Fundamentalist Colonialism - The Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380 www.politicalgeography.
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Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of IsraeliPalestinian conict

R. Reuveny
School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Suite 430, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
Abstract In July 2000, it looked as if Israeli-Palestinian peace was just around the corner. Although the Camp David Summit did not lead to a permanent agreement, talks continued. By the fall of 2002, the peace process had all but collapsed. The two sides clash violently and almost daily. The premise of this paper is that Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible. Given this premise, the paper addresses two questions. First, why did the Oslo peace process fail to resolve the conict? Second, assuming a Palestinian state were to be formed, what would be the best geopolitical arrangement to secure a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace? This paper argues that at its core, the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conict is driven by Israeli colonialism: since 1967, Israel has built numerous settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and has, in practice, annexed the land. At the forefront of this colonialist movement are settlers who are members of Israeli fundamentalist groups that believe in the vision of biblical Israel. Historically, colonialism has remained intact as long as the native population accepted its presence. When this passivity was replaced by a quest for independence, colonialism collapsed. Some colonial rulers left peacefully. Others put up a ght. Colonial conicts ended only when the colonial rulers gave up the colonies. To the extent that history can serve as a model, there can be no resolution of the conict until Israel withdraws from all the territories and evacuates all its settlements, and a Palestinian state forms in all the West Bank and Gaza Strip. If the Palestinian state takes the form of numerous discontinuous enclaves surrounded by Israeli land, the conict likely will continue. 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Decolonization; Settlements; Oslo Process; Conict resolution
Tel.: 812-855-4944; fax: 812-855-7802. E-mail address: rreuveny@indiana.edu (R. Reuveny).
0962-6298/03/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00114-2
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R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380
Introduction In July 2000, it looked as if Israeli-Palestinian peace was just around the corner. Although the Camp David Summit did not lead to a peace agreement, talks continued. Then, on September 28, 2000, a visit by the then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the site of the Al Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem provoked Palestinian protests that grew into a rebellion against Israelthe second intifada. The two sides continued to talk and in January 2001 progress apparently had been made (European Union, 2002). By then, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had lost parliamentary support. In February 2001, Sharon formed a new government and the January 2001 progress was nullied. Since then, the conict has escalated into a violent cycle of actions and reactions. Most Israelis and Palestinians support negotiations toward a reconciliation agreement.1 Throughout the second intifada, Israeli and Palestinian ofcials discussed cease-re and cooperation. This mixture of violence and cooperation has characterized the Israeli-Palestinian relationship since 1992, when the two sides began to discuss peace. Understanding why the relationship is unstable is important for resolving the conict. Some observers believe that Palestinians want to destroy Israel. Others believe Israel wants to dominate the Palestinians. A third view is that Israel and a Palestinian state cannot coexist. Taken together, these views imply indenite conict. The premise of this paper is that Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible. Peace, of course, can entail different levels of friendliness. In this paper, peace is taken to denote at least formal diplomatic relations and the cession of hostilities. Given this premise, the paper addresses two questions. First, why did the Oslo peace process fail to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conict? Second, assuming a Palestinian state were to be formed, what would be the best geopolitical arrangement to secure a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace? These questions are analyzed against a backdrop of historical colonialism and decolonization. The benet of using a colonial framework is that it places the Israeli-Palestinian conict in a comparative environment. Too often, this conict is looked at in terms of its unique nature. While there are features that make the Israeli-Palestinian case different from other colonial situations, there are enough similarities to make an objective observer wonder where this conict is leading, and how it will ultimately be resolved. When Israels presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the territories) is placed within the context of colonialism, it is more often than not done as part of some polemic and using an antagonistic tone, so that any attempt to be reective is immediately paralyzed. One exception to this assessment is provided by Lusticks (1993, 1994) comparison of the Israeli link to the territories from 19671992, with the British link to
1 In July 2001, e.g., 73% of Israelis and Palestinians supported reconciliation (Haaretz Jul 23, 2001). In December 2001, 71% of Palestinians supported negotiations (Haaretz Dec 26, 2001). In April 2002, 73% of Israelis supported negotiations (Yediot April 5, 2002). In May 2002, 70% of Palestinians supported reconciliation (Center for Palestinian Studies and ResearchCPRSMay 15-19, 2002).
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Ireland from 18861922, and the French link to Algeria from 19551962. Probing a threshold of settler activity that makes violence over state contraction likely, he concluded that Israeli Prime Minister Rabins attempt to leave the territories stood a better chance than the 1914 failed British attempt to leave Ireland, and the 1959 1961 successful French attempt to leave Algeria. In the mid-1990s, political geographers studying the Israeli-Palestinian conict were also optimistic. For example, Falah (1997) argued that Israeli-Palestinian enmity was about to be transformed into a link characterized by high concern for the self and high concern for the other (1997: 310). Similarly, Newman and Falah (1997) expected that in the future the gap between the two sides would close. These expectations have not yet materialized, the explanation of which further motivates this paper. Some studies (e.g., Newman, 2002; Klieman, 2000; Alpher, 1995) imply that the nature of Israeli-Palestinian conict always has been about the partition of Israel/Palestine. However, this paper argues that the nature of the conict changed fundamentally after 1967, when Israel occupied the territories. Israeli control of the territories is a form of colonialism nourished by a mixture of Jewish nationalism and religionor Israeli fundamentalism. Since 1967, Israel has built numerous settlements in the territories and has, in practice, annexed the land. The contemporary Israeli-Palestinian relationship is a conict over Israeli decolonization; many similar conicts occurred in the past. Historically, colonialism remained intact as long as the native population accepted its presence. When this passivity was replaced by a quest for independence, colonialism collapsed. Some colonial rulers left peacefully. Others put up a ght. Colonial conicts ended only when the rulers gave up the colonies. If the interpretation that history can serve as a model is correct, the Israeli-Palestinian conict may only end following complete Israeli decolonization and the formation of a Palestinian state in its place. Palestinian statehood is supported by many Israelis, but its borders are contested. Israeli Labor and left wing parties agree to a state covering most of the territories. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon apparently agrees to a state in the areas that the Palestinian Authority (PA) controlled at the eve of Camp David. The Palestinian Authority wants a state encompassing the entire territories.2 Importantly, if the Palestinian state would take the form of numerous discontinuous enclaves surrounded by Israeli land, the conict likely would continue. My analysis, no doubt, will be deemed controversial. Colonialism is a loaded term. The approach of this paper, however, is not normative but rather empirical. Structural instability The questions of what caused the failure of the Camp David Summit and the onset of the second intifada are hotly debated. One position blames the Palestinians. Some
2 Examples of statements to that effect are provided later. In May 2002, 66% of Palestinians supported peace with Israel, in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel (CPRS, May 1519, 2002). The Palestinian Islamist opposition claims all of Palestine (including Israel proper).
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argue that Yasser Arafat planned the rebellion before the summit because he feared that peace would diminish his stature. Others argue that the Palestinians planned the violence in order to pressure Israel to make more concessions, because they believed that violence triggered the Oslo process (Haaretz Sept 19, 2001; Ben-Meir, 2001). Another view is that the Palestinian leaders lacked the maturity to accept Baraks generous offer. The failure of the summit, in turn, facilitated the violence, contradicting the premise of the Oslo process: peaceful negotiations (Eldar, 2002; Makovsky, 2001; Sontag, 2001; Malley and Agha, 2001; Haaretz Mar 29, Sept 19, 2001; Yediot Jul 20, 2001). A second position blames Israel. Some argue that Israels Camp David offer, in effect, replaced direct Israeli control of the Palestinians with indirect control. In other words, Barak conspired to derail the peace process (Hammami & Tamari, 2001; Sontag, 2001; Eldar, 2002). A related view argues that the intifada is a grass root explosion; the Palestinians felt that the Oslo process had reached a dead end (Jahshan, 2000; Dajani, 2001; Elia, 2001). Others blame Sharons visit to Temple Mount. The visit triggered Palestinian outrage; the Israeli response was harsh, and things got out of hand (Haaretz Mar 8, Sept 19, 2001). A third position blames both sides: Barak generated unrealistic expectations; Arafat failed to meet his own deadlines for declaring a state, frustrating the Palestinians and paving the way for the intifada (e.g., Ben-Meir, 2001). A fourth position criticizes organizational factors: Barak and Arafat did not negotiate face to face during the Camp David Summit; Israel did not present a formal offer; the US brokering was biased toward Israel, and the parties faced an impossible timetable due to President Clintons leaving ofce and political pressures in Israel that undermined Baraks government (Malley & Agha, 2001; Kimmerling, 2001; Ben Meir, 2001). These explanations have merits, but the failure of the Camp David Summit and the eruption of the second intifada cannot be fully understood when studied in isolation. The Israeli-Palestinian relationship since 1994 cycles between conict escalation, and cooperation. The cycles can be described by a stylized theoretical model (Reuveny, 1999). The model considers two countriesIsrael and Palestinethat have been enemies until recently and now are negotiating a compromise. Formally, the PA is not a country. But since 1994, it has exhibited a number of country-like attributes, including controlling land and security forces, and conducting foreign policy, and therefore in this model it will be treated as such. Israel is stronger and richer than Palestine, and Palestine depends on Israel economically. Each country includes three actors: the government, the public, and the hawksa radical faction that rejects compromise. The public in both countries supports negotiations. In each cycle, the hawks or government (acting under the inuence of hawks) on one side provoke or attack the other side. The hawks on the other side demand a government response. The Israeli government employs economic and military measures against Palestine, demanding that the Palestinian government (PA) take action against its hawks. The PA refuses, and the conict escalates. The Palestinian economy deteriorates since it depends on Israel. Eventually, Palestine submits to Israels demands. Israel lifts punitive measures, and the two sides again cooperate. Over time, grievances rise, as does public support for the hawks, and a new cycle commences.
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Empirical data generally support this model. In the 1990s, Israel imposed frequent closures on the Palestinians in response to attacks, signicantly damaging the Palestinian economy. The Palestinians became desperate and support for militants rose. Palestinian attacks on Israel were followed by more closures, and so on (Reuveny, 1999). The second intifada can be thought of as yet another conict cycle (or cycles). During the second intifada, Israeli closures and the conict in general caused Palestinian economic conditions to worsen (The Economist, Aug 11, 2001; Haaretz, Feb 5, 2002). In 2001, half of Palestinians were unemployed, half lived in poverty, the economy fell into a barter system, and per capita income fell nearly 50% (World Bank, 2002). This economic misery provides a fertile ground for radicalism and violence (Hamami & Tamari, 2001; Siegman, 2001; Haaretz, Nov 29, 2001; Yediot, Feb, 23, 2001; The Economist, Jan 20, Mar 17, Aug 11, 2001). The economic explanation of the contemporary conict provides an important piece of the puzzle, but it fails to recognize that the conict is fundamentally over Israeli decolonization.
Colonialism and decolonization Colonialism has existed since ancient times.3 Over the last 500 years, there have been two waves of colonialism. The rst wave started with the Spanish and Portuguese expansion into the Americas. By the mid-nineteenth century, most of these colonies won independence from European rulers, typically following rebellions. A second wave of modern colonialism began in 1870, involving European, Japanese and US expansion into Africa, Asia and the Pacic Islands. The post-1945 era witnessed extensive decolonization. In broad terms, there were three types of colonies, in all of which native populations were subjugated. Colonies of exploitation utilized the natives in labor-intensive sectors. In colonies of settlement, the European settlers maintained a privileged socio-economic position and excluded the natives from their societies. Colonies of contested settlement followed a similar pattern, but the natives eventually rebelled and won independence, at which time most of the settlers left the former colony (Ferro, 1997; Abernethy, 2000; Cell, 2001). The causes of colonialism are debated. In Neo-Marxist interpretations, colonial powers expand in order to alleviate demographic or economic pressures at home. Realist interpretations suggest that colonialism is driven by desires for security and power. A third theory of colonialism focuses on its incremental terrestrial nature: colonial powers expand existing colonies in order to contain instabilities in bordering regions and to protect settlers and properties (Menon & Oneal, 1986). Post-1945 decolonization had several causes. Anti-colonial indigenous nationalism was present in all cases, but nationalism was not the only factor. Colonial powers
3 Early colonial powers include Egypt and Babylon. The Phoenicians probably were the rst builders of colonies overseas, followed by the Greeks, Carthaginians, and the Romans (Cell, 2001). In the 7th century, the Arabs began their great expansion (Hourani, 1991). The Middle Ages saw Viking colonialism and, beginning in 1171, English colonialism in Ireland (Smith, 1999).
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were able to crush indigenous rebellions, indicating that other forces were also at work. The changing needs of colonial powers led in many cases to the realization that the cost of colonialism was greater than the benet. By denying independence to millions of people, colonialism contradicted democratic norms. Domestically, the public increasingly opposed losses in battles over colonial holdings. As the importance of international trade and nance grew, the colonies became less economically important. The rise of the welfare state further reduced the willingness of Europeans to invest funds in order to maintain colonies. International political forces also played a role. The liberation of colonies inspired others to struggle against their own colonizers. The conquest of European colonies during World War II by Japan, and the decline in Europes power emboldened native resistance. It is also argued that as a new world leader, the US pressed to end colonialism in order to consolidate its power (Holland, 1989; Springhall, 2001). Several post-1945 decolonization episodes involved violence between natives and colonial rulers. The main causes of this violence were the reluctance of rulers to give up their colonies, the social-political-economic cleavages between natives and settlers, and the pressure from settlers on rulers to maintain the colony (Wilson, 1994; Chabal, 1993). Conicts between native factions during and after decolonization have also occurred, reecting various tensions, including ethnic-religious cleavages, controversies over collaboration with colonial rulers, and struggles over the power base in new or emerging states. European powers built most of their colonies overseas and far from home (transoceanic colonialism). Similar to the Israeli case, however, some colonies were established in nearby territories (terrestrial colonialism).4 Historically, the homelandcolony proximity had competing effects. On one hand, the colonists had somewhere to return to when colonialism ended, particularly if they maintained tight links to the homeland. On the other hand, the proximity enabled reinforcement of colonists by compatriots in the homeland, which intensied the wealth and power differences between the colonizers and the colonized, emboldened settler resistance to decolonization, and escalated colonial conicts.
Geographical phases Historically, colonialism involved states expansion beyond their borders and indigenous populations eventual rejection of this expansion. If the current IsraeliPalestinian conict is colonial, then at some point in time, Israel expanded beyond what was generally considered to be its borders and the Palestinians eventually have rejected this expansion. This idea can be demonstrated by a longitudinal empirical
Examples of terrestrial expansionism include imperial Germanys goal of creating a Mitteleuropa by colonizing in Central Europe and Nazi Germanys followup in Poland and the former Soviet Union (Schultz, 1989; Johnson, 1996), the US expansion in the Western part of North America, and the Russian expansion in South-Central Asia (Abernethy, 2000). The Anglo-British colonization of Ireland and the French colonization of Algeria, while overseas, were also relatively close to home.
4
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analysis of the actors geopolitical attitudes. It is possible to categorize these attitudes by using a seven-phase historical model, as shown in Table 1.5 Phase 1: 18821916 The rst Zionists arrived in Palestine in 1882. Almost immediately, they grappled with the issue of land. Of three optionspurchase, expropriation, and conquest they concluded that only purchase was viable (Ussishkin, 1903). In Phase 1, the Zionists and Palestinians coexisted, but tensions were rising (Gorny, 1987). In 1916, Britain and France agreed that after WWI, the British would control Palestine and Trans-Jordan (SykesPicot agreement). Phase 2: 19171949 The 1917 Balfour Declaration outlined British support for a Jewish home in Palestine. In 1919, the Zionists lobbied for a state in all of Palestine, as well as parts of Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Palestinians and the Arabs argued that the British promised them Palestine in 1916. The British gave Trans-Jordan to the Arabs in 1922. Seeking a compromise with the Palestinians, most Zionists accepted the decision. The Zionist revisionist minority demanded a state on both banks of the
Table 1 Geopolitical phases Phase Duration Israeli attitudes Palestinian attitudes Coexistence Initial event Ending event
18821916
Coexistence
2 3 4
19171949 19491967 19671977
5 6 7
19771987 19881992 1992present
Rejecting partition Institutionalizing Rejecting partition partition Creeping colonialism Rejecting partition, moderation Choosing colonialism Considering partition Debating colonialism Accepting partition Debating Demanding decolonization decolonization
Accepting partition
Zionist immigration begins Balfour Declaration Israeli-Arab armistice 1967 War
Sykes-Picot Agreement 1948 War 1967 War Labor loses elections First intifada begins Likud loses elections Labor loses elections
Likud Government PLO recognizes Israel Labor Government
Many studies documented the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conict. In addition to sources cited, see Hareven (1989); Shimoni (1990); Tessler (1994); Kimmerling and Migdal (1994); Gilbert (1998); Gazit (1999); Smith (2001), and The Middle East and North Africa (2001).
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Jordan River, ignoring Palestinian claims. The growing Zionist presence enraged the Palestinians and led to clashes. In 1936, the Palestinians rebelled and demanded independence from the British. The 1937 British government-appointed Peel Commission recommended the division of Palestine between the Jews and Palestinians. The mainstream Zionist party MAPAI (Land of Israel Workers Party) accepted the idea of partition, while the Palestinians and the Zionist revisionists rejected it. In 1939, Britain decided that henceforth Palestinians would rule Palestine. The Zionists disagreed, and in 1945 rebelled against the British. Britain decided to leave Palestine and submitted the issue to the United Nations (UN). The 1947 UN Partition Plan called for separate Palestinian and Israeli states. MAPAI Zionists accepted the plan; the Palestinians and the revisionists rejected it. In 1948, the conict grew into an Arab-Israeli war, in which Israel gained more land relative to the UN plan. Phase 3: 19491967 At Rhodes in 1949, Israel signed armistice agreements with Arab states, but not with the Palestinians. In Phase 3, most Israelis came to view the Rhodes Armistice Line as Israels permanent boundary (Tsur, 1982; Belin, 1985; Harkabi, 1988; Lustick, 1993). The revisionist Herut (Freedom) party continued to strive for all of Palestine and parts of Jordan, but by the 1960s it all but gave up on this idea (Isaac, 1976; Seliktar, 1986). The Palestinians continued to reject partition. In 1964, they founded the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in order to liberate all of Palestine. Phase 4: 19671977 In the 1967 war, Israel conquered the West Bank, Gaza Strip and other areas. Israeli attitudes began shifting toward colonialism. East Jerusalem was annexed immediately, but the government debated what to do with the West Bank. The deadlock led to the informal adoption of the Allon Plan. Suggested by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, this plan called for annexation of areas along the Jordan River and Dead Sea, around Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip for security reasons, and the return of the rest of the territories to Jordan. In 1970, yielding to international pressure, Israel accepted UN Resolution 242s principle of land-for-peace. The PLO considered accepting this resolution, if it were amended to include a Palestinian state. Phase 5: 19771987 In 1977, Likud, a union of parties led by the Herut party, won its rst Israeli elections. In a marked shift from Phase 3, the new regime asserted that in Greater Israel (all of Palestine) there could be only Israeli sovereignty. The government intensied the rate of land conscation in the territories, utilizing them for the building of Jewish settlements. The Palestinian quest for statehood was ignored. In effect, Israeli geopolitical attitudes became colonial. The Palestinians continued to lean toward accepting the idea of partition, and were inclined to accept several inter-
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national peace plans that called for a Palestinian state in the territories in exchange for peace with Israel (Shaheen, 1984; Melman, 1987; Feste, 1991). Phase 6: 19881992 In December 1987, the Palestinians rebelled against Israel. Likud continued to reject a land-for-peace deal with the PLO, while the Labor party (an offshoot of MAPAI) supported it. As the rebellion continued, Israelis increasingly supported talks with the PLO over Israeli withdrawal from the territories and the formation of a Palestinian state, in return for peace. In 1988, the PLO formally accepted the partitioning of Palestine along the 1967 border (Green Line). Phase 7: 1992present In 1992, Labor returned to power and began discussing peace with the PLO. In 1993, the two sides agreed to a gradual Israeli withdrawal, phased in by dividing the territories into three area types. In Area A, the Palestinians would have full control. In Area B, the Palestinians would control civil society and the two sides would jointly control security. In Area C, which included the Israeli settlements, Israel would have full control. The two sides signed several interim agreements that outlined the pace and scope of the Israeli withdrawal (Table 2). The issues of the settlements, Palestinian statehood and the control of Jerusalem were deferred to a later, nal agreement. Israeli and Palestinian extremists resorted to violence in order to derail the Oslo process. As the violence intensied, Israeli popular support for the Labor government declined. In 1996, Likud returned to power. The Oslo II agreement was put on hold,
Table 2 Oslo process interim agreements in the West Banka Stages West Bank Share in Area A (%) 1.1 2 9.1 10.1 12.1 17.2 West Bank Share in Area B (%) 0 26 20.9 25.9 26.9 23.8 West Bank Share in Area C (%) 98.9 72 70 64 61 59
Oslo I, 1994 Oslo II, 1995 Wye I, 1998 Sharm I, 1999 Sharm II, 2000 Sharm III, 2000
a
Source: Oslo I and II and Sharm-El-Sheikh agreements were negotiated by Labor governments. The Wye agreement was negotiated by the Likud government. The area types in the Gaza Strip have not changed since Oslo I. The Wye agreement included two additional Israeli withdrawals that were not implemented, after which the division of the West Bank would have been 17.2%, 23.8% and 59.0% in Areas A, B and C, respectively. Data come from FMEP, Report on Israeli Settlements, JulyAugust 2000, Isaac and Ghanyem (2001), Jerusalem Media & Communication Center (2001) and Le Monde Diplomatique (various).
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and the 1998 Wye interim agreement was negotiated in its place. In December 1998, the Likud government collapsed, unable to ratify the Wye agreement, and in 1999 Labor returned to power under Barak. A new interim agreement was negotiated at Sharm-El-Sheikh. On the eve of Camp David, the Palestinians fully controlled 18.2% of the West Bank (Area A) and partially controlled 21.8% (Area B). The details of the negotiations at Camp David may never be known, as there is no agreed upon account of the talks. It has been reported that Barak offered that Israel would annex 10% of the land; another 10%a zone along the Jordan Riverwould remain in Israeli hands for now. The Palestinians rejected the offer because it meant a fragmented Palestinian state (Haaretz Jul 12, 2000; Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP) October, 2000; January, 2001). In September 2000, the second intifada broke out. Talks continued in the Egyptian resort of Taba, and in January 2001 Israel apparently agreed to cede about 95% of the territories to the Palestinians (Fig. 1). In February 2001, Likud returned to power. The Taba informal accord was nullied, and the conict escalated. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon is said to support a Palestinian state in Areas A and B from Fig. 1 (about 40% of the West Bank and 80% of the Gaza Strip), which the Palestinians reject (Haaretz Jun 28, Nov 15, 2001; The Economist May 25, 2001; Jerusalem Post Jul 21, 2001).
The empirics of the Israeli settlements With a few exceptions (e.g., the British decolonization of Egypt), once the Europeans decided after 1945 to leave their colonies, their pullout was quick and permanent. In contrast, the Oslo process generated anything but a denitive Israeli pullout (see Fig. 1). Why did the Oslo process opt for a geopolitically complex decolonization? The answer lies in the Israeli settlements. Shortly after the 1967 war, Israel began building settlements in the territories. In 1977, there were about 5000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, 33,000 in East Jerusalem, and none in the Gaza Strip (Fig. 2). In 2001, there were 213,000 settlers in the territories (including 6900 in the Gaza Strip) and 180,000 in East Jerusalem.6 Before 1977, annual additions to the settler population were small; after 1977, the increments grew, peaking at about 16,000 in 1999 and 2000 (Fig. 3). From 19932001, the average yearly settler population growth in the West Bank was 9.51% (5.65% in the Gaza Strip); the (natural) average growth inside Israel proper was 2.79% (Statistical Abstract of Israel, various). Obviously, Israeli settlers required land. Between 1967 and 1979, land was conscated by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) for security reasons, and transferred to settlers. The Palestinians protested the legality of this procedure. The Israeli High
Data come from FMEP (Nov, 2001; Jan, 1996), Hareven (1989); Goldberg (1993), and Haaretz, Jan 23, 2002. The presentation of the number of settlers in the territories and East Jerusalem in the same sentences does not imply that the two units are necessarily similar in terms of conict resolution.
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Fig. 1.
Final status map presented by Israel at Taba, January 2001.
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Fig. 2.
Settler population.
Fig. 3.
Annual additions to settler population.
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Court decided that security justied conscation, as long as the IDF stayed in the territories. As detailed in BTselem (1997) and Gazit (1999), in 1979, the Palestinians protested the legality of the West Bank settlement of Elon Moreh. The settlers argued that Elon Moreh was part of Israel proper. Observing that the issue was no longer security, the Israeli High Court ordered the evacuation of Elon Moreh. Following this ruling, the Israeli government changed its approach. Basing its decision on a nineteenth century Turkish law, it allocated unclaimed land to the state. To prevent conscation, the Palestinians had to demonstrate formal ownership. This proved difcult, since land in the territories typically had not been registered. The new approach had profound effects: in 1967 the Israeli government conscated 9.3% of the land in the West Bank (previously owned by the Jordanian government); by 2000 it had conscated 49% of the land (Table 3). Table 3 and the previous section indicate an important distinction between the acquisition of land in Israel/Palestine by Zionists before and after 1967, which is often ignored in the literature. Prior to 1948, most Jewish land was legally purchased from Palestinians. The sale of land was done willingly, and both sides benetted from the trade. From 19481967, Israel found itself as the de facto landlord of land vacated by Palestinians in the wake of the War of 1948. The period after the 1967 war, and particularly after Likud came to power in 1977, has seen a fundamental change: land-conscation became the main tool in the armory of Israelis who wished to intensify Israeli control of the territories and annex them to Israel. At this time, Israels practices became fairly similar to those of other colonial powers. Israeli governments have supported settlers in various ways, including providing them land, cheap mortgages, tax reductions, grants, subsidies and employment, and deploying IDF to guard settlements. For example, inside the Green Line, 33% of the labor force is on the public payroll, while in the territories, 60% of the settler labor force is on the public payroll (Haaretz Dec 15, 1995). In per capita terms, the government has invested more in the settlements than in Israel proper. In the 1990s, for example, 5.3 m of road per person were paved in Israel proper, compared
Table 3 Israeli state-conscated land in the West Bank, 19672000a Year 1967 1973 1984 1993 1995 1998 2000 Land Size (km2) 527 700 1800 2500 2557 2729 2760 West Bank Share (%) 9.3 12.4 31.9 44.3 45.3 48.4 48.9
a Source: The 1967, 1973 and 1984 data-points are from Benvenisti and Khayat (1988). The 1993 datapoint is from Maariv, Jan 22, 1993 and BTselem (1997). The 1995, 1998, and 2000 data points are based on Haaretz, Jul 20, 2000 and Isaac and Ghanyem (2001). The shares data are computed based on the West Bank land area of 5640 km2 (World Fact-Book, 2001).
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with 17.2 m in the territories. In 2001, average per settler spending in the territories was 8146 New Israeli Shekels (NIS); in Israel proper it was 3000 NIS (Haaretz Dec. 27, 2001, Mar 8, 2002; Yediot Apr 24, 2002). From 1989June 2001, there were 38,361 housing starts in the settlements, of which 65% were publicly nanced. Inside Israel proper, only 38% of housing starts were publicly nanced. From the beginning of the Oslo process (October, 1993) to June 2001, there were 20,371 Israeli housing starts in the settlements (Peace Now, 2001). In 2001, there were 137 settlements in the West Bank: 25 were built from 1967 to 1976 under Labor governments, 96 from 1977 to 1984 under Likud governments, 10 from 1985 to 1990 under unied Labor-Likud governments, three from 1990 to 1992 under Likud, and another three from 1996 to 1998 under Likud. In the Gaza Strip, 10 settlements were built from 1977 to 1984 under Likud, and six from 1985 to 1990 under unied Labor-Likud governments (FMEP-a, FMEP-b). Between 1967 and 1976, most of the settlements were built far from Palestinian population centers, generally following the Allon Plan. After 1977, they were distributed throughout the territories in order to promote their general Israelization (e.g., Rowley, 1981; Gazit, 1999). Between 1996 and 2000, the settlers built 71 outposts without government approval. Some outposts were dismantled by the Israeli government, but new ones were built in their place. In the fall of 2002, there were 91 unapproved outposts in the West Bank (Haaretz Sept 14, 2002). In the rst year since Sharon took ofce (February, 2001), Israel has expanded 34 existing settlements considerably (FMEP Jan 2002; Yediot Jan 25, 2002; Haaretz Mar 18, 2002). The current map is complex. All of the settlements are in the Israeli controlled Area C (Fig. 1). There are 161 Palestinian islands (Areas A and B) surrounded by Area C, 105 Palestinian villages are in Area C, and 216 are partly in Area C; the farthest Palestinians live from Area C is four miles (Isaac & Ghanyem, 2001).7 The land is crisscrossed by bypass roads that can only be used by settlers (BTselem, 1997; Gazit, 1999). In 1997, there were 159.2 km of bypass roads (Peace Now, 2000); in 2001, there were 316.7 km, and 24.1 km were under construction (Isaac & Ghanyem, 2001).
Israeli civil war The Palestinian negotiators in Oslo and at Camp David insisted that the Jewish settlements be evacuated (Haaretz Jul 7, 20, 2000; Savir, 1998). Taken at face value, the issue seemed manageable. Israeli Prime Minister Rabin believed the settlements had no security value; Prime Ministers Peres and Barak also wanted to evacuate settlements (Aronson, 1996; Savir, 1998; FMEP Sept 1999; Yediot Nov 24, 2000). By agreeing to evacuate some settlements in the interim agreements, Israel could
According to Goldblum (2001), there are 190 Palestinian islands, 43 permanent IDF checkpoints in the West Bank and 40 in the Gaza Strip. The data presented here on the number of Palestinian islands do not reect the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank, beginning in Spring 2002.
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have simplied the geopolitics and promoted Palestinian trust. Not only was this not done, but the number of settlers grew under all the Labor governments. Moreover, during the Oslo process the Labor governments attempted to show that they were pro-settler.8 How can one explain this contradiction? It is possible to argue that these were negotiation strategies aimed at improving Israels cut in the nal deal. However, this section shows that the Israeli approach to the Oslo process under Labor was primarily driven by fear that the evacuation of settlements would lead to an Israeli civil war. As in other colonial situations, the Palestinian nativeIsraeli settler relationship has been hostile. For example, in 1980, settlers attacked Palestinian West Bank mayors. In 19831984, settlers planned to blow up the Dome of the Rock Shrine in Jerusalem and bomb Arab buses (Segal, 1988; Haaretz Mar 7, 1984; Peri, 1982). An Israeli government-appointed commission reported that settler violence toward Palestinians was widespread (Karp Report, 1984). This violence was soon followed by settler-violence toward Israelis who were perceived as a threat to the settlement program. Early on, some settlers said they would forcibly resist evacuation of settlements (Sella & Yishai, 1986). In 1982, many settlers opposed the evacuation of the Sinai settlements (called for by the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord) and clashed (unarmed) with IDF. Shortly thereafter, Israel invaded Lebanon to ght the PLO. As stated by Israeli government ofcials, the ultimate goal of the war was to destroy Palestinian morale so as to eradicate opposition to Israeli annexation of the territories (Harkabi, 1988; Gilbert, 1998; Smith, 2001). The war became controversial in Israel. Against this backdrop, in 1983 a demonstrator was killed when a Jewish extremist threw a grenade at a Jerusalem anti-war demonstration. In December 1987, the Palestinians rebelled against Israel, and the Israeli public debate over the future of the territories intensied. The settlers became ever more explicit in rejecting withdrawal from the territories. They called IDF ofcers kapos (Nazi-nominated Jewish guards), called former Israeli president Yitzhak Navon (from Labor) Quisling (after the Norwegian ofcial who collaborated with the Nazis), and said that withdrawal from the territories is national treason (Jerusalem Post Apr 10, 1988; Haaretz Jun 16, 1989). In 1989, 58% of Israelis thought that domestic strife over the settlements could lead to civil war (Yediot Jun 8, 1989). In 1990, settler leader Yoel Ben-Nun warned that an agreement with the Palestinians could cause civil war (Ben-Nun, 1990). Consequently, Israeli ofcials came to believe that evacuating settlements would lead to civil war.9
8 For example, on Nov 22, 1995, Prime Minister Peres announced that the government would not abandon the settlers (FMEP Jan, 1996). Minister Yossie Beilin said the Labor government made sure the settlements would remain intact in Oslo II (Maariv Sept 27, 1995). Prime Minister Barak said that settlement activity is very important (Haaretz Oct 13, 1999). 9 For example, in 1980 Deputy Prime Minister Yadin said his party joined the Likud regime, because a Labor regime raised the risk of civil war (Yediot Jun 6, 1980). In 1983, Likud ofcials said civil war was possible (Jerusalem Post Feb 26, 1983). In 1985, Prime Minister Peres said the risk of civil war justied a unity government (FBIS Jun 6, 1986: 16). Israeli presidents (Jerusalem Post Sept 7, 1983, Independence Day Speech, Apr 25, 1985) and ofcials (Israeli Democracy Winter 1989: 5-9) made similar warnings. See also Talmon (1980); Benvenisti (1986); Barzillai (1990), and Lustick (1993).
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The settlers anti-Oslo campaign was also very intense. They blocked trafc, rioted, called Prime Minister Rabin a traitor, urged IDF to refuse orders to evacuate settlements (should such orders come), and warned of an imminent civil war (e.g., Smith, 2001; Sprinzak, 1999). Facing this opposition, Rabins government debated how to approach the Oslo process. Foreign Minister Peres supported a quick pullout from the territories, while Prime Minister Rabin feared settler violence (Smith, 2001; Makovsky, 1993, 1996). In the end, the government decided to defer the issue of the settlements to the nal stage of the Oslo process (Savir, 1998; Makovsky, 1996). For the Jewish people, civil war brings painful memories. About 2000 years ago, the clash between moderates who supported a compromise with the Romans and zealots who rejected it, is said to have destroyed the Second Temple and the historical Jewish nation (e.g., Yerushalmi, 1982; Rapoport, 1982; Harkabi, 1988; Ravitzky, 1993). Alluding to this historical crisis, in November 1993 Peres explained the Israeli approach to Oslo: the government wanted to avoid a terrible clash in Israel (FBIS Nov 29, 1993: 41). In December 1993 he said, we had to choose between splitting the nation in pieces and nding a difcult solution (FBIS Dec 6, 1993: 34). In 1994 he added, we thought that any different approach [i.e., evacuating settlements] would split the nation beyond recognition (Makovsky, 1996: 141). My point is not that a 2000 year old memory makes contemporary civil war more painful, but that this memory affects contemporary policymaking, a point to which I will return. The 1996 Likud regime delayed the Oslo process, and the settlers toned down their anti-Oslo campaign. In the period around the 2000 Camp David Summit they revived the campaign with marches, riots, trafc blockages, threats against Baraks life, and threats of civil war.10 Once again, the campaign had an effect. For example, in June 2000, Peres said that the Gaza Strip settlement of Netzarim offered no benets and was left in place only to prevent domestic strife (Yediot Jun 24, 2000). In August of that year, Minister Yossi Beilin said that Baraks Camp David plan annexed settlements to lessen settler resistance to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement (Maariv Aug 18, 2000). Barak continued talks with the Palestinians despite the onset of the second intifada. As the two sides got closer, settler leaders warned of an imminent civil war.11 A few months later, Sharons (Labor-party) Defense Minister Ben Eliezer explained that Barak did not evacuate the unapproved outposts due to fears of settlers violence (Haaretz Jun 28, 2001). We can say then, that Labor governments were inclined to evacuate settlements during the Oslo process, but did not do so out of fear of settler violence. This tension parallels the tensions in France over pulling out of Algeria and in Britain over pulling
10 For example, settlers said, If Barak orders clearing of settlements, he will be murdered (Yediot May 30, 2000), shouted at Israeli minister Ben Ami the biblical curse destruction upon your house (Yediot May 31, 2000), compared Barak to Hitler (Haaretz Jun 11, 2000), and said it is a betrayal to hand over Jewish land; The criminal who does this is the same criminal who allowed the Holocaust to happen (Maariv Jun 4, 2000). For more examples, see Haaretz (Jun 20 and 23; Jul 24, 2000), Maariv (Jul 17; Aug 11, 2000), and Yediot (Jul 24 2000). 11 For example, settler leader Beni Katzover says a decision to evacuate settlers would mean the government prefers a war among brothers over a war against terror (Yediot Dec 29, 2000).
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out of Ireland. The fears of civil war in France, however, did not prevent the pullout. While the British attempt to pull out of Ireland in 1914 failed, the British left a few years later. In contrast, in the fall of 2002 Israeli colonial grip on the territories is rm, and the Israeli settlers rejection of decolonization is as strong as ever. Why have the settlers so adamantly rejected territorial compromise? And why have their threats of civil war been deemed credible? Answers to these questions lie in the geopolitics of Israeli fundamentalism.
The geopolitics of Israeli fundamentalism In his classic book, Relph (1976) observes that places are fusions of human and natural order and are the signicant centers of our immediate experience of the world... [Places] are important sources of individual and communal identity, and are often profound centers of human existence to which people have deep emotional and psychological ties (Relph, 1976: 141). When a place makes people feel at home, secure and at ease, they are said to be inside it. The level of insideness varies from existential insidenessa sense of complete, almost subconscious immersion in a placeto existential outsidenessa sense of alienation and strangeness. It is hard to exaggerate the emotional signicance of Greater Israel to Israeli fundamentalists. Their existential insideness in (the place of) Greater Israel drives their geopolitical world view, the evolution and effects of which stand at the center of this section. Palestinian fundamentalists also feel deeply inside all of Palestine (Greater Israel). Given the focus of this paper, I do not study Palestinian fundamentalism. I will return to this issue in the last section. Roots and ideology The Likud party win in the 1977 Israeli elections enabled revisionist Zionists to implement their vision of Greater Israel. However, Likud did not have a parliamentary majority or the human infrastructure needed to settle a hostile land. The solution was logical: the revisionist Zionists formed an alliance with religious Zionists. The Likud regime would provide military and nancial muscle, and religious Zionists would provide settlers (Weissbrod, 1985; Bauer, 1985; Gazit, 1999). Before 1967, religious Zionists held a pragmatic world view. After 1948, they accepted Israeli democracy and joined the government under the mainstream MAPAI party. The magnitude and speed of the Israeli victory in 1967 shocked many Israelis. Virtually overnight, Israel grew from a small state ghting for its life into a regional power. Many religious Zionists perceived the triumph as a miracle, a sign from God that the time had come to reinstate the Kingdom of David. Shortly after the war, several religious Zionist groups began building settlements in the territories (without government approval). The group led by Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook from Jerusalem was particularly fascinated by the 1967 victory. This group has played a central
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role in the formation of Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful), the largest Israeli fundamentalist group.12 Gush Emunim was founded in 1974 with the goal of settling throughout the territories. Today, about 35% of the settlers are afliated with Gush Emunim. The group controls about 48 settlements and exerts signicant inuence over others, as well as over Israeli society in general (Newman, 1985b; Alpher, 1995; Joffe, 1996). Israeli fundamentalist leaders served as members of Knesset (Israeli Parliament), but the movements primary political power lies in its ability to mobilize thousands of dedicated settlers (Smith, 2001; Gazit, 1999). Israeli fundamentalists believe that God chose Israel to be the place of the Jews. In the words of Rabbi Kook, there is a prohibition in the Torah against giving up even an inch of Israel (Pichnik, 1968: 108). All this land is ours, absolutely... nontransferable to others even in part... there are no Arab territories or Arab lands here, but only the lands of Israel... to which others have come and upon which they have built without our permission and in our absence (Schnall, 1984: 19). Hanan Porat, a Gush Emunim leader says: For us, the Land of Israel is a Land of destiny, a chosen land, not just an existentially dened homeland. It is the Land from which the voice of God has called to us ever since the rst call to the rst Hebrew (Hunter, 1993: 35). In rejecting Palestinian statehood and viewing the territories as homeland, Israeli fundamentalists resemble several other colonial settler groups. For example, the French settlers rejected Algerian independence and perceived Algeria as homeland. Israeli fundamentalists, however, do not view settling in the territories as colonization, but as a return to the homeland. The Israeli fundamentalist movement sees itself as a true continuation of Zionism: settling in the territories is not different from what the Zionists did in Israel/Palestine over the past 120 years (Newman, 1985a).13 Its world view is primarily founded upon a system of beliefs in which land, the promised land, plays a central and crucial role that can be traced to the conquest of biblical Israel by the ancient Jews (Rowley, 1981: 443). There were divine and theological elements in other colonial settler movements (e.g., Dutch Calvinists in South Africa, nonconformist groups in the US), but none of these elements were so intense as in Israeli fundamentalism. Israeli fundamentalism and the Oslo process Given their strong emphasis on the holiness and wholeness of greater Israel, Israeli fundamentalists perceive the Oslo process as the ultimate threat to their theology. In facing events that disprove their theologies, fundamentalist groups generally may collapse, justify the events as Gods will and explain them in ways that support their world views, or resort to violence in order to change events in a way they believe
Another notable group is Kach (Thus!). On Israeli fundamentalism, see, e.g., Newman (ed.) (1985a), Harkabi (1988); Weisburd (1989); Aran (1993); Don-Yehiya (1994), and Sprinzak (1999). 13 This also is the view of Israeli extreme right-wing parties.
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will please God (Rapoport, 1988; Festinger, 1989; Sprinzak, 1999). The second and third reactions are relevant here. Israeli fundamentalists rejected the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord because it called for the removal of settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. In the end, they relented: the Sinai Peninsula was not part of biblical Israel, and the post-1977 settlement growth was understood as a sign of Gods approval. In reacting to the Oslo process, however, Israeli fundamentalist resorted to violence. As shown next, the level of settler violence peaked in the periods 19931995 and 20002001 just as Israeli decolonization seemed likely. Baruch Goldstein was a member of the fundamentalist group Kach. Seeking to stop the Oslo process, he killed 29 Muslim worshippers in Hebron in 1994, and was then killed by Arab onlookers (Report Massacre, 1994; Gilbert, 1998; Sprinzak, 1999; Smith, 2001). Following the massacre, Rabins government decided to evacuate settlers from Tel Rumeida (a hill in Hebron); their presence had long promoted strife. Fundamentalist rabbis declared the decision to negate Jewish Law, urged Israelis to reject it, and urged IDF to disobey orders (Haaretz Mar 7 and 30, Apr 1 and 6, 1994; Sprinzak, 1999). Israeli fundamentalists blamed Rabin and the Oslo process for the Hebron massacre (Sprinzak, 1999). Some also praised Goldstein and his act.14 The Hebron massacre escalated the conict. In 1994, radical Palestinians undertook suicide bombing in Israel proper, Israel imposed closures on the territories, the Palestinian economy deteriorated, and Palestinian public support for radicals rose (Reuveny, 1999). In 1995, Israeli fundamentalists claimed Rabin was a traitor. In a letter sent to 40 prominent rabbis, settler rabbis asked whether one could declare Rabin a rodef and a moser (Lior, Shilo, & Melamed, 1996). According to Jewish law, a rodef plans to kill Jews and a moser illegally provides Jewish land to Gentiles; Jews should kill moser (since Israels land is sacred) and rodef (to save Jewish life). Rabins assassin, Yigal Amir, a religious Zionist who admired Baruch Goldstein, was convinced that God wanted Rabin dead in order to stop the Oslo process (Report Assassination, 1996; Yediot Dec 11, 1995). The settlers strongly rejected Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Camp David (Maariv Jul 17 and 24, Aug 11, 2000). In June 2000, they called on Israeli Prime Minister Barak: Did you not learn the lesson from the civil war waged here during the days of the late [Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin? (Haaretz June 20, 2000). Shortly thereafter, they said that an Israeli-Palestinian territorial compromise would be immoral, illegitimate and unlawful (Haaretz June 23, 2000), and warned they would react to it in a way they have never acted before, with the greatest severity. In July, settlers said they would refuse to evacuate settlements even if the evacuation were supported by the Israeli Parliament and public. Gush Emunim ofcials said that regardless of how much support an Israeli-Palestinian agreement were to get,
14 For example, Rabbi Dov Lior said that Goldstein acted in Gods name, and therefore is a righteous man (Yerushalim Mar 4, 1994). During Goldsteins funeral, some said: What a hero! A righteous person! He did it on behalf of all of us. Rabbi Israel Ariel said: The holy martyr, Baruch Goldstein... heard the cry of the land of Israel, which is being stolen from us day after day by the Muslims... The Jews will inherit the land not by any peace agreement but only by shedding blood (Yediot Feb 28, 1994). In 1995, settlers published a book glorifying Goldstein (Ben Horin, 1995).
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evacuation of settlements was illegitimate and the majority could not impose its will on the minority (Yediot July 24, 2000). The Israeli Shin Bet (Security Service) warned that settler extremists might attempt to assassinate Barak (Yediot Jul 24, 2000). Sprinzak (1999) predicted that by 2000 the Israeli extreme right would be increasingly ready for a land compromise with the Palestinians. This prediction has not materialized. The Israeli fundamentalist movement has consistently been at the forefront of the resistance to a land compromise, and the issue of the settlements has been a major obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.
The settlements and Israeli-Palestinian conict Prior to 1994, Israel ran all government functions in the territories. The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian agreement called on Israel to permit the Palestinians to govern themselves, provided they renounce violence against Israel. As reviewed in Reuveny (1999), it was assumed that to promote Palestinian prosperity and self governance, the PA would cooperate with Israel on security matters, as conict is bad for business and order. Over time, relations would improve and eventually the two actors would sign a peace agreement. This logic could have worked, had the issues of settlements and Palestinian statehood not been deferred to the nal stage, had the settlements not expanded in the meantime, and had there been Palestinian prosperity. This section focuses on the effects of the settlements on the conict since 1994. Symbolizing the occupation The main Palestinian grievance is geopolitical. In 1988, in their de facto recognition of the state of Israel, they gave up 78% of Palestine and accepted the Green Line. The remaining 22% (the territories) are viewed as occupied land.15 Today, most Palestinians interact with Israelis only through the settlements, the IDF defending the settlements, and the bypass roads. The current geopolitics humiliates the Palestinians (Mitchell Report, 2001). Political geographers observe that ethnic-nationalist territorial conicts generally have both symbolic and tangible effects (e.g., Newman, 2002). In line with this observation, the settlements symbolize the Israeli occupation and fuel Palestinian nationalism and hostility toward Israel, as reected, for example, by the Palestinians referring at times to the second intifada as the settlements inti-
See, e.g., statements by Arafat in Die Welt, Jun 8, 1998, and Palestinain minister Nabil Shaat in Maariv, Jul 21, 2001. Mohammed Dahlan, head of the PAs preventive security in the Gaza Strip says, We wish to live in our state, based on borders of June 4, 1967, alongside the State of Israel, and not in its place or at its expense (Haaretz Jan 31, 2002). For additional summaries of this point, see Newman (1996, 2002); Newman and Falah (1997), and The Economist, Apr 13, 2002.
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fada (Haaretz Apr 21, 2001). By May 2002, 89% of Palestinians supported armed attacks against settlers (CPRS May 15-19, 2002).16 Weakening Palestinian mainstream The growth of settlements weakens the position of the Palestinian mainstream (i.e., the PA and its backbone Fatah party) in the eyes of Palestinians and strengthens the position of its militant opposition (i.e., the Islamist parties). For example, Palestinian public support for Fatah fell from 37% in July 2000 to 26% in August 2002. In August 2002, support for Islamists was larger than for Fatah (CPRS Dec 19-24, 2001; Aug 1821, 2002). The island-like Palestinian geopolitics assists Palestinian forces that would like to derail the peace process. During the second intifada, in particular, the Israeli closures fragmented the PA. This undermined the PAs ability to enforce order, and played into the hands of radicals (US State Department, 2002). Promoting settler-Palestinian hostility The political geography of ethnic-nationalist territorial conicts exhibits micro and macro aspects of hostility (Lustick, 1993; Paasi, 1996; Newman, 2002). At the macro level, hostile groups dispute borders and political determination. At the micro level, the hostility spills over into issues such as natural resource utilization, local economic development, and the layout of roads. In general, situations involving hostile ethnic groups living in the same area have resulted in horric violence. The Israeli-Palestinian case reects this pattern. Settlers and Palestinians live close to each other, and both resort to acts of terrorism.17 This does not mean to argue that it is impossible to nd cases where ethnic groups live peacefully together. For example, Israeli Jews and Arabs get along relatively well.18 Yet in these cases, the groups agree to share power, a point to which I will return. The fact that much resentment has grown between settlers and Palestinians since 1967, further demonstrates the futility of the current Israeli-Palestinian geopolitics. Escalating the conict The settler-Palestinian hostility escalates the Israeli-Palestinian conict along two interrelated channels. One channel involves a classic conict spiral: each round of
Other examples are plentiful. Sheikh Yassin, Hamas leader, said in 1998: What does a state mean to us if it is on land that is full of settlements? (FMEP Nov. 1998). The PA information ministry says the settlements are legitimate targets for destruction (Middle East Media Research InstituteMEMRI, Dispatch 153, Nov 17, 2000). A Palestinian editorial says: The settlers are a dirty stain on our land... begin expelling them (MEMRI, Dispatch 160, Nov 30, 2000). Palestinian ofcial Jibril Rajub says that the settlements provoke violence and escalation (Jerusalem Post Jul 22, 2001). 17 Palestinian terrorism against Israelis is common. Israeli fundamentalist terrorism against Palestinians also is observed (Section Israeli Civil War; Ringal and Ben Haaim, 2001; Shragai, 2002). On settlerPalestinian violence since 1967, see, e.g., Weisburd (1989), Kass and ONeill (1997); Dudai (2001), and FMEP (various). 18 This example is not optimal. Better examples include the cases of Switzerland and Belgium.
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violence is linked both to the previous and next rounds (Kriesberg, 1998). For example, reacting to the 1994 Goldstein massacre, the Palestinian Islamists intensied attacks on Israel, ushering in Israeli responses and Palestinian counterattacks. During the second intifada, Palestinian attacks on settlers and IDF units guarding them have almost always been followed by settler and IDF responses, and settler attacks on Palestinians have almost always been followed by Palestinian responses.19 A second channel of escalation involves the settlers pressuring of the Israeli government for strong military measures against the Palestinians, which, in turn, elicits Palestinian responses. This channel became salient during the second intifada. In 2001, Israeli settlers rallied against Sharon, protesting his policy of restraint. In March, they said, we have to blow up the house of every terrorist that res on us and deport the family out the door (Haaretz March 16, 2002). In June, they blamed Sharon for the deaths of settlers. In October 2001 and January 2002, they demanded the breakup of the PA and the removal of Arafat (Haaretz Oct 17, 2001; Yediot June 15, 22, 2001; Jan 1, 2002). Sharon eventually changed his policy of restraint. In a meeting with settlers, he promised strong military responses to every attack (Haaretz Oct 17, 2001). It also has been reported that Sharon wants to replace Arafat with a Palestinian leader whom Israel would deem more suitable for negotiations (Haaretz May 19, 2002). Signaling the Israeli end game The Palestinians argue that the settlement expansion violates the spirit of Oslo (Mitchell Report, 2001). Israel argues that the Oslo process does not require the evacuation of settlements, and their expansion does not bias the permanent status talks. The point remains, however, that the consistently large Israeli investments in the territories, settler demands for settlement expansion, and the governments acceptance (after the fact) of unapproved, settler-built outposts, signal an Israeli intention to hold onto the land forever. This end game frightens and angers the Palestinians.20 Promoting inequality Kriesberg (1998) stresses the role of inequitable distribution of income and resources in stimulating protracted conicts. The settler-Palestinian economic and resource utilization disparities iname what is already a hostile interaction. The settlers standard of living is relatively high in Israeli terms (Leibovich-Dar, 2002; Meridor, 1997). In contrast, about 600,000 Palestinians live in refugee camps in the
19 In the territories, from Sept 29, 2000 to Nov 30, 2002, 1534 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces, 25 Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians, and 168 Israeli civilians and 137 Israeli security personnel were killed by Palestinians (BTselem, 2002). 20 Yasser Arafat, e.g., says the settlements goal is to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian State and undermine its geographical integrity (FMEP Jan, 2000). Palestinian leader Marwan Barguti says the settlements frighten the Palestinians and kills their hopes for a state (Haaretz Apr. 4, 1997).
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territories (Haaretz Mar 31, 2000), and, as noted, 50% of all Palestinians live in poverty. Before the second intifada, having few options, about 10,000 Palestinians worked in the settlements. As was true in other colonial situations, these workers are generally mistreated by settlers (Lein, 1999; FMEP, Sept, 1999; BTselem, 1999; Yediot Dec 8, 2000). Natural resource utilization is skewed in favor of the settlers. For example, the settlers water consumption per capita is almost six times that of the Palestinians, many of whom do not have running water (Haaretz Jul 31, 1998; Hass, 1999; Yediot Mar 8, 2001; BTselem, 2001). The settlersabout 15% of the total population in the West Bankcontrol about 42% of the land (Haaretz May 14, 2002). In the Gaza Strip, the settlers consist of one-half of one percent of the total population, but utilize about 20% of the land (Haas, 1999). Roy (1995), Kadri and Macmillen (1998) and Hass (1999) argue that Israel has maintained the occupation by deliberately keeping the territories underdeveloped. This claim could be true, but its full evaluation is outside the scope of this study. Regardless of this particular interpretation, Palestinian poverty, settler-Palestinian disparities, and settler-Palestinian violence are daily realities.
The geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian conict resolution The Bible tells the story of Josiah, King of Judah, who fought against Egypt. The place of the battleMeggidois better known by its New Testament name: Armageddon. One does not need to turn to the Bible in order to realize that the Israeli-Palestinian conict may lead to Armageddon. This section considers the geopolitics of conict resolution. The literature on political geography suggests two basic ways to resolve ethnic nationalist territorial conicts: power sharing arrangements between rival groups (e.g., binational state, autonomy) or territorial separation. These approaches are hotly debated. Supporters of separation (e.g., Mearsheimer & Van Evera, 1995; Kaufman, 1998) argue that it reduces ethnic friction, provides outlets for nationalist urges, and mimics an observed norm: ethnic groups typically live in separate nation-states. Opponents of separation (e.g., Schaeffer, 1990; Etzioni, 1993; Kumar, 1997) note difculties in implementing territorial separation. For example, groups may be attached to the land and refuse to relinquish claims to it. Or, groups may be highly intermingled, requiring population transfers. As noted by Klieman (2000), himself a supporter of separation, territorial fragmentation may also imply economic costs and promote a sense of external insecurity. Moreover, ethnic-nationalist territorial conicts may continue following separation. Waterman (2002), for example, claims that separation may foster ethnic-nationalist conict resolution in the short run, but it may not promote normalization of relations in the long run. Evaluating the pros and cons of separation, Horowitz (1985: 588) summarizes that when ethnicnationalist conicts are severe perhaps it is a mistake to seek accommodation among the antagonists. If it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogenous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state, even if this necessitates population transfers.
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Mearsheimer (1997) argues that historically, power sharing arrangements established in the wake of intense ethnicnationalist territorial violence eventually failed.21 But it also is possible to nd examples in which territorial separation failed to resolve ethnicnationalist territorial conicts, as well as examples in which rival ethnic groups resolved their conicts without separation.22 But we should not conate empirics with logic. Logically, both power sharing and territorial separation can resolve ethnic territorial conicts only if they are supported by both groups. Plans imposed by one side on the other or forced by external actors on one or both groups, will likely fail sooner or later. Empirical observations indicate that success requires that both groups agree to end the conict, the opposition in each group accepts the right of the majority to decide which plan is best, and the majorities in each group are ready to enforce their wills on respective extremists who wish to derail the conict resolution (Darby & MacGinty, 2000). One may argue that the experience of Israeli Jewish and Arab citizens suggests that it is best to form a binational, Israeli-Palestinian state in all of Palestine (for discussion, see Falah & Newman, 1995; and Imsalam, 1993). However, Israeli Jews and Arabs agreed to power sharing, whereas most Palestinians and Israeli Jews have consistently rejected the notion of a binational state (Newman, 2002). The most realistic approach to resolving the conict is one that employs separate Israeli and Palestinian states. As shown, this also is the goal of most Israelis and Palestinians.23 I have argued that after 1967 the Israeli-Palestinian relationship became colonial. As noted, however, some scholars argue that the conict has always been about partition. In essence, many Israeli policymakers also operate under this assumption. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon apparently rejects evacuation of settlements (Haaretz Apr 22, 2002). He is willing to consider a Palestinian state in about 40% of the territories, provided that Israel rst defeats Palestinian terrorism (Sharon, 2002). Some Labor ofcials advocate unilateral separation from the territories. This idea goes back to 1995 when, following attacks, Rabin wanted to build a fence along the Green Line. Unilateral separation goes beyond a fence, however, as it requires annexation of parts of the West Bank, and withdrawal from others.24 These plans are not likely to resolve the conict. Sharons plan identies Palestinian terrorism as the primary problem. Terrorism, however, is merely a symptom of the problem: Israeli colonialism. So far, military might has not defeated terrorism, and probably never will. The unilateral separation plan assumes Israeli-Palestinian
Contemporary Lebanon seems to refute this generalization, but, as noted by Klieman (2000), the future of Lebanons ethnic rivalries is still not clear. 22 For example, the India-Pakistan relationship since their 1947 separation has been hostile and the two fought several wars. In Belgium and Great Britain, power sharing arrangements between rival ethnic groups were able to create a stable and peaceful political environment. 23 For a similar conclusion, see Khalidi (1992); Falah and Newman (1995); Newman and Falah (1997); Falah (1997); Klieman (2000), and Newman (2002). The conict resolution plans suggested by the Peel Commission, UN (1947), and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon also were based on the notion of Israeli-Palestinian territorial separation. 24 Several unilateral separation plans have been proposed. Former Israeli Prime Minister Barak, e.g., calls on Israel to annex strips along the Jordan River and the Green Line (Yediot Apr 5, 2002).
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contact is the main problem. While this plan is closer to decolonization than Sharons plan, it is rejected by the Palestinians (Haaretz Jun 11, 2002). Unilateral separation is not likely to end the conict either, since success requires acceptance by both sides. Resolving the conict requires recognition of its cause: Israeli colonialism. Resolving the conict then, requires Israeli decolonization. It is possible to argue that colonialism can also end without decolonization. For example, the colonization of the US denied independence for the Native Americans, but today it is not thought of as a place to be decolonized. The American (or Australian or Canadian) model, however, is not feasible for ending Israeli colonialism. In the US, the natives eventually became citizens. If the Palestinians were to become Israeli citizens, within a few years Israel would become overwhelmingly Palestinian and lose its Jewish character (as the Palestinian population growth rate is much higher than the Israeli growth rate). Opinion polls show consistently that keeping a long term Jewish majority is the most important thing for most Israelis (Newman, 2002). To be sure, the conict has not always been colonial. At rst it was a dispute over land. Since 1967, and particularly after 1977, the relationship changed fundamentally. Although Israel never formally annexed the territories, its practice has been colonial: Palestinians are denied independence; Israel conscates land and controls daily life; Palestinians and settlers live in separate societies; and settlers are much richer than Palestinians and command the lions share of resources. Historically, colonial powers have denied independence to native populations. Eventually, the people rebelled and decolonization soon followed. Along similar lines, at rst the Palestinians were relatively passive when faced with rising Israeli dominance. Eventually, they rebelled and demanded statehood. The rebellion triggered an Israeli attempt at decolonization, but the process has been slow and indecisive.
Implementing Israeli decolonizatioin In the second intifada, while talks continued under Barak, there were no Palestinian suicide bombings inside Israel proper. When Sharons government nullied the January 2001 informal Israeli-Palestinian accord, the Palestinians became desperate and turned to suicide bombing. In the mid-1990s, Palestinians also used this tactic, but then the attacks were the work of a radical minority, and were not supported by most Palestinians. In the second intifada, people from across the Palestinian political spectrum are responsible for attacks, and they are supported by most Palestinians. In 1996, for example, 70% of the Palestinians opposed suicide bombings against Israelis (CPRS March 2931, 1996). In 2002, 68.1% of Palestinians supported suicide bombings against Israelis (JMCC May 2931 and June 12, 2002). The two sides no longer trust each other (and perhaps never fully did). Without trust, peace remains impossible. One may develop trust by building on the Graduate and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension Reduction (GRIT) approach (Osgood, 1971). GRIT calls for unilateral cooperative action and an invitation to respond in kind, followed by more actions as the other side reciprocates. Actions should be veriable and stick to a schedule, and the intensity of cooperation should grow over time.
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Arguably, the Oslo process was an application of GRIT that failed because it was deemed non credible. By continuing to expand the settlements during the Oslo process, Israel, in effect, signaled an intent to stay in the territories, which paved the road for the second intifada. In implementing Israeli decolonization, GRIT needs to be modied. First, the end game of Israeli decolonization and formation of a Palestinian state in its place should be clearly declared at the outset. In return, the Palestinians would formally give up on the right of return to Israel proper of Palestinian refugees displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. If the refugees and their descendants were to return to Israel proper, Israel would lose its character as a Jewish state. Second, the actors should move quickly and simultaneously; graduated and sequential efforts, as in the original GRIT (and the Oslo process), are likely to fail because they enable militants to derail the process. Following those declarations, Israel should move its forces back to their September 2000 position, and pass legislation to stop settlement expansion activities. The PA should call on Palestinians to stop attacking Israel and deploy its forces to prevent attacks. Israel would then evacuate a few settlements and announce a relatively short timetable for further decolonization, and the PA would collect arms held by militants. Both sides should invite the international community to monitor and assist their activities. Importantly, however, the PA would probably not be able to immediately stop all attacks on Israel. A decline in the number of attacks requires Palestinian public support for militants to fall substantially. This, in turn, requires manifest Israeli decolonization. Some may argue that it is not feasible to relocate many people from the territories to Israel proper. Historical experience demonstrates otherwise. For example, more than a million French settlers left Algeria shortly after the French decolonization. In the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of Greeks left Turkey following a Greek-Turkish peace agreement. Moreover, Israel itself evacuated several thousand settlers from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, following a peace agreement with Egypt. A stronger argument against Israeli decolonization is the risk of Israeli civil war. The fear of losing Jewish unity is rooted in Jewish collective memory, but memory does not necessarily produce accurate historical account. Yerushalmi (1982) concludes that until the 18th century, Jewish collective memory was based on Jewish theology. Then, Jewish historiography became scientic. For the rst time history, not a sacred text, becomes the arbiter of Judaism (Yerushalmi, 1982: 86). Jewish theology attributes the Jewish defeat against the Romans and the destruction of the Second Temple to Jewish civil war (Yerushalmi, 1982: 113). It is important to note, however, that while a Jewish civil war did occur, the Jews were defeated in their war against the Roman Empire because they were militarily much weaker than the Romans. By way of a (hypothetical) analogy, the Jews defeating the Roman Empire would resemble the state of Israel defeating Russia. If the Jews were united, their war against the Romans probably would have lasted longer, but would still have ended in a Jewish defeat. Rabins and Baraks governments did not evacuate settlements, despite their inclinations to do so, out of fear of civil war. But must internal strife over the settlements lead to civil war? And if it does, must it be so intense as to destroy the state of Israel?
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Israeli decolonization requires that the settlers return to Israel proper. Historically, decolonization attempts that involved many settlers faced opposition, but the extent of the opposition varied across cases. The evacuation of settlements will likely face some opposition, but the outcome of civil war is not inevitable. First, most Israelis reject violence as a form of opposition against the evacuation of settlements In October 1999, for example, 91.1% of Israelis rejected violence as a form of opposition (Mideastweb, 1999), and in November 2000, 86% rejected such violence (Yediot Nov 3, 2000). The likelihood of violence is expected to decline with the rise in public support for evacuation. Polls are showing this trend. For example, in December 2000, 55% of Israelis supported full or partial evacuation of settlements (Yediot Dec 8, 2000). By May 2001, 62% agreed to stop all settlement expansion in return for a cease-re (Yediot May 4, 2001). In June, 52% supported forced evacuation of settlements (Haaretz Jul 4, 2001). Support for full or partial evacuation was 59% in February 2002 (Yediot Feb 22, 2002), and in March 2002, 74% supported some evacuation, and 46% supported evacuating most or all the settlements (Haaretz Mar 5, 2002). Moreover, several Gush Emunim and Yesha (an acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) Council leaders reject violence and say that the settlers would accept a Jewish majority decision to evacuate; while other settler leaders argue the Jewish peoples well-being is more important than land (Ben Meir, 1995; Porat, 1994; Zarembski, 2000; Yediot June 22, 2001). Second, the settlers are not homogenous. About 4550% of the settlers are religious. Two thirds of the religious settlers are Zionists, while the rest are ultraorthodox (Meridor, 1997; Zarembski, 2000). Historically, the attitude of the ultraorthodox Jews towards the state of Israel has been ambivalent, at times hostile. These settlers are waiting for the coming of the Messiah, reject the fundamentalists emphasis on the holiness of Greater Israel, and do not share their unyielding vision on its indivisibility (Zarembski, 2000; Schiff, 1992). The ultra-orthodox settlers are primarily concerned with living in exclusive spaces, where the focus is put on religious education and the welfare of their own communities. Therefore, they are unlikely to resist evacuation. The geographical distribution of settlers in the West Bank further reects differences in terms of their reasons for living there, and willingness to leave peacefully. In an early survey, Weisburd and Waring (1985) found that 50% of the settlers moved to the territories because of religious-ideological reasons, 25% came in order to improve their quality of life, and another 25% did not support either view. In a recent similar survey, 56% of the settlerslocated mostly along the Green Line cite standard of living; 4%located mostly in the Jordan Valleycite national security, and 27%located mostly in the heartland of the West Bankcite fundamentalist ideology (Begin-Sadat Center, 1999). It is generally expected that the 5000 (or so) settlers in the Jordan Valley communities established under the Allon Plan would leave peacefully, if ordered. About 60% of the settlers that live along the Green Line, which includes the ultra-orthodox, would probably leave peacefully if compensated nancially. The remaining 3035% are fundamentalists that might resist evacuation (The Economist Apr 13, 2002; Rin-
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gal & Ben Haaim, 2001; Haaretz Nov 2, 2000; Alpher, 1995). In a recent survey, 68% of settlers say they accept the right of a Jewish majority to decide on withdrawal, and 26% say they will ght the decision, but only using legal means (Peace Now, 2002). Most settlers also believe that some withdrawal is inevitable. In 1999, 80% of the settlers believed Israel would eventually evacuate about 70% of the land, and were ready to relocate (Yediot May 7, 1999). During the second intifada, some have begun to leave on their own. In 2001, settlers were leaving the territories at an annual rate of 5% (compared with 1% before), 15% were in various stages of leaving, and 33% of the younger generation of settlers wanted to leave (Haaretz Jul 1 and 13, Aug, 9, 2001; Yediot Jan 4, 2002). The effect of the settlers proximity to Israel proper also needs to be considered. Similar to other instances of terrestrial colonialism, Israeli settlers are supported by their compatriots in Israel proper in various nancial and military ways. The settlers also get preferential treatment in Israeli courts deciding cases of settler violence (Newman, 1996). This support has strengthened settler-resolve in rejecting evacuation. But the proximity to the homeland can also ease the evacuation. The French Algerians, for example, derived their livelihood from the colony. Since the decolonization was expected to reduce their standard of living, they became more resolute in rejecting it (Lustick, 1993). Most Israeli settlers, however, work in Israel proper (Newman, 1985b; Meridor, 1997). If forced to evacuate, the standard of living of most settlers is not expected to decline much. Moreover, the Israeli government would likely compensate nancially evacuated settlers (as it did in the case of the Sinai settlers), which would further convince many to leave peacefully. Some armed resistance to settlement evacuation, however, is possible. In a 1999 poll, 14% of the settlers were ready to consider violence, and 2% said they would resort to armed violence (Begin-Sadat Center, 1999). In a 2002 poll, 6% said they would reject evacuation, including through illegal means. Of this 6%, a third said they would resort to arms to stop the withdrawal. Moreover, while some settler rabbis reject violence, the positions of others are vague (Sprinzak, 1999; Zarembski, 2000). The ercest resistance to evacuation is concentrated in the Gaza Strip Nezarim settlement, and the settlements located in hill-tops around Hebron, Nablus, and Ramallah (Peace Now, 2002). The Maon Farm unapproved outpost is a case in point. In November 1999, Barak decided to evacuate it. Yesha Council agreed, but the evacuation still took ten hours, there was physical (if unarmed) violence, and the ordeal required an IDF regiment and many security personnel (Yediot Dec 29, 2000). The angry settler response to the evacuation of a few, mostly uninhabited, unapproved outposts in October 2002, further illustrates the possibility of violence over the evacuation of settlements (Haaretz Oct 16, 2002).
Conclusions My analysis has not elaborated on several other disputed issues in Israeli-Palestinian relations, including the control of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, dealing with Palestinian Islamists, the allocation of natural resources, connecting the
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West Bank and Gaza Strip, and territorial swaps. One paper, of course, cannot study everything. It is important to note, however, that pragmatic discussions of these issues are predicated on Israeli decolonization and the formation of a Palestinian state. Three of these issues deserve special attention. First, in Camp David, the Palestinians demanded full control over parts of East Jerusalem, seeking to make it their capital. Israel rejected this demand. The implications for attaining peace are clear. Jerusalem should be partitioned between the two sides, so that a major part of East Jerusalem will be under full Palestinian control. A second issue involves the right of return to Israel for Palestinian refugees from abroad. One can certainly think of moral arguments in favor of the right of return. However, Israel rejects the right of return because it implies the loss of its Jewish character. As noted, in return for an Israeli commitment to full decolonization, the conict resolution strategy discussed here calls on the Palestinians to formally give up on the right of return and to agree to settle the issue nancially. This could promote Israeli trust and raise the likelihood of arriving at a stable peace agreement. Third, similar to Israeli fundamentalists, the Palestinian Islamists also claim all of Greater Israel/Palestine. Should the Palestinian Islamists reject peace even if Israel were to fully decolonize, the conict probably would continue. There are reasons to believe, however, that the Palestinian Islamists might choose peace in exchange for an Israeli return to the 1967 borders. Israel needs to openly invite the Islamists to discuss peace. This move could force the Islamists to make a clear choice: abandon the armed struggle or risk losing Palestinian public support. While the possibility of an open Israeli-Palestinian Islamist dialogue currently seems remote, pragmatic forces on both sides are receptive to the idea.25 In fact, the second half of 1995 was a period of apparent truce between Hamas and Israel, and it has been reported that Hamas representatives participated in Israeli-Palestinian talks (Jerusalem Post May 18, 1996; Smith, 2001). The PLOs moderation suggests that the position of the Palestinian Islamists may become less radical once they are brought fully into the negotiation process. Even if the second intifada were to be quelledlike other colonial powers, Israel might be victorious in this roundthe conict would not end. Without Israeli decolonization, it is not a question of whether a third intifada will occur, but only a question of when. The history of colonialism suggests that eventually Israelis will choose decolonization. When this happens, some settlers may take up arms. This would represent a clash between democracy and fundamentalism. Assuming the goal is the preservation of Israeli democracy, the Israeli government should crush violent
For example, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin considered talks with Hamas (Time Nov 7, 1994), and Hamas ofcials were receptive to the idea (Christian Science Monitor Nov 4, 1994). Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin said that in return for Israeli withdrawal from the territories, Hamas is ready for a cease-re (Haaretz July 24, 2000). Palestinian leader Marwan Barghouti said if Israel withdrew to the 1967 borders, all Palestinians, including the Islamist opposition, would stop attacking Israel (Haaretz Nov 11, 2001). The former head of the Israeli Security Service, Ami Ayalon (Yediot Sept 5, 2000), and the new leader of Labor, Amram Mitzna, also do not rule out talks with Hamas (Haaretz Nov 15, 2002).
25
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opposition to decolonization. It makes no sense to prolong the conict: Israel should get out of the territories as soon as possible. It is in Israels interest to evacuate the settlements sooner, rather than later, and, if needed, be prepared to respond in force, should the settlers resort to violence to derail peace. But what if Palestinians continue to attack Israel following a peace agreement? This possibility cannot be denied. Still, once Israel resolved outstanding geopolitical issues with Egypt and Jordan, their borders became quiet. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon also led to a sharp decline in border clashes. There is a good chance that Israeli decolonization would lead to peace. It is important to note, however, that the decolonization is not a sufcient condition for peace; it only is a necessary condition. The issue on the table, then, is the possibility of peace versus the surety of protracted conict.
Acknowledgements I thank the editor of this journal and three reviewers for their comments and suggestions for revision. I also thank Andrea Bartuski for feedback and research and editorial assistance, and Rhonda Batts for research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Fundamentalist Colonialism - The Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380 www.politicalgeography.

Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of IsraeliPalestinian conict

Tel.: 812-855-4944; fax: 812-855-7802. E-mail address: rreuveny@indiana.edu (R. Reuveny).

R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380

R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380

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19171949 19491967 19671977

19771987 19881992 1992present

Zionist immigration begins Balfour Declaration Israeli-Arab armistice 1967 War

Likud Government PLO recognizes Israel Labor Government

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Final status map presented by Israel at Taba, January 2001.

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Annual additions to settler population.

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R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380

R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380

R. Reuveny / Political Geography 22 (2003) 347380

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