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Broad doctrinal implications of CSR for religion and theology General questions To what degree is cognitive science of religion (CSR) relevant to theology? Does CSR only explain the groundwork of religion, leaving theology proper largely untouched? Are the claims of CSR and theology consonant with one another or are they in conflict? Does the believer who accepts the claims of CSR have to jettison purposiveness in their theological vision? Is religion only compatible with CSR on the assumption of some sort of theistic determinism? Does the CSR claim that beliefs are (often) rationalisations of intuitions force a theological recognition of the primacy of the will in the determination of belief? Does CSR suggest a demotion of the role of reason in religion? What are the implications for doctrinal instruction? Are certain belief systems more compatible with the findings of CSR than others? Is CSR only genuinely compatible with naturalism? Summary Theological discussion about the broad doctrinal implications of CSR is in its early stages, and there is some disagreement about how relevant the findings of CSR are to matters of theological importance, and, where they are agreed to be relevant, what manner of engagement with CSR is appropriate. Some scholars (e.g., Bielfeldt [1]) have cast doubt on the ability of CSR or the cognitive sciences in general to contribute anything substantially new to topics as important as the divine nature, divine action, and the nature of the self, whereas others have begun to stress the relevance of the findings of CSR and the importance of engagement (e.g., Oviedo [2]) but differ about what form the engagement should take. While some have supposed that the hypotheses and findings of CSR can be shown to be in substantial concord with traditional religious claims [2, 3], others (e.g., Peterson [4]) suggest that CSR is basically hostile to these claims and the appropriate theological response should be fundamental critique. The CSR approach to religious belief and behavior is often perceived as an attempt to 'explain away' religion, an impression encouraged by occasional statements by some cognitive scientists of religion to that effect (e.g., Boyers claim in Religion explained [5] that people who think that we have religion because religion is true...will find little here to support their views). There seems to be general agreement that theologians should neither accept the entirety of the CSR view nor fail to engage with those parts of it which demand very serious consideration, but that this latter middle way (Oviedo) may require revisions of important religious doctrines, with opinions differing on the extent of the revision required. Examples of philosophical and theological issues According to Peterson [4], one example of a central theological doctrine potentially undermined by the findings of CSR would be what he refers to as the received or humanist view of the person shared by theists and humanists alike and traceable back to the biblical doctrine of imago dei. On the assumption of evolutionary naturalism we would we stripped of our sense that we were made for some purpose or other [cf. 6], but even assuming some sort of consonance between evolutionary theory and theism, CSR explanations of religious belief and behaviour

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might still be regarded as casting doubt on the traditional doctrine of human free will. Brelsford [7] has argued that CSRs claim that religious beliefs derive from (unconscious) intuitions arising from basic evolved structures of mind need not imply complete determinism, since intuitions need not be seen merely as fixed outcomes of structures of mind but as capable of being consciously reformed or overridden via intentional reflection and practice. Nevertheless, he sees it as a consequence of the findings of CSR that religious beliefs do not typically or easily result from conscious mental processes, and actions and behaviours do not derive from and are not readily governed by conscious beliefs, a finding which does carry implications, e.g., for traditional approaches to religious instruction, since what one would actually think or do will more obviously be constrained by ones intuitions than by any taught religious content [cf. also 8]. Other examples of central theological doctrines in the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition potentially affected by the findings of CSR are beliefs about the afterlife (see Afterlife beliefs and mind-body dualism summary) and the divine-human relationship (see Agency detection/HADD summary). Some scholars might doubt whether the findings of CSR can plausibly be made consistent with the main claims of the Abrahamic traditions and argue instead that CSR claims are more compatible with a straightforwardly naturalist view or perhaps with non-Abrahamic religious approaches. Kurland [9], focussing on the implications of evolutionary theory for religion, has suggested that the Abrahamic notion that humans are created in the image of God and capable at least in principle of pure altruism must yield place to a recognition that we are the evolved result of a balance between cooperative and competitive instincts. In light of these types of considerations an argument could be made that Buddhism appears much more compatible with the findings of CSR than the Abrahamic traditions and their assumptions about human personhood, since it enables us to accept the reality of an indifferent nature (including persons). Moreover, according to Kurland and others Buddhism may be more compatible with a modular understanding of mind, since from the Buddhist perspective the self is an illusion, and the illusion could potentially be explained as the result of discrete mental modules producing the deceptive appearance of a unified consciousness. Outstanding issues Are CSR and religion consonant or do they conflict? Is CSR more compatible with theistic or non-theistic religions, or with naturalism? Which theological doctrines are potentially affected by CSR findings? Which are not? Does CSR only explain superstition? What are the implications for theological anthropology? What are the implications for free will/reason? Do the findings of CSR carry lessons for religious instruction? What are the implications of the CSR view of religious belief formation for theology? Can the findings of CSR illuminate how the believer is supposed to come to knowledge of God?

See also Afterlife beliefs and mind-body dualism; Agency detection/HADD

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References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Bielfeldt, D., Three questions about minding God. Zygon, 2004. 39(3): p. 591-604. Oviedo, L., Is a complete biocognitive account of religion feasible? Zygon, 2008. 43(1): p. 103-126. Barrett, J.L., Why would anyone believe in God? 2004, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Peterson, G.R., Theology and the science wars: who owns human nature? Zygon, 2006. 41(4): p. 853-862. Boyer, P., Religion explained: the evolutionary origins of religious thought. 2001, New York: Basic Books. Bering, J.M., The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2006. 29: p. 453-498. Brelsford, T., Lessons for religious education from cognitive science of religion. Religious Education, 2005. 100(2): p. 174-191. Lawson, E.T., A new look at the science-and-religion dialogue. Zygon, 2005. 40(3): p. 555-563. Kurland, J.A., Toward an evolution of mind: implications for the faithful? Zygon, 1999. 34(1): p. 67-92.

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