166

CHAPTER - IV
REFLECTIONS OF NYAYA-VAISESIKA ON
YURVEDA-BASED ON CARAKA
SAHITH.






167



Concept of pramas in yurveda
Ever since it's very origin yurveda has concerned itself
with the cause, symptoms, and remedies of diseases. Knowledge
of these three aspects of diseases was considered as essential in
medical practice and this is got only through the pramas
(sources of valid knowledge). In generally yurveda speaks
about four means of knowledge. Viz., ptopadea (testimony of
trust worthy person), pratyaka (perception), anumna
(inference), and yukti (reasoning).
Every system of Indian thought, whether philosophical or
medical hold its own epistemology so as to provide a precise
opinion, regarding its metaphysical and ontological doctrines.
The means of valid knowledge occupies a pivotal position in
168

these systems, since it is always described as the only instrument
for understanding the real nature of things.
According to Caraka, the things are in this world be either
existent ( sat), or non-existent (asat), they can be investigated by
the four pramas viz., Testimony of a trust worthy person,
(ptopadea), perception (pratyaka), inference (anumna) and
the coming to a conclusion by series of syllogisms of probability
(yukti).
1

ptopadea (verbal testimony)
+{iii
Vi x Hi{Yxx * jE Yxi n
* +{i& ] ri i C * i , Ixi i Eni
xVi& *
2

Those who are free from rajas and tamas and endowed
strength of penance and knowledge, and whose knowledge is
defectless, always uncontradicted and true universally in past
169

present and future are known as pta (trust worth person). Such
neither have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they
willingly say anything untrue. They must be considered as
absolutely trusty (pta), and their testimony may be regarded as
true.
Pratyaka (perception)
+ixpxlx zEi |ii *
H ini r& |iI xSi*
3

Perception is the knowledge which arises by the contact of
self, sense organs mind and sense objects, is called perception.
This contact of the sense with the object is regarded by
Cakrapi as being of five kinds,
4
viz., 1. Contact with the
dravya (substance, called samyoga; 2. contact with the guas
(qualities) through the thing (samyukta-samavya) in which they
inhere by samavya (inseperable) relation; 3.contact with the
guas (such as color, etc.) in the generic character as universals
170

of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (rpatva), which exist in the
guas in the samavya relation; this is called samyukta-
samaveta samavya since the eye is in contact with the thing
and the colour is in the thing by samavya relation, and in the
specific colour there is the universal colour or the generic
character of colour by samavya relation; 4. the contact called
samavya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear:
the auditory sense is ka and the sound exists is ka by the
samavya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive
sound by a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavya; 5.
the generic character of sound as the sound universal (abdatva)
is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-
samavya. Cakrapi further notes that the four kinds of contact
spoken of here are the real causes of the phenomenon of
perception; In reality, however, "knowledge that results as the
effect of sense-contact" would be sufficient definition of
171

pratyaka; so in the perception of pleasure though none of these
contacts are necessary, It Is regarded as a valid case of direct
perception. Contact with the self is, of course, necessary for all
kinds of cognition.
5
Here it is easy to see that above theory of
perception is of the same type as that formed in the Nyya
System. The nirvikalpaka perception is not taken into
consideration, for there is nothing corresponding to the term
avyapadea in the Nyya-stra.
6

Anumna (Inference)
..-... |.|.. |.+.. ...-.|.. +
.|-... . -.. -... .-.-.... ++
7

Inference must be based on perception; by which the
concomitance of the hetu can first be observed, which is of three
kinds as following:-
172

1. From effect to cause - by perceiving the effect to cause
can be inferred such as by seeing a pregnant woman sexual
intercourse is inferred
2. From cause to effect - by seeing a cause effect can be
inferred such as by fruit is inferred.
3. Inference by associations other than that of cause and
effect, as the inference of fire from smoke.
Yukti (reasoning).
. |: .-.|. .. -..... .-+.....-... +
.|-|-.+... .. -... |... .... ... ++
8

Yukti is defined as when our intelligence judges a fact by
a complex weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or
considerations, through which one practically attains all that is
desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have
what may be called yukti.
173

Cakrapi say that this is not a reality of the nature a
separate prama; but it helps other pramas, so it is counted as
a prama. For instance Caraka says that forecasting of a good or
bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated
amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like. Cakrapi
rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as
the combined application of a number of reasoning, is properly
called ha and is current among the people by this name. It is
here counted as a separate prama. That is why further in other
context only three or four pramas have been mentioned
eliminating yukti.
The Buddhist writes nta Rakita in discussing Carakas
doctrine of yukti as separate prama, holds that yukti consist in
the observation that, since, when this happens that happens, and
since there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a
174

dnta, or example, in Nyya inference ( eg. whatever is smoky
is fiery, as the kitchen).
Cakrapani however, points out that these criticisms are all
beside the point, since yukti, according to Caraka, is not krya
kraata from tad-bhva bhvita, It is arriving at a conclusion as
a result of a series of reasonings, But it is important to note that
Caraka speaks of three kings of pramas viz., pratyaka,
anumna, and abda and describe anumna as being tarka
depending on yukti. By this statement he states that the means of
investigation are only these four and noneless, by this statement
he rejets the like arthpati, sabhava etc. acceptance in certain
quarters.
Pramas and diagnosis.
Caraka says that, deciding a course of action becomes
faultless if the entire disorder is examine from all aspects priority
with the threefold sources of knowledge collectively, because no
175

knowledge is derived about the entire object by a part of its
source. Out of these three sources of knowledge, first of all
knowledge is obtained from authority. Thereafter examination
proceeds with perception and inference because if there be no
authoritative material before named what one would know from
perception and inference.
9

one proceeding to acquire knowledge about the facts
relating to the disease, should examine with perception applying
all the sense organs for all the sense objects except in respect of
taste such as gurgling sound In intestines, cracking sound in
joints and finger nodes, characters of voice and other sounds in
the body should be examined with ears, colour, shape, size,
luster, normal and abnormal characters of the body, and other
visual objects unsaid here, should be examined with eyes. The
taste of the patients body though a sense object, should be
comprehended with inference because it's acquisition with
176

perception is not feasible, hence one should know the taste of the
patients mouth by interrogating him, abnormal taste of body by
retreating of lice, sweetness of body by approaching of flies, the
doubt about internal hemorrhage as to whether it is pure blood or
blood affected with pitta is removed by feeding the sample of
blood to crow or dog. If they eat it, it is pure blood otherwise
affected one - this should be known with inference. In this way,
other tastes in body parts may be inferred. Smell normal or
abnormal, in all body parts of the patient should be examined
with nose. Similarly touch, normal or abnormal, with the hand.
Cakrapi further clarifies that there are three means for
knowing the specific features of diseases that is authority
perception, and inference.
10
Here Yukti is not mentioned
separately as it is included in inference. These three pramas
jointly or singly are applicable for diagnosis.
11

177

yurveda in its own way interprets the law of causation
and the method of induction in the context of disease. As regards
the law of causation, two principal kinds of inference were
adopted by yurvedic physicians in the diagnosis of diseases (a)
cause to effect, in which a disease was inferred from previous
causes, and (b) effect to cause, by which a specific malady was
attributed to certain conditions and habits of the patient. In
addition, there was another type of inference in which a disease
was diagnosed through early indications of its symptoms. A
fourth type of inference was based on the study of variations in
symptoms due to multiplicity of causes.
The principle of causality was first from a practical
necessity applies in yurveda. Thus, If it is known that a person
has been exposed to sudden cold or has enjoyed a heavy feast
then, since it is known that cold leads to fever and over feeding
to indigestion, with the very first symptoms of uneasiness one
178

may at once infer that the patient is likely to get fever or to have
diarrhea or acute indigestion, or if it is known that the patient has
a strong diarrhea then it can similarly be inferred that he has
eaten indigestible articles. Thus the two principle kinds of
Inference which were of practical use to the yurveda
physicians were inference of the occurrence of a disease, i.e.,
from cause to effect and inference of the specific kinds of
unhygienic irregularity from the specific kinds of disease of the
patient, i.e., from the effect to the cause. The other and third kind
of inference is that of inference of disease from its early
prognostications (prva-rpa).
In the method of induction three types of knowledge were
employed namely, the cause and effect relations (nidna),
invariable prognostication (prvarpa), and concomitant
variation (upaya).
12
The method was indispensable for
diagnosis of diseases, ascertainment of their causes, and
179

prescription of cures. Caraka insists that the physician should
examine carefully the causes of diseases by the application of all
these methods, so that they may be ascertained from their visible
effects. Caraka give examples of a number diseases and the
causes of prognostications by which their nature can be
ascertained, i.e., One cause produces several disorders or
sometimes only one, like wise, one disorder is caused by many
factors and sometimes many disorders are caused by those ones.
For instance, from rough substance arise fever, giddiness,
delirium etc, and sometimes fever only. Likewise, many factors
which as rough etc, cause only fever, while sometimes they
produce many disorders in addition to fever.
13

Hence it is evident that the determination of the nature of
causes and effects and the inference of facts or events of
invariable concomitance were in indispensable necessity for the
yurveda physicians in connection with the diagnosis of disease
180

and the ascertainment of their causes and cures. It is stated by
Cakrapi that it why Caraka divides inference into three classes,
from causes to effect, from effects to causes and from the
association of other kinds of invariable concomitance. According
to Nyya, in its fundamental work states that the inference is
described here for the diagnosis as same being of three kinds,
viz., prvavat ( causes effect), eavat (from effect to cause),
samanyato da ( inference from similarities).
14

Logical reflections in medical assemblies
Logic was used in yurveda not only in diagnosing
disease but also in the debates which they had with one another.
The logical and dialectical speculations concerned in medical
assemblies which used to be held for the advancement of
knowledge and for overcoming opponents. Both Caraka and
Suruta followed the Nyya method in their argument with
181

opponents. The Caraka sahit was an outcome of such logical
deliberations in medical assemblies.
The art of carrying dispute successfully was considered as
an important acquisition among medical practitioners. These
disputes conducting under so many terms used in it, but those
technical terms found only at the Nyya systems of literature.
According to Caraka a good physician should have gain
mastery of eight aspects of yurveda viz., contents of tantra,
sthna, adhyya, and praana and their scope. The physician
should be able to interpret any part of the text and recapitulate
the main points when necessary. In debate the physician would
often encounter people with inadequate knowledge. The students
should attain high proficiency through discussions and debate
under the guidance of their teacher.
Caraka, says that the wise who wishes to be a physician
should, first of all, examine the treatise with reasoning and
182

keeping in consideration his seriousness or otherwise in the
work, result, after effects, place and time. various treatises on
medicine are found in society from amongst them one should
select that which is great, used by eminent and wise men, full of
ideas, respects by authorities, intelligent and beneficial to all the
three types of disciples (dull, mediocre and intelligent), free from
the defect of repetition, coming down from the sages, with well
composed introduction, discussion and conclusion, having firm
base, free from weak and difficult words, having abundant
expressions, with traditional ideas, devoted mainly to arriving at
the essence of ideas, having consistent ideas, with demarcated
topics easily comprehensible, and having definitions illustrated
with examples such treatise like the clear sun enlightens the
entire subject while warding off the darkness (or ignorance ).
15

183

It is very important for a physician to have clear and
correct knowledge and for this a clear idea of the method of
study, teaching and discussing and also of means etc. is essential.
There after Caraka discuss once the pupil settled, on an
instructor, it became the guruji term to test. i.e., the teacher
should have clear idea of the subject, should have seen the
practical application, be skilful, amicable, pure, having practical
experience, well equipped, possessing all the senses in normal
condition acquainted with (human) constitutions, well versed in
courses of actions, having his knowledge un censured, free from
conceit, envy, anger, forbearing, fatherly to disciples, having
qualities of a good teacher and capable of infusing
understanding. the teacher possessing such qualities inculcates
physicians, qualities in his disciple in a short time like the
seasonal cloud providing good crop in a suitable land, i.e., during
a six-month period of probation the teacher identified the
184

students strengths and weakness and ensured that he was peace,
noble preserving intelligent, etc. and found the student was fit.
16

The guru-disciple relationship was thus originally marked
by a high degree of mutuality. At the outset each tested the other;
once instruction began, each taught the other, the guru learning
more about humans and human nature with each student taught.
The bond between teacher and student was much stronger than
the bond that exists today between teacher and student, because
today instructions has become an article of commerce. In the past
the disciple was expect to respect the guru as much as, or more
that, his own present, because the guru caused the disciple to be
'reborn'. These type of intense emotional relationship between
guru and disciple made it easier to knowledge to be transmitted
from one to the other.
The first part of the eighth chapter of Vimnasthna,
Caraka described about the detailed form of the physician and
185

disciples, like mentioned above, and after that he discussed the
detailed form of the discussion made by such a students and
gave compulsory instructions to the disciples.
The student recited text and commentary, and the guru
solved difficulties and transmitters trade secrets. On occasion the
disciples would sit together with the guru to ask questions, and
he would respond by expounding on the various points of view
that had previously been proposed by other authorities,
concluding with the point of view he felt worthiest. Experts also
used to meet together for seminar on specific subjects, those
meetings and debates reinforced the students facility with the
laws of rhetoric can so helped to clarify their understandings and
provided them with opportunities to learn new things from
opponents. Winning a debate improved one's reputations. These
disputations were conducted according to on strict rules by the
following methods described here.
186

The history of Indian logic of Dr. Satish Candra
Vidyban gives us a detailed reference about the doctrines of
discussion that found in Caraka- Sahit which are the contents
of Nyya system. In this work he states that "Caraka is a general
name for the ancient akhs (branches) of the yurveda, as well
as for the teacher of those khs. The word "Caraka" signifies
according to Pini a person who study the Veda ( i.e. the khs
of the Yajurveda).
Caraka the father of yurveda accepts some doctrines of
Medhtithi Goutama's Nyya system. The doctrines as we find
them in the Caraka Sahit are treated under three heads. Viz.,
1. Krybhinivthi, the aggregate of resources for the
accomplishment of an action.
2. Parka, the standard of examination
3. Saba - vidhi, or vda-vidhi, the method of debate.
187

Among them Prka ( examination) should be conducted
under the four heads, Viz ptopadea, prtyaka, anumna and
yukti, reappearing with a little modifications from Medhatithi's
view. It is undoubtedly clear that sabhaa-vidhi was the
principal topic of nviiki.
17

The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was
considered an important acquisition among medical practitioners.
Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes
such as never found in any other literature, excepting the Nyya
system. In Caraka Sahit the place of vimna the eighth
chapter called the "Rogabhiag- jtya- vimna" almost as whole
as developed to this purpose.
There are four terms are referred to the connection with
disputes in the Nyya-stra, viz., tarka, vda, jalpa and vitaa.
Tarka is said to be the same as ha, and this is explained as a
process of reasoning carried on in one's mind before one can
188

come to any right conclusion. It is a name for the subjective
weighing of different alternatives on the occasion of a doubt
before a conclusive affirmation of denial (niraya) is made.
Disputes are said to be of three kinds, vda, japa and vitaa.
Vda means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, Jalpa a
dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the
opponent rightly or wrongly, and vitaa a dispute in which
attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent's thesis
without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis. Vda is thus
essentially different in its purpose from jalpa, and vitada; for
vda is an academical discussion with pupils, teachers, fellow-
students and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of
arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain.
18

Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on
while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend
189

himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other
unfair methods of argument.
Caraka says that, a physician should hold discussion
(sabha) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal
for knowledge (sahara) clarifies knowledge, provides
dexterity, improves power of speaking, illuminates fare, removes
doubt in scriptures if any, by repeating the topics, and creates
confidence in case there is no doubt, brings for the some new
ideas neither to unknown the reason is that whatever secret ideas
are gradually delivered by the teacher pleased over the devoted
disciple, the same are expressed by him in enthusiasm during
discussion in order to gain victory.
19
Hence the expert
recommends the discussion with the specialists. These discussion
are of two classes, friendly ( sandhya sabha) and hostile
(vighya sambha).
20
A friendly discussion is hold among wise
and learned persons who frankly and sincerely discuss questions
190

and give their views without any fear of being defeated or of the
fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For in such
discussions, even though there may be the fallacies described, no
one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is jubilant
over the other's defeat and no attempt is made to misinterpret or
misstate the other's views.
21

Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one
should behave in an assembly, where one has to meet with
hostile disputes. Before engaging one self in a hostile discussion
with an opponent a man ought carefully to consider whether his
opponent is inferior (para) to him and also the nature of the
assembly (pariat) in which their discussion is under taken. A
pariat may be learned (jnavati) or ignorant (mha), and
those again may be friendly (suht), neutral ( udsna) or hostile
(pratinivia).
22
When an opponent is to be judged, he is to be
judged from two points of view, intellectual and moral. Thus, on
191

the one hand, it has to be considered whether he is learned and
wise, whether he remembers the texts and can reproduce them
quickly and has powers of speech, and on the other hand,
whether he is of an irritable temperament, or of a fearful nature,
etc. A man must carefully consider whether his opponent is
superior to him in these qualifications or not.
23

When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he
should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak
and attack him there and should try to corner him in such
positions as are generally unacceptable to people in general.
24

Caraka then proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in
connection with such disputes. Like the Nyya, Caraka divides
such hostile disputes (vda) into two classes, jalpa and vitaa.
25

Pratija, is the enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be
proved, e.g. "The purua is eternal".
26
Sthpana is the
establishing of a thesis by syllogistic reasoning involving
192

propositions with hetu, drnta, upanaya and nigamana.
27
Thus
the above thesis (pratija), " The purua is eternal", is to be
supported by a reason (hetu) "because it is uncreated", by an
example (drnta), "The sky is uncreated and it is eternal" by a
proposition showing the similarity between the subject of the
example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya), viz. "just as the
ka is uncreated, so the purua is also uncreated" and finally by
establishing the thesis (nigamana), " therefore the purua is
eternal.
28

Pratisthpana is the attempt to establish a proposition
contrary to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the
opponent.
29
Thus, when the thesis of the sthpana is "purua is
eternal " the pratistpana proposition would be "Purua is non-
eternal," because "It is perceivable by the senses", and "The jug
which is perceptible to the senses is non-eternal" and "purua is
like the jug, "So "Purua is non-eternal".
193

Caraka defines hetu as "the cause of knowledge" (hetur
nma upalabdhi- kraa) and the cause of knowledge is the
pramas of pratyaka aithihya and aupamya.
30
The definition of
hetu in the Nyya-stra refers only to the perceived hetu in the
case of inference, through a similarity to which a relation is
established by inference.
31

Here Caraka points out that a hetu may be either
perceived, inferred or formed by analogy or from the scriptures,
but in which ever way it may be formed, when it leads to
knowledge, it is called a hetu. Thus, when he is say, " The hill is
fiery, because it smokes" (.... .|-.-... .-..+... the smoke is
the hetu, and it is directly perceived by the eye. But when he say,
" He is ill, because he is of low digestion", the hetu is not
perceived, but is only inferred, for the fact of one's being in low
digestion cannot be directly perceived. Again, when It is said,
"Purua is eternal, because it is uncreated" (|.. .-.
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+ .+...) the createdness (ktakatva) is the hetu, but it is
neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the test of the
scriptures. Again, in the proposition, "his face is most beautiful
because it has been compared with the moon" (. -.. +...-.-.,
.:..-....) the fact of being compared with the moon is the hetu
and it is known by upama. Thus Carakas definition of hetu does
not really come into conflict with that of Goutama, he is only
says that a hetu may be discovered, by any of the pramas, and
by which ever prama it may be discovered, It may be called a
hetu, if it is invariably and un-conditionally (a-vin-bhva)
associates with the major term (sdhya).
32

Caraka then proceeds to describe uttara,
33
which is in
purport the same as the jti of the Nyya-stras. Thus one may
say that the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being
affected by snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from
causes similar to them, in reply it may be said that effects are
195

dissimilar from their causes, since a burning fever may often be
an effect of cold.
34

Caraka doesn't mention the long list of jti described by
Nyya-stra and the commentaries in any phase in description.
An example (dnta) is that on which the common folk
and the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve
facts which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g., the fire is
hot, water is liquid, the earth is firm. A sidhnta, or conclusion,
is that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and
demonstrations by proper reasons. This sidhnta is of four
kinds,
35
viz., 1) sarva-tantra-sidhnta or conclusions accepted by
all, e.g. "There are causes of diseases, there are diseases, curable
ones can be cured", (2) prati-tantra sidhnta, or conclusion,
which are not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books
or persons, e.g. Some say that there are eight rasas others say that
there are six some say that there are five senses, others that there
196

are six, (3) adhikaraa siddhnta, or conclusions which being
accepted or proved, other conclusions also become proved or
accepted. eg. If It is proves that emancipated souls. do not reap
the fruits of karma, as they are without any desire, then the
doctrine of the suffering of the fruits of karma, emancipation, the
existence of soul and existence after death will have to be
considered as reputed abhyupagama-siddhnta, or conclusions
which are accepted only for the sake of an argument, and which
are neither examined critically nor considered as proved.
36

abda- is a collection of letters which may be of four
kinds, viz.,
37
(1) drtha of experienced purport (e.g., "The
doas lost their equilibrium through three causes): (2) adrtha-
unperceivable purport (e.g. there is after life, there is
emancipation), (3) satya, or truth, that which tallies with facts
(eg. "There is yurveda, there are means for curing curable
diseases" anta, the opposite of truth, untruth.
38
Samaya, or
197

doubt, occurs with reference to things about which no certainty is
attained. Thus those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon,
whereas those who are healthy and active live a long life. So
there is doubt whether in this world death happens timely or
untimely, Prayojana, or the object of action, Is that for which
anything is begin, Thus one may think that, if there is untimely
death, he shall form healthy habits and leave off unhealthy
habits, so that untimely death may not touch him.
39

Savyabicra means variability, e.g. " This may or may not
be a medicine for this disease"
40
Jijsa means experimenting,
medicine is to be advised after proper experiments (jijsa).
Vyavasya means decision (nicaya), eg. "This is a disease due
to predominance of vyu ; this is the medicine for this disease.
Arthaprpti is the same as the well known arthpatti, or
implication, when on making a statement, some other things
which was not said becomes also stated, it is a case of
198

implication, e.g. The statement "This disease cannot be cured by
allowing the patient to take his normal food and drink, implies
that it can be cured by fasting, or if it said, "he should not eat
during the day," this means that "He should eat during the
night."
41

Sabhava is the source from which anything springs, eg.
the six dhtus may be considered as the sabhava of the foetus ;
wrong diet, of disease ; and right course of treatment, of health.
Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omits such details
should as should have been given in the answer, e.g. This
disease, can be cured by purificatory action." Such an answer Is
faulty, as It does not state whether the purification should be
made by vomiting or purging. Ananuyojya is what is different
from anuyojya is a question put by a learned man in a discussion
as an enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a
learned colleague. E.g. a learned man says, "Purua is eternal"
199

and another learned man asks, "what is the reason?" such a
question is called anuyojya. A counter-question is called
anuyoga. A counter-question, such as "what is the reason for
youre asking such a question" is called pratyanuyoga.
42

Vkya-doa, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz.,
nyna, adhika, anarthaka, aprthaka and viruddha.
43
Nyna or
the fault of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions
necessary for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to
those cases in which, when a statement has to be supported by a
number of reason, only one is offered and other are omitted,
materially affecting the strength of the support of the eternality
of purua viz., beginninglessness, not being the product of any
effort, unchangeableness, etc. Proposing to give all those reasons
and giving only one, is and instance of nyna. Adhika is where
when yurveda is being discussed, the opponent makes
irrelevent references to learned works on politics or the art of
200

government. It may be also mean cases where words or
statements are needlessly repeated. Such a repetition is of two
kinds, verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word, while
the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different
words may be used.
Anarthaka and aprthaka mean the use of meaningless and
unconnected words or expressions. Virudha, or contrary
statement, means the making of a statement contrary to the
example (drnta-virudha) or the accepted conclusion
(siddnta), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever, or when a
medical man ( vaidya) say that medicine does not cure diseases.
44

Samaya-virudha is the making of any statement against the
accepted conclusions of any particular stra. Thus, for example,
if a Mmsaka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it
will be against his acceptance doctrine that animals should be
sacrificed. Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of
201

emancipation (moka stra) it be said that injury to living beings
is good, then this is against the accepted tenet of the stra.
Vkya-praasa is that kind of statement in which the faults
mentioned above in vkyadoa do not occur.
45

Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the
opponent is willfully misinterpreted. It is of two kinds, vk-chala
and smnya-chala.
46
The word nava means "nine" as well as
"new" and if, when one says about one's opponent, "This
physician is navatantra" (has newly learnt his texts), and the
opponent replies, " I have not nine text- books, I have one text"
the other person objects, " I do not say you have one text, I say
that you are navabhyasta-tantra" (have newly learnt the texts),
navabhyasta-tantra" might also mean "read nine times" ; and then
the opponent might well say " I have several times read the texts,
and not nine times, as you say." This is an example of Vk-
chala.
47

202

Again, when a physician says " medicine cures diseases,"
the opponent may take the most general characteristics o f the
terms and say that the above statement come to this, that an
existent entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then
since bronchitis exists (saka) and consumption exists.
(Sankay) bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure
anotherr existent entity, consumption. This is called smanya -
chala.
48

Fallacious (a-hetu) are three kinds, Prakaraa-sama,
Samaya- sama and Varyasama.
49
Prakaraa-sama is where
that which is given as the hetu remains to be proved. Thus, when
it is said that, since the self is different from the body, it is
eternal, and because the body is not endowed with
consciousness, which are offered as the hetu, are themselves to
be proved ; in Nyya-prakaraa-sama is where two opposite
hetus exist in a thing, so that nothing can be affirmed by either of
203

them. It shows that this prakaraa-sama is different from the
prakaraa-sama of the Nyya-Stra.
Saaya-sama is that which is the cause of doubt is
offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person
quotes a passage from yurveda is he or he not a physician.
Even a man who is not a physician might have heard a passage
somewhere and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage
from yurveda leaves us in doubt as to the mans being a
physician or not. If this itself is offered as the hetu for a
particular conclusion and if it is said, He is a physician because
he has quoted a passage from yurveda. It becomes a case of
Saaya-sama as an instance of jti ; but the former is a case
where a doubt is not removed because of the fact that the thing
about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite
qualities, so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of
any of these characteristics. Here, however, Saaya-sama is
204

used in the sense that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the
reason for a particular conclusion.
Varya-Sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing on
the strength of another affirmation which itself remains to be
proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous
affirmation, e.g., Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is un-
touchable, like the latter. But the non-eternality of sound stands
as much in need of proof as that of Buddhi, and the former
affirmation cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy
is similar to the jti called Sdhya-sama and same as the fallacy
Sdhya-sama of Goutama, According to Goutama Sdhyasama is
where the hetu itself remains to be proved. Thus in the argument
Shadow is a substance because it moves, the movability of
shadows is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a
shadow move like a man, or is it that because the covering entity
205

moves that at different places the light is veiled and this gives
rise to the formation of shadows at different places.
Atta Kla
50
is that in which that which should be said first is
said later, e.g., the thesis, or pratija, should be states first and
the conclusion or nigamana, last ; if instead the nigamana is
stated first and the pratija after, then we have the fault of
Kltta .
Upalaba (Criticism) : is the finding fault with the hetus, also
called a-hetu, as described above or hetvbhsas.
51
Parihra
(reply) means the reply given to the objection pointed out by an
opponent ; e.g., the self is eternal, since no long as it remains in
the body it shows signs of life, and, when it is away, though the
body still remains the same, yet there is no sign of life ; therefore
the self is different from the body and is eternal.
Pratijhni (to give up ones thesis) is where, being concerned,
by the opponent, one is forced to give up ones original thesis.
206

Thus one may start with the thesis that purua is eternal.
Abhyaj (to bring a counter-charge) is that in which a disputant,
instead of refuting the charge brought against him by his
opponent, charges his opponent with the same defects.
52

Hetvntara (dodging with wrong reason) is where, when the
cause of some root fact (prakti) is asked, the reply refers to the
cause of the modifications or manifestations (vikti) of that root
fact.
53
Arthntara (wrong answer) is where, when the definition
of one thing (e.g., fever) is asked, a definition of another thing
(e.g., diabetes) is given.
54
Nigraha-sthna is where, in a learned
assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated is not understood
by the opponent. Caraka counts among the nigraha-sthna is
where, in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice
repeated, is not understood by the opponent. Caraka counts
among the nigrahasthnas many of the cases which have already
been enumerated and described. Thus he counts over and about
207

pratijhni, abhyaja, klttavacana, ahetu, nyna, adhika,
vyartha, anarthaka, punarukta, virudha, hetvntara, and
arthntara .
55

After this Caraka further explain some topics for the
knowledge of physicians because he thinks that is very necessary
for a mastery of the subject-matter of yurveda. If, if after
knowing well kraa, karaa, kryayoni, krya, kryaphala,
anubanda, dea, kla, pravtti, and upya one proceeds for
some action, he obtains the desired fruit and subsequent benefit
in what without any great effort.
Krana (doer) is who does a thing, he is the cause and agent.
Karaa (instrument) is that which sense as equipment for the
doer making offer for performing the action.
Kryayoni (original source) is that which is converted In to
action after transformation.
208

Krya (act) is that with the object of performing which the doer
proceeds
Kryaphala ( result of act) Is that with the object of which the
action is performed
Anubandha (after effect) is that which essentially enjoins the
doer as after effect, good or bad, of the action.
Dea (place) is location
Kla (time) is transformation.
Pravtti (inclination) is the effort for the action. This is also
known as krya, karma, yathna, kryasamrabha
Upya (procedure) is excellence of the first three factors, karaa
etc. and their proper management leaving aside the krya,
kryaphala and anubandha. Procedure leads to performance of an
action and thus it is said as upya.
209

Thus Caraka explained the terms used the course of debate,
he says that the debate among physicians should be held only on
(topics of) yurveda and not elsewhere. Here the statements and
counter - statements in details and also all the arguments have
been mentioned in the eighth text. After keeping them in mind
one should speak something and not anything which is irrelevant,
unscriptural, unexamined, inappropriate, confided or un
pervasive, He should speak everything with reasoning. All the
conflicts of debate, is endowed with reasoning, are devoid of
malice and promote the (cause) medicine due to its property of
enhancing the excellence of intellect because undamaged
intellect leads to success in all actions.
History of Indian Logic Dr.S.C.Vidyabhan states that the
Suruta Sahit pointed out in this connection that the Uttara-
tantra mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to physicians
in refuting the statements of hostile criticism and in establishing
210

their own points, which are called tantra-yukti. But these
technical terms are maxims for the interpretation of textual topics
like the maxims of Mms, and are not points dispute or
logical categories.
The differences between tantra-trayi and anviika is that
while the former refers to the laws of thought, the latter refers to
technical modes of expression in medical science in general and
in the Suruta-Sahita in particular. The scientific methods of
argument find in the Caraka Sahita are found to have employed
in the Nyya system of philosophy than in these of polity or
medicine.
Besides these S.C.V. states that the doctrines of nviiki
evidently did not constitute a part of the original yurveda of
Punarvsa treya, and that those doctrines seem to have been
incorporated into the Caraka-Sahita by the redactor Caraka, in
whose time they were widely known and studied. S.C.V. states
211

that Caraka and Akapda borrowed the doctrines from
Medhthithi Goutama, but while Caraka accepted them in their
crude forms, Akapda pruned them throughly before they were
assimilated in the Nyya-Stra.
56

Vaieika and yurveda
The concept of Padrthas in yurveda
The knowledge of Nyya-Vaiesika darana is an
inevitable part In yurvedic studies. Nyya-Vaiesika
contributes extensively to the yurvedic theories. Basic
principles of yurveda is constructed from different
philosophical thought, and many of them have been modified
and make it suitably to yurveda. Among them, yurveda has
remarkably to Vaieika darana here, some of them discussed
the following portions.
A categorical commitment is essential for any systematic
study. Different Schools of Indian thought generates categories
212

its own way. There are so many Padrthas common to all
Philosophies. In yurveda Caraka Sahit, Caraka beginning
his treatise enumerates six entities, which are the fundamental
categories of yurveda viz., Smnya, Viea, Gua, Dravya,
Karma, Samavya.
57

Among the categories mentions above Smnya and
Viea acquires a practical significance in yurveda a cardinal
principle of treatment of vitiated doas. Cakrapi clearly states
that the categories are mentions by Caraka is belonging to the
Vaieika darana, and also says that the change behind the order
is that the specific necessity of yurveda.
58

Smnya (Generality) and Viea (Particularly)
... ..-...... ..-... .|:+... +
..-. |.-... ..|-.-... . ++
213

Similarity of all substances is always the cause of increase
and dissimilarity the cause of decrease, Both effect by their
application.
..-...-.+.+, |.-... ..+.+. +
.... |- ..-..., |.-... |.... ++
59

i.e., similarity brings unity while dissimilarity causes
diversity. Again, similarity purpose (or action) while
dissimilarity has opposite one.
The concept of Smnya and Viea is of great importance
in yurveda and that is why list of six padrthas starts with
Smnya and Viea.
60
In the first verse , Caraka gives this
applied definition Smnya invariably causes increase while
Viea causes decrease in all substances.
Interpreting the word Sarvad Cakrapi says that it
means in all times in relation both ever-moving time as well as
214

conditional states
61
interpreting the word sarvbhvnm
Cakrapi says that here Sarva means all and Bhva
means those which are existing such as Dravya, Gua and Karma
and not those which are created.
62
Thus the products increased by
parthiva dvyauka with the similarity of eternal toms of
pthvi etc would not be covered by this.
Cakrapi emphasizes that causation of increase is the
feature of Smnya and not only the generic similarity. For
instance, both the flesh to be eaten and that of the body are
generically similar but it wouldnt do because in that case the
flesh should increase even in those who do not eat meat. Hence,
causation of increase is the feature of Smnya.
63
This is
actually not the definition but statement of the feature applicable
in yurveda. Actual definition is he declare that the second
definition mentioned above.
64

215

Cakrapi further emphasizes that here Smnya should
be taken in technical sense as one of the six padrthas and not
loosely in sense of similarity because in that case the present
statement would be superfluous.
65
But, as will be seen later, in
applicant sense, Smnya is reduced to Tulyatva (similarity) in
yurveda.
Cakrapi says that is a general statement of dravyas. But
in his view, the present case is quite different because it is not
enumeration or statement but an applied definition. In fact,
causation of increase is the specific character and as such
definition Smnya.
According to Cakrapi, Smnya causes increase but it is
not only the cause of increase because it may be effected by
similar entities as well such as increase of agni and intellect by
ghee. On the same basis, some divide Smnya in two types
Ubayavtti (bilateral) and ekavtti (unilateral). The former is
216

applicable in similar entities while the latter in dissimilar ones.
66

But, really speaking, unilateral similarity is only a form of Viea
and cannot be taken as Smnya.
Cakrapis view that Smnya causes increase but
increase is not always caused by Smnya cant be acceptable
because it would create chaos and the purpose of Carakas
statement would not be served. In scientific point of view, causal
relation between two entities should be established in such a way
that cause is inferred from the effect and vice versa. Thus there
must be invariable concomitance of Smnya and vdhi.
Accordingly, the definition can be put in both ways, Smnya
vdhikaram and Vdhikraam Smnyam. In this way one
would not be Smnya to effect the increase but would also
infer the causation of Smnya by observing increase.
Cakrapi further says that Smnya causes increase only
when there is no contradicting factor. For instance, the properties
217

like sour etc. in amlaka fruit do not increase similar properties
of pitta because of being contradicted by the inherent cooling
effect of the fruit. In the like manner, the cases of drugs
pacifying all the three doas may by explained. The increase by
dissimilar entities like that of intellect and digestive fire by ghee,
and also aggravation of vta caused by anxiety, increase of
semen by emotional determination and application of aphrodisiac
pastes on sole of feet etc. may be explained with prabhva . The
increase caused by Smnya would be effective in case of the
similar cases such as flesh would cause increase of flesh and not
of blood because it is Viea and not Smnya in respect of
flesh.
Commencing on the feature of Viea. Cakrapi says that
as the features of Viea defined in Vaieika are not of much
use in medicines, Cakra has given causation of disease as
distinguishing feature of Viea. The word Viea means that
218

which is distinguished.
67
For instance, though gavedhuka is
Smnya in respect of other gavedhuka grains, it is Viea in
respect of flesh because in the latter there is no generic attribute
of gavedhuka. In the same way, flesh in Smnya for flesh, but
Viea in increase should also be understood as in absence of
contradictory factor like that of Smnya such as the cases of
maaka etc. Contrary to vta etc. do not pacify vta etc.
because of their inherent unwholesome effect.
Like two types of cause (similar and dissimilar) of increase
in Smnya, Viea may also be grouped into two
Viruddhaviea (antagonistic dissimilar) and aviruddhaviea
(non-antagonistic dissimilar). The frame acts directly whereas
the latter does indirectly. Here the former is meant by Caraka
through the latter also exerts the same effect eventually. Though
the non-antagonistic dissimilar does not replenish the decaying
tissue elements due to dissimilarity. The decrease in such case is
219

indirect because of non-replenishment of tissues undergoing
katabolism such as by constructing dam on a river, there is
natural fall in water level upward course.
Interpreting the last quarter of the verse, Cakrapi says
that the both (Smnya and Viea) exert their effects only on
contact with the body,
68
otherwise they would remain ineffective.
Secondly, to effect equilibrium of dhtus, both of them act
simultaneously otherwise by one-sided action of Smnya there
may be increase on one side leading to disequilibrium.
69
For
instance, sweet and unctuous dravyas pacify vt, on one side,
they also increase kapha by Smnya so as to maintain the
balance otherwise there may arise pathological conditions of
vtakaya and kaphavdhi.
..-...-.+.+ |.-... ..+.+. This is taken by
Cakrapi as definition of Smnya and Viea. Smnya is that
which produces idea of oneness. For instance, the idea which
220

causes oneness in several cows in different places and times is
Smnya.
70
The same is applicable in respect of action (cook
etc.) and qualities (white etc.). On the contrary, Viea in respect
of horses because of making distinction.
71
Similarly, the generic
attribute of flesh increase the same due to similarity but it
behaves as a decreasing factor for vta due to Viea. However,
the same being non-antagonistic dissimilar to blood etc. does not
cause such decrease rather it may increase them due to similarity
in quantity.
The second half of the verse is taken by Cakrapi as
supporting argument for the first one. He interprets that Smnya
means similarity and Viea as the reverse. E.g., dissimilarity.
72

Cakrapi conclude this topic with remark that in order to
avoid details the subject has been dealt with only in respect of its
application to yurveda. Those who are interested in
(philosophical) details may go through the Vaieika Philosophy.
221

According to Vaieika Philosophy, Smnya and Viea
are relative terms
73
and they are limited to dravya, gua and
karma only.
74
Praastapda has defines Smnya as that which
produces idea of oneness whereas Viea is that which
discriminates.
75
According to its field of jurisdiction Smnya is
said to be of two types para (superior) and apara (inferior).
Satta (existence) itself is para while dravyatva, guatva and
karmatva are parasmnya. The latter three are at the same time
both Smnya in respect of the members in Smnya for pthvi
etc but is Viea to guatva and karmatva. Technically speaking,
Viea is used only to denote the discrimination between toms
which stands at the terminal point and are eternal but secondarily
it is used to denote discrimination in dravya-gua etc. too and
such is called as Bhkta (secondary).
76
The later authors have
also accepted a third type of Smnya as parpara which is
both para as well as apara such as dravyatva is para in relation of
222

pthvi etc. but is apara in that to satt.
77
Para is that having wider
extent while apara is that having narrower one.
78
In
Siddhntamuktvali , Smnya is defined as that which, being
eternal, is inherently related to more than one.
79

In pratibimbatva commentary on the Tarkasagraha,
Smnya is said as generic attribute and Viea as self-
discriminating.
80
Bhaparicheda also takes Smnya as Jti but
Vtsyyana while interpreting the aphorism of Gautama
(.-.......|-.+. -..|. distinguishes Smnya from jti though in
the aphorism there is no such indication. Vtsyyana says that
which produces idea of sameness in different individuals but
does not discriminate them mutually is smnya whereas jti is a
type of smnya which produces non- difference in some but
difference from some others.
81

223

According to this definition, smnya is purely smnya
whereas jati performs functions of both smnya and viea.
Thus the statement ..-... |.-... -...| is very meaningful.
Now if we look at the statement of Caraka on this topic, it
is evident that ..-...-.+.+, |.-... ..+.+. , is the
definition tallying with that given in Vaieika philosophy but
Caraka extended it further and said that as smnya and viea
cause oneness and discrimination respectively the exhibit
consequent effects of additions and subtraction on body tissues
when applied. Thus Caraka has remarkably been able to apply
the philosophical concept to the realm of human body in relation
to its physiology and medicine. It is to be noted that in the
definition propounded in philosophical texts there is emphasis
only on the idea of sameness and discrimination whereas Caraka
has made it as background for evolving his own concept of
Smnya as applicable to medicine.
224

Dravya (Substance)

In order or enumeration of padrths, gua comes after
Smnya and Viea but again it is superseded by Dravya
because of the latter being the substratum of the former. Caraka
defines substance : that where action and quality exist and which
becomes an inherent cause of them, is a substance.
82
Here
Cakrapis explanation is the following : existence means
existence in relation of inherence. By this, only a substance can
become the inherent cause of substance, quality and action. As
quality and action cannot produce an effect in relation of
inherence in their own, they are not inherent cause. Having
action in the definition of substance is only to exclude the other
five categories, quality etc. and not simultaneously to exclude
to dissimilar categories (quality). A further question may arise
that when a pot at the first moment of its origination exists
without any quality, then the definition of substance having
225

quality is non-pervasive. Here the solution suggested by
Cakrapi is that, as at the second moment quality must come
therein, so the capacity of having quality is there is in the pot.
And in this capacity the expression Having Quality must be
explained. Cakrapi now refers to the Vaieika Stra as to
show Kada also used the same expressions to define
substance:
|+.... ..... .-...|.+..-. :.
83

It is to be noted that the above explanation of Carakas
definition of substance totally corresponds with the Vaieika
explanation.
The number of substances mentioned Caraka Sahit is
nine and it corresponds with the same number of substances
mentioned in the Vaieika stra. The only exception between
the two stras is the change in order of the enumeration of the
substance. In Caraka they are kha (ka), air fire, water and
226

earth, soul, mind time and direction. In Vaieika the sequence
of the categories are earth water, fire, air and ka, time
direction, soul and mind.
84

..|..-.. -.. +... |-.. :..:.-
. |:. ... :., |.||:.-....-. ++
85

In short ka etc. (ka, vyu, tejas, ap, and pthvi), self,
mind, time, space are dravyas (substances). Dravya having sense
organs is sentient while that without it is insentient.
In Caraka verse dravyas (substance) have been enumerated
as kha (ka) etc. (Paca mahbhta) , tman, mana, kla and
dik. Cakrapni raises the question why tman in spite of being
the chief, is not enumerative the first. It is slowed by the
argument that in medicine, the body, being the seat of health and
disease, is more pertinent and as such the factors constituting
body such as ka etc. have been said first and not tman
because it is devoid of disorders.
227

Gua (quality)
Gua has been defined that which exists in relation to
inherence, which is Niceta and which becomes a cause is
quality.
86
On this the explanation by Cakrapi is the following
by saying existence is relation of inherence, ka etc. which are
pervasive substances and are motionless are being excluded. One
with activity indicates the finite substance which becomes the
substratum of the action. So they cannot be the quality. By
being a cause, generality, particularity and inherence which
cannot be the causes, are excluded.
Now it may be argued that definition of the quality is
inclusive, as it does not pervade all qualities, e.g., the dimension
of the ubiquitous substances, colour of the substances in the final
aggregate (antyavayavin), and the like. They cannot be the
causes, and hence being a cause is partly unproved. Therefore,
its meaning should be having generality which is invariable in
228

the causes being positive entity. This type of causality exhausts
generality etc. as generality cannot have any further generality.
Cakrapi now gives another explanation of being a
cause for a quality. As the efficiency of being a cause in
qualities other than dimension of a ubiquitous substance, the
colour of a substance in the final aggregate and the like are seen,
so the capacity of being the causes in the unseen cases are also to
be admitted. Hence there is no question of being partly unproved
for causality of quality. The dimension of a ubiquitous substance
can be a cause of the yogic perception, so its causality cannot be
negated. Though this kind of causality (kraatva, a generality)
may exist also in generality etc. , but by the expression existence
in relation of inherence (samavyin) generality etc. are excluded.
Because the expression Samavyin means to be a substratum
(dhra) , where something exists in relation of inherence as
well as to be contained (dheya) somewhere in the same
229

relation. So the ubiquitos substances that can only be the
substrate in relation of inherence and the generality etc., that can
only be contained in the same relation are exclude as qualities.
Besides these Caraka mentioned forty-one qualities.
Cakrapi has grouped these properties in three categories;
Vaieika (specific), Smnya (general) and tmagua
(spiritual).
87
The specific properties are sense objects sound,
touch, vision, taste and smell which are specifically related to
ka , vyu, agni, ap and pthvi respectively.
88

Gurvdi guas are twenty in number guru-lakhu, ta-
ua, snigdha-rkamanda-tkaa, sthira-ara, mdu-kahina,
viada-piccila , lakaa-khara, sthla-skma, and sndra-
drava. These are the Smnya guas as they formed generally in
pthvi etc.
89

Buddhi is intellect which included smti (memory), Cetan
(consciouness) dhti, (restraint), ahakra (ego) qualities. Pardi
230

guas are paratva, aparatva, yukti, sakhya, sayoga, vibhga,
pthaktva, parima, saskra and abhysa. They are also
general properties but comparatively they are not so important
and as such are placed at the end.
90

Karma (action)
According to Caraka Karma (action) is the response
(movement) originated from volition. Thus essentially it is
biological response. Action in Caraka is Ceita (i.e., activities of


living beings) where effort (prayatna) stands as its very cause.
91

Cakrapi mentions of some who explain action to be the cause
of effort. He also notes that though effort is narrated to be the
cause of action, the term prayatna is used in yurveda as a
synonym of karma.
231

On another occasion i.e., to explain the Caraka verse
(stra1.52)
. ... . |.-... . +..:....|..-. +
+... |+.. +-.+-. ..... -.. ++
Cakrapi says in this verse, karma is defined. Karma is
the causative factor in conjunction and disjunction and does not
require another factor (for the initiation or performance).
92
This
is evidently on the definition given in the Vaieika philosophy.
Praastapda has further elaborated it.
93


Samavya (Inherence)
Samavya is apthakbhva (inseparableness) as of Bhmi
(pthvi) etc. with their qualities.
94
Cakrapi say apthakbhva is
ayutasiddhi (invariable co-existence) as of part and whole,
quality and substance, action and active, attribute and that
232

possessing the same.
95
It is not possible to comprehend the whole
etc. on eliminating the part etc.
Pthvi is substratum of may residing qualities and as
such is the symbol of substratum. On the other hand, Gua is
used for the entity of secondary importance. Thus the above
definition may be placed in other words as Samavya is the
inseparableness existing between dhra (substratum) and
dheya (dependent).
96
This is confirmed by Praastapda in
Vaieika.
97
This excludes the relation of Samavya between
pthvitva and gandharvatva which though inseparable are not
related as substratum and dependent.
The Suruta Sahit like each and every other system of
Indian knowledge is no exception to the acceptance of five bhta
dravyas to obtain substances, obviously things here for
preparation of medicine or body to which it is applied. Already
in the fortieth chapter of Strasthna , while going to define
233

dravya (substance), rasa etc., Suruta says that a substance is to
be endowed with action and qualities and to be an inherent cause.
This is the same the idea the Vaieika hold to define a
substance.
Concept of Dravya in yurveda
The study of Dravya is the essence of yurveda. Dravya
generally means 'Substance' but in yurveda it is specifically
used in the sense of 'Drug' a substance employed as a medicine.
98

The assumption in Indian medicine is that there is no substance
in this world which cannot be employed as medicine, but that
one should know how and when to make use of it and in what
measure.
Indian medicine borrows the concept of dravya from the
Nyya-Vaieika system, which recognize nine categories. of
rudimentary and non-specific substances : the five primary forms
of matter ( earth, water, air, fire and ka) soul, mind, time, and
234

space, of these the first five (viz. forms of matter), are available
for sensory perception, while the other four are not. The entire
world has come in to being and functions on the ground work of
those substances.
Dravya is defined as the foundation for qualities (gua)
and action (karma) and as the combinative cause (samavya
kraa) wherein qualities and actions exist. The relation between
substances and qualities is inherent, inseparable and perpetual.
There can be no substances which does not have a quality and no
action exists without substance ; quality, therefore, is the
associate cause of both substance and action. It reveals that
yurveda is a study of substance ( Dravya) based on quality and
action. The primary of the substance is brought out by Caraka
sahit "There can be no maturation (Pka) without potency (
virya), and no potency without taste (rasa), and there can be no
235

taste without substance (dravya). Therefore, substances are
primary and most important.
99

In yurveda 'Substance' is specifically defined as
constituted by five primary forms of matter (paca-bhautika)
earth, water, fire and ka, Drugs as substances share this
characteristic with the human body- mind complex, which can be
diseased.
There are several classifications of substances. The nine
primary substances (the five forms of matter, soul, mind, time,
and space) are described a causal (kraa), while the entire
world of objects is described as emergent or as effect (krya).
The objects of the world, although constituted by all five primary
forms of matter are identifiable by the prevalence of one or the
other of the forms.
The guiding principle is objects are discrete owing to the
excessive presence of one of the forms of matter (-+. . .
236

..-.') Substance are also classified into living beings ( chetana,
organic) and non-living thing (acetana inorganic).
100
living
beings are equipped with sense-organs while non living matter
does not have this facility. The presence of consciousness is what
explains the capability of sensations ( sendriya) among the living
being.
101

In the case of non-living matter, consciousness being
absent, sensations are impossible (nirindriya). Soul (tma)
becomes conscious only on account of its association with the
body and the sense organs. living beings are further classified
into beings in which consciousness is only latent (antacetana
such as plants and trees) and beings in which consciousness is
both latent and explicit ( bahir-antacetana, such as animals and
human being). The former group is also called immobile
(sthvara) and the latter mobile (jangama).
237

There is another classification based on how substances
originate. Substances derived from plants and trees (udbhida or
vanaspati-ja). include roots, bark, sap, gum, secretion, leaves,
sprouts, flowers, bud, thrones, fruits, bulbs, oil extracts and burnt
powders. They are divided into four major groups; (a) plants and
trees which have fruits but no visible flowers (vanaspati) : (b)
creepers and climbers which grow on the support of a tree or
which spread on the ground (virudha) and (c) plants the lives of
which are over as soon as they yield fruits (auadhi).
Substance derived from mobile living beings (jangama)
include milk, butter, honey, skin, bone flesh, blood, bone-
marrow. flesh-marrow, urine, horns, hoofs, nails, hair and
excretions. Living beings are classified into four groups. (a) born
out wombs (jaryuja, viviparous) like animals and human; (b)
born of eggs (aaja oviparous). like reptiles and birds, ( c) born
of sweat and slime (svedaja) like worms and insects ; and ( d)
238

born from the earth (udbhija) like frogs and fireflies. Substances
derived from sources other that the two aforementioned, that is,
those obtained directly from the earth (pthv-janya), like metals,
minerals, salts sand and precious stones from another sub-
group.
102

The classification of substances into food (hra) and
drugs (auada) is also significant. Articles of food value are taste
dominated (rasa pradhna) and are meant primarily to sustain
and nourish the body constituents. Drugs, on the other hand, are
dominated by intense, moderate or meager potency (vrya-
pradna) and are meant to create new conditions in the body
which either maintain health or cure diseases by correcting the
malefic influences by vta, pitta and kapha.
In case of diseases, it is recommended that drugs must be
administered first, and with the diseased condition has been
brought under control, articles of food that are suitable for
239

recovery and nourishment of the weakened body constituents
need to be indicated. Pharmaceutical preparations (kalpa).
therefore, include both drugs and food.
The three fold classification of substances in terms of their
effects (prabhva) actually refer to drugs and food articles. Some
substances help in eliminating or reducing the malefic influences
of the three doas (doa praamana) some, on the other hand
serve to excite or derange the doas, and bring about disorder in
the normal function of the seven body constituents or dhtus
(dhtu pradaa or kopana) some substances, however, help
maintain normalcy (svasta -hita) they are the articles of food or
diet that one is accustomed to take, and those that are conducive
to one's well being.
Substance are also classified in terms of the six taste
groups (rasa skanda): sweet, sour, saline, bitter, astringent and
pungent. Substances are again grouped into eight (heavy, light,
240

cold, hot , coarse, soft, intense and unctuous) or two (cold and
hot) groups in terms of drug -potency.
103

Principles of medicinal preparation
An important aspect of Indian medicine dealing with
the identification, description, and classification of drugs.
(pharmacology) and also the preparations, and administration of
drugs, (viz., pharmacy, baiajya). This aspect has been
recognized as the foremost among the eight limbs of the present
day yurveda : pharmacology, diagnostics, therapeutics, major
surgery, minor surgery. psychotherapy, toxicology and
pediatrics, (Dravyagua, Nidna, Keyacikits, alya, lkya,
Bhta vidya, gadatantra kaumra btya)
The foundation of this aspect is to be formed in the concept
of substance (dravya), as crystalized in the Nyya-Vaieika
system. The science of pharmacy aims at retaining the medicinal
properties of the ingredients of drugs with necessary
241

modification .This modification, Caraka declares, is brought
about by dilution, application of heat, clarification,
emulsification, storing, maturing, flavoring, impregnation, and
preservation, as also by the material of the receptacle. As for as
medicine is concerned, among the categories of existence,
substance is the most important, for the other categories are
dependent upon it. Substances are known by the properties they
possess (gua) and the action they cause in the organism (karma)
the science of dravya-gua, therefore, inquires into the nature of
substances and the medicinal value they have in order to preserve
the health of the individual as well as to care the discusses that he
may suffer from. Substances, from this point of view,
comprehend both article, of food (hra) and drugs (auada).
In a substance are to be found five categories of existence
(pacapadrtha): properties (gua), tastes (rasa), systemic
changes (vipka), potencies (vrya) and specific effects
242

(prabhva). Each of which discharges its own function. This
aspect of yurveda deals with all these details. Brodly, however,
three details are recognized drugs (dravya) their therapeutic
properties (gua) and their pharmacological actions ( karma).
Drug: Substances which have medical property are broadly
classified into three groups. ( 1) articles of food (hara) (2)
medicinal preparations or drugs (auadha) and (3) poisons (via)
The basic idea is that besides the actual drugs, food as well as
poison can be employed for therapeutic ends.
Drugs listed in the classical pharmacological works
include animal products (prijanya) , substance from the plant
kingdom (vanaspati janya), and minerals and metals (Khanija),
Drugs of vegetable origin are classified according to the this kind
of country they are grown in, and the soil where the drug grown
is an important consideration. In accordance with the
pacabhautka theory, the soil can be one of five types
243

depending on the predominance of the primary element.
(mahbhta).
104

Concept of mind, Indriyas and Indriyrthas
Life is defined as a combination of arra (body) indriya
(senses) manas (mind) and tma (soul) According to yurveda
indriya and indriyrthas are considered as evolved from
pacamahbhtas,. and also this is the theory postulated by
Vaieika. The five sense organs (pacendriyas) are formed
mainly of one particular bhta and the sense it perceives is the
specific quality of that particular bhta. Suruta has accepted the
theory of evolution as postulated by Skhya Philosophy.
..-..|.+..||:...... .. . ..|:..|.+
105

In Caraka sahit arrasthna, Caraka deals the science
relating to human body in respect of its cause, origin,
maintenance, growth etc. A human body is regarded "as a
modification of the five elements. Ether, air, fire, water and
244

earth. Khdhi indicate them, which include five senses as well,
cetana, is consciousness consisting of soul associated with
mind.
106
The concept of purua is accepted by the Vaieika
system and is utilized in medicine. The same adhtuka purua,
is define by Suruta.
107

The word purua is derived as that who lies in the body.
108

Pure consciousness is also known as purua but this is not
so practical from the point by view of medicine which deals with
the adhtuka purua.
109

Though the word purua is applied to all living beings,
mainly it is used for human being which is the most important
all.
110

Again from the division of constituents he is known as
possessing twentyfour entities such as mind ten sense organs,
five sense objects and prakti ( matter) consisting of eight entities
( Avyakta, mahat Ahakra and five tanmtras).
245

Here manas (mind) is defined with its specific character
and properties. Conjunction of mind with sense senses in the
invariable factor in perception. If mind is there perception is
there, or the other hand, if mind is absent, perception is also
absent.
111
Thus by law of agreement in presence an absence,
mind is proved as cause of perception. similar definition are
found in the mind Nyya-Vaieika.
112
In language, Carakas
definition looks closer to that of Vaieika.

|.. |....-.- . .. .+.-.. .+
113

The objects and functions of mind are mentioned. Cintya,
vicrya, hya, dhyeya and sakalpa, these five are the objects of
mind.
Cintya is the consideration about worth doing or otherwise.
Vicrya is that of critical analysis about rightness or otherwise.
hya is conjecture or hypothesis is about emotional and
246

thinking. Sakalpya is that about which merit or demerit it is
consider.
Concept of Sukha and Dukha
According to Vaieika philosophy the concept of sukha
and dukha as a result of the interaction between tma, Indriya
manas, and indriyarthas is sukha (Happiness) and Dukha are
produced. (.-.|:.-.... .|.+. ...
114

Accepting this Caraka says that, happiness and misery
arise due to contact of the self, sense organ, mind and the sense
objects but when the mind is steadily concentrated to the self,
both case to exist due to non-initiation and a supernatural power
comes forth in the person. This state is known as yoga by the
expert sages.
115

Cakrapi explain that the use or contact of senses etc. is
the cause of happiness and misery and is proved as such by an
anvayavyatirkha (law of agreement in presence and absence)
247

because, in spite of existence of senses and their object, if contact
is here, effect is present otherwise not.
Concept of Moka
In Vaieika stra Kada says:-
.-... ... .-... ..-. .-. -...
116

When the activity in mind which is responsible for the
maintenance of he body becomes absent, samyoga of tma with
that a body also become absent and when no other body is

further taken up by the tma, salvation taken place. i.e.. The
Vaieika also regards bondage as due to ignorance, and
liberation as due to knowledge. The soul due to ignorance
performs actions. The actions lead to merit and demerits they are
due to attachment or aversion and aim at obtaining pleasure or
avoiding pain. if actions are inconformity with the Vedas
injunctions they lead to merit, if their prohibited by the Veda
248

they lead to demerit. The merit and demerit Individual soul make
the unseen moral. According to the law of Karma, one reap the
fruits of actions one has performed. This ada guided by the
God, emperies, motion to the toms and leads to creation for the
sake of enjoyment or suffering of the individual soul. As long as
the soul will go on performing actions it will be bound.
To get rid of bondage the soul must stop actions liberation
comes through which knowledge. When actions stop , merits
and demerits stop gradually the soul is separated from the

feelings of the mind the body realize, its own pure nature that is
liberation which is absolute cessation of all pains.
Accepting that Caraka says.
-.. .. -..-.. -..... ...+-. ..... +
|.... ... .... ..-. . -..++
117

249

Moka ( emancipation) is possible by absence of rajas and
tamas, destruction of the potent past deeds and detachment from
all the (source) conjunction. It is also said as absence of rebirth.
i.e., yurveda accept that salvation is attained when the two
doas of mind Rajas and Tamas are reduced, and the effects of
karma are also reduced, the bondage of tma with body and
mind ceases exist, and that state is called salvation. Activity in
mind in produced by Rajas and Tamas.

Concept of God
Kada in his Vaieika sutra has not envisaged any God. But
later on, commentators like Praastapda, accepted the existence
of God. Effect of karma In the previous dispensations of life
attached to tma is called Adam (unknown) in Vaieika
philosophy. Kada has attributed in it the initiation of activity.
250

and there fore no God was envisaged. Praastapda postulated
that action is initiated due to desire of God.
This adam is known as Daivam in yurveda.
|.| .-... +-. .. ... |-+-. ..
118

Moka there is no such an aciton the effect of which is not
to be suffer or enjoyed by the individual who does it. Diseases
caused by such karmas are capable of nullifying the effect of
treatment. They spontaneously subside when the effect of
treatment. They spontaneously subside when the effects of krya
are reduced as a result of sufferings.
Principles and theories postulated by Vaieika darana has
been accepted by alk branches of science that developed in India.
In yurveda, Jyothia, Vsthuvidya, even in music and dance
those principle are made use of. Therefore there is a saying in
sanskrit.
+... ..|..|.-. .. -.....+.+-. +
251










NOTES

1 C.S.Su., XI-17
|.|..-. . .. .. ..... .. ..|... .|-.. .... -. ,
..-.-. , .-... , .|-.|. ++
2 C.S.Su. XI 18,19
3 Ibid., XI, 20.
4 .|.+. |-.|. ....., . ... ...., .-...., ..-.-...., . .-.-....-.... ,
.-....-...., |.-...|.-. .-....-... -.. :. +
252


5 C.S.Su. XI, 20.
6 The definition of pratyaka given in C.S.Su. XI, 20 is
.-.|:.-....... .|.+... ... . + .-. ... .. .|: ..-. .. |... ++
the definition of pratyaka in Nyya Stra is as follows :-
:|:....|.+.... -...-...-.-..|-...| ......-.+ ..-. +
7 C.S.Su., XI, 20.
8 Ibid, XI, 25
9 |.|... .... -....-.. . ..-., .-... . |.|... .. .-..-.. + C.S.Vi., IV, 5.
10 ..-... .. .... .-.. :|. ..-...:.-.....-..-. .|-..-. --. ++
C.S.Vi. IV, 7.
11 |.|.. .. ..|.-..|.-... -..|. .v.. ... .-., ..-., .-... .|. +
C.S.Vi., IV,3
12 ... ..|.|.....-.|....-.....|.. + C.S.Ni., I, 6.
13 C.S.Ni., I, 27-32.
14 N.S., I. 1.5.
15 C.S.Vi., VIII. 3.
16 Ibid, VIII. 4.
17 H.I.L., p. 26-28
18 .. . |...+...|.. .. |...-..|-.-. + N.M., p.594.
19 . -....|.|.-.. . ......-. |-..+ |-..-. .- +-... + C.S.Vi., VIII, 15
20 |.|... . .. .|.v.-.... -..|. .....-.... , |..-.-.... . ++ Ibid, 16.
21 ..-...|.-.......|....-.|-. ....+. ..... :....-..-....|.|. ++ Ibid, 17
22 .. |.|.. . ..v. .. ... .-.. .., ..|.|.-... ... +... ++ Ibid, 19
23 Ibid, VIII, 23.
24 .... . .- .. .-..-.|-.-..|..-. ++ Ibid, 21
25 .. . . |.|.. .:.-. -.. , |..:. . + Ibid, 28.
26 .|.-.. ..-. ...... ... |.. .. :|. ++ Ibid, 30.
253


27 ..... ..-. .. -. .|.-.... -.......|..-.. ..... ++ Ibid, 31.
28 It is easy to see that C.S. admitted in a syllogism all the five proportions that
are admitted in the Nyya Stra.
29 . .|.-.... ..-. .. ... -. .|.-.... |..|....... + Ibid, 32.
30 - ...-....|.+.. .. ..-.-. , .-...-. , -|.--. , ..-.|-.|. + Ibid, 33.
31 -.-....-... ....... -. ... ..-... + N.S., I.1.34,35
32 -. -..|...-...|..... .v|. , ...|- |...:..-+.|. ..-..|.-......

... - -.-.... -. -.. ..:.-. + C.K.
33 --. ..-. ...-.. .| .. -.. .|....-.-.-. ++ C.S.Vi., VIII.36.
34 ...-...-..-.. ...... -..|. ++ N.S.I.2.18.
35 |.:... ..-. . . :|. ..|.. |.:.. ++ Ibid, VIII.37.
36 All these sidhntas are occur under the name in the Nyya Stra. N.S. I.1.28-31.
37 -.. ..-. ...-..-... . .. |.. . .-.|. ++ C.S, VIII.38.
38 The first two divisions, drtha and adrtha occur in the Nyya Stra,
. |.|... ...... + N.S. I.1.8.
39 Prayojana which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the Nyya Stra,
I.1.1, though it is now here critically examined.
. ...-.. .. ..- .... .. ... -.. + + N.B. p.6.
. ...|. .-.|. + + N.V.
40 .+.|.+ ..|-... + + N.S. I.2.5.
|.. -..:.-.. . .+ + N.B. p.73.
41 Cakrapi says that Caraka does not think that arthaprpti is a separate
prama; it is a case of inference, and hence is not included in the list of
pramas.
42 ... ..-.-. ...-. ..-. ...+. ..+....- .. + C.S.Vi. VIII.50.
.. ..-. ..-.... |..... ... .-.... ++ Ibid, 51.
254


... . ..-. . .. .|.v... .|.v. ... .. ..+-. .. ..+-.. ..
-...|.-.......|......-...-..|-.. + ... |.. . . :|. .|.-... .. . +. -.
:..-, ..:.... ++ Ibid, 52.
....... ..-....... ..-......... ... ... ....... .. +. -.||. ++ Ibid, 53.
43 ..+.... ..-. ... ..|-... ..-. , |.+-. , ...+-., |.: .|. :|. ..+.... ++
Ibid, 54.
44 Ibid, VIII.54.
45 Ibid, VIII.55.
46 . ..-. .|-.--... -...-... + .... -...-. . .. -.. ..-....-. ++ Ibid, 56.
47 Ibid.
48 Chala is treated in the Nyya Stra exactly on the same lines as here.
... |.....:.|.+...... This is divided into three classes, vk chala,
smnya chala and upacra chala.
49 N.S.I.2.4
-...-. .+...-. , . -...-., ...-.-.|. + C.S.Vi. VIII.57.
50 .|.+.. ..-. .. .. ... .. .-... -.. + C.S Vi.VIII.58.
51 -...--.. ..-. -....... , ... ..-.-... -..-.... ...... + Ibid. 59.
52 This corresponds to Matnuja of the Nyya Stra
.|.. . .. .-.-... .|...|..|... .-.... .. .... -....-.. + N.S
53 |.-... - -.. .|.|.: |.-. . |-.. -... :|. ... . . , We hear of a het-antara
that seems to be different from this.
54 This is also mentioned in the Nyya Stra (.+....|.. ...... N.S., V.2.7
55 .|.-..-.|. .|.-... |.:... -. ..-...-. |.:.-....|. + N.S., V.2.1.
... |.|-.|-.. . |.:.-... + C.S.Vi., VIII.65.
56 H.I.L., p.25,26.
57 ..-... . |.-.. . .... :..|. +-. . + .-.... . .--.... ...- |.|.-..|.. +
255


C.S.Su., I.28,29.
58 C.S.Su., I.44.
59 Ibid., I.45
60 Ibid., I.28
61 .... ..|-.. +.. |... ...|.+ . + Ck.
62 -..|. .-..-.. -...||. -.... :...+-...|.. , . . -....v. :|. + Ck.
63 .-.. . |:+...-.... ..-... .|:+..|-..--. + Ck.
64 -.. . |:+.. .-.... . .-.., |+ .-.......|... .-.. |.-. , .-.. .
..-...-.+. :|. +|.|. + Ck.
65 . . .-...-. . ..-...|-.|. +.. :..v. ..-...-...|-.|., ... -.. ..|.. .....
.+.. ... + Ck.
66 :- . ..-.... .|:+...|-.... , . . ..-...-. . .|:+..|-.... ,
....-....|. .... -..... .-.-. .|: .-.......... + Ck.
67 |.|-... ..... :|. |.-.. Ck.
68 ..|-. .... -.|..|-.... :|. .... + -.-... ..|-.
.....-...|.-.... . |:.. +..|-... + Ck.
69 . . +...-.... .....:.. .:.. .....-., +..|.-......... ...-...:.. ..-.
.... .-... |.|-.:........ ..|-......-.-.. -..|. + Ck.
70 -+..|:+ ..-... , ..+.. |-..-.+.... ...|.|-. . ... ..
:..|.+.. -+.+.. . |:.. ..-...-. + Ck.
71 ..+.+. .....|:+. + Ck.
72 . ..... -+..-...-.... ...|... , |.... :|. .... .. + Ck.
73 ..-... |.-.. :|. .:..-.-. + V.S. 1.2.3
74 ..-...|.-....-. :...+-.-. + Ibid.1.8.6
75 .|.......-.|-...-.+-..+.|-. -+|..-..-..-....-....+.| .-.-......
.... ..-...-...|-....+..-. + P.B.
256


76 -..|. . :...||. .-..|... ... ...... ..-....|. ....|.-..+.. -.+.. |.-.....|.+
Ibid
77 ..-... |.|.. ..- ....-.. . +
:..||.+.|.. .-.. ...... ++
.|-... . .. -..|. ......... +
:...|+-..|.. ........ + Ibid.
78 ..-. |.+ -..|-..-. , .. .-..|-..-. + S.M.
79 |... ... +.-....-. + SM
80 .-...... -... (-..|. , ... ....+. |.-...-. + P.B.C.
81 .. .-.... .|: ... |-...|.+.. ... .-.|.... . ...-.. ..:..:.+.
......|-.|.|-.-. .. ..-...-. + .. +..|.-. +..||. .. ..-...|.-... -..|.||. +
N.B
82 ...|... +-.... +.. .-...|. .. + C.S.Su., I.51
83 V.S.
84 .|... -......+.-.+..|..-.-...|. .. :..|.+ T.S.
85 C.S.Su., I.48.
86 .-...|. . |.-. +.. . . + C.S.Su., I.51.
87 .. |.|.. |. .-.|.+. ..-... .-...-..|.+ Ck.
88 ..... -..-.-....., -.. .-. |.+. , .. .+.-... -. ...... ,
..... .-. ...... , -.-...|. -... Ck.
89 -. . ..-... . .. .|...|.. ........ + Ck.
90 -. . ..-... . .. |. .....-..-... .|: ........... ..-. + Ck.
91 C.S.Su., I.82
92 . ... . |.-... . .... +..-. + Ck.
93 -+:.-... ....|.-.......+..|-.|. +-..-..-. + V.S.I.1.17
-+:.. -.|.+. . .|.|... -..|...|..-. + P.B.
257


94 .-.....:..-.... -.-..|.. . .-.. + C.S.Su., I.51
95 ..+-... ..|.|: .-......|-.|. .. Ck.
96 . .......-.... ..:..-... . .-.... + CK.
97 ..|.:...-........-..... . . .. + P.B.
98 .. :. ..-.-...|+-.|-...+ C.S.Su., 26.
99 ..+. ..|. |... .|... . ..-.-. -..-. + S.S.Su.
100 .......... . + C.S.Su.26.10
101 D.G.V., p.19
102 Ibid, p.22-28.
103 Ibid., p.28-32
104 Ibid.
105 S.S.Sa., 1
106 C.S.Sa., I.16
107 ...... :.. ....-.. . + Ck.
108 . | -.| -.. :|. .. + Ck.
109 . .... ...-. ..|.|+....-.|-... |.|+..|.... .:...+ -. .. + Ck.
110 .. ..-.. .....|. .:... .-... . .... ..-. + Ck.
111 .-.. -.... -....-.... -... -. . + :|. -.-.|:...... .|.+. . ... + C.S.Sa., I.18
112 ...--......|-.-.... |. .-. + N.S., I.1.16
.-.|:... .|.+.-.... -....:-...-. -.... |..-. + V.S., III.2.1
113 C.C.Sa., I.20-21.
114 V.S., V.2.16
115 C.S.Sa., I.8.
116 V.S., V.2.18
117 C.S.Sa., I.142.
118 C.S.Sa., I.116-117.