UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

In re: MARK A. D A M S CASE NO.:8:08-CV-01570-RAL

Appellaat,

CORPORATE SPORTS
MARKT'EING GROUP, MC.,ET.AL.,

Appellees. I

APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR WHEARING

OF ORDER ENTERED ON JANUARY 28,2009 2 5. 4
i gz
COMES NOW, the Appellant, Mark A. Adarns, pursuant to Fed& R& of Bankruptcy - -

Procedure 8015, and files this timely motion for rehearing of the Order entend by this Court on

January 28,2009 showing the facts and controlling precedent which ihis Court overlooked or

ignored as foUows:

PROCEDURAL ERRORS
No order was entered revoking any discharge.
The Order entered by this Court on January 28,2009 (hereinafter referred to as the

"Ordef') (Docket # 33) a r m e d the Default Final Judgment entered against the Appellant in a

bankruptcy adversary proceeding in Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG and af5nne.d the "Order

entered in the main Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, Case No. 8:05-bk-29501-PMG (Docket. 9-22),

revoking Adams' discharge based on the Default Final Judgment. ..." (Empbasis added.)

However, no complaint to revoke any discharge was ever filed concerning Case No. 8:05-bk-

2950 I-PMG as the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Denying Discharge of Debtor based
solely on it's erroneous entry of a default judgment against the Appellant Debtor in the adversary

proceeding. (B: 21)'

The Appellee, Timothy W. Weber, was improperly allowed

to supplement the record after the Appellant's Initial Brief was fded.

On November 14,2008, the Appellee, Timothy W. Weber, appearing pro se, filed the

Appellees' Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal and Extend the Time Period for Filing

an Answer Brief to One Week Following the Transmittal of the Complete Record (Docket # 19)
(hereinafter referred to as "Weber's Motion to Supplement the Record") with a certificate of

service falsely claiming to have served a copy to the undersigned via U.S.Mail. The record

shows that no hearing was held on Weber's Motion to Supplement the Record before it was

granted by entry of an order by the Honorable Richard A. Lazzara on November 14,2008

(Docket # 20).

The Appellant filed a motion to vacate the Order allowing Weber to supplement the

record (Docket # 25) showing that such Order was entered without notice or an opportunity to be

heard and that it was untimely as it was filed 42 days past the deadline for Weber to file a

designation of additional items to be included in the record and two weeks after the Appellant's

Initial Brief had been filed. The Appellant's motion (Docket # 25) showed that Weber failed to

show good cause why an extension of time to supplement the record should be granted, that

' All references to the Records on Appeal, as designated by the Appellant, are referred to as
follows: B for the Records on Appeal fiom Bankruptcy Case No. 8:05-bk-29501-PMG found in
this Court's Docket # 9; AVl for the first volume of Records on Appeal from Adversary Case
No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG found in this Court's Docket # 10; and AV2 for the second volume of
Records on Appeal from Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG found in this Court's Docket
# 11 followed by this Court's docket number for the item referenced followed by the page
number or paragraph if necessary. The Appellees did not timely file any designation of items to
be included in the record on appeal.
Weber failed to show that his failure to act in a timely manner was the result of excusable

neglect, and that Weber filed it on the Friday just before his answer brief was due.

Furthermore, the Appellant's motion to vacate the Order allowing Weber to supplement

the record (Docket # 25) showed that Weber falsely claimed that no party would be prejudiced

by granting Weber's Motion to Supplement the Record in an obvious effort to mislead this Court

and that Weber's false claim was absurd as the undersigned filed and served the Appellant's

Initial Brief (Docket # 18) on October 3 1,2008, a fact which Weber failed to mention, and

Weber sought to introduce documents not addressed in the Initial Brief, an action which would

obviously cause prejudice to the undersigned Appellant. As usual, Weber did not verify his

motion or submit an affidavit in support of it because it was filled with blatant lies. (Docket #

19).

In spite of the foregoing, this Court entered an Order on December 23,2008, denying the

Appellant's motion to vacate the Order allowing Weber to supplement the record without even

requiring Weber to file a response. As a result, the Appellant suffered severe prejudice and was

deprived of due process as he was deprived of his right to file an Initial Brief based on the record

before the Court, and therefore, the Court should have vacated the Order allowing Weber to

supplement the record, struck the supplemental items and Weber's Answer Brief fiom the

record, and proceeded with the determination of this appeal based on the Appellant's Initial Brief

or the Court should have allowed the Appellant to file an amended initial brief based on the

improperly supplemented record.

As the Court deprived the Appellant of his right to file an initial brief based on the record

before the Court, this Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) should be

vacated, and as shown infra, this Court should either enter an order requiring the Bankruptcy
Court to vacate the judgments entered in Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG, barring the

Plaintiff Appellees fiom objecting to the Appellant Debtor's discharge, vacating the erroneously

entered Order Denying Discharge of Debtor, and directing the Bankruptcy Court to enter an

order granting the Appellant Debtor a discharge of all of his listed debts in Case No. 8:05-bk-

29501-PMG or enter an order allowing the Appellant to file an initial brief based on the record

before the Court according to the dictates of due process.

The Court improperly denied the Appellant's right to even file a reply brief.

At the same time that the Appellant moved to vacate the Order allowing Weber to

supplement the record (Docket # 25), the Appellant filed a motion to enlarge time to file a reply

brief, if necessary, and requested that the deadline for filing it be extended to no earlier than

January 12,2009 due to the holidays. (Docket # 24). However, on December 23,2008, this

Court entered an Order denying the Appellant's motion to vacate the Order allowing Weber to

supplement the record and only granting the Appellant until January 5,2009 to file a reply brief.

As the Appellant had other matters to attend to over the holidays and expected to be

granted a reasonable amount of time in which to file his reply brief, on January 5,2009, he had

to file another motion to enlarge time to file a reply brief (Docket # 27) seeking another

extension of time to January 12,2009, and the Court entered an Order granting the same.

(Docket # 28).

On January 6,2009, the Appellant came down with the flu and was too ill to get to the

law library to complete the legal research necessary to complete his reply brief, and as a result,

on January 12,2009, the Appellant filed a motion seeking an extension of time of five days to

file his reply brief. (Docket # 29). On January 14,2009, the Court entered an Order granting the
Appellant an extension of time to file a reply brief to January 19,2009, an official court holiday.

(Docket # 30).

However, the Appellant had also been ordered to file an answer brief to defend himself

from the baseless and false contempt charges maliciously leveled against him by Timothy W.

Weber to cover up for Weber's criminal conduct and so that Weber and his associates could

extort money h m him for a sanctions order and judgment entered without jurisdiction, contrary

to due process, and contrary to the law and facts, the same one which Weber sought to avoid

being wiped out by the Bankruptcy Court, without of course, filing any copy of it as it is void on

its face. Due to the time required to research and prepare his answer brief concerning the

baseless contempt charges maliciously instigated and perpetuated by Weber and his associates in

crime who had appealed the dismissal of the criminal contempt charges without jurisdiction to do

so, the Appellant was not able to complete his reply brief by January 20,2009, and therefore, on

January 20,2009, the Appellant filed a motion seeking an extension of time of five days to file

his reply brief and attached a copy of the answer brief which had been filed with the Second

District Court of Appeal on January 20,2009. (Docket # 3 1).

Although the Appellant had shown good cause for the brief extension of time which he

requested on January 20,2009 and although no response in opposition had been made on the

record, this Court entered an Order on January 22,2009 (Docket # 32), denying the Appellant's

motion to extend time to file a reply brief which stated, "the Court is concerned that Appellant

has not been candid with regard to his previous requests to enlarge time for filing a reply brief."

In addition, this Court implied that the Appellant had committed perjury because he failed to be

"candid" apparently by not mentioning everything that he was working on when he filed each
motion to extend time or by choosing to complete an answer brief to a baseless criminal

contempt charge and seeking an extension of time to file a reply brief in this case.

In spite of the foregoing, in this Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket #

33), it stated, "this appeal can be resolved without need for a reply brief from Adams."

As this Court granted a completely baseless motion allowing Weber to supplement the

record on appeal after the Appellant had filed his Initial Brief, refused to vacate it, and then

denied an unopposed motion for a brief extension of time to file a reply brief, this Court has

deprived the Appellant of his right to due process, and therefore, this Court's Order entered on

January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) should be vacated and as shown infra, this Court should either

enter an order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments entered in Adversary Case

No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG, barring the Plaintiff Appellees from objecting to the Appellant

Debtor's discharge, vacating the emoneously entered Order Denying Discharge of Debtor, and

directing the Bankruptcy Court to enter an order granting the Appellant Debtor a discharge of all

of his listed debts in Case No. 8:05-bk-29501-PMG or enter an order allowing the Appellant to

file an initial brief based on the record before the Court according to the dictates of due process

or at the bare minimum, enter an order allowing the Appellant a reasonable period of time in

which to file a reply brief.

This Court made numerous factual errors in the recital of the procedural
history in its Order entered on January 28,2009 and included false and defamatory
statements which were not relevant to this proceeding or the proceeding in the
bankruptcy court, and such errors indicate that the Court is obviously biased. Therefore,
this Court has deprived the Appellant of his right to due process and honest services.

In addition to the foregoing procedural errors, this Court's Order entered on January 28,

2009 (Docket # 33), states, "The answer brief of Appellees is thorough, well-reasoned, and

amply supported by the record and, thus, portions thereof will be adopted and incorporated
herein." As a result, this Court's Order is filled with factual errors and false and defamatory

statements which were not relevant to this proceeding or the proceeding in the

bankruptcy court, like most orders entered in favor of Timothy W. Weber who claims to be

connected and able to improperly influence members of the judiciarye2These fachlal errors and

irrelevant false and defamatory statements will be addressed, if necessary, in other motions and

complaints. However, the Court did properly note that virtually everything which may be

relevant to this proceeding is only alleged by Weber.

As a result of the obvious bias in favor of Weber and his co-conspirators and against the

Appellant, this Court deprived the Appellant to his right to a just determination of this action

before an impartial judge in violation of his right to due process, and therefore, this Court should

vacate the Order entered on January 28,2009.

Ground I

This Court ignored the facts and controlling precedent by failing

to enter an order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments
entered in Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG and barring the
Plaintiff Appellees from objecting to the Appellant's discharge.

This Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33), states, "In Ground I of the

instant appeal, Adams raises the following issue: Whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its

discretion in granting a motion for extension of time to object (t)o discharge or dischargeability

under Fed.R.Bank.P. 4004(B) without a hearing where the Debtor did not timely object to the

motion, never requested a hearing on the motion, and failed to timely seek reconsideration before

His boss, Anthony S. Battaglia, claims to be a member of the Mafia and boasts of his ability to
improperly persuade prosecutors, judges, members of law enforcement, and other government
representatives and agents. The Mafia's efforts to improperly influence and infiltrate our
government through bribes and extortion has been extensively documented. Two judges in
Pennsylvania just pIed guilty to charges concerning case fixing and depriving parties of due
process. Similar prosecutions have been commenced in other states, and according to the St.
Appellees relied upon the extension." However, this statement is also false as that is the restated

issue presented by Weber in which he ignores controlling precedent by pretending that it doesn't

exist and attempts to shift blame to the Appellant for Weber's ignorance of and failure to follow

the rules?

In fact, the issue raised in Point I of the Appellant's Initial Brief was "The Bankruptcy

Court erred as a matter of law by entering its Order Extending Time to Oppose Discharge or

Dischargeability without a hearing and without any showing of cause by the Appellees in

contravention of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(b), controlling precedent, and the

Appellant's right to due process." Weber's Answer Brief and this Court's Order entered on

January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) ignored the following facts and controlling precedent:

On October 19,2005, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Notice of Commencement which

set February 6,2006 as the deadline to file a complaint objecting to discharge of the Debtor or to

determine dischargeability of certain debts. (B: 8). The record shows that the first date set for the

meeting of creditors under $341(a) was December 8,2005. (B: 8).

On February 2,2006, Plaintiff Weber filed a Motion to Extend Time to Oppose

Discharge or Dischargeability (B: 9) without including the notice required by Local Rule 2002-4,

without including any evidentiary basis showing cause why an extension of time was necessary,

and without even alleging that the Debtor would not be prejudiced by an extension of time. The
-- - - - --

Petersburg Times, many members of Florida's government are very concerned about
prosecutions due to their illegal activities. See the Notice to the Court filed herewith.
Curiously, Weber is often able to get judges to issue orders contrary to the rules and controlling
precedent. One has to wonder whether Weber's success is due to the ability to influence the
connections which he, Battaglia, and their clients brag about. Naturally, one has to wonder
whether Weber and his co-conspirators will be able to continue to keep their criminal activity
from being presented to a grand jury, how quickly indictments will be issued, whether all of their
assets will be forfeited, and whether they will be able to defend themselves before a jury when
the Appellant pursues his civil RICO claims against them which exceed $300,000,000.00.
record shows that no hearing was scheduled on Plaintiff Weber's Motion to Extend Time to

Oppose Discharge or Dischargeability (B: 9) and that no hearing was held between the time it

was filed on February 2,2006 and February 17,2006 when the Bankruptcy Court entered its

Order Granting Motion to Extend Time to Oppose Discharge or Dischargeability (B: 10). (B: 7)

(Certified Docket for Bankruptcy Case No. 8:05-bk-29501-PMG). Furthermore, the record

shows that on April 7,2006, the last day allowed under the erroneously granted extension,

Plaintiff Weber belatedly filed a complaint objecting to the Appellant Debtor's discharge over

two months after the deadline of February 6,2006. (B: 7).

On December 5,2006, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Debtor's Motion to

Dismiss Adversary Proceeding. (AV 1: 3), the Appellees' Motion to Substitute Party, Issue Alias

Summonses, and Extend Time Period for Service of Process (AV1: 4), the Debtor's Motion to

Enter Judgment of Dismissal and Quash Notice of Hearing or Continue Hearing on Debtor's

Motion to Dismiss (AV1: 8), Lisa Adarns' Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss

Adversary Proceeding (AV1: 24) filed by the undersigned, and the Debtor's Amended Motion to

Dismiss Adversary Proceeding (AV 1: 25). (AV 1: 1).

The foregoing motions raised the Bankruptcy Court's entry of its Order Granting Motion

to Extend Time to Oppose Discharge or Dischargeability (B: 10) without a hearing and without

any evidentiary basis showing cause why an extension of time was necessary. (AVl : 25). In

addition, the Debtor Appellant raised the foregoing issues in his Motion to Vacate Ex Parte

Order Granting Motion to Extend Time to Oppose Discharge or Dischargeability and to Dismiss

Untimely Adversary Proceeding filed on December 11,2007 (B: 13), but on January 17,2008,

the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order denying the same. (B: 14).

Fortunately, the more people who jump in to help Weber and his co-conspirators cover up their
crimes, the more people that those damages can be collected from.

9
 Without ever reaching the merits and in spite of the motions to vacate the erroneously

entered order extending time to file a complaint objecting to discharge and to dismiss the

untimely filed adversary case, the Bankruptcy Court entered orders granting Plaintiff Weber's

motions for entry of default against the Defendant, Law Office of Mark A. Adams, P.A., (AV2:

18), against the Defendant, Lisa Adams, (AV2: 19), and against Appellant Debtor, Mark A.

Adams, (AVl : 2).

The pertinent part of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a) requires that "In a

chapter 7 liquidation case a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge under $727(a) of the

Code shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under

8 341(a)." The pertinent part of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(b) states, "On
motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice, the court may for cause extend the time

to file a complaint objecting to discharge." (Emphasis added.)

It is a violation of due process to enter an order granting a motion under Rule 4004(b)

without an opportunity to be heard, and such an order must be vacated. See es.. Cornin v.

&gin 30 F.3d 1443.1450-1451 (1 lth Cir. 1994) overmied on other mounds by Kontrick v.

Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,454-459 (2004). (Coggin referred to the deadline set by Rule 4004(a) for

filing a complaint objecting to discharge as jurisdictional; however, Kontrick held that it was not

jurisdictional.) In addition, the Coggin court recognized that a motion for an extension of time

under Rule 4004(b) must show sufficient facts to justify the grant of the extension and that the

debtor was not prejudiced by the extension. Id.

In Kontrick, the United States Supreme Court held that the deadline set by Rule 4004(a)

for filing a complaint objecting to discharge is a claim processing rule, and if a complaint is filed

after that deadline, it may be raised as a defense to such complaint at any time before a
bankruptcy court reaches the merits. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443.454-459 (2004).

Furthermore, the Kontrick Court recognized that the 1lth Circuit has held that a bankruptcy

court has "no discretion to grant an untimely motion to extend the time to object." Id. at 458

citing. In re Altoa 837 F.2d 457.459 (1 lth Cir. 19881.

As no hearing was held on Plaintiff Weber's motion to extend time to file a complaint

objecting to discharge, as Plaintiff Weber's motion failed to include any evidentiary basis

showing cause why an extension of time was necessary, and as these errors were raised prior to

reaching the merits in the adversary case, the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in

refusing to vacate its order to extend time to file a complaint objecting to discharge, in refusing

to dismiss the untimely filed complaint objecting to the Appellant Debtor's discharge, in entering

any defaults against the Defendants, and in entering any judgments in favor of the Plaintiff

Appellees in Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00 185-PMG.

Furthermore, as Plaintiff Weber failed to take appropriate action to correct the

Bankruptcy Court's violations of due process and instead proceeded to seek relief based upon

them, the Plaintiff Appellees cannot show that the Appellant Debtor was not prejudiced by their

improper actions, and therefore, it would be erroneous at this late date, over two and a half years

later, for the Bankruptcy Court to enter any order finding that the Appellant Debtor would not

have suffered prejudice by an extension of time in which to file a complaint objecting to his

discharge.

Instead of recognizing the controlling facts and precedent, Weber's Answer Brief and this

Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) ignores them and cites decisions from

lower courts which cannot overrule controlling precedent. See e.g., Johnson v. DeSoto Countv

Board of Commissioners. 72 F.3d 1556. 1559 (1 I th Cir. 1996). Fortunately for the Appellant
and other interested parties, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that

violation of a right made specific by statutes, rules or settled interpretations of them, commonly

known as controlling precedent, is a violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 242 which provides criminal

penalties for a deprivation of rights under color of law. U.S. v. Lanier. 520 U.S. 259,267

(1 997). By the way, Lanier is about a judge being prosecuted. In addition, such violations under

color of law also give rise to civil liability for such acts which is not protected by the judicially

created doctrine of judicial immunity.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate its Order entered on January 28,2009

and enter an order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments entered in Adversary

Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG and barring the Plaintiff Appellees fiom objecting to the

Appellant Debtor's discharge.

Ground I1

This Court ignored the facts and controlling precedent by failing

to enter an order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments entered
in Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG for lack of service of process sufficient to
obtain personal jurisdiction, barring the Plaintiff Appellees from seeking to obtain alias
summonses and perfect service of process at this late date, and barring the Plaintiff
Appellees from objecting to the Appellant Debtor's discharge at this late date.

This Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33), states, "Ground I1 of

Adams' appeal asserts the following issue: Whether the Banla-uptcy Court abused its discretion

in extending, by 13 days, the time for service of process under Fed,R.Civ.P. 4(M),made

applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings, where the Debtor evaded service of process and

where a refusal to grant the brief extension would have resulted in Appellee's claims being time-

barred." However, this statement is also false as that is the restated issue presented by Weber in
which he ignores controlling precedent by pretending that it doesn't exist and attempts to shift

blame to the Appellant for Weber's ignorance of and failure to follow the rules.

In fact, the issue raised in Point I1 of the Appellant's Initial Brief was "The Bankruptcy

Court erred as a matter of law by proceeding in the Adversary Case without valid service of

process sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in contravention of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy

Procedure 7004 and the Appellant's right to due process." Weber's Answer Brief and this

Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) ignored the following facts and

controlling precedent:

The Certified Docket for Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG (AVl : 1) shows that a

summons was issued on April 7,2006 (AV 1: 2) and that an Amended Complaint was filed later

on April 7,2006. (AV1: 1). The record shows that no service of process was made within 120

days and that no new summonses were issued prior to October 26,2006. (AVl: 1). Instead, the

Return of Service on the Appellant (AV1: 9) and the Return of Service on the Law Office of

Mark A. Adams, P.A. (AV1: 10) show that these summonses were served on Auyst 18,2006,

over 120 days after these summonses expired on April 17,2006.

On September 18,2006, the Appellant served the Debtor's Motion to Dismiss Adversary

Proceeding. (AVI: 3). On October 23,2006, the Debtor served and filed the Debtor's Motion to

Enter Judgment of Dismissal and Quash Notice of Hearing or Continue Hearing on Debtor's

Motion to Dismiss (AVl : 8) which showed that the Plaintiffs had failed to make any timely

response to the Debtor's Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding and that the Plaintiffs had also

failed to even request a hearing on it and which requested a continuance of the hearing on the

Appellant Debtor's Motion to Dismiss which had been scheduled for October 24,2006.
 On October 19,2006, the Plaintiff Weber belatedly filed a Motion to Substitute Party,

Issue Alias Summonses, and Extend Time Period for Service of Process (AVl :4) in which

Weber demonstrated that he was completely ignorant of the most basic rules of procedure

including the rules requiring service of a summons within 10 days of its issuance, requiring that a

valid swnmons be served within 120 days of filing suit, and allowing service of summons by

mail. Weber f i e r demonstrated his complete ignorance by failing to ask for issuance of new

summonses and instead asked the Bankruptcy Court to make service of the expired summonses

served on the Appellant and the Law Office of Mark A. Adams, P.A. valid! (AV 1:4, p. 3)

On October 24,2006, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing in spite of its knowledge of

the Appellant Debtor's inability to attend, heard argument, and granted a continuance, but also,

granted some relief to the Plaintiffs even though no notice of hearing had been served regarding

the Plaintiffs' motion and even though such motion had only been mailed to the Debtor on

October 19,2006. (AV 1: 1 and 18).

On October 26,2006, the Court entered its Order Directing Issuance of Alias Summons

and Continuing Hearing which stated, "Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days fiom the date of

issuance of the alias summons in which to perfect service of process on Lisa Adams." (AVI : 18).

On October 26,2006, an alias summons was issued (AV 1: 17), and on November 22,

2006, Plaintiff Weber filed a Notice of Filing the Return of Service on Lisa Adams (AV1: 22)

which purported to show service of process on Lisa Adams by mailing the alias summons and

complaint to her at 4129 Balington Drive in Valrico, Florida 33594 on October 30,2006 (AV1:

23).

On November 27,2006, the undersigned served Lisa Adams' Motion to Quash Service of

Process and to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding (AVl: 24) which sought an order quashing service
of process and dismissing this adversary proceeding for lack of jurisdiction over the person,

insufficiencyof process, insufficiency of service of process, failure to prosecute, and failure to

comply with the Bankruptcy Court's Order dated October 26,2006 (AVl : 18). In addition, this

motion pointed out that due to the repeated threatening and harassing phone calls which appear

to have come from Plaintiff Weber, the other Plaintiffs or the others who are currently the

subject of the FBI's criminal investigation, Lisa Adams decided to move to ensure her safety and

the safety of her children. (AVl :24, pg. 5). On August 6,2006, Lisa Adams ceased residing at

4129 Balington Drive in Valrico, Florida as shown by the -davit of Lisa S. Adams which was

attached as Exhibit A to Lisa Adams' Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss

Adversary Proceeding. (AV1: 24, pg. 5 and Exhibit A).

On December 5,2006, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Debtor's Motion to

Dismiss Adversary Proceeding. (AV1: 3), Plaintiff Weber's Motion to Substitute Party, Issue

Alias Summonses, and Extend Time Period for Service of Process (AV1: 4), the Debtor's

Motion to Enter Judgment of Dismissal and Quash Notice of Hearing or Continue Hearing on

Debtor's Motion to Dismiss (AV1: 8), Lisa Adams' Motion to Quash Service of Process and to

Dismiss Adversary Proceeding (AV 1:24) filed by the undersigned, and the Debtor's Amended

Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding (AVl :25). (AVl : 1). The foregoing motions heard on

December 5,2006, raised the lack of service of any summons sufficient to obtain personal

jurisdiction on any defendant (AV 1: 3,24, and 25). The Bankruptcy Court entered an Order on

the foregoing motions on March 19,2007. (AV2: 2).

In it's Order entered on March 19,2007, the Banlcruptcy Court found that "the Plaintiffs

have not shown good cause for their failure to perfect service in accordance with Rule 4(m)."

(AV2: 2, p. 8). In addition, the Bankruptcy Court found ''that the Plaintiffs have not satisfied
their burden of showing good cause for their failure to serve the Debtor within 120 days after

filing the Complaint." (AV2: 2, p. 8). Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged that

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(e) "provides that service shall be made by delivery

of the summons and complaint within ten days after the summons is issued." (AV2: 2, p. 6).

However, the Bankruptcy Court's Order then held that service on August 18,2006 of the

Summons issued on April 7,2006 which expired ten days after its issuance or after April 17,

2006, and over 120 days prior to service was timely and valid! (AV2: 2, p. 17). In addition, the

Bankruptcy Court's Order held that a Summons issued on October 26,2006 which the Plaintiffs

served by mail to Lisa Adams at 4129 Balington Drive in Valrico, Florida was effectively served

on her even though the only evidence offered was that Lisa Adams had not resided in the State of

Florida since August 6,2006. (AV2: 2, p. 17).

As the Bankruptcy Court r e b e d to dismiss the adversary proceeding commenced after

the bar date and in which no valid service had been made on any defendant, none of the

defendants filed any answer, and as a result, the Plaintiff Weber filed Motions for Entry of

Default against the Appellant Debtor, Mark A. Adams, (AV2: 10 and 22), the Defendant, Lisa

Adams, (AV2: 14), and the Defendant, Law Office of Mark A. Adams, P.A. (AV2: 15).

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 7004(e) mandates that "Service made under

Rule 4(e), (g), @)(I), (i), or (j)(2) F.R.Civ.P. shall be by delivery of the summons and

complaint within 10 days after the summons is issued." (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, Rule

7004(e) mandates that "If a summons is not timely delivered or mailed, another summons

shall be issued and served." (Emphasis added.)

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(l) allows service of process on an

individual by mail "by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode...." (Emphasis added.) The Rules do not say service

of process may be made by mailing it to someone's former dwelling house, former usual place of

abode, or former residence.

The pertinent parts of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(a)(l) provide that

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) applies in adversary proceedings. The pertinent part of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires that "If service of the summons and complaint is

not made upon a defendant within 120 days afier the filing of the complaint, the court, upon

motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without

prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided

that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service

for an appropriate period." (Emphasis added.)

"When service of process is challenged, the party on whose behalf it is made must bear

the burden of establishing its validity." See, e. g., Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil. S. A.,

629 F.2d 1134, 1 139 (5th Cir. 1980).

Untimely service of a summons and nondischargeability complaint more than one month

after the summons was issued by the clerk of the bankruptcy court was a jurisdictional defect

precluding entry of a judgment against the debtor. In re C a b e l l . 105 B.R. 19 (9th Cir. 1989).

"It is axiomatic that absent good service, the Court has no in personam or personal

jurisdiction over a defendant." In re Welther. 343 B.R. 340,343 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 2006).

"Without personal service of process in accordance with applicable law, a federal court is

without jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against a defendant." &citing Royal Lace

Pauer Works.Inc. v. Pest-Guard Products. Inc.. 240 F,2d 814 (5th Cir. 1957).
 Insufficient service of process implicates personal jurisdiction and due process concerns.

Worldwide Web Systems. Inc.. v. Feltman, 328 F.3d 1291. 1299 (1 lth Cir. 2003). "Generally,

where service of process is insufficient, the court has no power to render judgment and the

judgment is void." Id. (Emphasis added). A judgment entered in an action where service of

process was insufficient is void unless the defendant failed to raise insufficient service in its

motion to dismiss, its answer, or its motion to vacate default if one was made. Id. at 1299-1301.

The record shows that the only summonses served on the Appellant Debtor and the Law

Ofice of Mark A. Adams, P.A., were issued on April 7,2006 and were served on August 18,

2006 over 120 days after such summonses expired. The record shows that Plaintiff Weber

purported to show service of process on Lisa Adams by mailing the alias summons and

complaint to her at 4129 Balington Drive in Valrico, Florida 33594 on October 30,2006, but the

only evidence offered was that Lisa Adams had not resided in the State of Florida since August

6,2006. The record also shows that insuflicient service of process was raised in the initial

motions to dismiss filed by each of the defendants in Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG

and that this fundamental jurisdictional issue was never waived by any of the defendants.

Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law by entering orders determining that

such service was sufficient, and as such service was insufficient, the default judgments entered

by the Bankruptcy Court are void as a matter of law.

Furthermore, the record shows that Plaintiff Weber demonstrated his complete ignorance

by failing to ask for issuance of new summonses with which to attempt to obtain valid service of

process and instead waived the opportunity to request appropriate relief by asking the

Bankruptcy Court to make service of the expired summons served on the Appellant and the Law

Ofice of Mark A. Adams, P.A. valid and to make service of a summons to Lisa Adams at her
former residence valid! The Bankruptcy Court properly found that "the Plaintiffs have not

shown good cause for their failure to perfect service in accordance with Rule 4(m)" and '%at the

Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of showing good cause for their failure to serve the

Debtor within 120 days after filing the Complaint."

As Plaintiff Weber failed to take appropriate action to correct his failures to obtain valid

service of process and instead waived that possibility by proceeding to seek relief based on

invalid service of process, the Plaintiff Appellees cannot show, over two and a half years later,

that the Appellant Debtor was not prejudiced by their improper actions, and therefore, it would

be erroneous at this late date for the Bankruptcy Court to enter any order reversing its finding

that the Plaintiff Appellees have not shown good cause for their failures to perfect service in a

timely manner and that they deserve any extension of time to perfect service on any of the of the

defendants in Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG.

Instead of recognizing the controlling facts and precedent, Weber's Answer Brief and this

Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) ignores them, pretends that the issue is

whether or not time for service can be extended, cites decisions concerning that issue, and does

not cite any precedent which overrules controlling precedent cited above holding that service of

an expired summons does not confer personal jurisdiction. Of course, no such cases could be

cited as %here service of process is insufficient, the court has no power to render judgment

and the judgment is void." Worldwide Web Systems. Inc., v. Feltrnan. 328 F.3d 1291.1299

Jl 1th Cir. 2003).

Once again, this Court must follow binding precedent. See e.g., Johnson v. DeSoto

County Board of Commissioners, 72 F.3d 1556. 1559 (1lth Cir. 1996). Violation of a right

made specific by statutes, rules or settled interpretations of them, commonly known as

controlling precedent, is a violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 242 which provides criminal penalties for a
deprivation of rights under color of law. U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S.259,267 (1997). By the way,

Lanier is about a judge being prosecuted. In addition, such violations under color of law also

give rise to civil liability for such acts which is not protected by the judicially created doctrine of

judicial immunity.

Therefore, this Court should vacate its Order entered on January 28,2009 and enter an

order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments entered in Adversary Case No.

8:06-ap-00185-PMG for lack of service of process sufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction,

barring the Plaintiff Appellees fiom seeking to obtain alias summonses and perfect service of

process at this late date, and barring the Plaintiff Appellees from objecting to the Appellant

Debtor's discharge at this late date.

Ground 111

This Court ignored the facts and controlling precedent by failing

to enter an order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments entered in
Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG for lack of sewice or process sufficient to obtain
personal jurisdiction and for failure to include the required evidentiary basis for the relief
requested by the Plaintiff Appellees.

This Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33), states, "Ground I11 of the

appeal asserts the following issue: Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in entering a judgement

denying the Debtor's discharge and the dischargeability of the sanctionsjudgment in favor of

Appellees and against the Debtor without an affidavit." However, this statement is also false as

that is the restated issue presented by Weber in which he ignores controlling precedent by

pretending that it doesn't exist and attempts to shift blame to the Appellant for Weber's

ignorance of and failure to follow the rules.

 In fact, the issue raised in Point 111 of the Appellant's Initial Brief was "The Banlcruptcy

Court erred as a matter of law by entering defaults in the Adversary Case without the required

showings of valid service of process and of an evidentiary basis for the relief requested by the

Plaintiff Appellees." Weber's Answer Brief and this Court's Order entered on January 28,2009

(Docket # 33) ignored the following facts and controlling precedent:

As the Bankruptcy Court refused to dismiss the adversary proceeding commenced after

the bar date and in which no valid service had been made on any defendant, none of the

defendants filed any answer, and as a result, the Plaintiff Weber filed Motions for Entry of

Default against the Appellant Debtor, Mark A. Adarns, (AV2: 10 and 22), the Defendant, Lisa

Adams, (AV2: 14), and the Defendant, Law Office of Mark A. Adams, P.A. (AV2: 15).

However, once again, the Plaintiff Weber demonstrated his ignorance by failing to include any

affidavits supporting the claims made in his Complaint or his Amended Complaint to which he

also failed to attach a copy of the void judgments which he seeks to collect upon and which he

claims supports denial of a discharge to the Appellant Debtor. (AV2: 10, 14, 15 and 22).

In spite of the lack of service of any valid summons and the lack of any of the required

evidentiary support for the claims brought by Plaintiff Weber, the Bankruptcy Court entered

orders granting Weber's motions for entry of default against the Defendant, Law Ofice of Mark

A. Adams, P.A. (AV2: 18), against the Defendant, Lisa Adams, (AV2: 19), and against

Appellant Debtor, Mark A. Adams, (AVl: 2). Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court entered a

Default Final Judgment against the Appellant Debtor, Mark A. Adarns. (AVl: 4).

"A defendant's default does not in itself warrant the court in entering default judgment.

There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered." Nishimatsu

Construction Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank 5 15 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).
 Local Rule 7055-2(a) mandates, "When a party seeks a default judgment as a result of a

defendant's failure to respond after being served with a complaint, if otherwise appropriate, the

Court may enter a default judgment upon being provided with the following: ...(3) Motion

for judgment by default. Attached to the motion shall be an aflidavit in support of the

allegation set forth in the complaint." (Emphasis added). In addition, Local Rule 7055-2(c)

mandates, "The motion for entry of default shall state that service was duly effectuated in

compliance with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.. ." (Emphasis added).

As the Plaintiff Appellees failed to include any affidavits in support of the allegations set

forth in their Complaint or their Amended Complaint in their motions for default and also failed

to even attach a copy of the void judgments upon which they sought to collect and which they

claim supports denial of a discharge to the Appellant Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court erred as a

matter of law by entering defaults against any defendant and by entering any judgments in favor

of the Plaintiff Appellees in Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00 185-PMG.

Instead of recognizing the controlling facts and precedent, Weber's Answer Brief and this

Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) ignores the mandates of Local Rule

7055-2 which require an affidavit showing both valid service of process, which did not exist, and

support for the allegations set forth in the complaint in order to enter a default judgment. Weber

makes the twisted argument which the Court adopted without citation to any authority supporting

entry of a default judgment without an affidavit showing valid service of process and support for

the allegations made in the complaint and once again, without even attaching a copy of the void

judgments which Weber claims supports denial of a discharge.4 Apparently, there is no

Weber obviously chose not to submit the required affidavit as it would have exposed him to a
slam dunk perjury charge, and Weber obviously chose not to attach a copy of the wish list
sanctionsjudgment which he prepared and submitted to Judge Crockett Farnell for entry without
being requested on the record to do so and without any semblance of due process or jurisdiction.
precedent which could be cited as this reasoning is clearly contrary to controlling precedent

noted above.

Once again, this Court must follow binding precedent. See ex., Johnson v. DeSoto

County Board of Commissioners, 72 F.3d 1556, 1559 (1lth Cir. 1996). Violation of a right

made specific by statutes, rules or settled interpretations of them, commonly known as

controlling precedent, is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 which provides criminal penalties for a

deprivation of rights under color of law. U.S.v. Lanier. 520 U.S. 259,267 (1997). By the way,

Lanier is about a judge being prosecuted. In addition, such violations under color of law also

give rise to civil liability for such acts which is not protected by the judicially created doctrine of

judicial immunity.

Therefore, this Court should vacate its Order entered on January 28,2009 and enter an

order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments entered in Adversary Case No.

8:06-ap-00185-PMG for lack of service or process suf5cient to obtain personal jurisdiction and

for failure to include the required evidentiary basis for the relief requested by the Plaintiff

Appellees.

Ground IV

This Court ignored the facts and controlling precedent by failing

to enter an order vacating the erroneously entered Order Denying Discharge of
Debtor, and directing the Bankruptcy Court to enter an order granting the Appellant
Debtor a discharge of all of his listed debts in Case No. 8:05-bk-29501-PMG.

This Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33), states, "Finally, in

Ground IV of the appeal, Adams presents the following issue: Whether the Debtor may

prosecute an untimely appeal ftom orders and judgments entered against Lisa Adams and Law

Offices of Mark A. Adams, P.A. where the Debtor, a disbarred attorney, was permanently

enjoined from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and was warned not to represent the
interests of these parties in the Bankruptcy Court." However, this statement is also false as that

is the restated issue presented by Weber in which he ignores controlling precedent by pretending

that it doesn't exist and attempts to shift blame to the Appellant for Weber's ignorance of and

failure to follow the rules.

In fact, the issue raised in Point IV of the Appellant's Initial Brief was "The Bankruptcy

Court erred as a matter of law by denying a discharge to the Appellant Debtor based upon the

erroneously entered default in the Adversary Case." Weber's Answer Brief and this Court's

Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) ignored the following facts and controlling

precedent:

In spite of the lack of service of any valid summons and the lack of any of the required

evidentiary support for the claims brought by Plaintiff Weber, the Bankruptcy Court entered

orders granting Weber's motions for entry of default against the Defendant, Law Office of Mark

A. Adams, P.A. (AV2: 18), against the Defendant, Lisa Adams, (AV2: 19)' and against

Appellant Debtor, Mark A. Adams, (AV1: 2). Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court entered a

Default Final Judgment against the Appellant Debtor, Mark A. Adams. (AVI : 4).

Finally, in spite of the fact that the record shows that on April 16,2008, the Trustee filed

a Report of No Distribution (B: 7), that the Trustee had not participated in the adversary

proceeding brought by Plaintiff Weber (AV1: l), that the Appellant Debtor had sought the

discharge of other debts (B: 7), and that no other creditor had objected to the discharge sought by

the Appellant Debtor in any way (B: 7), the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Denying

Discharge of Debtor based solely on it's erroneous entry of a default judgment against the

Appellant Debtor in the adversary proceeding. (B: 21).

 "Where service of process is insufficient, the court has no power to render judgment

and the judgment is void." Worldwide Web Systems. Inc., v. Feltman, 328 F.3d 1291.1299

/I lth Cir. 2003). (Emphasis added). In addition, the default judgment was entered without the

evidentiary basis required by the Rules and controlling precedent.

Instead of recognizing the controlling facts and precedent, Weber's Answer Brief and this

Court's Order entered on January 28,2009 (Docket # 33) ignores them and pretends that the

Appellant has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by pointing out that judgments were

entered against Lisa Adarns and the Law Ofice of Mark A. Adams, P.A. without jurisdiction.

However, entry of an order or judgment without jurisdiction is a violation of 18 U.S.C. 8

242 which provides criminal penalties for a deprivation of rights under color of law. U.S. v.

Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,267 (1997). Anyone can report a criminal violation, and in fact, pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. 5 4, it is a crime to fail to take action to report criminal violation of Federal law to a
judge or appropriate authority. In addition, this Court, each of Judge Lazzara's law clerks who

reviewed this case, and each member of his staff who did so, is required by 18 U.S.C. $ 4 to take

appropriate action to report the criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. 58 241 and 242 committed by

Judge Paul M. Glenn at the request of Timothy W. Weber, and by assisting in covering up those

criminal actions, this Court and the aforementioned staff members are also in criminal violation

of 18 U.S.C. 5 3.
Furthermore, if an examination of the record shows that the trial court did not have

jurisdiction, an appellate court must reverse the judgment. See. e.rr., Mansfiled v. Swan, 111 U.S.

379.381 (1884). As the lower court's entry of judgments without jurisdiction has been brought

to this Court's attention, this Court is required by controlling precedent to vacate them sua sponte

without even a request by an affected party, and once again, any failure to do so is a violation of
a right made specific by statutes, rules or settled interpretations of them, commonly known as

controlling precedent, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. $242 which provides criminal penalties

for a deprivation of rights under color of law. U.S. v. Lanier. 520 U.S. 259,267 (1997). By the

way, Lanier is about a judge being prosecuted. In addition, such violations under color of law

also give rise to civil liability for such acts which is not protected by the judicially created

doctrine of judicial immunity. Naturally, if this Court takes appropriate action in compliance

with controlling precedent, the Court and its staff avoid any criminal or civil liability.

Once again, as the Bankruptcy Court had no basis other than the erroneously entered and

void default judgment upon which to deny the Appellant Debtor a discharge of his debts, the

Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law and its findings were clearly erroneous when it

entered its Order Denying Discharge of Debtor, and this Court should vacate its Order entered on

January 28,2009.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate its Order entered on January 28,

2009, and enter an order requiring the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgments entered in

Adversary Case No. 8:06-ap-00185-PMG, barring the Plaintiff Appellees from objecting to the

Appellant Debtor's discharge, vacating the erroneously entered Order Denying Discharge of

Debtor, and directing the Bankruptcy Court to enter an order granting the Appellant Debtor a

discharge of d l of his listed debts in Case No. 8:05-bk-29501-PMG.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of this document via U.S. Mail

to Stephen L. Meininger, Esquire, attorney for the Bankruptcy 'Trustee, at 707 North Franklin

Street, Suite 850; Tampa, FL 33602; to Donald R. Kirk, Esquire, of Fowler White Boggs Banker,
P.A., counsel for Timothy W.Weber, at P.O.Box 1438; Tampa, FL 33601 ;and to Timothy W,

Weber, Esquire, pro se of Battaglia, Ross, Dicus & Wein, P.A., at P.0.Box 41 100; St

Petenburg, FL 33743 on this 7'- C . day of February, 2009.

Mark A. Adams JDIMBA

4129 Bdington Dr.
Valrico, FL 33596
Telephone: 8 1 3-643-44 12