APPROPRIATING GLOBAL DISCOURSES FOR DOMESTIC AIMS: NATIONAL MACHINERY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN

Melinda Adams Department of Political Science James Madison University adams2mj@jmu.edu

For presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5, 2004. Draft papernot for citation.

2 The condition of women is one of our constant concerns. Our action for women will consist in strengthening their integration into the political and economic life of the country.1 Paul Biya, October 1992 Cameroonian women, I pledge to foster womens advancement and shall not fail to do so. I shall do my best to ensure that your efforts are recognized and valued everywhere. I shall ensure that you are duly represented in all decision-making spheres of the country.2 Paul Biya, October 1997

Since 1962, the United Nations (UN) has advocated for the establishment of state institutions to promote the status of women.3 At the First World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975, the UN explicitly promoted the formation of national policy machineries for the advancement of women, calling them effective transitional measures for accelerating the achievement of equal opportunities for women and their full integration into national life.4 Over twenty years later, the UN continues to emphasize the importance of effective institutional mechanisms for the promotion of women. The Beijing Platform for Action, for example, calls on states to establish a national machinery for women at the highest levels of government, to give the machinery a clearly defined mandate, to provide it with adequate resources, and to ensure its ability to influence relevant policymakers.5 The UN also supports additional women-friendly initiatives like gender quotas and reserved seats for women in decision-making institutions.

This speech was made in 1992 during a tightly fought presidential campaign. Ministry of Social and Womens Affairs, Republic of Cameroon, National Plan of action to Integrate Women in Development (NAPWID), 1997, 3.
2

See Ministry of Womens Affairs, Republic of Cameroon, The Policy of Womens Advancement in Cameroon, 2000 and Ministry of Womens Affairs, Republic of Cameroon, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy: Working document for the national validation workshop, January 2002, 24. This speech was given on October 2 during the 1997 presidential election campaign. Bridget Byrne and Julie Koch Laier (with Sally Baden and Rachel Marcus), National Machineries for Women in Development: Experiences, Lessons and Strategies for Institutionalising Gender in Development Policy and Planning, Report prepared for the European Commission, Directorate General for Development (DGVIII), Report No. 36, Bridge Development-Gender, May 1996, 8. C.O.N Moser, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice, and Training, New York: Routledge, 1993, 111as cited in Byrne and Koch Laier, 1996, 8.

A national machinery for the advancement of women is the central policy-coordinating unit inside government. Its main task is to support government-wide mainstreaming of a gender-equality perspective in all policy areas. The

3 This paper suggests that the Cameroonian state has strategically employed the increasingly accepted global discourse on the need to establish institutions to promote the advancement of women. It has created a network of national womens institutions in line with this norm. The states use of women-friendly rhetoric and establishment of a womens machinery helps to attract international assistance to state programs and agencies, funneling money that donors might otherwise disburse to autonomous organizations into state coffers.6 The state also takes advantage of the fact that international actors rarely examine the operations and effectiveness of these machineries. While the construction of the womens machinery provides low-cost international legitimacy, it also advances the states domestic interests in two key ways. First, the Cameroonian state has managed to integrate the womens machinery into the prevailing patronage system. In fact, women at the local level often support the womens machinery, seeing it as a source of favors and goods. Second, the state attempts to use the womens to channel autonomous organizations towards state-delineated projects. The state exchanges access for support. The paper turns next to examine the broader literature on state feminism and its utility in the Cameroonian case. It then provides four brief case studies that analyze specific components

necessary conditions for an effective functioning of such national machineries include: (a) Location at the highest possible level in the Government, falling under the responsibility of a Cabinet minister; (b) Institutional mechanisms or processes that facilitate, as appropriate, decentralized planning, implementation and monitoring with a view to involving non-governmental organizations and community organizations from the grass-roots upwards; (c) Sufficient resources in terms of budget and professional capacity; (d) Opportunity to influence development of all government policies. See Beijing Platform for Action, Section H, Paragraph 201, http://www.un.org/womenwatc/daw/beijing/plat1.htm. The SDF has, in fact, compared Chantal Biyas Cercle des amis du Cameroun [Circle of Friends of Cameroon] (CERAC), a nominally independent philanthropic organization that uses state resources to Henriette Konan Bedies Fondation Avenir [Future Foundation] in Cote dIvoire, which was found to be a huge network for siphoning of aid. The Cameroonian state creates state and quasi-state institutions that compete with non-state organizations for international aid. Given their insider status, they frequently succeed in winning international support. See SDF, Expression Direct of the SDF 18-19 May 2000, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/releases/205.php.
6

4 of the national womens machinery. The paper argues that the Cameroonian state has appropriated a global norm in the service of its domestic interestsextending patronage networks and its control over societal groups.

STATE FEMINISM

The concept of state feminism developed out of work focusing on Nordic countries. Helga Maria Hernes defines state feminism as feminism from above in the form of gender equality and social policies.7 Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur define it as the activities of government structures that are formally charged with furthering womens status and rights.8 Vicky Randall argues that there are two ways that scholars generally define state feminism. One group of scholars uses the term to refer to the tendency for feminists to achieve positions of influence within government, while another group uses the term to indicate state policies and procedureswhich are in some way designed to improve womens status and opportunities. 9 My use of state feminism is congruent with this second conception. I employ it to mean state policies that seek to improve womens status in society. As for the concept of national machinery, the United Nations Division for the Advancement for Women defines it as any organizational structure established with particular responsibility for the advancement of women and the elimination of discrimination against women at the central national level. These include governmental, non-governmental or joint
7

Helga Maria Hernes, Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987, 153. Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G. Mazur eds., Comparative State Feminism, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995, 1-2.
9 8

Vicky Randall, Gender and Power: Women Engage the State, In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds. Gender, Politics and the State London and New York: Routledge, 1998, 201.

5 governmental/NGO bodies, and could consist of one or several agencies.10 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) sees national machinery as a set of co-ordinated structures, within and outside of government, which aim to achieve equality for women in all spheres of life.11 Like these perspectives, I employ an inclusive definition that encompasses a wide variety of institutional forms; some organized by the state, others by political parties and other societal actors. It is important to ascertain whether a national policy machinery provides opportunities for women to achieve change or if it exists mainly to let governments say they are consulting women and taking their needs into account.12 In determining whether womens policy machinery are indeed feminist (i.e. has the purpose of improving the status of women as a group and undermining patterns of gender hierarchy), Stetson and Mazur look at two criteriapolicy influence and policy access.13 They define policy influence as the participation of each womens policy office in the formation of feminist policies.14 Policy access refers to the degree to which womens policy machineries develop opportunities for society-based actorsto exert influence on feminist policies.15 Thus, state feminist institutions are those that are able to shape the policies that promote womens advancement and/or provide opportunities for non-state actors to voice their opinions to state agents and influence the policy process. Scholars have

10

Division for the Advancement of Women, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Office at Vienna, Directory of National Machinery for the Advancement of Women, 1993, 1. Gender in the South African Government, Gender Update, Issue Two, June 2000, http://www.undp.org.za/misc/genderupdate2.html. L. Pauline Rankin and Jill Vickers, Womens Movements and State Feminism: Integrating Diversity into Public Policy, Status of Women Canada, May 2001, 6. Stetson and Mazur 1995, 16. Ibid., 274. Ibid.

11

12

13 14 15

6 demonstrated that national machinery in many advanced industrial, democratic states achieve one or both tasks.16 One limitation of work on state feminism is that it has focused overwhelmingly on liberal democracies where, for the most part, societal actors view the state as a relatively benign institution or as a neutral arbiter between different groups within society.17 Hernes Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism draws empirical evidence from Nordic and other European states. Stetson and Mazurs volume, Comparative State Feminism includes case studies on Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United States, and Spain. For the most part, these scholars employ a most similar case design that seeks to minimize differences among the selected cases. Stetson and Mazur include Spain, a continuous democracy since only 1975, and Poland, a post-Communist state that underwent a democratic transition in 1989, in their study as two most different cases. Poland is the only case where researchers find that womens policy machinery are not at all effective in improving womens status. This finding highlights the need to look more closely at a broader array of countries to gain a fuller understanding of how state feminism functions around the world. Many states in the developing world have established womens policy machinery; yet little empirical work examines whether in these countries institutions actually improve the status of women. A few scholars are beginning to look at whether state feminism functions in similar ways in newly democratic, semi-authoritarian, and even authoritarian states as it does in liberal
16

Stetson and Mazur classify national policy machinery in Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark as High Influence, High Access. Sweden, Great Britain, and France are High Influence, Low Access and Germany, United States, and Canada are considered Low Influence, High Access. All are considered state feminist. See Stetson and Mazur 1995, 277. Georgina Waylen, Gender, Feminism and the State: An Overview, In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds. Gender, Politics and the State London and New York: Routledge, 1998, 5.

17

7 democracies.18 While it may at first seem counterintuitive that authoritarian states would implement state feminist policies, even some of the most repressive regimes have pursued policies to improve the status of women. Early in his tenure, for example, Saddam Hussein promoted the emancipation of women through anti-discrimination legislation, paid maternity leave, the construction of day-care centers, and adult literacy campaigns.19 He did so not out of concern for women but as a way of breaking down traditional power structures that could pose a threat to him. The vast majority of African statesmany of which are authoritarian or semiauthoritarian in naturehave established some sort of womens machinery. States may support feminist policies and programs for reasons other than their explicitly stated goals, and these ulterior motives may undermine states commitment and ability to promote womens and gender issues. Examining state feminism in non-democratic states and how it compares to state feminism in democratic states, Aili Mari Tripp argues: State feminism under a semi-authoritarian or authoritarian state is much more constrained and subject to political manipulations than state feminism within a democracy. There is an ambiguity within many of the female friendly policies under a semi-authoritarian regime because they have the potential to enhance womens status and in many respects they actually accomplish those goals. But in other important ways, they can also be subverted and turned against women.20 In non-democratic states, scholars and activists need to approach state initiatives with a degree of skepticism. Women-friendly policies may promote the advancement of women. They may

18

See, for example, Susan Franceschet, State Feminism and Womens Movements: The Impact of Chiles Servicio Nacional de la Mujer on Womens Activism, Latin American Research Review 38 (1): 2003, 9-40 and Aili Mari Tripp, Regimes and the Politics of State Feminism: How and Why States Subvert Female-Friendly Policies, forthcoming.

19

Guilain Denoeux, Iraq, In Charles Hauss, ed. Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges 4th ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson. Aili Mari Tripp, Regimes and the Politics of State Feminism: How and Why States Subvert Female-Friendly Policies, forthcoming.

20

8 also, however, advance a state agenda that works against womens interests. Thus, evaluations of these initiatives in non-democracies must be grounded in empirical evidence. Before delving into the Cameroonian case, it is important to ask whether state feminism is the most appropriate term for discussing these state-led, women-friendly initiatives in Africa. Within the African context, scholars have employed the term national policy machinery far more frequently than state feminism when discussing institutional mechanisms designed to promote the advancement of women. Feminism is a highly contested term in Cameroon and throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa, and one with which few activists closely identify. Indeed, within the Ministry of Womens Affairs (MINCOF), high-level personnel explicitly reject feminism, arguing that it is too divisive or a Western import that does not fit the African context,. Thus, state feminism is not a term with which scholars, activists, and bureaucrats on the ground identify. Moreover, the term has different connotations in African contexts, one associated with the states instrumental use of women rather than with the promotion of womens interests. State feminism has been defined as state controlled womens organizations and institutions which address womens issues in a non-threatening way and often act against the interests of women.21 From this perspective, state feminist initiatives do not change womens situation but rather maintain existing power relations that marginalize women. Stetson and Mazur define state feminist womens policy machineries as those agencies that concretely achieve their formal charge in some way.22 Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, womens national machineries do not always lead to changes in womens status. The concept of national machinery, in contrast to that of state feminism, does not imply that
21

E. Sisulu et al., Report on the Workship on Gender Analysis and African Social Science, CODESRIA Bulletin, 4, 1991, 9 quoted in Lisa Aubrey, Gender, Development, and Democratization in Africa, Journal of African and Asian Studies, 36 (1): 2001, 104.
22

Stetson and Mazur, 1995, 5.

9 these institutions actually yield feminist results. The outcomes may be ambiguous or even reinforce patriarchal institutions. Indeed, evidence below suggests that national womens machineries fall far short of transforming gender hierarchies. Finally, while the majority of work on state feminism neglects developing, nondemocratic states, work on national machinery has been more inclusive, encompassing a wider range of states. The vast majority of sub-Saharan African states have established some sort of national womens machinery.23 An 11-part series published by the Third World Network-Africa, based in Accra, Ghana, examines national machinery in eight African states.24 The studies raise important theoretical issues (e.g., on the nature of relationships between societal actors and state feminist institutions and on where national machinery should be located for maximum benefit) and provide empirical evidence drawn from the developing world to address these issues. They address a number of questions, including: How did the national machinery come into being, how was it established, and by whom and what are the implications of this for its work? What are the structures, location, functions, powers, legal character and mandates of national machinery for women in the study country and what are their implications for the work of the national machinery? What are the achievements, failures and problems of the national machinery, and how can the achievements be strengthened and the problems addressed? What is the relationship between organizations in civil society and the national machinery?25 In short, the studies challenge much of the conventional wisdom on national machinery and provide hypotheses to
23

For a list of national machineries, see Margaret C. Snyder and Mary Tadesse, African Women and Development: A History, London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995, Appendix 4. See also Directory of National Machinery for the Advancement of Women, DAWN, Vienna, Austria, 1993.

24

These include Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania. The series also includes two background pieces and a concluding essay that synthesizes the case studies. See Dzodzi Tsikata, Lip-Service and peanuts: The State and National Machinery for Women in Africa, National Machinery Series No. 11, Ghana: TWN-Africa, 2000. For a summary of the findings, see Dzodzi Tsikata, National Machineries for the Advancement of Women in Africa: Are They Transforming Gender Relations? Social Watch, 73-74.

10 test in other locales. Thus, unlike literature on state feminism, work on womens policy machinery encompasses developing countries and those that are new democracies or even semiauthoritarian states. It is for these reasons that I refer to women-friendly policies and institutions in Cameroon as the national machinery rather than as state feminist institutions. Nevertheless, I draw on scholarly work on state feminism and believe that this chapter contributes to the broader body of literature that examines whether policy machineries yield feminist results.

CAMEROON: FOUR CASES

On the face of it, Cameroon appears to have complied with global norms calling for the establishment of a national framework for the promotion of womens and gender issues. Cameroon, like many states, has created a national policy machinery to mainstream womens and gender issues and to promote the status of women. In 1975, Ahmadu Ahidjos government inaugurated the first program targeted specifically at women. Since then, the institutional framework of the national policy machinery has grown more complex. The Ministry of Womens Affairs, first created in 1984, occupies a central position in the national machinery. Numerous other institutions, including the Consultative Committee on the Promotion for Women, the Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians, and a Womens and Gender Studies Department at the University of Buea, support the work of the Ministry. Leading politicians in Cameroon have appropriated global norms regulating discourses on how states should address womens and gender issues. Cameroon has expressed a rhetorical

25

Tsikata, 2000, 50-51.

11 commitment to womens rights, to gender equity in decision-making positions, and to programs supporting womens and gender issues. The two quotations cited at the beginning of this chapter are illustrative of politicians rhetorical support for improving the status of women. In his October 2, 1997 speech in Maroua, Paul Biya identified the advancement of women as a priority area for his seven-year term as president. In his contract with women, Biya specifically committed himself to increasing womens access to health care, to ensuring that their work is recognized and valued, to adopting a family code, to increasing womens representation in decision-making positions, and to adopting a law that addresses violence against women.26 As this term comes to a close, one can begin to evaluate Biyas commitment to womens and gender issues. The cases below investigate whether Biya and other politicians back up their words with actions.

The Ministry of Womens Affairs

Up until 1975, Cameroon did not have any state institutions that explicitly focused on women. In 1975, Ahmadu Ahidjos government established the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS) within which a Service in Charge of the Advancement of Women existed. The mission of this founding structure of the national machinery was to gather data on the situation of women, to ensure the full participation of women in development, and to establish contacts with private and international organizations.27 In the 1970s, Ahidjos government also created a

26

See Mve Minsta, Le Candidat Paul Biya: 10 Points Pour Assurer le Mieux-Etre des Camerounais, Cameroon Tribune, October 10, 1997; J.M. Ahanda, Paidoyer pour les femmes, Cameroon Tribune, October 10, 1997; and Essama Essomba, Le Candidat Paul Biya: Plaidoyer pour un nouveau contrat de confiance, Cameroon Tribune, October 6, 1997. Sectoral Stategy Workshop, May 13, 2002, Yaound.

27

12 Womens Agricultural Activities Service within the Department of Community Development in the Ministry of Agriculture. This service targeted female farmers, a previously neglected population despite the fact that they comprise the vast majority of farmers in Cameroon. Thus, institutional predecessors to MINCOF existed, but these agencies were small and embedded in various ministries and government institutions. In 1984, immediately preceding the 1985 UN Conference on Women in Nairobi, Kenya, Cameroon established a Ministry of Womens Affairs (MINCOF).28 It is no coincidence that Cameroon created the Ministry at this moment. At the urging of the United Nations, states across the continent and the globe were developing similar institutional mechanisms to promote the advancement of women. In the 1980s, MINCOFs major focus was integrating women into development. The Ministry consisted of three technical structures: the Legal Research Unit, the Economic Research Unit, and the Socio-cultural Research Unit.29 As their titles indicate, all three units focused on research, and their key responsibility was to carry out studies in their domains. Thus, MINCOFs first incarnation existed only at the central level, and, in contrast to larger, more established ministries, it lacked a presence in the field. Its inability to reach out to the grassroots impeded its ability to induce tangible, positive changes in womens lives. In addition, insufficient funding, an ambiguous relationship with other ministries, and inadequate training of personnel combined to render MINCOF largely ineffective in its early years. According to the National Plan of Action on the Integration of Women in Development (NAPWID) drafted by the Ministry of Social and Womens Affairs (MINASCOF) in 1997:

28 29

Decree no. 84/95 of March 26, 1984.

MINCOF, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy: Working Document for the National Validation Workshop, January 2002, A14.

13 [T]he ministry was conceived for technical activities on the field, which explains the lack of peripheral structures. It had to play a watch role. Unfortunately, understanding of this mandate was neither evident for the ministries, which did not want to see their actions controlled by another ministry, nor for the Ministry of Womens Affairs, whose expertise in matters of women and development was still too young.30 MINCOF was supposed to be a watchdog, but it lacked the power to hold other institutions accountable. At a meeting organized by MINCOF in May 2002 to develop a sector strategy for womens advancement, a MINCOF representative reiterated that this first incarnation of MINCOF was marred by the absence of external services that would actually work in the field.31 It is easy to identify structural weaknesses that impeded MINCOFs ability to fulfill its mandate. It is also important, however, to recognize that these problems were not merely technical. They clearly demonstrated the states weak commitment to womens and gender issues. Paul Biyas government created a structurally weak and under-financed ministry saddled with the immense task of promoting the advancement of women. MINCOF was fighting an uphill battle from its inception, and one that other state institutions were making only more difficult. Barbara Lewiss study of the Saa Womens Agricultural Project administered by Ministry of Womens Affairs (MINCOF) highlights the intra- and inter-ministerial battles that confronted MINCOF during this era. Explaining the finding that MINCOF favored small, inefficient projects, she argued: That a womens ministry should tap the technical, administrative, and field resources of other ministries to serve women appears essential, given the lack of specialized personnel within the womens ministry. But the preceding analysissuggests that a convergence of bureaucratic interestswithin the womens ministry, within the womens wing of the party, and in the larger ministerial contextfavors autonomous projects.

30

Ministry of Social and Womens Affairs, National Plan of Action on Integration of Women in Development (NAPWID), Institutional Framework, April 1997, 239. Sectoral Strategy Workshop, May 13, 2002, Yaound.

31

14 Lewis asserts that the newly appointed minister needed the support of local party leaders. She, therefore, had an interest in designing small development projects that could be used for political gain. Since ministries function as patronage networks, there are few incentives for interministerial cooperation. Thus, the bureaucratic culture in Cameroon supports competition rather than collaboration and leads to inefficient outcomes. The state used patronage as a means of coopting and demobilizing womens groups. In September 1988, the state fused the Ministry of Womens Affairs with the Ministry of Social Affairs to create the Ministry of Social and Womens Affairs (MINASCOF).32 The state generally cites budgetary constraints as the impetus behind the decision.33 Yet, this explanation begs the question: why did the state choose not to fuse other ministries with overlapping mandates? The government, to cite a few examples, could have joined the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries, the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Scientific or Technical Research, and/or the Ministry of Towns and the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning. The states decision to fuse only the Ministry of Womens Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs demonstrates its lack of commitment to these issue areas. If budgetary concerns were the primary impetus for the decision, one would expect that other ministries would have been merged as well.34 MINASCOFs mission was similar to that of MINCOF, though it took a broader approach to achieving this mandate. A key difference was that MINASCOF inherited the
32 33

See decree 88/1281 of September 22, 1988.

Cameroons initial report to the CEDAW Committee notes, for example: With the economic crisis, which became increasingly serious after 1987, Cameroon adopted a structural adjustment plan which called for a cutback in public expenditure and, among other measures, the restructuring of the Government. Thus, the Ministry of Womens Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs were merged. See United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Initial Reports of State Parties: Cameroon, CEDAW/C/CMR/1, May 9, 1999, 16. I thank Lotsmart Fonjong for raising this point.

34

15 external services of Ministry of Social Affairs; thus, unlike MINCOF, it had a presence on the ground that facilitated closer relations with its target population. To a certain extent, this ability to reach grassroots populations facilitated MINASCOFs work. Its internal organization also differed from MINCOF. MINASCOF consisted of three services on Womens Education, Womens Economic Integration, and Womens Organizations Relations.35 Budgetary constraints, duplication of services, and the limited effectiveness of outreach services, however, continued to impede its ability to fulfill its mandate. Thus, while MINASCOFs existence brought national and international attention to womens and gender issues throughout Cameroon, the institutions relative lack of power and insufficient resources continued to impede its ability to effect substantial changes in womens lives in Cameroon. Once again technical problems were only the tip of the iceberg, indicating the existence of deeper political obstacles. In 1997, Cameroon re-established a separate Ministry of Womens Affairs.36 Again, this permutation of the ministry differed from its predecessors in a number of important ways. The internal organization of the ministry changed. Since a reorganization in May 1998, MINCOF has been composed of four departmentsthe Division for Studies, Planning and Co-operation, the Department for the Socioeconomic Advancement of the Woman, the Department for the Promotion of Womens Rights, and the Department of General Affairs.37 MINCOFs second incarnation also developed a stronger presence outside Yaound. Provincial, divisional, and subdivisional delegations support the work of the central ministry. Womens Empowerment Centers (WECs), Appropriate Technology Centers (ATCs), and rural animation pools, all of which target grassroots populations, further supplement the ministry. Moreover, MINCOFs mandate is both

35 36 37

Byrne and Koch Laier, 1996, 60. Decree no. 97/205 of December 7, 1997. Decree no. 98/68 of May 4, 1998.

16 broader and clearer than those of its predecessors. Among other things, MINCOF is responsible for the drawing up and implementation of measures relating to the respect of womens rights in society; the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women; and the increase of equality guarantees in the political, economic, and socio-cultural domains.38 In July 1999, Cameroon adopted a National Policy on Women in Development (NAPWID). The document identifies seven priority areas (1) improving womens living conditions; (2) improving womens legal status; (3) empowering women in all areas of development, (4) womens effective participation in decision-making; (5) the protection and advancement of the girl-child; (6) violence against women; and (7) improving the institutional framework. NAPWID also outlines strategies to meet MINCOFs objectives in each of the seven priority areas. Thus, NAPWID along with international documents, like CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action, provides MINCOF with a sense of direction. These changes have combined to make MINCOF stronger and more effective than its predecessors. Contrasting the MINCOF of 1984 with that of 1997, Cameroons initial report to CEDAW stated: In contrast to the spirit of the decree of February 1984, which restricted the role of the Ministry of Womens Affairs essentially to carrying out studies, the new Ministry had its powers of intervention reinforced and a general secretariat, a gender inspectorate, specialized technical directorates and local departments in the provinces were placed under its authority.39 Clearly, todays MINCOF has a more formidable structure than its predecessors possessed. It is less clear, however, whether its content and power are also stronger. Still, its extension into society grants it more contact with grassroots groups and, perhaps, more influence over these groups.
38

MINCOF, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy, A16.

17 Still, MINCOF continues to encounter problems. Like earlier manifestations, it suffers from a lack of resources. Table 6.2 provides a summary of MINCOFs budget allocations from 1998 to 2004. Though the amount of money allocated to MINCOF has risen, MINCOFs percentage of the total national budget has fallen. Compared with other Ministries, MINCOFs budget is tiny. The 2004 budget allocated just 3,538,000,000 FCFA (approximately US $6,803,846) to the Ministry of Womens Affairs.40 As Table 6.1 demonstrates, MINCOF is not a budget priority. Out of 37 government bodies, MINCOF ranked 32nd, receiving 0.43 percent of the total budget. The data belies the governments claim that the promotion of women remains one of the major axes of the political program of this seven-year term of office.41 In speeches, President Paul Biya continues to express a strong commitment to womens and gender issues. He has even identified the advancement of women as priority for his current presidential term. Yet, Biya has failed to follow through on these commitments, and his government has not provided MINCOF with sufficient resources.

Table 6.1: MINCOF Budget Allocations, 1998-2004 Fiscal Year 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003
39 40 41 42 43

Budget (FCFA) 2,980,000,000 3,216,000,000 2,300,000,000 3,194,161,000 --43

Percent of Total Annual Budget 0.63 0.66 --42 0.41 --

CEDAW/C/CMR/1, 16. See La Rpartition de lEnveloppe Budgetaire 2004, Cameroon Tribune, December, 11, 2003. La promotion de la femme demeure lun des axes majeures du programme politique du septennat. Ibid. Data missing for total annual budget. Data missing for MINCOFs budget allocation in the 2002-2003 fiscal year.

18 2003-2004 3,538,000,000 0.43

Sources: Ministere de lEconomie et des Finances, Loi de Finance 1999/2000, http://www.camnet.cm/investr/minfi/loi.htm; United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Twenty-third session, Summary record of the 483rd meeting, Held at Headquarters, New York, June 26, 2000, CEDAW/C/SR.483, 2; Budget du Cameroun anne 2001-2002, http://www.ambafrancecm.org/html/camero/econo/budget.htm; and La Rpartition de lEnveloppe Budgetaire 2004, Cameroon Tribune, December 11, 2003.

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Table 6.2: Cameroons 2003-2004 Budget Breakdown Ministry/Government Body Ministry of National Education Ministry of Defense Ministry of Public Health Ministry of Public Works General Delegation of National Security Ministry of the Economy and Finance The Presidency of the Republic Ministry of Technical Education and Professional Training Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation Ministry of Higher Education Ministry of Public Investment and Regional Development Ministry of External Relations Ministry of Housing and Town Planning Ministry of Youth and Sports Ministry of Justice Services of the Prime Minister National Assembly Ministry of Towns Ministry of the Environment and Forest Ministry of Post and Telecommunications Ministry of Public Service and Administration Reform Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries Ministry of Transport Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research Ministry of Mines, Water Resources and Power Services attached to the Presidency of the Republic Ministry of Communications Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Insurance Ministry of Womens Affairs Ministry of Culture Ministry of Tourism Supreme Court The Ministry of Supreme State Audit Economic and Social Council TOTAL % Total Budget 22.29 14.18 7.08 6.44 5.08 4.71 3.90 3.58 3.41 3.05 3.02 2.80 2.15 1.81 1.43 1.28 1.27 1.03 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.85 0.82 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.62 0.55 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.37 0.27 0.20 0.12 100.00

Source: La rpartition de lenveloppe budgetaire 2004, Cameroon Tribune, December 11, 2003.

20 Funding shortfalls have forced MINCOF to seek funding from alternate sources, primarily foreign funding agencies. The fact that MINCOF is able to gain external funding also allows the government to under fund it. In the past, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided funding as part of its Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme.44 Other bilateral sources like the lAmbassade de France au Cameroun have provided significant support to MINCOF.45 Recently, MINCOF received nearly 800 million FCFA from two sourcesla Fondation pour le Renforcement des Capacit en Afrique (ACBF) and le Collectif des Organisations de Promotion des Femmes du Cameroun (COFEF)in 2003 to support a project that aims to reinforce the capacity of womens networks in Cameroon.46 While merely illustrative, these donations place the states budget allocation in perspective, demonstrating just how far state budgetary allocations fall short of covering MINCOFs expenses as well as the extent to which external funding supports the work of the ministry. The lack of adequate funding has led to a number of technical problems. MINCOF offices, particularly the provincial, divisional, and sub-divisional delegations, severely lack human and material resources. Operational costssalaries for MINCOF employees, money to pay rent, to repair buildings, or to pay utilitiesare the very costs that external funding agencies are the least likely to cover. When MINCOF personnel leave or retire, positions remain unfilled for months or even years.47 In addition, MINCOF staff members sometimes wear two or more

44 45

Byrne and Koch Laier, 1996, 60.

lAmbassade de France au Cameroun gave 300,000,000 FCFA over 36 months between 2000 and 2003 to the Ministry of Womens Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs to support social development. See http://www.ambafrance-cm.org/html/camfra/actions/coops/social/social1.htm. See 800 Millions pour la Promotion de la Femme, Cameroon Tribune, January 12, 2004.

46 47

For example, describing MINCOFs presence in the province, a staff member in the Northwest Provincial office noted that there were four chiefs of service in the provincial office but only three of the four positions were currently filled. He also indicated that only four of seven divisions currently had divisional delegates. Personal interview, Bamenda, February 20, 2002.

21 hats, serving, for example, as both a divisional and sub-divisional delegate. Offices lack material resources like computers, documents, and vehicles, which would enable staff members to do their jobs more effectively.48 Moreover, MINCOF personnel frequently possess insufficient expertise in gender and womens issues. MINCOF has acknowledged as much, organizing a three-day conference in February 2003 that brought together personnel from the central Ministry, provincial delegations, and womens promotion centers. At the conference, the participants were acquainted with their various functions and receive[d] lectures on governments policy in the domain of womens promotion with relation to good governance, fight against corruption, poverty, and HIV/AIDS.49 The workshops goal was to reinvigorate the Ministry and to give a new impulse to MINCOF services.50 Inadequate gender training among MINCOF personnel points to a lack of coordination among the various arms of the national machinery. The Womens and Gender Studies (WGS) program at the University of Buea, for example, could serve both as a source of qualified personnel and as a mechanism for training existing employees. Many ministries in Cameroon have specialized training programs that seek to build the capacity of civil servants; some even have special schools. MINCOF lacks these sorts of training programs and has hired few WGS graduates.

48 49

To be sure, civil servants in other departments face similar challenges.

MINCOF: Women to Get VIP Treatment, Cameroon Tribune, February 18, 2002. See also La Condition fminine se modernise, Cameroon Tribune, February 21, 2003.
50

Ibid.

22 Moreover, Ministry personnel recognize that a lot is yet to be done.51 MINCOF personnel tend to emphasize insufficient resources as the primary obstacle blocking MINCOF from fulfilling its mandate. Speaking at the Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-first Century in New York in June 2000, Julienne Ngo Som, the Minister of Womens Affairs from March 2000 to April 2001, stated that the major obstacle encountered by my government in the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action has been the lack of financial resources.52 MINCOFs Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy of January 2002 echoed this complaint. It highlighted a shortage of human, material, information and financial resources by the external services and a highly insufficient state budget allocation.53 Insufficient funding, however, is symptomatic of a larger problemthe states lack of a commitment to creating a strong, effective national policy machinery. The political will needed to make MINCOF effective is absent in Cameroon. Politicians give lip service to womens and gender issues, especially during political campaigns, but they fail to follow through on these rhetorical commitments and rarely back up their speeches with money and action. The statecontrolled media (e.g. CRTV and the Cameroon Tribune) are powerful tools that propagateand rarely challengethese claims. Many MINCOF personnel are highly committed to their work and sincerely attempt to improve womens life conditions in Cameroon. Despite their commitment, political obstacles, frequently emanating from other state agencies and actors, impede their ability to realize this goal.

Statement by H.E. Julienne Ngo Som, Minister of Womens Affairs, Head of the Cameroonian Delegation to the 23rd Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century held in New York in June 9, 2000. See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ daw/followup/beijing+5stat/statments/cameroon9.htm.
52 53

51

Ibid.

Ministry of Womens Affairs, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy: Working Document for the National Validation Workshop, January 2002, A23.

23

The Consultative Committee for the Promotion of Women54

Created in the same year as MINCOF, the mission of the Consultative Committee for the Promotion of Women is to: (a) study any matter relating to the status or condition of the Cameroonian woman; (b) give opinion on draft instruments relating to womens advancement which are forwarded to the Ministry; and (c) propose any action aimed at ensuring optimum participation of women in the development effort.55 Appointed by decree, members of the Committee include representatives of ministries, trade unions, the National Assembly, and political parties. The Committee has been wholly ineffective. After 12 years, it had met only three times and had made little tangible progress towards accomplishing its objectives. Commenting on the Committees weaknesses in 1997, MINASCOF noted: The reduction of the budget of MINASCOF, the absence of a permanent secretariat and the lack of autonomy vis--vis the ministry have not permitted [the Committee] to evolve normally.56 The same document noted that a project to revitalize [the Committee] is under way.57 At the 23rd Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in June 2000, Minister Ngo Som noted in response to questions about the Committee that it worked in close consultation

54

This body le Comit Consultatif pour le Promotion de la Femme has also been translated as the National Advisory Board for the Advancement of Cameroon Women. See Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations, Directory of National Machinery for the Advancement of Women, 1993, 28. Decree no. 84/324 of May 23, 1984 established the Committee. See MINASCOF 1997, 240. United Nations, Press Release, CEDAW, 23rd Session, 483rd Meeting, June 26, 2000, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/4CFE43B7B3F4D10DC125690B002978BE?opendocument. Ibid.

55 56

57

24 with the Ministry.58 At the session, Ngo Som acknowledged that after just three meetings the Commission no longer met but indicated that it would become active again soon. Four years later, the Committee is moribund. The overlapping mandates of MINCOF and the Committee did not facilitate positive interactions between the institutions. The Committees lack of resourceshuman, financial, and materialand its subordination to MINCOF meant that it was fighting a losing battle with the ministry. By withholding funding and refusing to provide the Committee with office space and other necessary materials, MINCOF easily emasculated the Committee. One woman involved in the Committee noted that the then Minister of Womens Affairs, Yaou Aissatou, did not make funds available to the Committee and did not provide office space for it to work or meet.59 These frictions are not unique to Cameroon. Conflict between rival state agencies charged with the advancement of women occurs in other African states as well. In Nigeria, for example, power struggles between the national machinery and organizations run by the first ladies marred the work of national machinery.60 Amina Mama found that decades of high profile first lady programmes for women led to instrumentalism and in some cases opportunism among groups.61 Indeed, certain womens organizations were established solely to enjoy such benefits. Writing during Abachas military regime, Mama noted: today, womens organisations are more likely to be paying courtesy calls on the wives of military administrators than taking to the streets.62 Across the continent, first ladies establish and support their pet NGOs, many of
58 59 60

United Nations, Press Release, June 26, 2000, 23rd Session of CEDAW, 2. Personal interview, Limbe, April 10, 2002.

See Dzodzi Tsikatas Lip-service and Peanuts: The State and National Machinery for Women in Africa, National Machinery Series No. 11, Accra: TWNAfrica, 2000. Ibid, 23-24.

61 62

Mama cited in Ibid., 24. See also Amina Mama, Feminism and the State in Nigeria: The National Machinery for Women, National Machinery Series No. 4, Accra: TWNAfrica, 2000.

25 which undermine the effectiveness of official state institutions by diverting funding and attention towards the NGOs and away from the womens machinery. Similar power struggles are visible in Cameroon not only between MINCOF and the Consultative Committee for the Promotion of Women but also between MINCOF and Chantal Biyas Circle of Friends of Cameroon [Cercle des amis du Cameroun] (CERAC). CERAC is a philanthropic organization that addresses issues like poverty, HIV/AIDS, health care, and education. Targeting underprivileged groups, it finances social welfare programs and distributes goods like farm implements, food, and clothing to citizens. CERAC has won the hearts of women because of its better financial standing than MINCOF.63 In addition, the presence and support of Chantal Biya draws media attention to CERACs activities, which are widely covered by CRTV and the Cameroon Tribune.64 The organization also draws on presidential resources (e.g. vehicles and staff) in ways that MINCOF cannot. Discussing CERAC, the SDF, admittedly not an unbiased source, observed: When CERAC comes, the long lines of vehicles of all makes virtually all belong to the state; and the civil servants, ministers and other politicians who come around are paid from the state treasury. Who says that the gifts of CERAC are not also bought with tax payers money?65 In short, CERAC, a quasi-state agency that targets women, outshines MINCOF. The existence of multiple organizations that compete rather than collaborate sacrifices the effectiveness of the national machinery for political gains. By creating MINCOF and the Consultative Committee simultaneously, the Cameroonian state may have consciously pursued a strategy of divide and conquer, heightening tensions
63 64

Personal communication, March 18, 2004.

A quick search of the online version of the Cameroon Tribune revealed that in the past two years the paper published 115 articles on CERAC compared with 53 articles on MINCOF. An additional 93 articles cover La Fondation Chantal Biya, another philanthropic organization led by the First Lady. Cameroon Tribune, searched on June 15, 2004, http://www.cameroon-tribune.cm. SDF, Expression Direct of the SDF 18-19 May 2000, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/releases/205.php.

65

26 between the two institutions. Yaou Aissatou, a Francophone from the north headed MINCOF, and later MINASCOF, while Gwendoline Burnley, an Anglophone from the Southwest, led the Consultative Committee. Personal differences in priorities and perspectives exacerbated the already existing institutional tensions. At the very least, the state lacked the political will to establish an effective advisory body. It created the Committee as a hollow institution without any real power to influence policy. Lacking resources and infrastructure, it should be no surprise that the Committee failed.

Party Gender Quotas

Scholars and activists have devoted significant attention to the role that gender quotas, reserved seats, and other affirmative action measures play in increasing womens participation in decision-making spheres. The Cameroonian state has yet to implement any affirmative action measures targeting women. The two leading political partiesthe Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) and the Social Democratic Front (SDF)have, however, set intra-party gender quotas, although neither party has yet to enforce them.66 The CPDM announced support for affirmative action measures in favor of women in 1996. At its Second Ordinary Congress in Yaound in December 1996, the party took two steps toward achieving greater gender balance within the decision-making organs of the partyit increased the number of women on the Central Committee and announced a 30 percent gender
66

Though these policies are not state policies but rather ones established by political parties, I include them in my discussion of Cameroons national machinery since affirmative action measures are frequently an important component of state feminist initiatives. Hernes notes, for example: State feminism has often been identified with the use of quota systems, and especially with rules of positive discrimination in hiring. See Hernes, Welfare State and Woman Power, 1987, 24. Moreover, in Cameroon, the line between the ruling party and the state itself is frequently blurred. One could make the argument that party policies, in the case of the CPDM, are in fact state policies.

27 quota that would be enforced in future elections.67 Describing these decisions, Alice Mungwa writes: In the heat of impending parliamentary and presidential elections, the number of women represented in the partys Central Committee was raised to 20, while a thirty percent quota was announced for female candidacies in future elections.68 Mungwa links the CPDMs commitment to gender equity to the uncertain political context. As elections loomed, the CPDM gave lip service to gender equity within the party. While gender quotas lack grassroots support, they are popular with certain segments of the population, namely some womens activists and female members of political parties. Once the elections passed, however, the party weakened its commitment to affirmative action measures. In fact, it has never fully implemented the 30 percent gender quota. Recently, party documents tend to discuss gender equity in general terms, noting merely that electoral lists should include traditionally under-represented constituencies like women and youth. The Modalits de slection et d'investiture des candidats drawn up for the 2002 municipal and parliamentary elections, states, for example, that CPDM electoral lists must accord a just attention to women and to youth.69 It gives no indication of what just attention constitutes. Not to be outdone, the SDF responded to the CPDMs quota with its own intra-party gender quota of 25 percent. The May 1990 SDF Manifesto noted: The SDF shall ensure the equality of Women in society. It shall ensure their full involvement and participation in all aspects of national life. The SDF shall enable women in rural areas to have greater access to agricultural credits. It shall ensure a wider literacy rate among women and further ensure that
67

Alice Aghenebit Mungwa, The Mandatory Nature of Affirmative Action for Womens Political Rights in Cameroon, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Nashville, November 1999, 14-15. Ibid, 14.

68 69

RDPC/CPDM, Modalits de slection et d'investiture des candidats, http://www.rdpcpdm.cm/rdpc_inf/index.htm.

28 many more women assume greater responsibilities in policy-making in politics, administration, banking and finance.70 At the Fifth Ordinary National Convention of the SDF held in Yaound in April 1999, the party resolved to create a quota of at least 25 percent for Women in all organs of the Party.71 While this resolution and the one listed on the Socialist International web site indicate that the SDFs 25 percent gender quota applies only to party structures, other SDF documents imply that the quota encompasses nominations for elections as well.72 The Conditions on National Elections in the SDF, which was adopted by the National Executive Committee in June 2001, explicitly recognizes gender quotas for women. Article II states: For all list elections (Municipals/Legislative) the party officials at the base must respect the quota allocated to women. The National Investiture Committee should make sure that the quota for women is respected.73 While the document does not stipulate the exact quota, it indicates that the quota pertains to list elections as well as positions within the party. Moreover, the SDF led donors to believe that it would implement gender quotas in the 2002 municipal and legislative elections. Although it has moved away from programs that specifically target women, the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FEF), which works with the SDF,

70 71

Manifesto of the Social Democratic Front, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/references/17.php.

SDF, Resolutions: Fifth Ordinary National Convention of the Social Democratic Front, Yaound, 16th to 20th April 1999, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/resolutions/194.php. The document goes on to say that the SDF Enjoins the National Executive Committee to ensure through this quota system that women are well represented at all levels of the Party and in all Partys decision-making bodies. It also Enjoins the National Executive Committee to use informal and formal meetings, training, seminars, conferences and social events to give support, encouragement, confidence skills to women in the Party to permit them to play their full role and have their voices heard within the mainstream of the Party.
72

The Socialist International supports gender quotas, and the SDF is a member of the organization. The Socialist International indicates that the SDF has a 25 percent gender quota for party structures only. See Socialist International, http://www.socintwomen.org.uk/QUOTA/QUOTAEng1.html. SDF, Conditions on National Elections in the SDF, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/references/287.php. See also Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Sminaire sur Femmes et Elections Lgislative 2002, Mbalmayo, June 16-20 2001, Yaound: Strategies, 18.

73

29 organized a series of workshops to increase the efficacy of female political candidates.74 Discussing the outcome of the workshops, a FEF program officer noted that the Foundation spent 100 million FCFA to train women to be political leaders but it hasnt been successful. She indicated that the SDF applied gender quotas in the reorganization process, rejecting lists that did not include a sufficient number of women. This led the FEF to believe that the SDF would enforce the quotas during the 2002 elections, but the party failed to do so. Like the CPDM, the SDFs commitment to gender quotas has wavered. In the past, the SDF sought to gain the support of women and to be viewed as the party that truly supports gender equality. It challenged the existing political system, including discriminatory gender relations embedded within it. Unlike the majority of political parties in Cameroon, it did not establish a separate womens wing, arguing that women should participate in the central party structure. Yet, it does not want to be bound by gender quotas when fighting tight electoral competitions. A high-level, female member of the SDF reflected this ambivalence. She stated: [In] every election everyone is encouraged to run for positions they think they can occupy. Gender quotas are a good way to increase womens participation, [but we] want to feel that men should not say that position is for the women. [We] should be given positions because we merit them not because were women. [We] should prove we can do the job.75 The respondent was torn over the issue of gender quotas. On one hand, she believed that they would quickly increase the number of women in party and elected positions. On the other hand, she feared that quotas would devalue the position of women in the party, as female political leaders would be seen as the beneficiaries of quotas rather than as meriting their spots in leadership roles.

74

These and other training programs are discussed in greater detail in chapter eight. The workshops addressed issues such as how to develop a campaign platform, raise money, and speak effectively in public. Personal interview, Limbe, April 19, 2002.

75

30 The SDF, like other political parties, tends to nominate women in constituencies where they are unlikely to win. In the 1997 election, the SDF won 45 seats in parliament, a woman occupied just one of these seats. The SDF dominates the Northwest province: it swept all 20 parliamentary seats in the 1997 elections and won 19 out of 20 seats in the 2002 legislative elections. Yet, the SDF nominated no female candidates there. In contrast, women were better represented on lists in other regions, where they were far less likely to win.76 Thus, women tend to be nominated in constituencies where they are expected to lose, while men retain the positions with real power for themselves. This strategy is not a particularly effective one, since the party fails to deliverer additional seats to women. Yet, the lack of an alternativeno party has carried through on its commitment to increase womens representationmeans that the SDF does not come out looking all that bad. Despite support for gender quotas among certain activists and party militants, the general population is ambivalent toward the issue of quotas, questioning whether they will actually promote womens interests.77 More women in parliament may not translate into better policies for women. Women who win their partys nomination are generally handpicked for their party loyalty. Once in office, they face pressure to toe the party line. In sum, both CPDM and the SDF have expressed a commitment to gender quotas; yet, neither party has implemented them. The fact that neither the CPDM nor the SDF has held true to its promises of greater gender equity creates a mutually beneficial stalemate. Both can continue to call themselves the party most committed to women, but neither needs to follow through on these verbal commitments. They have appropriated global discourses to legitimate

See Cameroon Tribune, Elections Lgislatives et Muncipales du 23 Juin 2002: Listes Compltes des Candidats de tous les Partis Politiques en Comptition, June 12, 2002,
77

76

Chapter eight provides a more detailed analysis of campaigns to increase womens representation in Cameroon and their shortfalls.

31 their policies and to win the support of Cameroonian women. The lack of a strong, autonomous womens movement means that parties face little accountability.

Womens Parliamentary Caucus

In 1992, in the first multi-party National Assembly since 1966, female parliamentarians established an Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians, informally referred to as the Womens Caucus. The Caucus sought to bring together female Members of Parliament (MPs) across party lines to support policies that would advance the status of women. From 1992 to 1997, 16 representatives of the CPDM and 7 members of the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP) participated in the Caucus. In June 1994, the Womens Caucus jointly organized with UNICEF a Seminar of Women Parliamentarians on the Family, which brought together MPs from the four parties represented in parliament to discuss the Draft Family Code. Representatives of the Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians participated in numerous regional and international conferences. These include the First Pan-African Conference of African Women Parliamentarians in Burkina Faso in February 1994, the African Regional Conference on Women in Senegal in November 1994, the Regional Conference of African Women Ministers and Parliamentarians in Burkina Faso in July 1995, and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995.78 In June 1997, the Womens Caucus published Profiles of Women Parliamentarians, which provides bibliographic information on all female MPs since Cameroons independence.

78

See Livre dOr des Femmes Parlementaires: Les Femmes Camerounaises au Parlement Bilan et Perspectives/Profiles of Women Parliamentarians: Cameroon Women in Parliament Achievements and Perspectives, Yaound, April 1997, 103-113.

32 The Womens Caucus was active throughout the 1992-1997 legislature. After the 1997 parliamentary elections, however, the Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians quickly fell apart. Between 1997 and 2002, women comprised just 10 out of the 180 MPs, compared to 23 out of 180 in the previous National Assembly. Moreover, nine out of the ten female MPs elected in 1997 were members of the ruling CPDM. Only one female MP was a member of the opposition, Victoria Tomedi Ndando of the SDF. The declining number of female representatives and the fact that the female MPs overwhelmingly represented the same political party partially account for the demise of the Womens Caucus. In addition, the CPDM and NUDP arguably enjoyed friendlier relations after the 1992 elections than the CPDM and SDF did after the 1997 elections. In fact, in December 1997, the leader of the NUDP, Bello Bouba Maigari, cut a deal with the CPDM, earning himself an appointment as Minister for Industrial and Commercial Development and two additional ministerial positions for NUDP stalwarts. The SDF, in contrast, maintained a critical stance toward the government, making collaboration between the two parties all the more difficult. Still, the changing composition of parliament cannot fully account for the failure of the Womens Caucus. One female MP noted that the [Womens Caucus] started during the first year of last legislature. [It] didnt work out. [It] wasnt long lasting.79 Although she was reluctant to discuss the demise of the organization, she indicated that male MPs wanted to know what the women were talking about and were not receptive to the Caucus. Another female parliamentarian stated that in the 1992-1997 parliament, women tried to create an inter-party group to think about womens common problems. After 1997, it was no longer an initiative. The goal was to create common strategies. We produced the book, organized a training seminar on

79

Personal interview, Limbe, April 19, 2002.

33 rights of the family. Describing why it fell apart after 1997, she noted: It is the men. The women in 1992-1997 wanted to go. The men refused them, but they still went. In 1997, men refused again and women were not worthy. When the men barred their path, [they] didnt protest. These women lacked the daring, audacity, courage to say no to these men. [They] were not conscious of women as a marginalized group.80 These statements indicate that the failure of the Womens Caucus was not simply a result of the changing composition of the National Assembly. Male MPs felt threatened by the organization and sought to eliminate it. It was political obstacles rather than technical difficulties that ultimately led to the demise of the Womens Caucus.

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Why did the state create the womens machinery? It did so in part as a response to international pressure to do so. This pressure came not in the form of coercive threats, but rather in the form of international norms that indicate how states should respond to womens and gender issues. International organizations like the United Nations have called on states to establish womens machinery and other institutional mechanisms to promote womens advancement and eliminate gender inequities. But self-interest also influenced Cameroons decision to create a national womens machinery. Like other states in the developing world, Cameroon stood to benefit from its compliance with global norms. It gained recognition as a good state that supported womens and gender issues and enabled Cameroon to obtain international funding for MINCOF and

80

Personal interview, Yaound, June 6, 2002.

34 MINASCOF programs. This was a particularly important development in the early 1990s as many funding agencies directed their attention to empowering civil societal actors to counteract corrupt and undemocratic states. In this environment, it was important that the state find ways to attract external resources into state coffers. This revenue is important because it assists in the maintenance and extension of patronage networks. The womens machinerys legitimacy among grassroots populations is linked to its ability to deliver goods to local womens associations. By distributing farm tools, small machinery, and other goods to registered groups, the state creates incentives for cooperation and bolsters its support among grassroots organizations. The creation of a national womens machinery has also helped the state to assert control over the increasingly diverse field of womens activism. In particular, the re-establishment of a separate and revitalized Ministry of Womens Affairs in 1997 reflected the states desire to regain control over the field of womens activism. It has done this through setting policy priorities and establishing a partnership initiative that seeks to create formal linkages between MINCOF and societal groups working on womens and gender issues. The fact that ministries in Cameroon are the primary source of legislation and policy means that societal groups working in this field need access to MINCOF to have their voices heard. In this case, then, the norm in favor of the creation of national machinery for the advancement of women has served to strengthen the state, reinforcing its power over societal groups.