CHRONOLOGY ON PDB PROPOSAL

1. Document Request to CIA (July 3,2003): "Articles from the President's Daily
Brief (PDB) relating to Usama bin Laden (UBL), al Qaida, or Afghanistan
(including the Taliban and/or the Northern Alliance), as well as articles relating to
counterterrorism issues in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Yemen, and/or
Sudan from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001."

2. Initial Offer by White House (September 2003) : General briefing for all
Commissioners on numbers of PDBs in various categories, followed by more
specific briefings for Chair and Vice Chair and designated staff, with possible
access for same group to one or more PDBs.

3. After negotiations in late September, White House agrees to more "substantive:"

general briefing for all Commissioners, leaving open what further steps will
follow.

4. Briefing for all Commissioners and selected staff takes place on October 14,
2003.

5. Further offer by Gonzales to Tom (October 25, 2003): Access for Chair and Vice
Chair and two staff to approximately 22 PDBs relating to] |
I [(subject to further discussion with Tom and Lee). Notes can be
taken, and full Commission can be briefed after clearance by White House. No
access to additional 340 PDBs responsive to our request.

6. Revised offer by Gonzales to Tom and Lee (October 28): Same as above, plus
access by one staff member to 340 to determine whether there were omissions in
constituting the core group of approximately 22 and whether there are additional
highly relevant documents that should be added t0 the core group.

7. Commission meeting (November 1,2003): Commission rejects Gonzales offer;

directs Chair and Vice Chair to present counterproposal seeking access to the core
group for all Commissioners and access by Chair/Vice Chair and two staff
members to additional 340. Tom and Lee present counterproposal to Gonzales.

8. Final offer by Gonzales (November 5, 2003): Same as October 28 offer, except

that review of 340 may be conducted by cWr or Vice Chair or staff member
chosen by Commission, an^ Gonzales apparently accepts Tom's characterization
of review of 340 as providing opportunity for Commission to seek to add to core
group any additional PDBs that are important to our carrying out our statutory
mission.

9/11 Classified Information

THE PROPOSAL

A core group of 22 PDB items can be examined by the Chair, Vice Chair, and two
members of the Commission staff. They can take notes. The notes will be held for the
Commission by the White House. The notes or other summaries of the information in
these items can be shared with other commissioners and staff. Before sharing such
notes/summaries outside the limited group, the White House would have the right to
review the notes/summaries in order to limit circulation of especially sensitive details
about the intelligence. If this information is used in the Commission's report, the White
House will resist citations that specifically identify the information as coming from the
President's Daily Brief.

A Commission representative (Chair, Vice Chair, or staff designee - staff designee would
be Kojm) can examine the remaining 340 PDB items produced in response to the
Commission request. That representative can identify any other PDB items that the
Commission must see in order to do its job under the statute. The White House would
then move those items to the core group for further examination and effective sharing of
the necessary information with the rest of the Commission. If, however, the White House
refuses to add such items to the core group, the Commission could consider whether to
take further action, including a subpoena to obtain adequate access to the specific PDB
items at issue.

OPTIONS

1. Accept proposal

Pro: Gets issue behind us without complaints about which commissioners or staff
have access to what. Recognizes that Commission as an institution will have
access to all the PDBs it requested, that Chair/Vice Chair and 2 staff will be able
to take notes on core group of PDBs and pass information to their colleagues, and
that Commission will be able to seek addition of other significant PDB items from
the 340 to this core group.

Con: Does not provide as much direct access to core group (for all
Commissioners or an expanded subgroup) or to 340 that we sought.

la. Accept proposal with complaints.

Pro: Would make clear our disagreement with the White House proposal while
still taking advantage of it.

Con: Would require public, detailed discussion of the modalities for Commission
access to highly sensitive intelligence materials, thereby influencing ongoing
discussions of White House with Congress, etc. White House may therefore
resolve other issues (like interviews of White House staff and the scope of
 interview questioning) under the assumption that details will be made public by
the Commission and set precedents for dealing with Congress.

2. Reject proposal — This would presumably mean issuing public statement saying
that White House is denying us access we need to PDBs and issuance of a
subpoena to CIA to produce these documents.

Pro: Preserves our position of the need for direct access for all Commissioners.
Puts additional public pressure on White House.

Con: Would likely mean that we would get no access to any PDBs unless we won
a difficult court case to enforce a subpoena against the likely claim of executive
privilege/state secrets by the President. White House would contend that the
Commission has been offered access to all the documents it sought. White House
voluntary cooperation on all other matters - including interviews and access to
other especially sensitive documents ~ also could be jeopardized.

DRAFT TEXT (Option 1)

As President Bush noted last week, the Commission has asked to examine a large number
of intelligence items prepared for the President's Daily Brief in both the Clinton and
Bush administration during the years before the 9/11 attack. Hundreds of such items
have been identified in response to the Commission's request. The Commission received
a briefing on this intelligence material, but we have also sought to examine these
documents in order to have direct access to information we need to prepare our report.

The Commission and the White House have now agreed upon a process that will allow
the Commission to examine all of the documents produced in response to our requests.
We expect that these procedures will allow the Commission to obtain the information that
it must have in order to prepare the report mandated by law. If those procedures fail to
achieve that goal, the Commission retains the option of using whatever remedies are
available under its statute.

These are not easy issues. There are few, if any, precedents for the Commission's
requests. These negotiations have concluded in a fashion that will allow the Commission
to do its job with due regard for the sensitivity of the information contained in such
intelligence documents.

DRAFT TEXT (Option la)

As President Bush noted last week, the Commission has asked to examine a large number
of intelligence items prepared for the President's Daily Brief in both the Clinton and
Bush administration during the years before the 9/11 attack. Hundreds of such items
have been identified in response to the Commission's request. The Commission received
a briefing on this intelligence material, but we have also sought to examine these
documents in order to have direct access to information we need to prepare our report.

The Commission asked that all commissioners be able to examine these documents. The
White House position would limit direct access only to the Chair, Vice Chair, and two
members of the staff, who would in turn have to report what they found to the rest of the
Commission in summaries cleared by the White House. The Commission believes these
procedures make it more difficult for all commissioners to play their part in the
preparation of the report. Nevertheless, to avoid further delay in gaining access to the
information, the Commission has accepted the White House proposal.

We expect that these procedures will allow the Commission to obtain the information that
it must have in order to prepare the report mandated by law. If those procedures fail to
achieve that goal, the Commission retains the option of using whatever remedies are
available under its statute.

DRAFT TEXT (Option 2)

As President Bush noted last week, the Commission has asked to examine a large number
of intelligence items prepared for the President's Daily Brief in both the Clinton and
Bush administration during the years before the 9/11 attack. Hundreds of such items
have been identified in response to the Commission's request. The Commission received
a briefing on this intelligence material, but we have also sought to examine these
documents in order to have direct access to information we need to prepare our report.

The Commission asked that all commissioners be able to examine these documents. The
White House position would limit direct access to a subset of the requested PDBs only to
the Chair, Vice Chair, and two members of the staff, who would in turn have to report
what they found to the rest of the Commission in summaries cleared by the White House.
Other requested PDBs would be available only to one representative of the Commission,
who would not be able to take notes on relevant information unless the White House
acceded to further requests to add such items to the subset set aside for the limited access
described above. The Commission believes these conditions on access will not allow
commissioners to be able to play their required part in the preparation of the report.

Having failed to obtain through negotiations the adequate, effective access to the
information we must have to fulfill our statutory mandate, the Commission has decided to
issue a subpoena to the Central Intelligence Agency requiring the production of these
documents for the Commission's review.