WHAT IS DEFAMATION? Libel or Slander: Libel is written, slander is oral. Historically, defamation consisted of slander and libel.

Slander is defamation by speaking, and libel is defamation by means of writing. After the invention of the printing press, the permanence of the written word meant that libel caused far more damage than slander. Slander, however, had a big impact in pre-literate communities where the spoken word was the primary way information was exchanged. In modern times, the legal distinction between libel and slander has been narrowed. Most modern defamation cases involve libel, and modern writers have come to use the term "defamation" to describe both libel and slander. Defamation consists of the following: (1) a defamatory statement; (2) published to third parties; and (3) which the speaker or publisher knew or should have known was false. Each of these element has generated controversy. We shall examine them in turn: A. A Defamatory Communication What is a "defamatory" statement? 1. A statement which causes harm to reputation. A statement is defamatory if it "tends to injure the plaintiff's reputation and expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or degradation." Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 1987). When the defamatory meaning is not apparent on its face, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving such extrinsic facts. Anderson v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. 1977). 2. Defamation Per se Some statements are so defamatory that they are considered defamation per se; and the plaintiff does not have to prove that the statements harmed his reputation. The classic examples of defamation per se are allegations of serious sexual misconduct; allegations of serious criminal misbehavior; or allegations that a person is afflicted with a loathsome disease. The historical examples of loathsome diseases are leprosy and venereal diseases. Allegations that a person is afflicted with AIDS may well constitute a modern variation on this form of defamation per se. When a plaintiff is able to prove defamation per se, damages are presumed, but the presumption is rebuttable. 3. What Constitutes Injury to Reputation?

The plaintiff must establish proof of damage to reputation in order to recover any damages for mental anguish; see Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239, 1244 (1982); Swanson v. American Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 359 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Minn. App. 1984) (rev. denied) ("To establish a claim in a defamation action [plaintiff] must prove that the [defendant] made false and defamatory statements about them which injured their reputation."). Evidence of plaintiff's poor reputation is generally admissible to mitigate damages. Davis v. Hamilton, 92 N.W. 512, 515 (Minn. 1902); Finklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. App. 1987). If an individual's reputation cannot be further damaged, a defamation suit serves no purpose, wastes judicial resources, and hinders First Amendment interests. Id. The "libel-proof" plaintiff. A plaintiff is "libel-proof" when his reputation has been irreparably stained by prior publications. At the point the challenged statements are published, then, plaintiff's reputation is already so damaged that a plaintiff cannot recover more than nominal damages for subsequent defamatory statements. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3rd Cir. 1985). However, a court will not dismiss a defamation action merely because the plaintiff already has a bad reputation. Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (D.N.J. 1986), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1069, 1072-73 (3rd Cir. 1988). Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 516 ("[E]ven the public outcast's remaining good reputation is entitled to protection.") Rather the statement upon which the defamation claim is based should relate to the same matters upon which the prior bad reputation was founded, or to substantially similar matters. In extreme cases, a plaintiff's general reputation may be so bad that a court will hold a plaintiff libel-proof on all matters. For example, Charles Manson or Adolph Hitler could not be damaged by defamatory statements. Langston v. Eagle Publishing Co., 719 S.W.2d 612, 623 (Tex. App. 1986). B. The Statement was published to third persons Defamatory statements must be communicated to a third party. You cannot defame someone by speaking to them alone, or by muttering to yourself. This element of defamation is virtually always satisfied when claims are made against newspapers and broadcast media. C. The defendant knew or should have known that the communication was false Defamation allows recovery for unfair damage to reputation. As a consequence, if

true statements are made about a person which damage their reputation, they cannot maintain a lawsuit.
This is a relatively recent development. One origin of libel and slander laws was a criminal cause of action by the English Crown used to silence its critics; hence, it was the

truth of the alleged libel which provoked the lawsuit. However, as the right of free speech developed and gained support, the use of defamation to suppress true statements was rejected. Virtually all states today apparently require that the alleged defamatory statement be false before a defamation action may proceed. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held: We hold that a private individual may recover actual damages for a defamatory publication upon proof that the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the defamatory statement was false. The conduct of defamation defendants will be judged on whether the conduct was that of a reasonable person under the circumstances. Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn. 1985). Other cases follow this reasoning. See LeDoux v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 59, 67 (Minn. App. 1994) ("In order for a statement to be defamatory . . . it must be false."); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. den., 479 U.S. 883 (1987) ("Libel, by definition, consists of publication of a false and unprivileged fact."). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of whether the U.S. Constitution requires purely private defamation plaintiffs to prove falsity in all cases. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 476 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986). In other words, there may be no constitutional barrier if a particular state wishes to allow defamation actions even for true statements. How false is false? The test is whether the alleged defamatory statement as a whole is true or false. Minor inaccuracies are not subject to defamation claims if the overall substance of the statement is true. "The plaintiff cannot succeed in meeting the burden of proving falsity by showing that only that the statement is not literally true in every detail. If the statement is true in substance, inaccuracies of expression or detail are immaterial." Jadwin, supra, 390 N.W.2d at 441. No Defamation by Implication. Failure to report all the facts may lead to a defamatory conclusion by the reader. But unless the overall substance of the statement can be proven false, no defamation claim will arise. "[T]he cause of action known as defamation by implication . . . is not recognized in Minnesota." Kortz v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 20 Media Law Rep. (BNA) 1860, 1865 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. 1992). A public official may not maintain a defamation by implication claim. Diesen v. Hessberg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 451 (Minn. 1990). D. Negligence Is Standard Of Liability In Minnesota, the defendant is liable if it "knew or should have known in the exercise of reasonable care" that the defamatory statement was false. Jadwin, supra. This is the standard formulation for liability based on negligence, that is, liability arising from failure to take due care. This is a low standard of liability. However, First Amendment considerations substantially limit the application of this standard.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 104189 March 30, 1993 AMELIA LAROBIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Francisco D. Alas for petitioner. The Solicitor General for public respondents. QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 10507, entitled "Amelia Larobis v. Hon. Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., at al." promulgated on November 20, 1991 and the resolution of the same Court dated January 22, 1992, denying the motion for reconsideration of said decision. In CA-G.R. No. 10507, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, ManoloFortich, Bukidnon, Br. XI, in Criminal Case No. 979 insofar as it found petitioner guilty of the crime of grave oral defamation but it modified the penalty imposed on petitioner to an imprisonment of "three (3) months of arresto mayor as minimum and one year and eight (8) months of prision correccional as maximum." In Criminal Case No. 979, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dated January 9, 1991, affirming in toto the decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Manolo Fortich-Libona, Bukidnon, finding petitioner herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave oral defamation and (a) sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of an "Indeterminate Sentence of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its maximum period to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum period", and (b) ordering her to pay the complainant the amounts of (i) P1,500.00 as attorney's fees, (ii) P3,500.00 as moral damages, and (iii) P100.00 as cost. (Rollo, p. 19) The Court of Appeals and two trial courts found that petitioner had shouted, within hearing distance of several persons, the following words calculated to humiliate and to cast aspersion on the complainant:

LIMBONGAN, MARO NGA MAGTUTUDLO, PATAY GUTOM, TIGULANG GIUBAN NA, BOGOK, HUGAWAN, IPASALBIDS KA NAKO NI DODONG AMORA. ("You are a cheat, a dishonest teacher, you are dead hungry, an old person with gray hair, dull, dirty, I will have you salvage(d) by Dodong Amora.") (Rollo, pp. 16 & 18)
In this petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in the evaluation of the evidence, particularly in its findings that her defamatory utterances were "calculated if not wholly premeditated" to insult the complainant, that there was no provocation on the part of the complainant, and that the utterances were not made in the heat of anger and obfuscation. Petitioner has not shown any grounds to warrant a disturbance of the findings of facts of not one, not two but three different courts. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 729 [1988]; Calalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 514 [1991]) The sole legal question raised by petitioner is her claim that, at most, she is liable only for the crime of slight oral defamation. (Rollo, p. 14) Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the

social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. (Victorio v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 645 [1989]; Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]) Elements that qualify the oral defamation to the graver offense are extant. Petitioner disregarded the respect due to the age and status of the complainant, who was 61 years old and has been a public school teacher for the past 32 years. The offense, having been qualified to grave oral defamation by the aforementioned special circumstances, cannot be reduced to simple oral defamation by the claim that the slanderous words were said in the heat of anger. Besides, the slanderous words were uttered with evident intent, using the language of Balite v. People (18 SCRA 280) to "strike deep into the character of the victim." In reviewing the penalty meted on petitioner, WE found that the Regional Trial Court erred in imposing the minimum penalty while the Court of Appeals erred in imposing the maximum penalty. While petitioner did not raise said errors as issues in her appeal, this Court has the authority to review the same if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. (Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760 [1969]; Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 105 [1991]). The penalty imposed by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code for grave oral defamation is arresto mayor its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. In order to fix the minimum term of the penalty required by the Indeterminate Sentence Law, WE descend one degree lower from arresto mayor maximum to arresto mayor medium or an imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months. (Sec. 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225; People v. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549 [1942]) The Regional Trial Court did not follow this mandate of the law. The Court of Appeals was correct in fixing the minimum term of the penalty to three (3) months of arresto mayor which is within the range of arresto mayor medium, instead of four (4) months and one (l) day of arresto mayor as fixed by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals however erred in increasing the maximum term of the penalty from one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as imposed by the Regional Trial Court, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional. (Rollo, p. 24) With respect to the imposition of the maximum term of the penalty, WE have to divide by three the number of days included in the penalty prescribed by law because the said penalty is composed only of two periods, i.e., arresto mayor maximum and prision correccional minimum. (Art. 65, Revised Penal Code) The rules on the application of the different circumstances attending the commission of an offense require three periods. (Art. 64, Revised Penal Code). Dividing the penalty for grave oral defamation into three periods produces the following results:

Minimum Four (4) months and one (1) day to one (1) year; Medium: One (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months; and Maximum: One (1) year, eight (8) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. (II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 12th ed., 1006)
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances present in this case, the maximum term of the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, i.e., within the range of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months. (Art. 65 (1), Revised Penal Code) The maximum term of the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is within the range of the medium period and there is no legal basis for the Court of Appeals to change it. The courts should be careful in fixing penalties because any error may have dire consequences, as in this case wherein the prison term imposed on the accused has been increased erroneously. To unduly prolong the confinement of an accused, even by only one day, is unjust in any sense of the word.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with the modification that the petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional. In all other respects, the civil liabilities imposed by the Regional Trial Court are affirmed. SO ORDERED.

II. Defenses to DefamationG.R. No. L-22794 January 16, 1968 RUFO QUEMUEL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Manglapus Law Office for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. CONCEPCION, C.J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of libel, 1 with which he is charged, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs, petitioner Rufo Quemuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of conviction, but imposed, instead the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of P500.00, and added thereto a P2,000.00 indemnity to the offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six (6) months, in case of insolvency, aside from the costs. Petitioner maintains that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous because: 1) it awarded said indemnity, despite the fact that the offended had not appealed from the decision of the trial court, which made no award of such nature; 2) the assessment of damages in a criminal case, in which the civil action is impliedly included, is "vested in trial courts (and not in appellate courts);" 3) there is no proof that damages had been sustained by the offended party; and 4) subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the indemnity constitutes imprisonment for non-payment of debt, which is unconstitutional. Petitioner's contention is untenable. The appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased 2 and the indemnity is part of the penalty. Hence, in Bagtas vs. Director of Prisons, 3 this Court held that: The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty, it being expressly provided by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code that every person criminally liable is civilly liable. Although the authority to assess damages or indemnify in criminal cases is vested in trial

courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passess to the appellate court. Thus, this Court has, in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party had not appealed from said award, and the only party who sought a review of the decision of said Court was the accused. 4 As regards the alleged absence of proof that the offended has suffered mental anguish, lost sleep, or could not look his neighbor straight in the eye, suffice it to stress that, by its very nature, libel causes dishonor, disrepute and discredit; that injury to the reputation of the offended party is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel cases; that "where the article is libelous per se" as it is in the case at bar "the law implies damages;" and that the complainant in libel cases is not "required to introduce evidence of actual damages," at least, when the amount of the award is more or less nominal, as it is in the case at bar. 5 Needless to say, the civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt", within the purview of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non-payment of "debt". Insofar as said injunction is concerned, "debt" means an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from contract", express or implied. In addition to being part of the penalty, the civil liability in the case at bar arises, however, from a tort or crime, and, hence, from law. As a consequence, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of said liability does not violate the constitutional injunction. 6 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against petitioner Rufo Quemuel. G.R. No. L-23508 December 11, 1967 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs. NELLY P. CORTEZ, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Angel Aquino for defendant-appellant. BENGZON, J.P., J.: A complaint for grave slander was filed on January 16, 1964 by Julita Santos against Nelly P. Cortez in the Court of First Instance of Manila. It was alleged therein: That on or about the 14th day of November, 1963, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly utter and proffer slanderous words and expressions which are grave and of insulting nature, considering that the complainant is a married woman with good reputation, such as "Matanda kang walang hiya, anak mo na lamang nagpapaasawa ka pa, kaya ikaw ay hiniwalayan ng asawa mo dahil sa gawain mo, ang sabi ng asawa ko ay nagpapaasawa ka sa kanya, iyon pumunta ka roon sa Kalunya mo" and other words of similar import against Julita Santos, thereby bringing the latter into public disgrace, contempt and ridicule.

At the arraignment on January 30, 1964, the defendant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.1awphil.net The case was then set for hearing at 8:30 A.M. of February 6, 1964. On said date, however, on petition of Atty. Angel Aquino, counsel de oficio of the accused, to enable him to prepare for the defense, the hearing was postponed to 8:30 A.M. of March 3, 1964. From this point, the record of the trial court shows that on the date scheduled for hearing, the court rendered a decision which, after quoting the charge, proceeded to state as follows: Upon being arraigned assisted by her counsel de oficio, Atty. Angel Aquino, the accused voluntarily and spontaneously entered the plea of guilty and insisted thereto notwithstanding the information furnished her by the Court regarding the consequences of her plea. WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused NELLY P. CORTEZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the crime of grave slander, defined and penalized in Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in her favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty, hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of these proceedings. SO ORDERED. (Record, p. 16) The same day, the accused filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, from said decision convicting her.1awphil.net The Court of Appeals, on September 3, 1964, certified said appeal to this Court as involving only questions of law. Appellant in her brief now contends that she did not Plead guilty to the complaint and that no plea of guilty had thereafter been entered of record as required by the Rules. Appellant would rely on the fact that a page of the trial court's record (page 15), which she alleges to have contained the stenographic recording of the trial of March 3, 1964, is missing, adding that the loss appears to have occurred while the case was in the Court of Appeals. It is argued that said loss has rendered it impossible for appellant to prove her claim that he never pleaded guilty to the complaint. She stresses that the only plea of record is that of "not guilty " entered on January 30, 1964. And, with the conformity of the Solicitor General (See Appellee's brief, p. 3), she now asks for a remand of the case for trial.1awphil.net Fortunately, there are other data of record showing that defendant really pleaded guilty in the lower court. Thus, in appellant's motion of April 30, 1964, with her annexed affidavit (Annex "G") praying for admission of attached documents as part of the record, and her supplemental motion of May 10, 1964, asking that she be allowed to present evidence, in addition to her plea of guilty in order to obtain a lesser penalty, both filed in the Court of Appeals, and appearing in the Rollo of this case, defendant admits that she pleaded guilty but argues that the court should have allowed her to present evidence in spite of her plea of guilty, to determine the graveness or lightness of the offense charged as well as the corresponding penalty to be imposed. Thus, she stated in the affidavit:

2. That I have interposed said appeal of the lower Court's judgment of conviction not for the purpose of seeking its reversal but only for the purpose of seeking a modification of the penalty imposed which I believe is rather harsh and severe or excessive; xxx xxx xxx With respect to the lawyer offered to me by the Honorable Judge, I declined to avail of his services, besides I was than already deadset to plead guilty. In fact, my only conversation with the court-appointed lawyer was when I asked him what the penalty would be in the event I enter a plea of guilty and he assured me that I will only be made to pay a fine not exceeding P20.00 or P30.00. Thus, with this added inducement coming from no less than a lawyer, I did not even hesitate in expressing to the Honorable Judge my willingness to plead guilty. It is clear, therefore, that defendant did not question the fact that she pleaded guilty, but even admitted it, until page 15 of the record was missing; thereafter, she started to deny said plea of guilty. Considering the foregoing circumstances and the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed (Sec. 5[m], Rule 131, Rules of Court), this Court can reach no other conclusion but that the statement in the appealed decision, that the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment, truly reflect what transpired. And even assuming that defendant's, plea of guilty, altho made, was not entered in the record, the failure to so enter the same does not affect the solidity of the proceeding held. (Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court.)1awphil.net As regards the correctness of the penalty, the slander, as quoted in the complaint, is patently for a insulting nature. The penalty for slander if of a serious and insulting, nature, is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (Art. 358, Revised Penal Code). The court a quo, therefore, imposed the right penalty. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. Let a copy of this decision be transmitted to the Honorable, Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, for any investigation he may wish to order regarding the missing page, of the trial court's record. So ordered

A. Truth

Truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim. This is simply the flip side of the requirement that plaintiff prove the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement.