were considered Spanish subjects. Ong Te falls within such provision. If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. Thus, Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The petitioners allege that the document presented is not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated. But it was since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses. The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse. 3. WON Ong Jr. is a resident of Laoang, Samar

The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Despite having gutted by fire, the old houses were reconstructed, thus, the petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced. Moreover, in De los Reyes v. Solidum it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. In order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness. It is time for the antiquated naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential. Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. VI. Natural-born citizens ARTICLE IV Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. BENGSON VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF REPRESENTATIVES

Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari FACTS: Constitutional requirement for members of the House of Representatives: no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen. Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship was settled by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.

The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile.

May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his opponent was Bengson. Bengson is claiming that Cruz was not qualified to be a member of the House of Representatives. The HRET ruled in favour of Cruz and as such Bengson filed this case. ISSUES: WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. HELD: Yes RATIO: 1987 Constitution enumerate who are Filipino citizens: - Citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this constitution - Whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines - Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority - Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship a. b. By birth natural born citizens Naturalization Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications)

reason for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for reacquisition. Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. TECSON VS COMELEC G.R. No. 161434: MARIA JEANETTE TECSON & FELIX DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents G.R. No. 161634: ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.), respondent G.R. No. 161824: VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.), respondents [all cases were decided on March 3, 2004] SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: May 17, 1915 Allan Poe, FPJs dad, born to Espaol father, Lorenzo, and Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. July 5, 1936 alleged marriage of Allan Poe & Paulita Gomez Aug. 20, 1939 FPJ was born Sept. 16, 1940 marriage of Bessie Kelley, 21 and American citizen and Allan Poe, 25 & Filipino. Sept. 11, 1954 Lorenzo Poe/Pou, grandfather of and earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ, died at 84. PROCEDURAL FACTS: Dec. 31, 2003 FPJ filed certificate of candidacy for position of President of the RP under Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party where he declared that he was born on Aug. 20, 1939 in Manila & is a natural-born citizen of the RP Jan. 9, 2004 Fornier initiated a petition w/the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ claiming that his parents were both foreigners, mom Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and dad Allan F. Poe was Spanish being the son of a Spanish subj. Even if his dad were Filipino, Fornier claims that FPJ would still be an American citizen since as an illegitimate child, he should follow his mothers citizenship. He claims that FPJs illegitimate because Allan Poes marriage to Paulita Gomez was still subsisting when he married Bessie Kelley and even if such marriage were not bigamous, Kelley & Poe were only married one year after FPJ was born. He presented documentary evidence such as copies of FPJ and Allan Poes birth certificates, an affidavit by Gomez re filing a case for bigamy & concubinage against Allan Poe, & certification that the National Archives had no info re residence of Lorenzo Poe and birth of Allan Poe. FPJ presented 22 documentary evidence such as certification that no info re birth of Allan Poe in the registry of births in Pangasinan, certification that no info available re Poe & Gomez marriage, FPJs birth certificate, Certificate of Titles & Tax Declarations in the name of Lorenzo Poe & his death certificate, and marriage certificate of Bessie Kelley & Allan Poe. Jan. 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of merit. Fornier filed MFR, denied. Feb. 10, 2004 Fornier brought the case to the SC by virtue of Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court praying for a TRO, writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin finality/execution of COMELEC resolutions. His petition was consolidated w/ Tecson & Velez cases. Both Tecson &

1. Additional notes for naturalization: The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after 2 years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of Congress. a. Naturalization mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. b. Repatriation available for those who have lost their citizenship due to desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other time, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic necessity. Process: taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering it in the Local Civil Registrar of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original nationality. He will be restored to his former status as a natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation. 1987 stitution only provides for 2 classes of citizens: 1. Natural born 2. Naturalized 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either natural born or naturalized depending on the

Velez assail the COMELECs jurisdiction claiming that under Art. VII, Sec. 4, Par. 7 of the 1987 Consti, only SC has exclusive & original jurisdiction to resolve the case. ISSUES & RATIO: 1. WON the SC has jurisdiction over these cases. a. With regards to Forniers case, the SC has jurisdiction. Under Sec. 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement & administration of all laws related to elections to ensure its free, orderly & honest implementation. Art. 69 of the Code states that any interested party can file a verified petition to deny/cancel a nuisance candidates certificate of candidacy. Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and Sec. 7, Art. IX of the 1987 Consti state that any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, including on disqualification cases may be reviewed by and brought to the SC on certiorari w/in 30 days from receipt of copy. Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Consti also vests the judiciary w/the power to determine WON there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction on part of any government branch/instrumentality. b. With regards to Velez & Tecsons case, the SC has no jurisdiction. Art. VII, Sec. 4, Par. 7 of the Consti states that the SC en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns & qualifications of President or VP & may promulgate rules for the purpose. This provision contemplates that the SC will sit as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) w/c will handle contests in a post-election scenario. Rules of the PET promulgated by the SC supports this by stating that a contest is initiated by filing a protest or petition quo warranto against the President or the VP (Rule 13) and that only registered candidate for Pres or VP who received 2nd or 3rd highest no. of votes may contest the election of the Pres or VP (Rule 14). This does not include cases directly brought before the SC questioning the qualifications of Pres or VP candidates. Both cases are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 2. WON FPJ is a natural born Filipino. The decision traced the history of the concept of citizenship. It was traced to Aristotle in 384 322 B.C. Its meaning evolved from a man who shared in the administration of justice & in the holding of office to one who would both govern & be governed. It later on included rights, entitlements, obligations & participation in the public life. It also evolved from civil (rights) to political (participation in exercise of political power) to social (economic & social security). Currently, we are geared towards internationalization of citizenship. It then traced the history of laws on citizenship in the country. Spaniards had laws on citizenship, however, only 3 of these laws were extended to the RP. Spanish CC enumerated Spanish citizens as persons born in Spanish territory, children of Spanish father/mother, naturalized foreigners & domiciled inhabitants of any town of the monarchy. Treaty of Paris provided that the civil & political status of the inhabitants of the territories ceded to the US will be determined by the US Congress. Inhabitants were given the choice to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain or renounce it & adopt the nationality of the territory where they reside. Filipinos then did not become US citizens but were afforded US protection. The Philippine Bill of 1902/Philippine Organic Act of 1902 defined citizens of the PI as those Spanish subjects on Apr. 11, 1899 and any Philippine inhabitant who 1) is native-born, 2) is a native of Peninsular Spain, 3) obtained Spanish papers on or before April 11, 1891, excluding those who chose to preserve their allegiance to the Spanish crown. For children born between April 11, 1899 to July 1, 1902 when no citizenship law was in force, the principle of jus soli/principle of territoriality was applied. March 23, 1912 amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 authorized the Philippine Legislature to come up with rules that will govern natives who were not covered by the Bills provisions. Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916/Jones Law restated the Philippine Bills provisions along with the amendments

thereto. It also defined a native-born inhabitant as a citizen of the Phil. as of Apr. 11, 1899 if he/she was: 1) a subject of Spain on Apr. 11, 1899, 2) a Philippine resident on said date & 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country. 1935 Consti removed doubts as to whether the jus soli principle would still apply. It adopted jus sanguinis/blood relationship as basis of Filipino citizenship. Sec. 1, Art. III defined citizens as: 1) citizens of PI at time of adoption of Consti, 2) those born in the PI of foreign parents elected to public office in the PI, 3) those whose fathers are citizens of the PI, 4) those whose mothers are PI citizens & they choose to elect Phil. citizenship upon reaching age of majority. It also provided that Filipinas lose their citizenship & acquire that of their foreign husbands w/c incapacitated them from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children. Illegitimate children were required to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching age of majority. 1973 Consti, Sec. 1, Art. III defined citizens as : 1) Phil. citizens at the time of the adoption of the Consti, 2) those whose fathers/mothers are Phil. citizens, 3) those who elect Phil. citizenship pursuant to 1935 Consti, 4) those naturalized in accordance w/law. Filipinas who marry aliens still retain their citizenship unless they renounce such. 1987 Consti, Sec. 1, Art. IV defined citizens as: 1) Phil. citizens at the time of the adoption of the Consti, 2) those whose fathers/mothers are Phil. citizens, 3) those born before Jan. 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and 4) naturalized in accordance w/law. Sec. 2, Art. VII of the 1987 Consti states that no person may be elected Pres. Unless he is a natural-born Phil. citizen. Natural born is defined as those citizens of the Phil. from birth w/o having to perform any act to acquire/perfect their Phil. citizenship. Marriage certificate of Kelley & Poe and FPJs birth certificate are admissible evidence being public documents. Lorenzo Poe was born sometime in 1870 while RP was under Spain. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it will be assumed that his place of residence was his place of residence at the time of his death, which was in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Thus, it will also be assumed that he benefited in the en masse Filipinization under Phil Bill of 1902. Presumption would be that he passed on his Filipino citizenship to his son & later on to his grandson. Spanish CC: requires acknowledgment of filiation or paternity by judicial (compulsory done during the lifetime of putative parent) or voluntary (record of birth, will or public document) means. No proof of acknowledgment by Allan Poe was shown whether voluntary or judicial. 1950 CC added additional means of acknowledgment which is legal (acknowledgment of an illegitimate childs full blood brothers/sisters). FC provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by a record of birth or pub document or private handwritten instrument signed by parent concerned. In the absence of such, it can be proven by open & continuous possession of status as legitimate or other means allowed by Rules of Court & special laws. Action may be brought by child during his/her lifetime. Same provisions apply to establish illegitimate filiation. FC provisions should be applied retroactively. Currently, we can see the attempt to differentiate citizenship in political law from civil status provided in civil law. Little, if any, evidence show that civil status would also affect ones political rights. Civil law governs the family & prop erty relations. Citizenship in civil law are limited to applicability of RP laws on family rights, status, condition, legal capacity and succession. It is biased against illegitimacy, perhap due to monarchial set-up of Spain then. Such discrimination should remain in civil law & should not encroach upon the domain of political law. Thus, proof of filiation should be independent from civil law purposes. Sec. 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide that a declaration about the pedigree/lineage of a person may be admissible evidence if 1) declarant is dead/unable to testify 2) pedigree of a person must be at issue 3) declarant is a relative of the person whos pedigree is

questioned 4) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred and 5) relationship of declarant & person whos pedigree is questioned must be shown by evidence aside from act/declaration. Ruby Kelley Mangahas (Bessie Kelleys sister) declaration might be accepted as proof that Allan Poe recognized his paternal relationship with FPJ. She declared that Allan lived w/ Bessie & their children in one house as one family. (They also mentioned DNA testing, saying that it can be used to prove filiation or paternity. But they didnt say anything about its connection to the case.) Fornier presented cases w/c according to him were precedents to this case. All cases were debunked by amicus curiae Joaquin Bernas & affirmed by other amici curiae former Justice Mendoza, Prof. Balane & Dean Magallona. Cases did not involve jus sanguinis and illegitimate children. AND THE ONLY IMPORTANT PART: Making distinctions between illegitimate & legitimate children and between the illegitimate children of Filipino fathers and illegitimate children of Filipino mothers violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him/her for the indiscretion of his/her parents. When the law provided that the illegitimate child will take the citizenship of his/her mother, it was done to help the child & not to prejudice/discriminate against him. The 1935 Constitution stated expressly that children whose fathers are Filipino citizens will be considered as citizens of the Philippines without making any distinction as to whether these children should be legitimate or illegitimate. Thus, whether legitimate or illegitimate, FPJ may be considered as a natural-born Filipino citizen. HOLDING: All cases dismissed. Tecson & Velez for lack of jurisdiction and Forniers for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC. No proof either of material misrepresentation by FPJ in his certificate of candidacy. DAVIDE, SEPARATE OPINION He concurs with the way the issue on jurisdiction was resolved. On the issue of citizenship, he states that for purposes of citizenship of an illegitimate child of Filipino father & alien mother, proof of paternity/filiation is enough for child to follow fathers citizenship. Fornier admitted Allan Poes paternity by only attacking illegitimacy of FPJ and not questioning WON Allan Poe is FPJs real father. CARPIO, DISSENTING OPINION On the issue of jurisdiction, Carpio claims that COMELEC has jurisdiction to determine initially qualifications of candidates pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Consti. Any citizen of voting age or any registered political party, org or coalition of parties may file petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds specified. COMELEC in its decision in the Fornier case failed to state factual basis of its ruling. In effect, it was allowing a candidate for President to run w/o first ascertaining WON hes a natural-born Philippine citizen. It acted w/grave abuse of discretion. SC cant claim that it will only have jurisdiction in post-election contests. Waiting for an alien president to be elected would be absurd. It has to be decided before the election. Main point is that the 1935 Consti & Spanish CC were the laws in force when FPJ was born. Thus these laws should govern his citizenship at birth. Subsequent legislation cannot change his citizenship at birth. (This only means that hes only born once thus, his citizenship at birth can only be determined once. It will never change. If the law says that he was not a Filipino citizen at birth then thats it.) Opinion further claims that illegitimate children enjoy no presumption at birth of blood relation to any father unless father acknowledges the child. Thus, the mother is the only legally known parent of an illegitimate child whose citizenship the child should follow. For a child to follow his fathers citizenship at birth, acknowledgment should be made at birth. If acknowledgment comes

after birth, then, child would still be disqualified from being a Philippine citizen at birth. Acknowledgment should come in the form of an administrative or judicial approval. Mere admission of paternity is not recognized/valid. Acknowledgment/legitimation is not retroactive to the time of childs birth. Thus, citizenship only begins at the time of acknowledgment. Besides, legitimation only vests civil & not political rights on the child. President, along with other high public officials should be natural-born. It is important that they owe their allegiance to the Philippines from birth to assure the country that they would be loyal & faithful. Burden of proof lies with the person who claims to be a Filipino citizen. FPJ has to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino father. Citizenship cannot be stipulated. Alleged admission of Fornier of Allan Poes paternity is not binding on the State. No proof that Lorenzo Poe was naturalized as a Phil. citizen & no proof either that Allan Poe was also a Filipino citizen. Anyway, their citizenships are immaterial. The Convention on the Rights of the Child does not govern FPJ. It only applies to stateless persons and guarantees them w/right to acquire a nationality. When FPJ was born, he was an American citizen thus he was not stateless. Besides, his citizenship at birth cannot be changed by any treaty or legislation. This was signed half a century after he was born. Precedent: Ching Leng vs. Galang states that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father & an alien mother follows the citizenship of the mother, even if the father acknowledges or legally adopts the illegitimate child. According to the Court, the children referred to in the Consti only pertain to legitimate children and not those created by legal fiction. Adoption, though it grants the child the rights & duties of a legitimate child, does not include acquisition of the nationality of the adopter. This doctrine was in force in Oct. 1958 & such has not been changed in the 1973 & 1987 Constis. Carpio believes that this doctrine is pass and should be abandoned. No need to distinguish between legitimate & illegitimate to uphold equal protection clause of Consti. BUT abandoning such doctrine does not mean that an illegitimate child of Filipino father & alien mother automatically becomes a Philippine citizen at birth. Again, at birth means he acquires such at the time of his/her birth & nothing should be done to acquire or perfect it after birth. FPJ is not natural-born since theres no proof that his father acknowledged him. Natural-born means that he has been a Phil citizen from birth w/o having to perform any act to acquire/perfect his citizenship. Poe does not meet this requirement. Forniers petition should be granted but Tecson & Velez should be dismissed since theyre premature there being no election contest involved. VI. Dual citizenship & dual allegiance

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship Constitution allows for the possibility of dual citizenship (Child also follows the citizenship of the mother, Filipino woman does not lose her citizenship when she marries an alien) If Philippine citizenship is acquired by naturalization and not by operation of the Constitution, it is well within the power of Philippine law to require prior renunciation of foreign nationality as a condition. Often a function of the accident referred to that birth on foreign soil. Dual allegiance Larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious.

Referred to that unsettled kind of allegiance of persons who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance to another state. MERCADO VS MANZANO Special Civil Actio in the Supreme Court. Certiorari FACTS: Eduardo Manzano and Ernesto Mercado were candidates for vicemayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano received by the highest number of votes. The proclamation of Manzano was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. May 7, 1998 the Second Division of Comelec granted the petition on the ground that Manzano is a dual citizen and, under section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it remained pending until the May 11, 1998 elections. May 19, 1998 Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification this motion for intervention was opposed by Manzano. August 31, 1998 the Comelec en banc reversed the ruling of the second division on the grounds that when Manzano registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998 he effectively renounced his US citizenship under the American Law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship. August 31, 1998 Manzano was proclaimed as the vice mayor of the City of Makati. Mercado file a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the Comelec en banc. ISSUES: 1. WON Mercado has the right to bring the suit. YES When can a person intervene? If he has legal interest in the matter of litigation, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding When Mercado sought to intervene in the proceedings before the Comelec there had been no proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City. Mercado had an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. Under RA 6646 section 6 intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgement rendered. 2. WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification. NO Section 40 of the local government code declares as disqualified from running for any elective position those with dual citizenship. Petitioner contends that through section 40(d) command in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective official. Dual Allegiance vs. Dual Citizenship Dual Citizenship result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli

Born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by law of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual Allegiance when a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Result of an individuals volition Article IV (5) of the constitution provides: Dual Allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by the law. The concern of the constitutional commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Therefore, dual citizenship im RA 7160 section 40 (d) refers to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is just a reality on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered as a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control. 3. WON Manzano has effectively elected Philippine citizenship. YES By voting in the Philippine elections Manzano renounced his American citizenship. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounce his American citizenship. Frivaldo vs. Comelec: Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine government when he ran for Governor in 1988, 1992 and 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. Aznar vs. Comelec: The mere fact that he has a certificate stating that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. The certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenship. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country is concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. Res judicata in citizenship cases Doctrine of Indelible Allegiance Naturalization REPUBLIC VS DE LA ROSA G.R. No. 104654: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, versus HON. ROSALIO DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC MANILA BRANCH 28 and JUAN FRIVALDO, respondents G.R. No. 105715: RAUL LEE, petitioner versus COMELEC and JUAN FRIVALDO, respondents G.R. No. 105735: RAUL LEE, petitioner versus COMELEC and JUAN FRIVALDO, respondents [ALL CASES WERE DECIDED ON JUNE 6, 1994] G.R. No. 104654: {petition for Certiorari to annul RTC decision readmitting Fornier as Filipino citizen under Revised Naturalization Law & nullify his oath of allegiance} Sept. 20, 1991 Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization

Oct. 7, 1991 de la Rosa set petition for hearing on March 16, 1992 & directed publication of such order in the OG & newspaper of general circulation for 3 consecutive weeks, last of w/c should at least 6 mos. Before hearing date. Order should also be posted in the Office of the Clerk of Court. Jan. 14, 1992 Frivaldo filed a Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule. He claims that he intended to run for public office and deadline for filing candidacy will be on March 15 or day before the hearing. He requested that it be moved to Jan. 24. Jan. 24, 1992 motion granted. Hearing set to Feb. 21, 1992. No publication of order. Feb. 21, 1992 hearing took place. Frivaldo, as sole witness presented documentary evidence such as affidavit of publication order issued by newspaper publishers, certificate of naturalization issued by US and certification that his record of birth was not on file. Feb. 27, 1992 de la Rosa granted petition & re-admitted Frivaldo as RP citizen by naturalization, granting him rights & privileges of natural-born RP citizens. He also took his oath of allegiance before the Judge. March 16, 1992 Quiterio Hermo filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene & to Admit MFR. He claimed that proceedings were tainted w/jurisdictional defects and prayed for new trial that will conform w/ requirements of Naturalization Law. March 18, 1992 Sol Gen received copy of decision & appealed directly to SC Frivaldo claims that naturalization is the only available remedy. Repatriation is only for army deserters/Filipinas who lost citizenship by reason of marriage to foreigners. Request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his citizenship failed too. He claims that Sol Gen didnt object to the re-scheduled hearing w/o publication. Besides, he says that public was well-informed of his petition due to publicity given by media. He further claims that 2year waiting period before taking the oath of allegiance only serves purpose of granting public the opportunity to investigate applicants background or oppose such. It can be dispensed w/ because he is well-known being a freedom fighter & former Sorsogon governor for 6 terms. ISSUE: WON Frivaldo has already reacquired his citizenship. HELD: No. Petition granted. Hes not a Filipino citizen. Hes disqualified from holding office, requested to vacate office & surrender such to Vice-Gov. RATIO: He should comply w/all requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law. He cant choose requirements to follow. Its immaterial that he was a former Filipino citizen. Proceedings were null & void for failure to comply w/publication & posting requirements. Publication should take place once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in the OG & newspaper of general circulation. Only after this has been complied w/ will the court acquire jurisdiction. Several allegations were absent such as proof of his good moral character, continuous residence in the RP for the last 10 years, ability to speak & write English & any of the principal dialects, continuous residence in the RP from date of filing petition until admission to Phil citizenship & filing of declaration of intention or justification if excused from doing so. No affidavit of 2 credible persons attesting to his good moral character & no copy of certificate of arrival to the petition. Irregularities: heard case ahead of scheduled hearing w/o publication of such order, heard w/in 6 mos from last publication of petition,

allowed to take oath of allegiance before finality of judgment (which comes 30 days after Sol Gen receives his copy of the decision & w/o opposition) and took oath w/o observing the 2-year waiting period. Waiting period seeks to observe if applicant has left country, dedicated himself continuously to any lawful calling/profession, not convicted of any offense/violation of govt promulgated rules and committed acts prejudicial to the interest of country or against govt policies. G.R. No. 105715: {petition for Certiorari, Mandamus w/injunction w/prayer for TRO to annul COMELEC resolution w/c dismissed petition seeking to annul proclamation of Frivaldo as Governor-Elect of Sorsogon} Lee official gubernatorial candidate of LDP in Sorsogon whereas Frivaldo was Lakas-NUCDs candidate May 22, 1992 Frivaldo was proclaimed winner June 1, 1992 Lee filed petition w/COMELEC to annul Frivaldos proclamation claiming that proceedings & composition of Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance w/ law and that Frivaldo was an alien whose citizenship was being questioned & that Frivaldo was not a duly registered voter. He prayed that votes in favor of Frivaldo be considered stray votes & he be proclaimed winner. June 10, 1992 COMELEC dismissed petition for being filed out of time. Appeal on composition/proceedings of board of canvassers should be filed w/in 3 days. Lee appealed to SC claiming that COMELEC acted w/grave abuse of discretion and that inclusion of Frivaldos name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because Frivaldo was then an American citizen. He further claims that readmission of Frivaldo as RP citizen was not yet conclusive since case was still on appeal. He prays for the annulment of Frivaldos proclamation, deletion of Frivaldos name in the list of gubernatorial candidates, proclamation of gov-elect based on remaining votes after Frivaldos been excluded, issuance of TRO to enjoin Frivaldo from taking oath & assuming office & issuance of writ of mandamus to compel COMELEC to resolve disqualification case. ISSUES & RATIO: WON petition was filed out of prescribed period. No. This is a petition quo warranto questioning Frivaldos title & seeking to prevent him from holding office due to alienage is not covered by 10-day period for appeal. Qualifications for public office are continuing throughout his tenure & once an official loses these qualifications, he may be removed from office. WON Lee can be proclaimed winner in the event that Frivaldo is disqualified. No. Labo Jr. vs. COMELEC states that when candidate who obtained highest number of votes is disqualified to hold office to w/c he was elected, candidate who garnered 2nd highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner. Vice-governor should assume office since hes next in line. HOLDING: No. Petition granted. Hes not a Filipino citizen. Hes disqualified from holding office, requested to vacate office & surrender such to Vice-Gov. G.R. No. 105735: {petition for mandamus w/ prayer for TRO} Petition for cancellation of Frivaldos certificate of candidacy and deletion of his name in the list of registered voters on the following grounds: he is an American citizen, his re-admission as Filipino citizen is null & void due to infirmities, oath of allegiance failed to comply w/ 2-year waiting period provided for in RA No. 530, hearing

was held less than 4 mos. After last date of publication, violating rule that it should be heard at least 6 mos. After last date of publication. May 13, 1992 Raul Lee intervened urging COMELEC to decide pursuant to Sec. 78 of Omnibus Election Code w/c provides that issues on cancellation of certificates of candidacy should be decided at least 15 days before election. COMELEC admits that Frivaldo has not yet reacquired citizenship but issue of disqualification is not among grounds allowed in pre-proclamation controversy. Petition was also filed out of time. COMELEC is excused from deciding w/in period provided by law for reasons beyond its control (Sec. 5, Rule 25, COMELEC Rules on Procedure) HOLDING: Moot and academic. Discussed in the 2 other cases. FRIVALDO VS COMELEC G.R. No. 120295 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC and Raul Lee G.R. No. 123755 Lee vs. COMELEC AND Juan Frivaldo G.R. No. 123755 FACTS: During 1992 and 1988 elections he won for the position of governor but he was disqualified because he was not a citizen. March 20, 1995 Juan G. Frivaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. March 28, 1995 Raul R. Lee filed a petition praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines May 1, 1995 COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the petition Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration but it was decided until May 11, 1995. COMELEC affirmed its decision. (note the motion was denied after the May 8, 1995 election) Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes with a margin of around 20,000 votes from the Lee who got the second largest number of votes. June 30, 1995 8:30 pm Lee was proclaimed as the governor of Sorsogon. On July 6, 1995 Frivaldo file with COMELEC a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30 , 1995 at 2:00 pm he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under PD 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994. December 19, 1995 COMELEC first division held that Frivaldo who garnered the highest number of votes and having reacquired his citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provision of PD 725 is qualified to hold the office of Governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC. G.R. No. 120295 FACTS: Petition to annul three resolutions of COMELEC 1. Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines"; 2. Resolution of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo Basically the facts are the same with GR 123755 except that Frivaldo assails the resolutions under different grounds. Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void. CONSOLIDATED ISSUES: 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when? 2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon? 3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"? 4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? 5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"? RATIO: Frivaldos Repatriation Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, and it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired his citizenship. Citizenship may be reacquired by: Direct act of Congress Naturalization Repatriation He was able to reacquire his citizenship via repatriation and he took his oath of allegiance at 2 pm on June 30, 1995. Lees asserts that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended. The Court held that the memo cannot be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing the repeal of PD 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and repeal may be express or implied. There is no question on whether there was an express repeal. There is also no implied repeal because it is the basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is

convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist Lee also contends that the repatriation proceedings were made in haste. The Court held that the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The requirement s of repatriation are not difficult to comply with nor are they tedious and cumbersome. Lee also contends that even if the repatriation is valid it could only be effective as at 2 pm of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed. Local Government Code Sec. 39: An elective local official must a citizen of the Philippines a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or provincewhere he intends to be elected a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day The LGC does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residency and age. Sec. 39 provides for the qualifications of ELECTIVE officials and not candidates. Qualification, unless otherwise provided for, must be possessed when the elective official begins to govern (the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judiciallydeclared" alienage Should the repatriation of Frivaldo be applied retroactively to the date of the filling of his application on August 17, 1994? YES Civil Code of the Philippines provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS PD 725 creates a new right and also provides for a new remedy. P.D. 725 granted a new right -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.

Retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. It is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994 Is the Lack of Citizenship a continuing Disqualification? NO First ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. This was the basis of COMELEC for the disqualification of Frivaldo but decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Comelecs Jurisdiction over the petition in SPC no. 95 -317 COMELEC has jurisdiction The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory? MOOT AND ACADEMIC Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.) Moot and Academic because these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission of Dec. 19, 1995 affirmed en banc on February 23 , 1996 which both upheld the election. Section 78 is merely directory as section 6 of RA 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections.

Davides Dissent President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension. By allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen.

Answer of the Main Opinion The retroactivity of his repatriation legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.

Disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship"

Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final

Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known

First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc

Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest

Questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship

The provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted

YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [January 24, 1989] Petition for Habeas Corpus Petitioner: Willie Yu Respondents: Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Bienvenido Alano, Jr., Major Pabalan, Deleo Hernandez, Bloddy Herrera, Benny Reyes and Jun Espiritu Santo FACTS: 1971 Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years & renewed for same period upon presentment before Portuguese consular officer Feb. 10, 1978 He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen April 1980 signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as Portuguese July 21, 1981 He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport will expire July 20, 1986. PROCEDURAL FACTS: July 4, 1988 He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He was detained because the Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his deportation. CID claims that his acts are tantamount to an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. July 20, 1988 oral arguments Nov. 10, 1988 SC resolution denied petition for habeas corpus & resolved issued on jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless arrest & detention. Yu filed MFR, denied

FERNAN, DISSENTING: Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not enough to reach such decision. Evidence must be clear & express w/o room for interference or implication. In a deportation proceeding where alien claims citizenship w/substantial evidence, hes entitled to have his status determined by judicial & not an executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown trial under more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SC is not a trier of facts. GUTIERREZ, JR., DISSENTING: Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as important as denaturalization should be filed & prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due process clause. When a person pleads vigorously that he has not renounced his citizenship, he should at least be given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the facts fully ascertained. Dangerous precedent to allow administrative officials to rule that one has renounced his citizenship based on informal evidence. Mere use of a foreign passport is not express renunciation. He may have passport for other purposes (employment, convenience). Some high govt officials have done acts w/c are more indicative of express renunciation than mere use of passport or different citizenship has been signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yus morality is beside the point. He deserves his full day in court. CORTES, DISSENTING: CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yus Filipino citizenship has not been established. Evidence presented were not authenticated by proper Philippine consul, thus not substantial and are inadequate. ARTICLE V SUFFRAGE Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise in for the public good. 1935 Constitution a right granted by the sovereign people to a definite portion of the population possessing certain qualifications. 1973 Constitution imposed the obligation AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC NATURE: Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari and Mandamus FACTS: Akbayan-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II - Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, Patricia Q. Picar, Myla Gail Z. Tamondong, Emmanuel E. Ombao, Johnny Acosta, Archie John Talaue, Ryan Dapitan, Christopher Oarde, Jose Mari Modesto, Richard M. Valencia, Edben Tabucol and Michelle D. Betitoinvoking the right of suffrageseek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 01 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21 as 4M youth failed to register on or before the Dec. 27, 00 deadline set by COMELEC under R.A. No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996). Senator Roco, Chairman if the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's Participation, through a Letter invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before the COMELEC deadline. Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion, together with Consultant Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate. On Jan. 29, 01, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only which stated that participating students and civic leaders along with Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-day additional registration of voters to be conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. Certain restrictive parameters were discussed and it further stated that the rationale for the additional two-day

w/finality. Filed urgent motion for issuance of restraining order, denied. Dec. 5, 1988 Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for restraining order. Dec. 7, 1988 SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease & desist from deporting Yu pending conclusion of hearings before Board of Special Inquiry of CID. Dec. 13, 1988 Respondent commissioner (Im assuming this is Miriam coz shes the first respondent.) filed motion to lift TRO saying the commission already issued a summary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2, 88. Dec. 13, 1988 Yu filed an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention. Opposed vigorously to lifting of TRO. Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. He complied. His reply revealed aforementioned substantive facts. ISSUE: WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. HELD: Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted. RATIO: 1. Renunciation made known distinctly & explicitly and not left to interference or implication (BI Commissioners vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese even after he has acquired Filipino citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation. 2. He does not dispute the facts. He was given the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due process. 3. Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But due to petitioners insistence, SC had to do it. 4. Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. CRUZ, CONCURRING IN RESULT: Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his status as naturalized Filipino by obtaining Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued only to nationals. No proof of Yus unequivocal & deliberate renunciation of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its significance & consequences as provided for in CA No. 63. Commercial documents signed are not proof enough of renunciation.

registration is the renewed political awareness and interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political events in the country among the youth. In viewing of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for estimated costs of additional two days of registration. Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and representatives and it was the decided to disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. On Feb. 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 which stated the Commissions decision to deny the two -day additional registration request. Petitions filed before the SC in response to said decision were consolidated. ISSUES: 1. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Feb. 8 COMELEC Resolution No. The right to suffrage is not absolute as its exercise, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Substantive requirement: Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. Procedural requirement: A citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996." The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage for registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even preelection activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner. RA 8189, Sec. 8: System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The Personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election," RA 8189, Sec. 35: Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List - Any registered voter, representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election x x x." RA 8189, Sec. 8 and Sec. 35 provide prohibitive periods where no registration shall be conducted and the one within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voters list. The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of securing the voter's substantive right to be included in the list of voters. This means that if a special voter's registration is conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter's list since we would already be well into the 100day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process, this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the voter's list, and consequently, that of the entire election. The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of registration within the

last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom might not even be qualified to vote, the very possibility that we shall be conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections, regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own results. Still, petitioners invoke the so called "standby" powers or "residual" powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of RA 6646, Sec. 29 and adopted verbatim in RA 8436, Sec. 28 where COMELEC shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage, if it should no longer be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain preelection acts. Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board. (RA 8189, Sec 3(a)) Reconciling RA 8436, Sec. 28 and RA 8189, Sec. 8: Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. Accordingly, courts, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other as they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature. Court thus held that Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in present case, for purpose of upholding assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election. Sec. 28, RA 8436 applies in cases where the pre-election acts may be performed within the available period prior to election day. In more categorical language, Sec. 28, RA 8436 is anchored on the sound premise that these certain "pre-election acts" are still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law. COMELECthe constitutional body tasked by no less that the fundamental charter (Sec 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including registration of voters painstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the "operational impossibility of conducting a special registration, which in its own language, "can no longer be accomplished within the time left to (us) the Commission." Even without the legal obstacles, the Comelec has much to do (such as complete project of precincts, constitute BEI, inspect, verify and seat Book of Voters etc.) and with very little time to accomplish them. Since it is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances and since the law does not require that the impossible be done, the court held that the "stand-by power" of COMELEC under Sec. 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposed the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise. On the allegation that petitioners were disfranchised when COMELEC set the registration deadline on Dec. 27, 00 instead of the day before prohibitive period before May 14, 01 regular elections commences: Petitions and records show that none of the petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by COMELEC or has filed a complaint before COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between period from Dec. 28, 00 to Jan. 13, 01, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by COMELEC from filing such application. Though COMELEC set the registration deadline on Dec. 27, 00, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189. Petitioners in instant case are not without fault or blamethey admit that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration. They are denied of the Courts protective mantle because Let no one come to court with

unclean hands and the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Held: COMELEC did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No, 3584. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of laws. COMELEC in denying petitioners request to hold special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter Sec. 8, RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Whatever action COMELEC takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters' registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Thus, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of COMELEC, Court is precluded from meddling with affairs exclusively within the province of COMELEC a body accorded with independence by the Constitution.

This is a case filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal, as taxpayer, against COMELEC, Exec Sec Alberto Romulo and Hon. Emilia Boncodin, Sec of Dept of Budget and Mgmt. Petitioner, also a member of the Phil Bar, seeks a declaration that certain provisions of RA No 9189 suffer from constitutional infirmity. Such Act appropriates funds under its Sec 29 to carry out the provisions and as taxpayer, petitioner Macalintal also seeks to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute, w/c results to a misapplication of funds. RA No 9189, more commonly known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, was enacted in lieu of Sec 2, Art V of the Consti. It provides Congress the system in w/c absentee voting should be done by qualified Filipinos abroad. Absentee voting- a relatively new concept, completely separable and distinct from the regular system of voting. It is an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting. Such right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory. It is devised to accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election. Overseas Absentee Voter- a citizen of the Phils, at least 18 yrs of age, who is qualified to register and vote under RA No 9189, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of the elections. Absentee- not a resident. A person cannot be simultaneously a resident and an absentee under normal conditions. However, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Phils as residence is considered synonymous to domicile. Residence- a temporary/permanent place of abode; not a domicile. It implies factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. Domicile- a fixed permanent residence to w/c, when absent, one has the intention of returning. Difference between residence & domicile- A person can only have a single domicile but he may have numerous places of residence. The essential distinction is the intent to return or the intent to leave when the purpose for w/c the resident has taken up his abode ends. ISSUES (Resolved in seriatim): WON Sec 5 of RA No 9189 allowing immigrants or permanent residents to register as voters is violative of the residency requirement in Sec 1 Art V of Consti? WON Sec 18.5 of RA w/c empowers COMELEC to proclaim all the winning candidates violates Sec 4 Art VI of Consti, w/c states that the Congress proclaim the winning candidates for Pres & VP? WON Congress, via the JCOC, can exercise certain powers over the COMELEC, w/o violating the latters independence under Sec 1 Art IX-A of the Consti? HELD: Petition partly granted. The ff portions (4) of RA No 9189 are declared VOID for being unconstitutional: The phrase in the 1st sentence of 1st par of Sec 17.1, to wit: subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee; The portion of the last par of Sec 17.1, to wit: only upon review and approval of the JCOC; The 2nd sentence of par 1 of Sec 19, to wit: The IRR shall be submitted to the JCOC created by virtue of this Act for prior approval; and The 2nd sentence in par 2 of Sec 25, to wit: It shall review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission. RATIO: No. Sec 5 of RA No 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Phils not later than 3 yrs from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the Natl Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. Petitioner claims this is violative of the residency requirement in Sec 1 Art V of the Consti w/c requires the voter must be a resident in the Phils for at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 mos immediately preceding an election. He

2. WON SC can compel COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed Dec. 27, 00 deadline and the May 14, 01 general elections. No. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The court held that petitioners failed to satisfactorily establish that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus. Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora: Court's function (Art. VIII, Sec. 1) is "merely [to] check, WON the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutionally limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing ...[of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power...It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. Presidents issuance of Proc. No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 18, 2001, to allow the conduct of Special Registration of new voters and filing of House Bill No., 12930 (and similarly Senate Bill No. 2276 before Senate) before the Lower House, which bills seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period provided for under said law, are clear intimations on the part of both the executive and legislative departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the COMELEC of a special registration before May 14, 2001 General Elections.

MACALINTAL v. COMELEC Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court, Certiorari and Prohibition (July 2003) Ponencia was penned by J. Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez. The case used the debates in the constitutional convention to determine the intent of the framers re Absentee Voting. Nine other justices gave their separate opinions. This is held to be a momentous case because the core issue is the enfranchisement of some 7 million overseas Filipinos. FACTS:

presents the ruling in Caasi v. CA wherein Court held that a green card holder US immigrant is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Phils. However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for w/o it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Phils and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Sec 5 of RA No 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Phils not later than 3 yrs after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Phils otherwise consequences will be met accdg to RA No 9189. Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for a deterrence w/c is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections. Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, w/c is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Sec 1 Art V), the Court finds that Sec 5 of RA No 9189 is not constitutionally defective. Yes, Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and VP for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Sec 4 ART VII of the Consti. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps. No, by vesting itself w/ the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left w/ no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence (silence) in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. Unlike the first 2 issues where it remained silent, this is the sole issue reacted to by COMELEC. Bellosillo, J., Concurring Opinion: Opined his views on WON Sec 5 of RA NO 9189 is violative of the residency requirement. Actual and physical residence abroad should not ipso jure result or automatically be equated w/ abandonment of Phil domicile. The values of animus manendi (intent to remain) and animus revertendi (intent to return) must not be brushed off in determining WON immigrants and permanent residents should be denied of their right to vote. Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. 3 rules to be considered: a man must have a residence/domicile somewhere; domicile is not easily lost, once established it is retained until a new one is acquired; and a man can have but 1 residence/domicile at a time. Puno, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Elements of domicile: Fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place Animus manendi: intention of returning there permanently The mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence w/o the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

To successfully effect change in domicile, its actual removal or change must be demonstrated. Where he concurs: Congress could not have allowed COMELEC to exercise a power exclusively bestowed upon it by the Consti in its constitutional duty to canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Pres and VP Congress should not have been given power over IRR of COMELEC for the latter was granted the power to strengthen its independence. Hence, its exercise is beyond invasion by Congress. Where he dissents: The affidavit merely proves the intent to return but not other requisites for reacquiring the domicile of origin. Domicile could not be established as soon as the old is abandoned even though the person has not yet arrived at the new domicile. The burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon the party who asserts it. It should not merely rely on a persons declarations as to what he considers his home, residence or domicile. Therefore, the burden rests on an immigrant or a permanent resident to prove that he has abandoned his foreign domicile and reestablished his domicile in the Phils. Until the intent is fulfilled upon ones return to the Phils, he continues to be a domiciliary of another country and cannot be considered a qualified voter. Physical presence is not a mere test of intent but the Principal confirming evidence of the intention of the person. Extent of exercise of Congress of its oversight powers in the implementation of RA No 9189: Power of oversight: embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. It is intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of govt. Categories: congressional scrutiny (determine economy & efficiency of operation of govt activities), congressional investigation (inherent power w/c involves a more intense digging of facts), legislative supervision (most encompassing; allows Congress to supervise over executive agencies through its veto power). COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary. The Court has no general power of supervision over it except those specifically granted by the Consti. However, the COMELEC is subject to congressional scrutiny especially during budget hearings. Congress cannot abolish it as it can other agencies under the executive branch. COMELEC is not a mere creature of the legislature, it owe its origin from the Constitution. Vitug, J., Concurring Opinion: COMELECs power is limited only to proclaiming Senators and Partylist Reps as winners. The election returns for the positions of Pres & VP should be certified by the Bd of Canvassers to Congress & not COMELEC. Panganiban, J., Concurring Opinion: 3 Requisites of Voters: citizenship, age and residence. Importance of residence: enables one to know the needs and the problems of the locality/area. Nowadays, through e-age communication facilities, actual presence is no longer necessary to make Fils abroad aware of the countrys conditions and the suitability of candidates for natl offices. Ynares-Santiago, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Immigrant defined: a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence Dissent: Sec 5 of RA No 9189 grants the right of suffrage to a category of voters who do not possess the constitutional requirement of residence and therefore should be declared UNconstitutional. Immigrants have voluntarily and unambiguously chosen actual, physical and permanent residence in a foreign country. Concurs in the rest of the decisions on the given issues. Sandoval-Gutierez, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Since the Consti fixes qualifications of voters, such cannot be increased, diminished or changed by legislative enactment, unless the power to do so is expressly granted or necessarily implied.

Residency requirement aims to serve as an invaluable protection against fraud and interference. It is not competent for Congress to diminish or alter such qualification. Thus, Sec 5 of RA No 9189 is Unconstitutional. Callejo, Sr., J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Sec 5 of RA No 9189 Unconstitutional insofar that qualifications of voters set in Sec 1 Art V is clear and unambiguous. 2. Territory 3. Government GOVERNMENT OF THE P.I. vs. MONTE DE PIEDAD Parens Patriae: parental authority/guardian

1. Constitutive theory recognition constitutes a state & it confers legal personality on the entity 2. Declaratory theory recognition is merely regulatory & being a state depends upon possession of required elements. (favored authoritatively) Art. XVI, Sec. 3 The State may not be sued without its consent. (sovereign immunity) Dates back to the King could not be sued w/o his consent rule. King counterpart today: legislature. US 11th amendment: US cant be sued in law or equity by any citizen. 1973 Consti: first appearance of this provision. Santos vs. Santos: State can do no wrong, which actually meant that State must not & was not allowed to do wrong. Holmes: exemption is not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on logical & practical ground that there can be no legal rt.as against the authority that makes law on w/c the rt.depends. (for single sovereign clothed w/ full sovereign authority) Republican state: coursed thru any one of its organs none of whom exercises full sovereign authority. Metran vs. Paredes: RP has a representative govt & as such, people have surrendered some of their priv.rts. & interests w/c may conflict w/higher rts. & larger interests of the people as a whole represented by govt. ex. Of a higher rt: govt immunity. If govt can be sued, it would be tantamount to the people attempting to sue themselves along w/the rest of the people represented by the common govt. Anomalous & absurd. Providence Washington Insurance Co. vs. RP: propensity of people to go to court at the least provocation, loss of time & energy to defend against law suits w/o such basic principle as an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined. May be waived by legislature through express consent or implied consent. Implied consent ex. when State enters into contracts wherein State is reduced to the level of a citizen & consent is implied by entering into contract or when State sues a private party who has right to file a counterclaim. a. When a suit is against the State Against the Republic of the Philippines Against unincorporated govt agency: has no juridical personality, suit is against agencys principal thus determine WON principal gave consent Against government owned corp: not against the state because its a juridical person distinct from the state. But if it was established to perform govtal functions, it shares States immunity, thus we need to determine WON theres consent Against an officer of the state: Determine if liability will fall on officer or govt. b. Express Consent (waiving rt.) Special Law: private bill authorizing a named individual to bring suit on specified claim General Law: authorizes any person who meets conditions stated in the law to sue the govt in accordance w/procedure specified in the law. Ex. Consti Art. IX-A Sec. 7: unless otherwise provided by Consti or by law, any decision, order or ruling o each Commission may be brought to the SC on certiorari by aggrieved party w/in 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. i. Money Claims arising from contract ii. Torts committed by special agents CC Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the

to enforce all charities of a public nature by virtue of its general superintending authority over pub. Interests where no other person is entrusted w/it

inherent in supreme power of ever state, whether lodged in a royalty or legislature & has no affinity to those arbitrary powers w/c are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people & the destruction of their liberties. Its a most beneficient function & often necessary to be exercised in interest of humanity & prevention of injury to those who cant protect themselves. Taking care of those who cant vindicate their rights & protection of sovereign authority

CABANAS vs. PILAPIL

State should take up this role to accord priority to the best interest of minors who are part of suit of litigation. Parent should be preferred in deciding issues re children since its in consonance w/ tradition & Consti (The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution.). De Jure & De Facto Governments basis of legitimacy De Facto: all acts & proceedings of legislative, executive & judicial departments are good & valid. Kinds (Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh): govt that gets possession & control of or usurps by force or by voice the majority, the rightful legal govt & maintains itself against the will of the latter established & maintained by military forces who invade & occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war & w/c is denominated a govt of paramount force established as an independent govt by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against parent state De Jure: legitimate CO KIM CHAN vs. VALDEZ TAN KEH DE FACTO GOVERNMENT

Another type: government de facto: 1) maintained by active military power, 2) should be obeyed in civil matters by priv. Citizens. Occupant has responsibility to maintain pub order & safety Sovereignty

1.

SOVEREIGNTY Capacity to conduct international relations w/ corresponding political, technical & financial capabilities to do so. Source of the ultimate legal authority. Legal sovereignty: power to adapt/alter the constitution or supreme power to make laws vs. Political sovereignty: sum total of all the influences in a state, legal & non-legal w/c determine the course of law Resides in the people (those who have direct hand in the formulation, adoption, & amendment/alteration of the Consti) but not always directly exercised. Its delegated to the govt & to people in whose hand governmental powers temporarily reside Govt officials have authority given them & defined by law w/c o nly continues w/consent of the people. (RULE OF LAW: govt of laws & not of men) Are the 4 elements prerequisites for a state or is recognition sufficient? Pol. decision

service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)