machine safety, pressure vessels. construction products, and so on. It has to be said.

however, that much of this information is at a 'macro' level. covering all manufacturing industry, and certainly valve and actuator companies see the need for detailed guidance relevant to their sector. In this respect, BV AMA has acted on behalf of the industry and has produced guidance notes on, for example, product-liability legislation specifically in relation to practical questions raised by manufacturers. Other regulations are being studied in the same way. IS stanAnother area for representation dardization. and the importance of product standards for the valve and actuator industry cannot be over-emphasized, certainly with EC

directives, where working to harmonized standards is one way of meeting essential safety requirements. Considerable progress has been made with European Standards for valves and actuators through the UK national body, BSI. and into the European Standards Organization, CEN. BV AMA members represent the industry on 12 CEN committees and working groups, covering all product and application areas. The British Valve and Actuator Manufacturers' Association is based in Birmingham, UK an can be contacted by phone on 021 643 3331, or by fax on 021 643 5064. Among its publications of interest to readers of Pipes & PI/ielines International will be Valves and actuators from Britain, the Valve and actuator manual, Codes of practice and guidance notes, and the BVAMA members and products list.

Causes and frequency of failures on gas mains in the USSR

t,

by S I Levin and V V Kharionovsky

All Russian Scientific/Research Institute for Natural Gas and Gas Technology (VNIIGAS), Moscow, Russia

ANII.YSI5; o( tht' the problems o(protccting the environment. a basis .flJl' enhancing their rt'liabilit)" 1I11denmter gas solutions to caust's o(.f{ll"lure in gas pipt'lines .flml1S In/wrticlI/m: the ana(rsis offai/urt's in and providing pi/wlines is gaining in importance becallst' these relJairs requirc considerable time and /abol/l: n,is paper dcscrihes the causes andf;H/lIen(r o{jiti/lIres ofg(/S nwinsf()/' the pcriod /98/-/990. and of IIndcl1l'ater gas pipelincsfor the
/wrioc! /970-/990.

Gas-main

failures during 1981-1990

The total length of gas mains in the former Soviet Union (FSU) increased by ~3'<)OOkm during the period 19RI-1990. and reached 20H100km by early 1990. During this decade. the biggest gas pipelines. of 1.420mm (56in) diameter. were constructed and put into service. linking the gasfields of West Sioeria to the European industrial regions. The average annual growth rate was XJOOkm. Statistical data have oeen used for the analysis of I'ailures as a function of length of gas main. and arc given in Table I. The f(JIlowing causes of failure were analysed: material defects: construction and weld defects: external and internal corrosion and erosion: external intedcrence: violation of operating codes: others. The total numoer of failures \vhich occurred during this period due to the aoove causes was 752. One of the main reasons for 1~lilure was defects in pipe material.
PIPES

there were IOR cases. which accounted for 13.3% of the total number of failures. The most unfavourable year was 19R5. when there were 16 failures. compared to an annual average of 10 cases. Defects in equipment material caused 17 failures (2.3%), including five cases in 19~9. However. external corrosion (24R cases out of the total numoer of 752) was the main cause (33%) of failure for gas pipelines. Internal corrosion and erosion led to 52 failures (6.9%). Unfortunately. erosion-induced failures were not identified in this number, and it was therefore impossible to cletermine an exact number of failures which took place due to internal corrosIOn. Construction defects (dents. scores, etc.) were the cause of R.6% of failures: weld defects accounted for 10.8%. hence, 19.4% of the total numbers of failures occurred due to insufficient control of construction. External interference resulted in 127 failures. of which 26 occurred in 19X7. Similarly. violation of operating codes led to 22 failures (2.9%). Other reasons accounted for 40 cases (5.3%).
9

For the period

INTERNATIONAL

under

consideration

& PIPELINES

July -- August 1993

...

as a % of Causes of failure:

-1 19811981-90 total 22 938 87 76 55 42 45 2921 1984 1 1986 3 12(0.60) 43138 222 28 97 68 49 13(0.34) 2210 32 2 5 7526 12196 26(0.094) 5(0.030) 9(0.088) 1988 54 45 14 124 54 82 74 1985 1982 1983 1774 216 2489 18 17 39 11 10 67 1(0.058) 6513 4(0.008) 9(0.023) 3 4 177 160 170 1276 for 40(0.031) 129 1989 81 66 1000 10 81(0.55) 189 207 3 (0.024) (0.43) 5 (0.023) (0.020) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.59) (0.048) (0.047) (0.072) (0.147> (0.124) (0.189) (0.090) (0.044) (0.215) (0.171) (0.283) (0.022) (0.53) (0.027> (0.029) (0.051) (0.081) (0.031) (0.059) (0.016) (0.028) (0.018) (0.48) (0.04D> (0.061) (0.100) (0.068) (0.151) (0.088) (0.037) (0.087> (0.010) (0.039) (0.700) (0.047) (0.124) (0.46) (0.005) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.034) (0.078) (0.040) (0.021) (0.051) (0.056) (0.020) (0.086) (0.26) (0.28) (0.074) (0.021) (0.039) (0.026) (0.010) (0.061) (0.043) (0.049) (0.032) (0.007) (0.113) (0.290) 3 1981 (0.019) (0.057)52(0.089) (0.71) 100.0 1990 2.9 10.8 6.9 5.3 13.3 2.3 33.0 8.6 (0.121) 16.9
14

1990 Failures 1638 (0.010) Number and frequency of failures (per 1000km year) on gas pipelines 1981-1990
148

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Table 1. Causes and frequency of failures on gas pipelines 1981-1990.

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Table I illustrates the failure frequency for each cause in turn, along with an average failure frequency (0.46/LOOOkm/yr) on gas pipelines for all causes during the period 1981-1990. During the first five years (1981-85), the average failure frequency was 0.57: for the last six years it was 0.38. It should be noted that there was an increase in failure due to external interference within recent years (1986-90). The same applies to failures due to violation of operating codes, which increased from six during 1981-85 to 16 during 1986-90. The number of failures induced by material defects in the first five-year period was equal to that in the following five years. The numbers of failures caused by weld defects were also equal for both periods, and had not decreased by the end of the period under consideration. Failures caused by construction defects decreased slightly during the second fiveyear period compared with the first. A drop in the frequency of failures from 0.71 in 1981 to 0.46 in 1990 is explained primarily by a decrease in the number of failures caused by pipe corrosion. A decrease in the rate of corrosion itself is attributed to the construction of large-diameter pipelines (I,220-1,420mm) with an increased wall thickness. The same trend was observed in the USA[II The graph in Fig.1 illustrates the change in frequency of failure for each cause: the failure frequency for all causes is given by the envelope curve of the figure. USA/FSU comparison

The principal reasons for a lower frequency on large-diameter gas pipelines USA are as follows: increase in wall thickness:

failure in the

improved construction and control quality: shorter service life. It is likely that the same reasons resulted in declining failures in gas pipelines in the USSR in 1988-1990. Over this period. the average I~lilure frequency dropped to 0.26-0.34 (Table I). T.Anderson and A.Misundfl] point out that most corrosion failures in the USA occurred on fieldcoated pipes. This phenomenon indicates the higher quality of factory-coated pipes. Underwater gas-pipeline failures during 1961-1990

A comparison of failures in the USA and the FSU is of particular interest. At the present time, about 400,OOOkm of gas mains are operated in the USA[I]. Frequency of failure increases with an increase in their'service life. and corrosion-induced failures sharply increase in gas pipelines constructed before 1950. External interference is the main reason for the largest number of failures in the USA. According to statistics, poor quality of metal together with corrosion amounted to 15-20% of total failures. External interference and corrosion combined therefore amounted to 85% of total failures in the USA. Failure frequency declines with an increase in pipe diameter. For gas pipelines of a diameter of over 508mm, the failure frequency is within a range of O.I-0.6 failure per l.OOOkm/yr, with an average annual frequency of 0.3. These data are comparable with those for the USSR (see Table I), where the average annual failure frequency during the period 1981-1990 was 0.46.
12

The first investigations into accidents on underwater gas pipelines. and an analytical comparison of causes of failures in both the USA and USSR (at that time). were performed in the early I960s. A total of 42 accidents on USA pipelines and 26 accidents on USSR pipelines were analysedI2]. Gas pipelines which cross rivers over 30m in width, and which. according to previous codes and standards. required a mandatory emergency string. were included in the study for subsequent years. To summarize, 40 accidents which occurred in underwater gas pipelines were studied. Causes of failures were the same as for above-ground pipelines, except for pipeline-span vibration resulting in fatigue stresses and. finally. in complete pipe rupture (see Table 2). A span occurrence was usually due to insufficient depth of trench or insufficient weighting. Four such accidents took place in the period 1971-1975. However, after the adoption of codes on mandatory deepening of trenches beneath the level of the river bed. possible pipeline deformation or flotation. there has only been one accident during the last 15 years (1975-1990). The failure occurred on a 273mm gas pipeline with 8mm wall thickness at a crossing of the Alagir river in 1984. One of the mai n reasons 101' underwater gaspipeline failure on river flood plains was external corrosion (22.5% of total accidents). The main cause, however, was construction and weld defects (27.5%), while violation of codes and standards caused three accidents over the last five years (17%). Precise definition of failure frequency for underwater gas pipelines has been hampered by the fact that there was no data on the true length of these pipelines. In order to estimate failure frequency, therefore. the length of underwater gas pipelines was taken as 2% of the total length of gas mains constructed in the USSR Such an estimate allows calculation of a general trend in failure frequency for separate periods of construction, and
PIPES & PIPELINES INTERNATIONAL July - August 1993

pipelines 1971-1990 1 3 2

of total Causes of failure:

- Insufficient Transportation5 -- -7Number and- frequency Failures asa% (per 1000km year) of 3 1 4 14flOQdplain 40 16 3.40 5 1990 1980 197632 2.07 2.48 1985 198619811971(0.17) (0.08) 9 6 (0.08) pipeline (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.02) (0.06) (0.24) (0.19) 1971-90 - (1.04) (0.85) (0.94) (1.12) (0.29) (0.13) (0.16) (0.24) Remarksuntreated gas (0.06) (0.08) burial 1.35 of1 On7 for (0.30) of1975total pipeline (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) 2.5 10.0 17.5 12.5 100.0 7.5 22.5 (0.15) of 15.0
4

Assumed as 2% length

"

Table 2. Causl.'s and frl.'qul.'ncy of failurl.'s on underwater

gas pipdines,

1971-1990.

demonstrates that si nce 1971 the failure frequency had dropped to 0.29 in 1976-1980. increasing to 0.94-1.12 by 1990. The initial decline in accidents was the result of newly-developed. stringent. codes and standards for underwater crossings. The increase in accidents. which began in 1981. is explained by metal defects (five accidents). weld and construction defects (10 accidents) and corrosion (nine accidents). including \0 gas pipelines which had been under service for 15-20 years.

3. 4.

5.

Stringent control of pipe quality. especially for underwater pipelines. Stringent control of weld and construction works. Control must be entrusted to an independent body. The current design and construction norms and codes for gas mains must be corrected and improved according to new, morestringent. requirements for enhancing gaspipeli ne reliability and protecting the environment.

Conclusions
Based on the analysis of gas-pipeline failures, the following recommendations may be used to provide guidelines for gas-pipeline designers and operators: I. The application of pigging for monitoring corrosion. wear and position of pipelines[3]. 2. The use of factory-coated pipes. especially for flood plains, water obstacles and other dangerous areas.
PIPES & PIPELINES INTERNATIONAL July - August 1993

References
I. 2. 3. T.Andersen and AMisund. 1982. Pipeline remarks offailure rate and characteristics. reliability
Veriras.

- some 105.16-19.

S.I.Levin. 1963. Prevention of failures and repair of underwater pipelines. Gosloplekhizdal. 1'.184. R.W.Shannon and R.Enol!. 1985. On-line inspection:
Froc. 17th Annual development and operation experience. Offshore Technology Conference. Houston. Texas. 2. 259272.

13