Trex 04362

Distribution l. z. r. 4. 5.
JohnGuide,Deepwater HorizonWells TeamLeader Ian Littlq Wells Manager Jonathan Sprague, GoM WellsEngineering Authority Neil Cramond,GoM Marine Authority CentralFile EPT Drilling, Sunbury
DeepwaterHorizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period
September2009
Prepared by
KevanDavies, Rig Auditor 24 September 2009
Approvedby
NormanWong, Manager, Specialist Technical Support Rig Audit 30 September 2009
4v(,^2
Exhibit No. Worldwide Court
Inc,
BP.HZN.IIT-OOO887I
Confidential
BP-HZN-MBt001 36211
Executive Summary A rig andmarineassurance performed the semisubmersible auditw-as on drilling rig Deepwater Horizon. The rig wasauditedon locationat the Kodiak prospect at MississippiCanyon7-27. The auditwasundertaken a four rnanteamfrom 13 to 17 by September 2009. The rig commenced out of serviceperiodon 31 August2009to undertake the Llnderwater Lierr of Dry-dock (IIIVILD) inspection, system In DP rrpgrades, refurbishment the forwardandaft PRSandreplacement the iron roughneck. of of Prior to recommencing operations rig was subject a follow up rig and marine the to assurance audit,andkey functiontestingsuchas blackout recovery, customer acceptance trials concerning controlsystem DP upgrades.Planned checks verify the functionality to of the drill floor anti collisionsystem reliability of the iron roughneck PRS could and and not be performed on departure as from the rig issueswith this equipment werestill being addressed. The audit madea numberof findingq based the natureof thesefindings,i.e. rig floor on non operational, the potentialadverse preparedness and elt-ect rig emergency on and watertight integrityregarding marine the related issues recommendation made a w-as to theWells Teamto suspend operations until manyhavebeensatisfactorily addressed. Findingsof particularnotewerethe following: ) Closingout of the last auditrecommendations no apparent had verilicationby BP. Consequently numberof the recommendations Transocean indicated a that had as closedout hadeitherdeteriorated againor not beensuitablyaddressed the first in instance.
Control of work issuesidentified specifically with isolation permit process and integrity of mechanical i solations Numerous persormelchangeshad occurred in the eighteen months since our last audit. These were seenat all levels and all disciplines. Overdue planned rnaintenanceconsidered excessive 390 jobs amounting to 3545 man hours. With the recent shift fromEmpac to RMS II maintenancesystems and revised maintenancescheduling the back log does not look as though it will improve The aft PRS was non operational, the retract function of the lower arm was defective The iron roughneck could not be made to operate from Cyberbaseunless the anti collision systmwas in override
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Confidential BP-HZN-M8t00136212
F Top driveguardis not fitted with a safetysling, not only is this an NOV requirement alsoa lesson but learnedfrom industryincidents, includingoneon thts rig, wherethe guardhad beenknockedoff dueto equipment clash. D Annualdrawworksrnaintenance routineoverdue sinceFebruary 2009,includes critical checkson the brakingsystem ) Test,middleandupperBoP rambonnetsareoriginaland out with oEM andAPI five yearrecommended recertification period. The port aft quadrant watertightdampers failedto closewhentested The starboard quadrantbilge ballastvalves,ballastpumpandtank aft and sounding system whererendered inoperable to a process due station(PCU 13) cardfailure
) )
F Threeout of four electricbilge pumpsweretested, threefailedto achieve all suctiondueto defective priming systems ) Emergency bilgesuction checkvalveintegrity checks concluded valves w-ere passing
functionality. Insuffrcientonboardspares rnakerepairs to P Justone ofthe eight seawater coolingpumpswastotally defectfree. Two of the pumpswere identifiedduringthe previousaudit(January defective 2008)while someof the defective pumpscouldbe operated, four pumpswere deemed non operational
BP-HZN-IIT.OOO8873 Confidential BP-HZN-M8t00136213
Introduction requested Rig Audit Group JohnGuide,Deepwater HorizonDrilling Superintendent, the to performa follow up rig andmarineassurance audit on the semi-submersible Deepwater Horizon. Customer Acceptance Trials concerning DP hardware the and softwaremid life upgrade, blackout recoveryandDP field arrivaltrials were also a periodlocationto the field. witnessed from the out of service duringrnobilisation The follow up rig auditwasrrndertaken whilst on locationon DP at MississippiCanyon 7-27,Kodiak prospect.Operations on ongoingduringthe audit periodrverefocussed the drill floor whereproblemswith the refurbishedaft PRS and new iron roughneckwere beingworked. Audit focusin additionto the follow up teruns reference on was of verifuingthat equipment which had beenreplaced, or was changed upgraded operating correctlyandreliably. The auditwasundertaken a four manteamfrom 13to 17 September 2009. by KevanDavies GordonRichard RichardCox Barry Hayward TeamLeader,Drilling andTechnical HSE Marine TechnicalandMarine
(ARAS) to accept, The wells teammustreviewthe Audit ReportAction Sheet change or rejectthe recommendations. a recommendation not accepted reason the If is for the that decisionshouldalsobe documented filed. Rig Audit Groupconsider and perfiormance, implementation all recommendations improvesafbtyienvironmental of will; complywith industrystandards bestpractice, enhance operational integrity. and and Document The marineassurance in auditwascaptured the CommonMarine Inspection (ClvD) anda CMID Annex (BP requirements from forMODUs). Recommendations the marineassurance for audit areincludedin CMID Annex (BP requirements MODUs) report. lf a recommendation not accepted reason the decisionshouldbe is for the from documented, filed andthe Rig Audit Groupinformed. A11 marinerecommendations this reportmustbe trackedandsatisfactorily closedout. This reportincorporates auditfindingsandrecommendations will be placedon and the Point siteat https://epti.bpglobal.com/sites/RigAudit/default.aspx. the Rig Audit Share The wells teamis responsible completing audit reportactionsheets placing for and the point site. Furtheradviceon the functioningof the share the updated versionon the share point sitecanbe obtained from the authorofthis report. Observations The main scopeof work duringthe out of serviceperiod(OSP)includedinstallation a of refurbished iron roughneck, refurbishment ofthe forwardandaft PRSand,UnderWater in Lieu of Dry-dock (t VILD) classsurveyandupdateof the DP controlsystem
BP-HZN.IIT.OOO8874 Confidential BP-HZN-MB100136214
(software Trials.black out recovery Acceptance with associated Customer andhardware) period of andfreld arrivaltrials. Whilst the DP andUWILD elements the out of service respective Detailsof the generally went well the drill floor work was lesssuccessful. work scopes detailed with in the applicable sections this reportandalsothe CMID of are andCMID Annex. PreviousAudit needs be improved,as it was to Protocolfor closingout the last auditrecommendations closingout the evidentthat the closeout process utilisedwaswith Transocean a recommendations no apparent verificationby BP. Consequently numberof the and had recommendations Transocean indicated closedout had eitherdeteriorated that as findingswere in againor not beenzuitablyaddressed the first instance.In othercases simply rejected, with no formal risk mitigationdemonstrated. with respect closeout of classone andtwo recommendations Overallexpectations to werenot entirelyrnetandwhile it is appreciated a goodnumberof findingshadbeen that addressed hardwork andeffort thereweretoo manythat hadnot. by Safetv As of 15 September 2009the rig hasgone2390 dayswithout a DaysAway From Work nearhitswerereported over which is an excellent how'ever serious l5 Case achievement, following the was the lastyearanda safetystand-down heldprior to startingoperations needs be re-energised re-enforce to out of serviceperiod. The START tour process to to safetybehaviours ensure and that all work areas subjected periodicauditby the are providing Supervisors, who areaccompanied a junior memberof the crewtherefore by practice. An annualstructured Healthand SalbtyPlanwas not in somegood mentoring placealthougha numberof safetygoalswere listed,but thesewere not commonlyknown andnot widely communicated. TheBP HSE Policy postedwithin the accommodation was datedMay 2OO2; doesnot sendthe right message. this With manynew personnel, rigour is required ensure thereis the to that continuous level of consistency the application the risk management in tools including expected of shouldfocuson Permitto Work andEnergyIsolation. Seniorpersonnel supervisors and to that continuous improvement coaching crewsandthird partypersonnel ensure in the the controlsystems placeare beingeffectivelyapplied. in personnel knowledgeable It is a requirement all staffand contractors be ofthe that Practioes. Drilling and Well Operations Engineering Technical Practice and associated to The audithighlightedthat this still needed be communicated relevantTransocean to personnel the rig. on Controlof Work ApproximatelyTOYo ofwork wasbeingcarriedout u$ingTHINK plansandPromptcards procedure only used is but no TSTP. The TSTPwhich provides corerisk assessment the TSTPlibrarywasnot if oneis available thejob. It wasevident for thattheextensive weregenerally an reviewed of beingfully utilised. ThatsaidthewrittenTHINK plans
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quality andpersonnel acceptable were seento be activelyinvolvedduringthe THINK Planning process. Time out for safetywasbeingusedandpersonnel wereawarethat they had the right and the responsibility call a time out and stopthejob if they felt that this actionwas to required.Data arisingfrom useof the variousbehavioural risk management based tools was compiledby the RSTC and statistics werereporteddaily with personnel briefedon resultsat the variousrig meetings.It was notedthat approximately l4Yoof START cards were for safeand submitted were for unsafeor at risk operations while the remainder positiveobservations. was alsonotedthat the subrnission START cardsby Third It of Partypersonnel was low'' The BP GoldenRulessetout specificrequirements permitto work andenergy for isolation. This requires permitto be issued work on all energysystms.Howwer for a if the Transocean SMS cangavethe OM discretionto determine a permitto work wasan requirement additional for or whenan isolationcertificatewasissued maintenance repair of a system, component, or that containing energy. It wasunderstood an isolation certificatewasrarelyissued without a permitto work but an example was sightedwhen only an isolationcertificatehadbeenissued an electricalisolationprior to for replacement ofthe iron roughneck servicehosebundle. Thereneeds be clear to alignment between two requirements, wherethereis conflictthenthe higherlevel the and ofcontrol should applied. be identifiedduringthe auditconcerned integrityand Controlof work deficiencies the jobs, oneto application mechanical isolations.In the machinery of spaces permitted two replace air startcompressor makerhadresulted in an motor,the otherto cleana water gaugeon the air start non-isolation the mechanical of systems.An air receiverpressure compressor registering24baui, was despite the isolationvalve althoughshuthadnot this beenlockedortagged. The watermakerhadbeenopened andagainalthoughjacket up water andseawater inlet andoutletvalveswereclosedneitherwere lockedor tagged. Of moreconcern, hadnot beenidentifiedon the isolationcertificate. On another this pipe occasion isolationcertificateissued changing a valveandassociated work the for out in the port forwardballas pumproom did not hare the mechanical lock (padlock) numberidentifiedon the certificate henceall controlmeasures not beenrecorded. had Detailssuchastheseshouldbe verified beforework commences duringthe approval stageandfurtherchecked duringaudit. Othercontrolof work deficiencies alsoconcemed energyisolation,permitto work and improperTHINK planning. During overhaulof the aft PRSit developed incline of an approximately I feet from the verticalplanewhenr,l.ork I between shiftswas not effectivelycontrolledor risk assessed. brakemechanism beenremovedfrom the The had PRSuppercarriage this informationwas not handed and overbetween shifts. When work resumed the aft PRSa THINK plan wasnot undertaken identify and mitigate on to hazards.Hencetwo controlof work failinesresultedin unolanned the associated movement thePRS. of
BP.HZN-IIT-0008876
Confidential
BP-HZN-MBt00136216
ESD fault andinhibit alarmconditions were indicatedon the bridgefire andgaspanel. and unacknowledged The vesselmanagement system operatorstationwasreviewed line communication faultswerenoted On clearingthe line faults theESD fault condition cleared.Furtherreview indicated that activeESD inhibitswere in placefor the helifoam fire fighting system.These had beenin placeasa resuhof testingthe helifoamsystem operations.The the previousday and hadbeenin placeduringthe morning'shelicopter pre-anivalhadnot includedchecks Task SpecificThink Procedure for helicopter OSTP) and to ensure critical safetysystems all wereoperational clearlypoor controlof work and was management defeats bypasses evident. of and IncidentAnalvsisand Prevention The IncidentReportLog wasreviewedfor the pastyearandof the twenty sevenincidents (not reported, fourteenrelated personal injury of which four were recordable to includedtwo DAIWC). The remaining for serious nearhits. These thirteenwere duringdriil-floor incidentswhereanchored man-riderwinch lines hadbecomesnagged operations, line partedandthe otherwasdamaged.Anotherincidentinvolvedthe aft one PRSveering11 feet offthe verticalplane. Othersinvolveda torquevalve failing under nearhits relatedto pressure the lossof power,/blackout. remainingserious The and dropped objects. The status actionsarisingfrom theseincidentsshouldbe periodically of properclose-out; was not monitoredby BP to ensure to access the Focustrackingsystem possible duringthe auditperiod. Audit. Assurance Learning and (PMAA) wasconducted 30 between A Performance Monitoring Audit andAssessment with the ISM andISPSaudits. ThePMAA audit Juneand3 July 2009and coincided actionsand found no areas non-confbrmities of althougha numberof improvement for wererecorded.Oneof theserelatedto the requirement the rig to conectiveactions that areraised. This was not yet adoptthe practiceof requiringa permit for all isolations the case. The maintenance in the summary the PMAA highlighted fact that EMPAC wasbeing werestill to utilisedonboard. Therehassincebeena change the RMS ll. Personnel in to becomingfamiliar with the new systemandneeded be moreknowledgeable its use e.g. whenaccessing DROPSdataon the rig floor, therewas an issuein locatingitems the found in inspections hadbeencarriedout. that is Furtherassurance requiredto demonstrate the permitto work andenergyisolation that from sucha ths systems working asintended incorporate rigour that is demanded are and to of Work process.This areaneeds be continuallymonitored key elementof the Control by both BP andTransocean. Trainingand Comoetency with personnel The tumoverof personnel the rig hasbeenhigh overthe lasttwo years on or eitherbeingattracted othercontractors movedto new buildswithin the Transocean to Drillers,andvarious who OIM, Toolpusher, Fleet. Personnel havemovedon include Supervisor one department, Electrical drillingcrewpersonnelWithin the maintenance
BP.HZN.IIT-O008877 Confidential BP-HZN-MB100136217
andoneMechanicalSupervisor haveleft in additionto a numberof Mechanics and personnel beenshrinkingto the point Electricians.The coregroupof experienced has personnel wheresomeconsolidation now required. Any furtherdilution of experienced is may be detrimental the performance the rig. to of The Transocean TrainingMatrix was reviewed(updated 14 September 2009). Most on given for trainingrequiredagainst werehigh of the percentages trainingcompleted indicatingthat mostpersonnel of onboardwerenearingcompletion both On the Job Training(OJT) andexternaltrainingrequirementsTrainingrequirernents were that mostlyunfulfilled related the SafetyLeadership (41%) andthe Foundations course to Kelvin Top Setincidentinvestigation training(12%). During the auditnumerous discussions wereheld with a cross-section the crew andmostindicated of that they were committed the OJT programme. to Environmental DROPSOJTshadrecentlybeen and added the requirements hadnot yet beenadded the ongoingprogramme to but to Therewasno competence in assurance system place. This wasongoingon other Transocean but personnel rigs interviewedduringthe audit hadlittle or no knowledge of requirement the competence needto confirmthe Transocean to system.Rig management havea competence assurance system place. Thereis alsoa requirement in underthe BP Drilling andWell Operations Practice the contractor's for safetymanagement system to incorporate for slstems trainingandcompetency. Derrick Inspection DroppedObjects and The denick wasinspected assess of to structural conditionandeffectiveness dropped measures. DROPSinspections carriedout in accordance RMS with objectprevention are process II maintenance routinesandchecklists, sinceour last auditthe DROPSinspection picturebook covering hasbeensupplemented improvedwith the additionof detailed and following a comprehensive eachderrickfixture andall derricklevels. This was produced third party denick survey. A derrickregisterwasin useto controlpersonnel tool and movments the derrick,howevernot all informationwasbeingrecorded in e.g. some peoplewerenot signingthe log to register that they hadcomedovrnor notifiedthat tools andequipment beenremoved. had The derrickwas coveredin a thick film of drilling mud from the fingerboard level down; plugs. The this wasattributed the previousdrilling operation when settingbalanced to pluggedleadingto permanently danger beingthat drainholesin the girts becoming itemsof trash standing waterandcorrosion.Despiteregulardenick DROPSinspections wererecovered duringour inspectioqclearlythe requireddegree ofrigour andvigilance arenot beingexercised duringthe rig DROPSinspections.Althoughsecondary retention rn'ere of derrickfixtureswasgenerallysatisfactory identified. Best someanomalies practicesecuring while methods not beenemployed the CCTV cameras had for retentionof the flare igniter equipment secondary wasbestdescribed suspect.The rig as hasbeenoperational historyfiles just forty three since2001but according maintenance to derrickbolts havebeeninspected.Gven the rig's ageall bolts shouldhavebeen inspected thistime. by
BP-HZN-IIT-0008878 Gonfidential
i BP-HZN-MBt00136218
Many of the recommendations concerning boardsandsafetyslingsasper API toe recommended practices madeduringour 2008auditremainoutstanding with no action taken. It was alsosurprising find the top drive guardnot fitted with a safetysling,not to only is this anNOV requirement alsoa lessonlearned but from industryincidents, includingoneon this rig, wherethe guardhadbeenknockedoffdue to equipment clash. Althoughthe third party lifting gearinspection recentlybeencompleted, majority had the of derick fixed and looselifting gear\.vas incorrectlycolour coded. The utility winch turndownsheave example the mini derrickwas fotrndin poor conditionandmany for in of the remotegrease nipplesfor divert sheaves dry, indicatingthat greasing was not was beingperformed. Drilling Equipment On arrival on the rig work was still ongoingto complete installationof the new iron roughneck refurbishment the aft PRS. Problems beenencountered both and of had with projects. Initially somefunctionsof the iron roughneck not work; this wastracedto a faulty did serviceloop,thoughtto havebeendarnaged duringinstallation. The serviceloop was subsequently replaced with a new spare althoughall iron roughneck and functionswere now available machine the fromthe couldnot be indexed thuscouldnot be operated and Cyberbase chairsunless ACS releasdignore switches key wereoperated.Initially it was geartooth thoughtthat the problemmay be mechanical, difference track andencoder in a pitch, but this waseliminated. FaultfrndingeffortsusingE-Hawk, NOV's remote softwareinterrogation were thwartedasan undetermined issuewith the remote system, access modemcould not be resolved.Althougheveryeffort wasmadeto achieve iron roughneck operation from Cyberbase within the controlof ACS forwardprogress had and not beenmadeon our departure from therig. NOV inspection reportsdatedAugust2006andMay 2007 highlighted that both PRS' had worn pins andbushes, was highlightedduringour last auditin January it 2008that although this work was necessary improvePRSreliability it had not beencompleted. to Revier.r,' the planned of PRSwork scope revealed somegaps, against that completed basicallythe plannedpin, bushand guidewheelreplacements not beenperformed had on the forwardunit, andonly the forwardtailing arm hadbeenrefurbished.The aft PRShad generally beenrefurbished according planwith pins,bushes guide*'heels replaced ro and asrequired. Justification not completing work scope the forwardunit wasnot for on the provided. During the lastwell the linearactuator wasrenewed the aft PRS,a few dayslater on problems w-ere experienced with the lower armretractfunction. The lower armwould not stayfully retracted, on release thejoystick the arm extends by and of out approxirnately puttingthe aft PRS into ACS initiatedstop. A risk assessment 8" was undertaken allow continued of the PRS,this was achieved operators to use holdingthe by joystick in the retractpositionwhen slewingandtraversing PRS It wasthoughtthat the thiswasdueto the wearin thevarious pinsandbushes refurbishment wouldsolve and
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.'. the the issue. Howeverfollowing refurbishment problemis still prevalent; problem the interference appears be attributed mechanical to to between primaryarm and the arrn. Althoughthe armshavebeendimensionally cheiked,a difficult taskin stabiliser itself with the arm in sifu,Transocean troubleinterpreting requiredreadings had as the were availableeach threeseparate detaildesigndrawings one differentto the other. As a with the forwardPRS arm dimensions werecompared separate checkthe aft stJbiliser were identifiedwhich resulted the forwardarm having in stabiliser arm anddifferences greaterclearance had with the primaryarm. Prior to departure from the rig Transocean decided removethe aft stabiliser to for dimensional arm and sendit ashore accurate repair. analysis possible and l As reportedduringour 2008 auditcomprehensive to of checks verifu properoperation the (ACS) were still not beingperiodicallyundertaken.Clearlylessons anti-collisionsystem learned from the equipment collisionson this rig havenot beenfully implemented. it Top drive maintenance reportedasup to datewith no outstanding issues, was was howevernotedthat it hadbeenomittedfrom the recentdrilling load pathinspection and conditionof the mud hosewasunacceptable ';! The annualdrawworksmaintenance routinewas foundoverdue'since February2009. planned routine hadnot been or Whenqueried to why this criticalmaintenance as perfirrmed periodno answercouldbe j4ovided. This annual duringthe out of service maintenance routineincludesintegritychecks the drawworksdiscbrakingsystem on includingcaliperdisassembly, MPI of the pins andarmsandadjustment checks.When AssetIVlanager that challenged furtherthe Transocean communicated this maintenance list, maintenance routine,despite beingactivein RMS II andreferenced the overdue on hence therewas was no longervalid andw-ould changed ten or five yearfrequency be to no needto complete Giventhe plannedhigh casingstringweightson the forthcoming it. pins arenot uncornmon well andalsodueto the fact that cracklike indications andseized findingsfor this type of drawworksbrakingsystem Transocean wererequested to justificationfor provideformal technical routineor otherwise conductthe maintenance not performing it.
. l:l
remains Accordingto maintenance history calibrationof critical drilling instrumentation it is recommendations couldnot an areawhereimprovement required. Despiteprevious is be demonstrated all critical digital andanalogue that drilling instrumentation being calibrated. very poor, Third party inspection reportsof the drilling load pathweregenerally frequentlyamounting little morethana line item on a recordof examination sheet. to or and The actualcomponents areas or inspected were seldomreported indicated where pictorialrepresentation providedit did not accurately installed reflectthe equipment was MPI reportsfor the derrickfeet wererequested, thesecould on the rig. In one instance resultedin a not be located the rig, so a call to the third parryinspection on company previousinspection "MPI reportbeingfaxedto the rig with an additionalline item added; 4 derrickfeet - pass". This assurance approach certainlydoesnot providethe requiredor
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BP-HZN.IIT-OOO888O Confidential BP-HZN-MB100136220
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suchastop drive and expected degree integrityor rigour. Additionallyin manycases of PRSthe inspection reportsdid not tally with the procedure outlinedin R\4S II.
,t:
'
.T
Mud Systems ;i pumproom, shaker found in a clean The pit room> room andsackstoreweregenerally NDT inspections andtidy conditionwith no reported defects.Mud pumpcrankshaft notedon were in dateandreported defectfree. Excessive of silicon sealant'was as use the mud pumpcovers;this canresultin blockedoil galleries bearing-starvation and leadingto pumpfailure. OEM gaskets shorrld usedfollowing futuremaintenance be activity. i
'iil
Well Control i Following time spentwith the Subsea department wasevidentthat moStwell control it relatedequipment maintenance beingrecorded with RMS II oo t"f-a.ute is out spreadsheets inthe daily log book. and $ The uppermiddleandtest rambonnets original andtherefore witii OEM andAPI out are The ST-lockshavJhowever certificationrequirements. beenchecked.Itam cavity it measurements just beentakenbut resultshadnot beenrecorded, was had The communicated werewitlin recommended specificatio'ir. annual thatall clearances duringJuly2008. All NDT inspection the ramblocksandbuttons waslastperforrned of has annularand ram sealswerereplaced duringthe out ofservice period. One annular beenin servicefor threeyearswhile the innerand outerpistonwas rephted on the other havebeenaddressed way of by during2008. Sinceour lastvisig all tensioner defects hosewasreflacedduring new rodsand modifiedpacking,the lastremaining tensioner the audit period. Thereis no onecomplete tcnsionerin the yard anpanother spare currentlybeingoverhauled, t $
.t
The spare POD is not 100%complete beingdeficientin solenoidvalvesandthe SEM needs be refurbished Cameron. to by i'; is The previouslyreported"holed" hot line hasbeenrenewed the boostrhose original but poiicy. five supplyanddated1999,and, clearlyout with Transocean's yearreplacement hoses recordsthathigh pressure Indeedit couldnot be established 'wayof maintenance by Accordingto in with RMS II requirements. arebeingmaintained accordance in maintenance historythe chokeandkill manifoldhasnot beenmaintained accordance requirements indeedAPI recommended with formerTransocean maintenance or practices.Chokemanifoldvalveshavingbeenreplaced the basisof failure only, on periodicinternalchokemanifoldandvalve inspection havingnot beenperformed. Recentthird party inspection reportsfor riserbolts andinsertsagain*eril of a poor The rig now for had standard, serialnumbers traceabilitypurposes not beenrecorded,i hasan onboardriserbolt torquetool calibration unit, but calibrationcertificationfor this riser will unit couldnot be produced.Basedon Vetco recommendations bolt"torque be is on reduced from 25,500 ft-lb to 19,250 ft-lb duringthe nextwell, this change based the
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BP.HZN.IIT.OOO888l BP-HZN-M8100136221
introduction new lubricant.Moly Paste 70 asperthe technical of TS bulletin datedJune 2009. Reviewof the thickness inspection reportsfor the high pressure piping systems once againhighlightedan inferior reportingprocess.The reportsamounted little morethan to numbers the originalthickness, as corrosionallowance percentage and wearwere not specified.ln somecases largeportionsof high pressure pipework hadnot been inspected to access due issues and in somecases hearry corrosionwasnotedbut no measurement remrded. Maintenance Management Maintenance management system recentlybeenchanged has from Transocean's former Empacsystem the GSFlegacyRMS II system.Althoughtraininghasbeenprovided to for mostpersonnel manywere still comingto termswith the operation features and of RMS II. Althoughformer maintenance historyhasbeencopiedacross RMS tr based to on conversation observation is evidentthat Transocean not fully settherig up and it has for success termsof maintenance in management. IV{aintenance routinesnow encompass the former rig specificroutines, genericTransocean the Routines the legacyGSFbest and practicemaintenance routines;it hasbeenleft to the rig to decidewhich routinesare requiredandreportthosethat arenot usingthe change request system.In addition maintenance scheduling not been has well thoughtout,in manyinstances for each and disciplinesomemonthshasmoremaintenance hoursscheduled thanavailablemanhours; this will clearlyresultin increases overdue in maintenance. A reviewof the RMS I1 maintenance management systemindicated that therewere planned significantoverdue maintenance routinesin excess ofthirty days;these totalled 390 routineswhich corresponded 3545manhours. Many of thejobs were high to priority designation it is unclearwhy Transocean not plan someof these the and did for out ofservice period. Whilst it is appreciated attempts beingmadeto improvequality of maintenance that are reportingbased observations on duringthe auditperiodfurthereffort is still required. All too frequentlymaintenance historywas substandard missinginformationandpoor w'ith qualityrcportsthat lackedsufficientdetailto convince reader the thatthe taskhad actuallybeenperformedin accordance the procedure. with Planned maintenance inspected the tw'odeckcranes, was for knuckleboom craneand riser gantrycrane. All scheduled work appeared be up to date,with no current to outstanding corrective maintenance apparent implied. Additionallydeckcrane or pedestal NDT inspections boom segment and boltsreplacements werefoundin date With the excessive overdue maintenance the recentintroduction moremaintenance and of routinesil would appear that the maintenance department struggling stayin touch is to with the planned maintenance schedule. Software Management t2
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the limit switchfrozenin the closedposition. This thenmeans bridgewould be the unaware the statusof the door asthe limit switch alwaysreportsclosedstatus. of Additionallywhen reviewingalarmstatusconditions the vesselmanagement on system a numberof doorshad hadthe 100second alarmtimer disabled.This means that if the doorsareleft openfor morethan 100seconds then the audiblealarmwill not be generated line with the originalrequirements. in During the auditperiodprocess PCUI S servingthe starboard quadrant station aft failed. ThePLC card failure meantthat it wasnot possible operate starboard bilge and to the aft ballastvalves,ballastpumpremotelyandthe tank sounding system was alsorendered inoperable.The defectcould not be immediately rectifreddueto insufficientonboard spares. During testingof the bilge system threeof the four electricbilge purnps failed to take suction, priming devices the beingdefective. Two emergency bilge suctioncheckvalves alsofailed integritychecks whensubject flow backtests. to just one wastotally defectfree,while four pumps Of the eight seawater coolingpumps were deemed non-operational otherscould be operated despite defectssuchas the severely leakingupperandlower shaftseals.In two cases pumpdef-ects been had reported duringour previous auditovereighteen months ago. PowerPlant Engine#l w'asoverdug sinceMay 2009,a planned24,000 hour overhaul.while engine #4 was overdue, sinceJune2009,a planned 24,000hour overhaul and 12,000 hour turbo charger replacement. TheMaintenance Supervisor citeda lack of manpower the as reason no progress. for Thruster#2 wasnon operational duringthe audit period,problems beenencountered had with currentimbalance thevariablefrequency on drive inverter;dueto manpower focus on the rig floor issues had not beeninvestigated. it Accordingto the daily maintenance reportthe rig hasrequested extension, 4Q2010,for the eightyearthrusterdrive an to maintenance routine;this basicallyinvolvessystematic disassembly inspection and of eachdrive vvithspecificpart replacement accordance in with OEM recommendations. The request this extension currentlypending. for is Thermographic surveyand currentinjectiontestingremainoutstanding, althoughthe rig now hasthe thermographic inspection equipment onboard windowsto facilitate the inspection havenot beenmadeon the variousswitchboards, drive cubicles andMCC's. Controlof alarmsanddefeats bypasses not well managed, fact no single and was in personcould account which alarmsetc. wereoverridden indeedfor what reason. for or Mec]ranical Handling Certification mostof the lifting equipment sighted for was with the exception theproof of loadtestcertification the manridingwinches, for utility winches, trolleybeams pad and
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Confidential
BP-HZN-M8t00136224
eyes,which could not be produced.webbing slingswereall changed during out February2009and all hadcurrentcertification. The last ABS load testson the two deck cranes, knuckleboom craneandthe risergantrycranew-ere performed between January 2006to December 2007 andthe last classannualthoroughexamination completed was in December 2008,with the cargo GearRegister beingendorsed required. as Th9 lastthird party lifting equipment annualsurveywascompleted August2009, in although final reporthadnot beenreceived was communicated defects the it that were limited to a few wire slings. Thepresent lifting gearcolourcodeis yellow, despite this several eyesin the mudpit room andmostlifting gearin the denick we.e siill painted pad green. The looseandfixed lifting gearwasspotchecked, all sightedslings,pad eyes and andoverhead,,lrolley beams were eithertaggedor markedwith their SWL andID. Thire is no dedicateil storeor rigging loft andsubsequently lifting equipment mainly the is stowedin the two aft leg columnswith no formal controlover use. The port and starboard deckcranes werefunctiontestedandlimits successfully tested. The safeload indicators were operational both deckcranes theLCD screen the on but on starboard cranewas no longerbacklit. The port deckcranelower boomsegment lattice, right handbraceto chordintersection an indentation is presently has that being monitored. The daily andweeklycraneoperator's inspection reportswere sighted together with lift plansfor special undertaken. lifts The risergantrycraneand knuckleboomcranewere bothfunctioned and limits tested satisfactorily.Due to ongoingoperalions the moonpool and on the Bop stack,the in BOP cranewas not testedduringthe audit period. All cranes wire rope certifrcation wasin orderwith specified change dates out honoured. The BOP cranemainandwireswere lastchanged OctoberA.lovember in 2007 andare shortlydue for renewalunderTransocean's year change policy. two out The drill floor andmoonpool manriding andutility wincheswere inspected function and tested.Anomaliesnoted,which in one instance includedfailure of the E stop,havebeen recorded the ARAS. in Obsolescence Issues Althoughobsolescence primarily conceming PRS andiron roughneck issues the control systems were reported duringour 2008audit. No actionhasbeentakento eitherresolve theseissues otherwise are undertake rig wide studyto identify otherareas a that may be becoming obsolete with potentialto havea detrimental effecton equipment availability. Warehouse The legacyTransocean warehouse management system hadjust recently, July 2009,been replaced the GSF legacyInventoryControl System by (ICS) with materialrequests and purchase ordersbeingplacedvia the intranetto the serveronshore.It was communicated that current stockinventory resides 3,913,687 at USD with a furtherl,7g6,l9g USD of
l5
BP.HZN.IIT-O008885
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BP-HZN-MBt00136225
materialon ordercovering448 purchase orders. Ofthesepurchase ordersfifty arefor critical spares. Warehouse personnel were still becoming familiar with ICS andconsequently werenot fully conversant with all functions. For example, they wereunableto produce full list a partson the rig. The storeroomsweretidy andpartswerebinnedand of critical spare tagged. Spotchecks the OEM rubbergoodsindicated of that all rubbergoodswere correctlysealed in date. and During the auditperiodseveral spares shortages cameto light, theseincludedcritical systems suchaswatertightdoors,vessel (PCU 18),fire andgasdetectors controlsystem andmain engineturbo chargers.
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BP-HZN-TIT-0008886 Confidential BP-HZN-M8100136226
Audit Report Action Sheet(ARAS) are The observations recommendations laid out in tabularformat that allowstracking and the systemindicates The of auditrecommendations. first digit in the numbering to criticality andby reflectionof the criticality,timing for reaction the findings. ClassI Class2 Theseitemsthat do not complywith BP policiesor Standards Rig TheseitemsareoutsideAPI, legislation, Owner policies, impactpotential. havehigh safetyor environmental These itemsthat onewould expectto find in placefrom a are and drilling contractor competent combination competent of operator. These itemsthat canbe usedby the drilling contractor are andlorBP to build on the project,thoughthey arenot as considered essential.
Class3
Class4
the indicates functionalareathe issueis based system The second digit in the numbering within. 1. Health,Safetyand SafetylVlanagement' 2. Drilling andWell Control 3. Technical Services 4. N{arine2 5. Environmental Handling 6. Mechanical bearingin mind the numberfor that particularsection The final digit is the recognition itemsarenot setout by priority, as on Audit TeamAdvisedCompletionis based what wasunderstood the criticality of the issuein relation projecttiming. to or change The wells teammustreviewthe Audit ReportAction Sheet(ARAS) to accept, is the recommendaiion not accepted reason If rejectthe recommendations. a non-marine that and for the decision shouldalsobe documented filed. Rig Audit Groupconsider performance, will; of implementation all recommendations improvesafety/environmental integrity. operational and and complywith industrystandards bestpractice, enhance
' There is no 3. 1 Classification 2 Recommendationsare included in &e CMID Annex (BP requirementsfor MODUs) report
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Confidential
BP-HZN-M8100136258
Photographs
Observations or Comments: Maintenance on watermaker #5, note the front of the unit is opened up but none of the jacket water or seawatervalves have been locked or tagged shut.
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AppendixA Blackout Recoveryand DP SystemUpgrade CustomerAcceptanceTrials ErecutiveSummary Two blackout testswereconducted with the first testconsidered fail. Therewasa diffrculty a in experienced re-establishing engines the l l kV switchboard Engine3 starledandthen to A. failed while engine2 was laggingin starttiming For this testit took nearly14 minutes reto establish thrusters the DP. The failure of engine3 to startshouldbe investigated all to to understand mitigations put in placeto preveff a reoccunence this delayin successful the to of black startrecovery, On repeating testthe restartof all the thrusters the in was achieved lessthan2 minutes. This was considered successful but did identifythat engine6 settings a test wereblockedfrom startingfor this test. The reason the blockingwasunclearasa request for wasmadethat the powersystem configuration settings setup for normaldrilling mode. On reviewingthe Redundancy be and (RCA) moduleon the VesselManagement Criticality Assessment is System documentation the unclearasto its function. In changing statusfrom DP 3 modeto DP I modethe thrusters were deselected liom the DP which wasunexpected. Thecontrolmodes the RCA shouldbe fully of investigated understood that staffis aware the implications boththeDP andvessel and such to of management system this module. of As partof the out of serviceperioda DP upgrade This involvedboth hardware was implemented. andsoftware upgrades.As a resultofthis upgrade customer test a acceptance wasconducted. The port HIPAP requires fault finding asthis was not available.Therewereotherminor findings which arebeinginvestigated.The rig also carriedout a full setof field arrivalDP trials. Test found somenon-functional thrusteremergency stopbuttonsandthesedeficiencies to be are addressed. stabilityofthe thruster2 at startup appeared havereliability issues this The to and reliability in startup shouldbe furtherinvestigated. Environmental Conditions Headine at 1360 set Cuoeni256o 0.56knots by Wind 172"by 3.4knots DP Blackout Testing The rig hadplanned black out to ensure system a the was fully functionalandthe rig and equipment couldrestartthrusters an approximate in from lossof time of 1 minute40 seconds powerto reinstatement thrusters of into the DP A numberof prerequisites process successfully w-ere to ensure the recovery set that was demonstrated. This includedsynchronisation clocks,dataloggerfunctional,power system of configured normaldrilling operations for etc.
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At the time of the black out. engineI was out of servicedueto dieselmounted fuel pumpbeing inoperative.Engine6 was warmedfor the testbut it wasthen foundthat problems were apparent took place with the air startvalvefor this engine; this requireda strip down. A discussion regarding two dieselgenerators beingout of serviceandit was felt that thetest shouldbe suspended until all dieselgenerators with tle exclusion engineI were available.One2500 of (Tag recharging the breaker kVA transformer incomerbreaker a fault conditionregarding has of 237056). Additionallyone azimuthpump for the thruster2 is reportedasnon-functional.The azimuthcircuitusestwo pumpsnormallywith one in stand-by. First Black out RecoveIry Test Observations Environmental Conditions Heading: 0000 Wind: 0800 14 knots bv K current: Og-Oo 0.7 knots by Position Loss:13m
this The testprotocolrequired 4 that engine be stopped usingfuel rack failure mode. In essence process. meantthat for the testthat engine was unavailable the black startrecovery 4 in Engine I wasout of servicewith an enginedriven fuel purnpfailure. For the testthis left only 2,3, 5 and6 available. engine and Thetestprovedunsuccessful. Althoughstartcommands were issued the high voltagebus As connected. no generators opened splittingthe system halfofthe bus hadno generators one thar were connected onebusthis allowedonly four thrusters be started.It appeared the rig to to 6.7,8 and wereunable start 2 to suffered partial a blackout on highvoltage boardA Thrusters intervention was in line with the black startrecovery.It was alsonotedthat little operator on undertaken evenwhenonly four thrusters carne line. Therig, based the en'ironmentand on wereavailable, wasableto stabilise setpoint position. the the fact that four thrusters for On interrogating vesselmanagement the system loggerthe enginestartcommands engine3 (busA) andengine6 (busB) were reported two seconds, in while for engine5 it was 10 seconds It and engine2 it was 16 seconds. canbe understood why the startsignalis not issued high voltagebusbut it is not clearwhy simultaneously two engines for connected the sarne to thereis a lag in startcommand engine2 (busA). This couldhavebeenissuedat 10 seconds for to corresponding with engine5 (busB). It is alsounclearwhy engine2laggedin connecting bus until 42 A. Engine3 was connected afterthe eventwhile engine2 did not connect at23 seconds seconds. Two alarmsoccurred and relatingto engine3, fuel inlet pressure HT cooling after 35 seconds low. Engine3 circuit breaker trippedleavingthe busB with no watercircuit inlet waterpressure Engine2 thenconnected seconds 2 afterthis time. It is aszumed engines line at 40 seconds. on that the engine3 shutdownwas asa rezultof these two alarmconditions.
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Thrusterloadreduction input via throughthe driveswas demonstrated the ABB frequency 2 monitoring. Successful situated switchboard at openingandclosingof high voltagebreakers and 5 were demonstrated thruster1,thruster3, The first four thrusters in wereon andenabled I minuteforty eight secondg to thruster4 andthruster5. Thetiming for the staxt and enable DP of the lastfour thrusters up was significantlylongerwith the eightthrusters to beingavailable the DP at 13 minutes57 on at seconds.The lastthrusterbeingthruster7. It is of notethat a time out occurred 42 seconds the leadhydraulicplrmpsfor this thnrsterbut this is assumed be asa resultof the lossof to 3. srvitchboard
9:42:13 9:42:.15 0:00:02 9:42:15 0:00:02 9:42:.15 0:00:02
Blackout detected alarms Thrusters alann.forcereduction transfertolocalcontrol StartEngine3, BusA 6. StartEnoine Bus B 9:42',230:00:10StartEncine5, Bus B 9:42:.29 0 : 0 0 : 1 6 StartEngine2, BusA 9:42:35 0:OQ'.22Enqine Connected B 6 Bus 9:42:36 0:00:23 DG 3 Connected BusA 9:42i42 0:00:29 UPS 11 Main failure,UPS 13 Back up failure 9:42:.45 0:00:32 UPS I Mainfailure. alarm 9'.42:47 0:00:34 DG 3 HT Coolino Waterlow Pressure 9:42:.47 0:00:34 DG 3 Fuel oil inlet oressure low 9:42'.47 0:00:34 DG 5 Connected Bus B to 9:42:53 0:00:40 DG 3 Circuit Breaker CB3-4tfips 9:42:54 0:00:41Switchboard Blackout relavde-energised 4 9:42:54 0:00:41Switchboard Blackoutrelayde-energised 3 9:42'.54 0:00:41 Switchboard Blackoul relavde-eneroised 2 9:42:55 0:00:42 DG2Connected A Bus 9:42:54 0:00:41 Switchboard Blackout relayde-energised 2 9'.43:25 0 : 0 11 2 UPS10 MainFailure : 9:43:40 0:01.,27 UPS 14 portHIPAP failure 9:,[3:380:01:25Thruster successfully 1 started 9:43:45 0:01 :32 Thruster3 successfullv started
9:43:450:01:32Thruster successfully 4 started 9:43:46 0:01:33Thruster enabled 1

9:43:48 0:01 :35 Thruster enabled 3 9:43:49 0:01 :36 Thruster enabled 4 9:43:51 0 : 0 1 : 3 8 Thruster5 successfully started 5 9:43:570:01:44Thruster enabled 9:45:0'l 0:02:48 SWBD2 11kV breaker closes 9:45:01 O:O2:48 SWBD 5 1 1kV breaker closes 9'.48:42 0:06:29 Thruster enabled 8 9:49:49 0:07:36 Thruster enabled 6 9:49:58 0:07:45 Thruster enabled 2 9 : 5 6 : 1 0 0 : 1 3 : 5 7 Thruster enabled 7
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SecondBlack out RecoveryTest Observations Environmental Conditions Heading: 0150 Wind: l20obv 13 knots K current: 0720 0.77knots by Position Loss:27m indicated that the unit was Engine6 did not startduringthis test. The vessel management system not in stand-by that for and it is assumed this is the reason not starting. It is unclearwhy this enginewas in this modeas it wasmadeclearat the startoftlre testthat the power systemshould for be configured normaldrilling mode. (RCA). This provideson-linefault The rig is fitted with a Redundancy Criticality System and identifiedin the monitoringwhich is usedto monitorandalertthe operator any deviations of stand-by modeselected.The system monitorsonline equipment alsoapplicable and operating (FDS) identifiesthat mode equipment status.The system Functional DesignSpecification blockingis in use. the During testingit wasnotedthat on switchingmodeselection from DP 1 to DP 3 this caused thrusterenable signalsand all thrusters dropout from the DP. The rig crewwereunclearon to is into this functionalityandit is clearthat furtherinvestigation this system required. It was also notedon the matrices within the FDS that perquisites requiredfor the minimum are contained numberof generators line. on Event
TimE
Time
Event Aclivitv
14'.12:.16 14:12:.17 14:12:.17 14:12:1E 0:00:00
(Check DG 6 NotStandbv Aux) UPS13 Backup failure Blackout detecled all Switchboards on alams Thrusters transfertolocalcontrol alarm.forcereduction
1112i18 9lo0:99. _sjed_Eng4g?_
14:12'.19 0 : 0 0 : 0 1 StartEnoine5 11:12',21 0:00:03 Thruslers readvalarm not 14.12.,230:00:05Thrusters unexpected sloo alarm 14:12',28 0:00:1 StartEngine 0 3
1412:28 0 : 0 0 : 1 0 lnsufficientthrust in suroe swav and 14:12:32 0 : 0 0 : 1 4 5 run rated DG 14:12:33 0:00:1 UPS 14 port HIPAP 5 failure
14:12:38 0 : 0 0 : 2 0 DG 2 run rated 14:12:.39 0:00:21 DG 2 connected 1412:.40 0:00:22DG 5 connected '14:12:49 0 : 0 0 : 3 1 UPS9, 10 mains failure 14:13:-O4 0:00:46 Positionout of limits5.4.5.0 1 4 1 3 : . 1 1 0 : 0 0 : 5 3 DG 3 Connecled
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BP.HZN.TIT-0008925 Confidential BP-HZN-MBIOO136265
0 : 0 1 : 2 3Switchboard kV hiohvoltaoe 211 breaker closes 0 : 0 1 : 2 3 Switchboard 11 kV hiqhvoltagebreaker 5 closes 0:01:.24 Thrusterstarted 0 : 0 1 : 2 6Thruster enabled 1 14:13:450:01:27UPS 13 Backup failure 1 4 : 1 3 : 4 6 0:01:28 ThrusterI started 14:13:48 0 : 0 13 0 Thruster enabled. : I UPS10 mainfailure 1 4 : 1 3 : 5 0 0 : 0 1 : 3 2 UPS'14portHIPAP failure, UPS10 failure 1 4 : ' 1 3 : 5 0 0:01:32Thruster7 started 1 4 : 1 3 : 5 0 0:01:32Thruster4 started 1 4 : 1 3 : 5 1 0 : 0 1 : 3 3Thruster5 started 14:13:.52 0 : 0 1 : 3 4Thruster enabled 4 1 4 : 1 3 : 5 3 0 : 0 1 : 3 5Thrusler enabled 5 14:13:53 0:01:35 Thruster started 6 14:13:54 0 : 0 1 : 3 6Thruster enabled 7 14:13:54 0 : 0 1 : 3 6 Thruster enabled 6 1 4 : 1 3 : 5 5 0 ; 0 1 ; 3 7Thruster2 started 1 4 : 1 4 : 0 1 0 : 0 1 : 4 3Thruster enabled 2 14:'14:O1 0 : 0 1 : 4 3 PMS Step4 busA '14:14:03 0 : 0 14 5 Thruster3 started :
14:13:.41 14:13:41 14:13:.42 14:13:.44
14:14:030:0,l:45 Thruster enabled 3
Conclusion Thetestprotocolandthe status the non-functional of engine1 allowedfor four of the engines to be usedfor the black startrecovery process.The first black startrecovery procedure was considered havenot achieved objectiveof the recovery to process.As a resultthe black start the recoverytestwas conducted second restarted thrusters a time. ln this case rig successfully the the and enabled thrusters the DP in I minute45 seconds. the in During this tes! engine6 was inhibitedfrom recoverysequence leavingonly threeengines participate the process.Further in to investigation needed is why engine3 started the first black starttest andthen failed. It is also on of notethu giventhat the automatic recoveryprocess was expected be within 2 minutes to that manualintervention was not undertaken sooner duringthe first recoveryprocess improve to recovery time. The Reliability Criticality Assessment (RCA) system fitted on this rig appears to be fully not documented to operation cause effects. The screen as and and shotsforthe RCA Processor Unit andRCA SubSystem modules were not populated.This tool shouldbe fulty investigated particularlywith regards the controlmodes to and operational inputsit hasexhibited. Changing modesindicates that the thrusters deselected are from the DP which is considered risk areawhen a usingthis system.
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BP-HZN.IIT-0008926 Confidential BP-HZN-M8t00136266
DP f,pgrade changes theDP to with hardr,r'are software and The rig hasjust undergone mid life upgrade a the DPS 200 unitswith a DPS 232. DGPS3 hasbeen of system.This hasincludeda replacement with two APOS 11 has replaced with a multifx unit. TheHIPAP system beenupgraded MRU 5 hasbeen Seatex havebeenreplaced.A newprocessors the SBC400H computers and with MP7900 havebeenreplaced fitted (replacement VRS #3). The Cos 200 processors for while SDPLoggerandDP simulatorhavebeenreplaced.AdditionallyGyros#1 and#3 systems havebeenreplaced with lasergyros. Acceptance Trials Testinq Customer supplied was and To demonstrate the equipment fully integrated functionala Kongsberg that by Trials (CAT) programme conducted.Thiswaswitnessed the was Customer Acceptance support.The CAT wasbased from onshore onboard marineteamandrepresentatives Transocean is ProjectSDP6280(SW version6.2.2). Reference madeto CAT on the software upgrade 2009. revision datedl0 September D, document 1117443 wasclustered with cablingrelatingto the fibre optic w'ithinthe cabinets Cablingmanagement poorly managed.Cabletidying within the cabinels containing OS processors the converters (MP7900)shouldbe reviewedandimprovedasnecessary. During the time of the CAT DGPS4 andthebackup DP controller The communications couldnotbe established between port HIPAP wasnot available useasfault finding wasongoing. for A surnmary the functional based the following test programme: on of testingwas undertaken FunctionalChecks and noted Lamp test caniedout on OS stations no defects PositionalStabilityTests Positioningaccuracy in undertaken the fore andaft direction.movesforwardandastern. move). Maximum overshoot notedas 1.6m (after 40m ahead l,2and ReferencesFIPR2,DGPS Thrusters 1,4,5,6,7 and8inuseandmediumgainselected 3. DGPS4 (Seatex 232usedasindependent reference) Positionreference in accuracy athwartships. High gain selected thesemoves. for notedwith maximumvalueof 0.6m Overshoot are systems all Headingrotationwasundertaken with regards relerence to systems.Reference noted. or for intemrption.No defects blind sectors selected.Demodulators monitored Deviation(SD) for DGPSwasfoundnot The raw datawas observed duringthe turn. Standard greaterthan m with GPS I beingusedasreference system.DGPS2 wasmonitoredandwas 0.5 had givingan SD of 0.2m TheLBL array(usingfour transponders) an SD of 2.5m. DGPS3 has SD of 0.6mandDGPS4 SDof 0.5m
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Positionalstabilityreasonable notedduring whenrotationundertaken.No obviousblind sectors rotation. GPS3 wasfound lessstable within tolerance. than otherDGPSbut w-as Headingtestwere conducted with up to 30 degrees/minute rotationalspeed.Headingdeviation foundto be a maximum 0.8 degrees 0.6min deviation position. in of w'ith ComputerandReference Redundancy TestsUndertaken System o CompADPS 01 r C o m p B D P Sl l o CompCDPS 1 2 Eachcontrollerwas failed andthenreset. Failedmastercontrollerandtransferfoundto be successful. Reference sensor input to DP individuallyfailed and appropriate alarmsobserved. o o . . o VRS 3 not ready Gyro I not ready Oyro 2notready Gyro 3 not ready Wind sensor not ready 2
DGPS4 inputto backup DP wasfound non functionalat this time. This input errorwas later rectifredsuchthat DGPS4 telegram datais received the DP backup system. by Consequence AnalysisSystem Reduced numberof thrusters selected the DP down to thrusters and8. This caused 4 the in in 'Thrust criticalif Switchboard lost' 6 Reduced number engines the of dor,'v'n engine nrnning to -5 alarm'Thrust only Consequence generated. critical if switchboard lost.' w-as 5 With two generators line with 8 MW load,(approx65% of bus load)the bus critical alarmwas on level only to be simulated The consequence is system setup sr"rch it readsat the switchboard that and assumes tie open. Henceunableto simulate generation the busoriticalalarm. bus the of Black out Prevention Test joystick caused following Usingjoystick simulated high sudden demand.The high loadw-ith the alarms: Demand Reduced Bus A, (4758,I 1900, 7088) on PMS Step4Bus A SA4 ForceReduction Alarms Simulation numberof thrusters.Thrusters undertaken with reduced enabled DP 1. 4 and5. to
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Autopilot andAuto Track Testing Autopilot/auto tracktestingwasundertaken per the CAT procedure.No deficiencies were as noted. Field Arrival Trials As partof the testprogramme additionto the CAT a full setof field arrivaltestswas in programme undertaken.Theseareusuallyundertaken a managed in aftereachwell suchthat over DP the yeara full setof trials hasbeencompleted.@eference Document Field Arrival Trials revision 0l). Enyironmental Conditions Heading at 130 set Current165by 0.76 knots Wind 158by 12 knots Key datawas extracted analysed and from the rig response both modelcontrolanddrift off to tests. A modelcontroltestwasundertaken durationof 10 minutesandthe resultswerenoted: for Max soeed Averagespeed Drift distance 0.08knots 0.06knots 19.37 m
(D
TableModel ControlTestResults Additionallya Drift offtest wasconducted.There$.erepoorrecordsasto the resultsof p'revious in drift testsandthe testwas conducted with testcriteriabased Op Doc 20 which is referenced on the Fieldarrivaltrials.
Max speed Averase sneed
0.30 knots
Drift distance
0.22knots 68.35 m Tabledrift of testresults
A drift offsimulation was carriedout on the DP system thencompared the actualresults to and from the drift offtest. Directionalityappeared achieved accurate. Environmental Conditions Heading at 136 set Current256by 0.56 knots Wrnd 172by 3.4 knots Time Stamo Drift Proeramme Actual Results 2 minutes seconds lOm drift 34 9m drift 3 minutes 53 seconds 20m drift 16 5mdrift 5 minutes seconds 30m drift 01 24mdrift Tabledrift offresults, calcalated actual drifi off results "-ernts
(D
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BP-HZN-MBt00136269

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Distribution l. z. r. 4. 5.

KevanDavies, Rig Auditor 24 September 2009

NormanWong, Manager, Specialist Technical Support Rig Audit 30 September 2009

BP-HZN-IIT.OOO8873 Confidential BP-HZN-M8t00136213

BP-HZN.IIT.OOO8874 Confidential BP-HZN-MB100136214

BP.HZN.IIT-O008877 Confidential BP-HZN-MB100136217

BP-HZN.IIT-OOO888O Confidential BP-HZN-MB100136220

BP-HZN-IIT.OOO8882 Confidential Confidential BP-HZN-M8100136222 BP-HZN-MBt00136223

BP-HZN-TIT-0008886 Confidential BP-HZN-M8100136226

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