Salva vs.

Makalintal, GR 132603, 18 September 2000 Facts: Ordinance 05 declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas, while Resolution 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. The Governor of Batangas vetoed Ordinance 05 for being ultra vires. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite. Officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of 1995. Issue: Whether the COMELEC Resolution may be reviewed by the Court via a petition for certiorari. Held: NO. Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that "Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within this days from receipt of a copy thereof." In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise: ". . . What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character. COMELEC Resolution 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC's quasijudicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Chavez vs. COMELEC, GR 105323, 3 July 1993 Facts: In 1992, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution (GR 104704) disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for the Office of Senator in the May 1992 elections. COMELEC issued Resolution 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of Francisco Chavez as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of qualified candidates. Confusion arose, allegedly nationwide, as the "Chavez" votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs). Chavez sent a letter to the Comelec requesting the latter to devise ways and means in crediting "Chavez" votes in his favor but COMELEC failed to act on said letter/complaint. Chavez, after being dissatisfied with the failure of the Comelec to act on his petition, filed the urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus. Issues: [1] Whether the inaction of the COMELEC calls for the exercise of the Court's function of judicial review. [2]: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant pre-proclamation controversy. Held : NO. The alleged inaction of the Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's function of judicial review. This Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions. COMELEC's alleged failure to implement its own resolution is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference. Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone. NO. A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, pursuant to Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166. From the provision of the law, "pre-proclamation cases (are) not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.'' What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. It is quite obvious that Chavez's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. Indeed, Chavez has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, Chavez's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

AKBAYAN vs. COMELEC, GR 147066, 26 March 2001 Facts: AKBAYAN - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC under Republic Act 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996). On February 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution 3584 denying the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17, and 18 2001. Issues: [1] Whether the right of suffrage is absolute. [2] Whether the COMELEC has the power to deny the petition for additional days for registration. [3] Whether administrative findings of the COMELEC should be given great weight. [4] Whether the COMELEC is mandated to exercise its so-called stand-by powers in this case. [5] Whether the Court can interfere with the present COMELEC Resolution. Held: [1]: NO. In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitutions and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse. The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. [2]: YES. Section 8 of RA 8189 provides a system of continuing registration. Likewise, Section 35 of RA 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter's list. Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. [3]: YES. It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances. [4]: NO. It is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally ..., it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that the "stand-by power" of the COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposed the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise. [5]: NO. The COMELEC in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter - Section 8 of R.A. 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally mandated powers. Hence, whatever action COMELEC takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters' registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.

Velasco vs. COMELEC, GR 180051, 24 December 2008 Facts: Velasco was born in San Antonio, Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 1952 to Arsenio Velasco and Lucia Mangalindan. He married Evelyn D. Castillo on June 1975 at the Roman Catholic Church of Sasmuan. In 1983, he moved to and worked in the United States of America where he subsequently became a citizen. Sometime in 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. His application was approved on 31 July 2006. On the same day, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco. He returned to the Philippines on September 2006 and has not left since, except for a 3-day Hongkong trip in September 2006. A month after, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his application. Thereupon, Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the list of voters with the Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan. The MTC, finding no evidence of Velasco's change of domicile, granted Velasco's petition on February 2007. A month later, Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga (RTC) reversed and set aside, on appeal, the MTC decision. The RTC reasoned out that Velasco lost his domicile of origin [Sasmuan, Pampanga] when he became a US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay in the Philippines as a visitor or as a resident alien. Velasco, according to the RTC, only regained or reacquired his Philippine residency on 31 July 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship; based on the ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals that naturalization in a foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Thus, the RTC found that Velasco failed to comply with the residency requirement under the Constitution, making him ineligible to vote in the May 2007 elections. Velasco appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review. Velasco filed on March 2007 his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan. Velasco's COC contains, among others, the required information that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga. He executed on even date an Affidavit renouncing, abandoning, and relinquishing his American citizenship. The next day, Mozart Panlaqui, who also filed his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco's COC. Velasco garnered 7,822 votes [the most number] for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan in the May 2007 election. As the COMELEC failed to resolve Panlaqui's petition prior to the election, Velasco was proclaimed Mayor of Sasmuan. He took his oath of office and assumed the powers and functions of the office. On July 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution canceling Velasco's COC and declaring his proclamation as Mayor of Sasmuan null and void. Velasco moved to reconsider the Second Division's Resolution, but the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution denied the motion. Velasco filed the petition for Certiorari. Issues: [1] Whether the proceedings and reliefs on voters' inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are the same. [2] Whether the COMELEC abused its discretion in holding that Velasco is not eligible to run for office. [3] Whether the decision of the MTC/RTC in an exclusion proceeding final and conclusive on COMELEC's hearing on COC denial/cancellation proceeding. [4] Whether Velasco is a regular voter considering he secured his dual citizenship status as early as 2006. Held [1]: NO. In terms of purpose, voters' inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are different proceedings; one refers to the application to be registered as a voter to be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the application to be a candidate. Because of their differing purposes, they also involve different issues and entail different reliefs although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities where they may be said to converge or interface. [2]: NO. The ERB denied Velasco's registration as a voter, which denial the RTC subsequently supported. This denial by the RTC is, by law, final and executory. Since Velasco's knowledge of the RTC decision at the time he filed his COC is not disputed, the COMELEC concluded that he committed a material misrepresentation when he stated under oath in his COC that he is a registered voter of Sasmuan.We can only conclude that he deliberately concealed the existence of the final and executory RTC ruling when he filed his COC. He could not disclose this fact as the unavoidable consequence of disclosure was to render him unqualified to be a candidat

[3]: NO. In Domino v. COMELEC - where this Court faced the contention that the decision of the first level court in an exclusion proceeding on the issue of residence is final and conclusive on the COMELEC hearing a COC denial/cancellation proceeding under Section 78 of the OED - we ruled that the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive on and do not rise to the level of a res judicata ruling with respect to the COMELEC. The reason is that inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary proceedings. We further added that a decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning his right to be registered as a voter. Otherwise stated, a ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final and executory ruling by a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding [4]: NO. At the time he filed his application for registration with the COMELEC local office on October 13, 2006, Velasco was a dual citizen. By law, however, the right of dual citizens who vote as absentee voters pertains only to the election of national officials, specifically: the president, the vicepresident, the senators, and party-list representatives. Thus, Velasco was not eligible to vote as an absentee voter in the local election of 2007. In fact, the records do not show that Velasco ever registered as an absentee voter for the 2007 election. On the other hand, Velasco could not have registered as a regular voter because he did not possess the residency requirement of one-year stay in the Philippines and six-months stay in the municipality where he proposed to vote at the time of the election. The records show that he arrived in the Philippines only on September 14, 2006 and applied for registration on October 13 of that year for the election to be held in May of the following year (2007). To hark back and compare his case to a similar case, Coquilla v. COMELEC, Velasco, before acquiring his dual citizenship status, was an American citizen who had lost his residency and domiciliary status in the Philippines; whose sojourn in the Philippines was via a visitor's visa; and who never established permanent residence in the Philippines. Like Coquilla before him, Velasco could not have therefore validly registered as a regular voter eight months before the May 2007 local elections.

Albano vs. Arranz, G.R. No. L-19260, January 31, 1962 Facts: Albano and Reyes were the candidates for Representative for the province of Isabela. Due to alleged differences of the data from the original and duplicate certificate of canvass, Comelec ordered for the suspension of the proclamation of the election winner. Reyes filed a motion for Injunction to the RTC which ordered the enjoinment of the submission of the flawed certificates to COMELEC and ordered the Board of Canvassers to proceed with the proclamation. Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in promulgating such order? Held: No. The actuations of the respondent court are highly irregular and void for lack of jurisdiction. The suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate pending an injury into irregularities brought to the attention of the Commission on Elections was well within its administrative jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, (Art. X), for the administration and enforcement of all laws relative to elections. The Commission certainly had the right to inquire whether or not discrepancies existed between the various copies of election returns for the precincts in question, and suspend the canvass in the meantime, so the parties could ask for a recount in case of variance. Moreover, the Court below could not properly pass upon the validity of the Commission's orders without giving it a hearing, and the Commission had not been impleaded.

Aratuc vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-49705-09, February 8, 1979 Facts: Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Comelec. A supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted hearings of the complaintsof the petitioner therein alleged irregularities in the election records. In order for the Commission to decide properly. It will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records and registration records and it will have to interview and get statements from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual voting took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass. Issue: Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? Held: No. Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the commission one lections shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body or office having supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit

Javier vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-22248, January 30, 1965 Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latters men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondents proclamation, the petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Comelec en banc as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Comelec authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election. Held: Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides that: The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.

Atienza vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 108533, December 20, 1994 Facts: Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1998 local elections. Following Sias proclamation, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court questioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality. Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained a plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of P300,856.19 representing petitioners expenses in the election protest. Private respondent appealed. Meanwhile, the Regional trial Court granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, which was opposed by respondent. The Comelec issued a preliminary injunction stopping the enforcement of the order of execution. The Comelec, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal. However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the Comelecs Second Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioners appeal for being moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the lower courts judgment. Held: The dismissal of an appeal in an election protest case for having become moot and academic due to the election of new municipal officials referred only to that part of the appealed judgment which was affected by the election and not to that portion relating to the award of damages. However, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the absence of a law expressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. This, petitioner has been unable to do. The intent of the legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid in fine, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.

Domino vs. COMELEC, GR 134015, 19 July 1999 Facts: On March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. Subsequently, Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., et al. filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory. The result of the election shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani. DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision. DOMINO filed the Petition for Certiorari. Issues: [1]: Whether the decision of the MTC declaring him a resident of Sarangani is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC. [2]: Whether DOMINO satisfied the residency requirement to run for office. [3]: Whether the COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the cancellation of his COC after garnering the highest votes. Held: [1]: NO. The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained. The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. [2]: NO. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution. In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void. [3]: YES. COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.

DEMAFILES vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28396,December 29, 1967 Facts: Demafiles and Galido are opposing candidates for the mayoralty of municipality of Sebaste in Antique province. Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167b of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered of whom 188 voted, when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct. The board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The new canvass resulted in Galido's proclamation as mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste. Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the COMELEC resolved to annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of Sebaste, Antique. Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the board was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board of canvassers and that the COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present petition for mandamus and certiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC, to annull the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7. Issues: 1) Whether the respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its power in rejecting the return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate that a less number of voters than that shown in the return had registered; 2) Whether the provincial board members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers; and 3) Whether the Commission on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a return from a given precinct. Held: 1.) A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function that of compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. They cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal. The return shows nothing on its face from which the canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is only when it is compared in the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to justify its exclusion. 2.) The canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for reelection. Section 28 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a candidate for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the performance of its duties in connection with the election. The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 3.) It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal canvass and an illegal proclamation as when they are based on incomplete returns, and order a new canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded. If it has power to direct that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to other copies of the same returns, there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to count all turns which are otherwise regular.itc-alf Indeed, it is its duty to do so, failing which it may be compelled by mandamus.

MASTURA vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 124521, January 29, 1998 Facts: Mastura and Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the examination four ballot boxes were produced and opened. Ballot Box 1 contained the MTC Judge copy of the election returns, Ballot Box 2 the Provincial Board of Canvassers copy of the election returns, Ballot Box 3 the COMELEC copy of the election returns, and Ballot Box 4 the Provincial Board of Canvassers copy of the municipal Certificate of Canvass of Matanog with its supporting Statement of Votes. Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the Certificate of

Canvass of Matanog.
The new Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and recanvassed the votes. During the proceedings Mastura objected to the inclusion of fifty out of the fifty-seven election returns on the ground that the COMELEC copy of the election returns was not reflective of the true results unless compared with the copy of the original Municipal Board of Canvassers. But the new Municipal Board of Canvassers believed otherwise; hence, it included in the canvass the fifty election returns objected to by Mastura who thereafter walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing and as a result, private respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed the duly elected member of the House of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao. Mastura contended imputing to COMELEC Second Division grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion upon issuing its orders. Held:

No, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled
jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself. That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself - on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.

GAYO VS VERCELES FACTS: In 1977 Violeta Verceles together with her family, migrated to the USA. She retained her Filipino citizenship and returned to the Philippines for good in 1993. Thereafter she retained a job in the country, registered as a voter, and paid her taxes. Only between 1993 to 1997 would she travel to the USA to visit her children. She left her status as lawful permanent resident of the USA effective November 5, 1997 to file her candidacy for Mayor of Tubao, La Union in the May 11, 1998 elections. On January 28, 1998, she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila. She won the 1998 elections and sought re-election on 2001 which she again won. On May 26, 2001, Lazaro Gayo, petitioner, also a candidate for Mayor during the May 2001 elections, filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Agoo, La Union. He prayed that the respondent be declared disqualified to hold the position of Mayor of Tubao, La Union, and he be declared Mayor. In her Answer, the respondent argued that she had clearly and unequivocally shown, through direct and positive acts, that she already renounced and waived her right to permanently reside in the U.S.A. even before she surrendered her green card in 1998. The RTC dismissed and ruled in favor of Verceles. ISSUE: Whether or not Violeta Verceles the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the position of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections. HELD: The Court said that the petition is unmeritorious. The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues (sic) until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). Applying case law, it can be said that the respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, the respondent reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May 2001 elections. The records show that she surrendered her green card to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in 1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency could not have been made clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in 1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic visits to her children who were residing there. Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as such for the duration of her term. Such acts are sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again made the Philippines her permanent residence.

ROMUALDEZ MARCOS VS COMELEC FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.COMELEC disqualified petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and suspended her proclamation. ISSUE: Whether or not Romualdez-Marcos has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: (a) Minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; (b) Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. (c) Wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. (d) Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house. The court ruled that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions are set aside and isdirected to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO VS COMELEC FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his application he provided that he has maintained residence in Makati for only 10 months. Thereafter Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked residence qualification. Aquino subsequently filed an amended certificate of candidacy this time stating one year and 13 days instead of 10 months, and prayed for the dismissal of the disqualification case. After hearing the COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition. A motion of reconsideration was filed. Meanwhile, the elections were held wherein Aquino won. Move Makati and Bedon filed motion to suspend proclamation and the same was granted. COMELEC reversed and found Aquino ineligible thus disqualifying him as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying Aquino on the ground of failure to meet the 1 year residency requirement. HELD: The Court Affirms the COMELEC resolution. As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Such clearly is not shown by his merely leasing a condominium unit in Makati for a short period. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.

SARANGANI VS COMELEC FACTS: A petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for certiorari. Subsequently, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the 23 barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in Opposition. After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties COMELEC referred the case for investigation. Thereafter an ocular inspection was conducted, it was found that only two structures were built in the said place which obviously could not possibly be a residence for a single human being. Further, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential place. So this contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285. One Madalum Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun even threatened the investigating group to stop the inspection. On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct. HELD: The Court affirmed the findings of COMELEC. The determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate.

LANOT VS COMELEC FACTS: On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot et.al, filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign period. Eusebio denied all allegations. Thereafter, Director Landra conducted investigation and ruled in favor of herein petitioners. COMELEC affirmed and ordered the pertinent election officials to delete and cancel Eusebios name from the certified list of Pasig City mayoral candidates, not to count votes cast in Eusebios favor, and not to include votes cast in Eusebios favor in the canvass of election returns. Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution which opted COMELEC Chairman Abalos to enjoin the pertinent election officials from implementing the 5 May 2004 resolution. In a Resolution dated 11 May 2004, the COMELEC En Banc subsequently ratified and adopted Chairman Abalos 10 May 2004 memorandum when it denied Lanots motion to suspend the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns. Meanwhile, Eusebio actually won the elections. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in finding Eusebio disqualified for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. HELD: The Court ruled in favor of Eusebio. The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed. Based on the findings of Director Ladra, the questioned acts attributed to Eusebio all occurred before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. Indeed, Director Ladra applied Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio precisely because Eusebio committed these acts "outside" of the campaign period. However, Director Ladra erroneously assumed that Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80, when Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

PUNGUTAN vs ABUBAKAR, G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972 Facts: A petition was filed by respondent Abubakar and the other candidates, alleging that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud. The respondents named herein, including petitioner Pungutan, answered to the effect that the elections were duly held in the municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of massive fraud, terrorism and serious irregularities. The case was duly heard, with oral testimony from five chairmen of certain precincts in Tapul, five teachers from Parang, five teachers from Luuk and three teachers from Siasi, followed by an examination of the precinct book of voters from said towns and the fingerprints and signatures of those who voted. Issue:Whether the COMELEC has the power to disregard or annul the returns. Held: It goes without saying that what is contemplated in the law is that the electors in the exercise of their free will can go to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage, with the boards of inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an honest count. It is on that basis that election returns are to be made. Where no such election was in fact held as was found by respondent Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only justified but it is its clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore bereft of any value. Considering the findings of fact made by the COMELEC that there exist massive fraud, terrorism and seriousirregularities attending the elections in the 4 towns of Sulu, it is not only justified but in fact a duty of COMELEC to exclude these tainted returns. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the determination of whetheror not a person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage. Thus, the question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly judicial. As to whether or not an election has been held is a different matter. It is properly within the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine whether voting had taken place considering the massive irregularities attending the election. The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. In the traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling every citizen to participate in the process of government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the governed.

Carlos vs Angeles, November 29, 2000, G.R. No. 142907 Facts: Petitioner Carlos and respondent Serapio were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela. Serapio filed with the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela, an election protest challenging the results. Due to the inhibition of all judges of the Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela, the case was ultimately assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, presided over by respondent Judge Angeles. Petitioner filed with the trial court an answer with affirmative defenses and motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner elevated the order to the Comelec on petition for certiorari and prohibition which, however, has remained unresolved. The court came up with revision reports which also showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of significant badges of fraud, which it attributed to the protestee. The trial court proclaimed Serapio as duly elected mayor. The trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by disregarding and setting aside the results of the election. The petitioner appealed to the Comelec, and also filed a petition to the SC questioning the decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC. Issue: Whether the trial court gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision. Held: Supreme Court finds that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor. In fact, without a single vote in his favor as the trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the decision is not supported by the highest number of valid votes cast in his favor. This violated the right to due process of law of petitioner who was not heard on the issue of failure of election, an issue that was not raised by the protestant. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. The trial court can not decide the election protest case outside the issues raised. If it does, as in this case, the trial court is ousted of its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is a basic principle that a decision with absolutely nothing to support it is void. A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. Here, the trial court indulged in speculations on its view of the voice of the people, and decided the case disregarding the evidence, but on its own intuition, ipse dixit. It is the Comelec sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court can not declare a winner.A permanent vacancy is thus created. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.

KilosBayan vs COMELEC, October 16, 1997, G.R No. 128054. Facts: Secretary of Interior and Local Government Sarino, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into and sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organizations in order to utilize them to projects of the Countrywide Development Fund provided for under R.A. No. 7180. Executive Secretary Drilon, granted the request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the Department of Interior and Local Government. Pursuant to the authority granted him as the then Regional Director of the DILG-NCR, respondent Relucio, entered in the Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. A complaint was filed against private respondents, alleging that CDF were used for electioneering purposes. Kilosbayan alleges that DILG-NCR collaborated with PYHSDFI, the former approving allotment to the latter 70M allegedly use to buy medical and sports equipment that was distributed few days before election and stopped at the day of election. Comelec investigators submitted the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence to prove probable cause. Kilosbayan provided news clippings, regarding alleged use of funds resulting from the said transaction of DILG-NCR and PYHSDFI and arguments to support its claims. The new paper clippings was regarded as hearsay. Kilosbayan filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are not responsible for the production of evidence by using public funds, it is the COMELEC who should search the evidence by using public funds and with the help of other agencies of the government as the constitution gave them the responsibility to prosecute election offenses. The motion was denied, thus this petition to compel COMELEC to prosecute the private respondents Issue: Whether the COMELEC be compelled to produce evidence despite the complainants failure to prove probable cause. Held: No, Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the COMELEC is the public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code before the competent court. The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed innocent. Petitioner KILOSBAYAN must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and in support of the allegations in its letter-complaint, to prove probable cause. It certainly demands more than "bare suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic" The task of the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant.

Batabor vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160428, July 21, 2004 Facts: Petitioner Batabor and Private Respondent Batondiang are opposing candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur, with Batondiang emerging as the winner. Batabor filed with the Public Respondent COMELEC a petition to declare a failure of election in Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A of Barangay Maidan, docketed as SPA No. 02-295 (Brgy). Petitioner claims on the day of the election while several voters casted their votes in the morning, But after lunch, the Chairwoman of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A suddenly tore all the unused official ballots. Thus, the voting was not continued. The BEI then padlocked the ballot boxes. This prevented petitioners relatives and followers, numbering more than 100, to cast their votes. Respondent Batondiang averred that petitioners allegations are not supported by substantial evidence. It was petitioner who padlocked the ballot boxes as shown by the affidavit of Comini Manalastas. Besides, petitioners allegations can be properly ventilated in an election protest because the issues raised are not grounds for declaration of a failure of election. The Public Respondent COMELEC issued a resolution denying the petition of Batabor. Hence, Petitioner raised the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Solicitor General, in his comment on the instant petition, vehemently disputes petitioners allegations and prays that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not there was failure of elections In Brgy. Maidan, Lanao Del Sur? Held: No. Two conditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts due to fraud, force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The court finds that the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition alleging a failure of election. While the alleged 100 votes of petitioners relatives and supporters, if cast during the election, are sufficient to affect its result, however, he failed to prove that the voting did not take place in precincts 3A, 4A and 5A. As found by the COMELEC, the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass of Votes show that out of the 316 registered voters in the questioned precincts, at least 220 actually voted. This simply shows that there was no failure of election in the subject precincts. Moreover, petitioners allegation that the voting was not resumed after lunch break, preventing 100 of his relatives and followers to vote, is better ventilated in an election contest. The COMELEC correctly found that the high turnout in the number of registered voters who actually voted is clearly not an indication of a failure of elections. There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.