Running Head: TSA Regulations

Should Transportation Security (TSA) regulations be changed? Earo Jones Prof. Lakina Freeman ENG215 11/11/12

Running Head: TSA Regulations

Since September 11, 2001, I believe that we can all say that we are glad for many protocols in society that help us to insure security and safety for our country. The Transportation Security Administration was founded after the attack to help to bring about that kind of safety and freedom. But the placement of the TSA under the Homeland Security Act tended to fill its halls with bureaucrats and politicians who were more used to meetings and discussion than they were with action. They carefully thought through their many regulations, but some of them were immediately revealed as inefficient and poorly thought through. In a hearing in front of United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security on September 11, 2012, Mike Rogers the sub-committee chairman set out some concepts that warrant changes in typical TSA regulations. Advance security by working together to adopt a full-view plan Strengthen privacy by encouraging private firms to modernize and automate the passenger screening process. Cut red tape by working with firms and reforming Prohibited Items lists to better reflect threats. They suggested other various alterations, but the above three were the most pertinent to the topic of regulation change.

Running Head: TSA Regulations

An article by CNN reports that some changes are already taking place which refer to individuals who would not typically be considered a threat. The TSA is slowly realizing that it is just as important that Americans retain their freedoms and their dignity as well as their safety. It is this tight balance beam that they must navigate while constantly trying to keep politicians content that they are conscientiously doing their job. Protocols announced in March of 2012 mirror some made the previous fall that affected passengers of the age of 12 and under. This time, they are focusing on passengers 75 and older. They account that the time saved focusing on unlikely threats can be better utilized focusing on more probable suspects. Interestingly, there are many travelers who pass through security screenings every day. Could we now find a way to expedite their screening process of they have proven time and time again not to be a threat? Perhaps we could somehow form a good-guy list that would include people who have proven to be trustworthy. I for one am glad for all the up-roar and discussion regarding TSA regulations. It proves two things. The American population still knows what it means to be free and serious about maintaining their freedom, and we are also a people who recognize the importance and position in regulations that insure those same freedoms. A wise saying says, Dont be part of the problem, be part of the solution. Complaining and fussing wont do a bit of good, but putting pen to paper, or better sending a message will go much further to show our forces and agencies that we are supporters of freedoms and that we

Running Head: TSA Regulations

have some ideas, some concepts that just might help them do the job that we pay them to do for us.

No one wants to see a repeat of 9/11. But nor do we want to become a police-state. We must find a common ground in which we can maintain our freedoms while maintaining our safety as well.

TSA faced in developing regulations and a comprehensive plan for managing the program, as well as several factors that caused TSA to miss initial deadlines for issuing TWIC cards. In our September 2006 report, we identified the challenges that TSA encountered during TWIC program testing, and several problems related to contract planning and oversight. Specifically, we reported that DHS and industry stakeholders faced difficult challenges in ensuring that biometric access control technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment where the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program is being initially tested. In October 2007, we testified that TSA had made progress in implementing the program and addressing our recommendations regarding contract planning and oversight and coordination with stakeholders. For example, TSA reported that it added staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the contract and developed plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts.13 However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will implement a biometric identification system for access controls at commercials airports. We have initiated ongoing work to further assess DHS`s efforts to establish procedures for implementing biometric

Running Head: TSA Regulations

identifier systems for airport secured areas access control. Aviation Security Workforce. We concluded that DHS has generally achieved all 7 performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has hired and deployed a federal screening workforce at over 400 commercial airports nationwide, and has developed standards for determining TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA also established numerous programs to train and test the performance of its TSO workforce, although we reported that improvements in these efforts can be made. Among other efforts, in December 2005, TSA reported completing enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000 TSOs, and increased its use of covert testing to assess vulnerabilities of existing screening systems. TSA also established the Screening Partnership Program which allows eligible airports to apply to TSA to use a private screening workforce. In addition, TSA has trained and deployed federal air marshals on high-risk flights; established standards for training flight and cabin crews; and established a Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or criminal acts. Related to flight and cabin crew training, TSA revised its guidance and standards to include additional training elements required by law and improve the organization and clarity of the training. TSA also increased its efforts to measure the performance of its TSO workforce through recertification testing and other measures. Passenger prescreening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved one, and has not generally achieved two, of the performance expectations in this area.

Running Head: TSA Regulations

TSA faced specific challenges in developing regulations and a comprehensive plan for managing the program, as well as several factors that caused TSA to miss initial deadlines for issuing TWIC cards. In our September 2006 report, we identified the challenges that TSA encountered during TWIC program testing, and several problems related to contract planning and oversight. Specifically, we reported that DHS and industry stakeholders faced difficult challenges in ensuring that biometric access control technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment where the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program is being initially tested. In October 2007, we testified that TSA had made progress in implementing the program and addressing our recommendations regarding contract planning and oversight and coordination with stakeholders. For example, TSA reported that it added staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the contract and developed plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts. However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will implement a biometric identification system for access controls at commercials airports. We have initiated ongoing work to further assess DHS`s efforts to establish procedures for implementing biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas access control or Aviation Security Workforce. We concluded that DHS has generally achieved all 7 performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has hired and deployed a federal screening workforce at over 400 commercial airports nationwide, and has developed standards for determining TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA also established numerous programs to train

Running Head: TSA Regulations

and test the performance of its TSO workforce, although we reported that improvements in these efforts can be made. Among other efforts, in December 2005, TSA reported completing enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000 TSOs, and increased its use of covert testing to assess vulnerabilities of existing screening systems. TSA also established the Screening Partnership Program which allows eligible airports to apply to TSA to use a private screening workforce. In addition, TSA has trained and deployed federal air marshals on high-risk flights; established standards for training flight and cabin crews; and established a Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or criminal acts. Related to flight and cabin crew training, TSA revised its guidance and standards to include additional training elements required by law and improve the organization and clarity of the training. TSA also increased its efforts to measure the performance of its TSO workforce through recertification testing and other measures by utilizing passenger prescreening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved one, and has not generally achieved two, of the performance expectations in this area.

Running Head: TSA Regulations

REFERENCES http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/14/travel/tsa-elderly-screening/index.html

Congressional Testimony. (2007, October). TSA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMENDATIONS:MS. CATHLEEN A. BERRICK Retrieved from http://elibrary.bigchalk.com

http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=722671