Primary Ousia. by Michael J. Loux Review by: A. R. Lacey The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, No.

173, Special Issue: Philosophers and Philosophies (Oct., 1993), pp. 525-527 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219994 . Accessed: 29/03/2012 18:22
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an otherwise interesting has paper which could shed lighton what Aristotle in mind. the to, Apartfrom papersbyKosman and Kahn alreadyreferred and theextract from there remains paper byHenryS. Richardson 'Desire and the a on Brentano, Good in the De Anima'.It providesan intricateargumentfor attributing to Aristotle 'good-basedmodel' ofanimal movement opposed to a 'desire-based a as model'. It is,however, onlypaper todiscuss the matters outsidethecognitive lying faculties which, mustbe admitted, greater to it the is partoftheDe Anima devoted. It would have been reasonableperhapsto expectmorein thiscollectionon the of whether nottheybelongto itsmainfabric. or Apart closing chapters thatwork, whichis reasonably from final is but this comprehensive paperthere a bibliography of contributions a study to of whichstillremains evenin respect recent incomplete Aristotle's on thinking thesematters. What is one to make ofthecollection a whole?It includeswhat are, forthe as scholarswriting in most part, able papers by some of the leading Aristotelian whichtheDe not English.It coversmost,though byany meansall, ofthesubjects a Anima raises,butin doingso it deals withtheissuesin too detailedand intricate withAristotle's to it. thinking gain from It is way foranyonenotalreadyfamiliar I a and itssize makesitsomewhat scholars, indigestible. do not essentially workfor have reallythought thattheeditors however, think, seriously enoughabout what the such a workshouldcontain.In particular, attention givenby nearlyhalfthe contributors thequestionwhether to Aristotle a functionalist was seemsa pityin whichmaybe lessthanilluminating aboutAristotle. thatitgivesa slanttothework The impact of some of the insightful contributions particularpsychological on and issues may be blurredin consequence. The De Animaremains concepts a is fundamentally biologicalworkin whichAristotle concernedto understand of are variousfunctions life terms thewayin whichanimalsand humanbeings of in relatedto theobjectswhichbringabout the actualizationof thevarious,manywhich remains an This framework, levelled, capacities for such functioning. in fromthe one to which functionalism the one, is very different interesting of can be produced by assuming philosophy mind belongs,and only confusion Given the framework thereis stillmuch to be otherwise. adopted by Aristotle, learnt fromthe De Anima, but not generallyin termswhich belong to postof Cartesianphilosophy mind.Ifa philosophy mindcan be said to be offered of by a of he in himit is simply thesensethat,in thecontext an accountoflife, presents not But concepts. thatmakeshistheory worsethan, theory involving psychological and certainly not betterthan, theories concepts- just involving post-Cartesian different. Birkbeck ofLondon University College, D. W. HAMLYN

Loux. (Ithaca and London: CornellUP, 1991. Pp. Ousia. BY MICHAELJ. Primary xii + 285. Price$43.95.) but has Aristotle's recently, metaphysics been thecentreofquite a bit ofinterest which could render thereis no danger of any agreed interpretation emerging
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suchbooksas this, makeLoux risk or scholars whilehe explains superfluous boring the generalnatureof Aristotle's Armedwith positionto an outsidereadership. reflections such as these,Loux addressestwo audiences,the conventional one of one in specialistsand the 'quite different' of non-specialists Greek philosophy mature views on what we nowadays call the problemsof seeking'Aristotle's substance'(p. 1). I am not surejust what thissecondaudience consists or how of, textswill want to many people withouta reasonable knowledgeof Aristotle's of concessions made to are pursuetheinterpretation themin suchdetail,but three such readers.No knowledge Greekis required(though'ousia',and also I think of are There is an eleven-page 'Introduction' 'idion', left untranslated). summarizing the book's main themes;thisis excellently clear, and could indeed be read with as etc., by undergraduates, whileto manyspecialists well,I profit non-specialists, it before downto brasstacks;there getting suspect, willgivea welcomeorientation are also useful summaries from timeto timethroughout. Finallyon thebrasstacks themselves: references theliterature frequent useful, onlysometimes to are and but a does Loux allow himself longfootnote deal withsomepointofscholarly to detail; us he keeps a nice balance betweenundulyignoring such pointsand getting so down in subordinate considerations thatwe lose themain thread.In the bogged inclinedto be rather main the styleis fluent and accessible,thoughsometimes (And dependson something prolixand heavy-weather-making. whensomething elsefor mustitreally called 'identifiability-dependent'that? be on beingidentified, But such barbarisms are untypical.) Some sections, however, including, the one are for the unfortunately thenon-specialist, veryfirst after Introduction, and it as had veryintricate difficult; would have helpedifsections wellas chapters had titles, ifthere and had been an index and more locorum, back-references specific are fairly than 'in earlierchapters'or 'as we noted' (pp. 230, 233). Misprints and sometimes 'hechaston', common, 'Telloh');theyare systematic (e.g., 'tieineinai', but references. harmless, watchthea's and b's in Aristotle mostly The book'smainconcernis to tracethedevelopment thenotionofousiafrom of Z theCategories to through Metaphysicsand H, showing just how muchoftheearly is and the is theory preserved how muchis not,and whether latertheory consistent with itself, and in particularwhetherit escapes the inconsistent triad that no is Z form ousia, is whileform a universal. and H are assumedto universal ousia, is withH6 as its'grandfinale'(p. 191), an assumption thathas form singletreatise, a not gone unchallenged(see p. 2 of Noteson Eta and Theta,the successorto the of on he London seminar's refers Ousiaitself thinks as Notes Zeta thathe often to). it becauseofcertain substance reality, iscoyabout translating so,apparently or but and Lockean onesof'substance'.For Platonicconnotations of'reality' misleading I or meanseither 'stuff' something find themanin thestreet suspect 'substance' you in is in yoursoup,but thephilosopher, eventhe'non-specialist Greekphilosophy', meansmoreorlesswhatever so imbuedwithAristotelianism surely that 'substance' after as well as Locke. For 'ti en 'ousia'means.Leibniz wroteabout substance, all, 'essence'alongside einai'on the otherhand Loux is happy to use the traditional 'whatit is to be'. of of ariseswhenwe cometosomeofthe The importance thesepoints translation of and sections thebook,suchas chapter6 ?4, wherewe are mostintricate difficult
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betweena set of terms, concernedwithsubtlerelations notably'ousia','essence', article(inMind 'form' and 'species'.Loux usesideasdevelopedbyhimin a previous One sees to claim thatAristotle twokindsofsubstance-predication. is that 1979) of wherebya species is predicatedessentially a compositeparticular:man is is for is a of essentially Socrates, Socrates essentially man.The other that predicated ofa parcelofmatter make to form predicated is a substantial accidentally whereby of of the accidentally thatparcel particular: form man is predicated up a composite for ofmatter thatmakesup Socrates, thatparcelhappensto have takenon human whichit level the is shape,etc. This latterpredication on a different from former, The term mistake. servesto explain,and to confusethe two involvesa category 'man' is ambiguousbetween'mixedproduct'and 'pureproduct'senses(pp. 115wherematter involved. is sense, 17). In 'Socratesis a man' ithas themixedproduct into is In 'This parcelofmatter (as it happens) constituted a man' it has thepure Later whichis imposedon thematter. purelyto theform productsense,referring of (chapter6 ?4) he appliesone interpretation 1038b 14-15,ofwhichp. 207 offers the but threepossibleinterpretations, ignoresthatofthe Loeb, whereby unityof he essencebelongsto the conclusionratherthan the premiseof the argument; of thatis theessenceofa plurality objectscan be the concludesthat'no universal ousiaofany ofthoseobjects' (p. 216). of discussion thesevariousinterIt is here thatwe reallyrequiresome further an A on relatedterms. footnote p. 216 counters objectionto theabove conclusion Aristotle does equate 'ousia'and 'essence',thisonlyrefers byclaimingthatthough ownousia forms are their that of totheprimary cases,to 'theessences thesubstantial whoseousiai(but of and notto theessences thecomposite and essence, particulars is whichproperly are'. It is thespecies, notessences)thoseforms speaking itsown is becausetheessence of sense essence theparticulars, the that essence, isina derivative have universals a definition 184). andonly ofadefinition whatthe (p. expresses, definiens is Whatexactly meantbysaying all Well,yes;buthowarewe tounderstand this? or a whether form anything thatsomething, else,is identicalwithwhatit is to be 'what it is to be', substantialize Aristotle does ofcourseverbally (for)thatthing? in whichetymologically anycase recalls'ousia', but'essence', helpstoglossoverthe thisraises. problems about the for not These are real problems, just problems Loux. His conclusions of inter-relating ousia, formand essence are stated with excellentclarityin summaries (pp. 147, 184, 187,etc.), but it would have been nice to have a more the of discussion thenotionsthemselves, especiallyas thismightaffect integrated claim in thebook,thatthereare no individualforms. mostcontroversial about Loux' looms.I have said nothing As usual withreviewers, length-limit my of on actual conclusion thetopicsat thestart mysecondparagraph,so let me add that he producesa rounded and coherentpatternforAristotle's development, the intohis system failure integrate to seeinga major anomalyonlyin Aristotle's matter whichhe was committed. to prime I book. Despiteitsgeneralclarity am notsurehow many This is an important shelves. an will placeon thescholar's non-specialists readit,butitwillfind honoured London King'sCollege
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A. R. LACEY