On the philosophical positions Dharmottara and Jitari

of

Shiro

Matsumoto

I. It seems that the philosophical positions of Dharmottara and Jitari can be made clear by investigating their interpretations of the reason sahopalambhaniyama (the necessityof being perceived together) which is applied in the Pramanaviniscaya as follows: blue and the cognition of blue are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhaniyamadabhedonilataddhiyoh/)1). We have already investigated Dharmottara's interpretation2). According to his opinion, the non-difference (abheda), the property to be proved by the reason sahopalambhaniyama, implies not the identity (ekatvaor tadatmya)but the mere negation of the difference (bhedapratisedhamatra). other words, the negation In expressed by the prefix a- in the word abheda is interpreted by him not as paryudasa (the negation which affirmsthe contradictoryof what is negated) but as prasajyapratisedha (the negation which does not affirm the contradictory of what is negated). This interpretation of Dharmottara seems to rest on his understanding that, if the non-difference between the cognized and the cognizing were construed as their identity, the cognition (the cognizing)would become unreal because of the unreality of the form (akara) of the object (the cognized)3). Thus, because it is clear that Dharmottara regarded the form as unreal, it seems possible to consider that he is a scholar of the Vijnanavadins who hold that the form is unreal (Sems tsam rnam rdsun pa). This assumption seems to be confirmed by Tson kha pa's statement that the property to be proved by the reason sahopalambhaniyama is the mere negation of the difference for the Vijnanavadin who holds that the form is unreal, and the identity for the Vijnanavadin who holds that the form is real (Sems tsam rnam bdenpa)4), and also by the Tibetan traditions that Dharmottara interpreted the intention of Dharmakirti in the -969-

On the philosophical positions of Dharmottara (S. Matsumoto) Pramanavarttika the form is unreal5).

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as explaining the theory of the Vijnanavadin who holds that

The aim of this paper is to verify this assumption concerning the philosophical position of Dharmottara6) and to determine Jitari's philosophical position by investigating Jitari's interpretation of the reason sahopalambhaniyama. For the sake of convenience, the theory that the form is real is called Satyakaravada, and the theory that the form is unreal is called Alikakaravada paper. II. Jitari, in his Sugatamatavibhangabhasya in this

(SMVBh, D. ed., No. 3900) ad Su-

gatamatavibhangakarika (D. ed., No. 3899), k. 7, critcisied the Yogacara philosophy. The synopsis of the criticism is as follows: (a) Introduction (a, 46b4-5) (b) Criticism by the reason ekanekasvabhaviyoga(a, 46b5-49b2) 1) Introduction (a, 46b5-7)7) 2) Criticism of Satyakaravada (a, 46b7-47a5)7) 3) Criticism of Alikakaravada (a, 47a5-49b1) (c) Criticism of Alikakaravada by the reason asatyahetuvattva(?) (a, 49b2-51a3) (d) Explanation that the reason ekanekasvabhavaviyoga is free from the three kinds of fallacy, i. e. asiddhata, viruddhata and anaikantikata (a, 51a3-52b6) (e) (f) Criticism of the four kinds of Yogacara philosophy (a, 52b6-60a4) Criticism of the Yogacara theory that samvrti does not exist without the

[real] locus (a, 60a4-5) (g) Conclusion (a, 60a5-60b2) Section (c) starts with the following passage : Then, how can we say that the formless cognitions (nirakarajnana) such as pleasure etc. are unreal ? Whatever has an unreal cause is unreal, just as a sprout. Pleasure etc. have an unreal cause. [Therefore they are unreal.] This inference rests on the svabhavahetu (reason of self-essence). (SMVBh, a, 49b2) In order to show that that the reason applied here is free from the logical fallacy of inadmissibility (asiddhata), Jitari employs the reason sahopalambhaniyama in the following passage: Although the cognition appearing as the corporeal objects (murti) is the cause -968-

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On the philosophical positions of Dharmottara

(S. Matsumoto)

[of pleasure etc.], the unreality

of the cause of pleasure etc. is proved in the f olappearing as them and the cogni-

lowing way. If the corporeal objects are unreal, the cognition tion is proved by the necessity of their being perceived yama). [The inference is as follows:]

is unreal, because the non-difference between the corporeal objects

together (sahopalambhani-

When the two things are necessarily percei-

ved together, they are identical, just as the cognition and its self-essence (svarupa). The corporeal objects and the cognition appearing as them are necessarily perceived together. [Therefore they are identical. ] Here their non-difference is proved by the blue and the

svabhavahetu. Thus is stated [in the Pramanavinifscaya]

as follows:

cognition of blue are not different, because they are necessarily perceived together. (SMVBh, a, 50a1-3) Here Jitari clearly palambhaniyama tara's interpretation states that the property to be proved by the reason sahoDharmot-

is the identity, that

and in the following is the mere

passage rejects

the property

negation

of the difference.

There is an opinion as follows: negation of the difference).

"The property to be proved by the necessity of bebut the non-difference (i. e. the mere (8-When A inference.]

ing perceived together is not the identity

[It is stated in the following

is necessarily perceived together with B, A is not different from B, just as the first real moon is not different from perceived different together the second moon-8). The object is necessarily

with the cognition of that object. [Therefore This inference rests on the (vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi).

the object is not of the

from the cognition.] of the pervading

perception

contradictory

This is the intention

of the Master (Dharmakirti).

In other words, (8-the difference (bheda) is pervaded together is the It is the

by the absence of the necessity of being perceived together (asahopalambhaniyama?), because of loss of the connection. The necessity of being perceived contradictory of the absence-8)." This interpretation is not correct.......9)

great intention of Dharmakirti (Varttikakara) that the one who knows logic is the advocater that the cognition has the form (sakarajnanavadin). (SMVBh, a, 50a3-7) Here Jitari karavada considered the philosophical position of Dharmottara to be AlIkait se-

as opposed

to his own position, that the difference

i. e. Satyakaravada.

Therefore

ems possible

to consider

of the interpretations of the philosophical table.

of the reason positions of

sahopalambhaniyama the interpretors, III.

indicates as is shown Jitari's

the difference in the following criticism -967-

By investigating

of Dharmottara's

interpretation

of the

On the philosophical positions of Dharmottara

(S. Matsumoto)

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reason sahopalambhaniyama, i) ii) Dharmottara Alikakaravada.

it seems possible to attain following conclusions.

should be considered to be a Vi jnanavadin who advocates

Jitari should be regarded as a Madhyamika who advocates Satyakaravada.

1)

On the different interpretations of this inference, cf. Matsumoto S.: Sahopalambha-niyama, Journal of Soto Sect Research Fellows, 12, 1980, pp. (1)-(34). 2) Cf. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. (18)-(22). 3) Cf. Pramanaviniscayatika (PVin T, P. ed., No. 5727), dse, 183a1-3; Matsumto: op. cit., pp. (18)-(19). 4) Cf. gSer phren (P. ed., No. 6150), na, 255a6-7; Matsumoto: op. cit., p. (19).
5)Cf. Hakamaya N.: (The texts written

in Tibet concerning the schools of the Vijnanavadins), Journal of Buddhist Studies of Komazawa University, 6, 1976, pp. 254, 249, 241. 6) Although the prevalent opinion that Dharmtotara is a Sautrantika seem to rest on the fact that he interpreted the qualifier abhranta, added by Dharmakirti to the definition of pratyaksa, from the view-point of a Sautrantika in the Nyayabindutika (Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII, p. 7), we think that this fact is not ade7) quate to characterize Dharmottara as a Sautrantika. It should be noted that the passages corresponding word for word with each other are found in SMVBh (a, 46b6-47a4) and Tarkabhasa (Iyengar ed., p. 70, 1. 14-p. 71, 1. 8), as is reported in Shirasaki K.: rJitari L MoksakaraguptaJ

(Jitari and Moksakaragapta), JIBS, XXV-I, 1976, p. 421. This passage corresponds word for word with Dharmottara's passage. Cf. PVin T (dse, 189b7-190a1). 9) The content of Jitari's criticism is not investigated in this paper. 10) On the different examples (drstanta), cf. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. (20)-(21). 8) (Graduate -966Student, Tokyo University)