Citizenship and Home: Political Allegiance and its Background

Arpad Szakolczai

Abstract
Today it is widely considered as self-evident that belonging to a political community is basically a matter of citizenship. In this literature, informed both by liberal and social democratic politics and political theory, citizenship is often opposed to nationality, and is considered as the stepping-stone towards membership in a global, cosmopolitan community. However, it is highly dubious that in itself citizenship, a weak form of identity (Pizzorno), and increasingly a predominantly legalistic construct, can serve as the basis of a meaningful political unit. In contrast to this literature, and taking some cues from the works of Michel Foucault and Eric Voegelin, this paper argues that a more stable political allegiance must be built up from below, based on the experience of the home. In its theoretical part the paper contrasts the perspectives of Martin Heidegger and Colin Turnbull concerning this experience, while in its second, empirical part it illustrates the argument using a few examples from the East Central European experience, where during the communist period this experience was destroyed at its roots. Keywords: Home, Experience, Spirituality, Warfare, East Central Europe

Introduction
In the 1970s, when trying to pin down the specific character of his approach to power, Michel Foucault repeatedly set power in opposition to an economic or legal perspective (e.g., Foucault, 1980a, 1980b). This created some perplexity, as it was not exactly clear what would establish this identity between the economic and the legal. However, looking backward, and having the discourse on citizenship in mind, one could argue that Foucault proved prophetic even in this respect, as power is indeed dominated by legal and socio-economic considerations: by the question of social citizenship, formulated in classic form by T. H. Marshall, and by questions of normative political theory and legal philosophy, as contained in the works of John Rawls and especially Jrgen Habermas. In opposition to this legalistic perspective, this paper will sketch the outlines of a sociological perspective on citizenship based on the works of Norbert Elias, Foucault and other thinkers who could be called Weberian reflexive historical sociologists,1 and on the approach developed for the study of collective identities by Alessandro Pizzorno (1986, 1987, 1991).2 It will consider the acquisition of citizenship as one aspect of the long-term historical process that was called subjectivation by Foucault and the civilizing process by Elias. According to this perspective, citizenship considered a weak form of identity by Pizzorno (1991: 224) is not simply a matter of legal definition but involves the actual forming and shaping of a special type of subjectivity; a sense of identity based on certain practices and the conduct of life derived from them. Furthermore, insofar as it involves the actual formation and transformation of the self, there is also a spiritual component. In the terminology of Foucault, the question of citizenship touches upon the issue of political spirituality.

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A Theoretical Framework
1. The problem of legal discourse The point made by Foucault, referred to above, of course, has nothing to do with a criticism of the Law, whatever that may mean. It rather concerns the applicability of a certain type of legalistic thinking, as an intellectual mentality, for the interpretive understanding of ongoing social processes. In this respect, it is quite relevant to point out that the discipline of sociology emerged, not against law or legal philosophy, but based on the recognition that there is need for a language that would go beyond the limits of a legal framework. It was this recognition that motivated the entire life-projects of Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte since the start; and it is furthermore worthwhile remarking that Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber all turned their backs to a legal or legal-philosophical career in search of an approach better suited to the understanding of their contemporary world. It was this search that led to the establishment of sociology as we know it. In this context, the work of Habermas, especially his spectacular turn away from sociology and towards legal philosophy, is of particular significance. Habermas became perhaps the single most important theoretical inspiration behind the literature on citizenship, while in a broader sense he is also representative of the kind of legal approach to social power Foucault singled out for critical attention. The clear and basic contrast between the two thinkers in this regard is thus helpful to clarify the issue concerning the compatibility or incompatibility of their projects.3 But the issue at stake is not a simple either/or choice. The dilemma can be clearly mapped and argued. The first point to notice is that Habermass turn to legal thought is a re-turn, a reversal, from sociologically-based to legally-based thinking. This return, furthermore, is not simply a dialectical, reflexive revisitation of earlier concerns, in light of the experience gained from the new perspective, but a quite decisive questioning of the relevance of the entire sociological undertaking. Habermas takes up exactly the kind of legal perspective and thinking against which sociology emerged in the works of all of its classic figures, and as a solution.4 This modality of his return to law as the basic means for understanding social reality has some further special characteristics. It fits into a series of similar reversals, like the reversal of the old Frankfurt school from Marx to Hegel, from empirical and historical analysis to mere philosophising; the reversal from socialism to liberalism; or the kind of grotesque history turned into a backward gear that was characteristic of the dismantling of communism (Sakwa, 2002). In all these reversals, intellectual or political, the common element was the fact that once it was recognised that Marxism, Leninism, or socialism did not provide the answer, there began a desperate backward slide in history in the moment in which things went wrong, as if the lost red thread could be picked up again, or the train of history rejoined once the station was found in which the proper connection had simply been missed. With the dismissal of the false solutions, it seemed as if the genuineness of the problems had also vanished, while at the same time the most questionable aspect of the intellectual mentality that produced the catastrophic answers, the search for a universally applicable intellectual blueprint, was simply reasserted under new forms.5 In this sense, the reversal from sociology to law was all the more unfortunate as, in opposition to Marxist socialism, sociology still had things to offer, especially as a way of criticising this very underlying intellectual attitude. In fact, the entire thrust of Max Webers
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work was deployed against the stance of intellectuals and academics who, instead of taking up directly political or social careers, abused their cathedra for pursuing political or moralising aims. Webers polemics against academic prophets could be applied, ceteris paribus, against intellectual lawgivers.6 In this respect, as in many others, the step from Weber to Foucault is quite small, as Foucault several times singled out this intellectual attitude as deeply objectionable, and as the opposite of what he stood for.7 With this intellectual attitude, having the problem of the right constitution at its centre, Habermas also returned, now in a Jungian sense, to the archetypal figure of this entire line of intellectual investigation. This is Hegel, with the attempt to build up a closed intellectual system, a discourse solving all the problems of the world, which is the hubristic ego of an intellectual fancying himself as logos itself, the very word of God.8 If one can argue, again with Foucault, that modern philosophy can be understood as a series of attempts to escape Hegel,9 then one of the most important common elements of this dissent no doubt concerns a certain reflexive or rather self-reflexive turn of thought (or of academic-intellectual activity) recognising its own limits, and the necessary modesty and humility it entails. It is this modesty that can be captured in the forceful attacks of Kierkegaard against the Hegelian system and in the return to the existential tensions of the single human being; in Husserl on the life-world and Heidegger on background practices; in Wittgenstein (and Austin) on ordinary language; in Foucault on the death of author, the problem of reflexivity: or in Eric Voegelins idea that we always start in the middle, just to mention a few. The return of Habermas, even here, means a pure reassertion of the old Hegelian position of the academic priest, without taking serious heed of any of the later dissents. The sociological perspective on citizenship to be suggested in this paper will therefore take as its starting point the thought of some of these main dissenters and critiques of Hegel. It will, however, turn into a direction that few if any of them took, by arguing for the centrality of the experience of home for (reflexive) political sociology. The introduction of the term, however, requires some further work of conceptual clarification. This will focus on the concern with background practices. 2. The Background: Heideggers being in the world The reassertion of the importance of latent or hidden background practices, discursive and non-discursive, that are simply taken for granted both in ordinary everyday life and in explicit scientific investigation and concept formation, is one of the single most important concerns in the thought of the century. It is present, apart from the work of the thinkers already listed above, in Alfred Schutzs concern with the taken for granted, taken up by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann; in the frame analysis of Erving Goffman and Gregory Bateson; or in the work of John Searle (1992) on the background, just to mention a few further examples. This way of thinking had to overcome considerable intellectual resistance in the past, as it goes against the grain of both Lockean empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, neoKantian transcendentals and neo-Hegelian systems, or the concern with proposition by Rudolf Carnap and with falsification by Karl Popper.10 However, while it has often been labelled a continental way of philosophising and a minority concern in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical world, it is of some interest that a recent poll of American philosophers put the two perhaps most important documents of this continental orientation, Wittgensteins
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Logical Investigations and Heideggers Being and Time, as the two runaway most influential philosophical books of the century (Lackey, 1999). Heideggers work can be considered as a milestone for our theme as it put not simply inter-subjectivity, the life-world or linguistic games, but the entire taken for granted existence as mans being in the world (Dreyfus, 1991), into the centre of philosophical investigation. Furthermore, though partially only continuing the work of Husserl, he has also been perhaps the single most important direct source of influence on a great number of the other main protagonists of this work of intellectual re-orientation, like Gadamer, Foucault, or Patoka (see Dreyfus, 1991: 9). However, paradoxically, at the heart of his actual formulation, there is a profoundly problematic left-over of the very mentality his thought attempted to render problematic. One could argue that Heidegger overcame the separation of the object and the subject, but only to replace it with the even deeper and even more problematic duality of man and the world. This is best visible in two major existentials (Heideggers term replacing categories; see Dreyfus, 1991, 40) of the work, thrownness (Geworfenheit) and unsettledness (Unheimlichkeit). The two main discussions of thrownness are situated at strategic positions in the work, at the beginning and the end of Chapter 5 on Being-In, concerned with the existential constitution and the everyday being of the there (Da) of Dasein. In the first instance, thrownness is defined as the unveiled disclosure of the character of Daseins being (unverhllter erschlossener Seinscharacter des Daseins) (1977: 180), intended to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over (1967: 174).11 This leads to a discussion of fleeing (Flucht). In the second instance, thrownness is linked to fallenness (Verfallen). In fallenness, it is a basic mode of being of everydayness that is revealed (1977: 233). Though Heidegger states that no negative evaluation ought to be expressed here and fallenness should not be conceived of as a fall, this qualification is hardly tenable. Here we have to opt for Wittgenstein against Heidegger: words do have their everyday meaning, and its explicit neglect only promotes confusion. In this case, the qualification is all the less acceptable as Heidegger soon connects fallenness to alienation (1967: 222), and then to thrownness that renders visible the facticity of Dasein. The discussion of unsettledness is contained in the first substantive paragraph of the next chapter on care, the last chapter of Division I. Here Heidegger first alludes back to the discussion of the first pages of the first substantive chapter of the book, on the basic makeup or set-up (Grundverfassung) of Dasein. There the argument seems different, emphasising that Being-In implies familiarity, a dwelling in the world (1967: 80).12 However, at the start of Chapter 6, this sense of familiarity is revealed as a mirage. The real character of Dasein is revealed through the basic disposition or affectedness (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety. Anxiety follows falling and fleeing. It is not caused by a concrete threat that emerges here or there. It is rather the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety (1967: 231, emphasis in original). Even further, anxiety isolates and thus discloses Dasein as solus ipse (1977: 250). The basic disposition or affectedness thus revealed is the unsettledness of Dasein, or the fact that one is not at home in the world (Un-zuhause) (1977: 251). The concluding sentences of this line of argument are quite blunt: That kind of being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mode of Daseins unsettledness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the not-at-home must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon (1967: 234, emphasis in original). In this way, Heidegger completes an entire revaluation of values: instead of starting from a world based on home and familiarity with the actual or potential threat of its dissolution, we start from isolation, anxiety and homeless60

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ness as being at the real centre of human existence, out of which, through the work of care, it is possible to secure for ourselves a small clearing or retreat.13 The common element fundamental to both thrownness and fallenness is a negative valorisation of the underlying tone of our existence, implying that we are not really at home here. In other words, and following here Voegelin (1968), in this existentialist stance opposing man (or the spirit) to the world where he does not feel at home, Heidegger was returning to Gnostic imagery. Indeed, Heideggers story can be put almost perfectly into the language of the ancient Gnostic psycho-dramas. According to these, creation was the work of an evil demiurge, as it represented the enclosing of the spirit into the prison of matter of the body. For the spirit, therefore, living in the world into which it was thrown represents a fall, where he can never be at home. Salvation means the fleeing of this world, which, however, can only be accomplished by those select few in whom the spirit, through the gaining of true knowledge, recognises its own true nature its fundamental alienness in the world.14 In one sense, this result is deeply paradoxical. Following Heidegger, we started by a search for the fundamental background practices of human culture that underlie mere legal concerns. There we found an even more basic, and more questionable, separation than the previous legalistic separation of the object and subject. However, the result is less surprising than it seems. This can be seen through a further step in reflexivity, or meta-reflexivity. The reflexive line of questioning, applied by philosophical hermeneutics against the legalism of transcendental philosophy, should be applied to its own conditions of emergence. If the limits of the intellectual attitude underlining philosophical legalism are shown by its overlooking of the taken for granted, then the limits of Heideggerian hermeneutics lie in the specificity of the experience of the loss of the taken for granted, which is necessary for becoming visible through the work of the philosopher. Thus, whatever rendered it possible for some thinkers to gain an in-depth insight into the basic background practices of human experience also ensures that they will fundamentally mis-recognise this experience, unless they are aware of this pitfall and refrain from positing their own experience as universal. This paper suggests that this shortcoming can be alleviated by a two-fold restorative operation. First of all, the singularity of the underlying perspective, from which the taken for granted becomes visible, should be reasserted and analysed on its own right as an event in history and in biography. The biographical level is concerned with the evolution of the own being and thought of the particular thinker concerned. The task of the historical part of the investigation is to identify those periods of history when the taken for granted order has collapsed for a broad range of people, and with lasting effects. In this way, the existential mood underlying the thought of Heidegger and other existential thinkers becomes (sociologically and experientially) historicised. Once this specific kind of subject position, that successfully deconstructed the alleged universals of neo-Kantian transcendentalism or Husserlian phenomenology, has been historicised on its own, it is possible to solve in the spirit of the direction of Husserl and Heidegger but against their actual word and work the task of the secure foundation of a genuinely universal and fully valorised background position. This can be done, following here Wittgenstein against Heidegger, not by the invention of an elaborate new category, but by the intellectual valorisation of one of the simplest words of common language the term home. Given the fundamental importance of home for human life, its almost complete absence from social and political thought is quite surprising indeed. This may be due to the central concern of political philosophy, going back to Plato and Aristotle, with the com61

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munity that goes beyond the family, which is the polis though even there, the reason why it would imply a denial of the very relevance of the older or smaller concept is not selfevident.15 Even further, one could argue that the neglect of the importance of home merely reflects the conditions of possibility of major innovations of thought: situations in the sense of Gadamer (1975) and Jaspers (1951) in which the taken for granted order has collapsed and where individuals, especially those most sensitive intellectually and spiritually, and in the most profound sense, have lost their home. Thought, spirituality, reflexivity is stimulated by moments of crisis (see V. Turner, 1967, 1969) but thought should not forget about its secondary character in situations where order is (still) intact. The background of thought is indeed non-thinking, the background of speech is silence, but this does not necessarily hide ignorance, repression, or stupidity. It may simply mean that things are indeed fine, and one feels happy and at home in the world. The terms used for home in many languages give an important first clarification concerning the experience of being home. Whether one takes English, French, German, Italian, or even Russian or Hungarian, home is always directly associated with house. In the terminology of Heidegger, this is a place in which someone dwells. This has considerable political relevance, especially with respect to citizenship. Citizenship is not simply about political activity, or even political participation in its contemporary sense, but political allegiance, or participation in a broader entity. It can help to explain, beyond the incomprehension and angry charges characteristic of so many intellectuals, the phenomenon of nationalism, which became so successful and seemingly almost ineradicable as it is indeed based on roots, the valorisation of the nation-state as a home, which cannot be countered by a cosmopolitan valorisation of the entire world as a home. In fact, the close links between the natural position of being at home and citizenship is granted even in the legal procedures and terminology surrounding the granting of citizenship in the fact that citizenship is acquired as a birth-right, being linked to ones parents but also to the place where one is born; or in the labelling of the acquisition of citizenship as naturalisation. These considerations help to bring forward a further, once again both quite essential and almost completely forgotten aspect of political allegiance, the perspective of the child and of childhood. Apart from the neglect of home, it is a further general characteristic of the philosophical tradition that the experiences of childhood are almost completely neglected. Freud represents a partial break in this respect only partial, as he was only interested in the long-term impact of traumas, when on the other side, the normal daily experiences of children may acquire even more relevance in some contexts. In the following, only one relevant aspect of these experiences will be shortly mentioned. The experience of being thrown into the world may reflect a genuine experiential anxiety of adults, but surely has nothing to do with the way in which, paraphrasing Nietzsche, a human being becomes what one is. One comes into the world by simply being born into it.16 Now, birth is certainly a mystery, and the singular unity formed in every living human being between the physical body and the soul, spirit or personality cannot be, and never will be, fully described by methods of science and rational thought. However, what is certain is that in the overwhelming majority of cases a child is born into a home. This is not identical with the parents or with family (though it certainly constitutes a primary element), but incorporates spatial coordinates and material objects the room, the house, the physical surroundings, siblings, relatives, acquaintances, etc. The feeling of home is at once the centre and the background of the life experiences of any child, the place and the sub62

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stance of what happens with him/her. This is rendered clearly visible by the profound marks left on of any child who is raised outside a home.17 At this point Heideggers intriguing, but highly problematic, philosophical-anthropological reflections about the home and the world can be complemented by the ideas of the social and cultural anthropologist Colin Turnbull. The parallels between the works of these two thinkers, belonging to such different disciplinary traditions, are not unique; similar comparisons can be drawn between the philosophical work of Wilhelm Dilthey on Erlebnis (experience) and of Victor Turner on liminality; or between Voegelins historiogenesis and Kosellecks pathogenesis (both thinkers belonging the German philosophical tradition) and the anthropologically trained Bateson on schismogenesis. 3. Colin Turnbull: the experience of being at home in the world and its collapse While Turnbull is universally acknowledged as a major figure of anthropology, his work had its fair share of critiques, and it is practically ignored in political anthropology. Turnbull is usually recommended for the unusual, almost visionary empathy an important Diltheyan value he developed for the life-style and experiences of the Mbuti Pygmies of the tropical rain-forest, who managed to live a decent life under extremely adverse conditions. The Forest People is a classic of anthropology, where Turnbull managed to capture, in so far as it was possible (and according to detractors using a good dose of imagination), the manner in which human beings lived before the invention of settlement; the surprising warmth and humanity of people who lived almost carelessly among conditions where, it would seem, human life should have been impossible. A central aspect of this way of seeing the world was living a life of giving and receiving gifts, while the core of their spiritual life, the singing of the molimo even expresses in Voegelinian language an experience of participation in the mystery of being. But even more important are the absences of the book. Missing from the life of Pygmies are almost all the characteristics usually identified by anthropologists as central to culture, like the use of magic, the belief in spirits, myths (especially foundation myths), and the use of rituals most surprisingly, even the initiation rituals of young males. The book renders therefore particularly evident how much our ideas of human culture, even by anthropologists, takes for granted the condition of settlement. At the conceptual level the central insight of Turnbull is the realisation that for the Pygmies there is no separation between the home and the world: they feel at home anywhere in the world in their world, which is a few dozen miles diameter area of tropical rainforest. Such an identity of the home and the world means that rites of passage, and much of what has been identified by anthropologists as the basic, universal features of culture, have no meaning for the Pygmies. They do not have rituals, myths, do not use magic, and even though yielding to the surrounding villages they perform initiation rites, dont show much interest in them: there was no need to leave ceremonially the home to enter the world. The passage of seasons only mattered for at least partially settled, agricultural populations the rainforest, at any rate, had no seasons; and in the absence of warfare, they had no need for charismatic heroes. This, however, does by no means imply that they live a deprived mode of existence. Quite on the contrary, Turnbull emphasises that their views and mentalities seem much more modern and enlightened than those of the surrounding village cultures, which are dominated by belief in magic, all-pervasive spirits and witchcraft. The other classic work of Turnbull, The Mountain People, about the Ik, living in the mountainous region in between Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, turned out to be even more controversial, though from the opposite angle. If The Forest People was accused of romanti63

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cism, this one was denounced for its alleged lack of sensitivity in dealing with people undergoing extreme suffering. The scenes depicted in this book indeed evoke the exact opposite sentiments from those of the previous volume: The Mountain People captures a hunter-gatherer community in the moment of forced settlement and the resulting complete dissolution of the very fibres of social life resulting in attitudes and forms of conduct that genuinely look inhuman; where, in a general state of cultural disintegration, famine and illness, even parents and children cease to have the slightest degree of emotional involvement and interest in the suffering, even the death, of one another. Thus, if in The Forest People Turnbull managed to demonstrate, pace Heidegger, that the experience of being at home in the world is the condition of possibility of any decent human life, in The Mountain People he captured the genuine significance of the experience of settlement: far from being a simple consequence or condition of possibility of the agricultural revolution, as the evolutionist reading of history would have it, it rather involved an extremely traumatic, even paralysing experience: the collapse of the identity of home and world. In actual history, this trauma would only be eased with the rise of the first genuine city cultures. However, even if home represents the ultimate background on which political allegiance can be built, it is only its broad, social, existential or experiential basis. The question of how a properly political allegiance can be built on this basis still needs to be discussed. This issue, or the question of the formation of citizens, has two main aspects: the question involved in the actual shaping of human beings, and the transference of broader allegiance, or a sense of home, to a political entity. 4. Spirituality The first question can be discussed in very similar terms as the question of the background, as it indeed constitutes another of the major trends in thought that developed in the past century in opposition to the legalistic way of thinking. This is concerned with the way to think beyond the legal concept of subjectivity. The individual subject, the bearer of inalienable rights, a self-enclosed entity, is a taken for granted category and value of modern political thought. Still, this self-evidence covers the highly unique and peculiar character of the mode of being of this form of subjectivity. According to the legal-Kantian perspective, the subject of knowledge comes before experience, and only the transcendental categories of the mind render experience possible. This view is based upon a fundamental separation between those individuals who can be assigned with rights and who cannot, like criminals or the mentally ill, who therefore are deprived even of the most basic respect given to human beings; or like children, who are only conceived of as not adults and whose only task therefore is to fit into the world of reality, i.e. adulthood. The specificity of this perspective was brought to the surface through the works of thinkers as diverse as: Michel Foucault and Eric Voegelin, Norbert Elias and Lewis Mumford, or Henri Bergson and Erving Goffman; through concepts like habitus, techniques of self, care of the self, homo clausus, closed self, etc. In a few cases, this led to the recognition that this perspective implies a return to the concern with spirituality. The clearest example is Eric Voegelin; but from the late 1970s even Foucault developed a strong interest in spirituality. In one of his last interviews, he defined spirituality provisionally as the subjects attainment of a certain mode of being and the transformations that the subject must carry
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out on itself to attain this mode of being (Foucault, 1997: 294). In his writings on Iran, he also developed the term political spirituality, which created considerable uproar. In spite of the controversies in which a concept like political spirituality has been involved, it seems to be a much better way for a non-legal conceptualisation of politics than the language of emotions or passions, for a series of reasons. At the conceptual level, while emotions and passions are usually handled as constants or universals, the concern with political spirituality shifts attention to the transformative, mobilising element involved in politics, focusing on those moments where such emotional mobilisation occurred, and the dangers it involved. This renders possible the systematic analysis of such moments at the historical level. This may start with the seminal work of Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, locating the emotional and existential outburst of early-modern politics in the collapse of the medieval world and the subsequent search for a calculable, rational, interestbased politics in an attempt to curb the excesses of this emotional involvement. Furthermore, it may identify the problem of revolution as a second fundamental issue belonging not simply to the irrational aspects of politics or the search for the truly revolutionary potential, but as the question of the identification of periods, and reasons, for such kind of mobilisation. At the third step, it offers a perspective on totalitarianism. The most important aspect of political spirituality, however, is its provision of a proper context for returning to the question of the formation of lasting political allegiance, the substantive basis of citizenship, or the transferring of a sense of home from the family to a larger political unit. 5. Warfare If the question is political allegiance proper in distinction from social allegiance, whether family or clan based, or from religious allegiance, whether in the form of a congregation, a sect or a church (Weber, 1978) then the main source of its formation can be identified in warfare. In the republican tradition, from the Greek classics up to Machiavelli and beyond, a citizens army was always considered as central to the polis. Citizenship rights were indissoluble from the right and duty to take up arms.18 This practice can be made sense of using the works of Alessandro Pizzorno. He argued in his path-breaking work on collective identities, war is a great producer of devotion (Pizzorno, 1987: 54). He also identified the crucial moments for the definition of identity and devotion as those in which they came under threat (ibid.: 38).19 This renders intelligible the link between home and warfare. Warfare, in the form of a defeat and conquest, presents the ultimate threat for the individuals home, and of all the homes of a community at the same time. This common threat brings forward the political interest in common defence, and thus helps to consolidate political allegiance. This point can be illustrated through Max Webers behaviour and writings during WWI. However, one should immediately add that this was the swan-song of the very idea that a war could be great and wonderful and worth experiencing (as in Marianne Weber, 1988: 522), with a profound effect on the spirit of the population (as in ibid.: 528). Already at that time, Webers position in this regard was clearly outdated, and can be contrasted with the way the war was actually seen by Hasek in his novel Sweik. Today, the very argument of mobilising for the defence of the home seems almost unintelligible for most liberal intellectuals, and when it is actually made in an academic context, it is bound to produce a scandal.20 This is due to a fundamental long-term historical reorganisation concerning warfare, political
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allegiance, and indeed the very foundations of Western culture, which is linked to the process of social disciplining. There is no space here even to sketch the main outlines of this process. This can be found in detail in the writings of the main reflexive historical sociologists: such as Max Weber, Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault, Philippe Aris or Gerhard Oestreich, among others. The context of these developments was indeed provided by a major threat to collective identity, the collapse of the unity of Western Christianity, or of the medieval world order. This resulted in the chaotic conditions of the 16th and 17th centuries, a period of civil and religious wars, and the ensuing emergence of the absolutist states, with the standing armies at their centre. The shaping of citizens through a citizen militia was replaced by the disciplining of the (male, adult, non-sick, non-mad, non-criminal) subjects through the absolutist, and later the national, states. In this process, the republican concern with citizenship and the philosophical-monastic concern with spirituality or the formation of subjectivity became interlinked. As Gerhard Oestreich (1982) has shown, the new military discipline grew directly out of the writings of late 16th and early 17th century neo-Stoic philosophers, and the concern with discipline, constancy, and prudence.21 As these considerations already indicate, the results were much broader and more widespread than a mere change in the order of military practice. The machine-like regularisation of military discipline and its spread as a model through a vast field of the institutional network of the early modern and then modern state which was like the reverse side of enclosing the former warrior aristocracy into the courts or the courtisation of warriors (Elias, 1994) produced a fundamental and wide-ranging transformation of the entire Western culture. As the civilizing process encompassed the entire range of everyday activities, Norbert Elias argued, it is not without reason that we speak of an age of absolutism. What finds expression in this change in the form of political rule is a structural change in Western society as a whole (Elias, 1994: 266).22 In the language of Heidegger, it can be described as the replacement of the background practices of the entire culture.23 Such a development seems paradoxical, almost by definition impossible. The background involves those aspects of human existence that are so evidently taken for granted that they cannot even become visible in their entirety. Yet, background practices do disappear, as tribes, societies, cultures, even entire civilisations do actually collapse. In the 16th century, with the dissolution of the unity of Western Christianity, our civilisation has indeed gone through such a period of crisis, encompassing the very fibre of social order. The ensuing long-term process of social disciplining touched that very level. Furthermore, the result of this process also became paradoxical, in the sense that the long-term solution of social disciplining implied the transformation of society in the model of (civil) warfare, as Heidegger, Patoka or Foucault argued. In an even more general sense, and using the terminology of Victor Turner, one could argue that modernity is a type of society that has transformed liminality from a temporary, suspended, in-between situation into a permanent state.24 The links between home and politics, just as between spirituality and politics, became invisible in the modern age because modernity (the modern liberal democratic order) was rendered possible and is based upon the simultaneity of military and spiritual transformations of the realm of everyday life that followed the collapse of the medieval world order. While the language of law and of human rights does provide some respite from the excesses of the violence and arbitrariness of absolutist (and then totalitarian) states, it does not solve the problem posed by the incorporation of everyday background practices, or the world of the home, into the institutionalised order of the modern market economy and civil society
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it cannot even take notice of this development. Even further, if the legal language, the language of rights, becomes the dominant form of discourse of those who perceive something of the problematicity and emptiness of an entire culture stuck in a permanent state of liminality and thus become passionate or emotionally mobilised, then there is a good probability that this will be transferred to the kinds of emotion the law is most able to handle. This could be the language of (pacified) revenge, or ressentiment, which have already been pointed out by Nietzsche; or the language of complaint, which is present in an even more evident manner, as it is indeed the procedural starting point for the mechanisms of the law to be set in motion. According to this logic, a society dominated by legal mentality will not be a fully rationalistic society deprived of emotions; it would rather be a society of complaining or of complaint.

An Example: East Central Europe

The theoretical part of the paper argued that citizenship, as a form of political allegiance, is based on certain taken for granted background practices, especially the experience of being at home. Citizenship in modern European states, however, is characterized by the fact that its background practices are based upon a specific institutional network, generated by a centuries-long process of social disciplining that attempted to replace, and to a considerable extent successfully so, the very fibres of the culture that was threatened with dissolution due to the collapse of the unity of medieval Western Christianity. The question now concerns the peculiarities of political allegiance and allegiance-building characteristics of the margins of Europe. One could probably not even invent a better starting point for such a discussion than a piece of contemporary intellectual history. Ivn Szelnyi, one of the two most important Hungarian sociologists of the post-war period, gave a talk on citizenship in Budapest at the turn of 1988-89. Time and place were both of particular importance. This was the first public talk he gave after he had been expelled, about 15 years earlier, from the country due to the writing with Gyrgy Konrd of the famous book Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power. It was just before the changes of 1989, but they were already quite clearly visible (of which the very fact that the talk took place was a telling proof). The talk was, furthermore, given in the main lecture room of the Institute of Sociology, which he had led before his expulsion, at 62 Uri Street a building that since then has returned to its rightful pre-1948 owner, the Catholic Church. Szelnyi started in a roundabout way, stating that he will talk about a concept which does not even exist in Hungarian. He then gave his reasons why the set of meanings associated with citizenship is not reflected in the Hungarian legal technical term, a simple translation of the German Staatsbrgerschaft, and then drew some conclusions concerning the character of Hungarian, and in general East-Central-European, modernization. This story, on the one hand, renders any attempt to reconstruct a Hungarian tradition of citizenship a rather dubious undertaking. On the other, however, and seen from the perspective outlined in the theoretical section, it also puts the entire undertaking in a different light. If the long-term civilizing process, or process of social disciplining, on which modern society is based, implies the institutional re-creation of the background practices for a civilisation whose underlying order codes have collapsed, then it can be argued that a precondition of modernization is the effective destruction of the entire previous taken for granted order.
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This puts the question of Bolshevism, on the one hand, into the perspective of a dilemma faced by any modernizing elite, as analysed by Andrew C. Janos (1982). On the other hand, however, it also helps to shed light on its particular, and particularly demonic, character. In the case of Bolshevism, this dilemma was resolved in the direction of an explicit, direct, focused, systematic and cruel destruction of the taken for granted background practices, the world of home, indeed of any element of collective, even personal stability. Bolshevik parties did not simply attempt to complete the process of modernisation through the education (or creation) of a citizenry by an enforced extension of social disciplining, but used, or rather abused, the enormous difficulties inherent in the process by systematically destroying any element of stable allegiance in the everyday life of the population under their control so that it would become dependent on them. The conscious use of such processes had been followed throughout the history of the Eastern-European, especially Russian, revolutionary movement since its beginnings. But these aspects gained special intensity with the Communist take-overs. Subsequently, a few of the major aspects of these practices will be discussed. In analogy to the civilizing process, they can be considered as steps in the Bolshevik decivilizing process. 1. War and terror The first point to notice is that in Europe, communist regimes were only established at the end of world wars. This is not accidental. Communist parties before these wars were marginal fringes, without any popular support or intellectual influence. The destruction created by a world war was necessary to render the communist project and language credible, and the breakthrough was only possible when society and state were weakened and rendered susceptible to a communist takeover. If the deep and lasting sufferings caused by a world war were necessary for the successful Communist takeover, then the perpetuation of such an emergency situation was central for the maintenance of Communist power. In the post-world war situation, instead of healing the wounds and calming the negative passions, emotions were explicitly, consciously, and artificially stimulated (Horvath, 1997, 1998). This was the main function of the period of terror. If warfare creates an out-of-order, liminal situation, where the ordinary background practices are suspended and thus become visible, it is still dominated by the expectation that that the state of emergency will eventually end and things will return to normalcy. The terror was the systematic, ruthless, cynical perpetuation of extraordinary situations in order to wipe out any hope of such a return. Even worse, the terror mobilised all kinds of human passions, including the best and worst. It brought forward the worst, putting into responsible positions of power individuals who were mostly driven by hatred and ressentiment; while it also mobilised and emptied the most noble and forward-looking passions in others, the desire for betterment and reorganisation after the sufferings of the war. Furthermore, this point helps to shed some light on the links between communism and the law. The use of law is not restricted to legislation, constitution building, or the thinking out of sophisticated verbal expressions for justice and fairness, but implies the actual legal practice, the functioning of the machinery of law. The wheels of this machinery, however, start working in most cases only once a complaint is made about the breech of law, order or rights. In a sociological sense, therefore, the emphasis on legal mentality implies a stimulated search for occasions to lodge complaints and the ensuing transformation of
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everyday life into an endless tribunal. One is constantly in search for unlawful or unrightful acts, the guilty and the sinner, the perpetrator and the victim. This, in fact, was exactly one of the main logics according to which the communist system functioned. The regime is often described as if it had functioned outside the law; as if law had no place in it. This is quite mistaken. The law played quite a heavy role in communism. Under communism, any aspect of life was turned into a legal procedure. One constantly behaved as if one were under arrest and could easily become so, as everyone was strongly induced to denounce everybody else, for the smallest mistakes of act or speech, to the Party, to the police, or to the legal authorities. These institutions worked together, and with a great deal of harmonisation in their activities. Thus, as it has been correctly identified by some of the classic analyses of totalitarianism already in the 1950s,25 the problem was not the non-legal but the non-political character of totalitarian systems and their ideologies. This is why the mentality of both the Enlightenment and Romanticism could have been so close to them. The central issue in dismantling Communism was the restoration of political activity, and not a return to the Law. This, however, did not end the culture of complaint in former communist states. 2. The everyday activities of party committees The war-like mobilisation using extraordinary efforts and methods, however, could not be maintained forever, even with the help of the terror all the more so as the terror only wasted the energies at an even higher rate. It was therefore soon complemented and eventually completely replaced by a third stage in the attacks against the taken for granted background practices: the boring, routine, everyday activity of party committees. As we documented elsewhere in detail (see Horvath and Szakolczai, 1992, Chapter 3), the actual everyday activity of the communist party apparatus was as different from widespread preconceptions as the idea of the utter separation of the law and communism was. Party workers did not spend their days chasing political dissidents, teaching the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, or catching teenagers listening to Radio Free Europe. Their basic work was rather a direct, day-to-day involvement in the actual direction of any conceivable activity of the institutions, firms or organisations that came under their caring supervision. Thus, the party apparatus represented not simply a duplication of state organs, but rather a return to the old disciplining function of the early-modern state and police, the reinforcement of the background practices the only difference being that this activity was not a response to a genuine problem, but was forcefully and artificially imposed and maintained. 3. Everyday behaviour Norbert Elias argued in his historical works that the civilizing process of the 16-18th centuries was instigated by a situation of transition in which the entire range of everyday conduct had become problematic. Given the direct involvement of the party apparatus in the minute daily activities of firms and institutions, one could expect a related problematisation of the most trivial aspects of everyday background practices. The connection is indeed there, but again, as always, works inversely. The communist party was not responding to real problems, but rather created (or attempted to create) the rationale of its own activity by undermining the ordering codes of everyday human interaction. These aspects became visible by the 1970s and were analysed in a series of highly influential articles by the other leading Hungarian sociologist of the post-war period, Elemr Hankiss. Hankiss recognised, going beyond the taken for granted wisdom of both the regime
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and its hidden or vocal opponents, that the most important and problematic impact of communism lies not at the level of politics or ideology but the most trivial, routine, everyday practices. He could publish these articles in the late 1970s, when communism was still mostly intact, as they had little to do with politics or ideology. For the very same reasons, they were just as vehemently attacked by many of the opponents of the regime as by its adherents. Their thought was that such trivialities dont deserve attention, and displace the critical interest that should focus on the real and major strongholds of the regime. How wrong they were, the old Hegelians. The first such article, entitled Deformities of our behaviour culture, which appeared in the, then leading, Hungarian periodical Valsg (reality) in mid-1978, was striking not only by its content but firstly by its style (reprinted in Hankiss, 1983: 157-204). It was our behaviour culture and not theirs which was deformed, while in the language of both communists and their opponents, it was always they who had all the problems, not us. Concerning substance, it was an almost ethnomethodological analysis of communism, presenting shocking revelations about the all-too familiar but not even noticed details of everyday life, like the fact that there were no longer any forms in which one could properly address (salute) another person. The pre-war social order knew an elaborate, though extremely old-fashioned, almost feudal, system of such addresses, according to a fine gradation of social status. This was abolished after 1945, but only to be replaced by a communist etiquette that was always considered as alien. As a result, by the 1970s, a hybrid system developed in which there were dozens of ways to utter a simple statement like Good morning, Mr Smith, depending on the place of the two persons in the socialist hierarchy, the degree of their acquaintance, and the hints one had concerning the expectations of the other. The next article of Hankiss was published in the same journal a year later. Entitled The crisis and absence of communities; it was more directly political, touching upon one of the official values (reprinted in Hankiss, 1983: 205-240). However, the attack was not ideological but sociological, charging at the level of the self-image of the regime. While the Communist Party fancied itself as the promoter of communities and collective life, Hankiss argued that it was, on the contrary, an instrument of forced individualisation or atomisation. The third article in the series, entitled Infantilism (Hankiss, 1983: 396-446), was written and presented at the Institute of Sociology two years later. It was vehemently attacked by figures of the semi-underground who considered it as a blatant attack on the suffering victims of the communist regime, and by those defending the system as an untenable slander. Though submitted again to Valsg, publication was declined this time, and it only appeared in 1982 in a collection of essays. The paper was based on the analysis of five plays that were all performed in the previous years by theatres in Budapest, and that, according to Hankiss, were all about the phenomenon of infantilisation, or the situation in which adults behave and/or are treated as children. That so many different plays, both Hungarian and non-Hungarian, could be analysed on such a tight interpretive framework was something of a revelation for Hankiss, assuring him that he touched there upon a very important aspect of social pathology. The key example of the article deserves a short summary, all the more so as the play is certainly not known outside Hungary. It was entitled Air in cubic meters, written by Gza Beremnyi, then an almost cultic figure as playwright, songwriter and filmmaker. The play is about a soldier who receives a leave of absence for a few days. During this period, he wants to secure a flat for himself and for his fiance, in order to secure their future. In this

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first phase, he acts with full, nave confidence in the world of adults and expects that his sincere desire will be understood and met. He is bound to be sorely disappointed. In the second act, he changes strategy. He now wants to beat the adults at their own game. He decides to be even more ruthless, egoistic and cynical than they are, blackmailing his opponents and even cheating his fiance. However, he only succeeds to dirty himself and confuse his own world. His Machiavellian rebellion is doomed to fail. This leads to his third and final step. He recognizes his sin and guilt, and again turns to the adults, asking their absolution and forgiveness. However, instead of saluting the prodigal son and granting what he was asking for, the adults play out a further, ultimate trick: They suddenly take back and hide the values. They act as if they did not even understand what this young man would want. He committed a sin? What kind of sin? Against them? But really nothing has happened, he hasnt done anything worthwhile mentioning: there is nothing to forgive (Hankiss, 1983: 440). They hide the values from the young man, as they have already hidden them from each other and from themselves, and do not allow him to get a grasp there; for in this case he would gain some stability, and the name of the game is to maintain the state of confusion. This is the stage when the game became autopoetic; when the logic of communism no longer needs communists to perpetuate itself, constituting a vicious circle. 4. Naming The last example will be based on even softer evidence than the previous. Nevertheless, apart from fitting into the line of argument, it also has broader contemporary connections. It concerns the way in which newborn babies are given names. While a name is the most singular means of identification at the individual level, naming is one of the most deeply embedded social practices of a community. Names are not given at random, but are selected out of a quite restricted pool of possibilities. In European countries, such names are taken either from the Bible (reflected in the expression Christian name), or from the surviving stock of pre-Christian ethnic names. In contrast to this, starting already around the late 1950s and gaining further strength with every passing decade, a trend emerged in Hungary to move away from traditional names, a practice which applied mainly to girls names. It started with the popularity of Italian or Italian-sounding names like Andrea, Krisztina or Monika in the late 1950s and the 1960s, continued with a shorter and less pronounced fad for French names like Henriette or Jacqueline. At this stage, the important thing was that the name should not be Hungarian, or even Hungarian-sounding. The trend was of course stronger among the intellectuals and in the capital, but eventually encompassed the entire country. It escalated, out of all proportions, from the late 1980s onwards. The modality of the trend, however, suffered a marked mutation. It was no longer sufficient for the name not to be Hungarian. It had to be different from all others. Walking into day-care centres one gained the impression that parents evidently thought that they had to give names to their children that no other child had ever worn before. It is quite illuminating to contrast this social fact with contemporary practices in other European countries. Two examples will be singled out. On the one hand, in most other especially Catholic countries, one would be hard pressed to find parallels. Thus, in Italy, it is quite rare to hear non-Italian names, and even ones regional allegiances (so characteristic of the Italian republican tradition of citizenship) can be quite well guessed by hearing ones first name. In Ireland, on the other hand, Irish names are extremely popular,
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and if one hears a non-Irish or non-Christian name, one can be sure that the childs parents are not from the country. The second example moves in the opposite direction. In very recent years, it has become popular among actors, rock-stars, footballers or similar high-publicity figures to invent unique, often quite bizarre names for their children. This practice, however, is greeted with a quite sceptical response even in the press, considered more a further eccentricity of media stars than the start of a popular wave at least for the moment.

Conclusion
Citizens dont exist in a state of nature, they must be made, so goes the saying. The making of citizens, however, is not a matter of simple publicity campaigns or policies of social engineering. As it was argued above, using Pizzorno, citizenship is a weak form of political identity. It only becomes effective if based on deeply embedded background cultural and social practices. In spite of all their differences, this was as true for the ancient city-states as for the medieval Italian communes or the modern Western national states. In the former communist countries, where such background practices were systematically destroyed for decades, using a distorted form of an obsolete version of the same mechanisms of social disciplining, the making of citizens faces special difficulties.26 However, it is highly questionable that in the region the building up of political allegiance to the nation state is on the agenda. Notes
About this, see Szakolczai (1998b, 2000) For more details, see Greco, della Porta and Szakolczai (eds.) (2000). 3 While for a long time, there was a tendency to bring together the two thinkers that started already in Foucaults life-time, now there is a widely shared recognition of their fundamental divergence: see Flyvbjerg (1998), Tully (1999). By the way, this was evidently recognised by Foucault himself; see Eribon (1994: 289ff). 4 In this sense, his avowed return to the Enlightenment project is again revealing. Without dismissing the Enlightenment, in his writings Saint-Simon singled out the philosophes as representative of the kind of legalistic thinking that he considered as not equipped to handle the problems of the new industrial society. While some of his suggestions could rightly be questioned now though the precision of his prophetic vision was incomparably better than Marxs there is no reason to question his sensitivity concerning the need to reformulate the Fragestellung. 5 In this context, see also S. Turner (1999: 142-3). 6 See his famous talk Science as a Vocation, and also the sections Prophet and Lawgiver and Prophet and the Lawgiver and Prophet and Teacher of Ethics in Economy and Society (Weber, 1978: 442-6). 7 For more details, see Szakolczai (1998a). 8 Here I strongly rely on the criticism of Hegel by Eric Voegelin; see especially Voegelin (1971, 1974). 9 See Foucault (1971). In this book, his inaugural lecture at the Collge de France, Foucault singled out for attention five departures from Hegel: Marx, Fichte, Bergson, Kierkegaard and Husserl (p.79). 10 Not surprisingly, the very concern with the Background or the Framework has been singled out by Popper in one of his last writings as a main source of obscurantism in his self-appointed crusade in defence of rationality (see Popper, 1994: 34ff). Needless to say, Popper misconstrues
1 2

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the entire point, arguing that claims about the Background imply an explicit agreement in a shared intellectual framework before any rational discussion. 11 The English term delivered over fails to convey the extremely negative connotation of the original berantwortung, which implies a disposition in which an individual is completely at the mercy of another. The kind of being delivered over should convey the expulsion of an illegal alien. In the Heidegger quotes, wherever the standard English translation seemed inappropriate, I used my own translation, following the general suggestions of Hubert Dreyfus. 12 Though significant, even here Heidegger stops short of stating that one is therefore at home in the Dasein. This is all the stranger as his entire discussion in these pages of suffixes and of the spatial component (see Heidegger, 1977: 72-3) rhymes closely with the similarity of Dasein and Daheim (home); and as in most European languages, there is a close link between home and house. 13 The imagery of Retraite used in certain important passages of Folie et draison (Foucault 1961: 587-8) can thus be understood as an ironic play on Heidegger. 14 About ancient Gnosticism, see Jonas (1963). Concerning modernity as a gnostic revolt, see Voegelin (1852, 1968, 1974), and in more detail in Szakolczai (2000: 152-69). 15 This further calls attention to the central importance of the genealogical method, according to which the new emergence is a difference, a displacement, and not a full denial of previous practice and tradition. 16 Concerning the next sentence, see Anja Haenschs PhD thesis entitled Symbolic Orders of Birthgiving, defended at the European University Institute in 2000. 17 One could continue this discussion of such crucial Heideggerian terms like presence and mode of being, from the perspective of the experience of children. 18 As it is well known, this was one of the central reasons why women did not possess such rights in the past. This was not considered as a deprivation, but rather a clear and working division of tasks. The basic, daily, ordinary maintenance of home was the task of women, while its extraordinary defence (in the Weberian sense of the ausseralltgliche) was the charge of males. 19 Citizenship is a mode of identity, but, as such, it is rarely a strong one. Strong identities are those that allow an individual both to be clearly recognized and to offer recognition in return. The identity of citizenship performs this function in its pure mode only in the situation of war, or in situations similar to war (Pizzorno 1991: 224). 20 This indeed all but happened in the December 1997 Elias memorial conference, when a plenary speaker started to extol the merits of the Israeli warrior ethic. 21 About this, see more in Szakolczai (1999, 2000). 22 This passage was quoted by Oestreich in his chapter Police and prudentia civilis in the seventeenth century, in Oestreich (1983: 164, fn 24). 23 It is in this sense that we can interpret the claim made by Hubert Dreyfus in the 1988 Foucault memorial conference that Foucaults power is the same as Heideggers being; see Dreyfus (1992). 24 This is elaborated in detail in Szakolczai (2000: 215-26). 25 See Koselleck (1988, published originally in 1959), and Voegelin (1952). 26 About this, see also Bauman (1993).

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