Schuman-Night Over Europe

FREDERICK L.
SCHUMAN
Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College
NIGHT OVER EUROPE

The Diplomacy of Nemesis
1939-1940
N E W YORK . ALFRED A KNOPF

1941
PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
PREFACE
who write of politics and war in the midst of the world's ordeal write dangerously, both for themselves and for their readers. T o take a ringside seat at Armageddon, to sit by with one's books, to set down one's passing thoughts as if he had no part in the battle seems almost contemptible to those who know that all they cherish is at stake. But he who finds no better way to serve, he who believes that those also serve who only sit and write, has no option but to write and to hope,whilewriting, that the quest for truth is also service of a kind, even if only partially successful. Yet truth amid the battle is coy or shy, like a frightened g i r l evasive to stir hopes of more to come, or fearful lest death strike too near. In quest of so elusive a prize the seeker is cautioned by all the canons of learning to practice patience and delay. Scholarship demands that the scholar wait until all the evidence is in, until all the documents are published, until the dispassionate calm of "objectivity" can be enjoyed in a distant future far removed from the turmoil of heart-breaking and world-breaking tragedy. This volume is a violation of these imperatives. If there be justification for such a departure, it lies in part in Voltaire's comment (April 14, 1732) to M. Bertin de Rocheret: "Who writes the history of his own time must expect to be attacked for everything he has said, and for everything he has not said: but those little drawbacks should not discourage a man who loves truth and liberty, expects nothing, fears nothing, asks nothing, and limits his ambition to the cultivation of letters." Further justification
THOSE
vi
Preface
lies in the probability that no calm future will ever come unless men and women can learn now to understand why their lives have become a mad and embittered flight before disaster. It is unlikely, moreover, that "all" the diplomatic documents of these recent years will ever be available. A decade hence a new Sidney B. Fay or a Bemadotte E. Schmitt may be able to tell in detail all the story of 1939-40perhaps. But some of the documents have already been burned (in Warsaw and in the courtyard of the Quai d'Orsay before the fall of Paris) and others will never see the light of day. The documentation already available on the immediate genesis of the war is voluminous and, within its limits, completedespite the scarcity of source materials on AngloSoviet, German-Soviet and German-Italian relations. The writer ventures to believe that no fuller or more accurate analysis of the diplomacy of Nemesis will be possible for many years to come. This essay, although tentative at certain points, will be found complete enough, I trust, for all save the most rugged and insatiable readers. The present work, while itself a unit for the period dealt with, concludes a trilogy of which the first volume was The Nazi Dictatorship (1935) and the second Europe on the Eve (1939). Taken together, these works purport to tell how and why democracy committed suicide and delivered Europe and the world over to the mercies of the Fascist Caesars. From the rise of German National Socialism in 1919 to the Triple AlHance of 1940, from the Reichstag fire to the capitulation of Weygand, the tale is an unbroken continuum. The sickness of the Western soul which lies behind the decisions and indecisions of the years of misery is the same disease, from the fall of Briining to the invasion of Greece and beyond. Errata and addenda to the earlier volumes can scarcely be set forth here. But a few retrospective comments will not, I hope, be taken amiss. My first regret is that the initial volume of the trilogy was mis-named. The Nazi regime is not, and never was, a "dictatorship." Neither is the Fascist regime in Italy. The Soviet "dictatorship of the proletariat" was and is a "dictatorship" only in theory and in intent, not in practice. Hitler's rule, like Mussolini's and Franco's and Stalin's, is a "tyranny" or "despotism." This half-forgotten distinction was fully appreciated by the
Preface
vii
Greeks and Romans who saw deeply into the forms and purposes of pohtics. "Dictatorship" is a form of power which is (or was) resorted to voluntarily and temporarily by democracies to meet dangers of invasion or revolution. It is a device to save democracy, not to destroy it. Had Briining or Schleicher established an effective "dictatorship" in the Weimar Reich in order to crush the N.S.D.A.P., German democracy might yet be living today. The inability or unwillingness of other democracies to resort to "dictatorship" to save themselves has been a major factor exposing them to destruction by tyrants. The disposition of democrats to regard "dictatorship" in time of crisis as fatal to democracy rather than as fundamental to its preservation reflects a tragic confusion resting upon ignorance of history and misuse of labels. I have shared in this sin in the past. I hereby do penance. In one other respect The Nazi Dictatorship suffered somewhat from misplaced emphasis. The tyranny of the Third Reich is not an "executive committee" of Junkers and capitalists, despite the circumstance that these classes established it under the delusion that it would play this role. It is government by a new and revolutionary political elite which tolerates industrialists and aristocrats only so long as they are content with a status giving them no actual influence over the determination of policies. Property and Money in the old sense have no more future in the Fascist States than in the U.S.S.R. I recall vividly a long argument in Berlin in the summer of 193 3 with Edgar Ansel Mowrer in which he predicted that "National Socialism" would become a kind of "National Bolshevism." I dissented vigorously, thanks to my preoccupation at the time with a too-mechanistic economic determinism. Subsequent events (e.g., the fate of Fritz Thyssen) have demonstrated the correctness of Mr. Mowrer's original thesis. Despite this mistake of evaluation, a detailed understanding of the Nazi Revolution in Germany has proved itself indispensable in my own thinking and writing to an understanding of the Nazi World Revolution. "Those who witnessed the birth and development of Nazism and so the weakness and end of democracy in Germany," writes Heinz Pol in his work on France, The Suicide of a Democracy, "have developed an especially keen eye for certain things. Today this vision makes it possible for us to analyze and explain many events."
viii
Preface
These events were forecast with fair accuracy in the first book of this trilogy. As they unfolded, they were dissected in detail in Europe on the Eve. They constituted a return engagement in the European and world arena of the drama of conflict between Liberalism and Fascism first played on the Italian and German stages. In the larger theater, as in the smaller, and for precisely the same reasons, one protagonist was predestined for victory by virtue of the inability of the other to comprehend reality or to act relevantly or in time to meet a mortal danger. So much had been surrendered that I ventured the guess in January, 1939, that the Western Powers had already lost the Second World War at the "conference" in Munich and in the London "Non-intervention" Committee. Since wars already lost do not have to be fought, I felt that the Western Powers would continue (or resume) appeasement and proceed from defeat to defeat without a call to arms. This prognosis left out of account what should have loomed as a certainty: that Hitler would unsheathe the sword against the West and strike for total victory as soon as he felt confident of success, thereby giving the Wêstern Munichmen no further opportunity for appeasement through surrender. Stalin's decision likewise assumed a guise different from that anticipated, for he rejected passive "neutrality" as fatal, struck a bargain with Berlin when a viable bargain with London and Paris proved impossible of attainment, and thereafter resorted to aggressive "defense." The hope expressed at the close of the second book, moreover that Pan-American solidarity was a possible policy for the United States regardless of what might happen in Europehas also been shattered. It is now clear that the defeat of Britain will mean Fascist control of most of Latin America, regardless of what steps may be taken, too little and too late, in Washington. The thesis of Europe on the Eve which gave rise to most heated argument among commentators, however, was of a different order. The hypothesis (which I regarded as early as 1938 as validated by the evidence then available) that the Western appeasers were basing their calculus on the hope of a Fascist-Communist clash and on the expectation of a German attack upon the U.S.S.R. did not commend itself, even after Munich, to a goodly number of observers. By some my insistence upon it was regarded as proof of "Communist" sympathies, by others as evidence of bias, dis-
Preface
ix
tortion or a flair for uncritical and unscholarly polemic. Even some of my best friends did not hesitate to tell me how mistaken was this view. One of them, in The American Political Science Revieiv (August, 1939), held that my interpretation approached "fanatical obsession" and was a "plot" theory and a "too neat formula" attributable to the frustration of "a bitterly disappointed idealist." Another reviewer, in The New York Times, May 14, 1939, held that "It is all . . . too neat, too simple, too early, too unfair and too fantastic." There is little satisfaction in the rueful thought that these critics were in error. Had they been correct, had the motivations of the Munichmen been other than I believed them to be, the world of 1941 might not be a vale of tears and blood. Ample documentary evidence is now at hand to demonstrate the truth of the thesis of Europe on the Eve, as will soon be apparent to all readers with sufficient courage and endurance to toil through the following pages. Indeed the thesis is now fully accepted in quarters which two years ago would have none of ite.g., Jules Remains in The Saturday Evening Post, October, 19, 1940. On the occasion of Mr. Chamberlain's political retirement. The New York Times observed editorially:
Rarely does history provide such dramatic irony as in the coincidence that on the day that Neville Chamberlain finally passed from the political scene Signer Gayda informed the readers of the Giornale d'ltalia that the differences between the supposed enemies, Communism and Fascism, were not after all so very great: that there were indeed "affinities of inspiration and application" between them. As late as the Spring of 1939 the argument was common in London that, repellent as it was, Fascism (in its Italian and German forms) was preferable to Communism, the assumption being that the two were mortal foes and that the free nations could choose between them. T h e acceptance of this thesis in influential quarters throughout the democratic world represented Hitler's greatest propagandist triumph. H e had been thundering it forth for years. It had got him into power in Germany. It likewise served his purposes abroad, since it led logically to the policy Mr. Chamberlain espoused, with much popular support in Britain and Francethe policy of giving Hitler a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe and accepting Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia, the policy which counseled acquiescence in the Nazi seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia and gave Hitler the great Skoda munition works and new bastions to the east ( N Y T 10.6.40).
Preface
Night Over Europe is, in design, a record and an evaluation of the eleventh-hour diplomacy of the Caesars vi'hereby they paved their road to conquest. It is likewise a record and an evaluation of the eleventh-hour diplomacy of the Western Powers whereby their sorry statesmen brought the scourge of war upon their peoples and led them to and beyond the brink of defeat. National politics and mihtary campaigns have been dealt with only in the measure necessary to render the course of diplomacy intelligible. The past role and the present dilemma of the United States have not been neglected. The narrative of necessity stops in medias res. The broad alternatives of the future, however, are now painfully clear. If Britain succumbs, America and the Soviet Union will be in peril of their lives. If Moscow makes a new "deal" with the Fascist Caesars, giving them the means of final victory over Britain and China, the U.S.S.R. will be destroyed in the sequel and America will face disaster. If Russia joins Britain in challenging the Triplice, the defeat of the Axis will yet be possible without direct American involvement in hostilities. If America clashes with Japan or gives full aid to Britain, the same result may be achieved without Soviet intervention. Any reversion to "neutrality" by America or Russia will almost inevitably mean the conquest of the world by the Triplice. Nothing is certain for 1941 and the years thereafter save that only these alternatives are available to those still able to make choices. In any event I am persuaded that the Great Society will be politically unified in this generation by those who know that it is already an economic and cultural unity, and who are prepared to run risks, to assume duties, to do what must be done to realize this end. Only these will win and survive. All others will perish. As an American rather than a German, as a friend of liberty rather than of tyranny, I share the hopes and preferences of most of my countrymen. I hate war. I want the democracies to survive. I know that victory in war is the price of survival. I know that a new democracy, dedicated with firm and courageous faith to the commonweal and prepared to undertake the building of a new world, is the price of victory. I do not know, nor does anyone, whether Britishers and Americans and others whom they must summon to their aid are capable of freeing themselves from the fatal thralldom of a past which has brought them to ruin, or are
Preface
xi
willing or able to pledge themselves to a new mission. If not, others will do what must be done. Tyche, like Nemesis, is a goddess who has no favorites. She is kind only to the wise and the brave. At her hands each people receives w^hat it deserves and deserves what it receives. Whether the Western peoples can again make themselves worthy of her mercy is still for them to say. If these chapters contribute in any way to clarifying what has been, what is, what may be, what must be in the days to come, they will have justified themselves. No one save the speakers and actors who march or stumble through these pages is answerable for anything here said or left unsaid. I am deeply grateful, however, to Sally Carlton Foote and to Helen Schmitt of Williamstown for efficient and cheerful assistance in documentation, typing and indexing. I am also grateful to the donors and administrators of the "Class of 1900 Fund" at Williams College for aid in defraying stenographic and clerical expenses. My thanks are likewise due to G. P. Putnam's Sons and to other publishers mentioned in the text for permission to quote from their publications; to the staffs of the Williams College Library and of the British and German Libraries of Information in New York City for unfailing courtesy and helpfulness; to Spencer Brodney, editor of EventsThe Monthly Review of World Affairs, for permission to reprint scattered passages which have already appeared in the pages of his admirable journal; and to my erstwhile co-contributors to Events for lightening my task at many points. My colleagues and students in Williamstown, Chicago, Cambridge and Berkeley, and those who have listened and questioned in many a lecture hall, have made indirect contributions to this work which are no less important and no less appreciated for being anonymous and often unrealized. T o Alfred and Blanche Knopf I owe, among a host of others intellectually indebted to them, more than can be said. Let it be hoped that their work, and the work of all who would save the best in the old by meeting the new with open eyes, will go forward "to broader lands and better days."
FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williamstoivn, Mass., Armistice Day, 1940
ABBREVIATIONS
of Principal Documentary Sources
B = T h e British W a r Blue Book: Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939), Cmd. 6106. Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and Germany on September 5, 1939, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1939; published in United States by Farrar & Rinehart, N e w York, 1939. F = Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Le Livre Jatine Frangais. Documents Diplomatiques, 1938-39, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1939, translated as The French Yellow Book, Reynal & Hitchcock, N e w York, 1940. G = German W h i t e Book N o . 2: Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, Reichsdruckerei, Berlin, December 12, 1939, translated as Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War (German Foreign Office, Berlin), German Library of Information, N e w York, July 1940.This 549 page compilation, containing 482 documents, is not to be confused with German White Book N o . I of 1939 (Urkunden zur letzten Phase der deutsch-polnischen Krise, Reichsdruckerei, Berlin) which is limited to events of August 1939, nor with subsequent German W h i t e Books on special topics, each of which is cited separately in the footnotes of the present work. H = Failure of a Mission, Berlin 1937-1939, b y the Right Honorable Sir Nevile Henderson, P . C , G.C.M.G., G. P. Putnam's Sons, N e w York, 1940. P = Polish White Book: Republique de Pologne, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Les Relations Polono-Allemandes et PolonoSovietiques au cours de la periode 1933-1939. Recueil de documents officiels, Flammarion, Paris, March 4, 1940. N Y T = The New York Times, with figures following indicating date of issue citede.g. N Y T 3.15.39, for March 15, 1939. All figures after abbreviations in the text (e.g. G loi, P 84 etc.) refer not to pages but to the number of the document cited, save in the case of Henderson's memoirs ( H ) where page references are given. T h e translations from (G) follow the official English translation issued b y the German Library of Information. Those from (F) largely follow the official English translation with occasional deviations from it where a different phraseology seemed to me to suggest more accurately the meaning or spirit of the French original. T h e translations from (P) are my own from the French edition. r- T c F.L.S.
CONTENTS
I DESIGN
FOR D Y I N G
1. The Barbarians 2. Thoughts Before Darkness 3. The Last Frontiers

II A P P E A S E M E N T TRIUMPHANT
3 11 26
35
1. "Peace for Our Time" 2. The Spanish Republic t January 18, 1939 3. Ukrainian Dream
III A P P E A S E M E N T BETRAYED
35 41 55
78
1. Blackshirt Blackmail 2. Czecho-Slovakiat March 15, 1939 3. Anger in Birmingham

IV T O W A R D THE GREAT COALITION
78 92 103
123
1. Eastern Front 2. Albania t April 8, 1939 3. Words from Washington

V AGGRESSORS' A L L I A N C E
123 137 146

166
1. 2. 3. 4.
Fascist Axis Danzig's Freedom Poland's Fate Back to Appeasement xiii
166 173 183 195
xiv
VI R E T R E A T FROM
Contents
MOSCOW 216
1. Stalin's Price 2. Chamberlain's Honor 3. Hitler's Bargain

VII HITLER'S WAR
216 247 272

285
1. Fear 285 2. Crisis 301 A. The Prelude, August 15-21 301 B. The Chamberlain-Hitler Letters, August 22-25 305 c. The Hitler-Daladier Letters, August 26-27 3^4 D. The "Ultimatum," August 28-30 328 E. The Finale, August 31 344 3. Conquest 353 VIII S T A L I N ' S V I C T O R Y 1. Poland t September 28, 1939 2. The Eastlands 3. Finland's Sorrow
IX W I N T E R S E T
377 377 387 397

429
1. The Westwall 2. Transatlantis

X DEATH IN A P R I L
429 445
462
1. The Northlands t April 9, 1940 2. Chamberlain to Churchill

XI D E A T H IN M A Y
462 474
481
1. The Lowlands t May 10, 1940 2. Sedan II

XII DEATH IN J U N E
481 493
502
1. Duce's Hour 2. The French Republic t June 16, 1940
502 510
Contents
XIII P E A C E BY T H E SWORD
XV
I. 2. 3. 4.
INDEX
Urbis et Orbis Stronger than Words Dilemma in Muscovy Union Tomorrow
523 523 548 573 583 follows page 600
N I G H T OVER EUROPE
LES
FLEURS
/lytiyt/M I'lA/tîA/
DU
MAL
Quand le ciel bas et lourd pese comme un couvercle Sur I'esprit gemissant en proie aux longs ennuis, E t que de I'horizon embrassant tout le cercle II nous verse un jour noir plus triste que les nuits; Quand la terre est changee en un cachot humide, Ou I'Esperance, comme une chauve-souris, S'en va battant les murs de son aile timide E t se cognant la tete a des plafonds pourris; Quand la pluie etalant ses immenses trainees D'une vaste prison imite les barreaux, Et qu'un peuple muet d'infames araignees Vient tendre ses filets au fond de nos cerveaux Des cloches tout a coup sautent avec furie E t lancent vers le ciel un affreux hurlement, Ainsi que des esprits errants et sans patrie Qui se mettent a geindre opiniatrement Et de longs corbillards, sans tambours ni musique, Defilent lentement dans mon ame; I'Espoir, Vaincu, pleure, et I'Angoisse atroce, despotique, Sur mon crane incline plante son drapeau noir.
CHARLES BAUDELAIRE
CHAPTER
ONE
DESIGN FOR DYING
I. T H E
BLOOD AND SOIL
BARBARIANS
are bearers of life. These timeless symbols of courage and fertility are forever sacred. In the flowering earth men plant seed that they may enrich blood with the fruits of soil. For possession of patches of earth men enrich soil with blood, for the tribes of men seldom work together and love one another as they love possession of the fields that feed them. From the blood of their gods men drink faith. From the bodies of their gods men eat strength of spirit to face the trials of an earthbound struggle for sustenance. In a mingling of bodies and blood women and men beget new life, moving without end from soil to blood and from blood to soil. Earth is the matrix from which man is bloodily born and to which he bloodlessly returns for final rest. The re-discovery of these pagan truths, recalled from the primitive childhood of the race, has in our age brought solace and new assurance to millions of the world-weary. A whole nation has resounded with the summons of "Blut und Boden." "Never forget," wrote the Leader in the Book, "that the most holy right in this world is the right to land, and that the most hallowed of sacrifices is the blood which one sheds for this land." The men and women of a continent and then of a world have eagerly taken up the cry, or suffered bondage at the hands of those to whom this cry meant victory. Other truths of nobler meaning have left men helpless and hollow-hearted. The men of the West no longer respect or comprehend the higher values which moved their ancestors to devotion. Only the primitive call of blood and battle has power to beget effective belief and action. 3
CHAPTER
ONE
DESIGN FOR DYING
I. T H E
BLOOD AND SOIL
BARBARIANS
are bearers of life. These timeless symbols of courage and fertility are forever sacred. In the flowering earth men plant seed that they may enrich blood with the fruits of soil. For possession of patches of earth men enrich soil with blood, for the tribes of men seldom work together and love one another as they love possession of the fields that feed them. From the blood of their gods men drink faith. From the bodies of their gods men eat strength of spirit to face the trials of an earthbound struggle for sustenance. In a mingling of bodies and blood women and men beget new life, moving without end from soil to blood and from blood to soil. Earth is the matrix from which man is bloodily born and to which he bloodlessly returns for final rest. The re-discovery of these pagan truths, recalled from the primitive childhood of the race, has in our age brought solace and new assurance to millions of the world-weary. A whole nation has resounded with the summons of "Blut und Boden." "Never forget," wrote the Leader in the Book, "that the most holy right in this world is the right to land, and that the most hallowed of sacrifices is the blood which one sheds for this land." The men and women of a continent and then of a world have eagerly taken up the cry, or suffered bondage at the hands of those to whom this cry meant victory. Other truths of nobler meaning have left men helpless and hollow-hearted. The men of the West no longer respect or comprehend the higher values which moved their ancestors to devotion. Only the primitive call of blood and battle has power to beget effective belief and action. 3
Design for
Dying
Yet all now know, victors and victims alike, that this call is no longer an appeal to life nor a pledge to posterity. Neither is it an echo of a remote Springtime when the earth of the West teemed with promise and blood flowed hotly with the challenge of lifegiving deeds. The 20th-century apostles of blood and soil, unlike those of the 5th, do not revere that which they destroy. They do not breed new values out of the ripeness of the old. Their deepest motivation is a fierce rejection of all that the heirs of Western culture have hitherto loved best. They are outside that culture even though they lived long within it. Their appearance is not a herald of re-birth. In its genesis their faith was sired by corruption, conceived of want, and bom in violence. In its maturity it sleeps with decadence and grows great with tribal arrogance and a naked will-to-power. Despite all words and deeds in imitation of life, the modem call of soil and blood bespeaks the grave. Despite the gaudy trappings of those who sing victory, despite all their frantic and fanatic glory in their creed, their song is now the song of death. Few doubt that this is so. Few know why. Perhaps none can know what is and what will be when mysterious forces tragically shape the destinies of men beyond their knowledge. A less skeptical generation would attribute the wreck of its world to the wrath of God. A less sophisticated age would find in strange misfortune a proof of diabolical forces in the cosmos. The contemporary scapegoats and bugaboos devised by the frightened serve as answers only among the mad. Those still sane are baffled. Even those who play a major role in the drama no longer understand the world nor comprehend why human lives once rich with hope are now lost in panic flight before the horsemen of the Apocalypse. Sir Nevile Henderson, whose mission failed, arrived at no insight beyond a feeling that he and those with whom he dealt were alike entrapped in a Greek tragedy moving inexorably toward doom. The mystery therewith deepened. And yet this dark suspicion offers a key. If men are moved to action only by long-forgotten symbols of the primitive and the bestial; if the feebleness of those who abhor bestiality delivers the world to death-struck nihilists; if the physiognomy of defeat for freemen, and of victory for tyrants and slaves, assumes the mask of predestination; then the secret of cause and consequence lies deep within the organism of the culture in
The Barbarians
which these things occur. That the great cultures which men build out of contact with their fellows, and out of their striving toward Godhood, are organic entities needs no proof beyond the evidence of man's past. If the great culture of the West lies close to death, its mortal illness, like that of its precursors, admits of possible diagnosis in terms of senile decay breeding rottenness in its loins and in its inmost heart. The historian of the future who pens the epitaph of this age, as did Gibbon for the earlier Western world of Rome, may indeed come to this Spenglerian conclusion in the absence of any other explanation of the strange plague that slows the steps and dims the sight of modern man. But the chroniclers and commentators of today can scarcely rest content with any simple formula of cultural senescence, even though their discontent may itself be a symptom of the disease which they deny. Still less can they cry Destiny and abandon all search for Causality. Western man, unlike any men before him, had the means of saving himself from the grave which swallowed all earlier cultures. Once freed from the thralldom of kings and creeds, he reached out eagerly and knowingly to subdue all Nature. With the weapons his Science gave him he conquered space and time, he purged his blood of many ills, he defeated pestilence and famine, he drew from the soil such riches as none before imagined. He reaffirmed the dignity of Man. He gloried in the freedom of his dynamic Will. He praised his fruitful Reason as the instrument of his own redemption from all the woes his forbears had endured. He cried out triumphantly that he was master of his fate and captain of his soul, and that for the first time on earth an unending era of peace and abundance was within his grasp. And in the end, strangely when his dreams were fairesthe failed. Falteringly, dumbly, almost without regret for his lost freedoms and his broken hopes, he turned once more to face the night. This destiny was scarcely pre-ordained. The soothsayers who cry that fate is beyond control, and call upon the West to abdicate, are mirrors of despair. Western man had tools for saving his future. His defeat is not due to the will of the gods nor the world's design nor the limits of reason nor yet to any doom whereby each civilization inescapably destroys itself and reconverts its children into savages. His failure stems from his collective unwillingness or incapacity to face the realities of his own devising and to adapt himself to the changes of his own creation.
Design for Dying
The world society of the 2 oth century, with its world-wide web of interdependence among all the millions of men, was a product of the machinesoulless servant born of the marriage of industry and science. With the machine as slave. Western man could either court self-destruction or make of all the earth a garden for himself and posterity. That he never reached the latter goal, despite much wishing and willing, that he stumbled unwittingly toward the former which no one willed or wished, is a consequence of his ineptitude in the business of statesmanship and in the statesmanship of business. The Machine Age, promising peace and plenty, produced want and war. The masters of machines became the victims of machines because they refused to pay the price of their own salvation. Wisdom was not lacking. The mind of the race was not too feckless to grasp the issue. Seers and savants long knew what price must be paid for survival. But man as citizen and man as entrepreneur was unwilling to pay. For not paying, a world was lost. The price has been often stated. In an industrial civilization covering the planet, peace and plenty are alike indivisible. There might have been abundance, or hope of it, for all or else for none. There might have been security against war for all or else for none. No half-way house was tenable in a world which was one. Peace and plenty were also one, for without the promise of plenty there could be no hope of building peace within nations or among them, and without peace there could be no building of an economy of abundance. Poverty begets envy and war. War begets despair and penury. The cure of poverty and war was not to be had by idle waiting, nor by blind faith in "progress," nor by reliance on the beneficent effects of each serving the good of all by seeking his own good first. Only in the 19th century were the hopes and illusions of laissez-faire still possible. In the 20th the vision of a peaceful and a prosperous fraternity of mankind required organized effort for its realization. Such effort required abandonment of old ways. It called for foresight and for the sacrifice of ancient prides. The interests which called most imperatively for sacrifice were those which men were least willing to abandon, for they touched most deeply men's purses and men's hearts. In the realm of business, and of agriculture and labor as well, the profits of monopoly,
The Barbarians
and the comforts of a security which rested upon the privileges of the few at the expense of the many, were incompatible with economic stabihty and advance. Yet monopolists everywhere clung desperately to their advantages rather than acquiesce in any program of restoring capitalist competition in a free market or creating a collectivist economy in a controlled market. All else they and their followers were willing to sacrificefreedom, honor, ethics and even life itselfbut not the prerogatives which seemed to their beneficiaries the only possible foundation of their lives. In the realm of politics, the persistence of national patriotism and the continued fragmentation of the world community into hostile sovereignties were incompatible with world peace and order. Yet patriots everywhere clung desperately to their tribal prejudices and in the end rejected every effort to create a world polity assuring security and justice for all. In the spheres of commerce and government, where the sickness of the West was most malignant, the twin disorders which threatened death were the economics of monopolyfatal both to "capitalism" and "democracy," and the politics of powerfatal to any hope of ordered peace. By staunch defense of money and privilege, by firm repudiation of socialism and competitive capitalism alike, the favored classes of the Western nation-states insured their own destruction and that of the world which they ruled. By staunch defense of the National State, by firm repudiation of "internationalism" in all its guises, patriotic multitudes destroyed all possibility of survival for nationstates of patriots. The pathology of Nemesis is familiar. Its course in retrospect is clear. Monopoly bred poverty and a slow paralysis of the great industrial societies where economic well-being and progress had hitherto depended on the fruitful competition of the marketplace. Nationalism and its off-spring, national imperialism, bred international anarchy and war. Each consequence aggravated the causes of the other. Each new crisis generated new fearsnever quite sufficient to move men to effective remedial measures, but always sufficient to provoke desperate efforts at escape by measures which rendered the dilemma more insoluble. Men and women by millions lived increasingly in the shadow of fearof unemployment, of social degradation, of bitter impoverishment, of economic and political insecurity, of foreign invasion, of death
Design for Dying
from the skies, of a crushing burden of armaments to meet fears which became more terrifying with each blundering effort to ward them off. Despair and terror seldom beget the courageous wisdom necessary to face difficult tasks. These moods paralyze intellect and conscience alike and drive men back toward brutishness. Each floundering and fear-born move to escape spreads new fears in ever-widening circles. The first national community to be utterly broken by the impact of 20th century war was Russia. Here in a backward, semi-feudal state, far removed from the insecurities of late capitalism, the insecurities of military defeat and social dissolution created an opportunity for the seizure of power by the inspired apostles of the Marxist dream. They visioned a cooperative commonwealth from which want and war would be forever banished. On paper, the Communist program was objectively relevant to the world's dilemma. But in practice, in Lord Balfour's phrase. Communism became an excellent means of making rich men poor, but a doubtful means of making poor men rich. The methods adopted to achieve freedom and plenty produced tyranny and famine. The expropriated resisted the expropriators. The Western ruling groups strove by all the means at their command to destroy the "Workers' State." They failed. Their failure bred new fear of the dispossessed among all the threatened possessors. This fear in turn, along with other fears induced by the miseries of a maladjusted world, shaped the acts of all the rulers of the West in the years following the Great War. In another marginal and backward society, industrialists, nobles, and priests were struck with terror at "Bolshevism"by which they meant every mistaken effort of proletarian and peasant leaders to extend the horizons of the poor at the expense of the wealthy. The frightened turned for salvation to barbarous practitioners of violence who promised "salvation from Bolshevism"through methods of rulership copied from the Bolsheviki. Mussolini's Blackshirts found supporters among the timid middle classes. Money flowed from the rich and well-born who saw in Fascism the means of maintaining their own positions. Therewith was born the Caesarism whose fear-driven disciples subsequently conquered power by force and fraud in the sick society of industrial Germany, and in Japan and Spain and Portugal and elsewhere. In the name of
The Barbarians
anti-Communism and national awakening, the gang-captains of the lesser bourgeoisie smashed organizations of workers and converted peasants and burghers to a new faith. Through bribery and intrigue, the great monopohsts of money and land put tyrants in power, under the delusion that their own fears could thereby be allayed and their advantages assured. Millions of the anxious and the world-weary, tired of thought and talk, joined the marching mobs. The spiritual essence of this fear-bred cult was (and is) a blind quest for security at whatever cost, and an embittered repudiation of words and values that no longer have content. Liberty, equality and fraternity; democracy, toleration and the dignity of manall were alike rejected, though these had been the soul of the Western cultural tradition for centuries. The "new" values of Blood and Soil, of Race and Empire, became the rationalization of decadence and desperation. In the words of Benedetto Croce: The choice between liberty and suppression of liberty is not on the same plane as a choice between things of different values, one of which may reasonably be preferred to the otherthe first means human dignity and civilization, the second the debasing of men until they are either a flock to be led to pasture, or captured, trained animals in a cage. Coming to our own times, I see the future that liberty promises always as a beacon; I do not see any light in the future promised by authoritarianism. In the past, under the forms of theocracy, of monarchy or of oligarchy, authority had at least a background of religious mystery. Modern humanistic thought has dissipated the mystery, replacing it by simple humanitarian ideals. But authoritarianism in our times, in those we see looming ahead, is irreligious and materialistic, despite its pretenses and rhetoric, and comes down to a brutal rule of violence over people who are prevented from seeing and knowing what is going on, and who are forced to submit to leadership and give unquestioning obedience to it. To lend glamor to this obedience by associating it with the noble and the heroic, it is usually called military discipline, which has been extended, or should be extended, to the whole of society. But military discipline has its function only as one aspect of the social order. If instead of being contained within the society, it is itself the containing body or is coextensive with society, it can no longer be called military discipline, but is a general process of fostering universal stupidity. An artist with the face of a corporal, a scientist with that of a
10
Design for Dying
sergeant, a politician who waits for his orders and blindly carries them out, is no longer an artist, a scientist or a politician, but an imbecile.^
In what manner has Caesarism "solved" the problems of the 2oth century? To deny the fact of a solution is to ignore reality. The manner of the solution is crucial. How does Fascism reheve its subjects of fear of war and fear of poverty? How does it afford to its followers those material and emotional satisfactions which democracy no longer furnishes? Partly by pageantry and propaganda. Partly by the savage suppression of all dissent. Partly by the deflection of mass aggressions onto scapegoats unable to resist. But beyond these devices of force and trickery, the new Caesars have in truth freed millions of men from the terror of impoverishment at home and war abroadand this not merely by rendering war "heroic" and "noble" or by preaching to the masses the virtues of self-denial. The problems of war and poverty in the Fascist States have alike been "solved" by mobilizing all of the energies of great peoples for conquest. The tribesmen of old fled famine and fear by desperate plunder-raids against the wealthy cities and bountiful provinces of more civilized people who had become too sophisticated to defend themselves. The chiefs of today's despoiling hordes are not different in motives or deeds, though the fighting men they command are no longer hunters and herdsmen but robots of the machine. Idle machines, idle money and idle men in the totalitarian States have been put to work forging the weapons of destruction. Heavy industry is restored to full productivity, light industry and agriculture are renovated, unemployment is abolished, economic security for all members of the chosen race is achieved by the creation of a society which lives and moves and has its being for one end only. Preparation for conquest restores life to a sluggish economy and gives new confidence to a discouraged society. Adventures in conquest bring exaltation to all the faithful and put an end to doubts and fears. Success in conquest brings booty and the slave-labor of the conquered. The victims, having renounced conquest and having found no other formula to restore their faith and cure their ills, are as putty in the hands of the invaders. And beyond conquest? Time gives no certain answer. All
1 The New Republic, April 7, 1937.
Thoughts Before Darkness
11
that is clear is that the new Caesars and their successors cannot halt even if they would. Like climbers scaling a cliff, they may climb higher or they may fall to death. But they may not rest save momentarily. They cannot descend. They continue to live only by continuing to climb from conquest to conquest. N o resumption of a welfare economy, no return to "capitalism," no satiation with aggrandizement, no turning back to the ways of peace is permitted to those who have pledged their all to war and world hegemony. And if they conquer all? If they crush and subjugate all the twilight peoples of a lost world? Then they must perhaps rend and tear each other, or face the collapse of the structures on which they stand. That this is their destiny, if fortune grant them endless victory over the dying West, is scarcely in doubt. N o stable world imperium is promised by their successes. What looms ahead is titanic and timeless strife among the empire-builders in everwider arenas of combat. Such struggles to come will be meaningless by any standard of value save that of power as an end in itself. Beyond looms disintegration and the coming of the long darkness. After Rome was done to death her conquerors fought fiercely for spoils until all the spoils were gone. Visigoths and Vandals, Huns and Franks, Lombards and Norsemen warred upon one another until the Mediterranean world was reduced to a desert inhabited only by nomad hordes. Wretched bands of survivors gathered about feudal rulers. Their realms were but the shattered fragments of lost empires and broken kingdoms. The modern destroyers of the West, mad and dream-driven, move toward a like demise. As the West once was, before its culture flowered after centuries of feudal night, so may it be again. The triumphs of its puny tyrants will not hide the emptiness of an age whose soul has perished because its mind and heart would not will its survival.^
2. T H O U G H T S BEFORE D A R K N E S S
The disintegration of the world society of the 20th century is attributable less to the satanic power of its destroyers than to the
1 Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee's brilliant essay, "The Saviour with the Sword," in "The Disintegrations of Civilizations," Vol. VI, pp. 178-212 of A Study of History, Oxford University Press, London, 1939.
11
that is clear is that the new Caesars and their successors cannot halt even if they would. Like climbers scaling a cliff, they may climb higher or they may fall to death. But they may not rest save momentarily. They cannot descend. They continue to live only by continuing to climb from conquest to conquest. N o resumption of a welfare economy, no return to "capitalism," no satiation with aggrandizement, no turning back to the ways of peace is permitted to those who have pledged their all to war and world hegemony. And if they conquer all? If they crush and subjugate all the twilight peoples of a lost world? Then they must perhaps rend and tear each other, or face the collapse of the structures on which they stand. That this is their destiny, if fortune grant them endless victory over the dying West, is scarcely in doubt. N o stable world imperium is promised by their successes. What looms ahead is titanic and timeless strife among the empire-builders in everwider arenas of combat. Such struggles to come will be meaningless by any standard of value save that of power as an end in itself. Beyond looms disintegration and the coming of the long darkness. After Rome was done to death her conquerors fought fiercely for spoils until all the spoils were gone. Visigoths and Vandals, Huns and Franks, Lombards and Norsemen warred upon one another until the Mediterranean world was reduced to a desert inhabited only by nomad hordes. Wretched bands of survivors gathered about feudal rulers. Their realms were but the shattered fragments of lost empires and broken kingdoms. The modern destroyers of the West, mad and dream-driven, move toward a like demise. As the West once was, before its culture flowered after centuries of feudal night, so may it be again. The triumphs of its puny tyrants will not hide the emptiness of an age whose soul has perished because its mind and heart would not will its survival.^
2. T H O U G H T S BEFORE D A R K N E S S
The disintegration of the world society of the 20th century is attributable less to the satanic power of its destroyers than to the
1 Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee's brilliant essay, "The Saviour with the Sword," in "The Disintegrations of Civilizations," Vol. VI, pp. 178-212 of A Study of History, Oxford University Press, London, 1939.
12
Design for Dying
weakness of its defenders. Power is relative. The power of the new nihilists flows from the impotence of their foes. The modern barbarians, unhke those of old, came from within. They were bred, like parasites on the bodies of the dying, for the corruption of the living. They sprang from the "schism in the soul" of a civilization in dissolution. By their enemies and victims they were nurtured and brought to mature ferocity. The fall of Rome presents a parallel in the folly of the Emperor Valens and that of his successors who relied upon barbarians for defense against barbarians. The disasters which overtook ancient China were likewise due in large measure to the precept stated by Kia Yi, philosopher of the second century B.C.: "The policy for the Middle Kingdom is to employ the barbarians for knocking the barbarians on the head." The fall of the West exhibits on the grandest scale the comic-tragic drama of a whole culture done to death by the deeds of those entrusted with its protection, with each step toward doom plausibly presented and gladly accepted as the only means of salvation. That any such dismal farce was possible was due to blindness and helplessness which all but pass understanding. Here again those who watch are driven toward hypotheses of senility. The net effect of countless thousands of individual decisions and indecisions in the great capitals of a lost world suggests that the peoples of the West fell victims to a strange plague which progressively deprived them of all power of perception and action. They did not quietly await an unknown fate with the resignation of those who have renounced life. Like desperate suicides, they sought out their destroyer, hailed him from afar, and in every way aided him to encompass their destruction. How did this come to pass? Partial answers have been suggested in the books preceding this one. Further answers will appear in the pages which follow these. The segments of a total answer can only be dimly outlined. Man never lives by bread alone. He needs love and confidence in his fellows. He needs hope and assurance in his way of life, whatever it may be. He needs religion, secular or ecclesiastical. He needs devotion to social values which have meaning in his daily toil. Western man in the years of his downfall lost these prerequisites of his security. The loss of them came about from the unforeseen and perhaps "inevitable" consequences of the very faiths which he was certain would enrich his life and make him
13
master of his world and of his destiny. These faiths were Rationalism, Liberalism, Patriotism. That modern man met disaster by virtue of devotion to reason and to the ideals of freedom and fatherland is a paradox so striking as to invite abrupt denial. The road to ruin was surely paved with irrationality and treason, and with successive betrayals of the values of liberty. Men no longer cherished truth. Men no longer valued freedom. And men sold their country for a mess of pottage. This much must at once be granted. But if one is to know why the peoples of the West fell victims to faithlessness and self-betrayal, one must observe the impact of Science, Patriotism and Democracy on a culture which first blossomed in an ideational context of theological mysticism, catholic universality and aristocratic ethics. That impact was one of dissolution. Experimental science and technology on the one hand, and the creeds of freedom and fatherland on the other, produced effects of disintegration which modern man was unable either to prevent or to transcend. The ever-questioning skepticism, the incessant doubting of authority, the patient insistence upon pragmatic demonstration which lie behind all Science have given rise to the most amazing achievements of the modern mind and to many of the noblest expressions of the human spirit. The history of science is a tale of courage, adventure and accomplishment without precedent in the annals of the race. Those who broke with the past, who smashed dead idols, who shattered superstition and shook men out of complacent ignorance desired to point the way to a resplendent future of freedom and light. If that future never materialized the fault was scarcely theirs. It lay rather in the incapacity of masses of men to build an enduring civilization on the wreckage of an old folk-culture. Wisdom cannot be learned by those deprived of the comforts of ignorance unless they have courage to rebuild their intellectual and spiritual lives on new foundations. Faith in God and faith in Man cannot be recaptured by those who have become skeptical of all words and all things, unless they can devise new values worthy of their belief. Security in the relations between men cannot be enjoyed by those who live in a world of endless flux, unless they are capable of re-ordering their collective existence according to some design which will recover in new forms the satisfactions which rapid social change destroys.
14
Design for
Dying
These things the peoples of the West were unable to achieve in any measure adequate to meet the crisis provoked by the passing of the old ways. Science dissolved old loyalties. It was but a step from questioning the authority of dead saints to questioning that of living priests. It was but another step to questioning the authority of nobles and kings. In destroying men's faith in the creeds of Church and State, rationalism and agnosticism dissolved the very fabric of society. For men are uhited not by self-interest or abstract reason, but by devotion to ideas in which all men believe. Here as elsewhere nature abhors a vacuum. If old gods die, new gods must be born. No synthetic "Goddess of Reason" will serve the needs of worshippers. If the old order passes a new order must emerge, for men cannot live in endless disorder save on the frontiers of new worlds. To make man wholly rational is to make man less than human. "Economic man," whose relations with his fellows are governed only by calculating selfinterest, is a mythical monster. A society dominated by those who approximate to this model is a society facing the grave. The processes of decay need not here be traced in detail. Their first adumbrations manifested themselves in the Reformation and in the Wars of Religion, aftermaths of the liberating inquisitiveness of the Renaissance. Therewith the unity of Christendom was broken, and the power of priesthoods to prescribe a stable way of life for European man was lost. Applied science thereafter begot modern industry and commerce. In their wake grew a free merchant class of town-dwellers standing between the peasant serfs and the feudal lords of medieval folk-society. This bourgeoisie was dedicated by the very means of its livelihood to risktaking, to profit-seeking, to adventurous enterprise, to shrewd foresight, to the ways of material calculation and to vigorous affirmation of freedom of the willall alike fatal to the inherited forms of a static society where each man respected his betters, patronized his inferiors and proudly knew his own place and kept it. Relationships of status, resting on unquestioned tradition, gave way to relationships of contract, resting on self-interest. This bourgeoisie was at once the fountain-head of scientific rationaUsm and the source of the liberal-patriotic ideology wherein all men were envisaged as reasonable, equal and free. As it grew in numbers, riches and influence, its leaders inevitably challenged the Divine Right of Kings and the ruling caste of nobles.
15
Social revolution ensued. In the great Anglo-French communities facing the Atlantic the years between 1640 and 1815 were years of battle between burghers and aristocrats, commoners and kings. The tremendous dynamism of the modern tempo, born of science and of the new capitalism which science nurtured, manifested itself in rebellion and class war. Old kings were killed. Old classes were dispossessed. Old norms were broken in the name of liberation. To be sure, new rulers, new elites, new standards replaced the old. The men of 1649, of 1776 and 1789 were builders as well as destroyers. The sturdy merchant was their ideal. Constitutional democracy and national patriotism were their creeds. Their program for living? Utilitarian rationalism, laissezfaire, unfettered private enterprise and free trade. They believed in this faith and fought for it. They triumphed over monarchs, mercantilists, militarists and landed lords. With the signing of the Armistice of 1918 in Compiegne forest, at the close of the last great combat between bourgeois democracies and feudal monarchies, their victory was all but world-wide and their way of hfe had reached fruition. But at the moment of victory they were already self-defeated. Impersonal forces, beyond cognition or control, had transformed the European world anew between the Congress of Vienna and Sarajevo. The transformation proceeded with dizzy speed and left no time for men to fit themselves snugly and serenely into a new scheme of life. The Machine magically changed the world and made of all Western living a raging torrent, compared to which the turbulent i8th century was as a placid stream.^ Europe's
1 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, V, pp. 15-16, observes shrewdly: "An empirical survey has left us doubtful whether there is any ascertainable correlation at all between the historical variations in the degree of a society's control over its environment and the historical change in the fortunes of a society whose growth is cut short by a breakdown running into a disintegration. And the evidence, so far as it goes, suggests that, if some correlation did prove to exist, we should find that an increase in command over the environment was a concomitant of breakdown and disintegration and not of growth. It looks, in fact, as though the internal struggles within the bosom of a society which Isring the society's breakdown about, and which become more and more violent as its consequent disintegration proceeds, were actually more effective than the activities of genesis and growth in promoting the extension of the society's command both over the life of other living societies and over the inanimate forces of Physical Nature. In the downward course of a brokendown civilization's career there may be truth in the Ionian philosopher Heracleitus's saying that 'War is the father of all things'. The sinister concentration of the society's dwindling powers upon the absorbing business of fratricidal
16
Design for Dying
people multiplied as never before on the basis of the new means of Hvelihood which the Machine made possible. Africa, Asia, Australasia and the Americas were explored, claimed, conquered, settled, exploited. The lands facing the North Atlantic became bee-hives of industry, adapted to the ever-growing needs of an ever-expanding population in a constantly enlarging world. The simple burgher class of old was spHt in two: a small class of great industrial captains and money-masters"self-made men," lacking blue blood but rich in gold and sharing power in many lands with the remnants of the ancient aristocracy; and an ever-increasing middle-class mass of small merchants, salesmen, advertisers, technicians and intellectuals. Peasants became independent farmers or agricultural laborers. The class of artisans swelled into an industrial proletariat living by work for wages and resenting the harshness of a lot as lacking in dignity as it was poor in the comforts of bourgeois existence. It is a law of all living that activity is followed by rest, growth by maturity, aggrandizement by quiescence. The roaring, rushing world of the 19th century was predestined to a new phase when its far frontiers should vanish, its markets should become sated, its peoples should cease to multiply. These developments might have inaugurated a quiet century of orderly adjustment to the problems of a changed world. Western man might have paused in his headlong quest for profits and empire and found peace once more in a new order and a new faith. Instead he stumbled into violence and misery, class conflict and war, poverty and sickness of soul until finally he faced the breakdown of all order and all values in a vast chaos. That so complete a catastrophe should have followed an age so bright with promise is explicable in terms of the persistence of a faith that had become empty in the face of intellectual disbelief
warfare may generate a military prowess that will place the neighbouring societies at the war-obsessed society's mercy, and may strike out a military technique that will serve as a key to the acquisition of a far-reaching technical mastery over the Material World. Since the vulgar estimates of human prosperity are reckoned in terms of power and wealth, it thus often happens that the opening chapters in the history of a society's tragic decline are popularly hailed as the culminating chapters of a magnificent growth; and this ironic misconception may even persist for centuries. Sooner or later, however, disillusionment is bound to follow; for a society that has become incurably divided against itself is almost certain to 'put back into the business' of war the greater part of those additional resources, human and material, which the same business has incidentally brought into its hands."
17
and material misfortune. In the life-cycle of creeds, men devise and cling to beliefs not because they are logically best or objectively relevant to their problems but because they afford emotional comfort. The cults of Reason, of Freedom, and of Fatherland afforded such satisfactions in the late i8th and early 19th centuries, because they were organically integrated with expanding and prosperous societies of small-scale competitive business carried on under the relatively peaceful political order of democratic nationalism. When these things passed, when men were willy-nilly driven by the blind forces of material self-interest and collective will-to-power toward the contractions and frustrations of monopolistic capitalism and national imperialism, the old faiths failed. One new faith emerged which for a time caught men's imagination with the promise of salvation: International Social Democracy. But that faith, insofar as it won the support of disgruntled workers and peasants, terrified the mighty of land and money. With its Apocalyptic vision of class war and a revolutionary millennium, it brought fear to the middle-class masses who identified themselves with their social superiors. These threatened groups reasserted all the more vigorously the "reasonableness" of capitalism. They preached Political Democracy and National Patriotism all the more vehemently as a means of winning the lower classes to acceptance of the status quo. In this they largely succeeded. Social democracy was tamed and corrupted and at last rendered innocuous. But the elites of industry and agriculture, and their emulators in the middle class, scarcely believed any longer in the Democracy and Patriotism which they preached. Believing in nothing and finally lacking all faith even in themselves, they became ripe for conversion to barbarism or for defeat at the hands of the new barbarians. By the time of the First World War, Rationalism had already half-destroyed itself. The corrosive acids of skeptical analysis, poured over the acts and beliefs of men at a time when misfortune fostered doubt, begot disbelief in all beliefs, including belief in Freedom and Fatherland. In sequel came disbelief in Reason and disbelief in Man. Political democracy had likewise half-destroyed itself, for its functioning was corrupted by the self-seeking of insecure plutocrats, and by the rise of demagogues outbidding one another in promising favors to an electorate which had become a congeries of interest-groups, each seeking to bend the
18
Design for Dying
powers of the State to its own advantage. By the same token, national patriotism was far on the road to ruin, despite the chauvinistic exuberance of 1914. The paths of patriotic glory led only to stinking death for purposes which had ever less meaning to masses imbued with disgust and despair. To believe in Reason when Reason meant progress and plenty was easy. T o believe in it amid the wreckage of a world, when it meant only intolerable disbelief in everything, was to beUeve in nothing. T o believe in Freedom was not difficult when democracy meant the emancipation of the masses from ancient thralldom and the elevation of the humble to a share in the new prosperity. But to believe in it when democracy seemed to have become a "racket" and a facade for exploitation was hard. T o believe in Patriotism in time of national rebirth was simple. To believe in it after the clash of nations had brought want and woe to all was beyond men's capacity for faith. No effective new faith emerged which was relevant to the needs of the new age, and therefore emotionally gratifying to its followers. This phenomenon coincided in time and space with the decay of old estates and elites and with a growing cleavage of interests between classes and masses. This conflict, so clearly foreseen by Marx in its genesis but not in its outcome, brought both contestants to disaster, for each checkmated the other and was in turn checkmated by the middle-income bourgeoisie between them. Big Business in each of the nation-states, having achieved ascendancy in the name of democracy, could not safeguard itself from mass attack from below by establishing an open plutocracy, even had its leaders possessed talent for political dictatorship. Such a move would have driven the masses further toward socialism, or worse, toward socialism's enfant terrible, Communism. In this event even the middle classes might have identified themselves with the proletariat. Conversely the leaders of labor, having demanded "social reforms" in the name of democracy, could not embrace proletarian revolution and dictatorship, even had they had the will and the genius for the task. Such a step would have driven the middle classes completely into the enemy campas indeed it did wherever proletarian revolution was threatened. As for the amorphous middle class itself, it was an inchoate mass of millions of little men and women,
Thoughts Bejore Darkness
19
worried, hopeful, confused and forever insecure from inability to climb to the top and from fear of being pushed to the bottom. Its spokesmen preached democracy and patriotism with less and less conviction. In the face of opposition from Big Business, they were unable to translate liberalism into economic terms which promised security. Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom," Lloyd George's social reforms, Briining's democratic dictatorship, Blum's Popular Front, Roosevelt's "New Deal," all fell short of reshaping the economy of late capitalism into a viable order. The fears of the wealthy and the demands of the poor frustrated the enterprise. The men of the middle class were equally unable, in the face of their own frightened faith in "national sovereignty," to translate liberalism into international terms which promised peace. They defeated the Covenant of Wilson, the hopes of MacDonald, the dreams of Briand and Stresemann in the firm conviction that "My country, right or wrong" was a safer creed than the brotherhood of man. Nothing short of a revolution in the economic order and in the political structure of the community of nations could meet the crisis. But this was "Communism" and "InternationaUsm" and therefore anathema. And in fear of Communism and Internationalism, all fled back to programs and policies which insured further frustration. The blindness and weakness that followed had their genesis in these futile hopes and neurotic fears. The post-Versailles generation was unable to reconcile its own conception of its interests and needs with the demands of a world which offered it a choice between extinction and a radical reformation of its way of life. It was therefore unable to comprehend the nature of the new barbarism which grew out of the despair of the Kleinbiirgertum. The little Caesars of the colored shirts spelled the death of a free working class, of independent Big Business, of democracy and plutocracy alike, as Oswald Spengler had predicted years before the first of the new Caesars had appeared on the scene. Social Democrats nonetheless awaited their own destruction complacently. Communists at first hoped that the triumph of Fascism would pave the way for proletarian revolt and later hoped that alliance with Fascism would somehow lead to the same result. Big Business subsidized the Caesars and placed them in office in the belief that security for business was thereby won. Plutocrats de-
20
Design for Dying
livered power to their own destroyers. Democrats cried peace, tolerance and justice on behalf of those sworn to destroy peace, tolerance and justice. This process had reached its logical end-point within Italy and Germany by 1935. Henceforth it manifested itself on the larger stage of world politics. Here, despite the record and the plain evidence of events, the same drama of blindness and weakness was replayed. Precisely as parliamentary democracy and capitalism were demolished within the frontiers of the Caesar-states by the weakness of their defenders, so the balance of power and the whole fabric of the Western State System were destroyed by the folly and impotence of the statesmen and masses of the democratic countries. The masses sought "peace" through "neutrality," "isolation" and "pacifism," and thereby insured war and death. The classes, and the politicians who spoke for them, sought security by arming the "Anti-Comintern" Caesars for protection against the "Red Menace." They were paralyzed by secret hopes, assiduously cultivated by the Fascist Caesars themselves, of using Fascist Caesarism against Communist Caesarism. They were undone by fear of losing elections if they warned the masses of dangers which the masses preferred not to face.^ They distrusted the masses whose weakness and frivolity they well knew. They envied the alien dictators who had learned to drug the masses into passivity or fanatic devotion. In their anxiety and doubt, they feared for their gods: Law, Order, Property, Morality, Religion. They believed that Communism meant the death of their deities and that Fascism meant security and new life. So strong was their need to believe, despite all the evident deceit, cruelty and dishonor of the alleged protectors of their altars, that they believed in the face of all facts to the contrary. The moral chaos and political f ecklessness thus generated within
^ Stanley Baldwin in the House of Commons, November 12,1936: "I put before the whole House my views with an appalling frankness. From 1933 I and my friends were very worried about what was happening in Europe. You'll remember that at that time the Disarmament Conference was sitting in Geneva and there probably was a stronger pacifist feeling running through this country than at any other time since the war. . . . My position as head of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. . . . Suppose I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm. Does anybody think that this pacific country would have rallied to that at that moment? I can not think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain."
11
the bourgeois democracies rendered governments and people incapable of meeting either the crises of diplomacy or the shocks of war. T o each new act of Fascist aggression against weak and distant peoples, beginning with the Japanese rape of Manchuria in 1931, the democratic Powers could oppose only notes of protest, speeches of exhortation and tears of regret. The Geneva procedures set up for penalizing peace-breakers were willfully sabotaged. T o meet force with effective economic penalties was impossible, for such measures would be "bad for business", they might fatally weaken the still weak Fascist regime and lead to revolution; they would be unjust (were not the grievances of the "have-nots" legitimate?); they would be unsafe; they might lead to force; and force was wicked, un-Christian, ungentlemanly and dangerous. T o meet force with force was still more impossible for the same reasons redoubled. W h y mix in alien quarrels? W h y quit our own to stand on foreign ground? Collective security having been rendered impossible by these attitudes and policies, there remained the safe refuge of "neutrality"and neutrality forbade any retaliation against aggressors or any distinction between right and wrong, particularly when wrongs were committed in far places against peoples who were at best stupid foreigners and at worst disorderly heathens. Each successful aggression strengthened the power of the aggressors to commit greater aggressions, and encouraged others to embark upon a similar course. When the guardians of order not only fail to punish robbery and murder but help to make them profitable, thieves and assassins flourish. Danger came closer. The flames of Shanghai became the flames of Addis Ababa. The clank of tanks in Mongolia became the clank of tanks in Saxony and then in the Rhineland. Bombers over the Blue Nile became bombers over Barcelona. Still no matter. The aggressors who had formerly been too weak to be resisted were now too strong to be resisted. Did sympathy and decency dictate succour to the victims? Perhaps, if they were white men. But the Chinese were too yellow, the Ethiopians too black and the Spaniards too "red." Non-intervention was safer. And Austria? But Austrians were really Germans. "Self-determination" was a sacred principle. Happily it also applied to Czechoslovakia. "I have no further territorial demands to make in Europe," said Caesar. Good. Then give unto Caesar what is Caesar's or what Caesar says is his. But
22
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he should not use force to take what others will grant him freely. Force against Czechs might have to be opposed by force, even though this crisis too, sighed Mr. Chamberlain, was "a quarrel in a far-away country among people of whom we know nothing." Happily force was avoided. The Czechs were compelled by their French allies and British friends to surrender. Millions of Frenchmen and Britons wept with joy that war had been averted. . . . Still nearer swept the flames. At long last and too late, came disenchantment and determination to resist. The heroic Spanish Republic, the vigorous and civilized Czech democracy, had not seemed worth defending. But now the feudal oligarchy that was Poland, and even Rumania, called by the last Tsar "not a country, but a profession," seemed to merit defenseafter all hope of defending them was gone. Perhaps here too a "bargain" could be made. Would Caesar accept pacifically that which he might otherwise be tempted to seize with arms? Was not Caesar too a fishmonger to be dealt with honorably as trader deals with trader? If not, then reluctantly the gage of battle must be accepted, even after no one longer had stomach or heart to fight, or mind to know for what he was asked to fight. The result was a recapitulation of an ancient tragedy well described by England's most distinguished living historian:
In the fullness of Time the din of battle which has ebbed away towards the fringes of Civilization till it has passed almost out of ear-shot will come welling back again in the van of barbarian war-bands that have gained the upper hand over the garrisons of the limes by learning from them, in the effective school of a perpetual border warfare, the winning tricks of the professional soldier's trade; or, more terrifying still, the dreadful sound will come welling up again in the resurgence of an Internal Proletariat that has turned militant once moreto the consternation of a Dominant Minority which has been flattering itself that this projanum vulgus has long since been cowed or cajoled into a settled habit of submissiveness. The spectres of war and revolution that have latterly passed into legend now once again stalk abroad, as of old, in the light of day; and a bourgeoisie which has never before seen bloodshed now hastily throws up ringwalls round its open towns out of any materials that come to hand: mutilated statues and desecrated altars and scattered drums of fallen columns and inscribed blocks of marble reft from derelict public monuments. These pacific inscriptions are now anachronisms; for the "Indian Summer" is over; the "Time of Troubles" has returned; and this shocking calamity has descended upon a generation which has been
23
brought up in the illusory conviction that the bad times of yore have gone for good! ^ Insofar as this drift toward ruin represented any formulated plan of action (or inaction) on the part of the democratic politicians, that plan scarcely reflected the fears and hopes of the simple men and women of the masses. Popular intuitions were sound more often than not, but popular anxieties and aspirations were without plan in the absence of leadership. The holders of public office in the democracies mirrored more frequently the minds of those who held wealth, and therefore power, at the top of the social scale. Ditch-diggers, factory-hands and farmers saw the Great Society dimly as a vast stage-world peopled by heroes and villains, friends and enemies, homefoik and foreigners. Identification of the players was often confused by ignorant stereotypes or by the muddlement willfully spread by press magnates. Mass knowledge of historical processes was meagre, mass conceptions of cause and consequence limited. And yet in France, in Britain and even in America, men in the street sensed the danger that threatened their lives and looked for guidance in meeting it. But their political guides used words for the masses chiefly to win votes by promising favors or quieting fears. And of necessity in communities in which the many were poor and feeble, and the few were wealthy and powerful, statesmen communed with lords and clerics, merchants and bankers. These gentlemen and their ladies knew the Great World and knew, or thought they knew, their own interests as the poor can never know them. And their interests and their way of life caused them to view the world through glasses which enabled them to see what they looked for. They remained blind to all that might, if seen, prove disturbing to their own self-assurance. They did not all see the same things, nor see the same things in the same way, nor draw the same conclusions from what they saw. But by and large, like other people, they saw the world less as it was than as their fears and hopes pictured it to them. The prevalent picture of the world in the minds of the Western elites during the time of trouble was one in which Profits were menaced by Labor and in which the "good old days" could be restored by putting workers in their place and getting rid of
1 Arnold J. Toynbee, op. cit., VI, p. 206.
24
Design for Dying
"radical experiments" in government. The nation-states in their struggle for power were fitted into this scheme. Russia was Bolshevism, with Labor run wild and gentlemen butchered by ruffians. Italy was Order. Trains ran on time. The Duce stood for no nonsense. Germany was Order too, a bit shocking perhaps (too bad about the Jews) and dangerously experimental, but not radical. On the contrary, anti-radical, anti-Communist. Rather magnificent. Spain? Clear as crystal: Franco fighting the "Reds" to save Property, the Family and Christianity. Did Fascism wage wars and disturb markets.^ That was to be deplored. But if Hitler and Mussolini and Franco and the Tokio generals were really fighting Bolshevism, then why oppose them? True, none of them fought the Russians. They fought Chinese and Ethiopians and Spaniards and Czechs. But these enemies were also "Reds." Ultimately they would "clean up" Russia and restore order. Meanwhile they tolerated no agitators or labor troubles. There was discipline. One could understand such people. One could work with such people. One could plan and hope again.^ The resultant program, persisted in and pursued with few doubts until the end, was one of connivance in Fascist aggression and a strict quarantine of Moscow until Rome, Berlin and Tokio should be ready to deal with Moscow as Moscow deserved. Granted the premise, it followed that collective security through the League of Nations was folly, since its effective implementation would thwart the Fascist plan. British commitments in Central and Eastern Europe were folly, since the Reich must be free to move eastward. The French alliances with Prague, Belgrade, Bucharest, Warsaw and Moscow were sheer madness, likely to drag France and therefore Britain into a senseless war. American desires, if any, to oppose Japanese aggrandizement were nonsense. All these barriers in the way of the Grand Design had to be broken down by the gentlemen of The City and the Bourse, along with all popular foolishness about "People's Front" or about "saving" Spain or Austria or Czechoslovakia. The barriers were broken down. The nonsense was dissipated. Parliaments and publics were not told the untruths which so many of the influential took for truth, but they were told that alliances were dangerous, that collective security was full of peril, that Bolshevism
1 For typical British expressions of such sentiments during the years of appeasement see Europe on the Eve, pp. 340-46.
25
threatened ruin, that the U.S.S.R. was weak and untrustworthy, that the Fascist dictators desired nothing more than peace, and that justice (and therefore peace) could be had by granting their desires. Parliaments and pubhcs believed. Desperate fears of war, and pathetic hopes of salvation through flight or propitiation, had already become the dominant motivation of the mass mind. These fears and hopes were not only a legacy of the holocaust of 1914-18. They were the product of demoralization bred of the constant retreats and surrenders of democratic governments and deliberately fostered by the appeasers to render retreat and surrender more palatable. They furnished popular support for policies which were secretly based on the calculation of an ultimate Fascist assault upon Russia. When in the Ides of March, 1939, under circumstances which will be examined below, the hideous realization dawned upon those in power in London and Paris that this calculation was utterly false, it was too late to reverse in five months the consequences of the preceding five years. It became clear at a stroke that the Fascist TripUce aimed at the annihilation of the Western Powers first, and only later, if at all, at the destruction of the Soviet Union. This had been clear from the beginning to many Western joumaUsts and intellectuals. This had been clearly stated years before in Mein Kajnpf. But it became clear to the ruling politicians of the democracies only in March, 1939. By then the French alliance system was already broken, the League of Nations was a wreck, the masses were demoralized, the classes were hopelessly confused by new alarms, old hopes, and daily disillusionments. Nothing would suffice at home in the short time left to save the Western Powers but an immediate and dramatic regeneration of popular faith in Rationalism, LiberaHsm, and Patriotism. But for this it was much too late. Nothing would suffice abroad to meet the menace but an alliance with Russia to restore some semblance of a balance of power against the TripUce. This was still a possibility, despite the deep distrust with which the men of the Kremlin viewed the repentant appeasers. But this step was beyond the power of the Chamberlains and the Daladiers, and these men would not yield to new leaders who might have paid the price. In this wise, in the last hour, the West was condemned to war and to defeat and death.
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Design for Dying
3. T H E L A S T F R O N T I E R S
West of Europe lies the new Europe which is America, wrested by Europeans from the Indians and the wilderness. East of Europe lies the other new Europe which is Russia, wrested by Europeans from the Mongols and Tartars who once ruled the plains of Asia. Both of these great Continental communities had long since become an integral part of the cultural world of Greater Europe, even though many of their peoples, and many West Europeans, were unable to grasp this fact. Beyond Europe, the broader poHtical problem of the 20th century was one of the relationships between the Old World and the new worlds to the East and West. Could America, Western Europe and Russia co-operate in the post-Versailles reorganization of the world society in such wise as to enable their common civilization to prevail over the threats of inner barbarism bom out of disorganization and breakdown? Could America and Russia aid Western Europe to hold the new barbarism in check, once it had estabhshed itself and reached out for conquests? Could America and Russia save themselves from the new barbarism once it had overrun Europe? Each of these questions admitted of an affirmative answer. Each might have received an affirmative answer had leaders and peoples recognized the unity of the world and the imperative need for common action in the common interest. Had the first question been answered affirmatively, the second would never have been posed. Had the second been answered affirmatively, the third would never have risen. Historymeaning, in Gibbon's phrase, the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankindhas already answered the first two questions in the negative. It bids fair to answer the third in like fashion. The larger reasons for this result merit brief review. In essence it was due, on the one hand, to the unwillingness of Americans to recognize themselves as Europeans and to collaborate with Europeans in the work of safeguarding their security and their common heritage. It was due, on the other hand, to the unwillingness of West Europeans to welcome collaboration with Russians in their common task. America would not, Russia could not, save those whose salvation required American or Russian aid,
26
Design for Dying
3. T H E L A S T F R O N T I E R S
West of Europe lies the new Europe which is America, wrested by Europeans from the Indians and the wilderness. East of Europe lies the other new Europe which is Russia, wrested by Europeans from the Mongols and Tartars who once ruled the plains of Asia. Both of these great Continental communities had long since become an integral part of the cultural world of Greater Europe, even though many of their peoples, and many West Europeans, were unable to grasp this fact. Beyond Europe, the broader poHtical problem of the 20th century was one of the relationships between the Old World and the new worlds to the East and West. Could America, Western Europe and Russia co-operate in the post-Versailles reorganization of the world society in such wise as to enable their common civilization to prevail over the threats of inner barbarism bom out of disorganization and breakdown? Could America and Russia aid Western Europe to hold the new barbarism in check, once it had estabhshed itself and reached out for conquests? Could America and Russia save themselves from the new barbarism once it had overrun Europe? Each of these questions admitted of an affirmative answer. Each might have received an affirmative answer had leaders and peoples recognized the unity of the world and the imperative need for common action in the common interest. Had the first question been answered affirmatively, the second would never have been posed. Had the second been answered affirmatively, the third would never have risen. Historymeaning, in Gibbon's phrase, the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankindhas already answered the first two questions in the negative. It bids fair to answer the third in like fashion. The larger reasons for this result merit brief review. In essence it was due, on the one hand, to the unwillingness of Americans to recognize themselves as Europeans and to collaborate with Europeans in the work of safeguarding their security and their common heritage. It was due, on the other hand, to the unwillingness of West Europeans to welcome collaboration with Russians in their common task. America would not, Russia could not, save those whose salvation required American or Russian aid,
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and upon whose salvation depended the salvation of America and Russia as well. All might have saved themselves together. But by virtue of the design for death already suggested, each was forced to face its destiny aloneAmerica in relation to Europe and Russia by choice, Europe in relation to America by necessity, Europe in relation to Russia by choice, Russia in relation to Europe and America by necessity. Europe's final choices and necessities will be dealt with at length below. The general nature of America's choice and Russia's necessity may here be noted. Fifty-five gentlemen meeting in the City of Brotherly Love in the summer of the year of our Lord 1787 at length attached their signatures to a document reflecting their fears of too much government, too pure democracy and too hasty public decisions. This document provided (Article II, Section i, 2) that treaties might be made by the President of the United States "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." By virtue of fidelity to this formula, the United States of America failed to become a member of the League of Nations or of the Permanent Court of International Justice. On March 19, 1920, the final Senate vote on the resolution to approve ratification of the Covenant was taken. There were 49 votes for and 3 5 against. The necessary two-thirds was lacking by 7 votes. On January 29, 1935, the final Senate vote on the World Court Protocols was taken. There were 52 votes for and 36 against. The necessary two-thirds was lacking by 7 votes. "Our thanks are due to Almighty God," said Father Coughlin, "that America retains her sovereignty. Congratulations to the aroused people of the United States who, by more than two hundred thousand telegrams containing at least one million names, demanded that the principles established by Washington and Jefferson shall keep us free from foreign entanglements and European hatreds." Despite this sentiment, there is much reason to believe that more than half of the citizens of the United States, as well as more than half of the Senators and Representatives, in both cases favored American participation in the new adventure in international order. But the minority was larger than one-third. The United States therefore eschewed co-operation with the two great institutions which American leadership had planned and imposed on the governments of Western Europe. All of the other twenty-one
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sovereignties of the Western hemisphere from the Arctic to the 49th parallel and from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn assumed membership in Woodrow Wilson's League. But the largest, richest and most powerful State in the world, having helped decisively to win the war and make the peace, would have no hand in reshaping the world society of which it was an inseparable part. Had the choice been different, the role of the League of Nations would have been different and the ultimate fate of Europe and America would have been different. This admits, it is true, of no conclusive proof. Had the United States become a member of the League and had its spokesmen acted in the manner of Laval and Hoare or Blum and Halifax or Daladier and Chamberlain, the result might have been the same as if America had never joined. It is arguable, however, that active participation from the outset by the Power whose weight was decisive in world economy and world politics would have altered decisively the entire world scene. The membership of Canada and, at one time or another, of all the Latin-American Republics, could not offset the absence of the great Colossus of Transatlantis. Apart from Leagues and Courts, the United States might still have collaborated through traditional channels in building world order, in checking aggression, in helping to preserve a preponderance of power on the side of the democracies. In the 1920's Washington did indeed make a significant contribution toward disarmament and the "outlawry of war." Both moves were popular with pacifists. They aroused no wrath among provincial patriots, since they required no "foreign entanglements"i.e. no responsibilities and therefore, in theory, no risks. (In the United States as elsewhere, the physiology of decadence manifested itself in the widespread view that risks could be avoided by shunning responsibilities, and that escape from duty was the best road to escape from danger. That the exact opposite is the case occurred to few.) In the 1930's, however, these gestures no longer sufficed. The second question was posed. Could America lend effective aid to other Powers in checking the march of aggression? The answer was affirmativeif America would. But America would not. In the first test, to be sure, before the American Congress or public had expressed themselves, the tentative steps of Secretary of State Stimson toward common action against Japan were frustrated by the refusal of Sir John Simon to co-operate.
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But this first defeat begot later defeats and strengthened those who cried out against "intervention" and "involvement." The first question was answered. Here again the Nemesis of Rationalism, Liberalism and Patriotism worked its will, for the United States was a community not essentially different in the structure of its society and in the beliefs of its people from the Western European democracies. The gap between what citizens needed to do for their own security and what citizens wanted to believe for their own enjoyment was equally wide. It was never closed. A generation of intellectuals, scornful of emotion and wedded to Reason, helped to destroy Reason and enthrone emotion as the guide to national action by "debunking" the slogans of 1917. They demonstrated in scholarly fashion that the Republic was "dragged into war," contrary to its will and against its interests, by Wall Street bankers, greedy exporters, sordid arms merchants and British propagandists. That this was untrue was immaterial. This is what people wished to believethe more so as half-conscious feelings of insecurity and guilt over the defection of 1920 predisposed them to grasp at every rationalization of post-war retreat from international responsibilities. Liberalism contributed toward the same result. The i8th century Constitution, with its checks-and-balances and its purposeful, fragmentation of authority among President, Congress, Courts, States and electorate, made it politically impossible for any President and Secretary of State, whatever their intention and however firm their grasp of the issue, to commit America to any policy involving duties and risks. Many 20th century Liberals, moreover, were imbued with blind pacifism which sought to escape the terrors of war not by organizing the world for peace but by refusing to oppose war-makers. They damned British imperialism, French militarism and the Treaty of Versailles. They defended the aspirations of Germany, Italy and Japan in the name of "justice," and thereby unwittingly played the game of Fascist aggressors and Tory appeasers abroad. Their "Populist" and "Progressive" tradition, stemming from Bryan, the first Roosevelt and other reformers, was a tradition mingled with provincialism and shot through with xenophobia and distrust of "Europe." In the Senate of the Republic the great isolationists were not all "Liberals." But the great "Liberals" were almost all isolationists,
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Design for Dying
pledged to vote down any statute or treaty making possible common political action with other Powers. The freedoms of democracy, moreover, gave wide scope to all preachers of panaceas. The result was not wisdom or unity, but a Babel of tongues urging movement in all directions at once and thereby preventing any movement in any direction. Americans of the post-Wilson generation were unable to devise any acceptable liberal program which touched the realities of the world beyond America and took cognizance of America's place in that world. Patriotism moved Americans in the same direction. By the most prevalent definitions, to be "patriotic" meant to be anti-European and anti-internationalist. Hot anger against the totalitarian States expressed itself in verbal denunciation which always stopped short of any action, or any commitment to act, that might involve risk of war. Diplomatic non-recognition of the fruits of conquest was permissible because it was as innocuous as it was futile. But any economic pressure against aggressors, apart from ineffective private boycotts, was banned lest it lead to friction and danger of conflict. Military or naval pressure was at all times unthinkable. The patriotic youth of the land resolved never again to risk its skins on foreign battlefields. Patriotic age applauded. Love of country became so fervent that its practitioners insisted upon dying only on American battlefields. That persistence in this high resolve might spell the doom of America was irrelevant. Most patriots preferred to believe that America could live alone and like it. They assured themselves that refusal to risk blood and treasure abroad would release them from the need of risking anything anywhere. These attitudes and desires eventuated in public policies which had the effect of making the world safe for aggression and making America the economic ally of the aggressors. The "neutraUty" statutes of 1935-37 forbade the selling of arms and the lending of money to both sides in the Spanish civil strife and to all belligerents alike in all wars abroad. Complete "impartiality" was observed as between aggressors and their victims, law-breakers and law-keepers, enemies and friends, wrong and right. In the Far East the statutes were never invoked. Americans remained free to sell and lend impartially to- Chinese and Japanese. The war lords of Tokio were the beneficiaries, since they were able by military action to reduce such small imports of American supplies
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as China was able to buy. They were able conversely to purchase in America scrap-iron, oil, trucks and planes for the conquest of China. In the Ethiopian war, the new "neutrality" was fully applied. Italy, in no need of American arms and money, was denied access to them, but was permitted to buy oil in abundance for Badoglio's bombers and tanks. Ethiopia, in desperate need of money and arms, was denied both. II Duce expressed gratitude for American aid in his conquest. In Spain the policy was the same with the same result. American arms and money were barred to Madrid and to Burgos, but they went freely to Rome, Berlin and Lisbon where friendly governments interested in "saving Spain from Bolshevism" supplied Burgos with arms and money. Franco was grateful. In the United States pacifists, patriots and isolationists rejoiced that America had been "kept out of war" by connivance in the murder of the Spanish Republic. Catholics and conservatives rejoiced that Religion and Property had been protected against "Communism." The "Neutrality" Act of 1937 served notice on Hitler that Britain and France would be denied American arms and money as soon as he might attack them. Congress refused the President's pleas to change the Act until after war had begun. During September and October of 1939 the Allies were forbidden to buy American arms or borrow American money. The new statute of November 4, 1939, permitted them to buy arms. But in the name of "cash-and-carry" it still forbade them to borrow money and forbade American ships to call at their ports. These prohibitions, involving the abandonment of that "freedom of the seas" for which America had fought four wars, were "impartial" in form and wholly one-sided in fact. They were extended to each new victim of Nazi aggression as soon as Hitler attacked. The second question was answered. Not only did America willfully deny effective aid to Western Europe to hold the barbarians in check, but without willing the results of its acts it gave effective aid to the barbarians in overrunning Western Europe. As for Russia, there will be doubt in many minds regarding the view that the Communist State deserves to be regarded as part of European civilization. There will be greater doubt over the view that the U.S.S.R. can be deemed in any sense an actual or potential defender of Western European culture. Here is an "Asiatic despotism." Here is another totalitarian dictatorship. Here is the
32
Design for
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betrayer of the Western Powers who joined the barbarians against the West. Despite these judgments, which are well-taken, two facts stand against them. One is the fact that in the geo-politics of the world balance of power Germany and Russia, like Russia and Japan (any Germany, any Russia, and any Japan) are neighbors and therefore rivals and potential foes, whereas Russia is the logical ally of the neighboring enemies of its neighborsof France and Britain in Europe and of the United States in Asia and the Pacific. Without Russian support France and Britain cannot hold Germany in check, any more than Russia can achieve this result without Anglo-French support. Without American support Russia may be unable to hold Japan in check, just as America is helpless vis-a-vis Japan in Eastern Asia in the absence of collaboration with Russia. The other fact is that in its fundamental purposes (though not in its practice) Communism differs from Fascism in that its apostles envisage human society not in terms which repudiate the whole Western cultural tradition but in terms which seek to affirm and extend that tradition.^ For these
1 The point is well put by Leonard Woolf in Barbarians at the Gate, Victor GoUancz, London, 1939, pp. 191-95: "It is often said, not by reactionaries, Fascists, and barbarians, but by people whose whole lives have shown them to be good Socialists and good Europeans, that there is nothing to choose between the dictatorship of Stalin and that of Hitler or MussoUni, that in Russia as in Germany and Italy a ruthless autocracy has established itself, the dictatorship of a party or rather of a small group controlling a party, and that the group uses its power, without tolerance or humanity or justice, to suppress all opposition and so all poUtical liberty and freedom of opinion or speech. I beheve this view to be wrong. The Soviet Government, whatever may be the results of its ractice, is in its ultimate objective on the side of civilization, whereas the ascist dictatorships are on the side of barbarism. This is not a theoretical, but a fundamental and important distinction. Fascism deliberately aims at creating a master-slave society, founded upon force and upon the social relation between the few who command and the many who blindly obey. That is the only social ideal of those who control the German and Italian Governments, and their suppression of liberty and truth, their violence, intolerance, and savage inhumanity spring naturally from their ultimate aims. Being barbarians they follow out consistently the logic of their facts and of barbarism; that is part of their strength. But Stalin and the Soviet Government cannot escape from the consequences of their own ultimate beliefs. They are the heirs of Marx and Engels, and Marx and Engels were on the side of western civihzation. The ultimate aim of the founders of modem socialism was not a society of masters and slaves, but of free men. Liberty and equality were their standards of social value; violence, repression, disciphne, intolerance, inhumanity were not symptoms of communal strength, but of incomplete Communism and therefore of incomplete civihzation. Their object was to sweep away 'the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally'; they even looked forward to the with-
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reasons the Soviet Union may be viewed as part of Europe, as Europe's other frontier, as the State which shared with America a duty to itself to act with Western Europe against the barbarians, however unable or unwilling its leaders may have been to discharge that duty. Between 1920 and 1933 the diplomatic role of Russia was similar to the role of America: non-membership in the League, profound distrust of Western Europe, promotion of disarmament and outlawry of war. Between 1933 and 1938 the U.S.S.R. played a role which was the antithesis of that of the United States: it joined the League; it offered Western Europe co-operation in the organization of collective security; it offered economic and military aid against aggression. But it found in each test that its offers were spurned. And in 1939-40 Stalin played the role that Chamberlain and Daladier had sought to play earUer; he helped to unleash Fascist aggression against the Western Powers whose
ering away of the State; for their ultimate objective was the exact opposite of the Fascist's, it was the promotion, enrichment, and widening of the individual's existence, the creation of a community in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. That too is the ultimate objective of Stalin, of the Soviet Government, and of the Communist party. It puts them upon the side of civilization against the barbarians at the gate. It colours their practice as well as their theory. . . . "But though the ultimate objective of Communism and the Soviet Government is the antithesis of that of Fascism, namely western civilization, their attitude towards the communal control of power, democracy, and the social ideas and standards of western civilization has had disastrous effects upon the internal position and upon their achievements inside Russia. They are, as I have said, committing precisely the same mistake upside down as the democratic Liberals of the nineteenth century. The Liberals attempted to establish a civilized society of free men by a system of political democracy with a limited amount of liberty, knowledge, truth, equality, justice, and tolerance, while they allowed the economic system to enslave three-quarters of the population and set an inexorable hmit to the distribution of liberty, knowledge, etc., and therefore to civilization itself, through the community. They tried to establish civilization while refusing to alter the economic system in the only way which would have made the extension of civilization possible. They pursued two incompatible ends and, therefore, disrupted the society from within. The Soviet Government is doing the same thing from the other end. It has estabUshed the only economic system compatible with western civilization in the industrialized societies of the twentieth century. As far as economics are concerned, it has laid foundations which would make possible the development of a real community of free men. But upon this magnificent foundation it has imposed a political system of dictatorship and a contempt for liberty, truth, tolerance, and humanity which are incompatible with civilization and which made completely impossible the attainment of its ultimate objective, a society of free men. By doing this the regime continually weakens itself, for it is disrupting society from within."
34
Design for Dying
leaders had attempted to unleash Fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. The Nemesis of Moscovy was of a different design from that of America and Western Europe. Close inspection however, reveals similarities in reverse. Soviet foreign policy in relation to French and British was somewhat like Alice's Looking-Glass House: the rooms are the same, "only the things go the other way," and "the books are something like our books, only the words go the wrong way." For years Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay lived in fear of Moscow and looked to the Fascist Caesars for protection, hoping that Fascism would destroy Communism, and perhaps itself in the process, and leave the West in peace. For years the Narkomindel lived in fear of the capitalist democracies and, when efforts to co-operate with them against Fascism failed, looked at last to the new Caesars for protection against the West (and even for the destruction of the West), hoping that Fascism would destroy the Western Powers, and perhaps itself in the process, and leave the U.S.S.R. in peace. Had the Tory calculus proven correct, France and Britain would have become the great neutrals, rejoicing in the ruin of Russia but fearing the power of the victorious Reich. The Communist calculus proved correct. Russia therefore became the great neutral, rejoicing in the ruin of the West but fearing the power of the victorious Reich. Stalin's assumptions of 1939, however, proved too correct for comfortor perhaps not quite correct. They rested, as did the fatal calculus of Chamberlain and Daladier, on the hope of a long and ruinous war of attrition between the two enemy camps, not on a sudden knock-out blow which would leave Fascism's silent ally in mortal danger from the victor. By the advent of 1941 that victor was threatening both America and Russia with the gravest dangers their governments and peoples had ever been called upon to face. The third question remained as yet unanswered. There was little in the record, however, to suggest that it would be answered differently from the two questions which had preceded it. Where wisdom and will are lacking, miracles are rare.
CHAPTER
TWO
APPEASEMENT TRIUMPHANT
I. "PEACE FOR O U R
N E W YEAR'S DAY
TIME"
of 1939 dawned like other days in the midPacific at the international date-line. Hour after hour, time-zone by time-zone, over the turning face of the eastward-rolling planet, the year to come crowded the old year into the past. In the South Seas, in Eastern Asia, belatedly and by stages far across the great Eurasian land-mass, people tumbled sleepily out of a billion bedssome with the first light, some before break of day, others more fortunate long after dawn, each to his daily tasks. Some twelve hours later, as sunrise drove night westward, other hundreds of millions in Europe and Africa rolled out of other beds. Six hours after they had breakfasted still more millions bestirred themselves throughout the Americas, amid mid-winter cold in the broad Northland and in mid-summer heat in the narrow Southland. They rose to recover from hangovers, to enjoy the last day of the holiday season, to greet again the beginning of another cycle of the earth's slow journey around the sun. In all this there was nothing noteworthy. This had happened each dawn over much of the earth for a million days and would doubtless happen again for a million days to come. The private lives of the two billion earth-dwellers were doubtless little different during this New Year's Day from what they had been on others. Public events were in few lands sufficiently remarkable to warrant headlines in the holiday newspapers. Socialists in New Zealand were still celebrating an election victory. In Tokio diplomats pondered, but not too seriously, over a vigorous note received the day before from Washington insisting upon respect for 35
CHAPTER
TWO
APPEASEMENT TRIUMPHANT
I. "PEACE FOR O U R
N E W YEAR'S DAY
TIME"
of 1939 dawned like other days in the midPacific at the international date-line. Hour after hour, time-zone by time-zone, over the turning face of the eastward-rolling planet, the year to come crowded the old year into the past. In the South Seas, in Eastern Asia, belatedly and by stages far across the great Eurasian land-mass, people tumbled sleepily out of a billion bedssome with the first light, some before break of day, others more fortunate long after dawn, each to his daily tasks. Some twelve hours later, as sunrise drove night westward, other hundreds of millions in Europe and Africa rolled out of other beds. Six hours after they had breakfasted still more millions bestirred themselves throughout the Americas, amid mid-winter cold in the broad Northland and in mid-summer heat in the narrow Southland. They rose to recover from hangovers, to enjoy the last day of the holiday season, to greet again the beginning of another cycle of the earth's slow journey around the sun. In all this there was nothing noteworthy. This had happened each dawn over much of the earth for a million days and would doubtless happen again for a million days to come. The private lives of the two billion earth-dwellers were doubtless little different during this New Year's Day from what they had been on others. Public events were in few lands sufficiently remarkable to warrant headlines in the holiday newspapers. Socialists in New Zealand were still celebrating an election victory. In Tokio diplomats pondered, but not too seriously, over a vigorous note received the day before from Washington insisting upon respect for 35
36
Appeasement
Triumphant
the Open Door and for American rights in China. Japanese troops clashed with guerrillas in Mongolia. On the fourth day of the New Year, Premier Prince Konoye resigned under the pressure of the militarists who insisted not only on a free hand in China but on control over corporation funds and dividends at home. He was replaced by Baron Kichiro Hiranuma who had fewer scruples about bending the necks of Japanese capitalists to the yoke of the army oligarchy. In Chungking on January i Chiang Kai-shek's police arrested some hundreds of followers of Wang Ching-wei who had sent a message from his refuge in Indo-China urging peace with Japan. For this he was expelled from the Kuomintang and deprived of all his posts. To the North and West stretched the slovenly vastness of Russia. In Moscow Emelyan Yaroslavsky, head of the atheist society, admonished Russian children in the columns of Bezbozhnik not to obey priests or religious parents. Red Star, organ of the Red Army, informed its readers that the British ruling classes had betrayed China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia. "Each time the Fascist beast has opened its bloody maw a new victim was thrown in. Such feeding of animals seeking prey in all directions is called 'pacification.' World Fascism is sharpening swords and sabres against us, but we are confident. . . . With us are the growing forces of a united front of workers of the whole world. . . . With us is the wise, perspicacious fearless, unhesitating and genial marshal of Communism, the Great Stalin." In Poland, Wladyslaw Sikorski, General and Ex-Premier, averred that "localization of any war in Eastern Europe would be quite impossible." T o the South, in Bucharest, Premier Miron Cristea and his ministers for the first time greeted King Carol in court with the Fascist salute, and promised in an address to purge Jews from businesses and professionsin order to "preserve Rumania for the Rumanians." Daybreak in Germany brought floods of words in praise of the Great Hitler and of the victories of the past year. In a symposium in the ZiDolf Uhr Blatt Gobbels declared: "National Socialism's attitude toward Jewry brooks no compromise." A. S. Lees, a leader of the British Fascist League, contended that Churchill, Eden, Duff-Cooper and Greenwood were all tools of the Jews who "devote all their energies to making Britain believe that war is inevitable." Horace Greeley Hjalmar Schacht did not know that twenty days later he would be relieved by the Fiihrer of his duties
"Peace for Our Time"
37
as President of the Reichsbank in favor of Walter Funk, who had already succeeded him a year before as Minister of Economics. Or if he knew, he said nothing. In Prague hope and optimism were expressed by Premier Rudolf Beran. His threats to call in the Nazis if Benes accepted Soviet aid against the Reich had precipitated surrender to the Anglo-French ultimatum of September. He was confident of cordial relations with the victors of Munich. In Rome preparations were under way for the coming visit of Chamberlain and Halifax. But French Ambassador Andre Fran9ois-Poncet was troubled. He had come to the Italian capital from Berhn to promote "understanding" with the gift of French recognition of Italian title to Ethiopia. On November 30, however, the Italian deputies and their friends in the gallery had greeted him with cries of "Tunis! Nice! Savoy! Corsica! Jibuti!" On New Year's Day he made a speech at the Embassy to members of the French colony:
France will defend her possessions, her patrimony and the material and moral heritage left by the sacrifices of preceding generations. . . . The Munich spirit seeks to bring nearer to each other the two axes regardless of differences in regime, to complete the improvement of FrancoGerman relations with an improvement of Franco-Italian relations, to build peace, to halt the arms race. . . . I have brought here with unreserved good will and with sincere esteem for the great achievements of present-day Italy a desire and a hope to solve the difficulties and stamp out the quarrels dividing France and Italy so as to restore between them that collaboration and harmony that should in any case be an adequate expression of their natural affinities. Although circumstances have not up to now permitted these hopes to materialize, we shall not in any way abandon the task we have begun. We shall persevere.
In the Ambassador's own capital politics took no holiday. Premier Edouard Daladier battled in the Chamber, after a disorderly all-night session, with the men of the Left who had been his former allies in the Popular Front. Five times he posed the question of confidence on budget items. Five times he was victorious by a margin of over 100 votes supplied by the Center and Extreme Right. Daladier's own Radical Socialists for the first time split completely with their erstwhile Socialist and Communist allies. They voted as a unit with the Right. Daladier missed the 10.15 train for Toulon. But he departed at noon, leaving Paul Reynaud to secure approval of the budget. In this the diminutive Finance
38
Appeasement
Triumphant
Minister was successful in the course of the afternoon. The Chamber adjourned until January lo. Daladier sailed from the Mediterranean naval base that night for a journey to Corsica and Tunisia, symbolizing defiance of Italian demands. South of the Pyrenees war-bled Spain enjoyed a brief lull. With the greatest concentration of engines of war since 1918, Franco's forces were slowly pushing toward Borjas Blancas and Artesa, which they entered on January 4. Daladier was officially unconcerned. He had agreed with Chamberlain that Franco's victory would contribute to the "appeasement" of Italy. In London the day was quiet. The annual New Year's honors list conferred upon Sir James Jeans, physicist, and Lord Chatfield, Admiral of the fleet, the "Order of Aierit," and granted baronies to Sir Maurice Hankey, Cecil Harmsworth, Sir Laurence Philipps and Sir Frederick Arthur Greer. The diplomats who had helped to engineer the surrender of Czechoslovakia to Hitler were not forgotten: to Basil Newton, British Minister in Prague, went a knighthood of the Order of St. Michael and St. George; to Sir Nevile Henderson and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Grand Crosses of St. Michael and St. George; to Frank Ashton-Gwatkin and William Strang, titles of Companions of the Order of the Bath. Most of the British public still believed that Chamberlain had averted war in September and laid the bases for enduring peace with the Reich. On his Christmas card the Prime Minister had proudly pictured his Munich-bound plane. Only a few sharp minds saw through this sham.^ Others accepted at face value the piece of paper signed at Munich on September 30 by Chamberlain and Hitler, and waved so cheerily by the Prime Minister as he alighted from his plane at Heston Airport. It pledged "consultation" and reiterated "the desire of our two peoples never to go to war
1 To take but one example, Professor R. G. Collingwood, distinguished philosopher and historian, wrote in his Autobiography (Oxford University Press, 1939) pp. 165-6: "The betrayal of Czechoslovakia was only a third case of the same policy by which the 'National' government had betrayed Abyssinia and Spain; and I was less interested in the fact itself than in the methods by which it was accomplished: the carefully engineered war-scare in the country at large, officially launched by the simultaneous issue of gas-masks and of the prime minister's emotional broadcast, two days before his flight to Munich, and the carefully staged hysterical scene in parliament on the following night. These things were in the established tradition of Fascist dictatorial methods; except that whereas the Italian and German dictators sway mobs by appeal to the thirst for glory and national aggrandizement, the English prime minister did it by playing on sheer, stark terror. He gained his point."
"Peace for Our Time"
39
again." ^ From the balcony of 10 Downing Street Chamberlain had told the applauding crowds: "My good friends, this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time." Yet the turn of the year brought doubts. The Nazi pogrom of November had shocked Britain. On December 19 Chamberlain had defended Munich once more before Commons as the only alternative to war (with Germany, Italy, Japan and Rebel Spain!) and received a thumping vote of confidence, 340 to 143. But he said sadly of his Nazi friends: "I am still waiting for a sign . . . that they are prepared to make their contribution to peace." N o new hope emerged from the early January visit to the Reich of Sir Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of Englandto sponsor the baptism of the grandchild of his bosom friend, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. The flight of investors from the pound to the dollar indicated lack of confidence . , . These things seemed of small moment to the great Megalopolis of Transatlantis to which the gold flowed across the sea. The Broadway theatrical season was at its height. Among the offerings were "Kiss the Boys Good-bye," "The Primrose Path," "What a Life," and "Outward Bound." Washington, always provincial in comparison to Manhattan, had no theatre to which to escape. The shadows of Berlin and Lima hung heavy over officialdom. The irrepressible Harold Ickes had denounced Henry Ford and Colonel Lindbergh for accepting Nazi decorations and denounced the Nazi Jew-baiters as "unlettered, benighted and bestial." Chilly Sumner Welles had coldly rebuffed German protests. Roosevelt had dined with Ickes to show approval. The American press applauded. After the November pogrom, Ambassader Hugh Wilson had been called home to "report." He was not to return. Washington warned Berlin. Washington warned Tokio. At Lima on December 27 the 107 voting delegates of the 21 American Republics signed n o resolutions and declarations, including a Declaration of American Principles and a sonorous manifesto of solidarity ("The Declaration of Lima") pledging "consultation" in the face of any danger to the "peace, security, or territorial integrity" of any American Republic. On New Year's Day, John W . White of the Neiv York Times reported from Chile that agents of the Bena1 Text in Europe on the Eve, p. 446.
40
Appeasement Triumphant
vides dictatorship in Peru had surrounded the conference with an atmosphere of "censorship, intimidation and spying." But Washington made light of his charges. On January 4 the Chief Executive addressed the Congress in ringing words which called for action, for new resolve, for revision of "neutrality" legislation:
A war which threatened to envelop the world in flames has been averted, but it has become increasingly clear that peace is not assured. All about us rage undeclared warsmilitary and economic. All about us grow more deadly armamentsmilitary and economic. All about us are threats of new aggressionmilitary and economic. Storms from abroad directly challenge three institutions indispensable to Americans, now as always. The first is religion. It is the source of the other twodemocracy and international good faith . . . There comes a time in the affairs of men when they must prepare to defend not their homes alone but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments, and their very civilization are founded. The defense of religion, of democracy, and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all . . . The mere fact that we rightly decline to intervene with arms to prevent acts of aggression does not mean that we must act as if there were no aggression at all. Words may be futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people. At the very least, we can and should avoid any action, or any lack of action, which will encourage, assist, or build up an aggressor. We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairlymay actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen any more . . . Events abroad have made it increasingly clear to the American people that dangers within are less to be feared than dangers from without . . . Once I prophesied that this generation of Americans had a rendezvous with destiny. That prophesy comes true. To us much is given; more is expected. This generation will "nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of earth . . . The way is plain, peaceful, generous, justa way which if followed the world will forever applaud and God must forever bless."
Spain t January i8, i^s9
4^
But the way was not to be followed. Congress would not heed. Money for arms? Yes. Action to entangle America in international efforts to halt aggression? No. If Britain and France would not or could not act, why should America act? Later, when Britain and France acted, America would still not act, save within the limits of the President's phrase "short of war"three words which became a fatal fetish for Congress and the masses. In January, however, Britain was Chamberlain and France was Daladier. Hence no action. 2. T H E S P A N I S H R E P U B L I C t J A N U A R Y i 8 , 1939 The violent death of Republican Spain during the early months of the New Year, after two and a half years of heroic struggle against the forces of international Fascism, constituted the last great victory of "appeasement." This death was willed by the dominant personalities in the British and French Governments. It is tempting to linger over the tale in its entirety: the plotting of the generals in the Spring of 1936 in co-operation with German and Italian agents; the rebellion in Morocco in mid-July of the first year of blood; the flight of Franco in a British plane to take command of the Rebel forces; ^ the heartbreaking initiative of Leon Blum in proposing that all the Powers deprive the Spanish Republicans of weapons for their defense: the futile rage of his followers in the People's Front, shouting "Planes for Spain!" but quite unable to move the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street from their course; the cosmic farce of the "Non-intervention" Committee and the subsequent co-operation of the United States in cutting off
1 The plane was a private one chartered ostensibly for tourist purposes. The British Government was presumably unaware of the fact that British territory was in effect made a base of revolutionary operations against a friendly State and that British subjects, in violation of British statutes, were parties to a conspiracy to overthrow the Spanish Republic. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Britain was here guilty of violating the rights of Spain under international law by virtue of failure to observe "due diligence" to prevent such acts from taking place. The responsible persons were never indicted or punished by British authorities. They were rewarded by Franco in June, 1939: Major Hugh B. C. Pollard was made Hidalgo of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows; his daughter Diana and her friend, Dorothy Watson, received medals of the same order. The pilot, Mr. C. W. H. Bebb, had been honored earlier with the Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows.
Spain t January i8, i^s9
4^
But the way was not to be followed. Congress would not heed. Money for arms? Yes. Action to entangle America in international efforts to halt aggression? No. If Britain and France would not or could not act, why should America act? Later, when Britain and France acted, America would still not act, save within the limits of the President's phrase "short of war"three words which became a fatal fetish for Congress and the masses. In January, however, Britain was Chamberlain and France was Daladier. Hence no action. 2. T H E S P A N I S H R E P U B L I C t J A N U A R Y i 8 , 1939 The violent death of Republican Spain during the early months of the New Year, after two and a half years of heroic struggle against the forces of international Fascism, constituted the last great victory of "appeasement." This death was willed by the dominant personalities in the British and French Governments. It is tempting to linger over the tale in its entirety: the plotting of the generals in the Spring of 1936 in co-operation with German and Italian agents; the rebellion in Morocco in mid-July of the first year of blood; the flight of Franco in a British plane to take command of the Rebel forces; ^ the heartbreaking initiative of Leon Blum in proposing that all the Powers deprive the Spanish Republicans of weapons for their defense: the futile rage of his followers in the People's Front, shouting "Planes for Spain!" but quite unable to move the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street from their course; the cosmic farce of the "Non-intervention" Committee and the subsequent co-operation of the United States in cutting off
1 The plane was a private one chartered ostensibly for tourist purposes. The British Government was presumably unaware of the fact that British territory was in effect made a base of revolutionary operations against a friendly State and that British subjects, in violation of British statutes, were parties to a conspiracy to overthrow the Spanish Republic. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Britain was here guilty of violating the rights of Spain under international law by virtue of failure to observe "due diligence" to prevent such acts from taking place. The responsible persons were never indicted or punished by British authorities. They were rewarded by Franco in June, 1939: Major Hugh B. C. Pollard was made Hidalgo of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows; his daughter Diana and her friend, Dorothy Watson, received medals of the same order. The pilot, Mr. C. W. H. Bebb, had been honored earlier with the Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Red Arrows.
42
Appeasement
Triumphant
arms to the Madrid regime; the German and Italian invasions; ^ the attack upon Madrid in October 1936 by Mola's four columns, confident that Fascist sympathizers within, comprising the original "Fifth Column," would dehver the capital into their hands; the I ith hour arrival of Russian aid; the sacrifices of the Spanish masses in resisting year after year the siege of their citadel and in fighting stubbornly an unequal war in which they were doomed to defeat by the policies of Britain, France and the United States; the sickening subterfuges of the diplomats; the impassioned resistance of the Loyalist troops fighting barehanded against German and Italian machines. But these things have elsewhere been told. Only the close of the tragedy need here be recounted. All the elements of Europe's tragedy and the world's tragedy were here in miniature and in the exact proportions in which they were compounded in the larger drama. Nobles, bankers and priests supported military adventurers against workers, peasants and the lesser bourgeoisie. They feared that an irreverent parliamentary democracy, speaking for the masses, would reduce or destroy the prerogatives of those with land, money and sanctity. The forces of democracy awakened too late to their peril. Once awake, they fought with far greater vigor than democrats elsewhere, since freedom was for them a new experience which they cherished, rather than an old and empty word whose meaning they had forgotten. Rome and Berlin at once intervened to insure Rebel victory for reasons of Realpolitik. Their motives had little to do with ideology or economics, but much to do with the desire of the Caesars to complete the encirclement of France and to challenge AngloFrench power in the middle sea. London at once intervened to further the Axis design. Fearful Paris, frightened by British threats of desertion, led the way. Anglo-French nobles, bankers and priests deemed the cause of Spanish nobles, bankers and priests more sacred than the national interests of their country. Anglo-French politicians were not more far-sighted than those they represented. That all nobles, bankers, priests and politicians, save the servile bondsmen of the Caesars, would be brought to utter ruin by these decisions was too much
1 Ciano and Goring revealed in May, 1939, that German and Italian troops, some of them disguised as tourists, went to Spain to aid Franco's revolt at the outset of the rebellion and that these forces had been prepared for action long before the proclamation of revolt in Morocco on July 16, 1936. Cf. NYT 5.31 and 6.1.39.
Spain 1; January i8, ip^p
43
for any of the participants to foresee. Doubting electorates were readily silenced by solemn affirmations that Franco loved Britain and France; that the Loyalists were Bolsheviks, atheists, cutthroats and scoundrels; and that in any case the sacrifice of Spain was the price of "peace." Moscow intervened in a vain hope of saving France's southern frontier from Fascist control and of stirring London and Paris to action in their own defense. From first to last the story conformed in motive and plot to the stories of China, Ethiopia, Austria and Czechoslovakia. It foreshadowed a greater and grimmer story to come.^ The last act opened two days before Christmas 1938 with the launching of Franco's offensive against Catalonia. The Caudillo and his Nazi and Fascist aides knew that the Loyalist forces, since their Ebro counter-offensive of July, were short of guns and planes in the face of overwhelming Rebel superiority. They desired, moreover, to score new successes before Chamberlain should reach Rome. In the face of stubborn resistance, German planes and artillery and ItaUan tanks and infantry pushed forward on both flanks of the Catalonian line. A Loyalist counter-offensive gained some headway in Estremadura, but failed to deflect the Rebels from their major operation. Under these circumstances, Chamberlain and Halifax, accom1 The tale is nowhere better told than in Freedom's Battle (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1940) by J. Alvarez Del Vayo, Foreign Minister of the Republic. N.B. p. xvii: "The foreign policy of the Republic was at no time linked with that of the Soviet Union, and the assistance and support which the latter gave during the Spanish War was not aimed at achieving a political solidarity between the two countries, but was born of the Soviet Union's desire to prevent a hostile force, able to render the French-Russian Pact practically valueless as a safeguard for the Soviet Union, from massing on France's third frontier." P. 47: "Non-Intervention became one of the greatest farces of our time. The long and brilliant repertoire of Italian comedy has no better spectacle to offer than this, where the debatable quaUties of Lord Plymouth as stage manager served as a foil to the dexterity and abandonment of the actors. The most intelligent review of the comedy was given in Stampa on July 20, 1937, in a single phrasea model of simplicity and of honest and impartial dramatic criticism: 'While the diplomats play for time, the legionaries cut the Gordian knot with their swords.' It was only when with the fall of Barcelona they felt assured of certain victory that the totaUtarian states gave up all pretence and jeered at the childishness and passivity of the Western democracies. Now began the third stage of intervention, a stage of sarcasm and caustic irony and ridicule directed against the simple souls in London and Paris. A note published in the official Informazione Diplomatica stated: 'Italy replied to the first call of Franco on July 27, 1936: our first casualties date from this time.' All the Italian press echoed the Popolo d'ltalia: 'We have intervened from the first moment to the last.' " P. 59: "An examination
44
panied by Cadogan, prepared for their Roman holiday. Under urgent pressure from the French leaders, who feared a ToryFascist bargain at French expense, the British travellers stopped for tea in Paris on January lo. Bonnet expressed confidence that his guests understood the French position. In imitation of the American example, he announced that 45,000 tons of wheat would be made available to Barcelona. By January 24 only 1,700 tons had left for Spain. Sefior Pascua, Spanish Ambassador in Paris, commented bitterly that the wheat was "tied up with red tape." The Republic could yet be saved, not by wheat but by weapons. All arms, however, were denied to it. As his British visitors arrived, the Duce's legionnaires aided Franco's troops to capture Falser and Montblanch. On January 15 Tarragona fell. His Majesty's Ministers conferred in Rome with Mussolini, Ciano and Pius XI, January 11-14, 1939. Mussolini's formula was "peace with justice." Chamberlain's formula was "peace by the method of negotiation." The communique of January 12 declared: "No new commitment, arrangement or agreement has been asked for or entered into by either Government." The visitors had "learned" the ItaUan viewpointwhich the Fascist press had shrieked to the world for two months. The Earl of Perth, who
of the graph of so-called exports to Germany and Italy over the past two years will show how the saviours of Spain, in the midst of their ideological preoccupations, took advantage of the splendid opportunity offered them to feed their war industries, in preparation for the extension of their civilizing influence to other nations. In 1938 Germany imported from Spain 1,000,000 tons of iron ore, against 310,000 tons in 1937; 25,563 tons of copper against 7,309 in 1937; 13,167 tons of zinc where none had been imported in the preceding year. Italy also managed to provide herselfalthough in much smaller proportionswith some of the raw materials (principally wool) which she needed, and she now has free access to the quicksilver which she was unable to obtain by her repeated attacks on Almaden." P. 62: "According to the official statistics for the whole of the Spanish Warpubhshed in the Italian press in June 1939there were 86420 air raids on loyalist Spain, compared with 3,979 during the Ethiopian War; 5,318 bombardments in western Europe compared with 872 in east Africa; 11,584 tons of explosives hurled on the Spanish people, compared with 1,500 tons on the Abyssinian Negroes. During a considerable period of the war the rebels had some 600 to 650 first-line planes permanently at their disposal. This assumes the dispatch of thousands of machines to Spain from Germany and Italy." The most detailed and fully-documented account of "non-intervention" is Norman Padelford's International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1939). Professor Padelford's scholarly work suffers, however, from the author's delusion that "non-intervention" represented a triumph of "international co-operation" and prevented the spread of war.
Spain f January i8, ip^p
45
was scheduled to retire in April as British Ambassador to Italy, had presumably conveyed this viewpoint to London long before. As Chamberlain returned empty-handed to London, Mussolini's newspapers raged against France and indicated that all issues must wait upon Franco's final victory. Czaky visited Berlin and announced Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern. Britain and France belatedly followed the United States in protesting Japan's closing of the Open Door. Fascist forces moved against Barcelona. Toward the end there were scurryings of diplomats and last hopes that Anglo-French folly might still be redeemed. On January 14 Daladier, who had returned in triumph five days previously, was visited by Blum and by Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador. The Socialist author of the original "non-intervention" scheme apparently pleaded for last-minute aid to Barcelona. He received some encouragement in his belated repentance from the Radical Socialist Premier. But Sir Eric expressed different hopes. According to a Havas communique that night: "After seeing Mr. Chamberlain the British Ambassador gave M. Daladier an account of the Prime Minister's impressions of his Rome visit. He emphasized particularly the repeated assurances that Signor Mussolini gave Mr. Chamberlain of his intention to withdraw the Italian forces now in Spain, in the Balearics, and in other Spanish territories after the final victory of General Franco." ^ On January 15 Bonnet met Halifax at Geneva. The Loyalist Foreign Minister, Alvarez del Vayo, also came, since the League Council was to examine the report of the International Commission set up to supervise the withdrawal of foreign combatants from RepubUcan Spaina measure which the Loyalists had voluntarily agreed to in the vain hope that Britain and France would then take action to force the withdrawal of the vastly superior German and Italian forces fighting with the Rebels. Burgos (and Rome and Berlin) insisted that foreign troops could only be withdrawn in return for Allied recognition of the belligerency of the Rebels, a step which would enable them to blockade Loyalist ports without Anglo-French objection. Chamberlain had insisted that belligerent rights could be granted only in return for full acceptance of the complex 80-page "formula" of July 5, 1938. Franco had rejected
1 France and Munich (Harper & Bros., New York, 1939) by Alexander Werth. p. 415.
46
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Triumphant
the plan. Chamberlain, Halifax and Bonnet were content to do nothing more. Their problem of silencing domestic opposition to the final sacrifice of the Spanish Republic on the Fascist altar was not too difficult. Some new voices, to be sure, were now raised on behalf of a change of course. Del Vayo, who went from Geneva to Paris in an effort to beg, buy or borrow arms to hold the Catalonian front, found many generals, politicians and journalists who were formerly pro-Franco, including Henri de Kerillis, now convinced that a Rebel victory would be a catastrophe. At a Radical-Socialist congress on January 15 Bonnet's name was booed. Senator Berthod was cheered when he warned that French security was in danger from Italian intervention in Spain. Daladier said nothing on the issue. Bonnet hastened back from Geneva on the following day and joined Laval, Flan din and other Munichmen in silencing all such nonsense. He brought new assurances of Mussolini's assurances to Chamberlain. Flandin's pro-Franco speech in the Chamber on January 17 was cheered by half the house. He argued that France must abide by "non-intervention" even if others broke their promise. This was the way of peace. This was the way of humanity, since any other course would prolong bloodshed. This was the way to win the friendship of Franco. He countered Blum's counter-arguments: "If you thought that Italian intervention in Spain could damage France's vital interests, why did you tolerate it for two years? W h y are you choosing this moment for putting an end to non-interventionthe very moment when we have been solemnly warned that French intervention would lead to a general war?" ^ The French Right press shouted approval. Bonnet indicated that there would be no change in French policy unless British policy changed. Chamberlain had no intention of changing British poUcy. "Britain firm for inaction," asserted the headlines. The Nazi Diplomatische-Korrespondenz affirmed Germany's support of Mussolini's warning that any aid to Barcelona would be deemed "sabotage" of non-intervention and would give Rome a free hand. While the 35,000 ton battleship Richelieu was launched at Brest (destined for ignominious ruin eighteen months later without hav1 Cf. Werth, op. cit., pp. 4i6f.
Spain't January i8, i^^p
47
ingfireda shot in defense of France), Ciano departed for Belgrade on January 17 to woo Milan Stoyadinovich, pro-Axis premier of France's erstwhile ally, and to bind Italy, Jugoslavia and Hungary into an anti-French bloc. Italian war veterans returned their French medals. Said // Tevere: "We spit in the face of the Third Republic, which patiently is wiping its face with sheets of its newspapers." All of this was as Chamberlain would have it, for it rendered easier his task of holding Paris to the line of Mediterranean appeasement. In this area he had assigned to Spain the rolp imposed upon Czechoslovakia in Central Europe and upon China in Eastern Asia. The House of Commons was not scheduled to re-convene until January 31. Scattered demonstrations, speeches and editorials for a change of course did not affect the Prime Minister's imperturbability. On January 18 he announced his decision in the form of a reply to a letter from Laborite Clement Attlee, Leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition. Attlee's letter asserted:
The gravity of the situation in Spain compels me to request the immediate summoning of Parliament. In view of the fact that while the Spanish Government dismissed from its service all foreign combatants Italian and German troops and munitions are still being employed to carry out openly the avowed intention of the Italian Government to secure by every possible means a victory for Franco, it is obvious that the policy of non-intervention now has become a means of insuring that the Spanish Government shall be unable to provide for its defense against aggression by a foreign Power. It appears to me that it is inimical to the honor and interests of this country that it should continue to deny to the Spanish Government the right freely to purchase the arms and supplies necessary for its defense. Impartial inquiries made in behalf of the British Government proved there was wanton slaughter of women and children through indiscriminate bombing of non-military objectives. The British Government expressed its concern at the plight of the civilian inhabitants and the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the territory of the Spanish Republic and its willingness to give assistance on humanitarian grounds. There is grave danger of famine at the present time and it is in my view necessary to concert measures of relief in cooperation with other countries. For all these reasons it is, in my opinion, imperative that Parliament should be called together as soon as possible.
48
Appeasement Chamberlain replied:
Triumphant
I have given careful consideration to your request which is apparently based on your view that the time has come when the policy of nonintervention should be reversed and all embargo on the supply of arms and ammunition to the Spanish Government removed. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government such a course would inevitably lead to an extension of the conflict with consequences which cannot be accurately foreseen but which would undoubtedly be very grave. H. M. Government are not, as at present advised, prepared to adopt such a course and in these circumstances they see no advantage in anticipating the date on which Parliament is due to meet in less than a fortnight. . . . The Government will continue to watch the situation in Spain as it develops and if in their view the circumstances should demand alteration in the date they will not hesitate to recommend to Mr. Speaker to call the House together at short notice.
The French Cabinet announced an identical decision on the same day. The French frontier would remain closed to the shipment of any mihtary supplies to the Loyalists. The now pointless debate in the Chamber went on. Socialists warned of peril from an alliance of Fascist Spain with Fascist Italy. M. Montigny, colleague of M. Caillaux and spokesman for Bonnet, argued that Italian hostility and the results of Munich left France with no further possibility of a large European policy. But France was defensively invincible behind the Maginot Line. (Cf. Paul Reynaud, February, 1938: "No line of fortifications can hold out indefinitely against an indefinite accumulation of guns and tanks.") France should therefore run no risks. It should seek an understanding with Rome. Kerillis warned that such policies would only serve to leave France alone in Europe "with no ally save a soldierless England." The Cabinet should have supported Czechoslovakia and should now rebuild its alliances with Poland, Jugoslavia, Rumania and the U.S.S.R. Bonnet deferred replying until January 26after Barcelona had fallen. He then defended appeasement and accused the Communists of wanting France to "intervene everywhere, in China, in Spain, in Central Europe." The weak Daladier spoke glumly of "the hard and heavy task that lies ahead," but declared that France would surrender "not a single acre of our territory, and not a single one of our rights."
Spain "t January 18, 1(^3p
49
The verdict of January 18 was the death warrant of the Spanish Republic. Del Vayo, empty-handed and heavy-hearted, left Paris for Barcelona on the 24th. He never arrived. On January 26 Barcelona fell to the Rebels. Victory celebrations were ordered throughout Italy. Mussolini addressed a cheering throng outside the Palazzo Venezia: "Our enemies are biting the dust!" The crowd shouted back "We want Corsica! W e want Tunisia!" The Loyalist Ministers fled to Figueras amid the human wreckage of their shattered armies. Del Vayo saw the last remnants of the Republican forces pass the frontiers into France on February 9. "It was heartbreaking to watch that procession of men who had been defeated merely because the means of defending the country and the cause which they loved so passionately had been withheld from them."^ On February 2 in the cellars of Figueras Castle the members of the Cortes had supported Premier Juan Negrin's decision to continue the hopeless fight. By February 10, however, all of Catalonia was lost. The Cabinet next met in the Spanish Consulate in Toulouse. Negrin and Del Vayo flew back to the unconquered central zoneto Alicante and then to Madrid, still defying its besiegers. They held out for peace terms whereby Franco would pledge himself to free Spain from foreign domination, to hold a plebiscite to determine the form of government, to grant clemency to Loyalist sympathizers. But they had no means of enforcing their desires. At the end they clung only to the last condition. Even this was to be yielded. President Manuel Azafia, favoring unconditional surrender, had refused to return from France despite the pleas of Del Vayo who flew back to Paris on a peace mission. On February 28 Azafia resigned his office. The death agony of Madrid epitomized what had happened the year before in Vienna and Prague and what was to happen the next year in Paris, Tours and Bordeaux. On February 6, while still in France, the Negrin Cabinet sued for "an honorable peace" through British Charge Stevenson and French Ambassador Jules Henri. Loyalist Ambassadors Azcarte in London and Pascua in Paris sought to utilize the services of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay to obtain peace from the Rebels on the basis of no reprisals. But their communications to Negrin in Madrid, and those of Del Vayo as well, were intercepted by certain Loyalist
1 Freedom's Battle, p. 283.
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army leaders, headed by Col. Sigismundo Casado, who had plans of their own. Back in Madrid on February 27, Del Vayo was hopeful of prolonging resistancenot as a means to victory, of which there could no longer be hope, but as a means of securing clemency from the victors. But Casado took the view that Franco would never consent to deal with the Negrin Cabinet. He insisted that only a new regime, headed by himself, could secure peace at once on favorable terms. He alleged falsely that Negrin was turning over the command of the army to the Communists.^ To save Spain from Communism and to make a deal with the foe, Casado and his followers were certain that they must assume power and oust those who favored continued resistance. Fifteen months later a comparable drama was to be played in France with Reynaud and Mandel on the one hand, and Petain, Weygand and Laval on the other, playing comparable roles. In the name of anti-Communism, Casado, now a "General," organized rebelhon. On March 5 the artillerymen in Cartagena, crying "Long live Franco," repudiated Negrin's authority and forced the Republican fleet to put out to sea, never to return. It was later interned in Bizerte. This uprising was suppressed in a few hours. But the Cabinet, in session in Negrin's residence near Alicante, learned that evening that Casado had seized control of Madrid. With no means of opposing the coup, Negrin made a last appeal to preserve unity and settle all differences by discussion.^ No reply arrived. When the news came at 2.30 a.m. that the Casado forces had taken Alicante, Negrin, Del Vayo and other members of the Cabinet took a plane for France. Casado's "National Defense Council" was headed by General Jose Miaja, who
1 Luis Araquistain, former Ambassador in Paris and friend of tlie fiery Socialist Largo Caballero, who was Negrin's predecessor as Republican Premier in 1936-37, charged subsequently that Negrin was from the beginning a tool of Moscow and that Stalin had demanded Caballero's removal and Negrin's appointment. The letters from Stalin to Caballero which he published, however, dated December 21, 1936 and February 4, 1937, revealed the Soviet Dictator in a different role. He urged that the Soviet Ambassador, Marcel Rosenberg, and Soviet military experts be restricted to a purely advisory capacity and that Caballero's social radicalism be moderated in the interest of conciliating the peasantry and the small bourgeoisie. (Cf. text of letters and Araquistain's articles, NYT 5.21 and 6.4.39) Moscow supported Negrin because he was a liberal democrat, free of all taint of Communism or extreme Socialist sympathy. There was no Soviet military intervention in Spain until October 1936. Fascist intervention began in July with the connivance of the British and French Governments. 2 Text in Del Vayo, op. cit., pp. 316-17.
Spain i January i8, ip^p
51
at once declared in a broadcast: "We will fight to the last drop of blood unless we are assured of Spanish independence and the expulsion of the foreigner." Since the new junta was obviously headed for unconditional surrender, whatever Miaja's wishes may have been, it encountered opposition. On March 8 the Cuatro Cemines, a Communist stronghold in Madrid, rose in revolt. The mutineers were joined by others who opposed capitulation. For a week Miaja's troops fought the rebellion against the rebellion while the real Rebels looked on. The revolt was suppressed with great loss of life. At the end, Burgos would grant no terms save unconditional surrender. Hunger, disease and despair left the Loyalists with no alternative. By the end of the month Miaja and his staff had fled by plane to Algiers. Casado made good his escape with British help. The "Fifth Column" of Franco sympathizers in Madrid, long in hiding, took over the ruined capital amid shouts of "Arriba Espana! Viva Franco!" Of the Loyalist leaders, only the old and infirm Minister of the Interior, Julien Besteiro, remained to make the official transfer of authority to the victors. He was arrested for his pains and sentenced to 30 years in prison, where he died 18 months later. On March 2 8 Madrid surrendered. Within twentyfour hours the ten remaining provincial capitals in Loyalist hands capitulated: Valencia, Murcia, Alicante, Cuenca, Almeria, Jaen, Ciudad Real, Guadalajara, Cartagena and Albacete. At 2.20 p.m. March 29 Burgos broadcast: "The war has ended! Total victory is Franco's!" The ensuing triumph of reaction was ferocious and complete. The firing squad and the altar sanctified a fearful vengeance on all those who were active in the Loyalist cause. The priesthood came again into its own, with the vast wealth of the Jesuits restored to them, although the Vatican's hopes of a new Concordat were frustrated by Franco's desire to approve ecclesiastical appointments. The feudal nobility recovered its estates, punished the peasantry for its insolence and reduced it to semi-serfdom. The magnates of money crushed Spanish labor into sub-proletarian helplessness. The Falangists dominated the new regime through Franco's brother-in-law, Ramon Serrano Sufler, Minister of the Interior. German and ItaUan troops finally returned home in June, leaving large quantities of military equipment behind as gifts or as payment for Spanish ores. Suiier, Ciano, Mussolini, and
52
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Victor Emmanuel reviewed the victorious crusaders in Naples and in Rome. The German "Condor Legion" was similarly honored by Hitler. With all need for reserve now past, the Nazi and Fascist press boasted of the vast scope of Axis intervention from the beginning. Even Portugal, according to the Lisbon journals, had furnished 10,000 men to the Rebels. Franco had concluded a cultural pact with Germany on January 24. On March 9 General Wilhelm Faupel, first Nazi Ambassador to Burgos and head of the IberoAmerikanische Institut for the dissemination of Nazi doctrines throughout the Hispanic world, declared that victory in Spain would aid Fascist efforts to save Latin-America from the United States. On April 8 Berlin and Burgos announced that the new Spain had signed the anti-Comintern pact on March 27. Spanish democracy was dead. Spain had been "saved from Bolshevism." Chamberlain and Daladier responded to these events in their customary fashion. The Anglo-French press of the Right rejoiced in Fascist victory and "Red" defeat. Almost half a million Loyalist refugees were permitted to flee into France, where they were welcomed in a fashion which condemned most of them to appalling misery. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay hoped for a Franco amnesty in order that the fugitives might be repatriated. But Franco would grant nothing. Daladier and Bonnet, Chamberlain and Halifax, moved to extend prompt diplomatic recognition to the Caudillo. By favors and friendship they hoped fatuously that they might win the good will of Fascist Spain. On February 9 the British cruiser Devonshire had obligingly conveyed Count de San Luis, Rebel Governor of Majorca, to the Loyalist-held island of Minorca whose surrender to Franco was neatly effected with British aid. This action, in the British view, cleverly prevented an Itahan occupation of Port Mahon. Franco would need money. Franco could be "bought" by British and French loans . . . Long before the end of LoyaHst resistance, London and Paris acted to make Franco's victory complete and to obtain "assurances" and "guarantees." The aged Senator Leon Berard, admirer of Franco and friend of Laval, was named French agent to Burgos, to which he made two visits in mid-February. He sought to lay down two conditions for full recognition: an amnesty and a pledge of neutrality. Franco was uninterested and unavailable. Foreign Minister Jordana was non-committal. In the "settlement"
Spain f January 18, i^^p
53
which Berard negotiated, France got nothing. But Franco was promised so much in the way of Spanish arms, gold and other property in France that Daladier refused to divulge the terms. Like Chamberlain, he had decided to recognize Franco unconditionally because, as he told the Chamber on February 24, he did not desire France's third frontier to be "hostile." On February 27 the British and French Cabinets granted de jure recognition. This action, like the arms embargo against the Republic at the beginning of the conflict, constituted unlawful intervention. London and Paris thus belatedly followed Rome and Berlin (November 18, 1936) in intervening openly on the Fascist side by recognizing the Rebels as the government of Spain. The French Chamber approved on February 24, 323 to 261. Four days later Commons followed suit, 344 to 137, amid opposition shouts of "Shame!" and "Betrayal!" Anthony Eden, co-author with Blum of "non-intervention," supported Chamberlain. The latter declared that "certain assurances" had been received from Burgos, but he decUned to reveal them. Bonnet told the Chamber on March i that Franco had already demanded the withdrawal of Italian "volunteers" and had promised amnesty and "Spanish independence." Burgos and Rome failed to confirm his words.^ Franco designated the Duke of Berwick and Alba as his Ambassador in London, and received in return Sir Maurice Peterson, one of the authors of the Hoare-Laval plan of 1935. On March 2 Paris appointed 83-year-old Marshal Henri Philippe Petain as
1 Daladier opened his speech to the Chamber on February 24 with the words: "I want to say flatly that my intention is to recommend to the Cabinet recognition of Generalissimo Franco." In London two days later policemen and firemen kept anti-Franco demonstrators from Downing Street. Chamberlain's statement in Commons, February 27, declared: "H. M. Government have noted with satisfaction the public statements of General Franco concerning the determination of himself and his Government to secure the traditional independence of Spain and to take proceedings only in the case of those against whom criminal charges are laid." The lost Labor motion of censure asserted "that in the opinion of this House the decision of H. M. Government to grant unconditional recognition to the Spanish Insurgent forces dependent upon foreign intervention constitutes a deliberate affront to the legitimate government of a friendly Power, is a gross breach of international traditions and marks a further stage in a policy which is steadily destroying in all the democratic countries confidence in the good faith of Britain." Attlee accused the Prime Minister of deceiving the House, of "selling out" the Spanish Republic and "consummating the treachery by recognizing a rebel, puppet government." Attlee went on: "The Government's sham of nonintervention was really devised to prevent the Spanish Government from exercising its rights under international law. The British Government connived at
54
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French Ambassador to Franco, who reciprocated by sending to Paris the obscure pro-German mayor of Bilbao, Jose Lequerica. Petain, clerical reactionary, quasi-Fascist and venerable octogenarian, was a national hero in France by virtue of his command of the defense of Verdun in 1916. He had come out of retirement to serve as Minister of War in the Doumergue Cabinet of 1934. He was a warm friend of Daladier who sought his advice repeatedly during the Munich crisis. The Nazi press greeted his new appointment with approval. Franco had been a student in the Paris Military School in 1926 when Petain was an instructor there. Like Maginot, he was an old friend of the Caudillo. Yet he was held up at the frontier at San Sebastian for a week. It soon appeared that Burgos, not Paris, was now laying down conditions: the Spanish fleet at Bizerte must be delivered up before Petain could be received. The fleet was delivered. Petain was received. In Washington the Roosevelt Administration, which for twenty-six months had denied arms to the Spanish Republicans, lifted the embargo and recognized Franco on April i. Having together aided the Axis to strangle Spanish democracy, the western democracies sought to embrace Spanish Fascism. The reply was a kick in the face. "Foreign anti-Fascism," declared II Duce in Rome on January 22, "is truly incurably, stupendously ignorant of Italian thingsall of which does not disturb us in the least. After all it is better not to be too well known, for surprise will then have its full effect. Our enemies are too stupid to be dangerous."
the starving of women and children, the bombing of open towns and the slaying of men, women and children. Now this scrambling with indecent haste to try to make friends with Franco. This is not in the interests of democracy or of the safety of the British Empire. The Government is thinking all the time of the interests of British capitalists. What does it mean to the Government if Gibraltar is in danger if we get the Rio Tinto dividends? . . . There was a time when this country was universally known as the friend of liberty and the freedom of peoples and as the enemy of tyrants. It is now being regarded more and more as a nation that will acquiesce in any form of tyranny and always stand in favor of the dictatorships. . . . The present action is . . . an announcement to the whole world that anyone who is out to use force will always have a friend in the British Prime Minister." In reply Chamberlain denied that the Republican Government could any longer be regarded as the legal government of Spain and averred that recognition was essential for humanitarian reasons and for preservation of British influence. Liberal leader Sir Archibald Sinclair rejoined: "The British Government's policy has strengthened the dictatorships, weakened the democracies and betrayed one after another the countries that trusted us, and its epitaph will be 'We have eaten dirt in vain.'"
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55
3. U K R A I N I A N
DREAM
The modus operandi of appeasement, so admirably illustrated in the case of Spain, can scarcely be a subject of debate among those famiUar with Anglo-French policy toward Germany, Italy and Japan from 193 3 to 1939. The motives and assumptions of the appeasers, however, will doubtless continue to be debated for years. Diplomatic documents seldom tell all regarding the logical processes, to say nothing of the psychological and pathological processes, through which decisions are formulated. Public utterances and memoirs, designed to justify what has been done or left undone, are even less illuminating. The mystery of why the political leaders of France and Britain granted to Berlin (and to Rome and Tokio) the means of consummating the destruction of France and Britain is not one to be solved by any single clue or any simple formula. Part of the answer must be sought in the admiration felt in British and French "society" for the alleged purposes of the Fascist Caesars.^ Part of the answer lies in the conviction of many people in the democracies that appeasement was the surest road to peace and a morally necessary measure to rectify the "injustices" of Versailles. Part of it lies in the paralysis of mind and will which afflicts leaders and masses aUke in epochs of decadence. Apart from these subjective factors, however, the searcher after causes must look for light within the context of Realpolitik. Diplomats are habitually moved to action by regard for national interests and by guesses as to the purposes of those with whom they play the diplomatic game. Even in democracies, where their free^ Thus Winston Churchill, writing on December 30, 1938, wrote (Step by Step, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1939, p. 274): "The bulk of the Conservatives admire General Franco; all the forces of the Left are ardent for the Republic. The difference between the Duchess of AthoU and the Scottish Tories in the Perth by-election began about Spain. The dominant element in those parts regarded her vehement sympathy for the Spanish Government as proof that she was almost ready to carry Bolshevism into Britain, to confiscate their property, pollute their churches and, if necessary, cut their throats. Nothing has strengthened the Prime Minister's hold upon well-to-do society more remarkably than the behef that he is friendly to General Franco and the Nationalist cause in Spain. But these sentiments on either side may be pushed beyond the bounds of British interest. It would seem that today the British Empire would run far less risk from the victory of the Spanish Government than from that of General Franco." Cf. also Europe on the Eve, pp. 332-46.
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3. U K R A I N I A N
DREAM
The modus operandi of appeasement, so admirably illustrated in the case of Spain, can scarcely be a subject of debate among those famiUar with Anglo-French policy toward Germany, Italy and Japan from 193 3 to 1939. The motives and assumptions of the appeasers, however, will doubtless continue to be debated for years. Diplomatic documents seldom tell all regarding the logical processes, to say nothing of the psychological and pathological processes, through which decisions are formulated. Public utterances and memoirs, designed to justify what has been done or left undone, are even less illuminating. The mystery of why the political leaders of France and Britain granted to Berlin (and to Rome and Tokio) the means of consummating the destruction of France and Britain is not one to be solved by any single clue or any simple formula. Part of the answer must be sought in the admiration felt in British and French "society" for the alleged purposes of the Fascist Caesars.^ Part of the answer lies in the conviction of many people in the democracies that appeasement was the surest road to peace and a morally necessary measure to rectify the "injustices" of Versailles. Part of it lies in the paralysis of mind and will which afflicts leaders and masses aUke in epochs of decadence. Apart from these subjective factors, however, the searcher after causes must look for light within the context of Realpolitik. Diplomats are habitually moved to action by regard for national interests and by guesses as to the purposes of those with whom they play the diplomatic game. Even in democracies, where their free^ Thus Winston Churchill, writing on December 30, 1938, wrote (Step by Step, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1939, p. 274): "The bulk of the Conservatives admire General Franco; all the forces of the Left are ardent for the Republic. The difference between the Duchess of AthoU and the Scottish Tories in the Perth by-election began about Spain. The dominant element in those parts regarded her vehement sympathy for the Spanish Government as proof that she was almost ready to carry Bolshevism into Britain, to confiscate their property, pollute their churches and, if necessary, cut their throats. Nothing has strengthened the Prime Minister's hold upon well-to-do society more remarkably than the behef that he is friendly to General Franco and the Nationalist cause in Spain. But these sentiments on either side may be pushed beyond the bounds of British interest. It would seem that today the British Empire would run far less risk from the victory of the Spanish Government than from that of General Franco." Cf. also Europe on the Eve, pp. 332-46.
$6
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dom of action is limited and their opportunities to devise and execute far-sighted schemes are few, their conduct is shaped by the nature of the contest in which the Great Powers and their satellites are engaged. What assumptions regarding contemporarypower politics lay behind the course so long pursued in London and Paris? It would be easy to reply: "None"and to contend that the appeasers exhibited such extremes of blindness and naivete as to justify the conclusion that in their relations with the Caesars they were no longer playing the game of power at all. They played not checkers, but "give-away." Perhaps until the end they were unaware that they were players or that any game was going on. This explanation is unflattering but plausible. Against it stands much evidence that those who determined Anglo-French pohcy toward the Fascist States during the years of retreat were moved less by ignorance and by lack of calculation than by a set of apparently far-sighted assumptions, reinforced by hopes, fears and prejudices, which might have proved correct (and therefore safe as guides to action) but which in fact proved wrong. Insofar as such assumptions were the raison dêtre of appeasement, they envisaged the future not in terms of an irreconcilable conflict between the Western democracies and the Fascist signatories of the anti-Comintern accord, but in terms of an inevitable clash between Fascist totalitarianism and Communist totalitarianism. This indeed was the constant boast of Berlin (and of Tokio and Rome) and the equally constant fear of Moscow.^ T h e demagogues of the Third Reich, like the warlords of Japan, never tired of denouncing the Soviet Union as their inveterate foe and intended victim. In Realpolitik it is always a sound axiom that a quarrel between two Powers is beneficial to any third Power which fears bothprovided that neither upsets the balance by destroying the other and both do not settle their quarrel by combining against their common enemy. In the triad of power relationships during the 1930's, the contestants were the U.S.S.R., the Fascist Triplice and the Western Democracies. The leaders of the latter were not ignorant of the axiom, however feeble their grasp of the provisos may have been. A German-Russian clash in Europe, a Russian-Japanese clash in Asia, would not be disadvantageous to the interests of Britain,
1 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 239-62.
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France and the United States if it could he localized. This is not to say that London and Paris "wanted" such a clash or sought to promote it. Sufficient unto the day are the hopes thereof. This is only to say that such an eventuality would not have been unwelcome to those who made Anglo-French decisions, and that this hope explains much which is otherwise inexplicable. From the Tory point of view the conditions of the eventuality were obvious: Tokio must not be thwarted by America on the Asiatic mainland; Berhn must not be thwarted by France in Eastern Europe; Rome's ambitions were more troublesome, since they could be realized only at French expense, but Italy was weak and could be cajoled into "cooperation" by concessions in Ethiopia, the Near East and Spain. The prerequisite of locaUzation was equally obvious: the disintegration of the French alliance system in the East and the immobilization of France behind the Maginot Line, the Alps and the Pyrenees. Hence the willingness of Chamberlain and his confreres to acquiesce in Axis control of Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Munich was the climax of appeasement. The fall of the Czech bastion was the last step needed to free Hitler's hands for the Drang nach Osten, for it meant the ruin of the French bloc and of the Paris-Prague-Moscow alliance, and insured French acquiescence in further Nazi moves toward the East. The more specific hopes, which received full expression in the Munich accords, were hopes that Hitler, and his mentor in Eastern pohcy, Alfred Rosenberg, would now proceed toward the realization of their long-publicized program for "liberating" the Ukraine and converting it into a German satrapy after the design of the peace of Brest-Litovsk of 1918. The Ukraine ("frontierland") was inhabited by "Little Russians," having a common language and culture and spreading over the fertile plains between the North Caucasus and the Western Carpathians. Some 35,000,000 of them lived within the frontiers of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet RepubUc, second largest state of the Soviet Union. Another 5,000,000 or more dwelt in Poland on lands wrested from the Soviets by Pilsudski's armies in 1920. Almost a million lived in Bessarabia, wrested from the Soviets by Rumania in 1918. Some 400,000 lived in the eastern sub-Carpathian region of Czechoslovakia under the name of "Ruthenians." The Nazi dream thus involved the partition of Czechoslovakia, Poland and perhaps
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Rumania, and a struggle to free the great majority of the Ukrainians from Moscow's rule.^ If Chamberlain, HaUfax and Henderson, along with Daladier and Bonnet, cherished the hope that this development would be the natural aftermath of Munich, their hope at the time was by no means absurd.^ In fact sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, now rechristened "CarpathoUkraine" in the Nazi press, became after Munich the center of Nazi sohcitude and the hope of all Ukrainian "Nationalists" everywhere who looked to Hitler to help them achieve "independence." On October 8, 1938, Carpatho-Ukraine became an "autonomous" unit in truncated Czecho-Slovakia, with BohemiaMoravia and Slovakia as the other two constituents. On October 27 Mgr. Augustin Volosin was named Premier of this primitive region in a cabinet including Julian Revay, his pro-German assistant. He at once suppressed all political parties in favor of a single totahtarian entity, the "National Ukrainian Union," with a militia of some 12,000 called the "Carpathian Sitch." While Volosin occasionally doubted whether his State was large enough to undertake the liberation of the Polish and Soviet Ukraine (its total population was 552,000 of which four-fifths were Ukrainians), he declared on November 15: "The world already recognizes the Ukrainian nation and its efforts to build up a Ukrainian State . . . Representatives of Germany and other states promise moral and material support." * Ukrainian propaganda was broadcast from Vienna. The Sitch was trained by German officers. When War1 Cf. Alfred Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsiveg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, 1927; W . Kubjjowytsch, Die Verteilung der Bevolkerung in der Ukraine, 1934; and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace (Morrow, New York, 1939). 2 In Failure of a Mission (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1940) Sir Nevile Henderson makes no mention of this hope, though he acknowledges his admiration for dictatorships "up to a point" (p. 11) and reveals the extent to which he was impressed by Nazi denunciations of Russia. He was perhaps unconsciously influenced by his own anti-Slav prejudices (cf. his effort to explain "German sadism" by a bad admixture of "Slav blood," pp. 23-4) and he was of course, like most British diplomats and aristocrats, bitterly anti-Bolshevik. Cf. p. 259: "I always believed that Moscow's chief aim was to embroil Germany and the Western Powers in a common ruin and emerge as the tertius gaudens of the conflict between them. This was, up to August, similarly the professed view of all Germans from Hitler downward who commented on our Russian negotiations." This view, while correct enough "up to a point," is less revealing as a judgment of Stalin's policy than as a projection in inverted form of Chamberlain's policy. 3 Cf. Paul B. Taylor, Germany's Expansion in Eastern Europe, Foreign Policy Association Report, May 15, 1939.
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saw and Moscow protested, Prague intimated that the Ukrainian Nationalist campaign was being conducted from Berlin.^ The German capital had for years been the Mecca of most Ukrainian Nationalist leaders as well of Russian Monarchist emigres. As early as 1933 Rosenberg had encouraged the latter to establish a short-lived "Russian National Socialist" organization in Berlin to work for the overthrow of the Soviets with German aid. Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky and Cossack Herman Popov left the German capital for Carpatho-Ukraine early in January. Grand Duke Vladimir, Pretender to the Romanov throne, had visited Berlin in mid-December and had doubtless wondered whether Nazi promotion of Ukrainian Nationalism could be
1 Cf. Bulletin of the Ukrainian Press Service, 51 East 42 Street, New York City. Roman Lapica, Director, denied before the Dies Committee on October 20, 1939 that his organization was disseminating Nazi propaganda in the United States. (Bulletin No. 40) He and V. S. Dushnyk, Editor of The Trident ("One Independent Sovereign Ukrainian State!"), submitted a 133-page affidavit to the Committee on November 29, 1939 denying similar charges brought by Emil Revyuk, President of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States. The Bulletin and The Trident, however, though filled with denunciations of the U.S.S.R. and Poland, expressed few doubts as to the wisdom of accepting German support until the "betrayal" of March 1939. In the June, 1940, issue of The Trident, pp. 37-8, Mykola Sciborsky probably stated the relationship accurately when he wrote: "The Ukrainians hoped the anti-Comintern bloc would turn against their greatest enemy, Soviet Russia. They regarded the bloc favorably not because the sponsor was Germany but because the consolidation of Europe against Russia coincided with the interests of the Ukrainian people, and because the destruction of Bolshevism was one of the basic aims of Ukrainian nationalism. Had this anti-Russian front been initiated, not by Germany, Italy and Japan, but by England, France and the United States, Ukrainian nationalists would have supported these countries, since they were then and are now ready to fight Moscow to the end despite the fact that it is now a 'friend' of Berlin. But it is self-evident that Moscow's agents would hide before the world the fact that the policy of the Ukrainian nationalists was to serve only the Ukrainian people. The second reason behind the Bolshevik campaign has already been mentionedthe creation of Carpatho-Ukraine. Due to international developments, the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem was almost entirely in German hands. It is clear that the Ukrainians had to consider this situation and they decided to profit by it for their own interests. We are firmly convinced that had they been in their place, French, English and American leaders would have done the same. But the necessity of having German support did not mean that the Ukrainians were or are Germanophile. To become convinced of this one needs only to read the Ukrainian nationalist press of that time." It is interesting to note that a year previously, in The Trident for June 1939, V. S. Dushnyk expressed the opinion that the Ukrainian Nationalist cause would best be served by a war between Germany and Russia in which Germany would defeat Russia, with Britain and France neutral, and later be attacked and defeated by the Western Powers who should pledge themselves to Ukrainian independence. Cf. The Hour, July 27, August 10 and September 14, 1940.
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reconciled with his own hopes of Nazi support for a Russian counter-revolution. On December 20, 1938, General Anton Denikin, emigre White leader, asserted in Paris that Germany was plotting to conquer the Ukraine and Transcaucasia. He said that he and other White generals had obtained the whole plan from Hitler himself several years previously. "Whoever may aid Russia's enemies," he added in denunciation of White officers who were accepting Nazi gold, "cannot call themselves patriots no matter what ideological excuses they may make for taking money to fight their own people. Nazis are not the only ones. The Japanese too have been successful to our shame in buying so-called White Russians to aid them against our Fatherland" ( N Y T 12.21.38). In his Christmas message Premier Volosin declared: "The creation of a great Ukraine will be realized in the near future. I believe Ukrainians of the whole world will be able to return to a liberated fatherland, to their brothers who are now so brutally suppressed by Poland and Soviet Russia." Since the integrity of both Poland and the U.S.S.R. was menaced by these ambitions, it might have been expected that Warsaw and Moscow would attempt counter-measures in common. But the Polish Government, which had shared in the partition of Czechoslovakia and staunchly opposed all Soviet efforts to rescue Prague from its enemies, remained firm in its refusal to accept Soviet collaboration even in its own defense. Following conversations in Moscow between Litvinov and Ambassador Grzybowski, the two governments issued a joint statement of November 26, 1938, re-affirming existing treaties (including the non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932 which had been prolonged to December 31,1945), favoring an increase in Polish-Soviet trade and recognizing the necessity of regulating frontier incidents. They made no mention of the Ukrainian question (P 160,161). On February 19, 1939, a new Soviet-Polish commercial agreement was announced (P 162). Less than a month later CarpathoUkraine was liquidated by Berlin, but Poland's peril from the Reich was rendered more rather than less acute. Warsaw, however, still declined to consider any mutual assistance pact with Moscow. Following Potemkin's visit of May 10, Foreign Minister Beck declared: "The Soviets recognize that the Polish Government will not conclude any accord with one of its great neighbors against the other and understand the advantages which accrue to
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them from this attitude. M. Potemkin has declared similarly that in case of a Polish-German armed conflict, the Soviets will adopt toward us 'a benevolent attitude' " (P 163). Meanwhile German pressure on Poland took the form of veiled threats to stir up revolt in the Polish Ukraine. But if Warsaw would accept German demands regarding Danzig and the Corridor and agree to "a common attitude toward Russia within the framework of the anti-Comintern pact," then Berlin would guarantee the German-Polish frontiers and extend the German-Polish non-aggression pact for 2 5 years (Ribbentrop to Beck at Berchtesgaden, October 24, 1938, P 44). Beck refused. Ribbentrop then suggested that if Warsaw would assent, Berhn might accept Polish demands for Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine. These demands were inspired by the correct conviction that such annexation would eifectively destroy the Ukrainian Nationalist nucleus and by the doubtful assumption that a common PolishHungarian frontier would constitute an effective barrier to the Drang nach Osten. Beck declined to bargain. By the arbitral award of November 2, 1938, handed down by Ciano and Ribbentrop in Vienna, the Axis permitted Hungary to annex a generous slice of southern Slovakia (10,307 sq. kilometers with a population of 854,000) and a strip of Ruthenia (1,523 sq. km. with a population of 173,000), including the former provincial capital of Ungvar. The remainder of Ruthenia (CarpathoUkraine, 11,094 sq. km. and 552,000 people with its capital at Chust) consisted of the relatively barren uplands and was scarcely promising as the Piedmont of Hitler's Great Ukrainian dream. Berlin continued to groom the Volosin regime for this role, however, to the alarm of Warsaw and to the disgust of Budapest, which desired to annex the entire area. The Fiihrer told Beck at Berchtesgaden on January 5 that Germany and Poland had common interests: "For Germany, Russia, whether Tsarist or Bolshevist, was always dangerous. Bolshevist Russia was perhaps worse, given Communist propaganda. On the other hand. Tsarist Russia was militarily more dangerous and more imperialistic. It was for these reasons that a strong Poland was purely and simply a necessity for Germany. Here the Chancellor observed that each Polish division, engaged against Russia, released a corresponding German division. The Chancellor said next that he was interested in the Ukraine from an economic point of view, but that he had
di
no interest of a political order" (P 48). "Against Moscow, against 'Russia,' and not merely against Bolshevism, the Fiihrer showed the same hostility as in days gone by" (F 37). Danzig, however, remained the stumbling block in the way of any German-Polish collaboration against Moscow. On the fifth anniversary of the signature of the pact of January 26, 1934, Ribbentrop was dined in Warsaw by Beck. The Nazi Foreign Minister spoke soothing words. "At the audience with Marshal Smigly-Rydz, Ribbentrop spoke of Russia, whose enfeeblement he confirmed. He likewise asserted that the course of the U.S.S.R. was always unpredictable and that one could never know what it would be tomorrow" (P 51). Beck declared a week later that Ribbentrop had understood the Polish attitude toward Russia and the impossibility of Poland adhering to the antiComintern pact (P 53). The discussions over Danzig and the Corridor, however, made no progress. This dispute was soon to occupy the center of the diplomatic stage. In conjunction with the events of the Ides of March, it placed the whole question of AngloFrench policy toward the Reich and the U.S.S.R. in a new setting. Between the peace of Munich and the fall of Prague, Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay continued to act on the assumptions already suggested. Henderson acquiesced in the prompt liquidation of the Four-Power International Commission set up at Munich to define the new German-Czech frontier. He had "made up his mind before the first meeting began that, with a view to the future, the best hope of Czecho-Slovakia lay in direct negotiation, where possible, with Germany, and that plebiscites which could only lead to trouble should be avoided at all costs. I did my best to ensure both these objectives. I saw Goring and secured an assurance from him that Germany would not be unconciliatory if the Czech Government frankly sought co-operation with, rather than antagonism to, Germany" (H 174-5). Berhn demanded acceptance without a plebiscite of its maximum territorial claims as outlined in the Godesberg memorandum which Chamberlain had made the basis of the "war scare" of September. Berlin also insisted on defining the 50% German majority provision regarding additional territories on the basis of the language line drawn on Austrian maps of 1910. Two of the five members of the Commission were instructed by their governments to accept these de-
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mands as presented by the German member, Count Ernst von Weizsacker. They were Italian Ambassador Bernardo Attolico and the French Ambassador Andre Fran9ois-Poncet. The Czech member, Dr. Mastny, objected and looked to Henderson, the British member, for support. But Henderson accepted the demands "without prior reference to His Majesty's Government . . . because I hoped thereby to avoid plebiscites and to pin the Germans down to a line of their own choosing, which they would find it difficult afterward to modify again to their renewed advantage" ( H 174-5). He later threatened to resign when the Germans further increased their demands. "The German Government thereupon abandoned their pretension at the time, but only to secure their object, or at least part of it, by direct negotiations with the Czechs"which Henderson and Frangois-Poncet had favored from the beginning despite the plain language (F 12) of the Munich accord providing for a settlement through the Commission. On the principle that diplomats, like neurotics, are often most concerned with the things they talk about least, it may not be without significance that Henderson's published dispatches and his memoirs make no mention of the Ukraine. Anglo-French policy at Munich and immediately thereafter is intelligible as a deliberate sacrifice of Czech interests in order to give Hitler an open road for expansion toward the steppes of Little Russia. Henderson left for England in mid-October "thoroughly disheartened" and full of misgivings, so he wrote later, "as to Hitler's good faith and the honesty of his intentions toward the Czechs" ( H 176). He remained in England until mid-February, convalescing from a surgical operation which discommoded him rather more than the dissection of Czechoslovakia. In the interim. Western opinion was shocked anew by the pogrom of November, and Downing Street was perturbed by another development which Henderson does not mention. On December 30, 1938, it became known that British Admiralty officials were in Berlin to discuss Germany's demand for submarine tonnage equal to Britain's. The Anglo-German naval accord of June 18, 1935, often praised by Chamberlain, had granted the Reich a submarine fleet 45% as large as Britain's, with the option of building up to 100% of British tonnage. This option Wilhelmstrasse now proposed to exercise, though Germany al-
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ready had 6; submarines (of smaller tonnage) to Britain's 51. Amid deep secrecy, it was rumored that the Reich also desired to construct additional cruisers and to avail itself of the escalator clause of the 1937 naval agreement in order to build battleships of 40,000 tons with 18-inch guns. Here, as always, the "Soviet menace" was cited as justification. N o concrete result of the Berlin discussions was announced. These moves were not conclusively indicative of a Nazi decision to challenge British sea power. But since Chamberlain's quest for appeasement required ever new concessions, Hitler saw no reason for not charging all the traffic would bear. Despite these inauspicious developments, the British leaders were imperturbable. If Hitler had a free hand in the East they were convinced that all Western questions could be compromised through adroit appeals for cooperation, implemented by economic and financial concessions. Early in January Montagu Norman returned Hjalmar Schacht's visit of December. Dienst cms Deutschland, an official Nazi news agency, asserted that the two financiers would discuss trade and Jews. Germany must increase its exports. The Nazi inquisitors were quite willing to permit racial refugees to take part of their money with them into exile if the money were ear-marked to pay for German imports into the countries of refuge. George Rublee, American director of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, also went to Berlin to discuss possibilities. On January 27 eighteen eminent Britons, including Montagu Norman, the Earl of Derby, Sir Arthur Eddington. Sir Josiah Stamp and John Masefield, all acting with the approval of Lord Halifax, addressed a public appeal to the leaders and people of the Reich "to use those great gifts by which they have for centuries enriched our common heritage in all fields of human knowledge and activity and to join with us in a supreme effort to lay the spectre of war and enmity between nations and, in the spirit of free and willing cooperation by which alone can their needs and ours be satisfied, to build with us a better future so that we may not only preserve civilization but hand it down to our children enhanced by our experience." More tangible inducements were also offered. Leading British industrialists were preparing to visit the Reich to discuss trade arrangements with leading German industrialists. Before Henderson left London plans had been made for the President of the
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Board of Trade, Oliver Stanley, and the Secretary of the Overseas Trade Department, Robert Hudson, to visit Berlin in a "private" capacity, ostensibly to attend a banquet of the industrialists, but actually to pave the way for an economic and political rapprochement ( H 191-2). Ribbentrop and Goring expressed approval. Henderson was therefor optimistic on his return, despite Nazi resentment over British rearmament and Hudson's scheduled journey to Moscow. Henderson felt that British rearmament, along with Fascist victory in Spain, would deter Hitler from any move against the West. Goring was re-assuring. "He may have been fooling me, but I doubt it" ( H 195). Yet he was uncertain. "I would give much to know what was at the back of Hitler's mind during those fateful six months after Munich when he stood at the parting of the ways" ( H 207). Georges Bonnet and Edouard Daladier acted as if they felt certain of the ultimate direction of Nazi imperialism. Immediately after Munich Bonnet instructed Ambassador de Lacroix in Prague to convey to Foreign Minister Krofta his "profound sympathy," "personal friendship" and "admiration" for "the strength of character and the incomparable self-control shown by all Czechoslovak leaders, whose clear-sightedness has done so much to protect their country from the horrors of war . . . The dignity and the self-abnegation shown by the entire Czechoslovak nation afford proof of its reserves of strength and vitality, the best safeguard of her historical patrimony and her proud and free destiny" (F 14). Like Chamberlain, Bonnet sought to demonstrate that the Munich accorda "settlement concluded under the guarantee of the Four Powers, the execution of which is essentially under the control and even in many cases subject to the decision of an international commission"was a vast improvement over the Godesberg memorandum, which "resembled in many respects a veritable armistice convention concluded after victorious military operations on the part of Germany" (F 15). In the sequel the Commission came to nothing, and Bonnet approved of concessions to the Reich wider even than those contemplated in the Godesberg plan. Frangois-Poncet scarcely shared his chief's optimism. H e opined on October 4 that the Nazi radicals were already "scanning the horizon in search of new demands to formulate, new battles to fight, new prizes to conquer." The German press, he
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reported, was praising Daladier and quoting Goring: "With a man like M. Daladier, politics becomes a practical proposition." In the Ambassador's judgment "the Munich Conference should serve us as a warning . . . The Western Democracies should eliminate all causes of internal weakness, they should fill up as quickly as possible any gaps in their armaments, and they should give to the outside world tangible proof of industry, cohesion and strength. This is the price we must be prepared to pay if Europe is not to undergo again, after a respite of uncertain duration, crises similar to the last one just settled at the Munich conference after threatening for several days to degenerate into general pandemonium" (F 16). Frangois-Poncet, transferred to Rome, took his leave of Hitler on October i8, 1938, in the Fiihrer's fantastic eagle's nest, high in the Bavarian Alps above Berchtesgaden. The two men discussed the possibility of a peace declaration comparable to the Anglo-German declaration of September 30. "We may be certain," reported the Ambassador to Bonnet, "that the Fiihrer remains true to his wish to disintegrate the Franco-British bloc, and to stabilize peace in the West, so as to have a free hand in the East. What plans may be revolving already in his mind? Is it Poland, Russia, the Baltic States, which, in his thought, will be called upon to pay the cost? Does he himself even know? Be that as it may. Hitler is one of those men with whom one must never relax one's utmost vigilance, and whom one can only trust with reservations. Personally, I do not draw the conclusion that we should not listen to his suggestions" (F 18). Bonnet was delighted. Goring and Ribbentrop approved. But delays followed. They were due to the assassination of a German Charge in Paris, to the pogrom in the Reich, to the French general strike of November 30. They were also due apparently to Polish fears that such an accord would spell the end of the Paris-Warsaw alliance. The gentlemen in Warsaw showed little appreciation of the fact that the partition of France's other ally, in which they had so eagerly taken part, rendered their own position hopeless. Bonnet assured the Polish Ambassador on November 22 that the proposed agreement "reserving in principle the relations of the contracting parties with third countries, and consequently those of France with Poland, does not in any way interfere with France's commitments toward the latter country" (F 22). The
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Soviet Ambassador, Jacob Suritz, was given similar assurances. "He made no particular observations," noted Bonnet. The next evening, however, he telephoned for the text of the agreement. Bonnet replied that it was secret, but he outlined the essential points. Suritz called again on November 26. When asked for comment by Bonnet, he replied that "he had received no communication from his government and that, moreover, the agreement in its present form could not be modified. I drew his attention to the fact that before putting the agreement before the Council of Ministers, I had informed him of its general outlines. M. Suritz did not insist" (F 27). The terms of the declaration had been submitted to London on the 24th and had been warmly welcomed. Meanwhile on November 23 the new French Ambassador, Robert Coulondre, who had formerly served in Moscow, presented his credentials to Hitler. By the end of the month all arrangements had been completed. Ribbentrop came to Paris. He was accompanied by Otto Abetz, chief of the Nazi espionage and bribery services in France. Bonnet greeted him warmly. With great delicacy, he refrained from inviting Georges Mandel and Jean Zay, the two Jewish Ministers, to the Cabinet dinner in Ribbentrop's honor. On December 6, 1938, the two Foreign Ministers signed a solemn declaration:
(1) The French Government and the German Government fully share the conviction that pacific and neighborly relations between France and Germany constitute one of the essential elements of the consolidation of the situation in Europe and of the preservation of general peace. Consequently both Governments will endeavor with all their might to assure the development of the relations between their countries in this direction. (2) Both Governments agree that no question of a territorial nature remains in suspense between their countries and solemnly recognize as permanent the frontier between their countries as it is actually drawn. (3) Both Governments are resolved, without prejudice to their special relations with third Powers, to remain in contact on all questions of importance to both their countries and to have recourse to mutual consultation in case any complications arising out of these questions should threaten to lead to international difficulties. In witness whereof the Representatives of the two Governments have signed the present Declaration, which comes into force immediately
(F 28).
This declaration deserves to be regarded as the tombstone
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which the French and German Foreign Ministers erected over the grave of France's alliances in Eastern Europe, already buried at Munich. Its only possible meaning in Realpolitik was that France, as well as Britain, was prepared to accept German assurances of respect for the status quo in the West in return for a free hand in the East. The declaration, to be sure, did not expressly state this as its purpose. Bonnet took pains to insist, not to Ribbentrop but to his colleagues and to the French public, that French relations with Jugoslavia, Rumania, Poland and the U.S.S.R. were unaffected. His contention deceived no one, least of all himself. The phrase in the declaration admitting of this interpretation was "sous reserve de leurs relations particulieres avec des Puissances tierces." The joint communique pubhshed at the time of signature used the words "tout en reservant les relations particulieres avec les Puissances tierces" (F 29). Bonnet made no mention of this reservation in his address to Ribbentrop. The latter in his own address limited himself on this point to the phrase "tenant compte de la base solide que constitue Vamitie qui les lie a dâutres tats." He referred to Italy, and understood that Bonnet referred to Britain. In subsequent communications Bonnet asserted that he had warned Ribbentrop against speculating on Anglo-French disunity and expressed hopes for an improvement of Anglo-German relations. N o comparable warning or hope was voiced with respect to relations with Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest and Moscow (F 30, 31). Ribbentrop shared Bonnet's hope for an improvement of French-Italian relations. "It is the struggle against Bolshevism," wrote Bonnet on December 14, "which is essentially at the basis of the common German-Italian political conception and, without saying so formally, Ribbentrop perhaps wished to give us to understand that there is no other objective to be attributed to it. . . . In regard to Spain, it is again the struggle against Bolshevism which alone has inspired the German effort from the beginning. . . . These considerations incidentally led the Foreign Minister of the Reich to raise the question of French policy toward the U.S.S.R., without however laying any particular stress upon it and only with a view to informing himself of the position. This policy appeared to him to be a survival of the encirclement policy of Versailles. I had to remind him that the Franco-Russian pact was not originally meant to remain only bilateral, that it had
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been and still was conceived as an element of collective agreement, in which Germany and other Powers had been invited to participate, and that it was the fault neither of France nor of the U.S.S.R., if it had actually developed into an apparently purely Franco-Soviet affair. . . . With regard to Czechoslovakia, an exchange of observations was necessary in order to leave no doubt as to the implications of the international agreement of Munich, if executed both in the letter and the spirit. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is to re-examine, as soon as he returns to Berlin, the question of the setting up of the international guarantee, the principle of which was asserted by Germany in protocol No. i " Bonnet probably desired "re-examination" of an issue which was for all practical purposes closed only as a face-saving device to conceal the true purport of Munich and of the declaration of December 6. Coulondre reported from Berlin on December 15, in what is perhaps the most illuminating single dispatch in the French Yellow Book of 1939: The will for expansion in the East, as a matter of fact, seems to me as undeniable on the part of the Third Reich, as its disposition to put aside at least for the presentany idea of conquest in the West; the one is a corollary of the other. The first half of Herr Hitler's programmethe integration of the Deutschtum into the Reichhas been carried out more or less completely; now the hour of the "Lebensraum" has come. The insistence with which it has been explained to me that Germany has no claims in the direction of France would have been enough to enlighten me. But I received even more explicit information; all those with whom I held conversations, with the exception of Herr Hitler, spoke to me, in different ways, and always with intentional vagueness, of the necessity for German expansion in Eastern Europe; Herr von Ribbentrop spoke of "the creation of zones of influence in the East and South-East"; FieldMarshal Goring, of "an essentially economic penetration in the SouthEast." I have not personally received very definite confidential information on this subject; but it appears that little by little one can see the outlines of a great German enterprise emerge from what is still nebulous. To secure mastery over Central Europe by reducing Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a state of vassalage and then to create a Greater Ukraine under German controlthis is what essentially appears to be the leading idea now accepted by the Nazi leaders, and doubtless by Herr Hitler himself. . . . With regard to the Ukraine, it has been talked about by the whole staff
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of the National-Socialist Party for the past ten days. Dr. Rosenberg's Centre of Studies, Dr. Gobbels's Services and the "Ost-Europa" organization under the former Minister, Herr Curtius, as well as the Intelligence Service of the German Army, are working on the question. It looks as if the ways and means had not yet been decided upon, but the aim appears to be well defined: to create a Greater Ukraine, which would become Germany's granary. In order to achieve this, Rumania must be subdued, Poland won over, and Soviet Russia dispossessed; German dynamism is not to be stopped by any of these obstacles, and in military circles, they already talk of the advance to the Caucasus and to Baku. It is unlikely that Herr Hitler will attempt to achieve his plans concerning the Ukraine by direct military action. It would be contrary to the principles he has professed at different times, and according to which the regime wants neither an ideological war nor the annexation of heterogeneous populations. It seems, moreover, that he has not yet decided on the means of action. Among those who approach him, a political operation is thought of which would repeat, on a larger scale, that of the Sudetens: propaganda in Poland, in Rumania and in Soviet Russia in favor of Ukrainian independence; support eventually given by diplomatic pressure and by the action of armed bands; Ruthenia would be the focus of the movement. Thus by a curious turn of Fate, Czechoslovakia, which had been established as a bulwark to stem the German drive, now serves the Reich as a battering-ram to demolish the gates to the East. . . . The Nazi leaders use the method of Descartes, taking up each question in turn; above all, their appetites, whetted both by their needs and by their ambitions, drive them towards the East, towards the "glorious adventure" and the great achievement of the regime, which they are eager to undertake . . . In order to sustain and reinforce this preparatory war economy, there is need of a granary, of mines, and of labor; the Ukraine is at the door of the Reich. . . . It is quite possible that, among other advantages. Hitler will see in a Ukrainian adventure an opportunity to divert the attention of his people from the internal difficulties now increasing in a dangerous manner (F33). These were the expectations entertained by the French Ambassador in Berlin and by Bonnet regarding Nazi intentions at the turn of the year. They were fully shared by Laval, Flandin and the Right press of France, which sent correspondents to Chust and published feature articles on the forthcoming Nazi conquest of the Ukraine. The nature of these expectations was known in Berlin which had much of the Right press in its pay. The Nazi leaders lost no opportunity to encourage Paris and London to act upon these assumptions. Their nature was known
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in Moscow. On December 20 Bonnet was reported to have told the U.S.S.R. that it could rely upon French military aid against the Reich only in case of a German invasion and not in the event of a German-inspired insurrection in the Ukraine. Warsaw was apprehensive. The French Left charged that Bonnet and Daladier had abandoned all of France's allies in order to give Hitler a free hand against Russia. For domestic reasons Bonnet was obliged to deny thisand to the degree to which he became doubtful of the correctness of his own assumptions, he began to wish that his denials had substance. Ribbentrop at least drew the correct conclusions from Bonnet's policy. The latter's subsequent insistence that these conclusions were incorrect is unconvincing. In the Paris conversations the German Foreign Minister, according to his own account, told Bonnet that the Reich regarded Eastern Europe as its own sphere of interest and looked upon the French alliances with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia as "atavisms." On July 13, 1939, he wrote a personal letter to Bonnet (who had by then long since shifted his position) declaring:
As to your remark about the reservation recorded in Article 3 of the Franco-German declaration concerning the special relations of France and of Germany with regard to third Powers, it is unquestionably not correct to say that this reservation implies a recognition of France's special relations with Poland. In the conversations which took place in Berlin and Paris at the time of the preliminary negotiations on the subject of the declaration, and on the occasion of the signature, it was on the contrary perfectly clear that the reservation referred to the special relations of friendship of France towards Great Britain and of Germany towards Italy. We were in agreement, in particular, at the time of our conversations in Paris on December 6, 1938, in considering that respect for vital reciprocal interests must be the prior condition and the principle of the future development of good Franco-German relations. On that occasion, I expressly pointed out that Eastern Europe constituted a sphere of German interests, and, contrary to what is stated in your note, you then stressed on your part, that, in France's attitude with regard to the problems of Eastern Europe, a radical change had taken place since the Munich conference (F 163).
In his reply July 21, Bonnet said: "There is one point which I am anxious to make absolutely clear. At no moment either before or after the declaration of December 6 has it been possible for the German Government to think that France had decided to disin-
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terest itself in the East of Europe" (F i68). To return to January 1939: in his address of the 26th Bonnet asserted that all of France's engagements in the East, especially the French-Polish and French-Soviet alliances, remained fully in force and would be appUed if necessary. This struck Ribbentrop, then in Warsaw, as peculiar. French Ambassador Leon Noel reported to Bonnet that he had called upon Ribbentrop and "was able to put matters in their true light, thanks to the telegram of the Havas agency and to the conversation which I had last week with Your Excellency. . . . On the question of the Soviets, as he gave me to understand that he always dreaded their influence on our foreign policy, I rephed that our Government's attitude, as well as the situation at home and the state of public opinion in France, should be enough to prevent Germany's interpreting our relations with Soviet Russia in a way that would misrepresent their nature" (F 38, 39). There is no published record of the conversation cited. The reference to the Havas telegram is obscure. Ribbentrop was not satisfied. He ordered Count Johannes von Welzceck, German Ambassador in Paris, to protest. Bonnet apparently assured him that the objectionable passages in his speech "were for internal consumption only and of no importance whatever to France's real poKcy." According to Welzceck, Bonnet had submitted the speech to him for approval in advance of its delivery. "M. Bonnet read aloud several passages from his speech, declaring some were meant for internal consumption and at the same time mentioning France's absolute adherence to her present policy on Eastern Europe." In spite of this, the German protest followed, expressing displeasure over France's apparent intention to "widen her friendships in Eastern and Central Europe, thus creating the impression in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia that she was taking up again an encirclement policy directed against the Reich." Bonnet replied, according to Welzceck: "It should be possible to maintain old friendships and develop them, economically and culturally, without conflicting with the Reich, which enjoys a most favorable position in any case, thanks to its geographic location." Welzceck's report continued:
M. Bonnet said that in foreign political debates before the Chamber things were often said that obviously were only meant for internal consumption and did not have any further importance. If the French Foreign
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Minister braves the storm of the opposition to put through what he considers personally to be justified German demands on the Sudetenland and subsequently in his own mind draws the consequences of a changed situation in Central Europe, then one cannot well demand that he abdicate all along the line before the Chamber. "If I did so," said M. Bonnet, "then the war-mongers would gain the upper hand." ^
In an interview with Coulondre on February 6 Ribbentrop again complained over Bonnet's language. " 'One might gather the impression,' he remarked, 'that France has not renounced the policy which brought about the last crisis.' . . . I answered him that France had no intention of giving up either her friendships or her interests in any part of the continent; as a great European Power she would make her presence felt in Europe. Nothing however in her attitude could give rise to suspicion on the part of the Reich" (F 46). Ribbentrop's own account of this conversation differs from the version in the French Yellow Book. He "declared sharply that M. Bonnet has previously affirmed his disinterest in Eastern questions and that, therefore, deviation from this line would not be advisable." Coulondre replied: "It is difKcult for France to renounce Eastern Europe while making concessions in the Mediterranean. However, she will undertake no pohcy in Eastern Europe that would disturb Germany" ( N Y T
1.17.40).
By this time the hopes of the Western Munichmen for a Nazi drive toward the Ukraine were already wavering. Yet so much had been staked on this gamble, so much had been sacrificed, so much had been forever lost that it was all but impossible to execute a volte-face and seek a new orientation. The means were no longer at hand to rebuild the aUiance system that had been shattered or to revert to the diplomacy of Louis Barthou. T o enjoy the cake which one has given away to others is more difficult than to eat one's cake and have it too. Bonnet and Daladier, like Halifax and Chamberlain, drifted along in fumbling befuddlement, hoping against hope that their original hopes might yet be realized. The initiative lay with the victor of Munich. Whether he should move East or West was now for him alone to determine. H e bided his time, studied the map, conferred with his advisers
iNYT 1.1740, quoting documents issued by the German foreign office.
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Triumphant
and wrestled with his soul. H e dehvered one of his more notable orations on January 30, 1939. The day was the sixth anniversary of his appointment as Chancellor. The place was the gayly beflagged KroU Opera in Berlin. The audience was the new Reichstag of Great Germany, 855 strong, including Austrian and Sudeten delegatesand beyond the walls, all Germans listening attentively to their own radiosand beyond Germany, milHons of other auditors all over Europe and the Americas listening in fear to the voice of the Master. Hitler spoke for two hours and a quarter: When, six years ago this evening, tens of thousands of National Socialist fighters marched through the Brandenburg Gate to the light of their torches to express to me, who had just been appointed Chancellor of the Reich, their feeling of overwhelming joy and their vows as faithful followers, countless anxious eyes all over Germany and in Berlin gazed upon the beginning of'a development, the end of which still seemed unknown and unpredictable. . . . The rescue of Europe began at one end of the Continent with Mussolini and Fascism. National Socialism continued this rescue in another part of Europe and at the present moment we are witnessing in still a third country the same drama of a brave triumph over the Jewish international attempt to destroy European civilization. . . . After reviewing once more the years of struggle for victory, and reiterating the Nazi version of Anschluss and Munich, he paid ironical respects to democratic statesmen and journalists who criticized the Third Reich and desired its ruin. The democracies, with incomparably greater resources, had all failed to solve their economic problems. The Third Reich had succeeded. It is a matter of absolute indifference to us in Germany what form of government other nations have. At the most, it is a matter of indifference to us whether National Socialismwhich is our copyright, just as Fascism is the Italian oneis exported or not. We are not in the least interested in this ourselves! We see no advantage in making shipments of National Socialism as an idea, nor do we feel that we have any occasion to make war on other people because they are democrats. The assertion that National Socialism in Germany will soon attack North or South America, Australia, China, or even The Netherlands, because different systems of government are in control in these places, is on
Ukrainian Dream
75
the same plane as the statement that we intend to follow it up with an immediate occupation of the full moon. . . . If certain methods of our economic policy appear injurious to the rest of the world, it should recognize that a hatred on the part of the former victor States, which was irrational and purposeless from an economic point of view, was chiefly responsible for making these efforts necessary. . . . We must export in order to buy foodstuffs, and secondly, we must . . . export still more to cover raw materials. And if foreign statesmen threaten with I-don't-know-what economic counter-measures, I can only say that in such a case a trade war of despair would begin, which would be an easy one for us. Easier than for the saturated other nations because the motive for our economic battle would be a very simple one, namely: the German people either livemeaning exportor die. . . . The theft of the German colonies was morally an injustice. Economically it was utter insanity! The political motives advanced were so mean that one is tempted merely to call them silly. . . . Either the wealth of the world is divided by force, in which case this division will be corrected from time to time by force, or else the division is based on the ground of equity and therefore, also, of common sense, in which case equity and common sense must also really serve the cause of justice and ultimately of expedience. . . . We can only serve the cause of peace if it is quite clearly understood that a war of rival ideologies, waged against the Italy of today, will, once it is launched, and regardless of its motives, call Germany to the side of her friend. . . . Now, when we defend ourselves against such apostles of war as Duff Cooper, Eden, Churchill or Ickes, this is represented as interference with the sacred rights of the democracies. According to the conception of these gentlemen, they have the right to attack other people and their leaderships, but nobody has the right to take umbrage against this. . . . Our relations with the United States are suffering from a campaign of defamation carried on to serve obvious political and financial interests which, under the pretense that Germany threatens American independence, are endeavoring to mobilize the hatred of an entire continent against the European States that are nationally governed. We all believe, however, that this does not reflect the will of the millions of American citizens who, despite all that is said to the contrary by the gigantic Jewish capitalistic propaganda through press, radio and films, cannot fail to realize that there is not one word of truth in all these assertions. Germany wishes to live in peace and on friendly terms with all coun-
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tries, including America. Germany refrains from any intervention in American affairs and likewise decisively repudiates any American intervention in German affairs. The question, for instance, whether Germany maintains economic relations and does business with the countries of South and Central America concerns nobody but them and ourselves. Germany, anyway, is a great and sovereign country and is not subject to the supervision of American politicians. Quite apart from that, however, I feel that all States today have so many domestic problems to solve that it would be a piece of good fortune for the nations if responsible statesmen would confine their attention to their own problems. . . . If international financial Jewry within and without Europe should succeed in throwing the nations into another world war the result will be not the bolshevization of the earth and therewith a victory for Jewry, but the extermination of the Jewish race in Europe. . . ,
This address was widely hailed in the Western press as "moderate" and "conciliatory." Democratic demoralization had already reached a point at which any speech by Hitler which did not make new territorial demands or threaten immediate war was greeted with joy as a vindication of appeasement and an assurance of peace and prosperity for all the world. Stocks recovered in London and New York. The Neiu York Times wondered at the new demand for colonies. The London Times deplored antiSemitism, but declared that if Hitler desired peace, "if the economic and social welfare of the German people is henceforth the sole preoccupation of the German Government, much may be possible tomorrow that is beyond possibility in a time of obscure and growing tension." Chamberlain in Commons on the following day said: "What we want to see is not only words which indicate a desire for peace, but before we can enter upon the final settlement we shall want to see concrete evidence in a willingness, let us say, to enter into arrangements, if not for disarmament, at any rate for a limitation of armaments. . . . I know that this country will not be unsympathetic, and we shall be ready to make our contribution to the general appeasement of Europe." The most significant portions of the January 30 address were the portions left unspoken. For the first time in an address of such length the Fiihrer did not denounce Soviet Russia. For the
Ukrainian Dream
77
first time he defined Lebensraum in terms of Africa rather than in terms of Eastern Europe. He said nothing of the Drang nach Osten. He said nothing of the Ukraine. Hitler had charted his course for 1939: Uquidation of France's remaining "alHes" east of the Reich, up to but not beyond the Soviet frontiers, and then the war against the West. The Ukrainian dream was dead.
CHAPTER
THREE
APPEASEMENT
BETRAYED
I. BLACKSHIRT BLACKMAIL
^'DowN WITH WAR! Down with imperialism! Down with bloody adventures in Africa!" The agitator denounced King and country. He did more than talk. His socialism and pacifism were inspired by a will to deeds. At Forli in Romagna he and his best friend, Pietro Nenni, helped to organize their followers for resistance to the war of conquest already under way in the South. A mob seized the railroad station, tore up the tracks, stopped a troop train. Cavalry arrived. Martial law was proclaimed. The agitator and his friend were arrested, tried, sentenced to jail. His martyrdom made him a hero. Upon his release five months later he became editor of Avanti, official organ of the Socialist party of Italy. The year was 1911. Three years later he denounced war once more, this time more vehemently as befitted a greater war. Italy must remain neutral. The proletariat must revolt in all countries to overthrow the bloody capitalist exploiters and imperialists. The agitator was not Lenin, though he was later to learn from Lenin. Before the learning came the transformation. The instrument thereof was Socialist Jules Guesde, Minister of the Interior in the French War Cabinet. Unlike the Itahan agitator, he was a patriot first and a Socialist second. He had money to buy up newspapers in neutral countries. He sent his secretary, Charles Dumas, to Italy. Dumas had 50,000 francs and an offer of 10,000 a month. He discovered that the editor of Avanti had his price. The agitator switched sides and became an ardent advocate of military intervention on the side of France. He founded a new 78
CHAPTER
THREE
APPEASEMENT
BETRAYED
I. BLACKSHIRT BLACKMAIL
^'DowN WITH WAR! Down with imperialism! Down with bloody adventures in Africa!" The agitator denounced King and country. He did more than talk. His socialism and pacifism were inspired by a will to deeds. At Forli in Romagna he and his best friend, Pietro Nenni, helped to organize their followers for resistance to the war of conquest already under way in the South. A mob seized the railroad station, tore up the tracks, stopped a troop train. Cavalry arrived. Martial law was proclaimed. The agitator and his friend were arrested, tried, sentenced to jail. His martyrdom made him a hero. Upon his release five months later he became editor of Avanti, official organ of the Socialist party of Italy. The year was 1911. Three years later he denounced war once more, this time more vehemently as befitted a greater war. Italy must remain neutral. The proletariat must revolt in all countries to overthrow the bloody capitalist exploiters and imperialists. The agitator was not Lenin, though he was later to learn from Lenin. Before the learning came the transformation. The instrument thereof was Socialist Jules Guesde, Minister of the Interior in the French War Cabinet. Unlike the Itahan agitator, he was a patriot first and a Socialist second. He had money to buy up newspapers in neutral countries. He sent his secretary, Charles Dumas, to Italy. Dumas had 50,000 francs and an offer of 10,000 a month. He discovered that the editor of Avanti had his price. The agitator switched sides and became an ardent advocate of military intervention on the side of France. He founded a new 78
Blackshirt Blackmail
79
paper: II Popolo (Tltalia. His comrades accused him of accepting bribes and expelled him from the editorship and from the Party. Nenni took over Avanti. Eight years later its headquarters in Milan were burned down by the friends of his former friend. Nenni's arrest was ordered. He fled to France and continued his work for socialism. Fifteen years later, in March 1937, the followers of the agitator, on vacation in Spain, found themselves near Guadalajara on the road to Madrid. Their hosts inconsiderately showered them with propaganda pamphlets and then with bombs. The survivors sought safety in flight. The pamphlets were written by Nenni, head of the propaganda department of the International Brigade. The agitator was Benito Mussolini.^ Unlike parliamentary democrats who often compromise all their principles for the sake of the principle of compromise, the first of the new Caesars adhered uncompromisingly to one principlethat of exploiting the weak, casting his lot with the strong and selling himself to the highest bidder among those stronger than he. This is the way of the weak and of the newly-arrived. It is pleasant and profitable for those who are uninhibited by sentiment. If it has been a principle also of Italian foreign policy since the achievement of unification, this results from the circumstances that foreign policy is unsentimental and that Italy is weak and newly-arrived. In 1933-34 Mussolini perceived that Hitler was as yet feeble and that France and Britain were still strong. He therefore collaborated with the Western Powers and helped save Austria from Hitler's first assault. In 1935-36 he discovered that Hitler was becoming strong and that France and Britain were being steadily weakened by their own leaders. He therefore sold to Pierre Laval the pledge of an alliance against the Reich in return for Laval's acquiescence in the murder of Ethiopia. When Ethiopia was done to death with Laval's connivance, II Duce joined Hitler in alliance against France, sacrificing Austria in the bargain. The GermanAustrian accord of July 11, 1936, which paved the road to Austria's grave, also paved the way to the Ciano-Ribbentrop bargain of October 25.^ The "Axis" was herewith established. Its members took their first step together in according simultaneous
1 Cf. "Mussolini vs. His Past" by George Seldes, Ken, April 21,1938. - Europe on the Eve, pp. 24if.
8o
Appeasement Betrayed
recognition to Franco on November i8. Signature of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement followed on November 25, 1936. Italy adhered on November 6, 1937. Hungary and Manchukuo also signed on February 24, 1939. Fascist Spain did likewise on March 27. The three Fascist Great Powers, each with its satelHte, had formed a bloc. Its slogan was "Anti-Bolshevism." This slogan deceived only the democratic statesmen and the magnates of sanctity and property in the West whom it was intended to deceive. II Duce was not deceived. It was he who had first discovered what magic could be worked with this slogan. In its name he had assumed Caesar's mantle. For some of the mighty in Berlin and Tokio this slogan was deemed a useful fagade for imperialistic designs against Russia. The hopes of 1918, when German troops held the Ukraine and the Caucasus and Japanese troops poured into Eastern Siberia, were not forgotten. Mussolini and Ciano had no such designs and no such hopes. Italy was separated from Russia by three seas and six countries. Italy could neither wage war on Russia nor hope for the least advantage from war on Russia by others. The "plutodemocracies," holding most of Africa and both exits from the middle sea, were the only Great Powers at whose expense II Duce could hope to realize imperial dreams. Against these Powers he strove to turn the Axis and the Triplice. In this he succeeded. Many factors moved the Fiihrer to abandon or defer his Ukrainian adventure. By no means least among them was Mussolini. The Fascist jackal could not alone challenge France and Britain. But with the aid of the Nazi lion he could nurture another Fascist jackal in Spain to worry the flank of the Anglo-French bull. The creature was castrated, but still too formidable for the lesser beasts of prey. But if the Nazi lion could be persuaded that the Russian bear was tough and that the steer in the West was tender, then the steer could be brought down, with ample bits of the carcass for the jackals to feed upon after the lion was sated. Munich was the signal for the jackal to move. The prey in the West was in full flight and must not be permitted to rest. The lion, looking hungrily toward the East, must be induced to look hungrily toward the West. Hence II Duce's support of Magyar claims on Carpatho-Ukraine and his efforts to promote a settlement of all Eastern problems. The barking began with Frangois-Poncet's reception in the
81
Italian Chamber on November 30, 1938. Rioting broke out in Tunis on December 8. Two days later Gayda demanded Italian participation in the management of the Suez Canal. He warned Paris of the fate of Prague and intimated that French Somaliland and the Addis-Jibuti railway must pass into Fascist hands. Ciano hinted at war. On December 22 it was revealed that Rome had informed Paris on December 17 that it no longer regarded the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935 as binding. Ratifications had never been exchanged. Far from giving up the railway shares and the real estate ceded to Italy by Laval's catastrophic pact, Rome pressed for new cessions in fresh fulfillment of the promises of the Treaty of London of 1915. Gayda declared that if France proved stubborn "Italy is ready to accept the offensive on any front and with any means." Verbal threats were accompanied by troop movements from Ethiopia toward French Somaliland, though any intention of invasion was disclaimed. It was hinted that Rome might be satisfied with "independence" for Tunis, participation in the Suez Canal, and a free port at Jibuti. The Fascist clamor for partition of the French colonial empire was based upon the realistic supposition that France, even with British support, could never dare to resist the military might of the Rome-Berlin axis. Only with American and Soviet support could London and Paris meet the Fascist Triplice on equal terms. At a Socialist Congress on December 26 Blum advocated such a Four-Power Bloc against Fascism. His supporters approved, but his words were idle. Munich had ended any such prospects, at least for the near future. Should Germany move eastward, the Soviet Union could hope to offer effective resistance, even without allies. But should the Axis move westward, France and Britain would be beaten unless powerful allies went to their aid. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were thus under an increasingly desperate necessity either to join forces with Moscow or to push the Fascist powers into an assault on the Soviet Union at all costs. The first objective they were unwilling to contemplate. How to achieve the second? The salvation of the West through a German war against Russia was attainable only by convincing Hitler that his path of least resistance lay to the East and by convincing his allies that they stood to gain something from such an enterprise. The first condition could scarcely be realized as long as the Soviet Union
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Betrayed
remained armed to the teeth and Britain and France were without allies, hopelessly outarmed by the greater Reich which they had helped to create, and governed by Chamberlains and Daladiers. The second condition also offered difficulties. T o achieve it, Japan must be stopped from expansion southward and deflected toward Outer Mongolia and Siberia. And since Italy could gain nothing by the anti-Soviet crusade, Mussolini must be paid in other coin to give his blessing. This double problem dominated Tory diplomacy at the turn of the year. On December 6, 1938, Lord Plymouth announced that the Cabinet was contemplating the extension of export credits to China. He warned Japan of the "incalculable consequences" of closing the Open Door. Downing Street, having already hailed the Anglo-American trade agreement of November 17 as a symbol of solidarity, expressed approval of reiterated American championship of the Open Door; blessed the $25,000,000 credit to China through the Export-Import Bank, announced on December 15 in Washington; and looked to the United States to keep Japan within bounds. These gestures of belated and feeble aid to China were of doubtful efficacy. Tokio indicated that it regarded the Nine-Power Pact as dead and that the "new order" in East Asia would comprise a bloc of Japan, Manchukuo and China in which the privileges of the Western Powers would be curtailed or terminated. Hiranuma's assumption of the Premiership signified renewed determination to crush Chinese resistance, but it did not necessarily foreshadow any program of war against the Soviet Union. Whatever the West might do, Japan's path of least resistance lay southward. In the event that France and Britain should be driven to the wall in Europe by the Caesars, Tokio would strike at their Oriental possessions. T o London's distress, Paris failed to comprehend the problem of "appeasing" Mussolini. Daladier referred on December 5 to "the firm resolve of all Frenchmen to assure, by all the means in their power, the absolute integrity of the territory over which the French flag floats." On December 14 Bonnet told the Deputies: "There cannot be the slightest equivocation. France will never consent to giving up an inch of territory to Italy, and any attempt to realize such a claim can only lead to an armed conflict." On December 19 he reiterated this defiance and coupled it with
85
references to Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunis, and Somaliland and to British support of France against aggression. Three months previously he had denied that France could count on Britain. Four months previously he had made similar brave pledges in defense of Prague. Small military and naval reinforcements were sent to Jibuti where a few hundred troops faced 250,000 Italian and colonial soldiers in the neighboring territories of East Africa. Ciano's note of December 17 was answered on December 16 with an acknowledgment and an expression of willingness to redress "grievances" and to exchange ratifications of the accord which Rome had just repudiated. But no French territory would be ceded and Rome's suggestion of "arbitration" in Munich fashion, with Hitler and Chamberlain as participants, was rejected. On January 9 Daladier returned to Paris from a tour of Corsica, Tunisia, and Algeria which the Fascist press denounced as a "provocation." He made new promises: "I shall maintain France. I shall maintain the French colonial empire." The pathetic gyrations of the French politicians in the face of Fascist threats were of a piece with Laval's folly of 1935. The bargain which Laval had made with U Duce on January 7 of that year was sealed with a pledge to stand aside while Caesar attempted the conquest of Ethiopia. Laval's repeated denials that he had given such a pledge do not alter the fact, which is documented by the Maffey Commission Report to the British Foreign Office.^ In the sequel Laval had done his best, in cooperation with Sir Samuel Hoare, to carry out his pledge. Public and parliamentary pressures, alas, required a pretense of sanctions to restrain the aggressor. But II Duce understood and II Duce conquered his empire. Now he was displaying base ingratitude. Bonnet in his speech to the Chamber on December 19 made no mention of the Italian notification of two days before. On the 29th, after the news had leaked out, he was accused in the Chamber of having deliberately concealed the fact. His critics argued that France was now free to alter the status of Italians in Tunisia, to demand the return of the 2,500 railway shares, to take back the territories which had been ceded. But Bonnet preferred a different course. The small strip of Somaliland coast was indeed reoccupied in mid-February. For the rest. Bonnet chose "watchful
1 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 167-8,173-4, 559"6i.
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Betrayed
waiting." In his address to the Deputies on December 29 he said he had not learned of the Italian action until after his address of the 19th. Even if he had, he could not have mentioned it since it had not been discussed by the Cabinet. When asked whether the Italian note had been delivered on the 17th, he repUed: "I neither deny nor confirm it." "I am sorry to say," retorted Communist Deputy Peri, "that M. Bonnet's denials are no longer of any use to anybody." ^ Not until March 29 did the Quai d'Orsay publish the correspondence of December and then only to refute Mussolini's public hints that precise Italian demands had been formulated on December 17. Ciano had written to the French Ambassador: Mr. Ambassador: In our conversation of the second instant Your Excellency expressed the desire of the French Government to know whether the Italian Government considers as still effective the Franco-Italian accords of January 7, 1935, and whether these accords in its opinion can still serve as a basis for Franco-Italian relations. I replied to Your Excellency that the question was one of too great importance for me to give a definite answer offhand and required more extensive study. I now have the honor to inform you as follows in confirmation of what I was able then to tell you personally. The Franco-Italian accords of January 7, 1935, are composed, as Your Excellency knows, of a treaty relative to the settlement of reciprocal interests in Africa and of a series of acts that are closely connected with it. Article VII of the treaty provides that it will be ratified and subordinates its going into effect to an exchange of ratifications. Now this exchange has never taken place. The constitutional procedures preparatory to ratification were indeed begun immediately after the signature but were never carried out. Negotiations for the stipulation of the special convention concerning Tunisia were never even commenced and that convention, according to Article I of the treaty, should have become effective on the same date as the treaty itself. The Franco-Italian treaty for the settlement of reciprocal interests in Africa has therefore never been completed. Over and above these observations of a juridical nature must also be taken into account that the treaty as well as the accompanying acts were concluded on the basis of very definite assumptions and that these assumptions never received any partial confirmation. As you know, the 1935 accords, in return for the settlement of a whole 1 Cf. France and Munich, by Alexander Werth, pp. 399-406.
85
series of questions, aimed at developing friendship between Italy and France and instituting relations of confident collaboration between the two nations. Italy notably agreed by 1935 to important sacrifices both as concerns the rights of the Italians in Tunisia and as concerns the rights she held from the Treaty of London in 1915, in recognition of the equitable understanding and attitude in conformity that France was to show for Italy's needs for expansion in East Africa. Now the attitude adopted by France when Italy by the action of the Negus was forced to solve definitively the problem of its relations with Ethiopia and also thereafter was certainly not in accordance with the above intention. It was precisely the opposite. It is sufficient to refer, without need to discuss them further, to the different phases of the events that have transpired since 1935. The accords of January 7, 1935, as Your Excellency was able to note in our conversation of the second instant, have never been executed and thus are emptied of their content and can evidently not be considered as being in effect today. They have in fact been superseded historically by events. As a whole they were related to a general situation that has been rapidly outdated by the events that followed the application of sanctions. Further, the creation of the empire has established new rights and new interests of fundamental importance. Under these conditions and even in the interests of their improvement, Franco-Italian relations cannot have for a basis at the present time the accords of 1935, and especially if it is desired to improve them it is evident that these relations ought to be examined again in common accord by the two Governments (NYT 3.30.39). The nature of the "intentions" and the "very definite assumptions" referred to is not in doubt. The balance of the formula was familiar: you have granted our demands in return for our promises in other fields; once the demands are realized, however, "new rights and new interests" are created; these invalidate our earlier promises; conditions have changed. So sorry. With identical logic the Japanese Foreign Office had repeatedly demonstrated that "changed conditions" had rendered the Nine-Power Pact of 1922 "inappHcable." (The changes were a result of Japanese military violence in disregard of the pact and of other treaty obligations.) Here was the diplomatic equivalent of the proverbial strategy of the murderer who, having killed both his parents, pleaded for mercy on the ground that he was an orphan.
86
Frangois-Poncet's long reply, which was doubtless drawn up by Bonnet, was a plaintive plea for good faith:
. . . My government feels that it must set forth the following facts: First, the accords of January 7, 1935, which set the basis for the settlement of all outstanding differences between France and Italy and which had the object of assuring the development of their friendly relations were approved with only nine dissenting votes by the French Parliament on March 23 and 26,1935. If ratifications could not be exchanged as a result of the adjournment of the establishing of the Tunisian convention that was to precede that exchange, France cannot be held responsible for evaluating the circumstances that led Italy to desire that adjournment. Moreover, even before their ratification these accords, solely advantageous to Italy, were started to be put in operation by France since, anticipating one of their provisions, the French Government arranged the transfer from the French group of the company holding the concession of the Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway of a parcel of 2,500 shares into the hands of an Italian group. Even on the part of the Italian representatives in the negotiations that took place in Paris in 1937 for revision of the economic settlements providing for East Africa, the Rome accords were considered sufficiently established to be frequently invoked as a basic reference. Recently, again on May 12, 1938, considering with the French Charge d'Affaires the program of negotiations submitted on April 22, 1938, by the Italian Government, Your Excellency, while making a formal reservation, raised no objection to the principle of the application of the African accords of January 7, 1935, which was augmented in Points 9, 10 and 11 of that program. Your Excellency even specified with regard to the Tunisian convention that the Chigi Palace contemplated no substantial change in the text proposed by the French Government, which text M. Blondel [Jules Blondel, then the French Charge d'Affaires] pointed out, had been extracted from the 1935 accords. No political consideration in the mind of the Italian Government therefore opposed the maintenance of these accords at that time. Second, no political action of the French Government ever has been since invoked to justify the attitude displayed by the Royal Government. The French Government, on the contrary, has taken every step that has been represented to it as being in the nature of facilitating the improvement of relations between the two countries. On May 12, 1938, the French Government adopted at Geneva a position of principle that aimed to secure for it freedom of action to recognize
87
Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia. A few months later, on October 12, it accredited an ambassador to His Majesty the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia. Third, as to the previous attitude of France with regard to the Ethiopian affair, the Italian Government never has been ignorant of the general lines of French policy and the international obligations they included. They were always loyally reported to the Italian Government at the proper moment by the head of the French Government, M. Laval, who was then directing French foreign policy. And the Italian Government knows in what spirit that policy was conducted by the French Government. Premier Mussolini was several times good enough to express to the French Ambassador during the course of the Geneva procedures his appreciation of the moderating influence of France and of the constant efforts of the French delegation to reconcile as much as possible respect for the obligations of the pact with the safeguarding of Franco-Italian friendship. The French Government desires to recall these facts to Your Excellency in acknowledging the receipt of your communication (NYT 3-30.39)-
Thus: Laval had betrayed Ethiopia and the Covenant. Laval had kept his bargain in good faith. His successors had done likewise. Ethiopia was Italian. The League was dead. Mussolini had expressed gratitude. And now, nowto repudiate the deal and to make new demandswas this honorable? Was this just? The grim comedy of these complaints was not lost upon a lonely exile in England. This was what he had predicted. His name was Haile Selassie. But Bonnet continued to hope. He was willing to make new concessionsnot perhaps because the wits were right in saying that he was in the pay of every European government except the French, but because he was a convinced and incurable advocate of appeasement, wherever it led. He was quite prepared to grant new favors to Rome if the Grand Design of the Munichmen could thereby be restored to some semblance of its pristine beauty. But Daladier was doubtful. Parliament was dubious. The public was anxious. He must proceed circumspectly. His public formula was that no Italian territorial demands could be met, but as for "nonterritorial" demands, much could be done with sufficient good will on both sides. When the formula produced no results, Bonnet had other devices. On February 14 the Socialist group in the Chamber, sup-
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ported by other opposition deputies, demanded that the Foreign Minister explain reports of "secret negotiations with Germany and Italy." The reports came from the pen of Henri de Kerillis in USpoque. M. de Kerillis was a rara avis: an anti-Munichman of the extreme Right. H e was an honest and reputable journalist whose reports were not to be lightly dismissed. He asserted that Bonnet, in his ardor for concessions to the Axis, was circumventing his own diplomatic service through the use of secret agents: in BerUn, Fernand de Brinon; in Rome, Paul Baudouin. The former had published in Le Matin in November 1933 a sensational interview with Hitler, bespeaking appeasement and a French-Nazi entente. He became Vice-President of the Co?mte France-Allemagne, an organization pledged to rapprochement with the Reich. He was a contributor to the leading financial paper of Paris, VInformation, controlled by a bank with which Bonnet had close connections. In its pages he had denounced the "war-mongers" before Munich had praised "self-determination" after the surrender. Baudouin, who was destined for higher things, was a financier of extreme reactionary and Mimichois orientation. He had been party to the alleged "bankers' conspiracy" which had contributed to the fall of the Blum Cabinet in June 1937. He was now President of the Bank of Indo-China. The Berlin Borsenzeitung had reported on February 6 that Baudouin was in Rome negotiating a settlement of Italy's claims against France through a possible cession of a large area south of Libya, including Tibesti and Lake Chad. According to Kerillis, Ambassador Coulondre, after phoning the Quai d'Orsay, had issued a denial. Meanwhile it was announced in Jibuti that Italy had dropped its boycott of the French railway and had signed a contract for the shipment of 15,000 tons of freight. When Coulondre next saw Ribbentrop, the Nazi Foreign Minister expressed surprise at the Ambassador's denial in view of the fact that M. de Brinon had confirmed the story in person with Bonnet's permission. Coulondre returned to Paris and allegedly told Bonnet on February 10 that such maneuvers were "intolerable" and that he would resign if "such practices are not halted." De Brinon explained that he was convinced that Germany would long be occupied by "the immense job" of organizing Central and Eastern Europe. "European peace will not be exposed to grave risks during 1939. . . . If the Berlin-Rome Axis is considered a fact
89
and the Paris-London Axis another fact that the Germans themselves recognize, there are serious possibilities for negotiation and peaceful settlement. Briefly, I bring back the conviction that if we have a government, each day more and more stable and more and more realist, which is the case for the Daladier-Bonnet government, things should be considerably cleared up during the Spring and Summer, and that at that time we may look to the future with a certain optimism" ( N Y T 2.15.39). Bonnet as usual denied the whole story, though the charges were also made by Pertinax in UOrdre and by UHumanite} Nothing came of the accusations, nor of Bonnet's endeavors, if he had indeed done what he was accused of doing. From his point of view, the wretched "war-mongers" were forever making impossible a sensible settlement with the Axis. From their point of view, he was forever scheming to betray French interests into the hands of Hitler and Mussolini. The two groups checkmated one another in both France and Britain, as did "interventionists" and "isolationists" in the United States. The result was a paralysis of policy which was far more dangerous than a complete surrender or a firm defiance to the Axis. Chamberlain and HaHfax, to whom the French leaders constantly looked for guidance, were not helpful. They were as anxious as Bonnet to appease Mussolini. But they seemed to contemplate the necessity of "sacrifices" by France as well as by Ethiopia and Spain. Ever since the Ciano-Perth accord of April 16, 1938, London had pressed Paris to arrive at a similar settlement with Italy.^ The pressure had increased after Munich. Chamberlain and Hahfax acquiesced anew in Italian intervention in Spain, recognized Italian title to Ethiopia and put the April agreement in force. On November 23-25, 1938, they had come to Paris to urge a similar course on the French Ministers. Daladier and Bonnet needed no urging, but they were perturbed when Chamberlain announced on November 28 that he and Hahfax were going to Rome. At the London Press dinner on December 13 the Prime Minister said that "some will once again be speculating upon who is the winner and who the loser in these talks.
1 No hint of this appears of course in the French Yellow Book, though there is perhaps discernible a certain coolness in the dispatches between Bonnet and Coulondre after mid-February. 2Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 349-58 and s6$-yi (text).
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That is not the spirit in which we propose to undertake our journey. . . . I find it difficult to rouse much excitement over different systems of government, apart from particular actions which may not necessarily be inherent in the system." The anti-French demonstrations in the Italian Chamber had begun two days after the London announcement of the visit. Frangois-Poncet was assured that these outcries were "spontaneous" and did not represent Italian policy. But Tory appeasement might well be at French expense. In his references to the French colonies, Chamberlain first declared that Britain had "no specific pledge" to defend them. But at the press dinner, he asserted that "our relations with France are so close as to pass far beyond mere legal obligations, since they are founded on identity of interests." In the House of Commons on December 14 he asserted that the Anglo-Italian agreement to respect the Mediterranean status quo "certainly applies to Tunis." Any attack upon Tunis "would be a matter of grave concern." Here, as in dealing with Prague in the spring. Chamberlain warned against war, but declined to assume any pledge of defense. It was not strange that some Frenchmen feared that Tunis might suffer the fate of Sudetenland. On December 19 he spoke of Anglo-French relations as "cordial" and expressed gratitude at Bonnet's pledge of December 14 to place all the forces of France at Britain's disposal to resist unprovoked attack. But he made no reciprocal pledge covering the French colonies, merely opining that "intentions" were "more significant than actual treaties." Paris wondered anxiously what his intentions were. French courage was slightly restored by Daladier's Mediterranean tour and Chamberlain's pledge in Paris on January 10 not to attempt "mediation" of the French-Italian quarrel. This pledge rendered the Rome discussions largely futile. Their results were summed up by the Italian Foreign Office in the January 15 issue of Informazione Diplomatica:
Nothing sensational transpired since [Anglo-Italian] relations are defined in the accords of April 16 that went into effect November 16. These accords already have been loyally applied by both sides. . . . Italy stressed in a most formal manner that the basis of Italian foreign policy is and will continue to be the Rome-Berlin Axis. As for Spain, II Duce repeated that the last Italian legionnaires would be repatriated when the Reds do likewise and when Franco receives belligerent rights, which it is simply
91
absurd to refuse any longer. U Duce, however, added that if in the near future there is intervention on a larger scale on the part of governments friendly to Negrin, Italy will resume her liberty of action because she would thus consider the non-intervention policy ended and a failure. As for Italo-French relations, II Duce stated that the Spanish question deeply divided the two countries and only when the war was finished might it be possible to review the situation. In the meantime it is absolutely impossible to speak of arbitration or mediation, four-Power conferences and much less of three-Power ones.
The Spanish Republic died. Rome made new demands, always taking care to leave them vague and therefore elastic. Daladier breathed defiance. London pushed plans for a trade conference with Berlin, though the Reich exhibited little enthusiasm in the absence of colonial concessions. Downing Street made polite queries in Rome as to the reasons for the summoning of Italian reservists and the dispatch of reinforcements to Libya where Marshal Badoglio was inspecting fortifications. Chamberlain told the House of Commons on February 21 that ,580,000,000 would be spent for defense during a single year. Two days later Halifax reaffirmed Anglo-French solidarity and quoted from Mein Kampf to prove that Britain was not decadent. Meanwhile, amid unconfirmed rumors of border clashes, French army chiefs in North Africa conferred under General August Nogues on the defense of Tunis. Hore-Belisha announced on March 8 that Britain would send nineteen divisions to France in the event of war. But on the following day it was intimated that the Prime Minister was hopeful of the settlement of Italian claims against France without war and of the feasibility of a disarmament conference by summer. Sir Samuel Hoare echoed the idea on March 10 by suggesting a meeting of five heads of states. Sir Samuel, now Secretary for Home Affairs, was one of the authors of the Anglo-German naval accord of June 18, 1935, and of the Laval-Hoare bargains of September 10 and December 8 1935. He was a member of the "Inner Cabinet." He, of all men, should know what results might be expected from appeasement. Men and women therefore breathed easier when he said on March 10 that there was hope of freeing the people of Europe
from a nightmare that haunts them and from an expenditure upon armaments that beggars them. . . . Five men in Europethree dictators [he must have meant Hitler, Mussolini and Franco, since he was above sus-
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picion of dealing with Stalin] and the Prime Ministers of England and Franceif they worked with singleness of purpose and unity of action might in an incredibly short space of time transform the whole history of the world. These five men, working together in Europe and blest in their efforts by the President of the United States of America, might make themselves eternal benefactors of the human race. Our own Prime Minister has shown his determination to work heart and soul to such an end. I cannot believe that other leaders of Europe will not join him in the high endeavor upon which he is engaged.
On the same day, however, Stalin was deriving no little satisfaction from pronouncing in Moscow the bankruptcy of AngloFrench hopes for a Nazi-Soviet clash. And in Slovakia there was an effort to proclaim "independence" from Prague. Sir Samuel's address was a swan song.
2. C Z E C H O - S L O V A K I A
f MARCH
15, 1939
Emil Hacha was not a great leader. His eyes were tired, his hair was thin, his face drooped with age and ill-health. But he was amiable, colorless and therefore "safe." For these qualities, now so necessary after the Great Betrayal, the Chamber and the Senate of the Republic elected him President of Czecho-Slovakia on November 30, 1938. It was fitting that so small a man should hold the office that Thomas Masaryk and Edouard Benes had held before him. The proud and prosperous nation of freemen which they had helped to build was now a mutilated torso, still breathing only by the grace of Hitler. Hacha was a man of 66, of Czech peasant stocka devout Catholic, a jurist, a member of the Hapsburg Imperial Privy Council, Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Czechoslovakia after 1925, a lecturer and writer on administrative lawalways aloof from party politics. The important thing was that the Nazi press approved of him. Following his election, he drove from the Parliament House in Prague to Hradcany Castle, dominating the ancient city. He was accompanied by General Syrovy, Premier of the central government; by Mgr. Josef Tiso, Premier of Slovakia; and by M. Julian Revay, Deputy for Mgr. Augustin Volosin, Premier of CarpathoUkraine. The State of which he became the head had had, before
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picion of dealing with Stalin] and the Prime Ministers of England and Franceif they worked with singleness of purpose and unity of action might in an incredibly short space of time transform the whole history of the world. These five men, working together in Europe and blest in their efforts by the President of the United States of America, might make themselves eternal benefactors of the human race. Our own Prime Minister has shown his determination to work heart and soul to such an end. I cannot believe that other leaders of Europe will not join him in the high endeavor upon which he is engaged.
On the same day, however, Stalin was deriving no little satisfaction from pronouncing in Moscow the bankruptcy of AngloFrench hopes for a Nazi-Soviet clash. And in Slovakia there was an effort to proclaim "independence" from Prague. Sir Samuel's address was a swan song.
2. C Z E C H O - S L O V A K I A
f MARCH
15, 1939
Emil Hacha was not a great leader. His eyes were tired, his hair was thin, his face drooped with age and ill-health. But he was amiable, colorless and therefore "safe." For these qualities, now so necessary after the Great Betrayal, the Chamber and the Senate of the Republic elected him President of Czecho-Slovakia on November 30, 1938. It was fitting that so small a man should hold the office that Thomas Masaryk and Edouard Benes had held before him. The proud and prosperous nation of freemen which they had helped to build was now a mutilated torso, still breathing only by the grace of Hitler. Hacha was a man of 66, of Czech peasant stocka devout Catholic, a jurist, a member of the Hapsburg Imperial Privy Council, Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Czechoslovakia after 1925, a lecturer and writer on administrative lawalways aloof from party politics. The important thing was that the Nazi press approved of him. Following his election, he drove from the Parliament House in Prague to Hradcany Castle, dominating the ancient city. He was accompanied by General Syrovy, Premier of the central government; by Mgr. Josef Tiso, Premier of Slovakia; and by M. Julian Revay, Deputy for Mgr. Augustin Volosin, Premier of CarpathoUkraine. The State of which he became the head had had, before
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Munich, 140,500 sq. km. and 14,729,000 inhabitants by the 1930 census. It now had only 98,900 sq. km. and 9,807,000 inhabitants. Germany had annexed 28,680 sq. km. with 3,653,000 people, Hungary 11,830 with 1,027,000 people, and Poland 1,086 with 241,000 people. Thanks to German-supported pressure for local "autonomy" in the aftermath of the debacle, the new Czechoslovakia was a federation, with 6,794,000 of its population in Bohemia-Moravia, 2,450,000 in Slovakia, and 552,000 in Carpatho-Ukraine. In the reshuffle of posts in the wake of Hacha's election, Tiso and Volosin retained their positions in Bratislava and Chust, while the premiership in the National Cabinet passed to Rudolf Beran, with Frantisek Chvalkovsky remaining Foreign Minister. The new regime was committed to full collaboration with the Reich. Beran was leader of the ultra-conservative Czech Agrarian party. He it was who had long opposed Benes and urged appeasement of Hitler. He it was who helped to bring about capitulation to the Chamberlain-Daladier ultimatum of September 19. He it was who organized the new "Party of National Unity" in the name of "authoritarian" democracy. With his bald head, round face, stubby mustache and heavy body, he personified the "practical" bourgeois who preferred submission to resistance so long as Property seemed safe. In a broadcast of December 3 he declared:
We shall quickly consolidate good relations with all our neighbors. While firmly resolved to maintain our independence, we have decided in the interests of the present and coming generations for open cooperation with our most powerful neighbor. . . . Even after the recent convulsions, we shall fight our way successfully through all the difficulties that confront us. . . . No power in the world can destroy a nation that is determined to live.^
These hopes were buttressed by the fact that the Annex to the Munich agreement asserted that Britain and France had accepted the partition of Czechoslovakia "on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph six of the Anglo-French proposals of the nineteenth September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak state against
1 The Central European Observer, Prague, December 16, 1938.
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unprovoked aggression. When the question of the Pohsh and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia." By early November this "settlement" viâs achieved through German-Italian arbitration. The "guarantee," however, failed to materialize. Halifax and Bonnet displayed no enthusiasm. Ribbentrop and Ciano displayed less. If words on paper still had meaning, London and Paris were solemnly bound to defend Prague against unprovoked aggression. But Rome and Berlin were not yet parties to the arrangement. Bonnet raised the question with Ribbentrop in Paris on December 6. His German guest was non-committal: the Reich must await developments with respect to minority problems. "The best and most effective guarantee would be the establishment of a friendly relationship between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia." Berlin could never tolerate a reversion to Benes policies which might be encouraged by a four-power guarantee. According to Ribbentrop, Bonnet replied that "France was forced by the pressure of events to foresee the possibility of guaranteeing the Czech borders," but he recognized that the new State was within Germany's sphere of interest and that a four-power guarantee might be deemed "an onerous remnant of the defunct French-Czech alliance that was of no particular importance." ^ But Ribbentrop, according to Bonnet (F 32), agreed to re-examine the question of the guarantee on his return to Berlin. When Coulondre asked Baron von Weizsacker on December 22 what had been done in this direction, he replied with a smile: "Could not this matter be forgotten? Since Germany's predominance in that area is a fact, would not the guarantee of the Reich be sufficient?" (F 35) The French Ambassador responded rather weakly that obligations cannot be forgotten. His own Government had conveniently forgotten all its obligations toward Prague in September and therewith reduced its ally to such helplessness that no new guarantee could have any meaning. But the very lack of substance rendered it all the more important for the Munichmen to insist upon the form. This the Baron failed to comprehend. "Besides," he added, "it would be for Czecho-Slovakia to claim that guarantee. In any case we are in no hurry to
1 NYT 1.17.40, quoting German documents issued in Berlin, January 16, 1940, in reply to The French Yellow Book.
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f March 1^, I^^p
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settle this question, and M. Chvalkovsky is not coming to Berlin until after the holidays." This attitude, thought Coulondre, confirmed the misgivings felt in Prague. Downing Street did little to press Berlin for the guarantee. Henderson was uninterested. During his visit to Rome, Chamberlain apparently questioned Mussolini regarding the conditions under which Italy might consider joining in the guarantee. Bonnet did little until he began to feel alarmed over Berlin's reluctance. Even this reluctance, however, might be a good omen. The French Charge, M. de Montbas, reported to Bonnet on January 5 that "German domination is weighing down Czecho-Slovakia more and more heavily. The conclusion of a customs and monetary union to the profit of the Reich might prove at the same time a most advantageous operation and the first stage on the road to the Ukraine" (F 36). On February 4 Bonnet instructed Coulondre to join Henderson "in a parallel demarche" in soliciting the views of Wilhelmstrasse regarding the guarantee. Three days later M. de Lacroix conferred with Chvalkovsky regarding the latter's recent visit to Berlin. Hitler had received the Czech Foreign Minister in a not unfriendly fashion. The Fiihrer and Ribbentrop had both emphasized that the Reich could not guarantee any State which had not eliminated the Jews: "Do not imitate the sentimental and leisurely manner in which we ourselves treated this problem. . . . This vermin must be destroyed. . . . Germany will seek to form a bloc of anti-Semitic States, as she would not be able to treat as friends the States in which the Jews, either through their economic activity or through their high positions, could exercise any kind of influence" (F 45), Prague was already relieving Jews of public posts in order to oblige Berlin. Hitler was casting about for pretexts. He insisted also that Germans in Czecho-Slovalda must be free to be active Nazis. The Czech army must be reduced. Both conditions had already been met . . . ? Coulondre reported to Bonnet that he had seen Ribbentrop on February 6 and had been read a lecture denouncing the inability of London and Paris to understand that "our vital interests must be satisfied" and condemning attacks on the Reich by "British and American newspapers, under the pressure of Jewish and Bolshevising influences."
We have decided to give our newspapers full liberty to answer back,
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and you will soon see how they do it. In foreign policy our aim is twofold: (i) To fight Bolshevism by every means, and especially through the operation of the anti-Comintern pact. (2) To regain our colonies. On the first point, believe me, the struggle we have started is merciless. Toward the Soviets, we will remain adamant. We will never come to an understanding with Bolshevist Russia. . . . As to the colonies . . . we are not prepared to start negotiations. And why should we, as long as in the democracies the opposition parties are stirred up by the mischievous action of Bolshevism and Jewry (F 46).
In the face of this unpromising attitude, Bonnet instructed Coulondre to submit a note verbale on February 8, recalling the Munich annex and Chamberlain's talk with Mussolini. "The French Government, anxious to see all the clauses of the Munich agreement effectively carried out, would appreciate information on the views of the Government of the Reich on the question of the guarantee provided for in said agreement. The French Embassy would be grateful to the Reicih Foreign OfEce if it would kindly enable it with all speed to comply with the desire thus expressed by the French Government" (F 47). Ribbentrop prepared no reply until February 28. Meanwhile De Lacroix reported from Prague on the i8th that Germany had indicated willingness to guarantee the frontiers only on condition of complete neutrahzation, adhesion to the anti-Comintern pact, withdrawal from the League of Nations, drastic reduction of military effectives, surrender of part of the Czech gold reserve, sale of raw materials for the now worthless Czecho-Slovak currency in the Sudeten areas, full access to Czech markets for Sudeten industries with which no new Czech industries must be allowed to compete, anti-Semitic legislation fashioned after the Nuremberg decrees, dismissal of all State employees objectionable to Germany, and permission for Germans to carry Nazi badges and fly the Nazi flag ( F 4 8 ) . Ribbentrop's note of February 28, which was not transmitted to Coulondre until March 2, made no specific mention of such conditions. He argued instead that there could be no German guarantee until Prague's other neighbors were willing to accept similar engagements. New conflicts with Hungary and Poland were likely. The Anglo-French guarantee was no safeguard against them. Britain had similar difficulties in Palestine. "An undeniable danger exists that premature guarantees, far from
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bringing about a reasonable solution of the Czecho-Slovak internal problem, might rather contribute to consolidate existing opposition and thus provoke further conflict" (F 51). The same note was transmitted to Henderson, but he makes no mention of it in his memoirs. In transmitting it to Bonnet on March 2, Coulondre commented on "certain brutal or perfidious thrusts" and concluded that Berlin was rejecting a guarantee and denying to the Western Powers any further right to interfere in Central European affairs. "This document is therefore anything but reassuring as to the immediate intentions of Hitler's poUcy toward Czechoslovakia." No British or French reply to this communication has been published. Hitler's abrupt liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia followed. The technique was a masterly combination of "Trojan Horse" and "Fifth Column" operations, soul-shattering threats of annihilation, "consent" secured by force and, at the end, a swift military blow against a community too demoralized to offer the slightest resistance. While Berlin pressed Hacha, Beran and Chvalkovsky to accept arrangements which would have extinguished such independence as their State still enjoyed, Nazi agents fanned the flames of separatist sentiment in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Seyss-Inquart and Biirckel, with the aid of the Vienna radio station, began a campaign for Slovak independence. The Slovak autonomists wêre led by the Premier, Father Tiso. His regime at Bratislava was already anti-Semitic and totalitarian. Thousands of Czech officials were dismissed. Demands were made for a separate army. A private militia, the "Hlinka Guards," was organized and equipped with German aid. Comparable developments in Carpatho-Ukraine convinced Prague early in March that the dissolution of the federation was imminent unless preventive action were taken. Such action was the signal for which the Fiihrer was waiting. On March 6 Hacha dismissed the Ruthenian Cabinet and asked Father Volosin to form a new government from which Revay should be excluded. Revay went to Berlin to seek Nazi aid while Czech General Prchala, who had been appointed a Ruthenian Minister on January 17 to curb separatist agitation, seized the barracks of the Sitch Guards and sought to dissolve the organization. Prague simultaneously asked Bratislava to declare its loyalty and to abandon its separatist program as the price of a loan.
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Instead of complying, Tiso plotted secession. On March 9 Hacha dismissed the Slovak Cabinet, proclaimed martial law in Slovak towns and ordered the Hlinka Guards disarmed. Tiso at once wired Hitler for support. On the loth Hacha deposed Tiso. On the following day Goring, who was hastily recalled from an Italian vacation, received word that German intervention would be required and accordingly ordered the air force to be ready by the 14th. Troop movements in Germany were already under way. The Nazi press with one voice sponsored Slovak independence and denounced Prague for "persecuting" Germans. The Vienna radio screamed that a "Marxist plot" was being hatched in Prague. Tiso fled the monastery to which he had been sent. At Hitler's invitation, he flew to Berlin in a German plane on March 13. He was met by Ribbentrop and taken to the Chancellery to confer with Hitler. On his return to Bratislava on the 14th, he met the Slovak Diet, which unanimously voted a declaration of independence and approved the new constitution which he submitted. Tiso forthwith became "President" of a presumably sovereign Slovakia. Coulondre had learned on the 13 th that a German ultimatum was being prepared for dispatch to Prague. He urged Bonnet to inform the Czech authorities at once "so as not to be overtaken by events as happened in September" (F 56). Bonnet apparently communicated with Chamberlain as early as the i ith regarding the German troop movements. Without waiting for instructions from London, Henderson on the 13 th asked for an interview with Weizsacker, who received him the following morning. He was told that no ultimatum had been dispatched, that Berlin regarded the Tiso regime as the only legal Slovak Government and that all might yet be settled peaceably if Prague respected the decision of the Slovak Diet (F 63). Coulondre, who had suggested a demarche at Berlin on the 13 th, was instructed by Bonnet on the 14th to express "the most serious concern" of Paris and to inquire "most urgently from Herr von Ribbentrop what interpretation, in the opinion of the Reich authorities themselves, is to be put on their action in Slovakia. You should make this inquiry purely as a request for information, the importance of which would justify, if necessary, a reference on your part to the procedure of mutual consultation provided for by the Declaration of December 6" (F64).
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Before the French Ambassador could act, every one was "overtaken by events." Since Ribbentrop was away, Coulondre saw Weizsacker on the morning of the 15th at the same time that Count Welczeck was informing Bonnet in Paris of the GermanCzech "agreement" and of the military occupation of the Republic. Coulondre "reserved absolutely the judgment and attitude" of his Government and contended that the German action was contrary both to the Munich agreement and the Paris Declaration. Weizsacker replied that intervention was necessitated by the "dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia" and by the need of coming "to the rescue of the threatened German minority." Slovakia was independent. The status of Carpatho-Ukraine would be discussed with Budapest. The status of Bohemia and Moravia was already fixed (F 70). "Czecho-Slovakia" wrote Coulondre to Bonnet on the following day "has vanished from the map of Europe" (F 73). In Niimberg Julius Streicher told cheering throngs: "This is only a beginning; far greater events will follow; the democracies can rise up as much as they like, they will surrender in the end" (F74)The events which shook the world had followed hard upon the proclamation of Slovak independence. After tentative diplomatic steps at Prague looking toward a "reconstruction" of the regime, Berlin summoned Hacha and Chvalkovsky to the German capital on the 14th. Some fourteen German divisions, consisting largely of mechanized units, gathered on the frontiers and occupied Maerisch-Ostrow on the Czech side the same afternoon. Beran was ignored. The President and Foreign Minister were received with military honors, flowers and even a box of candy for Hacha's daughter, who accompanied him because of his poor health. The visitors were at once taken to the Chancellery where Hitler, Goring, Ribbentrop and Keppler awaited them. It was already past midnight. A document lay on the table. The Fiihrer announced that there would be no negotiations. The Czech Ministers had been summoned to sign. The decision was irrevocable. Bohemia and Moravia would be annexed to the Reich. Prague would be occupied at 9.00 the next morning. Whoever resisted would be stepped on. With this. Hitler wrote his signature on the document and departed. According to Coulondre, Hacha and Chvalkovsky then protested at the outrage done them and refused to sign a paper con-
loo
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Betrayed
demning their whole people to enslavement. Goring and Ribbentrop replied that if they refused to sign hundreds of bombers would be given the order at 6.00 a.m. to destroy Prague. This argument was unanswerable. Yet Hacha continued to protest. The Germans hunted him and his colleague around the table, shoved pens into their hands and repeated their threats. For hours the unequal contest continued. Hacha collapsed and was revived by injections, administered by doctors whom the German Ministers kindly kept in attendance. He objected that he could not make such a decision without the approval of his Government. He was told that German agents had already laid down a direct telephone line to the Cabinet in Prague. He collapsed once more and was again revived. At 4:30 a.m. March 15 Hacha capitulated. The document was signed. Chvalkovsky muttered as he left: "Our people will curse us, and yet we have saved them from a horrible massacre" (F 77). German troops were already across the frontier. By 9:15 a.m. advance detachments were entering Prague, followed by the Black Guards and the Gestapo. Hitler entered the city in triumph in the afternoon. From Hradcany Castle he recalled mediaeval Bohemia's membership in the Holy Roman Empire and declared to the Czech people: "For a thousand years Bohemian and Moravian lands were part of the Lebensraum of the German people. . . . It is by the law of self-survival that the German Reich is determined to intervene again decisively to erect the foundations of reasonable European order and proclaim decrees accordingly. Germany has already proven in its thousand-year-old past that, by reason of its size and the character of the German nation, it alone is predestined to solve these problems." The document of the preceding night asserted:
Both parties agree in expressing the conviction that the aim of all their efforts ought to be to ensure tranquillity, order and peace in this part of Central Europe. The President of the Czecho-Slovak State has declared that to serve this purpose, and with the object of securing a final appeasement, he entrusts with entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech country to the hands of the Fiihrer of the German Reich. The Fiihrer has accepted this declaration and expressed his resolve to take the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich, assuring it of an autonomous development suited to its own character (F 69).
Bohemia and Moravia were annexed to Germany, with Baron
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March 75, i^^p
loi
von Neurath as Reich Protector and Herr Frank, former aide of Konrad Henlein, as his Secretary of State. For the rest, President Tiso addressed a message on the 14th to the Slovaks of the United States: "We have founded an independent Slovak State today, not only to maintain the Slovak tradition, but also to secure bread and soil for Slovaks. W e base our future on our independence. . . . You can be sure today that Slovakia is no longer a tolerated appendage, but is everywhere the master in its own house and able to face the world in its own name. . . . May God protect you and be with us so that the Slovak people may prosper by that which we have begun today" ( N Y T 3.15.39). Immediately thereafter Tiso appealed to Hitler for "protection." On March 23 he signed a 25-year "treaty" with Ribbentrop by which (Art. I) "The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the Slovak State and the integrity of its territory." T o insure adequate protection, Bratislava agreed to German military occupation, with German forces exercising rights of sovereignty, and also agreed to conduct its policy and organize its own military forces "in close cooperation with the German Government." The fate of Carpatho-Ukraine was harder. On March 14 Budapest sent an ultimatum to Prague demanding the withdrawal of all Czech troops within twenty-four hours. Hungarian troops crossed the border before the ultimatum expired. The Volosin regime proclaimed the "independence" of Carpatho-Ukraine while Revay in Berlin pleaded for German support. But Hitler had changed his mind. General Prchala surrendered. The Sitch Guards fought the Magyars heroically but in vain. In Budapest pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic Premier Bela Imredy had resigned on February 15 upon discovering that he had "Jewish blood." On March 16 his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic successor, Count Paul Teleki, announced the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. An additional 400 sq. mi. of Slovak territory was acquired by seizure on March 24, ratified by a peace protocol of April 3. T o complete the early Spring seizing season. Hitler took advantage of the general consternation to recover Memel for the Reich. This Baltic port, with some 150,000 inhabitants, about half of whom spoke Lithuanian but almost all of whom regarded themselves as Germans, had been separated from the Reich by the Treaty of Versailles and placed under the Conference of Ambassadors. Lithuania, however, following the example of the Polish
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occupation of Vilna and the French occupation of the Ruhr, seized the district early in 1923. Lithuanian title was confirmed by the Allied and Associated Powers, subject to the terms of the "Statute of the Memel Territory" of 1924, providing for local autonomy, democratic government and the protection of minority rights. German-Lithuanian friction over Memel had been chronic during the ensuing seventeen years. Now Berlin delicately hinted to Kaunas that if Lithuania wished to escape the fate of Czecho-Slovakia, it had best surrender Memel. On March 22 an "agreement," embellished by a non-aggression pact, was signed in Berlin by Ribbentrop and Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys. Hitler made another triumphal entry and called the season closed. There were no tears in Memel and probably few in Kaunas. But in lovely Praha on the Vltava, now again Germanized into Prague-on-the-Moldau, men and women wept. G. E. R. Gedye, the British journalist who had written the most moving account of the betrayal of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938,^ took his leave of Bohemia's old capital on the day of the occupation of Memel. Under order of expulsion, he had taken refuge from the Secret Police in the British Legation. Only on the last day, with permit granted and preparations made for departure to Warsaw, was he free to see the conquered city. His account is a fitting requiem:
We saw and heard something of the terror of the Gestapo among the population, thousands upon thousands of whom were on the run, changing sleeping quarters nightly to escape secret agents of the invader and trying in vain to force their way through and beyond the iron ring of German bayonets. Men of high rank and low, pale, ashen-faced and hollow-cheeked, told of mass arrests and suicides. As dusk fell and I took my farewell of the city, before the Tomb of Czecho-Slovakia's Unknown Soldier, by the walls of the old city stood a little crowd that changed every two minutes, men bare-headed with teardimmed eyes and women sobbing softly, some kneeling in prayer at the grave of their nation. Thickly strewn before the tomb were thousands on thousands of tiny bunches of violets and snow drops, each dropped by some mourner for the Czechs' lost freedom. 1 Fallen Bastions, Victor GoIIancz, London, 1939 (American edition: Betrayal in Central Europe).
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On Sunday, the day of the great German parade, all Prague made a pilgrimage here. The piles of tiny bunches of flowers had risen breast high. Some one had dropped four daffodils, dimly discernible through a heavy veil of black crape. . . . German troops, mostly young boys, moved quietly beyond the crowds with no pride, but only immense disdain at the task that had been thrust upon them written on their faces. . . . An hour later I was on a train bound for Warsaw, confident that if I ever saw Prague again it would be once more the capital of a free democratic Czech nation (NYT 3.24.39).
3. ANGER IN BIRMINGHAM
The most remarkable aspect of the Nazi coup of mid-March was the official reaction of London and Paris to the news of it. That reaction in its final form was one of disillusion and bitterness, leading to abandonment of appeasement and belated efforts to rebuild a coalition against Germany. This was scarcely remarkable. The initial reaction was of a completely different order. Up to March 16 the Western Munichmen viewed the situation with philosophical complacency. The only anxiety to which they gave public expression was not due to any fear lest the whole basis of their policy had been undermined, but to apprehension lest their critics should contend that they were bound to enforce the Anglo-French guarantee of Czecho-SIovakia. This they promptly denied. Aside from expressions of mild regret, they were prepared to resume the course they had long been embarked upon. This too was scarcely remarkable, since they knew, if they knew anything, that the doom of Czecho-SIovakia was sealed at Munich and that its liquidation was a necessary corollary of the Nazi Drang nach Osten. What was remarkable was the swift change by the end of the week from the initial reaction of acquiescence to the ultimate reaction of disenchantment and wrath. At Paris Bonnet had known as early as March 11 what was coming. He was unperturbed. The paper which was usually his mouthpiece, Hojmne Libre, published an article on March 14 by M. Thouvenin denouncing the "lies" in the British press about alleged dangers to the Western Powers from events in Czechoslovakia. In the best Munich style, he denounced "Fausse alerte! Fausses nouvelles!" On the same day Pierre-fitienne Flandin pub-
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On Sunday, the day of the great German parade, all Prague made a pilgrimage here. The piles of tiny bunches of flowers had risen breast high. Some one had dropped four daffodils, dimly discernible through a heavy veil of black crape. . . . German troops, mostly young boys, moved quietly beyond the crowds with no pride, but only immense disdain at the task that had been thrust upon them written on their faces. . . . An hour later I was on a train bound for Warsaw, confident that if I ever saw Prague again it would be once more the capital of a free democratic Czech nation (NYT 3.24.39).
3. ANGER IN BIRMINGHAM
The most remarkable aspect of the Nazi coup of mid-March was the official reaction of London and Paris to the news of it. That reaction in its final form was one of disillusion and bitterness, leading to abandonment of appeasement and belated efforts to rebuild a coalition against Germany. This was scarcely remarkable. The initial reaction was of a completely different order. Up to March 16 the Western Munichmen viewed the situation with philosophical complacency. The only anxiety to which they gave public expression was not due to any fear lest the whole basis of their policy had been undermined, but to apprehension lest their critics should contend that they were bound to enforce the Anglo-French guarantee of Czecho-SIovakia. This they promptly denied. Aside from expressions of mild regret, they were prepared to resume the course they had long been embarked upon. This too was scarcely remarkable, since they knew, if they knew anything, that the doom of Czecho-SIovakia was sealed at Munich and that its liquidation was a necessary corollary of the Nazi Drang nach Osten. What was remarkable was the swift change by the end of the week from the initial reaction of acquiescence to the ultimate reaction of disenchantment and wrath. At Paris Bonnet had known as early as March 11 what was coming. He was unperturbed. The paper which was usually his mouthpiece, Hojmne Libre, published an article on March 14 by M. Thouvenin denouncing the "lies" in the British press about alleged dangers to the Western Powers from events in Czechoslovakia. In the best Munich style, he denounced "Fausse alerte! Fausses nouvelles!" On the same day Pierre-fitienne Flandin pub-
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lished an article in the American press (doubtless written, to be sure, some day previously) expressing optimism:
The Left Wing Extremists affiliated to the Second or Third International persist in basing their propaganda and their policy upon antiHitlerism and anti-Fascism. But within the democracies the authority and the influence of the Marxist and quasi-Marxist parties are declining. The failure of the Popular Front in France or the labor opposition in Great Britain and above all of the Frente Popular in Spain have made the democracies realize where their real interest lies. There are but few who still confound liberty and progress with the tyranny of the republican system of Dr. Negrin. All have realized the gigantic bluff of a propaganda based on the most advanced methods of Moscow.^
Pertinax (Andre Giraud) commented upon official apathy toward the German invasion of Bohemia. He reported that on Monday, March 13, a brief exchange of views had taken place between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay and that "in compliance with Prime Minister Chamberlain's strongly expressed opinion" it was decided to make no protest. On Tuesday, however, it was decided to ask Berlin for "explanations." "Paris and London seem to have come to the view that to do something futile was a lesser evil than not to take any notice at all of what was happening" ( N Y T 3.15.39). By Wednesday the pro-government press in Paris was accepting the situation with resignation and some surprise that none of the Czechs had been brave enough to offer resistance. Bonnet went before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber on Wednesday afternoon. On the agenda was a Socialist motion for convocation of an international peace conference. This was set aside. Bonnet explained that the guarantee of Czecho-Slovakia had never been put into effect. FrenchPolish cooperation was impossible because Warsaw, like Budapest, had adopted an attitude not approved by the Quai d'Orsay. He spoke very calmly and used the Nazi term "Czechia." Henri de Kerillis and Communist Peri denounced Bonnet's inactivity. He was unperturbed. That evening he received Count Welczeck who gave him the text of the German-Czech "agreement" and assured him that "the process of occupying and pacifying the territories concerned will be carried out calmly and in perfect order" (F 69). Not until Thursday did Bonnet and Daladier exhibit any alarm.
1 The New York Herald-Tribune, 3.15.39.
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Even then Bonnet repeated his reassurances to the Senate Foreign AflFairs Commission, where he was vigorously attacked by Laval on the ground that he had not made enough concessions to Italy. When parliament met on Friday, Daladier declared that the gravity of the situation (discovered somewhat belatedly, though no one commented on this) required that the Chambers within the next two days vote his Cabinet dictatorial powers until November 30. He rejected all amendments or pledges that the powers would not be used to curb civil liberties or jeopardize social reform. The session was stormy. Blum was cheered when he said: "A people has been reduced to slavery by the atrocious abuse of force in that year that is the 150th anniversary of the French Revolution. . . . Bohemia must henceforth rest mute. . . . At least let some protest of some sort against this violation of right come from this House." The deputies voted the Cabinet dictatorial powers on Saturday, 321 to 2 54, with the SociaHsts and Communists solidly in opposition. Kerillis argued that no such authority should be entrusted to the men of Munich or to a government which was producing only 71 planes per month. Daladier was adamant. The powers were necessary for "national defense." If he had not denounced Berlin and expressed sympathy for Prague, it was because this was no time for words. The Senate approved on Sunday, 286 to 17. Daladier indicated that the 40-hour week would be suspended in all defense industries. Appropriate decrees followed.^ By this time appeasement had been repudiated and diplomatic steps had already been initiated to check the Reich. Britain exhibited the same pattern of complacency on Tuesday, alarm on Thursday and counter-action on Saturday. In London, as in Paris, the Cabinet's course since the beginning of the year had been appeasement, diluted only by anxiety as to Italian and Japanese intentions. On January 14 Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie had delivered a note in Tokio to Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita, expressing the "uncertainty and grave anxiety in which His Majesty's Government have been left" by recent Japanese explanations of the "new order" in Eastern Asia. "They are not prepared to accept or to recognize changes of the nature indicated which are brought about by force. They intend to adhere
1 Cf. Leo Gershoy, "Alas for French Democracy," Events, May 1939.
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to the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty and cannot agree to unilateral modifications of its terms." By an agreement of January 27 London and Paris committed themselves to a grant of ;,/^ 16,000,000 to Czecho-Slovakia ("conscience money," said the anti-Munichmen) for refugee relief and debt service, half in the form of a gift and the balance as a joint guarantee of a new loan. On January 28 Chamberlain asserted: "Our motto is not defiance andmark my wordsit is not diffidence either. It is defense." Robert Hudson hailed Hitler's phrase "We must export or die" as "one of the most encouraging statements we have heard for a very long time. . . . I think it may lead to a sensible arrangement being reached between our two Governments to develop markets at reasonable prices and end senseless cutthroat competition." During February and early March there was no change of course. Somewhat vague pledges to France were accompanied by preparation for Anglo-German trade discussions. The naval estimates for 1939 contemplated expenditures of $722,200,000 as compared with $581,400,000 for 1938. On February 17 it was indicated that Stanley and Hudson would be preceded to Berlin by Munichman Frank T . Ashton-Gwatkin of the Foreign Office. He was received by Ribbentrop on February 21. They made plans for the forthcoming commercial negotiations. Despite this hopeful augury, Halifax told Lords on February 2 3: "War brings no advantage even to the victors. . . . It is disastrous, on the other hand, to think that the people of Britain and France would on that account recoil from resisting by force any threat to their rights or to their independence or what they deem to be their vital interest. . . . N o one who knows the British mind will doubt that, should the necessity ever be forced upon us, our people would be found today no less tenacious in defense of their liberty than they have ever been." Ashton-Gwatkin was reported to be seeking a general political settlement by a combination of threats and bribes. On March i the Marquess of Zetland, Secretary for India, told the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce that "Germany has it within her power to bring this insane race in armaments to an end." As a further warning to Japan and another step toward meeting American views, Simon announced a week later that the treasury was guaranteeing a ;/^ 5,000,000 credit to support Chinese currency. On
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March 13 Halifax, speaking at Sunderland, quoted Pascal: "Justice without power is unavailing; power without justice is tyrannical. W e must therefore combine justice and power, making what is just strong and what is strong just." He added that Britain would "neglect no opportunity of friendly and sincere approach to or by the governments of other countries which may hold real promise of removing misunderstandings or suspicion and so strengthening the forces that make for peace." Referring to Czecho-Slovakia, he added: "It may be that it suits some people, for whatever reasons, to propagate rumors or spread distorted views. . . . I would appeal both to those who write and those who read newspapers to weigh carefully all reports of foreign governments' alleged intentions." On March 16, the day after the fall of Prague, the Diisseldorf discussions culminated in the signature in London of an agreement between agents of the Federation of British industries and the Reichsgruppe Industrie to "replace destructive competition by constructive cooperation." It contemplated the creation of a series of Anglo-German cartels. Hitler's triumphal entry into the Hradcany appeared to the British ministers to be but an unpleasant interlude which had best be ignored. "The British Government and people," reported Ferdinand Kuhn on March 13, "resolutely looked the other way tonight. . . . There is complete confidence here that in the end the Czech Government will do whatever the Germans may command. , . . British apathy over Czecho-Slovakia's future is overpowering" ( N Y T 3.14.39). The Times declared: "It will be generally agreed that there is no specific obligation upon the British Government to take any direct action in the present developments in Central Europe." Bonnet and Sir Eric Phipps agreed at Paris on Monday morning that the Anglo-French "guarantee" at Munich did not apply, since Berlin and Rome had failed to participate and Czecho-Slovakia, far from being attacked from without, was breaking up from within. On October 4 Sir Thomas Insldp, Secretary for Dominions, had said "His Majesty's Government feel under moral obligation to treat the guarantee as now being in force." Chamberlain had confirmed this on December 12. These unfortunate statements, however, were not regarded as having any weight in mid-March. Speaker of the House Fitzroy ruled out of order a question by Noel-Baker as to whether Chamberlain would make any representation to Berlin. London news-
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paper placards on Tuesday carried in large letters " A N O T H E R G R E A T S T A N D " - b u t the "stand" was by a British cricket team. In reply to Attlee in Commons, Chamberlain asserted: "I may remind him that the proposed guarantee was one against unprovoked aggression against Czecho-Slovakia. No such aggression has yet taken place." "Are we to understand from your reply," asked Attlee, "that this Government are altogether disinterested now in Czecho-Slovakia?" "That," retorted Chamberlain, "would be an altogether unwarranted assumption." Sir Archibald Sinclair asked: "Do the Government still regard themselves as under a moral obligation in regard to the guarantee?" "The position has not undergone any change," replied the Prime Minister. Churchill commented "It is no use in our going to their aid now when we did not go to their aid in September," and added that this was not the last installment of the bill for Munich. "I am afraid other drafts will be presented, month after month and year after year, for the greater part of our lifetime." When Ellen Wilkinson asked "Is it unprovoked aggression for a country to provoke secession?" the Speaker ruled the question out of order before Chamberlain was obliged to reply. On the fateful Wednesday, when Hacha surrendered and Hitler seized Prague, Chamberlain reversed his position of Tuesday by arguing in Commons that the Anglo-French guarantee was, after all, no longer applicable. His only concession to his critics was a word of regret for Hitler's action, and a statement that although the trade talks were proceeding satisfactorily Stanley and Hudson would not go to Berlin because the moment was "inopportune." The Slovak declaration of independence, however, meant that the State which Britain and France had guaranteed had ceased to exist. "The Government, accordingly, cannot any longer hold themselves bound by this obligation." He continued:
I have so often heard charges of a breach of faith bandied about, which did not seem to me to be founded on sufficient premises. I do not wish to associate myself today with any charges of that character, but I am bound to say that I cannot believe anything of the kind that now has taken place was contemplated by any of the signatories of the Munich agreement. The Munich agreement constituted a settlement, accepted by the four powers and Czecho-Slovakia, of the Czecho-Slovak question. It provided for a fixation of the future frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia and
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laid down the limits of the German occupation which the German Government accepted. They have now without, so far as 1 know, any communication with the other tiuree signatories of the Munich agreement, sent their troops beyond the frontier then laid down. Even though it may now be claimed that what has taken place has occurred with the acquiescence of the Czecho-Slovak Government, I cannot regard the manner and the methods by which these changes have been brought about as in accord with the spirit of the Munich agreement. There is a further point I cannot omit to mention. Hitherto the German Government, in extending the area of their military control, have defended their action by the contention that they were only incorporating in the Reich neighboring masses of people of German race. Now, for the first time, they are effecting a military occupation of territory inhabited by people with whom they have no racial connection. It is natural that I should bitterly regret what has occurred. But finally do not let us on that account be deflected from our course. Let us remember that the desire of all the peoples of the world still remains concentrated on the hopes of peace and of a return to the atmosphere of understanding and good will which has so often been disturbed. The aim of this Government is now, as it always has been, to promote that desire and to substitute the method of discussion for the method of force in the settlement of differences. Although we may have to suffer checks and disappointments from time to time, the object we have in mind is of too great significance to the happiness of mankind for us lightly to give it up or set it to one side. Eden expressed alarm. "We are heading straight for anarchy, for a universal tragedy which is going to involve us all. . . . There is a time when a great nation has to make great decisions. I believe such a time to be now, and I believe further that only thus can we banish from our people the haunting fear of that shadow in our time." Laborite Grenfell opined that Chamberlain's policy was "in ruins" and that he should resign in favor of a Prime Minister who would strengthen British ties with friendly Powers. Liberal Sinclair spoke in a similar vein: "This so-called policy of appeasement is nothing but following the line of least resistance, regardless both of moral principle and the consequences of handing over powerful positions and great resources into the keeping of these formidable Powers." But Sir John Simon came nobly to the defense of the Prime Minister: It is indeed impossible to suppose that in these circumstances the guarantee to maintain the State of Czecho-Slovakia can have any meaning. I
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agree that this situation is in sharpest conflict with what was contemplated at Munich, but we ought not to spend time in rebuking one another, in failing to express that deepest sympathy with the Czech-Slovak people, for everybody feels that. . . . It is really essential that we should not enter into any extensive general and undefined commitment with the result that, to a large extent, our foreign policy would depend, not on this country, this Parliament and its electors, but on a lot of foreign governments. I do not see how we can avoid this resultnamely, that presently one or another of these foreign countries who would really have a call upon us in these circumstances, might involve us in the greatest possible military excursion, although it is quite certain that the judgment of the democracy in this country would not support it.
On Thursday the Cabinet faced severe criticism in the House and in the press. The Times held that "the purpose of Nazi policy is more and more revealed as sheer aggrandizement and brutal domination." The Daily Telegraph declared: " 'Monstrous outrage' is the mildest term that can be applied to yesterday's events in Central Europe. Germany has besmirched her name with infamy which will live as long as the Nazi regime lasts." The isolationist Daily Express held: "There is, there must be consternation and alarm in Britain at the course Hitler has taken." Only the Daily Mail was more reassuring: "The final disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia was almost inevitable. The shock lies in the swift and brutal manner of its end. Britain has no cause for self-reproach, no call to interfere. The final split-up of Czecho-Slovakia was due to an internal split-up, not external aggression. One thing and one thing only will serve Britainher own armed might." In Commons Government spokesmen announced that Sir Basil Newton would be transferred to Iraq and hinted that Henderson might be recalled from Berlin to report. Simon asserted that Czech gold and foreign exchange in the Bank of England could not be delivered to the Reich without the consent of the Cabinet a statement which was revealing in the light of subsequent events. Chamberlain said quietly that no protest had been made at Berlin. He declined to say whether one would be made. When asked to tell Berlin that "any attempt or attack on the lives and liberties of leaders of the Czech people will intensify indignation in this country at this aggression," he responded "I think it would be wrong to assume that the German Government have any such
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intention." Arch-appeaser Viscountess Astor, now thoroughly aroused, jumped up to ask: "Will the Prime Minister lose no time in letting the German Government know with what horror the whole of this country regards Germany's action?" Members of the opposition shouted derisively: "Chveden! W h y don't you have another lunch?" Chamberlain did not answer. But he was already wavering. That night at Warrington, Earl De La Warr, President of the Board of Education, was permitted to say in an address: "Aggression stands forth naked and arrogant in its shame. W e have seen suppression of a small gallant nation, one for whose gallantry we were only too grateful during the War." Halifax conferred with Eden and Chamberlain. He was reported to be urging the introduction of some form of conscription and the inclusion of his predecessor in the Cabinet. . . . On Friday, March 17, 1939, on the eve of his seventieth birthday. Chamberlain announced his conversion to a new policy. The place was his own home city of Birmingham. The Birmingham Conservative Association met in the century-old Town Hall. Here the Prime Minister's father had been Mayor in the 1870's and, because of his enthusiasm for slum clearance and municipal improvements, had been dubbed "Clown Joey" and accused of radicalism by ultra-conservatives. After his entrance into the Cabinet "Old Joe" had striven mightily but in vain to achieve an Anglo-German alliance directed against Russia. His son Austen was instrumental in negotiating Locarno and bringing the German Republic into the League of Nations. Austen's half-brother Neville had gone into his father's screw business and had also become an enlightened Mayor of Birmingham before entering Commons in 1918. He too had striven for an Anglo-German entente. Since Hitler in Mein Kampf favored such a policy, whereas William II and Biilow had rejected it, Neville Chamberlain was seldom without hope. But on March 17, 1939, he told a cheering throng of 2500, and sundry milhons of radio auditors, that his hopes had been shattered. He began by referring humorously to his birthday and went on to say that since the week's events in Europe had thrown everything else into the background, he must speak of them rather than of trade, employment, social services and finance as he had planned. Public opinion "has received a sharper shock than has ever yet been administered to it, even by the present regime in
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Germany." When he had spoken on Wednesday in Commons he was: "obliged to confine myself to a very restrained and cautious exposition on what at the time I felt I could make but little commentary. And perhaps naturally that somewhat cool and objective statement gave rise to misapprehension and some people thought that because I spoke quietly, because I gave little expression to feeling, that therefore my colleagues and I didn't feel strongly on the subject. I hope to correct that statement tonight." Before doing so, however, he felt called upon to defend himself from the charge that the fall of Czecho-Slovakia was the direct result of his work at Munich. "That is an entirely unwarrantable conclusion. The facts as they are today cannot change the facts as they were last September. If I was right then, I am still right now." Peace had been saved. "Nothing that we could have done, nothing that France could have done or Russia could have done could possibly have saved Czecho-Slovakia from invasion and destruction. Even if we had subsequently gone to war to punish Germany for her actions and if, after the frightful losses which would have been inflicted upon all partakers in the war, we had been victorious in the end, never could we have reconstructed Czecho-Slovakia as she was framed by the Treaty of Versailles." Without stopping to discuss questions which might have been raised as to the plausibility of these statements, he went on to defend appeasement:
When I came back after my second visit I told the House of Commons of the conversation I had had with Herr Hitler, of which I said that, speaking with great earnestness, he repeated what he had already said at Berchtesgadennamely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe and that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than Germans. Herr Hitler himself confirmed this account of the conversation in a speech which he made at the Sportspalast in Berlin when he said: "This is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe." And a little later in the same speech he said, "I have assured Mr. Chamberlain, and 1 emphasize it now, that when this problem is solved Germany has no more territorial problems in Europe." And he added: "I shall not be interested in the Czech State any more and I can guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs." And then, in the Munich agreement itself, which bears Herr Hitler's signature, there is this clause: "The final determination of the frontier will be carried out by an international commission"the final determination! And, lastly, in that declaration which he and I signed together at
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Munich we declared that any other question which might concern our two countries should be dealt with by a method of consultation. Well, in view of those repeated assurances given voluntarily to me, I considered myself justified in founding the hope upon them that once this Czecho-Slovak problem was settled, as it seemed at Munich, it would be possible to carry further that policy of appeasement which I had described. . . . I am convinced that after Munich the great majority of the British people shared my hope and ardently desired that that policy should be carried further, but today I share their disappointment, their indignation, that those hopes have been so wantonly shattered. Well, ladies and gentlemen, how can these events which happened this week be reconciled with those assurances which I have read out to you? Surely, as a joint signatory of the Munich agreement I was entitled, if Herr Hitler thought it ought to be done, to have the consultation which is provided for in the Munich declaration. Instead of that he has taken the law into his own hands. Before even the Czech President was received and was confronted with demands which he had no power to resist, the German troops were on the move, and within a few^ hours they were in the Czech capital. . . . Who can fail to feel his heart go out in sympathy to the proud and brave people who have so suddenly been subjected to this invasion, whose liberties have been curtailed, whose national independence has gone? What has become of this declaration of "no further territorial ambition"? What has become of the assurance "we don't want Czechs in the Reich"? What regard has been paid here to that principle of self-determination on which Herr Hitler argued vehemently with me at Berchtesgaden when he was asking for the severance of the Sudetenland from Czecho-Slovakia and its inclusion in the German Reich? Now we are told that this seizure of territory has been necessitated by disturbances in Czecho-Slovakia. We are told that the proclamation of this new German protectorate against the will of its inhabitants has been rendered inevitable by disorders which threatened the peace and security of her mighty neighbor. If there were disorders, were they not fomented from without? And can anybody outside Germany take seriously the idea that they could be a danger to that great country, that they could provide any justification for what has happened! Doesn't the question inevitably remain in our minds, if it is so easy to discover good reasons for ignoring assurances so solemnly and so repeatedly given, what reliance can be placed upon any other assurances that come from the same source? . . .
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Is this the end of an old adventure or is it the beginning of a new? Is this the last attack upon a small State or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force? Ladies and gentlemen, those are grave and serious questions. I am not going to answer them tonight, but I am sure they will require grave and serious consideration, not only of Germany's neighbors but of others perhaps even beyond the confines of Europe. Already there are indications that the process has begun and It is obvious that it is likely now to be speeded up. We ourselves will naturally turn first to our partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations and to France, to whom we are so closely bound, and I have no doubt that others, too, knowing that we are not disinterested in what goes on in Southeastern Europe, will wish to have our counsel and advice. . . . I do not believe there is any one who will question my sincerity when I say there is hardly anything I wouldn't sacrifice for peace. But there is one thing that I must except and that is the liberty that we have enjoyed for hundreds of years and which we will never surrender. That I, of all men, should feel called upon to make such a declaration, that is the measure of the extent to which these events have shattered the confidence which was just beginning to show its head and which, if it had been allowed to grow, might have made this year memorable for the return of all Europe to sanity and stability. It was only six weeks ago that I was speaking in this city and that I alluded to rumors and suspicions which I said ought to be swept away. I pointed out that any demand to dominate the world by force was one which democracies must resist and I added that I couldn't believe such a challenge was intended, because no government with the interests of its own people at heart could expose them for such a claim to horrors of a world war. And indeed, with the lessons of history for all to read, it seems incredible that we should see such a challenge, and I feel bound to repeat that while I am not prepared to engage this country by new and unspecified commitments operating under conditions which cannot now be foreseen, yet no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fiber that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it ever were made. And for that declaration I am convinced that I have not merely the support, the sympathy, the confidence of my fellow countrymen and countrywomen, but I shall have also the approval of the whole British Empire and of all the other nations who value peace, indeed, but who value freedom even more.
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This renunciation of appeasement, like so many of Chamberlain's statements, did not quite mean what it first appeared to mean. The transition was not one from appeasement to resistance, or from acquiescence in German aggrandizement to "encirclement" to thwart all future aggrandizement. Appeasement of Italy and Japan was unaffected by the events of March. The door to future appeasement of the Reich was carefully kept open. But here at least was a transition in attitude. Germany had hitherto been accorded a relatively free hand in the East. Henceforth Germany was to be opposed in the East. In what degree, at what point, by what methods, in collaboration with whom were all as yet undefined. But Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues were shocked and angry. They were now prepared to consider opposition in some form to future Nazi aggression.^ W h y did Mr. Chamberlain conclude on March 16, 1939, that he should embrace a policy which he had expressly repudiated in March, 1938, in September, 1938, and even on March 15, 1939? The obvious answer is his own: he had accepted in good faith the Nazi assurances of the preceding year and was now moved to reconsider his course by the repudiation of these assurances. This explanation, however, leaves much unexplained. Diplomacy, even when conducted by a Chamberlain, is directed not toward the affirmation of abstract principles of ethics but toward the protection and promotion of national interests. The Prime Minister became convinced on March 16 (though his conviction, as will be seen, was neither complete nor permanent) that the course toward Germany which he had hitherto pursued in the belief that British interests would be served thereby had now become a course which placed British interests in jeopardy. The change is not convincingly explained by the assumption that Chamberlain suddenly became aware of Nazi "perfidy" on Thursday, March 16, and concluded abruptly that Hitler was no longer to be trusted. The slowness of the Prime Minister's reactions to political change was doubtless a factor, along with the circumstance that the full scope of the Nazi coup was not clear until the middle of the week. His genius for understatement was
1 German efforts to show that Chamberlain was embarked upon "encirclement" of the Reich before the Ides of March 1939 are not convincing. Cf. G 249, 267, 268.
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likewise apparent in his earlier utterances.^ Public opinion assuredly played an important role in his decision, for it was clear by the end of the week that Parliament and press were ill-disposed toward the attitude which Chamberlain had assumed on Monday and Tuesday. But the Prime Minister had defied British opinion on many earlier occasions. None of these explanations is adequate, whether they be considered separately or together. Some other factor, left unnamed, played a decisive role. The identity of the other factor is not in doubt. It was Hungary's annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine on March i6 with Berlin's assent. Hitler's "perfidy" lay here rather than in his treatment of Prague. It consisted of his abandonment or indefinite postponement of the Drang nach Kiev, Odessa and the Caucasus. Nazi expansion in Eastern Europe was deemed harmless to British interests so long as its target appeared to be the U.S.S.R. The events of March i6 revealed even to Chamberlain that the Ukrainian dream was dead and that the Soviet Union would not be the next object of Nazi ambition. They suggested that the rulers of the Reich were interested in consolidating their power in the East not in preparation for a crusade against Moscow but in preparation for an assault upon the West. The Realpolitik assumptions behind appeasement therewith collapsed. The speech at Birming1 This point was well put by Alexander Glendinning in The Nineteenth Century and After, May, 1939, pp. 577-8: "I have heard Mr. Chamberlain accused of fiddling while Rome burns; but I do not think that if he were in Nero's position Mr. Chamberlain would fiddle. I think he would make a speech, and that it would go something like this: 'The fact, which I think I may say has been established beyond question, that the greater part of this city is now in flames, will cause, I have no doubt, the feelings of profound uneasiness and even alarm among those inhabitants who are conscious of the possibility of a threat to their security. The question we have to ask ourselves is whether this conflagration has not now created a situation which is incompatible with the safety of the community as a whole. I am sure that it will be generally agreed that the collapse of most of our public buildings, so far from relieving the apprehension which has been widely felt, has served only to increase anxiety and to administer a further shock to confidence. If the city is on fire, and if the lives of its inhabitants are in danger, then I confess that I find it difficult to reconcile this state of affairs with the view that there is no cause for misgivings in a situation which, if permitted to develop, may prove detrimental to the well-being of all concerned. It has been suggested that the Fire Brigade should be called, and I have no hesitation in saying that this suggestion is one which deserves the most serious consideration, and I may add that we are keeping in close touch with representatives of the Fire Brigade, with a view to such measures as it may be necessary to take in pursuit of our general aim to restore the confidence we all so earnestly desire. . . .'"
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ham followed. It made no mention of the Ukraine. But Berlin's changed intentions with regard to the Ukraine constituted the decisive element behind the new Anglo-French orientation. This explanation, first put forward as a hypothesis by the present writer/ can now be substantiated by documentary evidence, even though the British War Blue Book is as silent on the point as are Henderson's memoirs and Chamberlain's own utterances. Ambassador Coulondre in Berlin told Bonnet on March 13: "It also appears that the Reich, while favoring the independence of Slovakia, is supporting the Polish and Hungarian claims on Ruthenia" (F 57). On the following day he remembered that "on February 5 a National Socialist of standing, whose duties called for direct contact with the Fiihrer's immediate circle, told one of my collaborators to be prepared for developments in which a 'dislocation' (Auflosung) of Czechoslovakia would be unavoidable. In this case, he added, Slovakia would become independent, Hungary would annex Sub-Carpathian Russia, and the Reich would, in one form or another obtain control of Bohemia and of Moravia" (F 65). The German leaders had completely changed their course. After Munich "they considered at that time that a vassal Czechoslovakia, obedient to the will of the Reich would afford the latter a starting-point for her expansion toward the southeast, an expansion which had only to follow the corridor of Sub-Carpathian Russia to reach the oil-wells of Rumania and the wheatfields of the Ukraine. Hence Germany's veto to the Hungarian-Polish project of a common frontier, hence her stubborn determination in Vienna on November 2 to safeguard the existence of an independent Carpathian Ukraine within the frame of the Czechoslovak State. Today, Berlin does not hesitate to retract. The Nazi leaders are renouncing the principle of Czechoslovakian integrity. They are removing their opposition to the plan of a Polish-Hungarian frontier on the Carpathians. It is interesting to speculate when, how, and for what reasons this change of mind has occurred." (Ibid.) When the French Ambassador, for Bonnet's enlightenment, sought to answer his own question, he could come to only one conclusion which he hinted at on the 15th and i6th and stated with crystal clarity on the 19th: "I should like, after the violent changes wrought in the map of Europe, to try to determine in
1 Cf. Evefits, May, 1939.
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which directions German dynamism may turn, to see if we may still hold that it is aimed only at the East, and to draw certain practical conclusions for our guidance. . . . The German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia, with the subsequent inclusion of Slovakia within the German orbit, is in line with the policy of Eastern expansion." The new method, however, was abominable and alarming. But more important than the method was the probability that it presaged a new goal: Will Germany find it necessary to mark time for a while? Or, taking advantage of its acquired momentum and of the stupor of the Central European States, will it continue its drive towards the East? Or, again, will it be tempted to face about and put an end to the opposition of the Western Powers which is interfering with the Reich's liberty of action in the East? In other words, will the Fiihrer be tempted to return to the idea expressed by the author of Mein Kampf, which, be it said, is identical with the classic doctrine held by the German General Staff, according to which Germany cannot accomplish her high destiny in the East until France has been crushed and, as a consequence, Britain reduced to impotence on the Continent? W e must likewise examine whether there is still time to erect in the East a wall capable of stemming to a certain extent the German drive, and if to this end we should not take advantage of the favourable circumstances offered to us by the tension and anxiety which prevail in the Central European capitals, especially in Warsaw. . . . It is quite possible that tomorrow Hitler will apply to Rumania or Poland the same means that had been so successful against Austria and Czechoslovakia and place before them the alternatives of the massacre of civil populations and the destruction of open towns, or the acceptance of the German terms, however onerous and humiliating they may be. One must not, however, exclude the possibility that the Reich, before carrying out its vast program to the East, will first ttu:n against the Western Powers. . . . We must reckon with the risk of seeing Germany engaged in such an undertaking. This risk may even be increased by the intensification and the speeding up of our rearmament. However, as we have no choice save either to bow one day to Hitler's will or, by uniting our forces with those of Britain, to build a military machine, and especially an air force, strong enough to impress Germany, it is vital that we should without delay: (a) rearm to the maximum of our capacity; (b) as far as possible, avoid all publicity about this intensive rearmament. In any case, whatever new form German dynamism may take after the conquest of Bohemia and Moravia, we are always driven to the same conclusion: to the unavoidable necessity for concentrating the nation's energies towards as vast and
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as swift a development of its military strength as possible, especially with regard to its air force. In view of the impulsive character of the Nazi leaders, the state of mental intoxication in which the Fiihrer must be at present and the irritation and alarm caused in Germany by the rearmament of the democracies and by the attitude of America, I consider that we must proceed without delay to the industrial mobilisation of the country, as secretly and as intensively as possible (F 80).
Additional evidence, albeit less authoritative, is afforded from Polish documents issued by the German Foreign Office on March 30, 1940, following study of the Polish archives after the fall of Warsaw. According to a report attributed to Jerzy Potocki, Pohsh Ambassador in Washington, Ambassador William Bullitt on vacation from Paris told him in November 1938 that Russia was the "sick man of Europe" and that "it would be the wish of the democratic countries that armed conflict would break out there, in the East between the German Reich and Russia. As the Soviet Union's potential strength was not yet known, it might happen that Germany would have moved too far away from its base, and would be condemned to wage a long and weakening war. Only then would the democratic countries attack Germany, Bullitt declared, and force her to capitulate. . . . He confirmed the fact that Germany had a complete Ukrainian staff which would take over the Government of the Ukraine in the future and which would create there an independent Ukrainian state, under German control Carpatho-Ruthenian Ukraine would serve as a starting-point in this future undertaking in whose continued existence Germany is much interested, especially for strategic reasons." ^ On December 17, 1938, Polish Ambassador Jules Lukasiewicz, reporting to Beck on Bonnet's course at the time of the signature of the agreement with Ribbentrop, declared:
H e advised me of the conference with Ribbentrop, voluntarily stressing the fact that he had confessed to the German intermediary that he re1 Pp. 20-21, Fourth Document, The German White Taper. The full text of these documents, with an introduction by C. Hartley Grattan, was published by Howell, Soskin and Company, New York, 1940, under this title. Hasty denials of their authenticity in Washington do not prove that they are forgeries. Both internal and external evidence suggests that they are substantially correct translations of actual dispatches. The authenticity of the dispatches from The French Yellow Book quoted above has not been questioned.
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Betrayed
gretted both the alliance with us and with the U.S.S.R. . . . In case, for some reason or other, France should see herself forced to comply with her obligations to us as a result of the alliance, greater efforts would be made to break away from them than to fulfill them. My opinion does not appear to be in accord with the declaration of Foreign Minister Bonnet, which I had the honor to communicate to the Minister. However it is precise and reproduces the exact situation. Bonnet is a person of weak character who is not in a situation to defend any cause, and who falls into the temptation of adapting himself to each of his interlocutors. . . . Several times I have pointed out to Bonnet, directly and indirectly, the tremendous diif erence between our direct conversations and the statements of the semi-official press and in parliamentary discussion. M y remarks up to the present have not had any result. . . . Summing up: France does not consider anything of positive value except an alliance with England, while an alliance with ourselves and the U.S.S.R. is considered more of a burden, and she declares herself in their favor only in a displeased manner.^
On January i6, 1939, Potocki reported another conversation with BuUitt: "He expressed conviction that Germany would carry out her plan concerning Ukraine, but not before 1940. I did not enter into discussion with BulUtt about such action. I merely asked whether Western Powers would become active in such event and whether they would attack the Reich allegedly in order to protect the Soviet Union. Bullitt replied that all imaginary armed interventions on behalf of some State which might become the victim of German aggression had been abandoned once and for all by democratic countries." ^ Lukasiewicz on February i, 1939, expressed skepticism of Bonnet's renewed assurances in his address of January 6. "Minister Bonnet doubtless defended himself against attacks rather than circumscribing the positive outlines of French foreign policy." However "if we recall the attacks of which we were the butt after the Munich conference, and which ended with the Ukrainian question being generally shoved into the foreground by the French press and public opinion, if we further take into consideration that in the last analysis until the end of December the vast majority of French politicians were inclined to consider not only Central Europe, but also Poland, as objects which were conceded
1 Ibid. Fifth Document, pp. 25-27. 2 Ibid. Seventh Document, p. 34.
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to German expansionism, then one can realize the profound and essential change which has taken place in the political opinion of the French concerning us. The obvious antipathy against Poland has been replaced by the understanding that on the Continent we are the only State which, in the development of the problem of French security, is in a position to play an important and decisive role." ^ Finally, Count Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, reported to Beck on March 29, 1939, that the British appeasers had reckoned with
the expectation that Germany would find it difficult to absorb territories ceded to it, and, thanks to these difficulties and thanks to the opposition of Russia, would lose the capacity to expand and its forcefulness. It was foreseen that war between Russia and Germany would ensue, which would weaken both, not without affording indirect advantages to the Western Powers. The rapid succession of events by which Germany acquired valuable, bloodless booty showed the weakness of these arguments. It indicated the fact that in the last analysis this was an excuse for permitting the responsible statesmen of the Western Powers to withdraw along the line of least resistance. Serious misgivings arose when Germany, instead of losing force as a result of its action in the East, attained additional strength. From this conviction resulted an entirely new tone toward Germany.^
Coulondre drew correct conclusions from the liquidation of Carpatho-Ukraine and sought to convince Bonnet that the whole content of Anglo-French policy must accordingly be revised. Bonnet was sufficiently disturbed to resent the complacent attitude of Downing Street. It was publicly reported from London on March 14 that "in some diplomatic quarters here, Germany's action in Central Europe was believed today to be further paving the way for Hitler's long-cherished dream of establishing domination over the Ukraine." ^ Coulondre and Bonnet knew that such an interpretation of events was false. On the i6th the French Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Corbin to urge upon Halifax the necessity of protesting to Berlin: "The Governments, who gave their assent to a compromise intended to assure the survival of Czecho-Slovakia, cannot today watch in sUence the
1 Ibid., Eighth Document, pp. 39-40. ~ Ibid., Twelfth Document, p. 55. 3 AP dispatch, March 14, New York Herald Tribune, 3.15.39.
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dismembership of the Czech people and the annexation of their territory without being accused in retrospect of complaisance and moral complicity. . . . They owe it to international opinion, as well as to themselves, to register a formal protest against this act of force by which Germany, in contempt of the rights of a nation, has destroyed the contractual basis of the first attempt at an understanding between the four great European Powers. You should represent to Lord Halifax the full importance of these considerations and satisfy yourself that the British Government agree that the British and French representatives should immediately take concerted action in Berlin" (F 72). Bonnet doubtless conveyed to Downing Street Coulondre's view of the new German policy. Bonnet's appeal doubtless aided Chamberlain and Halifax to see the light. They saw. They reflected. They spoke. There would be no German-Russian war. Appeasement had failed of its purpose.
CHAPTER
FOUR
TOWARD THE GREAT COALITION
I. E A S T E R N
T H E PROBLEM
FRONT
of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay after March i6, 1939, was not one of organizing a new coaUtion to halt further German aggrandizement, but one of reviving an old coalition which had been made moribund by the surrenders of the preceding four years. Munich had struck the final blow at the French bloc. The entire Czech army and the Skoda arms plants wêre delivered into Hitler's hands without the firing of a shot in their defense. Belgrade, Bucharest, Warsaw and Moscow not only lost all confidence in the ability or desire of Chamberlain and Daladier to defend France's Eastern allies, but perceived that the appeasers contemplated their deliberate abandonment as the price for purchasing peace for the West. How could confidence now be restored? How could the lost coalition be reconstituted? In striving for answers to these questions in the Spring of 1939 the British and French leaders moved unsteadily along paths they disliked toward goals in which they had no faith. Public pressure and the course of events kept them on their new tack until the end. Their doubts and hesitations, however, convinced others and at length even themselves that they would fail in the enterprise. By the time their failure was complete, it was too late to return to appeasement. Belated efforts to do so only made the failure more disastrous. The sources of failure were visible from the beginning of the venture.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
TOWARD THE GREAT COALITION
I. E A S T E R N
T H E PROBLEM
FRONT
of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay after March i6, 1939, was not one of organizing a new coaUtion to halt further German aggrandizement, but one of reviving an old coalition which had been made moribund by the surrenders of the preceding four years. Munich had struck the final blow at the French bloc. The entire Czech army and the Skoda arms plants wêre delivered into Hitler's hands without the firing of a shot in their defense. Belgrade, Bucharest, Warsaw and Moscow not only lost all confidence in the ability or desire of Chamberlain and Daladier to defend France's Eastern allies, but perceived that the appeasers contemplated their deliberate abandonment as the price for purchasing peace for the West. How could confidence now be restored? How could the lost coalition be reconstituted? In striving for answers to these questions in the Spring of 1939 the British and French leaders moved unsteadily along paths they disliked toward goals in which they had no faith. Public pressure and the course of events kept them on their new tack until the end. Their doubts and hesitations, however, convinced others and at length even themselves that they would fail in the enterprise. By the time their failure was complete, it was too late to return to appeasement. Belated efforts to do so only made the failure more disastrous. The sources of failure were visible from the beginning of the venture.
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The first diplomatic steps of London and Paris after the fall of Prague were empty gestures of protest to Berlin. On March 17 Bonnet and Halifax instructed Coulondre and Henderson to present a note to Ribbentrop. Since the Foreign Minister was absent, Weizsacker was given the protests on the morning of the i8th. The French note asserted that the German action constituted "a flagrant violation of both the letter and spirit of the agreement signed in Munich on September 29, 1938. . . . The Government of the Republic cannot in the circumstances recognize the legality of the new situation brought about in Czecho-Slovakia by the action of the Reich" (F 76). When informed of the tenor of this communication, Weizsacker refused to accept it and asserted that Bonnet had assured Ribbentrop in December that Czecho-Slovakia would no longer be a subject of any exchange of views between Paris and Berlin. This Coulondre stoutly denied. Weizsacker then declared that France could not protest at a treaty which Prague and Berlin had "voluntarily" accepted. He reluctantly assented to receiving the French note by post, but feared that the French Government would regret the step. "I replied," reported Coulondre, "that one could never regret having done one's duty, and with these words took leave of the State Secretary" (F 78). Bonnet approved (F 81), Halifax took similar action. He also suspended the proposed visit of Hudson and Stanley to Berlin and called Henderson home to report (B 10). The British Ambassador had advised Chvalkovsky to come to Berlin, but had been plunged in deepest gloom when Hitler had summoned the Czech President as well as the Foreign Minister. He had thought of sitting up all night to learn the outcome of the conference, but he decided he could do nothing and therefore "preferred to go unhappily to bed" ( H 214). Upon his recall he felt that his mission was "already a failure, and from that moment I had no real hopes of peace except in a miracle" ( H 2 2 3). The German Ambassador in London, Herbert von Dirksen, alleged that Halifax was pushing the more reluctant Chamberlain toward a stronger policy. Consultations had been initiated with France, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the Balkan States. "It is impossible as yet to say whether these conversations are directed toward the creation of a new and soUd coalition against Germany, or merely intended to secure concerted action in case of further German drives against other
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States, for instance Rumania or Poland" (G 263). Henderson reached London on the afternoon of March 19. Dirksen was also called home to report. The precise purpose of British diplomatic moves over the week-end are not too clear and were perhaps not clear to those who made them. Attention was concentrated first on alleged German threats to Rumania and Poland. A mission from the Reich was conducting economic negotiations in Bucharest. According to German Charge Kordt, the Rumanian Minister, M. Tilea, called at the Foreign OiBce on March 17 to warn against "excessive German economic demands on Rumania" and presumably to plead for British support. Halifax was sympathetic, but Foreign Minister Gaf encu reprimanded Tilea by phone and forced him to issue a denial that he had taken any such step (G 270). Apparently Bucharest failed to secure any British assurances in which it placed sufficient faith to warrant resistance to Berlin. On the 19th a five-year commercial accord was signed whereby Rumanian grain and oil would be exchanged for German arms and machinery. Rights to exploit oil and mineral resources and to develop railways and highways were granted to German capital. In view of Hungarian threats and German troop movements in Slovakia, Bucharest nevertheless ordered partial mobilization and hoped for the best. On March 18 Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., had also delivered a note of protest to Berlin. He denied the German contention set forth in a German note to Moscow that Hacha had "voluntarily" consented to the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia. He asserted that his Government "cannot recognize the incorporation of Czechia in the Reich nor that of Slovakia in one form or another, as legal or as in conformity with the generally accepted rules of international law, or with justice, or with the principle of self-determination. Not only does the German Government's action not avert any of the dangers threatening world peace but it actually tends to multiply them, to disturb the political stability of Central Europe, to increase the causes of anxiety already existing in Europe, and, finally, to deal a new blow to the feeling of security of nations" (F 82). Meanwhile, official Warsaw was filled with lively apprehension by German occupation of Slovakia, by the ultimatum to Lithuania and by Ribbentrop's presentation of demands regarding
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Danzig and the Corridor. Polish military measures provoked protest from Berlin (P 63). Ribbentrop summoned Ambassador Josef Lipski to his office on March 21 to assure him that the Slovak Protectorate was not directed against Poland. If GermanPolish relations developed satisfactorily "a Polish participation in the guarantee of the Slovak State might be considered." He solicited a visit by Beck to Berlin ( G 203). On the 26th Lipski submitted to Ribbentrop a long memorandum rejecting German demands (G 208). The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that any Pohsh aggression against Danzig would be considered aggression against the Reich. Beck countered on the 28th by telling German Ambassador von Moltke that any German intervention to change the status quo in Danzig would be deemed an act of aggression against Poland and a casus belli (G 211). When the Ambassador protested that "you wish to negotiate at the point of bayonets," Beck retorted: "That is your system!" ( P 6 4 ) . In the interim the British Cabinet had gropingly given shape to its intentions. On Tuesday March 21 the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard, submitted a memorandum to the Pohsh Foreign Office averring that the German action at Prague had demonstrated that all States were now menaced by the Reich and proposing "without delay an organization of mutual assistance on the part of all those who recognize the necessity of protecting international society against the dehberate violation of the fundamental laws on which it rests." "As a first step, the British Government proposes that the French, Polish and Soviet Governments should join the Government of His Majesty in signing and publishing a formal declaration" to the effect that "the peace and security of Europe being an object of interest and of common concern, and European peace and security being susceptible of being affected by every action which constitutes a menace to the political independence of any European State, our respective Governments have decided for the present to consult immediately among themselves concerning measures to be taken with a view toward offering common resistance to any action of this kind." Such a declaration would by itself constitute "a valuable contribution to the stabiUzation of Europe." Its publication should be followed by common examination by the signatories of every specific situation calling for action. Britain was ready to sign as soon as the other three Governments should concur.
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Nothing should be said to outside States until the four Powers had reached an agreement (P 65) .^ Downing Street had thus decided to meet the issue by a solemn declaration in favor of "consultation," a procedure committing no one to anything and once aptly described by Mussolini as "the last refuge of indecision in the face of reality." On the same day that this proposal was transmitted, President Albert Lebrun was elaborately received in London by King George VI. He was accompanied by Bonnet, who had already conferred with Bullitt and Suritz. The "Entente Cordiale" was reaffirmed. No new obligations were assumed, but it was rumored that the British and French Governments had reduced to writing an oral agreement of January 29 whereby they would come to the armed defense of the Netherlands and Switzerland in the event of either being attacked (G 276).^ Belgium already enjoyed such a guarantee. Bonnet associated himself with the proposals to Warsaw and Moscow. These proposals failed of their purpose. Litvinov had already proposed a conference of Britain, France, Poland, the U.S.S.R., Rumania and Turkey to discuss organization of a peace front. Downing Street replied, as it had done to Litvinov's similar proposal of March 17, 1938, that the suggestion was "premature." Litvinov then urged a conference limited to France, Britain, Poland and the Soviet Union. This idea also was given no encouragement by Downing Street. When Hudson reached Moscow from Warsaw on March 24, he felt a certain coldness which was not entirely meteorological. Chamberlain in Commons on March 2 3 was evasive: "I am not yet in a position to make a statement on the consultations which have been held with other Governments as a result of recent developments. I wish to make it clear, however, that there is no desire on the part of H. M. Government to stand in the way of any reasonable efforts on the part of Germany to expand her export trade. . . . Nor is this Government anxious to set up in Europe opposing blocs of countries with different ideas about the forms of their internal administration. W e are solely concerned here with the proposition that we cannot submit to a procedure under which independent States are subjected to such pressure under threat of force as to be
1 Neither B nor F nor H contain any information regarding this proposal. 2Cf. VEurope Nouvelle, March i8, 1939.
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obliged to yield up their independence, and we are resolved by all means in our power to oppose attempts, if they should be made, to put such a procedure into operation" (B 11). Kordt reported from London to Berlin on the same day:
A well-informed diplomat here confirmed to me that, up to the present time, Poland had not been able to decide on accepting the British proposals. The decisive reason for this attitude, apart from the great distrust of assistance from Soviet Russia, was the consideration that the relations with Germany would become untenable as a result of such participation, and that, in case of a German attack, Great Britain and France would scarcely be in a position to give Poland effective military assistance. Under these circumstances, the idea of a conference seemed to be coming to the fore again in the Foreign Office. It was hoped that, in a Four Power Conference, effective pressure could be exerted on Poland. In British Conservative circles, now as always, there exists an oppositionnot to be underratedto the admittance of Soviet Russia to the system planned. From the statement just made by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons one may draw the conclusion that Conservative Party circles closest to the Government greatly fear that an area in the East consolidated under German predomination would, after such consolidation, turn upon Great Britain with its full strength (G 275).
The accuracy of Kordt's report is not open to serious question. Beck instructed Ambassador Raczynski on March 2 3 to ask Halifax whether, in view of the difficulties of multilateral negotiations and the rapid course of events, his Government "could not envisage the possibility of concluding with us without delay a bilateral understanding conforming to the spirit of the proposed declaration. . . . I beheve that the French Government ought to be confidentially informed of our ultimate decision" (P 66). On the 27th Beck asked Ambassador Lukasiewicz to tell Daladier that Warsaw had made "certain reservations" to the British proposal on the ground that "we do not believe that an act of this kind would be sufficient." Warsaw, however, was willing to consider bilateral discussions with Britain to parallel and reinforce the alliance between France and Poland (P 67). Here at the outset was the fatal flaw in the negotiations for a peace front. The problem posed by the new British policy was a simple problem of geography and grand strategy. As Henderson put it subsequently:
Neither Britain nor France was in a position to render any effective
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immediate aid to Poland if she were attacked by Germany's overwhelmingly powerful Air Force and highly mechanized Army. No physical courage would avail against the superiority afforded by these technical and material advantages. It could only be a question of at most a few months before Poland would be overwhelmed, i.e. long before any blockade or pressure on the Siegfried Line from the west would be available to help her in her one-sided struggle. Immediate support if she were to have any, must come from the east, and Russia alone was capable of giving it. Once again, as in the case of Czechoslovakiaand one cannot stress the point too oftenit was a proposition of political geography. Situated as she is, the fate of Poland depended, and will always depend, on Germany and Russia, between which she lies, and which are both infinitely bigger and stronger than she is. Germany was the menace to her in April, 1939; and Russia's good will and material assistance were consequently indispensable to Poland's immediate safety. With this consideration in mind, and with a view to the necessary inclusion of Russia in the peace front against further German aggression, the British and French Governments began the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. which were to drag on throughout those precious four months, only to end in Russia's abrupt volte-face toward the end of August (H 227-8).
Henderson ignores the fact that Moscow's "volte-face" was a result of the refusal of London and Paris to meet Moscow's terms. He makes no acknowledgment of the error of having rebuffed Moscow's first proposals and having opened serious negotiations with the U.S.S.R. only after a guarantee had been given to Poland. The original difficulty was two-fold: Chamberlain and Halifax were still unwilling to accept commitments pledging Britain to defend Poland and therefore suggested the vacuous declaration to "consult"; Smigly-Rydz and Beck had no desire to be guaranteed or defended by the U.S.S.R. (the only Power which could defend Poland against Germany) and preferred to bid for a guarantee by Britain (which could not defend Poland). The Warsaw leaders from beginning to end rejected all thought of protection of Poland by the Red Army because of their fear of Communism and their distrust of Moscow. The British leader shared their attitude. Litvinov and Stalin, on the other hand, could see no possibility of any effective eastern front against the Reich unless Britain was willing to assume binding commitments and Poland was willing to accept Soviet aid. The first condition was to be in part realized. The second was never realized. Without it the entire enterprise was doomed.
130
London's attempted solution of this problem has already been suggested. Instead of opening discussions with Moscow and pressing Warsaw to co-operate, Downing Street ignored the Kremlin and considered the Polish counter-proposal. Chamberlain declined to reveal whither the negotiations were leading, but by March 28 he was hinting that "what the Government have in mind goes a great deal further than consultation." He could not say how much further, but other Governments had not been left in doubt about what Britain was prepared to do (cf. G 277). Despite its earlier suggestions, Warsaw was evidently hesitant about entering into any bilateral arrangement with Britain until its doubts of British intentions had been resolved. Chamberlain and Halifax perhaps feared also that a bilateral accord might merely invite German aggression if it provided only for consultation and might close the door to a resumption of appeasement if it contained any British pledge to defend Poland. The solution was a unilateral declaration, indefinite and temporary, which had all the defects and few of the advantages of all compromises. Kennard asked Beck on March 30 whether he had any objection to such a declaration as Chamberlain contemplated making in Commons on the following day. Beck replied that the Polish Government was "fully in accord with the proposal of the English Government" (P 68). Bonnet also agreed, the more so as the British warning to Germany was to be given "in the least provocative form" (F 88). On March 31 the British Prime Minister accordingly startled the world by informing the House of Commons in a low voice of the new formula:
The right Hon. gentleman the leader of the Opposition asked me this morning whether I could make a statement as to the European situation. As I said this morning, H. M. Government have no official confirmation of the rumours of any projected attack on Poland and they must not, therefore, be taken as accepting them as true. I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the general policy of H. M. Government. They have constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free negotiation between the parties concerned, of any differences that may arise between them. They consider that this is the natural and proper course where differences exist. In their opinion there should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful means, and
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they would see no justification for the substitution of force or threats of force for the method of negotiation. As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of H . M. Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, H . M. Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. T h e y have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do H . M. Government (B 17),
This pledge, be it noted, did not preclude further "appeasement" provided that demands were submitted for "free negotiation" without use or threats of force. The pledge was limited to the period of the current discussions, although any bargaining value which such a limitation was expected to have was reduced to the vanishing point by the practical impossibility of withdrawing the pledge without thereby giving to the Reich an easy diplomatic triumph. The pledge however was not a guarantee of Poland's territorial integrity. Said the Tmes of April i: "The new obligation which this country has assumed does not bind Britain to defend every inch of the present frontiers of Poland. The key word in the declaration is not integrity but 'independence.' " Even Poland's independence was to be defended only if "clearly" threatened and if Warsaw decided upon resistance. Should Poland decide, with or without British advice, not to resist a German threat, Britain would have no obligation. If Poland decided to resist and London decided that the "threat" was not "clear," Britain would again presumably have no obligation. This curious formula, a typical product of the Chamberlain mentality, left much to be desired. Berlin nevertheless registered fury and Moscow expressed qualified satisfaction.-^
1 Walter Duranty, paraphrasing the ofBcial Soviet view, wrote (in NYT 4.1.39): "Mr. Chamberlain tried to use us to scare Germany about Rumania; that is why he appealed to uswithout committing himself. We are not Mr. Chamberlain's pawns, so we proposed a conferencea conference which made him pause and thinkand while he was thinking, Rumania gave way. Now he has come out
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Warsaw was not wholly satisfied, but hoped that Beck's visit to London would clarify the issue. Ambassador Raczynski spent an hour with Halifax on April i and received undisclosed "reassurances." Sir Alexander Cadogan was reported to have indicated that the British pledge was unlimited and covered Danzig and the Corridor if Warsaw so desired. Daladier's radio address of March 29, soliciting the collaboration of all interested in defending peace, contributed nothing new. Warsaw was gratified at the British pledge, but indicated that it would still follow an "independent" policy (cf. G 280). The first of April was by no means a day of undiluted triumph for the new Anglo-French course. Roosevelt, to be sure, announced diplomatic recognition of Franco. Tokio, however, announced Japanese occupation of the Spratly Islands, flanking French Indo-China 700 miles south of Hainan, already seized by Japan on February i o. On the same day at Wilhelmshaven, in ceremonies attending the launching of the Reich's second 35,000 ton battleship, the Admiral von Tirpitz, the Fiihrer breathed defiance and threats. He denounced British "encirclement" prior to 1914.
. . . If a British statesman thinks today that all problems can and must be settled by frank discussions and negotiations, I would only like to say to that statesman that there was an opportunity to do this for 15 years before our time. If the world says today that the nations must be divided into those that are virtuous and those that are notand that the virtuous nations are primarily the British and the French, and the,non-virtuous the Germans and Italianswe can only answer, "Judgment as to whether a nation is virtuous or not can be given not by any human being but by God alone." Perhaps this British statesman will say, "God has already given judgment, for H e has presented the virtuous nations with a quarter of the globe, and taken everything away from the non-virtuous." In reply to this, the question may be asked, "By what means have virtuous nations acquired this quarter of the globe?" T h e answer must be, "They were not virtuous means." . . . W e are told that we had no right to do this or that. I would reply, into the open with a French-British pledge. If that checks the Germans he will have the satisfaction of doing it without us, but we have the satisfaction of knowing he and Bonnet have done what we wantedthrown overboard the Munich surrender policy and taken a decisive stand. In that case we are willing to cooperate."
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"What right has Britain in Palestine, to mention only one example, to shoot Arabs merely because they stand up for their country? Who gives her that right?" At any rate, we have not killed thousands in Central Europe but we have settled our problems in calm and order. But I should like to say one thing. The German nation of today, the German Reich of the present time, are not willing to abandon vital interests, nor are they willing to look on threatening dangers without taking action. . . . We are not thinking of waging war on other nations, but this is on condition that they leave us alone. The German Reich is, however, not prepared permanently to accept intimidation or even a policy of encirclement, I once made an agreement with Britain, namely, the Naval Agreement. It is based on the keen desire which we all possess never to have to wage war on Britain, but this desire can only be reciprocal. If this desire no longer exists in Britain, the practical premises for this agreement are removed. Germany would, however, accept even this with calm. We are so certain of ourselves because we are strong, and we are strong because we are united, and also because we keep our eyes open . . . (G281).
Chamberlain told Commons on April 3 that the new course was a "tremendous departure" in British policy which would need "a chapter to itself when the history books come to be written," but he was surprised that there should be any misunderstanding or doubt. Here was "a specific engagement directed toward a certain eventuality, namely, if such an attempt should be made to dominate the world by force. . . . If the German Government has never had any such thoughts, well, so much the better. In that case any agreements which may be made to safeguard the independence of these countries will never have to be called upon, and Europe may then gradually simmer down into a state of quietude in which their existence even might be forgotten." Simon concurred. The agreement "binds us in certain events to undertake war," but it was to be hoped that the events would never come to pass. Under these circumstances Josef Beck paid his long-planned visit to London (April 3-6). This erstwhile pro-Nazi diplomat had seemingly decided to accept the risks of the British pledge. His task was to convince himself and his colleagues that the pledge would be carried out and to bargain, if possible, for a British loan and for colonial outlets for the victims of Polish anti-
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Semitism.- The task of Chamberlain and Halifax was to convert their temporary, unilateral pledge to Poland into a permanent, reciprocal alliance, and to use such an alliance as a nucleus around which a "stop Hitler" coalition might be built. Chamberlain told Commons that he would welcome "the cooperation of any country, whatever may be its internal system of government." As for Moscow, ideological differences "do not really count in a question of'this kind." Lloyd George, Churchill, and Eden stated that the PoHsh commitment would be dangerous and futile without Soviet collaboration. But their guest would make no bargain with the Red bear. Warsaw preferred bilateral to multilateral pacts. Beck, moreover, feared to alienate Hungary by including Rumania in any scheme of collective defense. Better to include Hungary and have Poland "mediate" between Budapest and Bucharest. Amid these complexities and confusions, a tentative AngloPolish alliance was projected in London. The government that had refused to defend the Czech democracy now undertook to defend the^nti-Semitic and half-Fascist Polish state. The government that had given Hitler a Sudetenland that had never been part of Germany now undertook to deny him Danzig and the Corridor which had for centuries belonged to Germany. The Western Powers, having yielded to the Reich the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and naval control of the Baltic, could not possibly save Poland from German conquest. Nevertheless, they undertook the impossible. Thanks to Polish cooperation with Hitler in destroying the Czech bastion, Poland now had a very much longer German frontier and could not possibly stand
1 This was one of the less savory aspects of Beck's visit to London. He apparently hoped to bargain with Downing Street in such a fashion as would enable Poland to do what Germany was already doingi.e. indulging in blackmail by using prospective Jewish refugees for the exaction of ransom. He was put off with an empty formula. An official British statement of April 6 declared: "In the course of recent conversations in London Colonel Beck expressed the desire that any international effort for the treatment of Jewish problems should be extended to that of the Jews in Poland and that Jewish immigrants through Poland should have their due share in any opportunity for settlement which may be found. Colonel Beck at the same time, at the request of the Rumanian Government, drew attention to the similar problem of enlisting Rumania. Colonel Beck was assured that Flis Majesty's Government fully appreciated the difficulty to which he had referred and was at any time ready to examine with the Polish and Rumanian Governments' proposals for the solution of problems arising in Poland and Rumania which are a part of the larger problem."
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up against the Reich in war. But Beck agreed that Poland should commit suicide by attacking the Reich in the rear in the event of a Nazi march westward. The Anglo-Polish communique released by Chamberlain in Commons on April 6 asserted:
The conversations with M. Beck have covered a wide field and shown that the two Governments are in complete agreement upon certain general principles. It was agreed that the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by H. M. Government to the Polish Government. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, M. Beck gave H. M. Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to H. M. Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by H. M. Government to Poland. Like the temporary assurance, the permanent agreement would not be directed against any other country but would be designed to assure Great Britain and Poland of mutual assistance in the event of any threat, direct or indirect, to the independence of either. It was recognised that certain matters, including a more precise definition of the various ways in which the necessity for such assistance might arise, would require further examination before the permanent agreement could be completed. It was understood that the arrangements above mentioned should not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of peace (B i8).
For the first time in 20 years the British Government had entered into a bilateral pledge of mutual defense with an Eastern European State. That Poland could give no effective aid to Britain in the event of attack and that Britain could give no aid at all to Poland, thanks to British acquiescence in German remilitarization of the Rhineland and German domination of the Baltic, was not regarded as a serious difiiculty by the negotiators in London. Military discussions were to await on a final accord. Chamberlain envisaged the new arrangement as a step toward a great coalition. Lipski, however, was at pains to assure Weizsacker that the obligations were purely defensive and bilateral and that Poland would enter no bloc. Weizsacker hinted that Warsaw had violated the Polish-German accord of 1934 and that Hitler's last offer regarding Danzig and the Corridor could not be repeated. The two men wrangled over Slovakia, Memel, troop movements. They left the
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issue in abeyance (P 70; G 212). Ribbentrop and Hitler were reported ^ to have warned Lipski that if Poland affirmed the new accord with Britain, the Reich would denounce the pact of 1934 and press for an immediate settlement of the problems of Danzig and the Corridor. There is no record in the available documents, however, of any such precise threat. Chamberlain compared the new Anglo-Polish relationship to the French-Polish relationship. They were "practically similar." What would constitute a threat to Polish independence had not yet been defined, but would form a subject of further discussion with Warsaw. Charge Vaux Saint-Cyr reported to Bonnet on April 5 that Anglo-French support of Poland had exasperated the Fiihrer "who has been of late in a constant state of anger" (F 92). On the 6th Ribbentrop told Tiso, who was in Berlin for a conference, that Hitler did not want war, but Poland must accede to German demands. French Embassy circles felt that no sudden blow at Danzig would now be undertaken, but that every effort would be made to blackmail Poland, to divide Britain and France and to bring about acquiescence in some "reasonable" settlement of the Danzig issue (F 93). The Nazi press, hitherto restrained, lashed out at Poland on April 7, warning Warsaw of the horrible fate in store for small States that made themselves tools of British designs of aggression against the Reich. In this atmosphere Beck passed through Berlin on the 8th, on his way back to Warsaw, without conferring with any high official (F 94-95). The German reaction to the recent developments was perhaps best summed up in Saint-Cyr's despatch to Bonnet of April 11:
The German hesitations must without any doubt be attributed in the first place to the firm attitude adopted by Poland. For the first time the Third Reich has come up against a categorical No; for the first time a country has clearly expressed its determination to oppose force by force, and to reply to any unilateral movement with rifles and guns. This is the kind of language that is understood in Germany. But they have not been used to hearing it there for a long time. It has also been very difficult for them to believe their ears, and they still do not despair of wearing down Polish resistance in the long run. Meanwhile, no decision regarding Danzig seems to have been reached as yet, although its restoration to the Reich had been anticipated for April i. The vacillation of German policy in the 1AP dispatch from Berlin, April 8, 1939.
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Danzig affair brings out a point which seems to me of capital importance for the appreciation of the general political situation, viz.: the German aversion to rush into a conflict in which the Reich would be engaged on two fronts and in which it would have to reckon, in the East as in the West, with powerful adversaries (F 97).
2 . A L B A N I A t A P R I L 8, 1939 If Mr. Chamberlain felt disposed to congratulate himself that the new British commitments had perhaps averted an imminent German coup at Danzig, his satisfaction was short-lived. The Axis soon delivered a new "blow to confidence" in another quarter. The blow was in part a diversion and in part a new instance of the Fascist technique of striking unexpectedly while the attention of the democracies was turned elsewhere. That the State struck down was already under the effective control of the aggressor did not diminish the seriousness of the action, for it was regarded in London and Paris as the prelude to further action of a far more ambitious character. Its diplomatic repercussions, reaching from Ankara to Washington, were therefore out of all proportion to the scope of the operation itself. Albania is perhaps the poorest and most backward region of the Balkan Peninsula. Save for small oil deposits in the hinterland of Valona, it has no resources to sell abroad, apart from cattle and the handicraft work of its peasantry. Its barren hills, sloping down to the Adriatic opposite the "heel" of the Italian boot, are inhabited by a million Moslem herdsmen, far less touched by Western life than their neighbors in Jugoslavia and Greece. These simple people have never in modern times been a subject of diplomacy, but they have long been an object. Their rocky shores command Corfu and the entrance to the Adriatic. Their inland valleys shut off Serbia from the sea and control the avenues into Epirus, Macedonia and Montenegro. The resurrection of an independent Albania in 1913 under the unhappy Prince Wilhelm of Weid represented a compromise between the ambitions of Belgrade, Vienna and Rome, with St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris and London in the background. By the Treaty of London of 1915 Italy was promised a protectorate over Albania. Italian troops occupied Valona during hostilities, but were forced to evacuate
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Danzig affair brings out a point which seems to me of capital importance for the appreciation of the general political situation, viz.: the German aversion to rush into a conflict in which the Reich would be engaged on two fronts and in which it would have to reckon, in the East as in the West, with powerful adversaries (F 97).
2 . A L B A N I A t A P R I L 8, 1939 If Mr. Chamberlain felt disposed to congratulate himself that the new British commitments had perhaps averted an imminent German coup at Danzig, his satisfaction was short-lived. The Axis soon delivered a new "blow to confidence" in another quarter. The blow was in part a diversion and in part a new instance of the Fascist technique of striking unexpectedly while the attention of the democracies was turned elsewhere. That the State struck down was already under the effective control of the aggressor did not diminish the seriousness of the action, for it was regarded in London and Paris as the prelude to further action of a far more ambitious character. Its diplomatic repercussions, reaching from Ankara to Washington, were therefore out of all proportion to the scope of the operation itself. Albania is perhaps the poorest and most backward region of the Balkan Peninsula. Save for small oil deposits in the hinterland of Valona, it has no resources to sell abroad, apart from cattle and the handicraft work of its peasantry. Its barren hills, sloping down to the Adriatic opposite the "heel" of the Italian boot, are inhabited by a million Moslem herdsmen, far less touched by Western life than their neighbors in Jugoslavia and Greece. These simple people have never in modern times been a subject of diplomacy, but they have long been an object. Their rocky shores command Corfu and the entrance to the Adriatic. Their inland valleys shut off Serbia from the sea and control the avenues into Epirus, Macedonia and Montenegro. The resurrection of an independent Albania in 1913 under the unhappy Prince Wilhelm of Weid represented a compromise between the ambitions of Belgrade, Vienna and Rome, with St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris and London in the background. By the Treaty of London of 1915 Italy was promised a protectorate over Albania. Italian troops occupied Valona during hostilities, but were forced to evacuate
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in 1920 when the Conference of Ambassadors decided to restore Albanian "independence," Albania nevertheless gravitated into the Italian orbit. By the five-year Pact of Tirana (November 27, 1926) Rome agreed to aid the Albanian Government in maintaining the political status quo vsîthin the kingdom. On November 22, 1927, a defensive alliance was signed for twenty years. A series of corresponding economic agreements culminated in June, 1931, when Italy consented to extend a number of "loans," free of interest and with no definite provision for repayment, on condition of a "continuation of full and sincere technical and political collaboration between the two governments." New "loans" followed in 1934 and 1935. Moslem King Zog, however, was difficult. He declined to renew the Pact of Tirana in 1931. He sought an entente with Jugoslavia. Ciano was his "witness" at his wedding on April 27, 1938, to Countess Geraldine Apponyi, a Hungarian noblewoman with an American mother. But after Munich Zog allegedly offered to denounce his alliance with Rome if the Western Powers would give him support. In March he pleaded for British aid to enable him to resist Italian pressure, but since none was forthcoming he decided to compromise. Italian reports early in April indicated that relations were "strained," but that negotiations for strengthening the alliance were under way and were expected to have a favorable outcome. On April 4 the Bari radio station during its regular broadcast in Albanian denied "tendentious and unfounded reports" abroad and declared: "It is not the intention of the Italian Government to make attempts on the independence and integrity of the Albanian Government." Perth saw Ciano. London hinted that any Italian military action in Albania would modify the Mediterranean status quo and therefore violate the Ciano-Perth accord of 1938. Paris saw evidence in the exchanges going on between Berlin and Rome that Hitler had advised Mussolini to act at once in a common plan to dominate the Balkans. Goring was on vacation in Italy. Hitler went to Berchtesgaden for the Easter holidays. German troops moved southward. Italian troops moved eastward. Earl Stanhope, First Lord of the Admiralty, explained empty seats at a film show aboard the Ark Royal on April 4 by saying that orders had been given to man the anti-aircraft guns of the Royal Navy. Commons jumped. The Prime Minister asked
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the press to give no publicity to the statement. Stanhope expressed regret. BerHn expressed resentment. Rome expressed amusement. Tirana expressed hope . . . On April 5 General Alberto Pariani, Italian Undersecretary for War, Chief of Staff and former military advisor to the Albanian army, conferred at Innsbruck with General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Reichswehr. The Fascist press warned small countries against accepting Anglo-French protection. Ciano received the Albanian Minister and the Italian Minister to Tirana. A new accord was reported imminent. But King Zog called up 15,000 troops. Queen Geraldine gave birth to a boy baby early the same morning. All day celebrating crowds of Albanian patriots cheered the blessed event and breathed defiance to the Duce. On the morning of the 6th, while Pariani and Keitel continued their talks, an Italian cruiser and two destroyers arrived at Durazzo. The Italian press and radio revealed nothing, but rumors in Rome held that this move was merely designed to persuade Zog to accept Italian proposals for the establishment of garrisons and the use of Albanian ports by the Italian fleet. On Good Friday, April 7, 1939, the blow fell as swiftly and almost as silently as the thrust of a stiletto. Itahan troops under General Alfredo Guzzoni landed at several points and moved inland. Some resistance was offered, particularly at Durazzo, but it was speedily crushed and degenerated into guerrilla fighting in the hills. Queen Geraldine, carrying the two-day old Prince Skander, fled over the mountains to Greece. On Saturday Italian forces entered Tirana while the king followed his family into exile. Ciano arrived by plane from Rome. A provisional council of Italian stooges called a constituent assembly which voted on April 12 to end the dynasty and the constitution and to "offer in the form of personal union the crown of Albania to Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, for his Majesty and his royal descendants." The new Cabinet was headed by Shefket Verlaci, a wealthy land-owner. On the 13 th Mussolini presided over the Fascist Grand Council which received the Albanian offer with joy. He then greeted the cheering crowds which shouted: "To Paris!" and "Down with France!" On the 14th he greeted Goring who was back from a visit to Tripoli where he had been the guest of Marshal Balbo. On the 15th the Senate and the Chamber of Corporations approved the King's
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assumption of the Albanian crown. At 1.00 p.m. on Good Friday the British Broadcasting Corporation interrupted its orchestra concert to announce the Italian occupation of Albania. The public was shocked. A Royal Air Force plane went to Dyce to take Mr. Chamberlain back to London from his fishing holiday. On the previous day he had told Commons that while Britain had no direct interest in Albania, it had a general interest in world peace and did not anticipate any breach of the Ciano-Perth agreement. As Beck took his leave, Halifax conferred with the French and Turkish Ambassadors, with the Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian Ministers and with the Jugoslav Charge. The Times expressed alarm and defiance. The Bishop of Coventry asserted: "We have to face the fact that a nominally Christian nation has delivered a shocking and appalling attack on a small nation." In Rome Perth called on Ciano to ask Italy's intentions and to inquire how the invasion could be reconciled with the 1938 accord. Ciano apparently replied that there was no violation, since Albanian "sovereignty" and "integrity" would be respected. The military action had been necessitated by Zog's unfriendly policy and by his plotting to invade Jugoslavia and disturb Italian-Jugoslav relations ( N Y T 4.8.39). Fiak Konitza, Albanian Minister in Washington, protested to Hull and said that ItaUans had no sense of chivalry. "Just when our Queen gave birth to a child, the Italians dealt this blow. . . . It is against the nature of the Italians to understand that they should have waited at least a few weeks more." On Saturday Hull condemned Italy's "forcible and violent invasion" as an additional threat to the peace of the world. France was more shocked than it had been at the fall of Austria, Spain or Czecho-Slovakia. Bonnet saw Phipps and Suritz. But France could not act. Jugoslavia could not act. Greece could not act. Turkey could not act. Nobody acted. Chamberlain decided to continue fishing. Halifax told Guido CroUa, the Italian Charge in London, that any occupation of Corfu or any ItaUan move beyond the Albanian frontiers would be viewed with gravity. Crolla was reassuring. Chamberlain returned to the capital on Easter Sunday and took a stroll and a cup of tea with his wife in Kew Gardens. On the loth the Cabinet decided that any aggression against Greece or Turkey would be regarded as an "unfriendly act." Diplomatic
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and naval moves were initiated in the Mediterranean. But it was decided neither to denounce the Ciano-Perth accord nor to charge Italy with its violation. If II Duce would only withdraw his troops from Spain, all would yet be well. The seizure of Albania coincided with continued British efforts to complete the "peace front" against Berlin. Certain overtures had apparently been made to Rumania before Beck's departure from London. With his preference for bilateral arrangements, the Polish Foreign Minister had no enthusiasm for converting the PoUsh-Rumanian alliance against the U.S.S.R. into a pact which might also be operative against Germany. If Berlin supported Hungarian irredentist designs on Transylvania, such a pact would be both dangerous and distasteful to Warsaw. Beck aspired to be "honest broker" between Budapest and Bucharest and to include them both if possible in any bloc against Berlin. The Rumanian Government appears to have refused to join any fourpower pact of Britain, France, Poland and Rumania or to make its alliance with Poland viable against the Reich (G 291). Budapest was reported to have been asked by Downing Street on April 6 whether it would welcome a British guarantee. But the Magyar regime was already firmly tied to the Axis. The Rumanian and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Grigore Gafencu and Shukru Saracoglu, concluded discussions at Istanbul on April 9, but without agreeing to any extension of the limited obligations of the Balkan Entente. Ankara, Athens and Belgrade were all alarmed by the Italian action, but seemed as hesitant as Bucharest to enter into any reciprocal pacts with Britain. They had done so in 1936 during sanctions, only to learn later that London was not in earnest in its professed desire to halt Italian aggression. On Thursday, April 13, Chamberlain announced another new departure to Commons. He began by reviewing the ItaUan and Albanian versions of what had occurred with emphasis on the "divergence of testimony." He revealed that King Zog had appealed to the Foreign Office on April 8 "to do their utmost in aid of a small nation which was desperately trying to defend its own territory." But "accounts seem to differ very materially, one from another, and it would be wise to suspend judgment on facts which preceded the occupation." While condoning the Italian action and carefully avoiding any temptation to protest or propose resistance, the Prime Minister conceded that "public opinion
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has once again been profoundly shocked at this fresh exhibition of the use of force." He went on in the best Chamberlain manner:
In this country there is one question which we are bound to ask ourselves, and that is how far are the proceedings in Albania in conformity with the agreement which was signed by the Italians and ourselves on April 16 last year. . . . It will be felt widely in this country and in the world at large that the action taken by Italy in Albania, so far from contributing to the general cause of peace and security, must inevitably be a cause of further uneasiness and increased international tension. . . . W i t h these considerations in mind, we instructed our ambassador to speak to Count Ciano in Rome, while at the same time Lord Halifax reminded the Italian Charge d'Affaires that the situation might raise in acute form the whole question of the status quo in the Mediterranean, a matter which in our opinion was an important element in the Anglo-Italian agreement of April last. . . . On these broad grounds, the Foreign Secretary said he could feel completely reassured if he could be certain that situation would develop in such a way that conditions of the agreement were not likely to be violated. O n the same day H . M. Ambassador had seen Count Ciano, w h o had stated that the Italian Government fully intended to respect the independence and integrity of Albania and the status quo in the Mediterranean. On April 9 he saw him again and informed him that, although H . M. Government had taken note of these assurances, they were, nevertheless, gravely concerned by reports reaching them of the sudden invasion of Albania and found it difficult to believe if the situation between Italy and Albania was as had been described to him by Count Ciano and Signor Crolla differences between the two countries were incapable of solution by negotiation and that they found it equally difficult to understand and reconcile the landing of Italians on the Albanian coast with the integrity of frontiers. Lord Perth reminded Count Ciano that both governments were pledged by the Anglo-Italian agreement to preserve the status quo in the Mediterranean area, and informed him that H . M. Government felt they were entitled to the frankest and fullest explanation not only of present developments in the Italian-Albanian situation but also of future intentions of the Italian Government. Lord Perth added that explanations proffered up to date had caused H . M. Government profound misgivings and that they would not satisfy public opinion in this country. W h e n pressed b y Lord Perth as to what were Italian intentions with regard to the future, bearing in mind definite pledges and assurances which the Italian Government had already given. Count Ciano said this would
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depend on the wishes of the Albanians themselves. It would appear from the latest news that the Albania Provisional Administrative Council has offered the crown of Albania to the King of Italy, and we must await the answer of the Italian Government to this offer. But, whatever might be the technicalities of the position, H . M. Government find it difficult in the extreme to reconcile what has happened in Albania with the preservation of national sovereignty as contemplated by the Anglo-Italian agreement.
The "difficulty," however, did not seem to warrant any denunciation of the agreement, nor even any threat to denounce it. "As far as I am concerned nothing that has happened has in any way altered my conviction that the policy of H. M. Government in signing the Anglo-Italian agreement a year ago was right." But "I frankly confess my deep disappointment at the action taken by the Italian Government, which has cast a shadow over the genuineness of their intentions to carry out their undertakings." The Prime Minister observed that lively apprehension had been engendered in Greece by the Italian action. Charge Crolla informed Halifax on Easter Eve that Italy had no intention of occupying Corfu, but that "any British occupation of Corfu would have a very dangerous reaction."
Lord Halifax told him he could dismiss from his mind that the British Government had any intention of occupying Corfu, but that the Government would take a very grave view if anybody else occupied it. O n the morning of Easter Sunday, we learned from our Minister at Athens that information had reached the Greek Government that Italy was intending to occupy Corfu in the near future, and this information was subsequently confirmed by the Greek Minister in London. T h e Foreign Secretary saw the Italian Charge d'Aifaires on that day and told him of this report, and the Italian Charge d'Affaires said he had no hesitation in saying it was absolutely impossible it should be correct and, on his own responsibility, he gave assurance it was not the policy of his government. Lord Halifax, while welcoming his assurance, said it was absolutely vital there should be no misunderstanding between the two governments on this point. T h e Greek Minister subsequently called at the Foreign Office and was informed of the tenor of the conversation and, during the same evening the Italian Charge d'Affaires called with a further message from Mussolini and gave renewed assurance Italy intended to respect the continental and insular territory of Greece.
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Chamberlain then went on to announce a new British commitment:

As I have said on previous occasions, once confidence has been shaken it is not so easily re-established, and H. M. Government feel they have both a duty and service to perform by leaving no doubt in the mind of anybody as to their position. I therefore take this opportunity of saying that, on their behalf, H. M. Government attach the greatest importance to the avoidance of disturbance by force or threats of force of the status quo in the Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula. Consequently, they have come to the conclusion that, in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatens the independence of Greece and Rumania, and which the Greek or Rumanian Governments respectively consider it vital to resist with their national forces, H. M. Government will feel themselves bound to lend at once to the Greek or Rumanian Governments, as the case might be, all the support in their power. We are communicating this declaration to the governments directly concerned and to the Powers, especially Turkey, whose close relationships with the Greek Government are known, and I understand that the French Government are making a similar declaration this afternoon.
The formula was identical with the Polish formula. "Independence," not "integrity," was guaranteed. The threat must be "clear." The threat must be resisted. The House and the public cheered this extension of British obligation. Attlee and Sinclair, however, deplored the refusal of the Prime Minister to concede that Italy had flagrantly violated its pledges and accused him of holding Russia "at arm's length." Eden agreed with Chamberlain, but urged him not to "halt half-way." Churchill was sympathetic, but demanded "speed and vigor" and insisted that the first step to preserve peace should be "the full inclusion of Soviet Russia in our defensive peace bloc" and the second step should be the promotion of Balkan unity. In reply to a question "What about Russia?" Chamberlain said that his failure to mention Russia did not mean that "we are not keeping in closest touch with representatives of that country. W e have a very difficult task to perform. W e have to consider not only what we wish, but also what other people are willing to do. I ask the House to believe that, without any prejudice, without any preconceived ideological notions, we are endeavoring to the utmost of our ability so to marshal the forces which are still in favor of peace, which are willing to resist
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aggression, that our efforts may be successful." It was intimated that negotiations with Turkey were far advanced. There were parallel steps in Paris. French commercial agreements were concluded late in March with Poland, Jugoslavia and Rumania. On April 11 the French Cabinet met for the first time since the disappearance of Albania and approved the defensive measures already taken by Daladier, including the dispatch of part of the French Mediterranean fleet from Toulon to eastern waters. On April 13 Daladier issued a formal declaration which read in part:
The French Government attaches the greatest importance to prevention of any modification to the status quo imposed by force, or by the menace of force, in the Mediterranean and in the Balkan Peninsula. Taking into consideration the special uneasiness that events of the last few weeks have brought on, the French Government has in consequence given to Rumania and to Greece the particular assurance that, in the case that any action should be attempted which would clearly menace the independence of Rumania or Greece and which the Rumanian Government or the Greek Government felt it to be to its vital interests to resist with its national forces, the French Government considers itself as engaged immediately to lend all the assistance in its power. The English Government has taken the same stand. The French Government, on the other hand, has been happy over the conclusion of the reciprocal engagements of Great Britain and Poland, who had decided to give each other mutual aid to defend their independence if they are menaced directly or indirectly. The French-Polish alliance is, furthermore, confirmed by the French Government and the Polish Government in the same spirit. France and Poland guarantee each other immediately and directly against all menace, direct or indirect, which attacks their vital interests. Today our Ambassadors are communicating this declaration to all interested governments, particularly to Turkey (NYT 4.14.39).
In summary, the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia and Albania had led by mid-April to a provisional and reciprocal AngloPolish accord for mutual defense, albeit carefully qualified and full of loopholes, and to non-reciprocal Anglo-French guarantees of the independence of Rumania and Greece. Turkey was not yet included. Bulgaria and Hungary, with irredentist ambitions capable of realization only through Axis support against Bucharest and Belgrade, were not interested in being included. Jugoslavia was interested, but too fearful of Fascist wrath to respond
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to overtures from the West. After a month of diplomacy, the "peace front" was still in the blue-print stage. Without Soviet adherence there could be little hope of its efficacy. The state of Anglo-Soviet negotiations remained a mystery. Berlin and Rome had no cause to feel discouraged over these developments so long as the U.S.S.R. did not join the bloc which London and Paris were seeking to build. The German occupation of Slovakia had rendered Poland strategically helpless against the Reich, even if the Polish diplomats and generals were unaware of the fact. German control of Austria, Italian control of Albania and Axis support of Hungary rendered Jugoslavia even more helpless. Belgrade was immobilized to the point of declining any Western proposals for unilateral guarantee. Athens and Bucharest was immobilized to the point of declining to give any reciprocal pledge in return for Western guarantees. If Anglo-French diplomacy could fashion nothing better than had thus far been achieved in the way of new barriers to Axis aggression. Hitler and Mussolini could face the future with confidence.
3. W O R D S F R O M
WASHINGTON
The next phase of the spring diplomacy of 1939 was initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Anglo-French architects of the "peace front" desired for obvious reasons to enlist the cooperation of the United States. Such cooperation would indeed become imperative if Soviet cooperation was to be spurned or become unavailable. If war came and America promptly joined Britain and France against the Reich, victory for the Western Powers would be probable. An American pledge to defend Britain and France in advance of war would deter the Axis from challenging the West in arms and thereby offer high hope of preventing war. An Anglo-French-American alliance for common defense, involving reciprocal commitments to make war jointly on any aggressor menacing either of the signatories, would make a "peace front" in Eastern Europe unnecessary and would even make possible, with minimum risk, a resumption of appeasement. There were precedents. America had fought the Reich in 1917. America had projected an alliance with Britain and France in 1919. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, however, did not enter-
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to overtures from the West. After a month of diplomacy, the "peace front" was still in the blue-print stage. Without Soviet adherence there could be little hope of its efficacy. The state of Anglo-Soviet negotiations remained a mystery. Berlin and Rome had no cause to feel discouraged over these developments so long as the U.S.S.R. did not join the bloc which London and Paris were seeking to build. The German occupation of Slovakia had rendered Poland strategically helpless against the Reich, even if the Polish diplomats and generals were unaware of the fact. German control of Austria, Italian control of Albania and Axis support of Hungary rendered Jugoslavia even more helpless. Belgrade was immobilized to the point of declining any Western proposals for unilateral guarantee. Athens and Bucharest was immobilized to the point of declining to give any reciprocal pledge in return for Western guarantees. If Anglo-French diplomacy could fashion nothing better than had thus far been achieved in the way of new barriers to Axis aggression. Hitler and Mussolini could face the future with confidence.
3. W O R D S F R O M
WASHINGTON
The next phase of the spring diplomacy of 1939 was initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Anglo-French architects of the "peace front" desired for obvious reasons to enlist the cooperation of the United States. Such cooperation would indeed become imperative if Soviet cooperation was to be spurned or become unavailable. If war came and America promptly joined Britain and France against the Reich, victory for the Western Powers would be probable. An American pledge to defend Britain and France in advance of war would deter the Axis from challenging the West in arms and thereby offer high hope of preventing war. An Anglo-French-American alliance for common defense, involving reciprocal commitments to make war jointly on any aggressor menacing either of the signatories, would make a "peace front" in Eastern Europe unnecessary and would even make possible, with minimum risk, a resumption of appeasement. There were precedents. America had fought the Reich in 1917. America had projected an alliance with Britain and France in 1919. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, however, did not enter-
Words from Washington
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tain serious expectations of American support in 1939 or 1940. America had repented of the decision of 1917 and had repudiated the alliance of 1919 and the League and World Court as well. The precedents were meaningless in the face of legislative and public opinion in the United States throughout the decade. The strange fact was that the greatest and most powerful of the Great Powers had no foreign policy and was incapable of devising any. This affirmation may be disputed by those who regard a foreign policy as a series of official verbalizations regarding the hopes, fears and purposes of the officials who indulge in the verbalizing. But in Redpolkik a foreign policy is much more than this. It consists of a well-defined formulation of the national interests which a government proposes to promote and defend. Whether the formulation is known to parliament and public is irrelevant, so long as it is known to other governments and so long as parliament and public can be counted upon to support whatever action may be necessary to protect the interests thus defined. It consists further of an expert analysis of the changing pattern of power relations in world politics in order that those who administer policies may know where, when and by whom national interests are jeopardized and what dangers and opportunities are presented from year to year, from month to month, from week to week by the shifting balance of power. It consists finally of a flexible but resolute program of action for meeting dangers and taking advantage of opportunities through the effective use of economic and military power to thwart those States who threaten the national interests and to aid those whose interests are parallel. In brief, a foreign policy, if it is to be worthy of the name and to have any possibility of being effective, requires authority to act on the part of those charged with responsibility for action, plus willingness to act on the part of those with authority, and it requires that those able and willing to act possess a knowledge of ends and means and a grasp of the political realities of the world in which action must take place. One of the central facts of world politics during the years of Nemesis was that the United States of America had no foreign policy. The President and the Department of State had knowledge and responsibility but no authority. Congress had authority but little responsibility and less knowledge. The public had neither knowledge, responsibility nor authority in any form admitting
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of relevant action. No one able to act was willing to take any action beyond verbalizing, since action was always inexpedient in terms of domestic politics and inaction was invariably safe. In place of a program of action, there was widespread determination to refrain from all action abroad and to make no use of the economic and military power of America, lest the use of it entail responsibilities and risks which many believed could be avoided by doing nothing. In place of a rational evaluation of Weltpolitik, there loomed in the public mind numerous fanciful and wishful pictures of the world, most of them mutually exclusive and none of them resembling reality. In place of an accepted definition of national interests, there were ardent efforts to deny that the United States had any interests outside of its own frontiers. Constitutional government by separation of powers and checksand-balances was in part responsible for this state of affairs. In larger part, the explanation lay in the peculiar American equivalent of the blindness and confusion which paralyzed the Western European democracies. The issue between "internationalists" and "isolationists" need not here be reviewed.'^ Suffice it to say what should be obvious: that any policy is better than no policy. A resolute and intelligent isolationism, based squarely on the premise that the conquest of Asia by Japan and of Europe by the Axis was of no concern to the United States, might have led to a program of successful adaptation to the kind of world which would result from such developments. A firm and far-seeing interventionism, involving the full use of the full weight of the United States in world economy and world politics to thwart the Fascist Triplice, might have promised success and safety. Even a deliberate policy of supporting the ambitions of Berlin, Rome and Tokio, if such a course could be imagined, might have led to results not too intolerable in the world of tomorrow. In truth, however, none of these courses was within the realm of the politically possible. Counsels in high places were divided. Public attitudes were confused. The Administration was reluctant to risk unpopularity by following any course judged "dangerous" by any appreciable body of opinion. It was unwilling to champion an isolationism in which its leading members had no faith. Where public sentiment was most nearly unanimous, as with regard to
1 Cf. Charles Beard, A Foreign Policy for America and Raymond Leslie Buell, Isolated America, both published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1940.
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the desirability of aiding China and Spain by denying arms to their enemies, the Administration was reluctant to defy the foreign governments and the domestic pressure groups that demanded a different course. Congress and the President worked forever at cross purposes, as the Founding Fathers perhaps intended. The result was paralysis. The "neutrality legislation" of 1935-37 reflected Congressional and public demand to "keep the United States out of war" by surrendering the right to trade with belligerents. The formula adopted, however, banned trade only in arms and money. This program offered no promise of averting the development of a "war boom." With lofty impartiality it merely denied the right of aggressors to buy or borrow the things they had no need of, and the right of victims of aggression to buy or borrow the things they needed desperately. At no time did the President have confidence that such a course could serve American interests. He nevertheless signed the bills. In his desire to discourage aggressors and aid their victims, he was reduced to devious devices and subterfuges to escape isolationist criticism. Only one means was available of reconciling the two views and eliciting public applause. This was to indulge periodically in abstract statements of high moral principle, devoid of all effective implementation or tangible content. These statements were usually addressed to foreign governments. They usually had no effect whatever on the behavior of foreign governments, since statesmen abroad were fully aware of the fact that the official spokesmen of the United States were neither able nor willing to support their eloquence by force. Since force is the final arbiter in an anarchic State System, nations which renounce force are impotent, and declarations of purpose unsupported by force are futile. American statements in defense of international law, in condemnation of aggression, in praise of democracy and in denunciation of totalitarianism were therefore evaluated abroad, by all those still capable of evaluation, as the utterances of men who either had no conception of the factor of force in Realpolitik or who were interested only in winning the plaudits of the crowd. This evaluation was substantially accurate. The verbalizers in Washington had commonly no grasp of the uses of violence in world politics and invariably denounced it in all its formsas if violence were an end rather than a means.
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as if moral and legal judgment of its use could be divorced from consideration of the purposes being served by its use. The verbalizers in Washington commonly vvôn public approbation within the United States and often in Britain and France as well. But a diplomacy of empty words is a diplomacy foredoomed to failure.^ Such was the case with Roosevelt's initiative of mid-April 1939. In its background two political forces were in juxtaposition, each checkmating the other. One was represented by Roosevelt, Hull, Welles, Bullitt, Kennedy, a few Congressmen and sundry members of the Cabinet and the Foreign Serviceall committed to giving support to the Western European Powers againsr the Axis. The other was represented by Borah, Vandenberg, Lodge, Walsh, Hiram Johnson, the La Follettes, Nye, and numerous Congressmen, pressmen, professional patriots and pacifistsall committed to eschewing "foreign entanglements" and reaffirming the isolationist conception of Washington's Farewell Address. The first group was muddled by anxiety to "keep out of war" and to avoid the criticisms which full frankness as to intentions would entail. The second group was muddled by hatred of totalitarianism. Red, Black, Brown and Yellow, and by patriotic concern for "national interests" envisaged as entities in a vacuum. The interplay between them, and the confusion within them, was a fascinating and tragic spectacle. The President's January message to Congress had urged repeal of the arms embargo and methods "short of war" but "stronger than words" to deter aggressors. Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, promised congressional action. While the President waited. Ambassador Bullitt, home on leave from Paris, bestirred himself (through Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau) to aid a French air mission to purchase American bombing planes. He had given private assurances to various foreign diplomats that the Administration stood squarely against any further appeasement and solidly behind the Western European Powers not only to the extent of desiring to give them material aid against the Axis but to the point of contemplating ultimate American entry into war on the Allied side.^
1 For text of the principal verbalizations see S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Vol. I, January, 1938-June, 1939; Vol. II, July, 1939-June, 1940. 2 Cf. 7th, 9th and 12th documents in The German White Paper of Polish documents (Howell, Soskin & Co., New York, 1940).
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Secretary of War Woodring accused Morgenthau of seeking to give away American military secrets. The President, however, confidentially ordered the army to release certain types of bombing and pursuit planes to the French mission. The crash of one of the bombers in California on January 23 precipitated pubUc outcries and an investigation by the Senate MiHtary Affairs Committee. The President invited the Committee to visit the White House on January 31. Most of its members were convinced that there was no danger of war abroad and that the President was "meddling." Roosevelt in his efforts to disabuse them hinted that American interests would be jeopardized by any successful German onslaught over the Rhine. The isolationists were outraged. Hiram Johnson cried, "Good God, do you not, Gentlemen, think the American people have a right to know if they are going down the road to war?" Herbert Hoover in Chicago on February i denounced the President for "his proposal that we make effective protests at acts of aggression against sister nations. . . . The distinction between legitimate expansion and wicked aggression becomes confused." W e must not "set ourselves up as an oracle of righteousness." W e must not risk war by playing "world-wide power politics." Soon afterward Roosevelt was quoted in other quarters as having said that the American frontier was on the Rhine. For three days the Anglo-French press rejoiced at this fresh assurance of American support, only to have the President issue a belated denial. Moves in Congress to repeal the arms embargo dragged on inconclusively during February and March. Colonel Stimson's appeal to the President on January 24 (NYT) to permit the sale of arms to the Spanish Republic evoked no response. Since Chamberlain and Daladier, along with the Vatican and most of the American Catholic hierarchy, were bent upon a Fascist victory in Spain, Roosevelt was unable or unwilling to do anything to implement the sympathies of the majority of Americans with the Loyalists. On February 9 the Neiv York Herald Tribune accurately described the Administration's policy as a "wobbling course between an appearance of neutrality which has vanished and a cooperation with the democracies which must remain unconfessed." Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, Walsh and William R. Castle all condemned the President. On February 28 twelve senators revived the "war referendum" proposal which had been defeated by a narrow margin in the
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previous Congress. Stimson warned ( N Y T 3.7.39) that Fascist aggression endangered America and could be "successfully resisted only by the far-sighted readiness and co-operation of the nations which are opposed to such a system. . . . I am unalterably opposed to the doctrine preached in many quarters that our government and our people must treat the nations on both sides of this great issue with perfect impartiality; that, for example, we must sell to a nation which has violated its treaties with us, as well as trampled upon the humanities of our civilization, the very instruments with which to continue its wrong-doing," Such appeals were vain. The fall of Prague and Tirana produced no marked change in the Washington deadlock. On March 17, to be sure, the Department of State once more championed "respect for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word" and denounced "intervention," "arbitrary force," "military aggression," and "wanton lawlessness." ^ The Administration refused to recognize the conquest of Czecho-Slovakia. It "froze" Czech balances in American banks. It imposed an additional 2 5 % countervailing duty on German imports in alleged retaliation against dumping. On March 21 Pittman moved to amend the Neutrality Act by putting all exports to belligerents, including munitions, on a cash-and-carry basis. But fifty Senators endorsed a bill by Senator Bone to tax all large incomes out of existence on a declaration of hostilitiesto "scare the country out of war," admitted the sponsor. Increased military and naval appropriations were passed. The President recognized Franco on April i. Senate hearings on the neutrality legislation opened April 5. Borah argued that aggressors were not violating the Kellogg Pact. Amid confusion worse confounded, with the Administration supplying no leadership, II Duce struck down Albania. Hull at once announced on April 8 that "the forcible and violent invasion of Albania is unquestionably an additional threat to the peace of the world It is scarcely necessary to add that the inevitable effect of this incident, taken with other similar incidents, is further to destroy confidence and to undermine economic stability in every country of the world, thus affecting our welfare." ^ Bullitt cabled that French officials were expecting immediate
1 Department of State Press Releases, XX, 199-200, March 18, 1939. 2 Ibid., 261, April 8, 1939.
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war. One had said: "It's just five minutes before midnight; the darkest hour is at hand." ^ The President now felt moved to do something dramatic, for poUtical expediency forbade doing anything effective. As he left Warm Springs, Georgia, for Washington on April 9 he startled the nation by saying, "I'll be back in the fall, if we don't have a war." Bullitt and Kennedy replied to his anxious inquiries that there was little he could do without making some commitment. He groped for a "formula" that would involve no commitment (this was verboten by Congress and country) and yet would, he hoped, have some effect in providing at least a breathing space for France and Britain. While Hull, Welles and other advisers were collaborating in concocting permissible phraseology, Roosevelt delivered a Pan-American Day address on April 14 and publicly asked the European dictators whether they could "find no better methods of realizing their destinies than those which were used by the Huns and Vandals." He expressed hope that "our sister nations beyond the seas will break the bonds of ideas which constrain them toward perpetual warfare." Gobbels fumed. Senator Reynolds accused the President of calling on the Germans to revolt and "sticking his nose into other people's business." Hamilton Fish denounced Roosevelt's "war hysteria" and his "provocative and inflammatory propaganda." The new "formula" was an appeal to the dictators, whom the President had just insulted, to refrain from attacking their neighbors. There was no "commitment." If they attacked, the United States would do nothing save deny arms and loans to them and to their victims. There were gestures, however. The fleet was ordered back to the Pacific. Pittman introduced a resolution (which came to nothing) to empower the President to embargo non-agricultural exports to any violator of the Nine-Power Pact. Elaborate arrangements were made to get full publicity in all countries, via press and radio, for the President's message. It came as a shock to Berlin and Rome, even though Duce and Fiihrer know it was empty verbiage. On Saturday, April 15, the message was issued, addressed to Hitler with an identical copy to Mussolini:
^Cf. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1940), pp. 35f.
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You realize I am sure that throughout the world hundreds of millions of human beings are living today in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars. T h e existence of this fearand the possibility of such a conflictis of definite concern to the people of the United States for whom I speak, as it must also be of the peoples of the other nations of the entire Western Hemisphere. All of them know that any major war, even if it were to be confined to other continents, must bear heavily on them during its continuance and also for generations to come. Because of the fact that after the acute tension In which the world has been living during the past few weeks there would seem to be at least a momentary relaxationbecause no troops are at this moment on the march this may be an opportune moment for me to send you this message. . . . It is, however, unfortunately necessary to take cognizance of recent facts. Three nations in Europe and one in Africa have seen their independent existence terminated. A vast territory in another independent nation of the Far East has been occupied by a neighboring State. Reports, which we trust are not true, insist that further acts of aggression are contemplated against still other independent nations. Plainly the world is moving toward the moment when this situation must end in catastrophe unless a more rational way of guiding events is found. You have repeatedly asserted that you and the German people have no desire for war. If this is true there need be no war. . . . In conference rooms, as in courts, it is necessary that both sides enter upon the discussion in good faith, assuming that substantial justice will accrue to both; and it is customary and necessary that they leave their arms outside the room where they confer. I am convinced that the cause of world peace would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to obtain a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of governments. Because the United States, as one of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, is not involved in the immediate controversies which have arisen in Europe, I trust that you may be wUling to make such a statement of policy to me as the head of a nation far removed from Europe in order that I, acting only with the responsibility and obligation of a friendly intermediary, may communicate such declaration to other nations now apprehensive as to the course which the policy of your government may take. Are you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, T h e Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
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Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Iran? Such an assurance clearly must apply not only to the present day but also to a future sufficiently long to give every opportunity to work by peaceful methods for a more permanent peace. I therefore suggest that you construe the word "future" to apply to a minimum period of assured nonaggressionten years at the leasta quarter of a century, if we dare look that far ahead. If such assurance is given b y your government, I will immediately transmit it to the governments of the nations I have named and I will simultaneously inquire whether, as I am reasonably sure, each of the nations enumerated above will in turn give like assurance for transmission to you. Reciprocal assurances such as I have outlined will bring to the world an immediate measure of relief. I propose that if it is given two essential problems shall promptly be discussed in the resulting peaceful surroundings, and in those discussions the government of the United States will gladly take part. T h e discussions which I have in mind relate to the most effective and immediate manner through which the peoples of the world can obtain progressive relief from the crushing burden of armament which is each day bringing them more closely to the brink of economic disaster. Simultaneously the government of the United States would be prepared to take part in discussions looking toward the most practical manner of opening up avenues of international trade to the end that every nation of the earth may be enabled to buy and sell on equal terms in the world market as well as to possess assurance of obtaining the materials and products of peaceful economic life. At the same time, those governments other than the United States which are directly interested could undertake such political discussions as they may consider necessary or desirable. . . .
This highly unconventional appeal to reason was received with incredulity and resentment in Italy and Germany and with enthusiasm in France and Britain. An official British statement of April 15 expressed "cordial approval." Chamberlain voiced his "satisfaction" in Commons on April 18. Some circles, however, deplored the President's "tactless phrases." Halifax in Lords on the following day denied that the Government was engaged in any effort to "encircle" Germanya policy which would "not only be extreme folly and lack any color of morality, but would be entirely foreign to the whole trend of British thought which rests essentially upon a desire to live and let live." He further
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announced that Henderson would return to Berlin, The Ambassador did so on April 24. Coulondre followed him. It was announced at the same time that another repentant appeaser, the Marquess of Lothian (Philip Kerr), would replace Sir Ronald Lindsay as British Ambassador in Washington. On April 2 6 Chamberlain proposed the introduction of limited conscription in Britain. The diplomatic effect of this revolutionary decision was partly nullified by the circumstance that the French Right press, followed by the London Times and other organs of the Munichmen, soon began to plead for a resumption of "peaceful negotiations" and to argue that Danzig, after all, was "not worth a war." New "assurances" from Aiussolini were brought to London by the Earl of Perth, retiring British Ambassador in Rome, who left his post on April 24. He was later made Chief of the Publicity Department of the Foreign Office. Sir Percy Loraine succeeded him in the Italian capital. The Caesars meanwhile bided their time and devised means of turning Roosevelt's move to their advantage. Mussolini made no reply apart from the statement in a radio address of April 20 in which he declared that preparations for the Rome Exposition of 1942 showed Italy's pacific intentions:
. . . This should be considered a promising indication that we do not intend to attack any one, and that we want instead to continue our work. It is therefore absolutely unjust and unjustifiable from any point of view to attempt to place nations of the Axis on the seat of the accused. N o less absurd is the proposal of reciprocal guarantees lasting ten years which do not take into account the pyramidal errors of geography into which individuals have fallen who have not even the most rudimentary knowledge of European affairs. As for the proposed expansive conference in which the United States would limit itself effectively to its customary role of distant spectator, experience gives us some bitter lessons on this score; namely, that the greater the number of conferees the more certainty there is of failure. W h e t h e r or not any reply is sent to the well-known message I cannot pass up this occasion to reaffirm that the policy of Rome and of the Axis is a policy inspired by the criteria of peace and of collaboration, of which Germany and Italy have given many concrete proofs. It is therefore time to reduce to silence the sowers of panic, anticipators of catastrophes, professional fatalists who often cover with a great banner their fear, their insensate hatred, or defense of their more or less inadmissible interests.
15 7
We, however, do not allow ourselves to be impressed by press campaigns or convivial vociferations, or by Messiah-like messages, because we have a tranquil conscience and we have both men and means to defend the peace of all, along with our own. . . .
Hitler announced that he would reply on April 28. He sent queries to a number of States on Roosevelt's list, soliciting assurances that they did not feel themselves menaced. Gobbels toured the Near East. Goring lingered in Italy. Brauchitsch visited Rome and Libya. Teleki and Czaky of Hungary visited Italy and Germany. Foreign Minister Gafencu of Rumania departed on a Cook's tour of Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Belgrade. Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovich of Jugoslavia called upon Ciano and Ribbentrop. Vice-Commissar Vladimir Potemkin of the U.S.S.R. subsequently visited Ankara, Sofia, Bucharest and Warsaw. What, if anything, was achieved by these peregrinations was not revealed. Hitler's Reichstag address was an unusually adroit appeal to the Munichmen in the Western democracies, despite the fact that it contained no threats against Russia. The Fiihrer revealed that he had already made his "one and only" offer to Poland and announced the abrogation of the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934 and the Anglo-German naval accord of 193 5. Memoranda to this effect were submitted to London and Warsaw, alleging that the Anglo-Polish commitments had invalidated both agreements. Hitler went on for 2 '/2 hours, warming to his subject and waxing humorous at Roosevelt's expense. He reviewed the record of his achievements at length. He, not "American clairvoyants," had acted to insure peace. In Czecho-Slovakia alone he had confiscated 1582 planes, 501 anti-aircraft guns, 2175 pieces of artillery, 785 mine-throwers, 469 tanks, 43,875 machine guns, 114,000 automatic pistols, 1,090,000 rifles and all kinds of other material of war. Here was no violation of any agreement with Mr. Chamberlain, but merely a pacific step to prevent "some madman or other" from getting control of vast stores of munitions. After recapitulating at length the objectives of Nazi policy, he turned to a specific reply to the American President in the form of 21 numbered points, all of them revealing extreme care in preparation, thorough familiarity with anti-Roosevelt sentiment in the United States and a nice mastery of symbols with which
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to refute and repudiate the plea of April 15. He paid his respects to Allied and American acts of war since 1919; to the mendacity of the democratic press which spreads alarm and panic "which in the end go so far that interventions from another planet are believed possible and cause scenes of desperate alarm"; to the Treaty of Versailles; to the wisdom of isolationism for America ("I do not believe that every conflict must have disastrous consequences for the whole globe, provided the whole world is not systematically brought into such conflicts by means of a network of nebulous pact obligations"); to the war-mongers ("It is a punishable neglect, to use no worse word, if the leaders of nations are not capable of controlling their newspapers which are agitating for war and so saving the world from the threatening calamity of an armed conflict. I am not able to understand further why these responsible leaders, instead of cultivating diplomatic relations between nations, make them more difficult and indeed disturb them by recalling ambassadors, etc., without any reason"); to the imperialism of the democracies ("Moroccans, Berbers, Arabs, Negroes, etc., have all fallen victim to foreign might, the swords of which, however, were inscribed not 'Made in Germany,' but 'Made by Democracies' " ) . He denied that any small State felt threatened by aggression or that he had ever waged or contemplated war for any purpose. He endorsed Senator Nye:
America's entry into the Great W a r was not a case of unquestionable home defense. A research committee set up by President Roosevelt himself has examined the cause of America's entry into the Great W a r and reached the conclusion that the entry ensued for exclusively capitalistic reasons. Nevertheless, no practical conclusions have been drawn from this fact. Let us hope, then, that at least the United States will in the future itself act according to this noble principle, and will not go to war against any country except in the case of unquestionable home defense.
He deftly ridiculed American championship of the conference method of rectifying injustices:

M y skepticism is based on the fact that it was America herself who gave sharpest expression to her mistrust in the effectiveness of conferences. For the greatest conference of all time was without any doubt the League of Nations. T h a t authoritative body, representing all the peoples of the world,
Words from Washingto72
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created in accordance with the will of an American President, was supposed to solve the problems of humanity at the council table. The first State, however, that shrank from this endeavor was the United Statesthe reason being that President Wilson himself even then nourished the greatest doubts of the possibility of really being able to solve decisive international problems at the conference table. . . . It was not till after years of purposeless participation that I resolved to follow the example of America and likewise leave the largest conference in the world. Since then I have solved the problems concerning my people which, like all others, were, unfortunately, not solved at the conference table of the League of Nationsand, too, without recourse to war in any case. . . . The freedom of North America was not achieved at the conference table any more than the conflict between the North and the South was decided there. I will say nothing about the innumerable struggles which finally led to the subjugation of the North American Continent as a whole. The Fiihrer went on to say that only one nation had ever laid down its arms before entering a conference: As soon as the German nation had laid down its arms it was not even invited to the conference table, but in violation of all assurances was made to suffer the worst perfidy that had ever been known. Then one day, instead of the greatest confusion known in history being resolved around the conference table, the most cruel dictated treaty in the world brought about a still more fearful confusion. . . . German representatives will never again enter a conference that is for them a tribunal. For who is to be the judge there? . . . Incidentally, the United States itself declined to enter the League of Nations and to become the victim of a Court which was able, by a majority vote, to give a verdict against individual interests. But I should be grateful to President Roosevelt if he would explain to the world what the new World Court is to be like. As for a statement of German policy, he had made manybut always to the German people. W h y should he make one to the American President, particularly since other States were not asked to do likewise? "We on our side might with the same right address to the President of the American repubUc the question as to what aim American foreign policy has in view in its turn and on what intentions this policy is based, in the case of the Central and South American States, for instance. In this case Mr. Roosevelt would rightly, I must admit, refer to the Monroe Doc-
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Toward
the Great
Coalition
trine and decline to comply with such a request as an interference in the internal affairs of the American continent. W e Germans support a similar doctrine for Europeand above all for the territory and the interests of the Greater German Reich. Moreover, I would obviously never presume to address such a request to the President of the United States of America, because I assume that he would probably rightly consider such a presumption tactless." As for States alleged to feel themselves threatened, inquiries had been made: The reply was in all cases negative, in some instances strongly so. It is true that I could not cause inquiries to be made of certain of the States and nations mentioned because they themselvesas for example, Syriaare at present not in possession of their freedom, but are occupied and consequently deprived of their rights by the military agents of democratic States. Apart from this fact, however, all States bordering on Germany have received much more binding assurances and above all, suggestions, than Mr. Roosevelt asked from me in his curious telegram. . . . He mentions Ireland, for instance, and asks for a statement to the effect that Germany will not attack Ireland. Now, I have just read a speech delivered by de Valera, the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), in which, strangely enough, and contrary to Mr. Roosevelt's opinion, he does not charge Germany with oppressing Ireland, but reproaches England with subjecting Ireland to continuous aggression at her hands. . . . In the same way, the fact has obviously escaped Mr. Roosevelt's notice that Palestine is at present occupied not by German troops but by the English; and that the country is having its liberty restricted by the most brutal resort to force, is being robbed of its independence and is suffering the cruelest maltreatment for the benefit of Jewish interlopers. The Arabs living in that country wUl therefore certainly not have complained to Mr. Roosevelt of German aggression, but they do voice a continuous appeal to the world, deploring the barbarous methods with which England is attempting to suppress a people which loves its freedom and is but defending it. . . . The German Government is nevertheless prepared to give each of the States named an assurance of the kind desired by Mr. Roosevelt on the condition of absolute reciprocity, provided that the State wishes it and itself addresses to Germany a request for such an assurance together with appropriate proposals. . . . And I here solemnly declare that all the assertions which have been circulated in any way concerning an intended German attack or invasion on or in American territory are rank frauds and gross untruths, quite apart
i6i
from the fact that such assertions, as far as the military possibilities are concerned, could have their origin only in a stupid imagination.
As for disarmament, Germany had disarmed once (he enumerated all the weapons surrendered), only to be "disgracefully deceived." He had nevertheless proposed disarmament agreements on many occasions. All had been rejected. No economic conference was likely to succeed because various countries are "not able to maintain order in their domestic economic system" or "infect the international capital market with uncertainty by currency manipulation and, above all, by causing continual fluctuations in value of their currencies to one another. It is likewise an unbearable burden for world economic relations that it should be possible that some countries for some ideological reason or other to let loose a wild boycott of agitation against other countries and their goods and so practically eliminate them from the market." Let Roosevelt reduce the American tariff. Let him bring about the restoration of the stolen German colonies. Let him contemplate how Hitler had solved the unemployment problem in Germany, re-united and re-armed German people and torn up the Treaty of Versailles without spilling a drop of blood.
I, who twenty-one years ago was an unknown worker and soldier of my people, have attained this, Mr. Roosevelt, by my own energy, and can, therefore, in the face of history, claim a place among those men who have done the utmost which can be fairly and justly demanded from a single individual. You, Mr. Roosevelt, have a much easier task in comparison. You became President of the United States in 1933 when I became Chancellor of the Reich. In other words, from the very outset you stepped to the head of one of the largest and wealthiest States in the world. You have the good fortune to have to feed scarcely fifteen people per square kilometer in your country. You have at your disposal the most unlimited mineral resources in the world. . . . Conditions prevailing in your country are on such a large scale that you can find time and leisure to give your attention to universal problems. Consequently, the world is undoubtedly so small for you that you perhaps believe that your intervention and action can be effective everywhere. In this sense, therefore, your concerns and suggestions cover a much larger and wider area than mine, because my world, Mr. Roosevelt, in which Providence has placed me and for which I am therefore obliged to work, is unfortunately much smaller, although for me it is more precious
162
than anything else, for it is limited to my people! I believe, however, that this is the viây in vi'hich I can be of the most service to that for which we are all concerned, namely, the justice, wellbeing, progress and peace of the whole human community.
This masterpiece of Hitlerical oratory achieved several purposes at once. By exposing the hollowness of Roosevelt's words and contrasting American professions of purpose with American deeds, it demonstrated the absence of any American foreign policy. It furnished new ammunition to the domestic critics of the President and promoted further confusion in the United States. It held out new incentives to Anglo-French appeasers by an adroit blending of professions of peaceful intent with complaints over "legitimate grievances" and threats of doom if "encirclement" were persisted in. It reaffirmed Axis solidarity and paved the way for the formal alliance soon to come. It freed the Reich from the encumbrances of the German-Polish and Anglo-German accords and twisted Roosevelt's formula into a plea for bilateral non-aggression pacts with the weaker neighbors of Germany. On the day of the address German diplomatic notes were dispatched to London and Warsaw. Downing Street was told that German acceptance of the naval pact of June i8, 1935, had been a great concession by the Reich to Britain, despite the fact that in this agreement Baldwin, Simon and Hoare had acquiesced in German violation of the naval clauses of Versailles by granting the Reich parity in submarines and a ratio of naval tonnage in other categories equal to 35% of the British tonnage.^ In concluding the original agreement London had violated the treaty rights of France and other Powers and had jeopardized Soviet naval security in the Baltic. For this act of bad faith it had received no quid pro- quo from the Reich save the pledge to restrict German naval building to the ratio specified. The German note of April 28, 1939, however, argued that Britain had withdrawn a quid pro quo allegedly granted to Germany as a condition of German concurrence in the bargain. This was the exclusion "for all time" of any possibility of conflict between Germany and Britain, "naturally conditional on the British Government's intention to adopt a political attitude which would assure a friendly development of Anglo-German relations." Germany had "never intervened in
1 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 145-52.
163
the sphere of British interests nor encroached in any way on these interests." But the British Government "are lately departing more and more from the course of an analogous policy towards Germany." Recent British decisions and "the inspired anti-German attitude of the British press" revealed that Britain "must always take up an attitude hostile to Germany, in whatever part of Europe Germany might be involved in war-like conflict, even in a case where British interests are not affected in any way by such a conflict."
Thus the British Government no longer regard a war between Britain and Germany as an impossibility, but, on the contrary, as a cardinal problem of British foreign policy. By means of this encirclement policy, the British Government have unilaterally deprived the Naval Agreement of June i8, 1935, of its basis, and have thus put out of force this Agreement, as well as the complementary declarations of July 17, 1937. The same applies to Part III of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of July 17, 1937, which establishes the obligation to make a mutual AngloGerman exchange of information. The execution of this obligation rests naturally on the condition that a relationship of open confidence should exist between the two partners. Since the German Government, to their regret, can no longer recognize the existence of this relationship, they must also conclude that the provisions of Part III, referred to above, have lapsed.
The Reich would abide by the qualitative provisions of the 1937 agreement so as to "make their contribution to the prevention of a general unlimited international race in naval armaments" and it would welcome new negotiations for "a clear and unambiguous understanding on a sure basis" (G 294). The same formula was used in a longer note to Poland, Warsaw was accused of having broken the pact of 1934 ^ by virtue of the Anglo-Polish agreement. The Reich had entered into the pact in all good faith. The Anglo-Polish accord was in "open contradiction" to it. "The German Government can only regard such a sudden and radical change of Polish policy with astonishment and estrangement." Poland had pledged itself to interfere in any Anglo-German conflict "even if this conflict does not at all touch upon Poland and its interests." Poland had "rendered itself subservient" to a policy of encirclement. "The German Govern1 Cf. Europe on the Eve, p. 98.
164
ment, on the other hand, have not given the slightest cause for such a change of Polish policy." Germany had proposed a reasonable solution of the problem of Danzig and the Corridor. Poland's answer had been "tantamount to a rejection of the German offer." Poland had partially mobilized its army and sought British aid. "The Polish Government have thereby arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration (the non-aggression pact) inoperative." The Reich vôuld welcome new negotiations and a new settlement, "and make only one stipulation, that it must be based on a definite obligation binding on both parties" (G 213). Thus were bids made for new agreements in communications announcing the unilateral abrogation of old onesand adding insult to injury by accusing the recipients of having broken their word. Simultaneously Wilhelmstrasse invited other States to conclude non-aggression pacts with the Reich. The supposition was that there were no limits to democratic gullibility. Negotiations to this end were opened early in May with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. A pact had already been signed with Lithuania on March 22 at the time of the re-annexation of Memel (G 342). Latvia assented in principle on May 4. Estonia followed suit. The Scandinavian States at a meeting of foreign ministers in Stockholm on May 9 decided that "the Northern countries as hitherto remain outside of all groups of Powers that may be formed in Europe and in the event of war will do everything to avoid being involved." But each State was left free to answer the German invitation as it chose. Norway, Sweden and Finland sent polite refusals (G 344), while Denmark joined the lesser Baltic states in acceptance. "The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no circumstances go to war or employ force of any kind against one another. Should action of the kind specified be taken by a third power against one of the contracting parties, the other contracting party will in no way support such action." Thus read Article i of the Danish-German Treaty of Non-Aggression of May 31, 1939. By Article 2, the pact was to be binding for ten years and would run for another ten years if not terminated by notice at least one year before the expiration of this period. A Protocol specified that normal exchange of goods under the rules of neutrality would not be deemed "support" to any third power against either signatory (G 345). The Estonian and Latvian
165
treaties of June 7, 1939 (G 346,347), were identical in language with the Danish treaty, save that they were to run concurrently with neither remaining in force longer than the other. There is food for reflection in the circumstance that this series of treaty texts in the German White Book concludes with the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23. The ten-year pact with Denmark was observed by the Reich for 11 months and 21 days, at the end of which time Denmark was abruptly occupied by the Reichswehr and its independence terminated. The pacts with the Baltic states were nullified by the mutual assistance agreements imposed upon them by the U.S.S.R. in the fall of 1939. The German accord with Lithuania nevertheless endured for 16 months and those with Estonia and Latvia for 13. Their final termination was effected on July 21, 1940, by the "voluntary" incorporation of the three Baltic states into the Soviet Union, which in turn had long-standing non-aggression pacts of its own with all of them. "Respect for the pledged word," to use Welles' phrase, was conspicuous by its absence in all cases. But the pacts had served their purpose in encouraging isolationist neutrality on the part of the neighbors of the Reich. Each signatory had pledged its neutrality in any conflict between Germany (or the U.S.S.R.) and any of the others and had thereby escaped the "entanglements" involved in common action for common defense. All had thereby facilitated the process whereby the aggressor was able to conquer each without interference from the others. If the United States could have been said to possess a "foreign policy," and if that policy could have been said to rest upon any "principles," its cardinal principle was precisely this rule which Germany's neighbors so trustingly followed. Roosevelt's words of April 15 were thus not taken wholly in vain.
CHAPTER
FIVE
AGGRESSORS'
ALLIANCE
I. FASCIST
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
AXIS
and Galleazzo Ciano both attained distinction through matrimony. The latter married power in the person of Edda MussoHni, daughter of the Duce. The former married money in the person of Annelies Henkel, heiress to a champagne fortune. The Nazi Foreign Minister was born plain Joachim Ribbentrop, son of Richard Ribbentrop, a retired army ofBcer of Wesel on the Rhine. One of his aunts by marriage, a lady of aristocratic lineage, sent him to boarding school in Grenoble, where he learned to win friends and influence people in French, and later to London where he became a clerk in a German importing company. In 1910 he sailed to America to make his fortune. The next four years he spent selling Rhine wine in Canada. In 1914 he returned to the Reich via a Dutch boat from New York. After service on both fronts, he worked in the War Ministry and was sent in 1918 to Turkey where he met Franz von Papen. As adjutant of the German delegation he witnessed the signing of the Versailles "Dictate." He was a pacifist and a socialist. But he was not above making a tidy sum during the early years of the French occupation of the Rhineland by speculating in inflated marks and importing French wines duty-free. He became intimate with several Jewish banking families and is alleged to have become an Anglophile under the influence of Madame Rothschild. He married in 1920. His father-in-law made him a partner in the wine firm of Henkel & Co. His noble aunt was persuaded to adopt him in 1926 and thereby to bestow upon him the coveted
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Danzig's Freedom
17 3
to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others , . . because if he conquers, you are at his discretion." If Mussolini felt any anxiety on this score, he left his worries to the future. 2. D A N Z I G ' S F R E E D O M Among the Hansa towns which grew up along the shores of the North and Baltic Seas during the German Middle Ages, Danzig long held an honored place. Its Hege lords were not German princes but the Kings of Poland through whose realm flowed the Vistula. The Danzigers built their town east of the river's estuary. In the dim past a Duke Conrad of Masovia had invited the Crusading Order of Teutonic Knights to help him protect his duchy against the Slavic pagans of Prussia, whose lands lay near the site of Danzig. After a series of wars of extermination, extending over the middle decades of the 13 th century, the Knights conquered Prussia and brought German colonists in their wake to dispossess the original Prussians who went the way of the vanquished. The Knights, who displayed a degree of ruthless ambition worthy of their Nazi successors, attacked the Lithuanians in 1309, They massacred the Danzigers. They seized the Baltic
In a similar manner the two governments will also constantly arrive at understandings concerning other measures necessary for the practical execution of the provisions of this act. The two governments will form standing commissions for the purposes indicated above under Articles i and 2. These commissions shall be under the jurisdiction of the two Foreign Ministers. 5. The contracting parties obligate themselves now, in the event of war conducted jointly, to conclude an armistice and peace only in full agreement with each other. 6. The two contracting parties are conscious of the importance which attaches to their common relations to powers with whom they are on terms of friendship. They are determined in the future too, to keep up these relationships and jointly to give them a form consonant with the mutual interests that bind these powers. 7. This pact becomes effective immediately from the moment of signature. The two contracting parties are in agreement to fix the first period of its effectiveness for ten years. They will come to an understanding in sufficient time (rechtzeitig) before expiration of this period concerning the extension of the effectiveness of the pact. NYT 5.22.39. The text of the treaty is not given in G, B, F or P, since Italy was still neutral when these publications were issued. Neither are there any other documents available as yet on German-Italian relations.
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Alliance
shore up to the Gulf of Finland but were beaten back from the Russian hinterland by Alexander Nevsky. They occupied Eastern Pomerania, inhabited by the Poles. But at Tannenberg and Griinewald in 14 lo they were defeated by the united Poles and Lithuanians. By the second treaty of Thorn, 1466, Poland recovered Pomerania, West Prussia and Danzig, while East Prussia, still held by the Knights, became a feudal dependency of the Polish Crown. The Grand Master of the Order was now a vassal of the Polish king, a relationship which continued after 1511 when the Mastery passed to Albrecht, Margrave of Brandenburg, of the Hohenzollern-Anspach line. In the years which followed the Poles restored the Slavic character of West Prussia or "Pomorze" (By the Sea) which connected the heart of the kingdom with the Baltic. But their colonization efforts in East Prussia failed to deprive the erstwhile realm of the Knights of its Germanic character. Danzig too had become almost completely German. In 1457 it received a charter from King Casimir which granted substantial independence, a status which it enjoyed until the annexation of the city by the King of Prussia in the second partition of Poland in 1793. From 1807 until 1814 it was again a "Free City," but it reverted to Prussia with the fall of Bonaparte, and remained Prussian until
1919.
At the Paris Peace Conference the resurrected Poland of Pilsudski's ambitious colonels and the land-hungry gentry demanded annexation of East Prussia, Danzig and Pomorze (the "Corridor"). The latter area was predominantly Polish. But the 400,000 burghers of Danzig were almost soUdly German. The conference decided that Danzig should again become a Free City, with its foreign relations, customs, railways, telegraphs and postal service controlled by Poland and with its internal administration in the hands of a local legislature. Its "freedom" was guaranteed by the League of Nations. A League High Commissioner was appointed to act as intermediary between Danzig and Poland. East Prussia was also German. Even its Polish-speaking Mazurians in Marienwerder and Allenstein voted to remain German in the plebiscite of July 11, 1920. The separation of East Prussia from the rest of the Reich became a major grievance to all German patriotsand one not to be assuaged by the treaty of 1921 whereby Warsaw granted the Reich an unimpeded right of transit across Pomorze.
Danzig's Freedom
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These arrangements, coupled with the partition of Upper Silesia in 1921, fell far short of the original Pohsh demands, but they transferred a million Germans to Polish rule. "We will never consent to a restoration of Poland," declared Bismarck in 1886. "Between Prussia and Poland there is a struggle for existence." ' Thirty-three years later Prussia consented under force majeure. But the survival of Poland, like the "independence" of Danzig, depended upon the maintenance of military superiority over Germany by the new Poland and her allies. In order to be effective, this military superiority had to be maintained against Russia as well as against Prussia, for the rulers of the new Poland had not been content with the boundary of language in the east, as projected by the "Curzon Line" of December, 1919. They had insisted on the frontiers of 1772. Pilsudski marched on Vilna in April, 1919, and proposed a union of Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine in a Greater Poland. A year later he invaded the Soviet Ukraine, despite Russia's recognition of Polish independence and its willingness to negotiate a compromise frontier. In alliance with the Ukrainian Nationalist leader, Petlura, Polish forces seized Kiev and sought to reach the Black Sea. But the ragged hordes of the Red Army were too numerous. General Tukhachevsky led the counter-attack with the words: "The destinies of the World Revolution will be settled in the West. Our way toward worldwide conflagration passes over the corpse of Poland." By July, 1920, the Communist armies were driving on Warsaw. The Allies dispatched a military mission to aid Poland, including two outstanding anti-Bolsheviks: Lord d'Abernon and General Maxime Weygand. The Reds were driven back. The world revolution was postponed. Warsaw was saved. The elated Pilsudski, contrary to his pledges to the Western Powers, launched a new invasion of Russia and by the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, annexed a million and a half White Russians and between five and seven million Ukrainians, in addition to the Lithuanians of Vilna which was again seized by the Poles in October, 1920, and held for nineteen years thereafter in the face of constant Lithuanian protests. The new Poland with an area of 150,000 square miles and 34,000,000 people, included only 23,000,000 Poles in an area
1 P. 73 of Raymond Leslie Buell's admirable study, PolandKey to Europe, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, third edition, October, 1939.
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Aggressors^
Alliance
of 90,000 square miles. The rest of its lands had been taken from Germany, Lithuania, the U.S.S.R. and (after Munich) Czechoslovakia. They were inhabited by minorities whose rights were in part protected by the treaty of 1919 (repudiated by Warsaw in 1934), but whose deepest loyalties were not to Poland. There followed a decade and a half of chronic Polish-German friction over Danzig and the Corridor (cf. G 1-196 and P 1-42). The Nazis succeeded between 1933 and 1938 in incorporating Danzig into the party structure of the Third Reich, if not into its territorial frontiers. Local Nazis supported from Berhn took over the Free City in violation of its democratic constitution, formally guaranteed by the League of Nations. The Western Powers abdicated in September, 1936. Sean Lester, League High Commissioner, was recalled. His successor. Professor Carl J. Burckhardt, a Swiss historian, was a friend of Hitler. He obligingly recognized that he had no authority. Poland acquiesced in the assumption of power in Danzig by a Gauleiter appointed by the Fiihrer on condition that Polish economic and military rights be respected. The Third Reich's diplomatic and psychological offensive against Poland followed hard on the heels of the Ides of March, 1939. The groundwork, however, had been laid after Munich. On October 24, 1938, Ribbentrop conferred with Polish Ambassador Josef Lipski at Berchtesgaden. On Beck's instructions Lipski pleaded for Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to aiford a common PoUsh-Hungarian frontier. Ribbentrop evaded this issue but proposed, in strictest confidence, "a clean sweep of all existing sources of friction between Germany and Poland . . . to crown the work inaugurated by Pilsudski and the Fiihrer." He suggested forthwith the formal return of Danzig to the Reich, an extraterritorial motor road and railway across the Corridor, a guarantee of the Danzig market for Polish goods, a reciprocal guarantee of the new frontiers, an extension of from 10 to 25 years of the German-Polish non-aggression pact, and an additional clause providing for consultation over all future controversies. Ribbentrop did not ask an immediate answer. Lipski promised to discuss these proposals with Beck. "The tone of the conversation was friendly throughout" (G 197). Lipski's report of this discussion corroborates the German version, save that he attributed to Ribbentrop a willingness to con-
Danzig's Freedom
I'j'j
sider German-Polish cooperation in colonial questions, in "Jewish emigration from Poland" and in a common policy toward Russia within the framework of the anti-Comintern pact. The Ambassador also indicated that he had expressed grave doubts to Ribbentrop regarding the possibiHty of Warsaw ever assenting to the reunion of Danzig with the Reich. The Foreign Minister had suggested that if Poland should accept the German view regarding Danzig and the Corridor highway "the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia might find a solution conforming to the desires of Poland" (P 44). Beck's reply to Ribbentrop was a message to Lipski on October 31 reiterating Poland's desire for good relations. He agreed that the 1934 accord should be "perfected." But since Danzig was one of the most important arteries of Polish trade, with a very special maritime significance for Poland, and since it could not serve Polish commercial needs in the absence of a customs union with its Polish hinterland, Warsaw must insist upon the maintenance of the status quo. Poland respected the liberty assured to the Germans of Danzig. Poland asked respect for Poland's rights: unlimited access to the sea; ownership of the railroads serving Danzig and Gdynia; the inclusion of the Free City in the Polish customs area; and the rights of the Polish minority. Any other solution "and in particular that of incorporating Danzig in the Reich would inevitably end in conflict" (P 45). He was wîlling, however, to substitute a bilateral German-Polish agreement for the League guarantees and to visit Germany for further discussion. On November 19 Lipski conveyed this response to Ribbentrop, emphasizing the difficulty of accepting the German proposals "for reasons of internal policy." The Foreign Minister deplored Beck's attitude. He did not regard the plan of a bilateral pact as "very practical." He asked the Polish position as to the extraterritorial highway. Lipski replied that he could not make any official pronouncement as to this, but he beUeved that "such a wish on the part of Germany might conceivably not fall on barren ground in Poland" ( G 198). Ribbentrop assured him that Berlin wished to deal with German-Polish relations in the broadest possible way. The Reich would not treat Poland as it had treated Benes. Beck's policy had been very clear and logical. Ribbentrop regretted, however, that Beck had publicly told a representative of the Hearst press in October that Poland would not discuss any
178
Aggressors^
Alliance
reunion of Danzig with the Reich. Lipski repeated that any German effort at Anschluss could only lead to a conflict (P 46). Hans von Moltke, German Ambassador in Warsaw, told Beck a few days later that amicable relations were too important to be disturbed by this or that difference of views. Beck agreed. It was for this reason that he had told Lipski to make clear the Polish position on Danzig by "eine offene Aussprache" (P 47). Moltke saw Beck again in mid-December to suggest a personal talk between the two Foreign Ministers. Beck assented, since such a discussion might dispel Polish suspicions on the one hand that Germany "intended to use Carpatho-Ukraine as the springboard for an anti-Polish policy" and German suspicions on the other that Poland wished to bar Germany from the Danubian region (G
199)-
These negotiations culminated in Beck's visit to Berchtesgaden on January 5, 1939, and Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw on January 25. At the former meeting Beck told Hitler, in the presence of Ribbentrop, Moltke and Lipski, that Poland was seriously concerned with the international guarantee of Czecho-Slovakia and the ultimate fate of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Fiihrer replied that Germany had "no interests on the other side of the Carpathians." As for Danzig a new departure must be attempted. "The Fiihrer had in mind a formula by which Danzig would return to Germany politically, but would remain with Poland economically. Danzig was German, would always remain German, and sooner or later would return to Germany." Communications with East Prussia were as vital to the Reich as access to the sea was to Poland. Novel methods would afford a solution. If Warsaw would agree to Berlin's terms, Germany would guarantee Poland's frontiers anew by treaty. No leader save Hitler "was in a position to engineer such a solution." There would be criticism within Germany, but if Poland would accept a general settlement "one would hear as little about the Polish Corridor as one now heard about the South Tyrol or Alsace-Lorraine." Beck replied that Poland thoroughly appreciated the German viewpoint and would hold fast to its old independent policy, having no trust in "security systems" or pacts with Russia. Polish opinion, however, made the Danzig question difficult, and it was not only a question of the opinion of the "coffee house opposition" (G 200). On January 6, in Munich, Beck and Ribbentrop continued the
Danzig's Freedom
179
discussion. Beck said he "had cudgelled his brains" for a solution of the Danzig question, "but without results so far." Ribbentrop repeated his original proposal and said that Berlin could not be disinterested in any alteration of the status of Carpatho-Ukraine. Beck invited him to Warsaw (G 201). According to the Polish account Hitler had emphasized the need of a strong Poland for defense against Russia, while Ribbentrop, in reply to Beck's pessimism over Danzig, had denied that Germany sought any violent solution (P 48, 49). The Warsaw discussions of January 25-27 brought the issue no nearer to a settlement. Ribbentrop told President Moscicki and Marshal Smigly-Rydz that the Chancellor desired an enduring entente with Poland. There would be no German blow at Danzig. All problems admitted of a pacific solution. Beck rejected the proposal for an extraterritorial highway, but agreed with Ribbentrop that if the League gave up its functions in Danzig a GermanPolish declaration should be issued to maintain the status quo. Poland could not join the anti-Comintern pact nor consent to any reunion of Danzig with Germany (P 50-56). Ribbentrop stressed the moderate character of the German proposals and asserted that "99 out of 100 Englishmen or Frenchmen would say at once, if asked, that at least the return of Danzig and of the Corridor was a natural demand on the part of Germany" (G 202). The deadlock over Danzig and the Corridor remained unbroken until the outbreak of war. It is noteworthy that the German suggestions were not accompanied by any overt pressure until March, 1939. Hitler and Ribbentrop regarded them as extremely modest and hoped that the projected guarantee of Poland's frontiers would induce Warsaw to accept them. Had these proposals been generally known about in the West, it is probable that public opinion in the democracies would have regarded them as fair, despite the distrust engendered by Munich and the November pogrom. They remained secret, however, until April. There is no documentary evidence that Warsaw or Berlin communicated their terms to London or Paris. Bonnet apparently had no authoritative news of them until the last week of March (F 83-88). Ribbentrop later declared that the offer was never flatly rejected by the Polish leaders. Even he did not suggest that the Polish attitude up to March was attributable to French or British influence. There is in fact no documentary evidence of any ad-
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vice or support from the Western capitals to Warsaw.^ W h y then did Smigly-Rydz and Beck avoid a final answer and adopt a negative attitude? T o say that "Polish opinion" forbade acceptance of the German proposals is to assume that Poland vvâs a democracy and that the Polish leaders lacked means of controlling opinion. Warsaw's attitude was "realistic." Beck hoped to secure a common frontier with Hungary as a quid pro quo. Had Ribbentrop proposed a bargain on this basis during the autumn, Beck might have accepted it. But the Nazi leaders were still cherishing the Ukrainian dream. When Carpatho-Ukraine was finally given to Budapest (March 16), the rape of Czecho-Slovakia had enhanced Polish suspicions to a point at which no such bargain was any longer acceptable. Indeed, it may have been impossible from the outset, for the Polish leaders had no confidence in Nazi pledges. They had observed that other States which granted German requests found that each concession paved the way for new demands. They believed erroneously that Poland was a Great Power. They supposed erroneously that the defense of the Corridor, and therefore of Poland as a whole, was secure so long as Danzig remained "Free" and Poland possessed unimpaired sovereignty over Pomorze. They assumed that acceptance of the German demands would jeopardize Polish security and that new demands would follow if Poland yielded. In short, Warsaw was inspired by justified suspicion of Nazi motives and by unjustified confidence in Poland's ability to resist the Reich. At no time was Berlin (or Paris or London) able to shake this confidence or alleviate these suspicions. The Reich's road to war and Poland's road to ruin therefore became a broad highway which ran undeviatingly toward its goal. The goal was not predetermined on either side, but was nevertheless implicit in the nature of the original deadlock. After the Ides of March, threats and recriminations became the order of the day in the relations between Berlin and Warsaw. The press of each country insulted the other with increasing vehemence. Each government accused the other of tolerating the persecution of minorities. When Polish and German students clashed in Danzig (G 195) and Polish mobs demonstrated before the German Embassy in Warsaw, throwing stones through the windows and shouting: "Down with Hitler" and "Long Live
1 Cf. Ribbentrop's address at Danzig, October 24, 1939, NYT 10.25.39.
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Polish Danzig!" Ribbentrop protested and Beck apologized. But such gestures did not stem the rising tide of hatred on both sides of the frontier ( G 146,147). The contest of wills was resumed on March 21 when Ribbentrop summoned Lipski to explain to him the circumstances of the end of Czecho-Slovakia and to express the hope that the final disposition of Carpatho-Ukraine "had caused great satisfaction in Poland." Lipski, who had sought in vain, despite the promised intercession of General von Keitel, to secure an interview with Ribbentrop or Weizsacker on Anarch 11, 12 and 13 (P 147), complained that the protectorate over Slovakia could only be regarded as a threat to Poland. This Ribbentrop promptly denied. He suggested that Lipski go to Warsaw to report to Beck in person and invite him to visit Berlin to negotiate a final settlement on the basis of the original German proposal. "This was also important because up to now the Fiihrer could not but be astonished at the peculiar attitude adopted by Poland on a number of questions. It was important that he should not gain the impression that Poland simply did not want to reach a settlement" (G 203). According to Lipski, Ribbentrop solicited Polish gratitude for the German defeat of Russia in 1914-17, which had made possible Poland's resurrection, and for Hitler's repudiation of Schleicher's scheme for a German-Soviet alliance which would have meant the downfall of the Polish state. "He insisted that any German-Polish entente should have manifestly anti-Soviet tendencies. He affirmed that Germany would never make a bargain with the Soviets." Lipski suspected that Ribbentrop desired to "neutralize" Poland while Memel was being occupied (P 61). The calling up of Polish reserves did not improve the atmosphere. The moves of the chancelleries now began to revolve in a vicious circle, British support of Poland and the subsequent British pledge of March 31 were inspired by fear of a sudden German blow at Danzig and the Corridor. The British pledge in turn made Warsaw more recalcitrant toward Berlin. Berlin accused London of making a German-Polish settlement impossible and increased its pressure on Warsaw. The more the pressure increased, the more vivid became Polish and British fears and the more firm became the attitude of London and Warsaw toward German demands. The greater the resistance encountered, the more determined became the Nazi leaders to increase the pressure
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and to see plots of "encirclement" in every new development. Ribbentrop received Lipski again on March 26 "with marked coldness" (P 63). He perused a memorandum which the Ambassador submitted from Beck and repeated that "the only possible solution of the problem was the reunion of Danzig with the Reich and the construction of an extraterritorial motor road and railway connection between the Reich and East Prussia. M. Lipski replied that it was his painful duty to draw attention to the fact that any further pursuance of these German plans, especially where the return of Danzig to the Reich was concerned, meant war with Poland" (G 208). Ribbentrop retorted that Polish troop concentration might prove dangerous and that any violation of Danzig territory would be treated as a violation of the Reich's frontiers. Lipski denied any such intentions. In view of the German military actions at Prague and in Slovakia and the German naval action at Memel, he felt that Ribbentrop's indignation over Polish defense measures was "at least bizarre." Ribbentrop pleaded for a general German-Polish "Ausgleich" and noted that the Reich now recognized the "priority" of Poland in Ukrainian questions. He quoted Hitler as denying that Danzig had any military importance. Lipski referred to the map and to the demilitarization of the Free City (P 63,147). Each man besought the other to persuade his superiors to reconsider (G 208). The Polish memorandum was conciliatory in tone, but expressly excluded any infringement on Polish sovereignty in the Corridor. It proposed that Germany and Poland jointly guarantee the "freedom" of Danzig. It thereby excluded any Anschluss of Danzig with the Reich (G 208, appendix; P 62). On March 28 Ribbentrop protested to Lipski over anti-German demonstrations in Bromberg (G 209). Moltke reported from Warsaw that anti-German and pro-war feeling was growing with the encouragement of the Polish authorities (G 210) and that Beck had told him on the 28th that any move by Berlin or the Danzig Senate to alter the status of the Free City would be deemed a casus belli (G 211; P 64). By the end of March each side had in effect assured the other that it would use force against any use of force by the other to break the deadlock.
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3. P O L A N D ' S
FATE
The contestants in this strange battle of threats were grotesquely unequal in power, though the Warsaw leaders seemed blissfully unaware of German might and Polish weakness. The role of the Western Allies was not one of inciting Poland to war, nor one of stiffening Polish resistance, nor yet one of pressing Warsaw to compromise. The men of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay moved through successive crises with no clear vision of what they should do or what they believed they were trying to do. T o protect Polish "independence" from any "clear" threat which Poland should feel called upon to "resist" was less a policy than a phrase to conceal the lack of a policy. One searches in vain for evidence of some logical Anglo-French program behind the phrase-making. Nothing emerges from the search save a hesitant determination on the part of repentant Munichmen to try to prevent the extinction of Poland's independence by German aggression, with the proportions of determination and hesitancy fluctuating from week to week. This confusion stemmed from a greater confusion. All knew that France and Britain lacked military power to save Poland from conquest by the Reich if the issue came to war. Everyone knew^, save only the political and military leaders of Poland, that Poland could not save itself from a Nazi onslaught. All knew that only one Power could give effective aid to Poland against Germany and that the ultimate risk of a German attack depended upon German calculations as to whether that Power would or would not come to Poland's defense. That Power was the Soviet Union. The key to Poland's fate lay in the relations between the Allies and Moscow, and in the relations between Moscow and Berlin. Few hints regarding them appear in the published diplomatic correspondence of Britain, France, Germany and Poland. The Soviet Union declines to publish any diplomatic correspondence. If all the communications exchanged during the spring of 1939 were available for inspection, however, it might well appear that little attention was given to these relationships. They were left in the background. Their role was that of a spectrehuge, grim and conclusive but half unseen. The Nazi leaders knew that their
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3. P O L A N D ' S
FATE
The contestants in this strange battle of threats were grotesquely unequal in power, though the Warsaw leaders seemed blissfully unaware of German might and Polish weakness. The role of the Western Allies was not one of inciting Poland to war, nor one of stiffening Polish resistance, nor yet one of pressing Warsaw to compromise. The men of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay moved through successive crises with no clear vision of what they should do or what they believed they were trying to do. T o protect Polish "independence" from any "clear" threat which Poland should feel called upon to "resist" was less a policy than a phrase to conceal the lack of a policy. One searches in vain for evidence of some logical Anglo-French program behind the phrase-making. Nothing emerges from the search save a hesitant determination on the part of repentant Munichmen to try to prevent the extinction of Poland's independence by German aggression, with the proportions of determination and hesitancy fluctuating from week to week. This confusion stemmed from a greater confusion. All knew that France and Britain lacked military power to save Poland from conquest by the Reich if the issue came to war. Everyone knew^, save only the political and military leaders of Poland, that Poland could not save itself from a Nazi onslaught. All knew that only one Power could give effective aid to Poland against Germany and that the ultimate risk of a German attack depended upon German calculations as to whether that Power would or would not come to Poland's defense. That Power was the Soviet Union. The key to Poland's fate lay in the relations between the Allies and Moscow, and in the relations between Moscow and Berlin. Few hints regarding them appear in the published diplomatic correspondence of Britain, France, Germany and Poland. The Soviet Union declines to publish any diplomatic correspondence. If all the communications exchanged during the spring of 1939 were available for inspection, however, it might well appear that little attention was given to these relationships. They were left in the background. Their role was that of a spectrehuge, grim and conclusive but half unseen. The Nazi leaders knew that their
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own course must follow the spectre's shadow. If the AlUed and Polish leaders knew this also, there is no evidence of it in their acts or words. They perhaps preferred not to know. They might have made their reckoning without the Kremlin. This too they would not do until too late, when their calculus had become fantastic. They were not deceived or ensnared by Moscow into some devilish trap or "doublecross." The trap was of their own devising. Escape was possible by their own efforts. If they had no desire to pay Stalin's price for Soviet defense of Poland, the first conclusion to be drawn therefrom was that of their own weakness vis-a-vis the Reich. That conclusion might have led them to the view that some compromise or any compromise, even at the inevitable cost of their own further enfeeblement, was preferable to the risk of war with the foe they had helped make formidable. T o pay Stalin's price was to make all compromise with Hitler unnecessary, for he would not challenge a Poland solidly supported by France, Britain, and the U.S.S.R. Not to pay Stalin's price was to create a situation in which (in the absence of the long-hoped-for Nazi-Soviet clash) the alternatives were compromise or catastrophe. The former is commonly deemed preferable to the latter. W h y was no compromise reached? The thought is easily dismissed with the cliche that no compromise with Hitler was possible. If not, then it is arguable that any compromise with Stalin would have been preferable to fighting the Reich alone. T o fight hopelessly and to die alone for a "principle" is heroic. But the first principle of Realpolitik is national self-preservation. There is much reason to beUeve that a compromise with Hitler would have been possible without at once jeopardizing the existence of Poland, France and Britain. If it be contended that such a compromise would only have delayed the struggle for survival, the answer is that delay was imperative for survivalsince it would have given the Western Powers time for more adequate rearmament, time to attempt the restoration of the Great Coalition thrown away at Munich, time to effect changes in the relations between the Allies and Moscow and perhaps between the AlHes and Washington. What was the price of delay? On what terms could a compromise have been had? The German proposals were "moderate" and were in all likelihood submitted in "good faith"i.e., with no original intention of
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using them to encompass Poland's destruction. Between October 24,1938, and April 28,1939, they were not made public by Berlin. The Nazi leaders were therefore not in a position of having committed themselves to a program from which they could not recede. The proposals themselves were not comparable to those made earlier to Austria and Czechoslovakia. Paris and London had acquiesced in the demands on Vienna and had intervened actively to compel Prague's acceptance of German terms which obviously spelled the end of Czechoslovakia's security and independence. The German proposals to Warsaw menaced neither the independence nor the security of Poland, despite the glib dictum that "he who controls Danzig controls Poland." The Polish state was no more secure against possible German attack with Danzig "free" and the Corridor under unqualified Polish sovereignty than it would have been with Danzig German and the Corridor traversed by German "corridor." If the Polish leaders were unaware of this, the Anglo-French leaders were not. Poland's acceptance of the German suggestions would have led to compromise and delay at what seemed to be relatively small cost. This was the case in October, 1938. It was also the case in March, 1939. And it was still the case in August, 1939, when the U.S.S.R. had been lost to the Allies and when the Western Powers were prepared to condone Berlin's original demands on Warsaw if only Hitler would resort to "negotiation" and not to "force." W h y then did Warsaw, Paris and London persist from beginning to end in their opposition to compromise? On the part of Smigly-Rydz and Beck the opposition was to the substance of the German proposal. On the part of Chamberlain and Daladier the opposition was less to their substance than to their formi.e., to the threat of force and to the alleged dangers to Polish independence. In both Warsaw and the Western capitals the dominant feeling toward the Nazi leaders was distrust. This distrust, however, was of a special character. Despite parliamentary rhetoric, neither Beck nor Chamberlain nor Daladier was concerned per se with broken Nazi promises and with the obvious unreliability of Hitler's pledges. Fiihrer, like Duce, observed his obligations when it was expedient to do so and repudiated or evaded them when they became inconvenient. Such conduct was distinguished from that of Beck, Daladier and Chamberlain only by the fact that their circumlocutions were less imaginative and
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their repudiations and evasions less open and honest. What was at stake in "distrust" of Hitler was not any question of honor or fidelity to engagements, for these virtues had long since vanished on all sides. They play little role in interstate relations in epochs of undiluted power politics. What was at issue was a terrifying doubt on all sides as to the ultimate direction of Nazi dynamism. This doubt was deliberately fostered by Berlin, for doubt is a weapon in the new strategy which can always be counted upon to frighten and demoralize prospective victims. These tactics, however, were not pure Machiavellianism. The rulers of the Reich were not following a course predetermined as to its details and timing. Conquest was their goal. But questions of when, where and whom were to be answered not in advance but according to circumstances. With shrewd insight the Nazi leaders were feeling their way after the victory at Munich to see where doubt and fear would open paths of least resistance. From March, 1938, to March, 1939, they permitted everyone to believe (including themselves) that the Ukraine was their objective. Chamberlain and Daladier were content. If Czechoslovakia stood in the way, they were quite prepared to sacrifice Czechoslovakiaif it could be done without war, for vâr was difficult to localize so long as Paris had paper obligations to Prague. Benes obligingly yielded. If Poland stood in the way, they were quite prepared to sacrifice Polandif it could be done without war, for war was difficult to localize so long as Paris had paper obligations to Warsaw. But Smigly-Rydz and Beck did not yield. Had Hitler appealed to the West with promises and threats, as he had done in the summer of 1938, the Munichmen of Paris and London might have pressed Warsaw to yield. But he assumed that the Western powers had abandoned the East. He pressed Warsaw directly without the Western capitals knowing what was being discussed until after the Ides of March. The pressure was polite and even patient. These are uncommon qualities of Nazi diplomacy. When they appear they reflect doubt. The Fiihrer's entourage was in truth doubtful as to its next move. Warsaw was therefore not at once terrorized. Warsaw, moreover, had learned lessons from Vienna and Prague. To the degree to which Beck and his colleagues suspected that London and Paris were ready to abandon them to encourage the Nazi Drang nach Osten, to that degree did they feel moved by fear to resist
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even moderate German demands. Between Munich and the Ides of March, Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay had no deep interest in the fate of Poland. They knew little and cared less about German proposals to Warsaw. They half hoped that Hitler would find means of bending Poland to his will on his march toward Kiev and the Caucasus. Under these conditions Poland was bound to resist. After March old hopes waned, but new doubts multiplied. Berlin had (for the present) renounced the Ukraine. The Western diplomats feared that the new target was the Western Powers. If Poland's diplomats could have felt certain of this, they might now have yielded what they could not yield before. A Nazi drive against the West represented only a remote threat to Poland. A Nazi drive against Russia represented an immediate threat. But Warsaw could not be certain that the direction had changed. Hitler had made a limited and tentative decision rather than a final one. Ribbentrop's words were confusing. His Master was still feeling his way. The steppes remained tempting. Berlin apparently continued to hint to Warsaw that the two countries might well cooperate against Russia. Prospects of sharing in a partition of Lithuania and of the Soviet Ukraine were held out (cf. F 114, 124). The liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia, moreover, threatened Polish security as clearly as the liquidation of Austria had threatened Czech security. Warsaw could not run risks of accepting now what it had rejected earlier, nor could it afford to rebuff the new interest of the Western Powers in Poland's independence. Beck thus adopted a clear line of continued resistance to the Reich. Paris and London on the other hand hedged and hesitated, half hoping that Hitler would still move East, half fearful lest the sacrifice of Poland might now become not the prelude to the Ukrainian crusade but the prelude to a Nazi peace with Russia and a Nazi war against the West. The question arises here as to whether the subsequent course of Paris and London may not have been inspired by a secret wish to entice Poland to destruction in the hope that Russia and the Reich would yet clash over the corpse. The Munichmen had shrunk from no perfidy in delivering Ethiopia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia to the Axis. When the error of this course was clear, the appalling peril to which it had exposed France and Britain was sufficient to drive the architects of disaster to any new
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expedient which offered hope of escape. T o lure Poland to death in order to restore the chance of a German-Soviet conflict wherein the West could be neutral and secure was not beyond their calculations. Berlin suspected this. Moscow suspected it. Warsaw may at times have suspected it, despite a certain witlessness in Polish diplomacy. The sequence of events suggest that such an appeasers' plot may have been embarked upon. If so, it was successful in destroying Poland. But it failed to precipitate the expected Nazi-Communist combat and was therefore as disastrous as preMunich appeasement had been. AH things considered, however, the course of Anglo-French diplomacy in Warsaw raises doubts as to whether Chamberlain and Daladier acted upon any such clear conception. That this was one of the many hopes and designs they entertained is probable. Like Brutus, they were honorable men, but their honor did not exclude such schemes as this. But their conduct suggests a variety of schemes, changing with the changing situation and entangling them in contradictory purposes springing from alternating hopes and fears. Here as elsewhere any policy is better than no policy. By the same token no policy is better than several incompatible policies pursued simultaneously with no choice made among them until after the twelfth hour. The Western statesmen defied Berlin and yet sought to appease Berlin. They wooed Moscow and yet rebuifed Moscow. They supported Warsaw and yet sought a "general settlement" at Warsaw's expense. Such conduct, to be sure, can be explained by the hypothesis suggested above. But it can also be explained by doubt, confusion, uncertainty, vacillation, befuddlement. Decadent societies are rich in great villainies which are often stupid. They are also rich in great stupidities which are often disastrous. The peace of Munich belongs in the first category. Pending conclusive evidence as yet unrevealed, the fall of Poland perhaps belongs in the second. M. de la Tournelle, French Consul in Danzig, reported to Bonnet on April 5 that Burckhardt had broken his journey from Geneva to the Free City at Berlin on March 12-13 ^^^ was there advised "to remain only a very short time to avoid exposing himself to the most serious inconvenience." He remained only three days at his post before returning to Geneva to report. Tour-
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nelle wrote of German troop movements near Danzig, followed by Polish troop movements which perhaps forestalled a putsch. The Danzig S. A. and S. S., however, hoped to strike from within on March 29 and confront Warsaw and Berlin with a fait accofnpli.
But [reported Tournelle] convinced no doubt with reason that Polish troops would immediately enter the city, the President of the Senate, accompanied by the President of the Bank of Danzig and the head of the Department for Foreign Affairs, flew to Berlin on March 28 and persuaded the Party Headquarters that strict orders should be issued at once to the Danzig units forbidding any kind of agitation. Herr Greiser's intervention was facilitated by the absence of the Gauleiter, who was in hospital for an operation. If Herr Forster had been present, events would doubtless have taken different course (F 91).
M. de Vaux Saint-Cyr, French Charge in Berlin, saw the situation in a similar light. Hitler was determined, he felt, to incorporate Danzig into the Reich. If Poland resisted, responsibility for war would be Poland's, not Germany's. He still hoped, however, to compel Poland to yield to blackmail and he could not believe that the British guarantee covered Danzig.
German propaganda would doubtless try to convince certain sections of French opinion that by fighting England's battles on the Continent, our country is playing a dupe's part. Nazi agents will not fail to maintain that the Third Reich has the best intentions towards us. Already, when Austria was invaded. Field Marshal Goring repeatedly gave his word of honor to M. Mastny that Germany was animated by the very best intentions toward Czechoslovakia. W e know today what such assurances are worth. W e must therefore, during the coming weeks, expect a violent offensive against the moral structure of France and of England. T h e German-Polish dispute has, in fact, degenerated into a tension between the Reich and the Western democracies (F 93).
Four days later:

Leading Nazi circles are said to be speculating still on the wavering attitude attributed to France. M y personal impression is that up to the present the Germans have made no final decision, and that they are still counting on the success of an intimidating maneuver. I persist in thinking that the best chance of avoiding a conflict depends on the spirit of resolution which the Western powers will display (F 96).
What course Bonnet may have favored under these circumstances is unreported, but Daladier issued a declaration on April
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13 approving the Anglo-Polish accord and guaranteeing "as between France and Poland immediate and direct aid against any threat, direct or indirect, which might aim a blow at their vital interests" (F 99). Meanwhile Lipski had called on Weizsacker on April 6 at the latter's request and assured him that the Anglo-Polish accord was purely defensive and did not make Poland a member of any antiGerman bloc. Weizsacker expressed incredulity and asserted that Hitler's offer, which could be made only once, had evoked a reply which was completely unsatisfactory. Lipski observed that Berlin had not regarded the French-Polish alliance as incompatible with the 1934 accord. He complained that the Reich had aroused Polish fears by its ultimatum to Lithuania and by its failure to maintain contacts with Warsaw while German troops occupied Czecho-Slovakia. Weizsacker reported that he "cut Lipski short, ridiculed his remarks as to troop movements, and calmly refuted his words with obvious arguments" (G 212; cf. P 70). Whether Berlin subsequently gave a formal warning to Warsaw not to accept the Anglo-Polish accord of April 6, as reported in the press, is unclear. On April 20 Beck told all PoKsh diplomats abroad that Polish policy toward Danzig -was unchanged and that Warsaw would not consent to any "unilateral decision" (P 74). According to Tournelle, Polish High Commissioner Marj an Chodacki had informed the Danzig Senate that if any effort were made, from within or without, to modify the constitution by violence, Polish troops would immediately enter Danzig. "That is apparently the sort of language best understood here" (F 104). It was under these circumstances that Hitler delivered his Reichstag address of April 28, revealing for the first time the terms of the German proposals to Poland and announcing the abrogation of the Reich accords with Poland and Britain (G 213, 214; P 74, 75; F 105; B 14, 21, 22). Coulondre warned Bonnet not to be deceived by Hitler's moderate tone. "Herr Hitler's activity will not be less dangerous because he plays the hermit for a while, and the Allies could not safely relax either their vigilance or their military and diplomatic efforts. . . . Armed force is the only thing that counts with him" (F 108). "The Germans are not wrong when they claim that Danzig is in itself only a secondary question. It is not only the fate of the Free City, it is the enslave-
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ment or the liberty of Europe which is at stake in the issue now joined" (F 113). Ambassador Noel in Warsaw also deemed it wise to caution Bonnet against taking the view that Danzig was unimportant: One could not help wondering why Polish public opinion took such an uncompromising attitude concerning the Danzig Statute and refused to consider any substantial concession on this point. The fact is that, since the events of last March, the Poles feel that the vital question is one between themselves and the Reich. The point is whether, by consenting to concessions, which would lead to others, Poland is to agree to stand aside in an eventual conflict between Germany and the Western Powers and thus resign itself to becoming an auxiliary and vassal of the Reich; or whether, on the contrary, it will use the political independence which it will have striven to safeguard, in order to join, should occasion arise, the common defense front against German imperialism. It may be deplored that the problem seems to center at the moment around Danzig. It is important that opinion in France should realize that it goes far beyond this Danzig question, and that it is neither the cause nor the essential factor. The Polish leaders hope, like ourselves, that the issue will not be precipitated; but, in any case, if we want to find Poland at our side when the hour of danger comes, it is important that nothing should be done which might make her doubtful of our support (F 112). On May 2 Henderson saw Ribbentrop. The Foreign Minister accused Britain and France of pursuing a policy of encirclement and warned that if they ever attacked the Reich they would "break their teeth." Henderson received the impression that Ribbentrop and Hitler did not believe that the Western Powers would fight over Danzig (F 118, 119). Three days later Beck replied to Hitler's speech and the German memorandum in an address to the Polish Diet. According to Moltke, the Polish Foreign Minister personally disliked the Anglo-Polish accord and would have preferred to continue Pilsudski's policy, but army circles had undermined his popularity and compelled them to accept the British guarantee. He had hoped to minimize it, but Hitler's words and acts had compelled him to reply (G 216). In his address of May 5 Beck declared: . . . Neither Great Britain nor Poland have any aggressive intentions whatever, but they stand equally firmly in defence of certain basic principles of conduct in international life. . . . The Polish-British Agreement has been employed by the Chancellor of the German Reich as the pretext
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for unilaterally declaring non-existent the agreement which the Chancellor of the Reich concluded with us in 1934. . . . It is still a matter of unilateral concessions w^hich the Government of the Reich appear to be demanding from us. A self-respecting nation does not make unilateral concessions. Where, then, is the reciprocity? It appears somewhat vague in the German proposals. The Chancellor of the Reich mentioned in his speech a triple condominium in Slovakia. I am obliged to state that I heard this proposal for the first time in the Chancellor's speech of the 28th April. In certain previous conversations allusions were merely made to the effect that in the event of a general agreement the question of Slovakia could be discussed. We did not attempt to go further with such conversations, since it is not our custom to bargain with the interests of others. Similarly, the proposal for a prolongation of the pact of non-aggression for twenty-five years was also not advanced in any concrete form in any of the recent conversations. Here also unofficial hints were made, emanating, it is true, from prominent representatives of the Reich Government. But in such conversations various other hints were made which extended much further than the subjects under discussion. I reserve the right to return to this matter if necessary. In his speech the Chancellor of the Reich proposes, as a concession on his part, the recognition and definite acceptance of the present frontier between Poland and Germany. I must point out that this would have been a question of recognising what is de jure and de facto our indisputable property. Consequently, this proposal likewise cannot affect my contention that the German desiderata regarding Danzig and a motor road constitute unilateral demands. . . . Peace is a valuable and desirable thing. Our generation, which has shed its blood in several wars, surely deserves a period of peace. But peace, like almost everything in this world, has its price, high but definable. We in Poland do not recognize the conception of "peace at any price." There is only one thing in the life of men, nations and States which is without price, and that is honor (B 15; P 77).
The Polish deputies stood up and cheered. On the same dayBeck transmitted a formal memorandum to Berlin, reminding Wilhelmstrasse of the original purposes of the 1934 agreement and of Hitler's pledge to respect Polish rights in Danzig on February 20, 1938. The German failure to reply to the Polish counter-proposals of March 26 was deplored.
It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland. . . . The Polish Government
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reject as completely without foundation all accusations regarding the alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Guarantee of April, 1939, with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934. This guarantee has a purely defensive character and in no way threatens the German Reich, in the same way as the Polish-French Alliance, whose compatibility with the Declaration of 1934 has been recognized by the German Reich. The Declaration of 1934 in its introductory paragraphs clearly stated that both Governments have "decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of the 27th August, 1928." . . . Poland's obligations arising out of the Polish-British understanding would come into operation in the event of German action threatening the independence of Great Britain, and, consequently, in the very circumstances in which the declaration of 1934 and the Pact of Paris had ceased to be binding on Poland as regards Germany. . . . It appears from the above that the Government of the German Reich had no justification for their unilateral decision to regard the Declaration of 1934 as not binding (B 16, P28).
Despite a pro forma bid for a resumption of negotiations, no response was forthcoming. While Ribbentrop conferred with Ciano, the German and PoHsh press insisted in each country that the Government of the other must take the initiative in any further discussions. The deadlock was complete. German-Polish negotiations ceased (F 124-126). The events which followed in the relations among Danzig, Poland and the Reich between May and August now became episodes in a larger game. They are germane to the narrative only as they reveal the ingenuity of the Nazi leaders in conducting the "war of nerves" and illustrate the process whereby German-Polish relations became progressively embittered to a point at which all possibility of a compromise was gone. The weapons utilized by Berlin were familiar onestried, tested and found true in Austria, Sudetenland, Slovakia, Memel and elsewhere. The psychological Blitzkrieg against Poland took the form of three coordinated offensives: one in Danzig itself, one among the German minority in Poland, and one in Paris, London and Moscow. The first, operating through Senate President Arthur Greiser and Gauleiter Albert Forster, was designed to wear down Polish rights and to intensify the Nazification of Danzig. Warsaw, assumed the Fiihrer, would either acquiesce or resist. In the former case, it would finally perceive that Danzig was in fact part of the Reich and that continued insistence on its formal independence
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was futile. In the latter case, Poland could be represented as the "aggressor" and the Reichswehr could be called into action in "self-defense." The second arm of the German drive reached into the German communities in Western Poland and organized them to resist Polish "persecution." T o the degree to which their subversive activities jeopardized Polish authority, Warsaw sought to intimidate their leaders, dissolve their organization and expel the agitators and saboteurs who operated covertly under orders from Berlin. This vicious circle served Nazi purposes perfectly. The German public and part of the British and French pubUcs were persuaded, as they had been in 1938, that innocent Germans were victims of intolerable oppression, and that "justice" and "selfdetermination" required the Reich's intervention to protect the helpless. The offensive on the diplomatic front was designed to frustrate the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, to win Moscow to a new orientation, to drive a wedge between France and Britain, to foster doubts as to whether Danzig was "worth a war," to revive appeasement, and thereby to convince the Polish Government that it stood alone and abandoned before the formidable power of Germany. The local moves and countermoves in this game of intimidation are partially recorded in the diplomatic documentspale reflections of manufactured fear, fabricated passion, made-to-order "incidents," and all the despair, bitterness and hatred which have ever been the weapons of tyranny (cf. G 349-437, F 126-202). Germans are boycotted in Thorn. Berhn demands investigation and punishment. A picture of Hitler is torn up in Liniewo. Berlin demands investigation and punishment. The Polish press is antiGerman. Windows in German shops are broken. Shots are fired at a German band. Stones fly. Polish patriots demand reprisals. Berlin demands investigation and punishment. Outrages multiply. Fugitives flee across the border. Germans are insulted. Germans are beaten. Farmhouses are burned. The leader of the German minority petitions the President of the Polish Republic. There is an anti-German "pogrom" in Tomaschow-Mazowiecki. German schools are closed. With methodical thoroughness, Berlin lists crimes and asks redress: libel, trespass, assault, arson, murder, theft, illegal arrest, etc., ad infinitum. In Danzig, Polish officials insult Germans and are insulted by Germans. Mobs gather. Shots fly. Sudden death strikes in dark alleys and in beer hall brawls.
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Greiser protests to Chodacki at the conduct and at the excessive number of Polish customs inspectors. Chodacki protests to Greiser at violation of Polish rights. Threats. Defiance. Recrimination. Black rumors. The breaking of nerves in a vast campaign to continue the breaking of nations . . . 4. BACK T O APPEASEMENT
In the face of the German-Italian alliance and the Nazi offensive against Poland, Anglo-French diplomacy failed to complete the organization of an effective "peace front" during the spring and summer of 1939. To those who still envisage the course of human events in terms of Causality rather than in terms of Destiny this failure will doubtless remain for years an object of study as absorbing as the closely related question of why the leaders of Britain and France finally accepted the armed challenge of the Reich, after their diplomatic efforts to avoid war and to prepare for war had alike come to naught. The last success of Downing Street in its efforts to reforge a bloc of states to oppose Axis aggression was registered in the negotiations with Turkey. Ankara was from the outset not too eager for an Anglo-French guarantee. The Turkish leaders welcomed German loans and the steady growth of commercial and cultural contacts with the Reich. They felt little anxiety regarding German intentions in the Near East. Franz von Papen, who came in mid-April as the new German Ambassador, was cordially received. Turkish apprehensions centered on more immediate neighbors. Ankara would do nothing which might antagonize the U.S.S.R. or interrupt a diplomatic collaboration with Moscow of many years' standing. Italian ambitions were viewed with suspicion, as were British efforts to appease Italy. The Balkan Entente of 1934 afforded no protection against aggression by a Great Power. Turkey sought additional security against Rome, but only on condition that it involve no commitment to risk war with the Soviet Union. The occupation of Albania and the announcement of the pending Axis alliance made the Turkish Government more receptive to British overtures. But there were serious obstacles in the way of a permanent agreement. Both parties preferred to await the outcome of the Anglo-Soviet discussions before accepting commit-
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Greiser protests to Chodacki at the conduct and at the excessive number of Polish customs inspectors. Chodacki protests to Greiser at violation of Polish rights. Threats. Defiance. Recrimination. Black rumors. The breaking of nerves in a vast campaign to continue the breaking of nations . . . 4. BACK T O APPEASEMENT
In the face of the German-Italian alliance and the Nazi offensive against Poland, Anglo-French diplomacy failed to complete the organization of an effective "peace front" during the spring and summer of 1939. To those who still envisage the course of human events in terms of Causality rather than in terms of Destiny this failure will doubtless remain for years an object of study as absorbing as the closely related question of why the leaders of Britain and France finally accepted the armed challenge of the Reich, after their diplomatic efforts to avoid war and to prepare for war had alike come to naught. The last success of Downing Street in its efforts to reforge a bloc of states to oppose Axis aggression was registered in the negotiations with Turkey. Ankara was from the outset not too eager for an Anglo-French guarantee. The Turkish leaders welcomed German loans and the steady growth of commercial and cultural contacts with the Reich. They felt little anxiety regarding German intentions in the Near East. Franz von Papen, who came in mid-April as the new German Ambassador, was cordially received. Turkish apprehensions centered on more immediate neighbors. Ankara would do nothing which might antagonize the U.S.S.R. or interrupt a diplomatic collaboration with Moscow of many years' standing. Italian ambitions were viewed with suspicion, as were British efforts to appease Italy. The Balkan Entente of 1934 afforded no protection against aggression by a Great Power. Turkey sought additional security against Rome, but only on condition that it involve no commitment to risk war with the Soviet Union. The occupation of Albania and the announcement of the pending Axis alliance made the Turkish Government more receptive to British overtures. But there were serious obstacles in the way of a permanent agreement. Both parties preferred to await the outcome of the Anglo-Soviet discussions before accepting commit-
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merits for mutual defense. Agreement was reached, however, on a provisional accord. On May 12, 1939, Chamberlain announced to Commons: "It is agreed that the two countries will conclude a definite long-term agreement of reciprocal character in the interest of their national security. Pending completion of the definitive agreement, H. M. Government and the Turkish Government declared that in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area they would be prepared to cooperate effectively and lend each other all aid and assistance in their power." He read no text, though one was issued in Ankara. It consisted of seven articles, substantially identical with those concluded the following month between Turkey and France. Chamberlain did not define "Mediterranean area." The commitment was not a unilateral British guarantee, comparable to those accepted by Rumania and Greece. Neither was it a reciprocal pact to safeguard the "independence" of the parties, as was the accord of April 6 with Poland. What was to be safeguarded, by whom and against whom, was left undefined. The looseness of this obligation made it little more than a mutual expression of hope and intent. Premier Refik Saydam secured unanimous approval from a parliament which simultaneously ratified a credit from Germany of 150,000,000 marks. He declared:
You know political events have occurred lately with lightning speed and have seriously occupied the attention of those burdened with the responsibilities of government. At first this government decided Turkey's best course was to remain neutral, but when events involved the Balkan Peninsula and raised the question of security in the Eastern Mediterranean, we were faced with a situation pregnant with danger which made it impossible for us to remain neutral. It is our conviction that the Mediterranean should be free to all nations on a footing of equality, and any attempt to interfere with that freedom would endanger Turkish security. Believing this danger now exists, we have made up our minds to cooperate and, if necessary, to fight with those equally anxious to preserve peace.
Parallel negotiations with France were complicated by the presence of a tangible quid pro quo which the Turkish authorities were determined to have as the price of any agreement. This was the Sanjak (district) of Alexandretta in northwestern Syria, under French mandate. On July 3, 1938, Paris and Ankara had concluded a pact under which Turkish troops were allowed to
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participate in the policing of the Sanjak during the election of a local constituent assembly. The League of Nations Commission which was to have supervised the election retired in haste. On September 6 the 40 delegates chosen (22 Turks, 9 Alouites and the balance Armenians, Greeks and Arabs of other sects) voted a new constitution for the district, now rechristened the "Republic of Hatay"a Turkish name indicating Hittite origin. The changed status of the Sanjak resembled a joint French-Turkish protectorate. Ankara had disclaimed all territorial designs and insisted that its only interest was self-determination for the Turkish inhabitants. In the negotiations of 1939, however, Turkey made clear its desire to annex Hatay as a condition of a new accord with France. The Quai d'Orsay was willing. Syrian protests were brushed aside. On June 23, 1939, two identical agreements were signed by Bonnet and Ambassador Suad Davaz, and by Foreign Minister Shukru Saracoglu and Ambassador Rene Massigli. One provided for the outright cession of Hatay to Turkey. The other was a mutual assistance pact of seven articles following the model of the Anglo-Turkish accord.^ This purchase of Turkish aid savored of a new type of "ap1 Cf. the illuminating articles by Wilbur W. White in Events, 1938, 1939. The text of the French-Turkish accord as issued at Paris June 23, 1939, was as follows: 1. The French Government and the Turkish Government have entered into close conversation and the discussions in which they have engaged and which are still in progress have disclosed their habitual identity of views. 2. It is agreed that the two States will conclude a definite accord of long duration carrying reciprocal engagements in the interests of their national security. 3. While awaiting the conclusion of the definite accord the French and Turkish Governments declare that, in case of an act of aggression that might lead to a war in the Mediterranean region, they would be ready to cooperate effectively and to give each other mutually all the aid and assistance in their power. 4. This declaration, as well as the accord in the future, is not directed against any country but has for a purpose to assure to France and Turkey reciprocal aid and assistance in the case where they would consider it necessary. 5. It is recognized by the two governments that certain conditions, including the more precise definition of the diverse conditions in which reciprocal engagements might be executed, will demand more profound examination before the definite accord can be concluded. This examination is actually in progress. 6. The governments recognize that it is also necessary to assure the establishment of security in the Balkans and are in consultation to attain this goal as rapidly as possible. 7. It is understood that the propositions announced above do not hinder either one or the other government to conclude, in the general interests of consolidation of peace, accords with other countries (NYT 6.24.39).
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peasement," different from the old in that the party bribed was a friend turned ally rather than a rival turned enemy. The "bribe," however, was not the property of the briber. Bonnet's gift of Hatay to Turkey had as little ethical or legal justification as Laval's gift of Ethiopia to Italy. Hatay was part of Syria, to which France had promised independence by the unratified treaty of 1936. France as mandatory had no title to Hatay. Syrian nationalists fumed over the bargain. Members of the League Mandates Commission spoke of the French action as a flagrant violation of the mandate. The Axis press raged against French "perfidy" and "hypocrisy." But at least an ally had been bought. If the cession of Hatay infuriated Arab nationalists against the Western Powers, British policy in Palestine partially appeased the furious at the cost of infuriating the Zionists. Here too high considerations of RealpoHtik were regarded as justification for a course difficult to defend on other grounds. All Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists alike, were of necessity committed to sympathy toward the Allies as against the anti-Semitic Caesars of the Axis. Their desires and even their rights could therefore be ignored with relative impunity. The Arabs of the Near East, however, whose nationalist spokesman ceaselessly condemned Jewish immigration into Palestine, were objects of the wiles of Berlin and Rome. If they should be won in any considerable numbers to the Axis cause, they might jeopardize all Anglo-French interests between the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. Following the failure of the partition plan of 1938 and of a round table conference of Jews and Arabs in London, the British Cabinet issued a White Paper on May 17, 1939, declaring "unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state." The aim was "the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state . . . in which Arabs and Jews should share in the government." Jewish immigration would be restricted to 10,000 per year for a transitional 5-year period, with an additional 25,000 permissible at the discretion of the British High Commissioner. Thereafter no Jewish immigration would be permitted without Arab approval. Land transfers were also to be restricted to meet Arab desires.^
1 Cf. Cmd. 6019, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1939. Cf. British Statemien on the White Taper, American Zionist Bureau, Washington, D. C , 1939.
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Commons approved 268 to 179 on May 23, but many speakers agreed with Dr. Chaim Weizmann and other Zionist leaders that this pohcy was a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, a violation of the mandate agreement and a heavy blow to millions of Jews throughout the world. These steps in the Near East, however deplorable on legal and moral grounds, were at least indicative of a determination in London and Paris to balk Axis designs with a firm veto and a diligent search for allies. But on the larger stage, a strange ambiguity made its appearance in the utterances of Anglo-French leaders during the late spring. The righteous wrath and the high resolve of March and early April gave way to phrases suggesting that the "peace front" was to be but the prelude to appeasement in a new form. "The future historian," wrote Henri de Kerillis in USpoque of April 26, "will note with a sort of stupor the incapacity of the democracies to adapt themselves to the totalitarian psychology. They cannot rise to the simple idea that the present day world is one of brigandage. They continue to send their top-hatted, white-gloved diplomats to fall into all of the gangsters' traps. They cannot detect lies, hypocrisy, ruses, blackmail and cynicism. They rejoice and swell with hope at the smallest promise. They cannot see the essential, which is Reichsfiihrer Adolf Hitler's aim. Hitler intends to strike down Great Britain and France." The Munichmen had no deep conviction that this -was so. They had only doubts and fears compounded of senile dreams and infantile illusions. On April 30 P. J. Philip, New York Times correspondent in Paris, and often a mouthpiece of Bonnet, wrote: "It is already evident that the day has not yet come when France and Britain are prepared to oppose Germany's forceful revision of the peace treaty terms with a definite 'No'." Daladier denied any rift with Bonnet, but he found it necessary in order to quiet rumors to re-affirm French determination to oppose further aggression. Pierre-Etienne Flandin, unrepentant appeaser, could write on May 7:
Danzig is merely an episode of the revision of the peace treaties. . . . Peoples may once more be committed to international war without the objects of the conflgration being clearly defined and understood. This would be a veritable crime against an unfortunate community of peoples which would have to sacrifice their well-being and hopes of a better future to the dreams of Utopists and speculations of the war merchants.
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. . . If there were a new world war, in which Germany would doubtless be defeated, the German people would probably become Communists. . . . If the present crisis continues, revolution wUl come. The democratic Powers, formerly weakened by the revolutionary parties, have regained their force. This force must henceforth be utilized for the great and indispensable effort to reconstruct Europe and the world on a pacific basis. The greater the love of freedom, the more they must seek to avoid war, for war has always been the negation of freedom.^
This voice was not alone. Following Bonnet's lead, Daladier groped.toward a new formula. On June 4 he said to the executive committee of the Radical Socialists:
The French Government has tried and is still trying to find a way of enabling Europe to live happily in a free collaboration of peoples. But at the same time I wish to assure the world that France is in the front rank of the Powers that will prevent Europe from being drawn into a catastrophe by efforts at domination. Such a policy cannot be considered one of encirclement, as some people claim. That is a vain pretext invented for propaganda purposes. We are for collaboration, which is just the opposite of encirclement. . . . In barring the road to the aggressor and in extending a welcome hand to all who seek the road to collaboration, we are, we claim, the real defenders of liberty.
The new formula received clearer expression in London. In a series of public and Parliamentary addresses British leaders voiced their hopes:
Halifax, June 8: Nobody can suppose that even if it is appreciated that further acts of aggression against the independence of European States would be resisted, if necessary by force of arms, it would be satisfactory or even possible for Europe to remain divided into potentially hostile groups. . . . The British Government, therefore, most certainly wishes to reach the point at which international difference can be made the subject of calm, unprejudiced negotiation. Chamberlain, June 9: We must resist any attempt to secure domination by force [but Britain] still is ready to discuss round the table the claims of Germany or any other country. . . . Such a settlement must be obtained by negotiation, not force. Eden, June 11: The world cannot continue to live indefinitely at the present tension nor can we hope to relax that tension by policies which, however urgent and essential, are mainly defensive. Great Britain and those nations who are like-minded with her must have a common con1 The New York Herald Tribune, May 8, 1939.
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structive purpose. . , . The final objective is still to insure peace with justice. Halifax, June 12: If there is no attempt or intention to use force, then the whole influence of this countrywhich is not negligiblewiU be thrown on the side of reaching a fair settlement by negotiation. Chamberlain, June 24:1 repeat once more, and this is my last word: our opposition is not to change, for in a changing world there must be adjustments from time to time. But what we are resolved to oppose is the use of force to bring about changes which should be determined by discussion and cooperation. . . . In a world in which confidence is restored, our two countries [Germany and Britain] could well cooperate in developing the resources which still lie latent and which would bring in returns of solid value to us both. [However] our navy today is the most powerful in the world; our army is daily increasing in its numbers and in the efficiency of its equipment; and as to our air force . . . in the quality of its personnel and the speed and power of its machines it is unexcelled by the air force of any other country. . . . These mighty armaments threaten no one, but they are available today to resist aggression or domination. Halifax, June 29: We know that if international law and order is to be preserved, we must be prepared to fight for its defense. . . . In the event of further aggression, we are resolved to use at once the whole of our strength in fulfillment of our pledges to resist it . . . [But] through cooperationand we, for our part, are ready to cooperatethere is ample scope for extending to all nations the opportunities of a larger economic life, with all that this means, which is implied in the term "Lebensraum." . . . It is not enough to devise measures for preventing the use of force to change the status quo unless there is also machinery for bringing about peaceful change. . . . In such a new atmosphere we could examine the colonial problem, questions of raw materials, trade barriers, the issue of "Lebensraum," the limitation of armaments, and any other issue that afiFects the lives of all European citizens. . . . [Yet] Our immediate task is to resist aggression.
This formula was neatly applicable to a hypothetical community of nations in which "justice" and "welfare" are common objectives. In such a community collective security against aggression plus peaceful change in the status quo are alike indispensable to orderly government, as Woodrow Wilson insisted in the League Covenant. But in the actual community of nations, the formula neglected Fascist Realpolitik. Diplomacy is potential war. War is but diplomacy carried on by other, i.e., forcible, means. In an anarchic State System, there are no negotiations free of the threat of force. There may be a parity of force and therefore a
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bargain between equals if each side knows that the other is prepared to use its force. But without the U.S.S.R., France and Britain no longer possessed parity with the Axis. Fascist demands, moreover, had never been demands for "justice" or "welfare" but for poweri.e., enhanced fighting capacity with which to make further demands for power effective. Demands for domination cannot be compromised. T o say that such demands will be met by negotiation but will be resisted if supported by force produces no change in the character of the demands nor in the consequences of yielding to them. The reluctance of Chamberlain and Daladier to pay the price of a Soviet alliance, their eagerness to deny "encirclement," and their anxiety to arrange a "general settlement" all lent color to Soviet suspicions and Fascist hopes that another Munich could be arranged. These fears and hopes rested on deeds no less than on words. The faith of the new appeasers was not without works. The first concrete evidence of the new departure was the revelation that the British Cabinet had done nothing to prevent the Reich from securing control of some ;^ 6,000,000 of Czech gold held in London in the name of the Bank for International Settlements on behalf of the National Bank of Czecho-Slovakia. The Cabinet had "impounded" other sums deposited by Czech nationals in British banks to prevent payment to Germany. On May 19 Chamberlain dismissed as "a mare's nest" the rumor that the Bank of England would release the Czech gold to the B.I.S. But on May 2 3 Captain Harry Crookshank, Financial Secretary of the Treasury, told Commons that the Cabinet had no authority to interfere with the balances of the B.I.S. Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, admitted that the transfer of the funds to Basle had already been made. The Government had learned of it "indirectly, I think from a continental source." He had wanted to prevent the transfer, but had discovered that he had no authority to do so. The Bank of England had to comply with the order of its depositor, the B.I.S., which had transmitted the order of the new Bank of Bohemia and Moravia. On the 24th Chamberlain told Commons that the Cabinet was considering de facto recognition of the German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia. The legal complexities of this curious episode need not here be reviewed. That Chamberlain and Simon should have permitted legal complexities to stand in the way of action to prevent Ger-
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many from securing Czech gold was typical of the approach of barristers and businessmen to issues raised by warlords who had no respect for law and no interest in money save as a means of preparing war. According to some reports, Germany had pledged the Czech gold a month before the occupation of Prague for the purchase of cotton and nickel in New York. The British representatives on the Board of Directors of the B.I.S. were Sir Montagu Norman and Sir Otto Niemeyer. They were parties to the transfer. Despite Simon's denial, it is probable that he and Chamberlain were parties to the transfer. For them at least, the end of appeasement did not mean that the Reich was to be deprived of the fruits of past conquests and thereby impeded in preparations for future conquests. In British financial and industrial circles hopes of a gentlemanly "deal" with Hitler refused to die. These hopes were not unrelated to the mixed character of many British and German corporations. Even the "internationalism" of "capitalism" could be used as an effective weapon by the Nazis to bring international capitalism to ruin. Among the members of the Committee of Six appointed by Chamberlain in January to advise the Cabinet on armament questions were Messrs. F. B. Bennet, D'Arcy Cooper, Geoffrey Clarke and I. A. Addison. Bennet was a director of Imperial Chemical Industries, which had $55,000,000 invested in the German I. G. Farben Trust. Mr. Chamberlain was believed to hold a thousand shares of Imperial Chemical stock. Clarke, a prominent member of the Anglo-German Fellowship, was a director of the Telegraph and Maintenance Company, holding half the shares of Submarine Cable, with the Siemens Electrical Company of Germany holding the balance. Cooper was President of Unilever (soap and margarine) in which the German Schicht brothers were partners. The offices of Unilever housed the central headquarters of the Anglo-German Fellowship, which had been inspired by Ribbentrop with the blessing of Lord Leverhulme, Governor of Lever Brothers. Among its members were the son of Lord Runciman, a director of Lloyd's Bank and Imperial Airways; Andrew Agnew of Shell Oil; Sir Josiah Stamp; Sir Robert Kindersley of the Bank of England; and, until November, 1938, Lord Mount Temple, its President. Addison, President of the English rayon trust, had close contacts with the German Vereinigte GlanstoffFabrike. In The City Bruno von Schroeder of the I. Henry
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Schroeder Bank was a fellow member with Sir Montagu Norman of the Bankers Industrial Development Company. One of his kinsmen was Kurt von Schroeder who aided Ribbentrop, Papen and Thyssen to put Hitler in the Chancellorship in 1933.^ This is not to suggest a "capitalist plot" in pre-war Britain to sabotage the "peace front" and serve Hitler's purposes. It is only to suggest that the tycoons of British industry and finance had an obvious stake (as who did not?) in friendly Anglo-German relations. These men and those in the Cabinet who saw eye to eye with them still believed that peace could somehow be purchased from the Nazi Caesar whom their fellow-industrialists and bankers of the Reich had placed in power in Berlin six years previously. Further strange results of this assumption came to light on July 20 in rumors in Fleet Street that Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat, Hitler's economic advisor, had conferred with Sir Horace Wilson and Robert S. Hudson regarding a British "disarmament loan" of a billion pounds to Berhn. After the usual official denials, Hudson admitted on July 23 that he had discussed with Wohlthat immediate "long-term credits on a huge scale" to Germany. If war came, he explained, such a "peace loan" would later be necessary to insure "stability." The Reich should accept arms limitation and evacuate Prague. Other Powers should participate in the loan. No British territories would be ceded, but Germany could join the Western Powers and the United States "in the economic development of China and of the vast regions of Africa." Wohlthat had returned to report to Goring. Hudson deplored the "leak" but insisted that his scheme was "a good plan." Chamberlain told Commons on July 24 that "there is no proposal of a loan to Germany." Hudson had merely expressed his "personal view." The Cabinet had not known of the talk. Wohlthat had seen Wilson, but they had discussed other matters, such as refugees and whales. "The mischiefif mischief there was was in the disclosure of what took place to the newspapers." Hudson was neither forced to resign from the Ministry nor even rebuked. Whether the "leak" had ruined a promising scheme or had been deliberately engineered to test opinion was unclear. Berlin was contemptuous and Paris amazed. Downing Street intimated
iCf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 344f.; "Quick March to Other Munichs" in Magazine Digest (Toronto) September, 1939; The Week, London, for May and June, 1939.
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that nothing would come of the proposal. This disclosure coincided with the wrangling in London between Col. Adam Koc and Ambassador Edward Raczynski, on the one side, and Halifax, Simon and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, on the other, as to whether a projected loan of ;{ 8,000,000 to Poland could be spent wherever Poland chose or only in Britain. Ambassador Kennedy, with one eye on the need of strengthening the peace front and the other on possible Polish orders in the United States, apparently urged generosity on Lord HaHfax.^ But Koc left in a huff on July 26. London would not lend save in sterhng, Warsaw would not borrow save in gold. "In principle" the Cabinet was strengthening the bloc against aggressors. In practice its course was devious. How the new strength was to be used was suggested by other developments. Mid-July rumors of new appeasement schemes ranged all the way from Warsaw tales that Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, who arrived on July 17, had urged Polish leaders not to fight for Danzig, to Washington reports of a projected 25-year 5-Power pact whereby Germany would recover both Danzig and the colonies. Sir Oswald Mosley preached colonial restitution and a free hand for the Reich in the East. There is no evidence that Chamberlain and his colleagues favored these particular plans. In the Far East, however, their course was clearer. It had been foreshadowed in Chamberlain's speech to Commons of November 2, 1938. The negotiations w^hich opened in Tokio on July 15 between Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie and Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita, following the imposition of a Japanese blockade on the British concession at Tientsin on June 14, were ostensibly designed to settle the Tientsin difficulty as a "local" matter. On July 17 Chamberlain denied in Commons that any change of policy was contemplated, despite Japanese insistence that the discussions include the "general situation." On July 21 a Foreign Office spokesman declared: "Britain cannot shut her eyes to the hard facts of the military situation, but in view of suggestions that Britain is about to make a deal at the expense of China, I would like to stress that the United States and French Governments are being informed of every step of the negotiations with Japan." But on July 24 Chamberlain revealed to Commons the text of the "formula" which had been agreed upon in Tokio as a basis of continuing the discussions over Tientsin:
1 Cf. The German White Taper, 15th document.
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His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and note that as long as that state of affairs continues to exist the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their ovi'n security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove such causes or acts as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy. H. M. Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by the Japanese forces and they will take this opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to British authorities and British nationals in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures.
Despite the insistence of Chamberlain and Halifax that the formula connoted no change of British policy, it could have but one meaning if actually applied in practice: British cooperation with Tokio in consolidating Japanese control of the areas already conquered, and in facilitating the conquest of the rest of China. The completeness of this capitulation to Japan's "New Order" in Eastern Asia was without precedent. The nearest parallel was the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917, constituting recognition by the United States (until 1923 when it was abrogated) that "territorial propinquity" creates "special interests." But this accord at least included a reaffirmation of the Open Door principle. The only quid pro quo that Downing Street received for its betrayal of China and the Nine-Power Pact was the hope that remaining British interests in China might not at once be liquidated by the Tokio warlords. Even this hope was slender in view of continued anti-British demonstrations and outrages in Japan and North China. Chamberlain's statement of August 4 that insults to British subjects made his "blood boil" and his "warning" that the British fleet might be sent to the Far East "in certain circumstances" were correctly assessed in Tokio, Rome and BerHn as verbiage. More significantly, he conceded British naval inferiority in the Orient, asserted "we have graver and nearer problems to consider," declined to denounce Britain's commercial treaty with Japan, and urged "patience and moderation." Downing Street apparently hoped for American acquiescence in the impending Oriental Munich in view of the fact that the President on July 18 had accepted defeat at the hands of Congress of Administra-
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tion efforts to remove the arms embargo provisions from the Neutrality Act and to impose restrictions on the sale of war supplies to Japan. Machiavelli must have roared with laughter from his grave at the spectacle of London and Washington pretending to oppose the Japanese conquest of China while 75% of Japan's imports of war supplies came from American and British sources. On July 26, however, the State Department gave a formal sixmonth notice of abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty of 1911. The Vandenberg resolution proposing such action had not come to a vote in Congress, but Senators Vandenberg and Borah, despite their isolationist prejudices, joined the general chorus of American approval. Downing Street and Tokio registered pained regret at a move that was widely interpreted as a forerunner of American restrictions on trade with Japan. There was no assurance that such action would follow in view of Congressional determination to aid the Fascist imperialisms by treating aggressors and their victims with complete "impartiality." But London and Washington had at last reached the parting of the ways in the Far Eastan eventuality that had been looming for seven years, since Sir John Simon spurned Secretary Stimson's pleas for joint pressure against Japan in February, 1932. By mid-August the central question of the world diplomatic game was whether Chamberlain's new program of yielding to Fascist blackmail would induce Hitler and his allies to accept new piecemeal victories by "negotiation." The absence of any ministerial crisis over the Wilson-Hudson revelations, coupled with the adjournment of Parliament on August 4, indicated that the Prime Minister was in no danger of effective opposition at home. As for pressure from abroad, France had become little more than a British dependency. Washington and Moscow were seemingly caught in an insoluble dilemma. If the Kremlin signed the coveted pact. Chamberlain might make new concessions to the Axis in the name of strength. If the Kremlin refused, he might do likewise in the name of weakness. If Washington limited its action in the Far East to words. Chamberlain could justify the abandonment of China as a necessity dictated by American indifference. If Washington went beyond words, he could urge that British action was unnecessary. The prospects thus appeared favorable for a full resumption of appeasement during the second half of the summerif Hitler would agree.
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Among the influential voices raised on the Continent in favor of such a course was that of the Vatican. Chamberlain and Halifax had been received by the Holy Father on January 13. Less than a month later, on February 10, 1939, Pope Pius XI (Achille Ratti) had gone to rest after seventeen years as head of Christendom's oldest and most nearly catholic church. Under his leadership the Holy See had arrived at a settlement of the "Roman question." What had been impossible so long as the Italian Government was a parliamentary democracy had become possible when Italy was ruled by a Fascist tyranny. The Lateran Treaty of 1929 restored the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy by establishing "Vatican City" as an independent state. Pius XI had spoken out vigorously against the racial and religious policies of the Caesars, but in other matters had followed the Biblical injunction of giving unto Caesar his due. Communism was the enemy. Franco was the savior of Spain. The Fascist despots and the democratic appeasers, it was hoped, would be the saviors of Europe. On March 2 the College of Cardinals elected Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli as 262nd Supreme Pontiff. He assumed the name of Pius XII. He was by profession a diplomat, having been Papal Secretary of State. He had negotiated the Concordat of 1933 with Hitler. He was the first native of Rome to reach the highest office of the Church in two centuries. His election, and his subsequent appointment of Luigi Cardinal Maglione as his Secretary of State, were widely regarded as a rebuff to the Axis. The new Pope, however, was above all a man of peace. Peace could most easily be preserved by promoting further compromise between the Western Powers and the Axis. If compromise meant that Britain and France must give and Italy and Germany must take, this was no fault of the Vatican. It was at any rate preferable to any pact between the Western Powers and the Red atheists of Moscow. On May 5 Mgr. Valerio Valeri, Nuncio to France, conferred with Bonnet, while Hitler received Mgr. Cesare Orsenigowho had expressed the hope on January 11 that "the peaceful procedure which was so effective in Munich may become the accepted method in the future of mediating international controversies." Pius XII, who had made no protest over the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia and Albania, now urged prayers for peace and secretly offered Papal mediation to bring about Ger-
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man-Polish and French-Italian compromises. That Warsaw and Paris would pay the price was not open to question. On May 8 the Duke of Windsor, in a plea for peace from Verdun, condemned "aggression" and "encirclement" alike. On the same day Richard Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, told Commons that H. M. Government "stands for the settlement of international differences by friendly negotiation, arbitration or other peaceful means. They are at all times ready to lend their good offices at the request of any of the interested parties." "The Polish Government," added Chamberlain, "are well aware that H. M. Government would welcome an amicable settlement." On the same day it was reported from Paris that the Pope had invited the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Poland to confer in Vatican City, first to settle the Danzig issue and then to seek a "general settlement." A Vatican statement of May 26 urged "either a general meeting of the interested Powers" or "bilateral negotiations confined to the nations interested in each specific question"the latter being a favorite Fascist formula to isolate the weak and induce surrender. On June 2 the Pope announced that he was greatly encouraged by the responses he had received. A week later it was rumored in Rome that the Papacy had proposed an immediate Four-Power conference a la Munich, with the U.S.S.R. excluded. Meanwhile, on June 4, Pius XII had conferred with Francis Osborne, British Minister to the Papacy. Ramon Serrano Sufier, Franco's Minister of the Interior, was received by the Holy Father as well as by the Duce. On June 12 the Pope praised the visiting Spanish soldiers of the Italian Arrow Division for having brought him "immense consolation" as "defenders of the faith and of civilization." Two days later Regent Horthy, in opening the Hungarian Parliament, expressed the hope that the Pope's efforts would result in a conference of Great Powers. On the 18th Mgr. Cortesi, Nuncio to Poland, left Warsaw for Rome to report and receive further instructions. On July 28 it was reported that the Pope was urging upon M. Casimir Papee, the Polish Ambassador, a compromise whereby Danzig would have "dominion status" under Berlin for five years. Vatican diplomacy had produced no demonstrable results by the end of July, but it was evi-
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dent that the Papacy's objectives ran parallel to those of the Anglo-French Munichmen and might be made to serve the purposes of the Axis equally well. Political developments in the United States during the summer tended in the same direction. The royal visit to America, announced the previous autumn, was a gesture which warmed many hearts but changed few minds. King George VI and Queen Elizabeth reached Quebec on May 17. As they sat on their thrones at Ottawa two days later to give ceremonial assent to bills passed by the Dominion Parliament, the new United States Minister to Canada, Daniel C. Roper, presented his credentials directly to the King. Following a long tour to the Pacific coast, the two Sovereigns, accompanied by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, were received at Niagara Falls on June 7 by Secretary Hull. A day later they were warmly greeted in Washington by the President and Mrs. Roosevelt. They stayed at the Executive Mansion. They placed a wreath on the tomb of the first American President at Mount Vernon. They dined at the White House. They entertained the Roosevelts at the British Embassy. They placed wreaths on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington. They visited a CCC camp. They had tea at the White House with federal officials. They heard the President insist again that if "methods divorced from aggression could only be universally followed, relations between all countries would rest upon a sure foundation." King and President swam in the White House pool like old friends. King and Queen visited New York, arriving on an American destroyer. They looked at the World's Fair and called at Columbia University where they were received by President Butler and shown the charter of King George II which established the College in 1754. They journeyed to Hyde Park. King and President swam in the Roosevelts' pool like old friends. The President and his wife drove them around the estate. All ate hot dogs. On Sunday evening June 12 they took their leave and three days later sailed for Halifax, Newfoundland and home. This visit might have symbolized the solidarity of the Englishspeaking world. It was intended to do so by guests and hosts alike. Millions of Americans gathered to see royalty. There was enthusiasm everywhere, nowhere an unfriendly voice. The President's warm greeting at Union Station was described by Ambassador Kennedy as "perhaps the most important handclasp in modern
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times." Despite all these things, the symbols of "hands-across-thesea" remained empty. The Americans who controlled Congress viewed the royal visit with cynicism, in private if not in public. They suspected Chamberlain's new moves for appeasement. They suspected a British plot to entangle America in Europe's wars with Roosevelt's connivance. They suspected Kennedy. They suspected Bullitt who said in Neuilly on May 28 that "we sympathize with nations which, whatever the odds, prefer to fight for their freedom rather than to submit to the heel of the conqueror. . . . There are times when men must take up arms to save all that is worthy in human life." They rejected every suggestion that the United States had a stake in Europe or an interest in supporting the Western Powers against the Axis. America must not jeopardize its neutrality by commitments abroad. Alliances were only for aggressors. These attitudes found expression in the long-delayed outcome of the Congressional debate over "neutrality" legislation. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began leisurely hearings on April 5. Col. Stimson's plea for the Thomas Amendment to differentiate between aggressors and their victims fell on deaf ears. Baruch's plea for Western Hemisphere defense and for cashand-carry as a means of keeping out of foreign wars had a better hearing. But even this slight step toward a policy advantageous to Britain and France was to prove impossible until it was too late to deter the war-makers. The polls of the American Institute of Public Opinion showed a 55% majority in March in favor of selling arms to the democracies in the event of war and a 66% majority in April. But the pressure of isolationists and pacifists who insisted on retention of the impartial arms embargo against all belligerents was more effective than popular majorities. Roosevelt's message of April 15 evoked immediate congratulations from the other American Republics and a favorable echo in part of the press, but many Senators were secretly pleased by Hitler's effective rejoinder. On May i the second section of the Neutrality Act of 1937 expired. It had authorized the President to place exports of goods to belligerents, other than arms, ammunition and implements of war, on a cash-and-carry basis. It had never been applied, but it represented the formula which the administration wished to extend to all exports to belligerents in place of the arms embargo.
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Pittman's reports of "progress," however, were not followed by action. Many Senators were skeptical or hostile. On May 8 the Senate hearings dragged to their close. It was clear that a majority of the Committee and a substantial minority of the American public were convinced that European aggressors represented no danger to the United States and that non-involvement in Europe's wars could best be assured by maintaining legislation in force which would tie the President's hands. Under these circumstances the Administration felt that it was politically inexpedient to furnish any leadership. Although the President could have rallied a majority of Americans to his cause, his control of Congress was doubtful. He preferred to let matters drift, even as his Ambassadors abroad advised him that war was inevitable and extended assurances to Anglo-French statesmen that they could count upon American support. On May i6 Secretary Hull declined an invitation from the House Committee to go before it. He agreed to talk confidentially with the members, however, and on May 27 he issued letters to the two Committee Chairmen urging legislation (doubtless as the lesser of impending evils, as he saw them) which would permit the sale of all American goods to all belligerents provided that title should pass to the buyer for cash before shipment, and that all ships of American registry be banned from belligerent ports and combat zones. On May 28 Sol Bloom, Acting Chairman of the House Committee, introduced a resolution embodying these suggestions plus a prohibition on travel by American citizens on belligerent vessels. His draft would not be apphcable to civil strife abroad and would apply to international conflicts only when the President should find that such conflicts were endangering the lives of Americans or the peace of the United States. In a Chicago address on the same day Hull warned that "there is no more disastrous illusion than the thought that a policy of national isolation would make it easier to solve our great domestic problems" or free us "from risk of embroilment in war. The exact reverse is true." On June 7, however, the House Committee voted to postpone reporting out the Bloom bill. But the vote was close and was reversed six days later. The minority report, signed by nine of the ten Republicans on the Committee, declared: "We are opposed to the President's policy of using the threat of our power to preserve a balance of power in Europe. . . . W e believe that the
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way to peace is for us to be neutral, not biased; friendly, not threatening. . . . W e cannot dictate what other nations shall do. We should not attempt to influence their decisions by attempting to conceal our firm purpose as a nation to stay neutral." In the House debate which began on June 27, the Republican opposition, led by Hamilton Fish of New York, argued that the Bloom bill would drag the country into war and make the President a dictator. On the 28th Congressman Vorys (Rep.) of Ohio offered an amendment to restore the embargo on arms and ammunition. The House approved, 159 to 157. A move to strike out the amendment and substitute the original bill was defeated two days later, 180 to 176. In the final vote, after a stormy night session, the House adopted, 200 to 188, an automatic arms embargo almost identical with that in the existing act and sent the amended measure to the Senate. The President was defeated. He said on July 3 that Europeans would construe the vote as evidence that the majority of Americans disapproved his efforts to deter aggression. He hoped that the Senate would reverse the House and expressed his readiness to keep Congress in session all summer if filibustering tactics should render this necessary. On July 7 Hiram Johnson announced that 34 Senators had agreed to oppose "by every honorable and legitimate means at our command" any attempt to lift the arms embargo. On July 11 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 12 to 11 to defer all consideration of neutrality legislation until the next session of Congress. The President's defeat was complete. The belated action he now took was too little and too late. He conferred with his Secretary of State, and on July 14 submitted a statement from Hull to Congress:
. . . Those who urge the retention of the present embargo continue to advance the view that it will keep this country out of warthereby misleading the American people to rely upon a false and illogical delusion as a means of keeping out of war. I say it is illogical, because, while the trade in "arms, ammunition and implements of war" is at present banned, the trade in equally essential war materials, as well as all the essential materials out of which the finished articles are made, can continue. . . . I say it is a false delusion because a continuation of the trade in arms is a clearly recognized and traditional right of the nationals of a neutral country in time of war, subject only to effective blockade and to the right
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of belligerents to treat any such commodities as contraband. The assertion frequently made that this country has ever engaged or may become engaged in serious controversy solely over the fact that its nationals have sold arms to belligerents is misleading and unsupportable. . . . Those who are supporting the recommendations for the amendment of existing legislation recognize definitely that the present embargo encourages a general state of war both in Europe and Asia. Since the present embargo has this effect its results are directly prejudicial to the highest interests and to the peace and to the security of the United States. In the present grave conditions of international anarchy and of danger to peace, in more than one part of the vsôrld, I profoundly believe that the first great step toward safeguarding this nation from being drawn into war is to use whatever influence it can, compatible with the traditional policy of our country of non-involvement, so as to make less likely the outbreak of a major war. . . . Partisanship should play no part in the determination of the foreign policy of this country. In the present situation of danger a peaceful nation like ours cannot complacently close its eyes and ears in formulating a peace and neutrality policy, as though abnormal and critical conditions did not exist. The entire question of peace and neutrality at this serious juncture in its possible effects upon the safety and the interest of the United States during coming months is of the utmost importance. This question should, in my judgment, receive full and careful consideration and be acted upon by this government without unnecessary or undue delay. These words were vain. On the evening of July i8, on the President's invitation, a number of Senate leaders gathered in the upstairs study of the White House to discuss the situation. For an hour Roosevelt repeated the arguments in favor of the immediate repeal of the arms embargo. When McNary asked if he believed in the probability of war before the next session of Congress, the President replied that he was certain there was "a very strong possibility." Hull contended that war was all but certain and that repeal would reduce its chances by half, since it would make clear to the Axis that American arms would be available to the Allies. Borah broke in to say that he had better sources of information than the State Department and that there would be no war. At the end, Vice-President Garner asked Barkley and the other supporters of the Administration whether they had sufficient votes at their command to bring up repeal on the floor.
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Their answers were negative. "Cap'n," said Garner, "you haven't got the votes." The President agreed and commented that he had done his best. The Senate must now take the responsibiUty.^ Hull was depressed, but the gathering broke up in good cheer. Congress adjourned on August 5. The greatest of the Great Powers thus announced to the world, almost casually, that if the aggressors' alliance precipitated war with France and Britain by attacking Poland, the United States would forbid its citizens to sell arms or loan money to either side. The Allies would be the victims since the Axis had no need of American arms and would in any event be cut off from the Atlantic seaways by the British fleet. America would act as economic ally of those whom most Americans habitually denounced as law-breakers and madmen. This would be the American role in Europe, for the President, in the event of general hostilities, would recognize a state of war and issue an embargo proclamation. It would be the American role in Asia because the President had not recognized a state of war and no embargo was enforced. The friendly Powers whose sea forces controlled the Atlantic would be denied access to American arms. The unfriendly Power whose sea forces controlled the Western Pacific would not be denied access to American arms. The notification to Tokio on July 26 of abrogation of the commercial treaty of 1911 could not take effect until January. It was not to be followed by any cessation of the steady flow of war supplies to Japan. In the face of Chinese appeals and the avowed sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the American people, the conquerors of China were permitted by Washington to proceed with their task and to draw 65% of their oil, 65% of their motor cars, 77% of their aircraft and 90% of their copper, scrap iron and steel from the United States of America.^ Isolationists and pacifists dictated American aid to the Axis in Europe. The American junk business dictated aid to Japan in Asia. The American policy of helping to make the world safe for aggression was not to be changed. In BerHn and Moscow political leaders reflected upon this decision. After reflection, they drew conclusions.
iCf. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper, pp. 44-46, and Charles Beard, "Neutrality Deadlock," Events, September, 1939. 2 Cf. the able address of Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach of Washington, with appended tables and documents, in the Congressional Record for August 2, 1939.
CHAPTER
SIX
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I. STALIN'S PRICE
loth of March, 1939, was the i6ist day after the Peace of Munich. It was also the i6ist day before the day on which the final touches were given in Berlin to a German-Soviet commercial treaty, signed on August 19 and followed four days later by the non-aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin. In one respect at least the ruler of Russia who was the son of Vissarion Djugashvili, the Georgian shoemaker, differed from the ruler of Germany who was the son of Alois Schicklgruber, the Austrian Beamter: the former had no faith in either astrology or numerology. He nevertheless recognized that the loth of March, 1939, was a mid-point between two epochs. For on that day he spoke his mind before the i8th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His address was a long report on the work of the Central Committee since the 17th Congress, held in 1934. It covered the chaos of the world, the crisis of capitalism, the progress of Soviet economy, the status of the Party, the questions of fact and the questions of theory which were of concern to all orthodox Stalinists. It dealt in particular with the position of the U.S.S.R. in world politics, and suggested the alternatives of the days to come. Stalin's point of departure was the proposition that the "second imperialist war" had become a fact:
FRIDAY THE
It is not so easy in our day suddenly to break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the Fascist rulers. That is why the Fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it. A
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SIX
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I. STALIN'S PRICE
loth of March, 1939, was the i6ist day after the Peace of Munich. It was also the i6ist day before the day on which the final touches were given in Berlin to a German-Soviet commercial treaty, signed on August 19 and followed four days later by the non-aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin. In one respect at least the ruler of Russia who was the son of Vissarion Djugashvili, the Georgian shoemaker, differed from the ruler of Germany who was the son of Alois Schicklgruber, the Austrian Beamter: the former had no faith in either astrology or numerology. He nevertheless recognized that the loth of March, 1939, was a mid-point between two epochs. For on that day he spoke his mind before the i8th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His address was a long report on the work of the Central Committee since the 17th Congress, held in 1934. It covered the chaos of the world, the crisis of capitalism, the progress of Soviet economy, the status of the Party, the questions of fact and the questions of theory which were of concern to all orthodox Stalinists. It dealt in particular with the position of the U.S.S.R. in world politics, and suggested the alternatives of the days to come. Stalin's point of departure was the proposition that the "second imperialist war" had become a fact:
FRIDAY THE
It is not so easy in our day suddenly to break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the Fascist rulers. That is why the Fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it. A
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military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a bloc! "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome Axis"; that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind! . . . All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokio triangle"; that is, a slight penchant for geometry. A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern. . . . That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous this whole clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spainand all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive states. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors. It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor States, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive States, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back in retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors. Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive States, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance, on the part of the latter. Incredible, but true. To what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war? . , . It might be attributed to the fear that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive States were to go to war and the war were to assume world-wide proportions. . . . But the chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of "neutrality." . . . The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union. . . . Cheap and easy! . . . Take Germany, for
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instance. T h e y let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then they began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." . . . T h e hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. T h e gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds. It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany w h o dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough strait-jackets for them in our country. [Thunderous applause.'] But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish seriously to talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Imagine: T h e gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you. . . . Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any Fascist bosses. Is that a way to live? . . . As I look at you I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me. . . . {General laughter.] Well, so be it: I allow you t o annex your tiny domain to my vast territories. . . ." [General laughter and applause.] Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. T h e y are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the west and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded t o Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades.
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Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. PoUtics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.
What must the Soviet Union do in the face of these facts? Obviously, implied Stalin, it must strive to turn the "non-intervention" of the Western Powers into a "fiasco." This fiasco, one gathered, was probable without any Soviet efforts to promote it. Yet there were dangers. How to meet them? The U.S.S.R. had joined the League and made pacts with Paris and Prague. The U.S.S.R. had sought to buUd a system of collective security. Soviet foreign policy was clear and expUcit:
1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country. 2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state. 3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country. 4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.
But new dangers imposed new tasks. These also were four: " i . T o continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries; 2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by war-mongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them; 3. T o strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost; 4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations." Stalin passed on to internal problems of the "Socialist Fatherland," reviewing at length statistics of production, trade, live-
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stock, freight, schools, etc. He concluded with quotations from Lenin and an ideological justification of the dictatorship. "If the successes of the working class of our country, if its fight and victory serve to rouse the spirit of the working class in the capitalist countries and to strengthen its faith in its own power and in its victory, then our Party may say that its work has not been in vain. And there need be no doubt that this will be the case. [Loud and prolonged applause.1 Long live our victorious working class! [Applause.] Long live our victorious collective farm peasantry! [Applause.'] Long live our socialist intelligentsia! [Applause.] Long live the great friendship of the nations of our country! [Applause.] Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union!" [Applause. The delegates rise and hail Comrade Stalin with loud and stormy cheers. Cries of: "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for our great Stalin!" "Hurrah for our beloved Stalin!"] 1 These words were less prophetic than Stalin's words five years previously, in January, 1934. He had then said:
Poland regarded herself as the barrier of the Western States against the U.S.S.R. All and sundry imperialists looked upon Poland as the vanguard in the event of a military attack on Russia. Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the Fascist regime in Germany. But Fascism is not the issue here, if only for the reason that Fascism, for example in Italy, did not prevent the U.S.S.R. from establishing very good relations with that country. It is not for us, who experienced the shame of the Brest-Litovsk peace, to sing the praises of the Versailles treaty. W e have never had any orientation toward Germany, nor have we any orientation toward Poland or France. O u r orientation, in the past and at present, is toward the U.S.S.R. alone. If the interests of the U.S.S.R. demand a rapprochement with this or that country which is not interested in disturbing peace, we will not hesitate to take it.
Here is a clue to the alleged "mystery" of Soviet foreign policy.^ That policy, and Axis policy as well, defied understanding by many Western publicists. The answer to the riddle did not lie in "ideological affinity," nor in the transformation of Russia into
1 J. Stalin, Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPS.U. (B.), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1939. ^ Winston Churchill on October i, 1939, referred to Soviet foreign policy as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
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a "Fascist" State, nor in the "Bolshevization" of the Axis. It lay rather in the circumstance that the Western democracies had ceased to play the game imposed upon them by the nature of international politics, whereas all the totalitarian regimes continued to play itunscrupulously, astutely, with all weapons in the arsenal of Realpolitik and without the inhibitions and confusions so characteristic of London, Paris, and Washington. In this game those who refuse to play and those who play stupidly are lost. Those who play well survive. Moscow played well.^ To play well means to follow rules of power which are far older than Machiavelli: to regard one's neighbors as one's enemies, to consider one's neighbors' neighbors as potential allies, to recognize that the power of States in relation to other States is local, to know that power is relative and that one State's gain is another's loss, to treat one's enemies as if they might some day be friends, and one's friends aS if they might some day be enemies. Success requires that words be not confused with deeds. It requires knowledge of the probable intentions of others and ability to change those intentions to one's advantage by adroit combinations of threats and inducements. The men of Moscow possessed these skills. Aiany eiforts have been made in the West to explain the revolution in Soviet foreign policy in 1939 in terms of internal changes in Soviet society and Soviet politics. Few efforts of this kind were made to explain the equally revolutionary shift of 1933-35. The earlier reversal was advantageous to the Western Powers and palatable to Western liberals. The later one was disastrous and bitter. Both changes are explicable through changes in the international environment to which the Kremlin sought by new devices to adapt itself. The Soviet leaders did not regard their policies as sources of service to the Western Powers or of pleasure to Western liberals. They were concerned exclusively with the interests of the Soviet Union. This is not to deny the relationship
1 Henry C. Wolfe, The Imperial Soviets (Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, 1940) p. 65: "The Kremlin leadership has rarely been unrealistic in its foreign policies. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that for the past two decades it has been the most realistic leadership in Europe. It has been given to far less wishful thinking than the Western democracies and guilty of infinitely less bombast than the Fascist states. . . . The Soviet hierarchy has nearly always been clear-headed in its appraisal of foreign governments, their aims, their psychology and their weaknesses." Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 253-62.
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between foreign policy and the internal structure of States. For the U.S.S.R., as for other Powers, this relationship is ever present and is fundamental to any understanding of the way in which interests are defined. It is not fundamental, however, to problems of means. Moscow's new course in 1939, like its new course in 1933, represented the adoption of new means to serve old ends. At only one point, albeit an important one, is it necessary to explain the decisions of 1939 in terms of internal factors. Freedom of choice as to means is circumscribed not only by external forces but by domestic forms as well. Bourgeois democracies have never been able to play at Realpolitik with the same flexibihty and ruthlessness that are possible to feudal monarchies and totalitarian despotisms. Their leaders are answerable to "public opinion" which changes too slowly to permit swift changes of program. Their ruling classes are imbued with the ethics of democracy and capitalism. States ruled by aristocrats or by tyrants suffer from no such restrictions. The Western commentators who assumed that the U.S.S.R. was in process of becoming a democracy supposed that the diplomacy and the vocabulary of Communism in 1933-39 i^-E-y the Constitution of 1936 and Litvinov's speeches at Geneva) reflected not merely a new means cjf protecting Soviet interests by collaboration with Western liberalism, but also a re-afHrmation of the democratic ideals associated with Marx and Engels and in some measure with Lenin. The abrupt repudiation of these ideals in Moscow's diplomacy of 1939 was therefore a profound shock, to be explained in terms of the villainy and perfidy of Stalin or in terms of the degeneration of the Soviet State into a despotism. In truth the Soviet State had not undergone any significant internal change, Trotsky to the contrary notwithstanding. It had been and it remained a totalitarian dictatorshipthe first to be established and in most of its political externals the prototype of the tyrannies of Mussolini and Hitler. Its class structure and its economy did not require foreign conquest as a prerequisite of domestic stability. But its rulers were not bourgeois democrats. They were servants of a Caesar ruling over an imperium which was a model of military socialism. Caesarism in Spengler's sense the conquest of Money by Blood, the supremacy of Politics over Economics, the free and ruthless rule of one party and one manfound its first clear expression in the 20th century in revo-
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lutionary Russia. The rulers of this realm felt themselves free to practice such opportunism in foreign policy as expediency might dictate. What was expedient depended less upon what happened within than upon what happened without.^ The problem posed to the men of the Kremlin in March of 1939 was difficult. They had acted for six years on the sound assumption that the Third Reich must either expand or fall. Its expansion was potentially dangerous to all its neighbors. In a rational world all its neighbors would therefore combine to prevent its expansion. Such was the goal of Louis Barthou and of Litvinov. A Great Coalition, committed to united resistance in arms to assault on any of its members, could make German expansion so dangerous that it could not be attempted. In this event the Third Reich would fall. Precisely at this point, however, the desires of Moscow clashed with those of London and Paris. Revolution in Germany might mean Communism in Germany. The same was true for Italy. Whether this prospect was objectively probable mattered less than the fact that it was dreamed of by the new revolutionary elite of the U.S.S.R. and feared by the old elites of France and Britain. Therewith the rationality of Realpolitik flew out of the window. Moscow desired to thwart German and Italian imperialism not only to protect the Soviet Union but also to weaken the regime of the Caesars. Paris and London refused to thwart Italian and German imperialism not only because they hoped it would leave them in peace in order to move eastward, but because they had no desire to weaken the Fascist regimes. The men of the West agreed with the men of Moscow that Fascism must make conquests or perish. Unlike the men of Moscow, they did not wish it to perish, for they dreaded the aftermath for which Moscow hoped. Moscow alone could not prevent Fascist conquests. Soviet
1 This writer shared many of the earlier illusions regarding the place of the Soviet State in the political evolution of our age, as his past writings testify. He still believes that Soviet society might have been progressively democratized and that the U.S.S.R. would have been won permanently to a democratic "peace front" against Fascismihad Western democracy displayed capacity to defend itself instead of serving the interests of its destroyers. In a democratic world StaUn's Russia might well have become a democracy. In a totaUtarian world it remained a totalitarian tyranny. Perhaps the most eloquent and persuasive presentation of the thesis that Soviet diplomacy was primarily a reflection of an inner degeneration of Soviet society is to be found in Chapter III of Louis Fischer's Stalin and Hitler, The Nation, New York, 1940.
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efforts to save Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia were successively frustrated by Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. Collective security died. Memorial services were held at Munich. The problem then became one of the direction in which the Fascist conquerors would strike. After the murder of Barthou, the Anglo-French leaders sought safety in the assumption that the Third Reich would strike at Russia, with Japan and perhaps Italy as allies. In their view this prospect constituted no danger to Western interests. Fascism and Communism might destroy one another. This hope brought cheer to the Western statesmen and fear to the Kremlin. Dmitry Z. Manuilsky, a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, told the i8th party congress on March 12, 1939: "The plan of the reactionary English bourgeoisie is thissacrificing of the small nations of southeastern Europe to Fascist Germany, to direct Germany eastward namely, against the U.S.S.R.; to attempt by such counter-revolutionary war to retard the further successes of socialism and the victory of Communism in the U.S.S.R.; to bribe Germany from her imperialistic designs on English colonies. At the same time the English reactionaries wish to pull the teeth of German imperialism by means of the U.S.S.R., to weaken Germany for many years and to retain for English imperialism a dominant position in Europe." With allowances for rhetoric, this view was justified. Moscow's counter-hope was that Fascist imperialism might be deflected against the Western Powers. Fascist capitalism and democratic capitalism might destroy one another. This prospect brought cheer to the Kremlin and fear to the Western Powers. When two men fear attack by a third and are unable or unwilling to act in unison against the menace to both, then each hopes that the other will be the victim. The Ides of March convinced Chamberlain that he had failed in his effort to turn Hitler against Stalin. The Red Caesar had already drawn the same conclusion. The next question was whether Hitler would turn against the West. This was the nightmare of Daladier and Chamberlain, mitigated only by the hope, which never quite died, that the Drang nach Osten might yet be resumed. This hope was empty unless Poland and Rumania should be sacrificed, as Austria and Czechoslovakia had been sacrificed, in order to clear the Nazi road to the Ukraine. This could not be
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risked, however, for Berlin and Moscow might declare a truce. The fall of Warsaw and Bucharest would then leave the Reich free to assault France and Britain. The Western appeasers no longer felt confident of Hitler's intentions. They therefore guaranteed Poland and Rumanianot in order to block Hitler's road to the East, but in order that the West should not be utterly isolated in the face of a possible Drang nach Westen. Stalin's dilemma posed three alternatives. He might respond to Western overtures and seek again to enlist the support of the now-frightened Western Powers in order to block the Reich in all directions. Or he might attempt to out-Chamberlain Chamberlain by giving Hitler a free hand against the West in the name of "neutrality" and "non-intervention," meanwhile picking up such pieces of the inevitable wreckage of Poland and Rumania as might be safely seized. Or he might join Hitler openly in trying to destroy and despoil the Western Powers. Each maneuver offered obvious advantages. Each involved risks. The first would expose Moscow to the danger of a new betrayal by the Munichmen, followed by a German-Soviet war with the West neutral. The second might lead to Nazi victory over the West, followed by assault on the U.S.S.R. from an invincible Reich. The third would make this possibility almost a certainty, since it would insure the fall of France and Britain and leave the Reich immeasurably more povvêrful than the Soviet Union. In the sequel to the Ides of March, Stalin dallied with the first alternative, rejected the third and finally accepted the second as the least dangerous of the three. The alternatives of the Western Allies were fewer and therefore more desperate. Their commitments to Poland and Rumania not only thwarted Hitler in the East, but afforded the West no genuine protection if he turned in the opposite direction. Poland and Rumania could be defended against the Reich only by Russian arms. T o solicit Soviet defense of Warsaw and Bucharest, however, was difficult, since Warsaw and Bucharest had no desire for Soviet aid. Pledges of Soviet aid, if obtained, might revive the possibility of a German-Soviet war. But Soviet fears of this possibihty made Moscow's price for pledges too high for London and Paris to pay. Yet if the price were not paid, Poland and Rumania would be lost and the Western Powers would face the Reich alone. The Allies' dilemma presented no other choice.
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Anglo-French overtures to draw the U.S.S.R. into the "peace front" began at once after the Birmingham speech. Tentative gestures had been made earlier in the year as doubts grew concerning the wisdom of Munich. Sir William Seeds, the new British Ambassador, arrived in Moscow in January and extended assurances of a desire to "cooperate." On February 20 London announced that Robert Hudson would visit Moscow as well as Berlin. On the same day Lord Halifax was guest of honor at an Embassy dinner given by Ambassador Ivan Maisky. T o be sure, when Laborite Thurtle jumped up in Commons to ask whether the Prime Minister did not believe the time opportune for some "friendly gesture" to Soviet Russia, all the Tory back-benchers shouted indignantly "Why? W h y ? " ( N Y T 2.21.39) ^ ^ t Chamberlain himself, accompanied by Halifax and other ministers, attended a reception at the Soviet Embassy on March ithe first time a Prime Minister had set foot inside the Soviet Ambassador's quarters since the days of Ramsay MacDonald. Litvinov expressed willingness to extend Soviet aid to Rumania, if need be, on March 17. But London hesitated. Bucharest yielded to German demands. Litvinov's rebuke to Berlin on March 19 further encouraged the British Cabinet to believe that Moscow's collaboration could be counted upon. But London had rejected the Soviet proposal for a six-Power conference. London's own suggestion for an Anglo-French-Polish-Soviet declaration to "consult" was regarded by Litvinov as wholly inadequate. He nevertheless assented, on condition of French and Polish adherence. Poland's rejection of the British formula closed the issue. Moscow next proposed a four-Power conference, but Downing Street preferred to give an immediate unilateral guarantee to Poland.^ Izvestia declared on March 28 that the British and French Governments "now appear inclined to drop the overtures that they made twelve days ago in the first moment of panic at the news of a German ultimatum to Rumania." Pravda asserted: "German aggression in Central Europe has not met opposition from the so-called democratic governments. . . . N o new line can be seen either in the foreign policy of England or the foreign policy of France." Chamberlain's pledge to Poland of March 31, however,
1 Cf. pp. izyf. above; cf. nth, 12th, and 13th documents in The German White Paper.
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was conceded to represent a change, though its sincerity and permanence were doubted. Izvestia of April 2 wrote: "If France and Britain are honestly determined to resist aggression and to stand for collective security, then they can count on the full support of the only country that bears no responsibility for Munich, has not been affected by the consequences of Munich, and unchangingly protects the interest of peace and the independence of nations." But it added:
If England and France, having promised support to Czecho-Slovakia, later demanded its capitulation to Germany, why should not German Fascism expect that England and France would act likewise in the case of Rumania and Poland? At Munich, supporters of the policy of non-intervention managed to deliver to Germany in a peaceful way what it was going to take by force. Are they not going to act the same way with regard to the Polish seacoast and Danzig after they have guaranteed Poland's independence without even deciphering what they mean by the word "independence"? They asserted that Czecho-Slovakia could continue its independent existence without the Sudeten provinces. Maybe now they will affirm that Poland can continue its independent existence without Upper Silesia and without access to the sea.
Soviet skepticism was given snarp expression when a Havas report from Moscow, published in Le Tanps, declared that the U.S.S.R. had promised to supply arms to Poland in the event of war and withhold raw materials from Germany. A Tass Communique of April 3, following the line of an earlier denial of similar reports on March 21, declared: "The U.S.S.R. gave no one such a promise and undertook no such obligation." The Soviet press distrusted "Beck's Poland" and doubted whether the Polish Foreign Minister was up to any good in London. Pravda's cartoon of April 4 showed a silk-hatted British lion in a boat extending a rock-weighted life preserver to small nations drowning in a sharkinfested sea. Beck made it clear to the British Ministers that his country wanted no Russian help. Pertinax commented: "The boast of Col. Beck that he does not want his country to bind itself to Russia until the last minute of the eleventh hour does not deserve to be taken seriously unless he accepts the prospect of his country's suicide. Russia can afford to wait. Nevertheless, for reasons of prestige, she can hardly bear to be left outside the door. It is probable that immediately after Col. Beck's departure from
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London, negotiations with Russia will be started in all earnestness" ( N Y T 4.5.39). But Polish capacity for suicide was not to be underestimated. Meanwhile Moscow waited. The Anglo-Polish accord of April 6 was deemed moderately encouraging, but the failure of London and Paris to do anything about the Italian seizure of Albania two days later was ridiculed as fresh evidence of Anglo-French weakness. Halifax informed Maisky almost daily of developments in British policy, but Chamberlain refrained from direct overtures to Moscow, partly out of fear lest such a move should drive MussoUni completely into Hitler's arms and cause him to keep his troops in Spain. Chamberlain's address of April 13, extending guarantees to Rumania and Greece, was given much space in Moscow papers but little comment. A month had passed since the fall of Prague. Britain and France had guaranteed Poland, Rumania and Greece and initiated discussions with Turkey, but between Moscow and the West everything was still in abeyance. This procedure, as became apparent later, was the first major error in Anglo-French efforts to build the "peace front." In view of the attitude of Warsaw and Bucharest, where fears were rife that Soviet aid would lead to the spread of Communism and to the loss of territories seized from Russia in 1918-21, Chamberlain had been obliged to choose between an effort to make a pact with Moscow, to be followed by attempts to secure Polish and Rumanian cooperation, and an effort to make a pact with Poland and Rumania, to be followed by attempts to secure Soviet cooperation. He chose the latter alternative. He doubtless feared that the former would throw Smigly-Rydz and Carol into Hitler's arms. This, to be sure, would have been a small loss if a binding alliance with the U.S.S.R. could have been secured thereby. But this was uncertain, owing to Soviet suspicions of the Munichmen. These suspicions grew while London wooed Warsaw and Bucharest and slighted Moscow. The completion of the guarantees to Poland and Rumania prior to any understanding with Litvinov produced a result which was to determine the course of decisions and events to come. This result was insufficiently appreciated in London and Paris but fully appreciated in Moscow. It was simply that the Western Powers had now committed themselves to fight the Reich if Germany threatened the independence of the two States lying between Germany and the
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U.S.S.R. If this promise was an empty gesture, Moscow had no interest in this or any other pledges to oppose aggression. If it was a solemn vow to act, then Moscow could point out that the Allies had assured the safety of the Soviet Union against any German attack through Poland and Rumania. Should the Kremlin have thanked London and signed a mutual assistance pact out of gratitude? This sentiment is unknown in Realpolitik. Moscow, no longer fearful of German assault, desired some tangible quid pro quo for accepting any obligation to defend France and Britain or Poland and Rumania. Chamberlain had already given away his best bargaining point. Soviet resourcefulness would devise another price. But this the Western Powers would never bring themselves to pay. Chamberlain's critics in Commons pressed him to woo the Russians. On April 3 Arthur Greenwood said: "Since her entrance into the League Russia has been more loyal to its principles and decisions than the British Government. . . . I realize that there are all kinds of ideological objections to the U.S.S.R., but in these times it is important to mobilize in the cause of peace all States which are prepared to stand for peace." Sir Archibald Sinclair: "The task of bringing Russia into cooperation with us is one of supreme importance." Churchill: "It has become a matter of life or death. . . . The German conquest of the Ukraine would be a direct assault on the life of the Russian Soviet State. Then in the Far East the aggression of Japan brought Japan into close grips with Russia. N o one can say there is not a solid identity of interest between the Western democracies and Russia. The worst folly would be to chill any international cooperation which Russia can give." Lloyd George: "If we are to go in without the help of Russia, we shall be walking into a trap. It is the only country whose armies can get there (Poland) and who has got an air fleet which can match Germany's. In 1914 . . . her invasion of East Prussia saved Paris." Eden: "The main purport of Mr. Lloyd George's argumentand with this I entirely agreeis the desirability of trying to secure the best possible relations with the Soviet Government." Chamberlain had contented himself with saying: I do not wish today to specify what governments we may now or in the near future find it desirable to consult on the situation, but I would make an allusion to the Soviet Union because I quite appreciate that the Soviet Union is always in the thoughts of members opposite and that
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they are still a little suspicious as to whether so-called ideological differences may not be dividing us in what otherwise it would be in the interests of both to do. . . . Our point is that whatever may be those ideological differences they do not really count in a question of this kind. . . . We welcome the co-operation of any country, whatever may be its internal system of government, not in aggression, but in resistance to aggression.
Ten days later Simon asserted that the Cabinet had no objection "in principle" to an alliance with Moscow, but had to consider the wishes of others. On April 14 Maisky saw Halifax. On April 15 Seeds saw Litvinov. An anonymous British official declared: "There is no reason to believe that Russia may not join the alliance within the next few days." The Quai d'Orsay was reported to have suggested that Moscow should agree to use the Soviet air fleet against Germany if the Reich attacked Poland or Rumania. Walter Duranty reported from Moscow that the Narkomindel (Soviet Foreign Office) felt that new commitments "should be undertaken only with extreme caution and after an assurance of most positive guarantees. . . . The Russians are not so entirely hostile to the Germans and Italians as the British and French may believe" ( N Y T 4.16.39). Paris reports held, however, that Litvinov would announce Soviet adherence to the new bloc within a few days. Seeds saw Litvinov again while Maisky was called home for consultation. A happy augury was President Kalinin's cable to Roosevelt of April 16 offering "deep sympathy and cordial congratulations in connection with your noble message appealing to the Governments of Germany and Italy. You may be sure that your initiative finds the warmest echo in the hearts of the people of the Soviet Union, sincerely interested in safeguarding general peace." The Journal de Moscou wrote on April 18: "It is clearer than ever that the world is moving toward a frightful catastrophe, which will inevitably occur unless the necessary measures are taken in time. . . . It is natural that such grave events should attract equally the attention of countries like the U.S.S.R. and the United States, which by their power and geographic situation do not have to fear a direct attack." Deep secrecy was preserved regarding the concrete proposals which followed. No documents are as yet available concerning them. In January, 1940, Chamberlain announced the publication of a British White Paper on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations of 1939. But on February 21 Butler told Commons that consultations
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with Paris had delayed publication and that he could not set a date. The Paper had not been issued by the time this volume went to press. It is possible that the British Ministers feared that it would further embitter Anglo-Soviet relations by presenting Moscow's purposes in an unfavorable light. It is equally possible that Downing Street concluded after study of the documents that the record was scarcely creditable to Anglo-French diplomacy. In any case the course of the discussions must still be traced from secondary sources. Pertinax wrote on April 20 that Paris was seeking to make the operation of the pact of 1935 "automatic" by sweeping away the procedural delays and restrictions introduced by Laval. The British plan, he reported, was to secure a unilateral Soviet guarantee of Rumania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, with Soviet aid to be extended to these States in the event of a threat of aggression only in the form and to the degree that their Governments might request. This arrangement would be supplemented by a direct Anglo-Soviet mutual assistance pact ( N Y T 4.20.39). On the 21 St, as Maisky reached Moscow, rumors circulated that Litvinov had asked that any new Triple Entente be operative against Japan as well as Germany. Distrust of Bonnet, Beck and Chamberlain were still voiced in the Soviet press. Vice-Commissar Vladimir Potemkin visited Bucharest, Sofia and Ankara in Maywith what result, if any, no one knew. The announcement of April 26 of the introduction of conscription in Britain was welcomed in Moscow, but the return of Henderson and Coulondre to Berlin stirred misgivings. Maisky, on his way back to London, declared in Copenhagen on April 27: "Russia's position in a possible conflict is perfectly clear. W e are going to assist Europe in case of aggression." He was reported to have brought from Moscow a proposal for a five-year Anglo-French-Soviet aUiance with binding guarantees of mutual aid against aggression in Europe and Asia alike. But Downing Street shied away from any commitments in the Orient. Appeasement of Japan was still the order of the day. In Europe looser and more "flexible" formulas were preferred. Portugal, Spain and the Vatican must not be offended. Lisbon, Burgos and Tokio openly threatened to join the Axis if London made a pact with Moscow. The Kremlin was believed to have agreed to support Britain and France in common defense of Swit-
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zerland, Belgium and the Netherlands on condition that the Western Powers sign a binding alliance and guarantee the Baltic States. London hesitated. On May 2 Chamberlain asked Commons to be patient. "We are carrying on discussions of a perfectly friendly character. Many details have to be considered, many other governments have to be borne in mind . . . There is no want of good will on the part of His Majesty's Government." The Polish Ambassador in London had reported to Warsaw on April 26:
Without any doubt England wants Russian participation in the relations of the Powers, but it does not want to bind itself formally or too closely. From the explanations made to me by the permanent Sub-secretary Cadogan of the Foreign Office, it is inferred that England and France wish to limit themselves to obtaining a declaration from Russia stating that in case of war it would maintain a benevolent attitude so that, in this way, assurance may be had of access to basic materials, etc. This could be accomplished through a partial statement of the Soviet Government which would state that in the case of a German attack on Poland or Rumania, Russia would make known its attitude beforehand. But the counter-proposal of the Soviet, which desires to arrange a pact of mutual aidin either an Anglo-Russian bilateral form corresponding to the French-Soviet treaty, or as an accord among France, England and Russia was unacceptable to England according to Cadogan, nor did France want it. Cadogan referred to the necessary considerations of the reactions that would be provoked in other countries, mentioning among others, Poland, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Spain. At the same time Cadogan underlined the difficulties that the British Government would have; he did not want to give a negative answer in such a way as to cause anger. Also, Minister Gafencu has been informed of this point of view. From his conversations he became convinced that the British Government was avoiding a closer relationship with the Soviet. T h e Rumanian Foreign Minister expressed his opinion before me that actual Anglo-Soviet negotiations would be fruitless. Because of this, English policy, which still does not want to make any exclusively anti-German arrangements, tries to avoid any direct tie-up with the Soviet. But the future development of the international situation may take such a turn as to make the maintenance of this line impossible.^
This hesitation was followed by a wholly unexpected event. On May 3 the resignation of the Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs was curtly announced in Moscow. Reason: "111 health." Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, bom of Jewish parents named
1 Raczynski to Beck, April 26,1939, The German White Paper, 14th document, pages 68-9.
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Finkelstein in Byalystok in 1876, had been a wandering revolutionary most of his hfe. His British wife, whom he married in England during the Great War, was Ivy Low. She accompanied him back to Russia after the revolution. He became Chicherin's aide and, in 1930, his successor. He had been for years an ardent advocate of collective security. The career of this wise and witty genius was a succession of brilliant diplomatic victories until the Western Powers destroyed the League and the "peace front" of 1935, spurned his oifers of aid to Prague in the summer of 1938, and at Munich left him uninvited, humiliated and alone. Reports of German-Soviet negotiations were already rising early in May. Chamberlain ignored them. He had sacrificed his own Foreign Minister, Eden, on the altar of appeasement. He saw no need to strengthen Litvinov's hand in Moscow by hastening the tempo of negotiations. Stalin was already considering his course in the event of their failure. If the alternative was to be an entente with Berlin, Litvinov must go. Andrei Zhdanov, Leningrad party boss. Premier Viacheslav Molotov and perhaps Marshal Klementi Voroshilov were rumored to favor a deal with Hitler if London would not meet Moscow's terms. Molotov assumed Litvinov's post. Maxim was not in disgrace, for he was seen thereafter at official functions. But he was out of office. It is probable that he had suggested his own retirement after Munich and had suggested a reorientation of Soviet policy in the autumn of 1938.^ London registered mild anxiety. The Times was reassuring: "There is no reason to anticipate any change in the prime objectives of Soviet foreign policy." There was in fact no outward evidence that Stalin had shifted his course or despaired of an agreement with the West. Chamberlain proceeded in leisurely fashion to prepare a reply to the Soviet counter-proposals. No hard and fast aUiance could be contemplated, it was hinted, because this would alienate the smaller anti-Communist Powers and tend deplorably to establish ideological blocs. "We cannot accept the view," said Chamberlain on May 5 in reply to Noel-Baker, "that we should give up altogether our own opinions and accept without question the views of some other government. W e have to look after the interests of our own country and also look at the probabilities of achieving success in the policy we are following." When Communist Willie Gallacher suggested that
1 Cf. G. E. R. Gedye, NYT 9.12.40.
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Chamberlain ought to establish personal contacts with Soviet leaders, the Prime Minister replied: "Perhaps the Honorable Member will suggest whom I should make personal contact with, because personalities change rather rapidly." Such cleverness was its own reward. More relevant were Washington reports that the U.S.S.R. was determined to occupy Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and perhaps southeastern Finland in case of any threat of German aggression.^ Preparations for the impending Anglo-Turkish accord on May 6 coincided with new rumors of appeasement. On the same day the British reply to Moscow was sent to Seeds. It was evidently a rejection of any alliance and a proposal that the U.S.S.R. should agree to come to the aid of Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey if called upon to do so and if Britain and France should do so first. During May Chamberlain continued to report progress and to withhold details. Lloyd George avowed on May 8 that British pledges were "demented" without Soviet support and suggested that any member of the General Staff who believed that Britain could win a war without Russian help should be "confined in a lunatic asylum." Sir Stafford Cripps opposed conscription on the ground that the Cabinet was not a national government but a "class and party government." When Lady Astor shouted: "Nonsense!" he commented: "That sounds like the noble lady for Berlin." Moscow's silence was broken by an official communique on May 9:
The Soviet Government received on May 8 counter-proposals of the British Government, with which the French Government was in agreement. In these proposals it is not stated that the Soviet Government must give separate guarantees for the States bordering it. The proposals state the Soviet Government must give immediate help to Britain and France in case the latter are involved in military operations in execution of their obligation toward Poland and Rumania. However, the counter-proposals of the British Government include no pledge of help to be given by the British and French Governments to the Soviet Union on a reciprocal basis should the Soviet Union become engaged in military operations in execution of the obligations it would undertake concerning any Eastern European State.
The British proposals appear to have corresponded to this description. Chamberlain, Halifax and Bonnet shied away from any
1 Cf. dispatch of Frank L. Kluckhohn, NYT 5.6.39.
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pledge to defend the U.S.S.R. They contended that their pledges to Poland and Rumania gave Russia ample protection. Maisky retorted that these States might be rapidly conquered by the Reich. The U.S.S.R. would then be exposed to German attack and would have no guarantee against a separate peace between Germany and the Western Powers. Daladier apparently recognized the justice of this objection,^ but Chamberlain did not. On May 10, however, he denied that British plans would require the U.S.S.R. to fight alone against aggression. In the most extensive statement he had thus far made on the negotiations, he declared:
H . M. Government undertook these obligations without inviting the Soviet government to participate directly in them, in view of certain difficulties to which the House is well aware that any such suggestion would inevitably give rise. H . M. Government accordingly suggested to the Soviet Government that they should make on their own behalf a declaration similar in effect to that already made by H . M. Government in the sense that, in the event of Britain and France being involved in hostilities in discharge of their own obligations thus accepted, the Soviet Government on their side would express a readiness also to lend assistance if it is desired. Such a declaration, if the Soviet Government feel able to make it, seems to H . M. Government to be in accord with the recent pronouncement of Stalin that it is the policy of the Soviet Government to support countries which might become victims of aggression and which are prepared to defend their own independence. Almost simultaneously, the Soviet Government suggested a scheme at once more comprehensive and more rigid, which, whatever advantages it might present, would, in the view of H . M. Government, raise inevitably the very difficulties which their own proposals were designed to avoid. H . M. Government accordingly pointed out to the Soviet Government the existence of these difficulties. At the same time they made certain modifications in their own original proposals. In particular, they made plain that it is in no part their intention that the Soviet Government should commit themselves to intervene, irrespective of whether Britain and France are already intervening in the discharge of their own obligations. H . M. Government added that if the Soviet Government wished to make their own intervention contingent on that of Britain and France, H . M. Government for their part would offer no objection. T h e Foreign Secretary yesterday saw the Soviet Ambassador, who explained to him that the Soviet Government was still not clear as to whether, under the 1 Cf. Pertinax's remarkable dispatch foreshadowing Soviet neutrality and the German-Russian pact, NYT 5.9.39.
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proposals of H . M. Government, circumstances might not arise wherein the Soviet Government wôuld stand committed to intervention unsupported by H . M. Government or France. T h e Foreign Secretary assured the Ambassador that this definitely was not the intention of the proposal made by H . M. Government, and that if there was any room for doubt on this point the Foreign Secretary anticipated that it would without difficulty be removed. H e accordingly invited the Soviet Ambassador to place H . M. Government in possession of the precise grounds upon which these doubts of his Government are based, if they still existed, and this the Soviet Ambassador readily agreed to do. I should add that the British Ambassador to Moscow had an interview two days ago with Molotov, at the conclusion of which Molotov promised that the Soviet Government would give careful consideration to our proposals, and we are now awaiting their reply.
Stalin, however, remained obdurate. A long editorial in Izvestia on May 11 was not without bitterness:
. . . T h e U.S.S.R. held and continues to hold that if France and Great Britain really want to create a barrier against aggression in Europe a united front of mutual assistance should be created, primarily of the four principal Powers in EuropeGreat Britain, France, the U.S.S.R. and Polandor, at least, of three PowersGreat Britain, France and U.S.S.R.and that these three Powers, bound by a pact of mutual assistance on the principle of reciprocity, should guarantee the other States of Eastern and Central Europe which are threatened b y aggression. It must be noted that this clear and fundamentally defensive and peaceable attitude of U.S.S.R., which, moreover, is based on the principle of reciprocity and equality of obligations, has not met with a sympathetic response on the part of Great Britain and France. As is known. Great Britain, with the consent of France, has made counter-proposals. Great Britain's suggestions avoid the subject of a pact of mutual assistance between France, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. and consider that the Soviet Government should come to the immediate aid of Great Britain and France should they be involved in hostilities as a result of carrying out the obligations they have assumed in guaranteeing Poland and Rumania. Great Britain says nothing about the aid which the U.S.S.R. should naturally receive on the principle of reciprocity from France and Great Britain should it be involved in hostilities owing to the fulfillment of the obligations it may assume in guaranteeing any of the States of Eastern Europe. It thus follows that under this arrangement the U.S.S.R. must find itself in a position of inequality, although it would assume exactly the same
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obligations as France and Great Britain. W e say nothing about the highlyinteresting fact that under this arrangement the actual resistance to aggression and the time of commencement of this resistance are left to be decided only by Great Britain and France, although the brunt of this resistance would fall principally on U.S.S.R., owing to its geographical situation. W e are told that by defending Poland and Rumania Great Britain and France would virtually be defending the western frontier of the U.S.S.R. T h a t is not true. Firstly, the western frontier of the U.S.S.R. is not confined to Poland and Rumania. Secondly, and this is the main point, by defending Poland and Rumania Great Britain and France would be defending themselves and not the western frontier of the U.S.S.R., for they have a pact of mutual assistance with Poland, who in her turn is obliged to defend Great Britain and France from aggression. As to Rumania, inasmuch as she has a treaty of alliance with Poland, she will be obliged to follow in Poland's wakethat is, Rumania virtually will have to play the part of an indirect ally of Great Britain and France. But the situation of the U.S.S.R. is different. N o t having a pact of mutual assistance with Great Britain and France nor with Poland, the U.S.S.R. is to undertake to assist all these States without receiving any assistance from them, and, moreover, in the event of aggression directly aimed at the U.S.S.R., the latter would have to rely solely upon its own forces. Again the situation of the U.S.S.R. would be one of inequality. In his statement in the House of Commons on May lo Chamberlain, the British Premier, spoke of collaboration, of an alliance with the U.S.S.R. But collaboration implies reciprocity as its natural basis. W h e r e there is no reciprocity, real collaboration cannot be brought about.
Here, by implication, was a clue as to Stalin's price for an alliance. Moscow would not give any unilateral guarantee to Poland or Rumania. Poland had reciprocal obligations with the West. Rumania had an alliance with Poland. The U.S.S.R. was willing to assume reciprocal obligations of defense with Britain and France and with Poland and Rumania. If London and Paris would agree to defend the U.S.S.R., as well as Poland and Rumania, against attack, the Kremlin might unilaterally guarantee Warsaw and Bucharest. But attack might come through the Baltic. Hence the Baltic States should likewise be guaranteed. On May 11 the League council consented to Moscow's request to postpone for one week the meeting scheduled for May 15 in
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order to permit Potemkin to attend. Moscow's reply was received by London on May 15. Two days later the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet decided to propose a joint declaration by France, Britain and the U.S.S.R. to resist any aggressor, to be followed by a Soviet guarantee to Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. If obliged to fight in support of these pledges, the Soviet Union would be joined by Britain and France. This formula did not meet Moscow's objections. Neither did the reported compromise plan attributed to Bonnet and to Ambassador Paul mile Naggiar, whereby London, Paris and Moscow would sign a mutual assistance pact but not guarantee the Baltic States. Maislcy told Robert Vansittart that his Government would accept nothing less than a full military alliance. What was more disturbing, it was announced that Potemkin would not go to Geneva after all. Maisky would represent the U.S.S.R. On the 19th Chamberlain, Simon and Hoare met to consider further steps. Daladier submitted suggestions after conferring with the Soviet Ambassador, Jacob Suritz. But Chamberlain would have no alliance and would consider no guarantee of the Baltic States. Daladier had men of similar mind in his own entourage, apart from Bonnet. General Maxime Weygand, clerical reactionary who both feared and despised the State whose armies he had helped to defeat before Warsaw in 1920, visited Ankara and Bucharest where he apparently expressed full agreement with those who looked upon Russia as a greater menace than the Reich and wanted no Russian aid against the Reich. Chamberlain was the target of another verbal barrage in Commons on May 19. He said in reply: "The suggestion that we despise the assistance of the Soviet Union is really without foundation." But "I want to make it clear that this policy is not a policy of lining up opposing blocs of Powers in Europe." In dealing with Russia it was essential to take account of the "wishes of some of the countries on whose behalf the arrangements are being made." Churchill argued vehemently for an alliance: "It is said, 'Can you trust the Russian Government?' I suppose in Moscow they say, 'Can you trust Chamberlain?' I hope we may soon say that the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. If we are ready to be an ally of Russia in time of war, which is the supreme test, why should we shrink from becoming an ally of Russia now, when we might by that very fact prevent the break-
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ing out of war? I cannot understand these refinements of diplomacy and delay. W e would not extend our responsibilities or risks by extending our guarantees to cover the Baltic States. W e are up to our neck in it already There is only one way to influence Mussolini, and that is to be strong." Without Russia, he urged, there could be no eastern front, and without an eastern front the West would be lost if war came. "Russia offered to come in months ago," said Lloyd George. "For months we have been staring this powerful gift horse in the mouth." "And have seen its false teeth," interrupted Archibald James. "And we were frightened of its teeth," continued the Welshman. "After all, the Government is not frightened of the teeth of those beasts of prey who have been tearing down one independent country after another. W e have pacts of friendship with them, we have shaken their paws. At this very hour we are officially joining in the celebration of their carnivorous triumphs." Halifax stopped off in Paris on his way to Geneva to consult Daladier and Bonnet who consulted Suritz who consulted Molotov and asked that new instructions be sent to Maisky who could see Halifax any day in London. Downing Street was adamant against any arrangement which might leave to Moscow the decision of Avhere and when to fight. This privilege must be reserved to London and Paris. British opposition was equally firm against any guarantee of the Baltic States. It was feared Aioscow might abuse such a guarantee and provoke a conflict with Germany for its own purposes. The Kremlin was likewise adamant. On the 2ist the 105th session of the League council met in Geneva. Appeals from Benes and King Zog for some action against aggression were sidetracked, despite Maisky's efforts to have them considered. A demand from China for economic pressure on Japan was met with an innocuous resolution, despite Maisky's plea for action. Halifax and Bonnet solemnly reaffirmed their devotion to the Covenant. The British Foreign Minister allegedly submitted to the Soviet Ambassador a proposal for an Anglo-French-Soviet guarantee of Poland and Rumania; concerted action among the guarantors if one of them should be attacked by virtue of its pledge; consultation in case of any threat to the Baltic States, the Netherlands and Belgium; and a technical agreement for effective assistance to the protected states. Such devices indicated no progress. Moscow was silent. But the Kremlin expressed its strong
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opposition to any fortification of the Aaland Islands. Other signatories of the convention had agreed to Finland's request, which required Council approval. In deference to Soviet wishes, the Council closed its session on May 27 without acting on the issue. Meanwhile it was reported in London on May 24 that the Cabinet had agreed "in principle" to a new formula. Chamberlain was vague but confident. "As a result of these conversations all relevant points of view now have been made clear, and I have every reason to hope that as a result of proposals which H. M. Government is now in a position to make on the main questions arising it will be found possible to reach a full agreement at an early date." As Downing Street forwarded the new proposals to Moscow on May 26, Voroshilov was invited to attend the British army maneuvers during the summer. Bonnet transmitted to Suritz the text of a tripartite accord. It was believed to include a pact of mutual assistance within the framework of the Covenant, whereby each signatory would come to the military aid of the others in the event of attack upon its territory and would "consult" in the event of aggression against any State guaranteed by the signatories. On May 27 the text was transmitted by Seeds and the French Charge to Potemkin and Molotov, who said he would have to "refer to his Government." Bonnet assured the French Cabinet that the plan met Soviet demands for equality and reciprocity and would be accepted. On the 29th Molotov announced that he would speak on foreign policy before the Supreme Soviet two days later. He summoned Seeds to his office that evening for further discussion. He was reported to have asked for, and to have received, assurances that the proposed alliance would go into effect automatically and immediately in the event of any aggression against the signatories or against States guaranteed by them. His doubts were due to a phrase referring to "the spirit of Article 16 of the Covenant"the sanctions article which Downing Street had long since interpreted as imposing only optional obligations. New doubts stirred in London. These doubts were resolved by Molotov's address of May 31, 1939. He began, in Stalin's vein of March 10, with condemnation of aggressors and stronger condemnation of appeasers. The U.S. S.R. "cannot, as everybody understands, be in any way suspected of any sympathy for the aggressors." Neither could it be accused of glossing over dangerous changes in the international situation
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in order to "soothe" opinion or appease aggressors. [Within three months Molotov would be doing both.] Munich was the culmination of appeasement. "Did the Munich agreement stop aggression? Not in the least." Germany "put an end to one of the large Slav States, Czecho-Slovakia" so easily as to raise the question of "what was the real aim of the conference in Munich." Memel was taken. Albania was extinguished. Then Germany denounced its pacts with Britain and Poland "in reply to the proposal of Mr. Roosevelt, a proposal permeated with a peace-loving spirit." Rome and Berlin then concluded an offensive treaty, devoid of anti-Comintern camouflage and "directed against the chief European democratic countries." The international situation had thus been altered for the worse.
In this connection certain changes in the direction of counteracting aggression are to be observed in the policy of the non-aggressive countries of Europe too. H o w serious these changes are still remains to be seen. As yet it cannot even be said whether these countries are seriously desirous of abandoning the policy of non-intervention, the policy of non-resistance to the further development of aggression. May it not turn out that the present endeavour of these countries to resist aggression in so?ne regions will not serve as an obstacle to the unleashing of aggression in other regions? Such questions are being asked in certain bourgeois publications abroad too. W e must therefore be vigilant. W e stand for peace and for preventing the further development of aggression. But we must remember Comrade Stalin's precept "to be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by war-mongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." Only thus shall we be able to defend to the end the interests of our country and the interests of universal peace.
But Molotov conceded that a change was taking place in British policy. "We, of course, appreciate the difference between verbal statements and real policy." Yet the Anglo-Polish pact and the Anglo-Turkish pact were new. The non-aggressive Powers had sought the collaboration of the U.S.S.R. Moscow had agreed to negotiate because it was interested in "checking the further development of aggression and establishing a reliable and effective defensive front of non-aggressive Powers."
In connection with the proposals made to us by the British and French Governments, the Soviet Government entered into negotiations with
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them regarding measures necessary for combating aggression. Tliis was in the middle of April. T h e negotiations begun then have not yet ended. But even at that time it viâs apparent that if there was a real desire to create an effective front of the peaceable countries against the advance of aggression, the following minimum conditions were necessary: that an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, a pact of an exclusively defensive character, be concluded between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R.; that a guarantee against attack by aggressors be extended b y Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. to the States of Central and Eastern Europe, including all European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R., without exception; that a concrete agreement be concluded by Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. regarding the forms and extent of the immediate and effective assistance to be given to each other and to the guaranteed States in the event of attack by aggressors. Such is our opinion, an opinion we force upon no one, but to which we adhere. W e do not demand the acceptance of our point of view, and do not ask anybody to do so. W e consider, however, that this point of view really answers the interests of security of the peaceable States. It would be an agreement of an exclusively defensive character, operating against attack on the part of aggressors and fundamentally differing from the military and offensive alliance recently concluded between Germany and Italy. Naturally, the basis of such an agreement must be the principle of reciprocity and equality of obligations. It should be noted that in some of the British and French proposals this elementary principle did not meet with favour. While guaranteeing themselves from direct attack on the part of aggressors by mutual assistance pacts between themselves and with Poland, and while trying t o secure for themselves the assistance of the U.S.S.R. in the event of attack by aggressors on Poland and Rumania, the British and French left open the question whether the U.S.S.R. in its turn might count on their assistance in the event of it being directly attacked by aggressors, just as they left open another question, namely, whether they could participate in guaranteeing the small States bordering on the U.S.S.R. and covering its northwestern frontiers, should these states prove unable to defend their neutrality from attack by aggressors. Thus the position was one of inequality for the U.S.S.R. T h e other day new British and French proposals were received. In these proposals the principle of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of reciprocity in the event of direct attack by aggressors is now recognized. This of course is a step forward, although it should be noted that it is hedged around by such reservations even to the extent of a reservation regarding certain clauses in the League
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of Nations Covenantthat it may prove to be a fictitious step forward. As regards the question of guaranteeing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, on this point the proposals mentioned show no progress whatever from the standpoint of reciprocity. They provide for assistance being given by the U.S.S.R. to the five countries which the British and French have already promised to guarantee, but say nothing about their giving assistance to the three countries on the northwestern frontier of the U.S.S.R., which may prove unable to defend their neutrality in the event of attack by aggressors. But the Soviet Union cannot undertake commitments in regard to the five countries mentioned unless it receives a guarantee in regard to the three countries on its northwestern frontier. That is how matters stand regarding the negotiations with Great Britain and France.
The Soviet Premier went on to say suggestively that he did not consider it necessary "to renounce business relations with countries like Germany and Italy." An advantageous trade agreement had just been concluded with Rome. Berlin had proposed to grant a credit of 200,000,000 marks. Disagreements had developed, but "it is not precluded that the negotiations may be resumed." The Polish-Soviet trade agreement was welcomed. "Our relations with the friendly power of Turkey are developing normally." Molotov noted with satisfaction that the League Council, lacking unanimity because of Soviet objections, had not sanctioned the revision of the 1921 convention demilitarizing the Aaland Islands. "It is to be expected that the Finnish Government will draw the necessary conclusions from this situation." The Premier concluded by noting that the fisheries agreement with Japan had been extended for another year on terms more favorable to the U.S.S.R. "Threats to the Soviet Union do not achieve their aim. . . . The Soviet Government will not tolerate any provocation on the part of Japano-Manchurian troops on its borders. A reminder of this must now be given with regard to the borders of the Mongolian People's RepubHc as well. . . . W e take such a thing as a pact of mutual assistance signed by the Soviet Government seriously. . . , There is a limit to all patience. . . . There is no need for me to deal with our policy toward China. . . . It is fully in line with the task which faces us in Europe, namely, the establishment of a united front of peaceable Powers against the further extension of aggression. . . . There is no need to show that the foreign policy of the
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Soviet Union is fundamentally peaceful and opposed to aggression . . ." ^ The Supreme Soviet unanimously adopted a resolution of endorsement, thus preserving the fiction that the policy of the Soviet leaders was under legislative control. The diplomatic negotiations rested where Molotov had left them. A reciprocal mutual assistance pact between Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. was all very well, but the Kremlin would not guarantee the States which the Western Powers had guaranteed unless they in turn would guarantee the Baltic States and thus commit themselves to fight any aggression against any of the European States bordering on the U.S.S.R. The question inevitably arises as to whether these demands were "sincere." Was Stalin at any time prepared to sign a pact with Britain and France on any conditions? Was he not perhaps carrying on negotiations with no intention of bringing them to a successful conclusion, merely as a means of securing more favorable terms from Hitler with whom secret negotiations of a wholly different character had already begun? This is possible, but not probable. Even the documents, when made available, are unlikely to answer this question. The answer must be sought in terms of Stalin's objectives as revealed by statements of purpose and by subsequent events. Four theoretical possibilities could be envisaged by the Kremlin: (I) a united attack by all the bourgeois Powers on the Soviet Union; (2) a Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R., condoned by the neutral Western Powers; ( 3 ) 3 bloc of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union against the Reich to prevent any further aggression or to insure German defeat if it were attempted; (4) a German attack on Poland and the Western Powers, condoned by a neutral Soviet Union. The first possibility no longer required serious consideration. That the last possibility finally materialized does not prove that it was from the outset envisaged as the most desirable one by the Kremlin. Moscow's menace was Germany. Prospects of Communist revolution in Germany could still be dreamed of without too great a strain of the Stalinist imagination. But no revolution was conceivable in a victorious Germany. And a Germany victorious over the Western Powers would be a far greater
1V. M. Molotov, The International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1939.
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menace than a Germany checkmated. Germany could be checkmated and, if not deterred from aggression, then defeated, only by the realization of the third possibility. This was therefore the alternative "sincerely" preferred by the men of Moscow, not because they said so, but because their purposes both as defenders of the Socialist Fatherland and as international revolutionists could best be served thereby. If they did not accept forthwith the Allied suggestions, it was because of continued fear of the second possibility, induced by the peculiar character of the Allied proposals and enhanced by new gestures of appeasement in the West. Stalin and Molotov, moreover, were no longer begging the Allies for support against the Reich. They had no need to. The fourth possibility was always open if the third failed. The Allies were the beggars. And beggars cannot be choosers.^ The Kremlin could afford to insist on its own terms. Stalin knew that the Allies could not afford to reject these terms. If their leaders thought otherwise, so much the worse for them. These terms were conditioned not only by fear of Possibility No. 3, but by the specific problems of strategy involved in the geo-political relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Reich. Moscow's demand for a guarantee of the Baltic States, as well as of
1 Louis Fischer, op. cit., puts the matter thus: "The away-from-appeasement tendency of the British and French thus offered Stalin a choice between the Allies and Germany. It was in this perspective that the Soviet Government saw its negotiations with England and France in the spring and summer of 1939. Stalin could play off the Allies against Germany and Germany against the Allies and use this bargaining advantage to get more from the side with which in the end he decided to sign a treaty" (p. 17). And again: "If Stalin had had any doubt about the Allies' determination to stop Hitler, his policy would have been to re-inforce that determination. Russia would never have trusted itself alone with Germany in Eastern Europe except in the expectation that Germany would be occupied with the war in Western Europe. Stahn foresaw the coming struggle between the Allies and Germany. Thus, as long as the Allies followed the weak policy of appeasement and submission to Fascist aggressors, the Bolsheviks were pro-Ally. And the moment the Allies took a firm stand against a Fascist aggressor, the Bolsheviks made a pact with him. That is what is called dialectics. The pact caught the Communists with their dialectics down" (p. 5). The last reference, of course, is to the Communists outside of the U.S.S.R. One may dispute the formulation that Stalin made his pact with Hitler because the AHies had committed themselves to fight the Reich. This commitment made it possible for Stahn to make a pact with Hitler without the risks which such a course would have entailed earlier. Whether the possibility was to be utilized depended upon calculations of the relative risks and advantages of a pact with Hitler and a pact with the Allies, and this in turn depended upon what each side offered to Moscow.
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Poland and Rumania, subsequently evolved into a demand for access to the Baltic States and to Poland by the Red Army. Was the demand "sincere"? Answers tend to run in terms of another question: Did Stalin desire no more than the defense of the independence and integrity of the Border States or was he aiming at their annexation under cover of a specious protection? Here again the final fate of these States is not conclusive evidence of original intent. The question ignores the central issue in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. That issue for Moscow was not one of protecting the Border States for the sake of protecting the Border States. It was one of protecting the U.S.S.R. and of preparing for war against the Reich. N o such war could be risked (since Possibility No. 4 was always available) unless Moscow could be certain of full Allied participation against Germany and of military control of the areas essential for defense against Germany or for attack upon Germany. These areas were obviously Poland and the Baltic States. Any German attack on Russia and any Soviet attack on Germany must traverse these countries. Questions of "independence," "integrity" or "annexation" were by themselves of no strategic consequence. Moscow had no need or desire for land for its own sake. What was important to the Soviet strategists was that Germany should not be permitted by a sudden blow, from without or from within, to secure mastery of Poland and the Balticum and to use them for the successful invasion of Russia, as in 1916-18. What was important was that the U.S.S.R. should be military master of these borderlands in order to use them for an invasion of the Reich, as in 1914. The leaders of the Red Army were not disciples of Andre Maginot and Liddell Hart. They did not believe that the best attack was defense. They believed, with the leaders of the Reichswehr, that the best defense was attack. In order to attack the Power which the Allies were asking them to attack in the event of further aggression, and in order to thwart attack upon their own country by that Power, it seemed to them necessary to have military control of the Baltic States and military access to Poland. These conditions were reasonable and "sincere." Without them. Possibility No. 4 appeared to the Kremlin to be preferable to Possibility No. 3. By failing to meet these conditions, London and Paris failed to secure an alliance with Moscow against Berlin.
Chamberlain's Honor 2. CHAMBERLAIN'S HONOR
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The negotiations for the new triple entente which had seemed so near to completion at the end of May were not terminated by Molotov's hard words before the Supreme Soviet. Confidence verging on complacency continued to be expressed in London. While the Soviet Premier was publicly expressing distrust of British sincerity, Chamberlain was fishing in Hampshire as the guest of Sir Francis Lindley, former Ambassador to Tokio and Charge in the Petrograd Embassy during the revolution. Sir Francis was a die-hard Munichman and anti-Bolshevik who had repeatedly condemned any coalition against Japan and declared that in the event of a Soviet-Japanese war "our sympathies certainly should not be with Moscow." Here as always Chamberlain's course was ill-calculated to dispel Russian suspicions. It was also noted that Ambassadors Seeds and Naggiar were not present in the Kremlin during Molotov's speech, although Augusto Rosso and Count Friedrich von der Schulenberg both appeared. The formal Soviet reply was given by Molotov to the Allied envoys on June 2 while Nicholas Charonov, new Soviet Ambassador to Warsaw, was being received by President Moscicki amid much talk of Polish-Soviet cooperation. The reply was understood to be a restatement of Molotov's address in the form of a detailed commentary on the British draft agreement, accompanied by a redraft more to Moscow's liking. It was hinted in Paris that the British and French Cabinets were not disposed to make further concessions and that little progress could be expected so long as Molotov insisted on a joint guarantee of the Baltic States. Chamberlain in Commons on June 5 was non-committal. When Laborite David Adams asked whether he "had considered or will consider the desirability of making an official visit to Moscow" he replied: "In the present circumstances I do not consider that the suggestion made by Mr. Adams would serve a useful purpose." Churchill wrote on the next day: "Matters have now gone so far that it is inconceivable that any of the three Governments could take the responsibility of depriving the hundreds of milhons of working people involved of this joint security for their life and progress. . . . I have from the beginning preferred the Rus-
Chamberlain's Honor 2. CHAMBERLAIN'S HONOR
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The negotiations for the new triple entente which had seemed so near to completion at the end of May were not terminated by Molotov's hard words before the Supreme Soviet. Confidence verging on complacency continued to be expressed in London. While the Soviet Premier was publicly expressing distrust of British sincerity, Chamberlain was fishing in Hampshire as the guest of Sir Francis Lindley, former Ambassador to Tokio and Charge in the Petrograd Embassy during the revolution. Sir Francis was a die-hard Munichman and anti-Bolshevik who had repeatedly condemned any coalition against Japan and declared that in the event of a Soviet-Japanese war "our sympathies certainly should not be with Moscow." Here as always Chamberlain's course was ill-calculated to dispel Russian suspicions. It was also noted that Ambassadors Seeds and Naggiar were not present in the Kremlin during Molotov's speech, although Augusto Rosso and Count Friedrich von der Schulenberg both appeared. The formal Soviet reply was given by Molotov to the Allied envoys on June 2 while Nicholas Charonov, new Soviet Ambassador to Warsaw, was being received by President Moscicki amid much talk of Polish-Soviet cooperation. The reply was understood to be a restatement of Molotov's address in the form of a detailed commentary on the British draft agreement, accompanied by a redraft more to Moscow's liking. It was hinted in Paris that the British and French Cabinets were not disposed to make further concessions and that little progress could be expected so long as Molotov insisted on a joint guarantee of the Baltic States. Chamberlain in Commons on June 5 was non-committal. When Laborite David Adams asked whether he "had considered or will consider the desirability of making an official visit to Moscow" he replied: "In the present circumstances I do not consider that the suggestion made by Mr. Adams would serve a useful purpose." Churchill wrote on the next day: "Matters have now gone so far that it is inconceivable that any of the three Governments could take the responsibility of depriving the hundreds of milhons of working people involved of this joint security for their life and progress. . . . I have from the beginning preferred the Rus-
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sian proposals to either the British or French alternatives. They are simple, they are logical and they conform to the main groupings of common interest. . . . The whole possibility of establishing an effective eastern front depends upon the military strength of France and Great Britain in the West and upon the cordial aid of a friendly Soviet Russia in the East." ^ Yvon Delbos agreed: "Without Soviet Russia, the French-British alliance with Poland, the guarantee the two Western Powers have accorded to Rumania, would no longer be effective." ^ Insofar as parliaments and publics were taken into the confidence of the Anglo-French leaders, they received the impression that the major difficulty lay not in any reluctance of Chamberlain and Daladier to guarantee the Baltic States but in the unwillingness of these States to accept any guarantee. Baltic spokesmen voiced their distaste for any scheme which would jeopardize their "neutrality" and expose their independence to the doubtful mercies of Soviet protection. Said Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter: "As soon as any Great Power should, without our invitation, desire to appear in the role of assistant, either as a representative of some collective system or as a defender of its own vital interests on the soil of the Baltic States, such assistance would be considered as an aggression against which the Baltic States would fight with all their means" ( N Y T 6.2.39). O"^ June 6 Augustus Schmidt, Estonian Minister in London, conveyed to Halifax the refusal of Latvia, Estonia and Finland to allow other Powers to guarantee them against German aggression. The Finnish Diet was told by Foreign Minister Eljas Erkko on the same day:
It is reported that Russia wishes to give Finland an automatic guarantee and thus detach Finland from other Nordic States by placing her in an exclusive position. We realize perfectly well what such an automatic guarantee, if given to Finland, means if offered without her consent and without negotiations. I have every reason to inform you on this occasion that such a guarantee cannot be accepted. It is not compatible with Finland's independence and sovereignty, and Finland is bound to treat as an aggressor every Power that on the strength of such a self-assumed guarantee intends to extend its so-called assistance when perhaps it considers the guaranteed State needs it. The Finnish nation is determined to protect its neutrality to the bitter end. Nobody can convince us that if 1 New York Herald Tribune, June 7, 1939.
2 Ibid., June 9, 1939.
Chamberlain's Honor
z^cf
we, in the name of peace, should be dragged into the Great Powers' constellations, it could help the world or ourselves.
The attitude of Kovno, Riga, Tallinn and Helsinki was a natural reflection of their peculiar political and geographical position. These border States, once freed from the Tsardom, could hope to maintain themselves only as buffers between Berlin and Moscow. A buffer State by definition is one which is too feeble to defend itself alone, but continues to exist because neither of its great neighbors will permit the other to secure control. The weak sovereignties of the Balticum could live only by virtue of a German-Russian checkmate. For such States isolationist neutrality is a necessity. This necessity remains a possibility so long as neither adjacent Great Power makes a thieves' bargain with the other or yields to the other or is defeated by the other. To accept a tripartite guarantee which in practice could be enforced only by the U.S.S.R. was to run risks of German attack and/or Soviet domination. T o refuse to accept such a guarantee, it turned out, was to promote a German-Soviet bargain in which the integrity of Finland would be threatened and the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia ultimately extinguished. In the hope of maintaining their buffer character these States rejected any guarantee. The attitude of London and Paris toward the issue is less comprehensible. The impossibility of accepting the Kremlin's terms lay ostensibly in ethical imperatives against forcing guarantees upon States which had no desire for them. Chamberlain and Halifax later declared self-righteously that Britain and France could not treat independent peoples as pawns and deliver them to Soviet control as the price of a pact with Moscow. Hitler might barter away the liberties of lesser peoples, but the democraciesnever. If sincere, such a sentiment was doubtless admirable, however disastrous its results might be. But the Machiavellian Realpoliticians in Moscow had difficulty in regarding the sentiment as sincere. They noted that Chamberlain and Daladier had experienced no visible traumas of conscience in delivering Spain to the Axis, and Czechoslovakia to the Reich, and Hatay to Turkey in exchange for "peace" in the first two instances and for an alliance in the third. Laval and Hoare had delivered Ethiopia to Mussolini. Britain had guaranteed Iraq and Egypt and dozens
2 50
Retreat from
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of lesser communities under circumstances justifying doubts as to the voluntary character of the marriage. France had done likewise all over the globe. In each case the protests of the "beneficiaries" of an unwanted "protection" had not been deemed sufficiently important to warrant jeopardizing some higher political purpose. The United States of America had withheld diplomatic recognition from the three smaller Baltic States for five years after Moscow had granted it, in the name of the "integrity" of Great Russia, then represented in Washington by Ambassador Boris Backmetiev of the long defunct Kerensky regime. Now, however, the "independence" of the Baltic States had suddenly become an object of inflexible solicitude on the part of the Western Powers. Moscow wondered . . . Others also wondered. Churchill wrote: "Nor should there be any serious difficulty in guaranteeing the Baltic States and Finland. The Russian claim that these should be included in the triple guarantee is well founded. There is no sense in having a crack in the peace diving-bell. People say, 'What if they do not wish to be guaranteed?' It is certain, however, that if Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were invaded by the Nazis or subverted to the Nazi system by propaganda and intrigue from within, the whole of Europe would be dragged into war. . . . W h y not then concert in good time, publicly and courageously, the measures which may render such a fight unnecessary? It is too much to ask these small States at this stage, before the triple alliance has been signed, to commit themselves. It is quite sufficient for the three Great Powers to declare that the invasion or subversion of the Baltic States by the Nazis would be an unfriendly act against the grand alhance." ^ Delbos wrote: "Since the Baltic States are for Soviet Russia what Holland, Belgium and Switzerland are for Great Britain and France, the Soviet leaders, in virtue of the principle of equahty and reciprocity, demand for the former the same guarantees as those accorded to the latter. . . . It is possible if not probable that the Baltic States, terrorized and weakened, would allow themselves to be invaded without saying a word and the agreement would thus be ineffective in the East. This hypothesis is confirmed by the statements of the Latvian and Estonian leaders refusing any kind of guarantee, and the non-aggression pact they have concluded with Germany is far from re-assuring. Inter1 New York Herald Tribune, June 7, 1939.
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preted in the Hitlerian manner, it may be transformed into a right of occupation and transit. This is the whole difficulty." ^ The difficulty was that the Western leaders were deterred from accepting the Soviet demands less by moral scruples than by political prejudices and misconceptions. They did not base their policy, as Molotov feared, exclusively on the hope of keeping open a last channel of possible Nazi attack on Russia through which a German-Soviet war might yet be unleashed without involving the Western Powers. Their policy rested rather upon refusal to face the possibility of a German-Soviet bargain. It rested in greater measure upon a desire to enlist Soviet collaboration against the Reich without paying a price which would enhance Soviet power and bring Communism closer to Central Europe. It was not that the Western diplomats loved the "independence" of the Baltic States, but that they feared and hated the Soviet colossus even while they sought its help. Here again the West was inhibited from playing RealpoUtik by the class attitudes of its rulers. To say that these attitudes were justified is beside the point. Thanks to the consequences of appeasement, the issue for the West was: to be or not to be. Survival in the face of Nazi imperialism was possible with Soviet aid. Moscow offered aid at a price. How specifically that price was defined is still a matter of conjecture. Behind Moscow's formulas was the implication that the U.S.S.R. should be granted military control of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, military bases in Finland and military access to Poland. Behind this was the implication of political control. N o doubt the Kremlin expected London and Paris to see the implications and to make appropriate proposals. Even had Moscow asked for outright annexation of Eastern Poland and all the Balticum, as Ankara asked for Hatay, this price would have been cheap in comparison with Allied defeat at the hands of the Reich abetted by the U.S.S.R. Chamberlain and Daladier did not anticipate this grim alternative. They therefore declined to pay Stalin's price. Their gestures to placate Moscow without paying the price were not indicative of great diplomatic skill. On June 7 Chamberlain told Commons that it was impossible to impose unwanted guarantees, but that some formula could be worked out, since the Cabinet did not intend "that the military support which the three
1 Ibid., June 9, 1939.
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Powers have agreed to extend should be confined to actual aggression on their own territory." In order to arrive at a formula a special envoy would be sent to Moscow^ to assist Seeds. The emissary selected was William Strang, head of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office. The choice was scarcely a happy one. Strang had been Charge in Moscow during the trial of the Metropolitan-Vickers engineers in 1933 when AngloSoviet relations had reached the breaking point. He had accompanied Chamberlain to Germany in September, 1938. From Munich to Moscow was a long journey. The voyage from London to Moscow could better have been undertaken by someone who had never been to Munich. Halifax had not hesitated to go to Rome. Chamberlain had not hesitated to go to Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, Munich and Rome. But neither would go to Moscow. Neither would they send Cadogan or Vansittart. Sir Horace Wilson appears to have induced Chamberlain to rely on Strang for both the Munich and Moscow missions. The Soviet leaders were disgruntled but wilHng to accept what the wits called the Strang nach Osten. While Laval in the French Senate on June 9 reiterated his thesis that only a French-ItaUan entente was worth having and that an Allied-Soviet agreement would be disastrous, Anglo-French conversations led to agreement on Strang's instruction. Chamberlain, Hoare and Simon had apparently agreed earlier that Moscow might be permitted to decide when its vital interests were being threatened by German action in the Baltic, and when it might therefore take action and call on Britain and France for support. But now they decided that no such "blank check" to Stalin was permissible. The new obUgation, in the event of a threat to the U.S.S.R. in the Baltic, would not be automatic mutual aid but "consultation." Strang took a plane for Moscow on June 12. When Dalton suggested in Commons that Chamberlain was merely "spinning out time" so he could "wriggle back to the Munich policy," the Prime Minister retorted angrily: "The honorable gentleman is very offensive in his suggestions. I see no reason why the delay should be attributed to H. M. Government." Pravda warned on the 13th that the Baltic States must be guaranteed whether they wished to be or not. It attributed their reluctance either to the influence of Berlin or to "certain reactionary quarters in democratic States," On June 15 Seeds, Strang and Nag-
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giar outlined new plans to Molotov and Potemkin. Tass declared that "the results of the first interview and of the examination of the Anglo-French formulations" were appraised at the Narkomindel as "not wholly favorable." Other conferences followed without result. A Tass communique of June 21 asserted that "the 'new' Anglo-French proposals do not show any progress as compared to previous proposals." Molotov delivered a formal answer to the Allied envoys on the 2 2nd. There was no comment on either side. That the deadlock was unbroken was indicated by another typical Soviet maneuver on June 29. In Pravda Andrei Zhdanov published a long editorial: . . . What is the reason for the delay in the negotiations whose favorable termination is impatiently and hopefully awaited by all peace-loving nations and all friends of peace? I permit myself to express my personal opinion in this matter, although my friends do not share it. They still think that when commencing the negotiations on a pact for mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. the British and French Governments had serious intentions to create a powerful barrier against aggression in Europe. I believe, and shall try to prove it by facts, that the British and French Governments have no wish for an equal treaty with the U.S.S.R. . . . Anglo-Soviet negotiations in the direct sense of this word, that is, since we were presented on April 15 with the first British proposals, have been going on for seventy-five days. Of these, the Soviet Government took sixteen days in preparing answers to the various British projects and proposals while the remaining fifty-nine have been consumed by delays and procrastination on the part of the British and French. The question is: Who, in such a case, if not the British and French, bears responsibility for such slow progress in the negotiations? . . . The question of a tripartite guarantee of immediate assistance to Latvia, Estonia and Finland, in the event of violation of their neutrality by aggressors, forms an artificially invented "stumbling block" to the negotiations. . . . The English newspaper, The Sunday Times, in its issue of June 4 this year, states that "Poland agreed that if Britain was involved in war on account of the invasion of Holland she would come to Britain's assistance" and that "Great Britain agreed that if Poland was involved in war on account of the invasion of Danzig or Lithuania she would come to Poland's assistance." Thus Poland and Great Britain give a guarantee simultaneously both to Lithuania and Holland. I do not know whether Lithuania and Holland were asked their opinions in connection with this bilateral guarantee. In any case, the press reported
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nothing to this effect. Moreover, as far as I know, both Holland and Lithuania deny the existence of such guarantees. Still, The Sunday Times reports a pact of bilateral guarantee for these countries has already, in the main, been concluded, and it is no secret for any one that The Sunday Times report has not been denied anywhere. Not long ago, in an interview with a certain French journalist, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Josef Beck, declared quite unequivocally that Poland neither demanded nor requested from the U.S'.S.R. anything in the sense of granting her any guarantee whatever and that she was fully satisfied with the fact that Poland and the U.S.S.R. recently concluded a trade agreement. Wherein then differs the position of Poland from the position of the ruling circles of the three Baltic States? In nothing whatsoever. However, this does not prevent Great Britain and France from demanding from the U.S.S.R. guarantees not only for Poland and four other States, of whose desire to receive a guarantee from the U.S.S.R. we know nothing, but also for Holland and Switzerland, with which the U.S.S.R. does not even maintain ordinary diplomatic relations. All this shows that the British and French do not desire a treaty with the U.S'.S.R. that would be based on principles of equality and reciprocity, although they vow every day that they too are for "equality." . . . It seems to me that the British and French desire not a real treaty acceptable to the U.S.S.R., but only talks about a treaty in order to speculate before public opinion in their countries on the imaginary unyielding attitude of the U.S.S.R. and thus make easier for themselves the road to deal with the aggressors. The next few days must show whether this is so or not. "New" instructions were sent from London. More conferences ensued in Moscow. Prime Minister Aimo Cajander of Finland asserted on July I: "Against our wish to stand neutral we are offered protection which we have not asked and which we do not accept and which offer we do not consider a friendly act." A Dutch communique of July 3 expressed similar sentiments. The Times wrote on July 5 that "Holland and Switzerland at least should never be brought in against their will." As for the Baltic, "the British Government cannot in any case undertake any engagement which even remotely or indirectly binds it to intervene in the internal affairs of another State except on the express request of the government of that State." The mention of "internal affairs" was understood to refer to Soviet insistence that the guarantee of the Baltic States must provide for action in the event of a Nazi putsch from within no less than a Nazi invasion from with-
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out. The secret conversations in the Kremlin dragged on for weeks with no issue. On July 25amid echoes of the HudsonWohlthat scandal in Londonit was hinted in Downing Street that the Cabinet was prepared to give Russia new proof of the importance of being earnest by opening staff talks for military cooperation. A military mission would be sent to Moscow. Pressmen speculated as to whether it would be headed by General Sir Edmund Ironside, Inspector-General of Overseas Forces. He had sufficient prestige and had recently conferred with Polish military leaders in Warsaw. On the other hand he had commanded the Allied forces that fought the Bolsheviks south of Archangel in 1918-19. Perhaps Viscount Gort, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, would be better. London was optimistic. Moscow was silentdeafeningly so on new British appeasement moves in the Orient. Paris breathed confidence that even the thorny point of "indirect aggression" in the Baltic could be smoothed over, despite Cajander's statement on July 30 expressing faith in British assurances that no agreement would be made in violation of Finland's integrity or neutrality. On the same day Izvestia declared that the Soviets "stand for the establishment of a general peace front capable of halting Fascist aggression, namely, a peace front erected on a basis of full reciprocity, full equality, and honest, sincere and resolute repudiation of the policy of 'non-intervention.' " On July 31, eve of the 25th anniversary of the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, Chamberlain told Commons in the last debate of the summer on foreign affairs that staff talks would be initiated at once. He and the French Ministers were willing to sign a provisional accord, as with Poland. But Aioscow preferred to sign nothing "until we had got a complete agreement." Military discussions would facilitate a final accord. The three Governments had "not hitherto been able to agree upon a definition satisfactory to all parties of the term 'indirect aggression,' although all three of us realize that indirect aggression may be just as dangerous as direct aggression and all three of us desire to find a satisfactory method of providing against it. At the same time we are extremely anxious not even to appear to be desirous of encroaching on the independence of other States. And if we have not agreed so far with the Soviet Government upon this definition of indirect aggression, it is because the formula they favor ap-
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peared to us to carry that precise significance." The Prime Minister denied that there had been any undue delay. The AngloJapanese alliance had taken six months to negotiate, the Entente Cordiale nine months, the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 fifteen months and the Locarno pacts eight months. The House was not stirred. Many of its members were interested primarily in getting away to their summer vacations. London Coastal Coaches, Ltd., advertised in Fleet Street: "Don't Mind Hitler. Take Your HoHday." Neither did Commons warm to Dalton's condemnation of the Inner Cabinet in which, he charged, Halifax was hamstrung by Hoare, Simon and Chamberlain "with their faded laurels on their brows. . . . I and my colleagues have no confidence whatever in them. W e cannot trust the Government to do the right thing when Parliament's back is turned." The announced personnel of the military mission was not reassuring, although Chamberlain spoke of "this most unusual decision" as "almost without precedent in negotiations of this kind. . . . W e are showing a great amount of trust and a really strong intention to bring these negotiations to a successful issue." Instead of Gort or Ironside, the Prime Minister named as leader Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, brother of Lord Dunsany, to be aided by Air Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, Inspector General of the Royal Air Force and Major-General T . G. Heywood. Molotov had suggested the mission, but not its personnel. A Tass communique of August i challenged Butler's statement that the U.S.S.R. sought to "encroach" on the "independence" of the Baltic States. It sought merely to leave no loophole in the formula of "indirect aggression" whereby aggressors could encroach on the independence of the Baltic States. On the second day of August, Commons voted, 245 to 129, to adjourn until October 3. Chamberlain denied in a bitter debate that there was any need for calling the members back earlier. Opposition speakers declared flatly that the Prime Minister was certain to attempt another Munich during the recess. Churchill felt that "the country is safer when the House is sitting. . . . The German Government now has two miUion men under arms. . . . It would be disastrous, pathetic and shameful if at this moment the Commons should write itself off as a factor in the situation or reduce whatever strength it can offer to the firm front the nation will make against
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aggression. . . . There is going to be a supreme trial of will power if not of arms" in the near future. But Chamberlain made adjournment a question of confidence and carried the day. Also on August 2 Hudson and Raczynski signed an agreement for a credit to Poland of ^8,163,300 for purchase of arms in England. The deadlock over an additional ;^ 5,000,000 remained unbroken. Meanwhile the French Cabinet named a military mission headed by General Joseph Doumenc to join the British mission in London for the trip to Moscow. Molotov evidently attached greater importance to these discussions. He named as agents to deal with the Anglo-French officers War Commissar Voroshilov, Chief of Staff General Boris Shaposhnikov, Navy Commissar Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, Chief of Navy Aviation Commander Alexander Loktianov, and Assistant Chief of Staff General Ivan Smorodin. On August 5 the Anglo-French mission left London on the City of Exeter for a leisurely voyage to Leningrad. Strang flew home from Moscow empty-handed on August 7. On the next day Laurence A. Steinhardt, new American Ambassador, reached the Soviet capital. Not until August 11 did the British and French officers arrive in Moscow. Accompanied by Seeds and Naggiar, they were cordially received by Voroshilov and Molotov, while Ciano conferred mysteriously with Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berchtesgaden. On the 12th the Moscow military discussions got fully under way in Spiridonovka House, one-time mansion of a sugar magnate and erstwhile residence of Litvinov. They continued daily, but no reports of any kind were issued regarding their course. Warsaw hinted at its desire to be represented to prevent Soviet control of Libau, Latvian port on the Baltic. Amid new appeasement rumors centering around Burckhardt in the role of the new Runciman, the final Danzig crisis boiled and bubbled ever more furiously. On August 19 Pravda reproduced an article from the Communist Daily Worker of London of August 7 accusing Chamberlain of plotting a new Munich through discussions between Lord Kelmsley and Hitler for a conference to hand over Danzig to the Reich. But Tass denied Polish reports that the military missions were in disagreement on Far Eastern questions. On August 20 an official Soviet announcement revealed that on the previous day a German-Soviet trade agreement had been signed in Berlin for a 200,000,000 mark credit over seven years at
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five per cent. Simultaneously a Soviet broadcast quoted a Paris report that Chamberlain had sent an economic mission headed by Professor Riley to arrange a nevv^ Munich. In Helsinki Erkko expressed confidence that Britain would not "sell out" Finland. Pravda opined that the trade pact "may turn out to be a significant step toward further improvement not only of economic but of political relations between the Soviet and Germany." It did. At midnight of August 21-22 it was announced in Berlin that Ribbentrop would fly to Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. Downing Street at once declared that its obligations to Poland were unaffected. Parliament was called back into session on August 24. Soviet circles suggested that the proposed pact with the Reich was not incompatible with an Anglo-French-Soviet accord. The pact was signed on August 23 in terms making it wholly incompatible with any new Triple Entente. Seeds and Naggiar saw Molotov. The Anglo-French military missions prepared to depart at once, hesitated and finally left Moscow for Helsinki on August 26. Soviet explanations of the new course at first made no reference to the military negotiations. Pravdds leading article on August 26 discussed Lenin's views on free love which, it seemed, was "bourgeois" if it meant freedom to commit adultery to escape childbearing. "Only the proletarian revolution," wrote the Master, "can create conditions where love and marriage are indivisible." Subsequent Soviet explanations of the failure of the negotiations with the Western Powers were brief and scarcely revealing. In an "interview" in Izvestia on August 26 Voroshilov contented himself with saying that the German-Soviet pact had been concluded "among other reasons" because the staff talks with Britain and France "had reached a deadlock in view of insuperable differences." He continued:
The Soviet military mission considered that the U.S.S.R., having no common frontier with an aggressor, can render assistance to France, Great Britain and Poland only if its troops will be allowed to pass through Polish territory, because there is no other way for Soviet troops to establish contact with the aggressor's troops. Just as British and American troops in the past World War would have been unable to participate in military collaboration with the French armed forces if they had no possibility of operating in French territory, the Soviet armed forces could not
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participate in military collaboration with armed forces of France and Great Britain if they were not allowed access to Polish territory.
On August 31 Molotov in his address before the Supreme Soviet urging ratification of the pact with Berlin declared: "Germany abandoned its anti-Soviet policy and offered the most favorable trade agreement ever made at a time when other countries plotted to involve us in a war." He ridiculed "those AngloFrench leaders who insist that the Soviet Union side with these two countries against Germany. But is it not clear to them that we do not have to get involved in war either way? . . . What lies at the root of the attitude of the British and French Governmentsof their contradictory policy? These Governments fear aggression and need a Soviet pact to strengthen them. But they simultaneously fear that a pact with the Soviet Union might strengthen the Soviet Union, which they do not desire. . . . As a result of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty the Soviet Union is not obliged to enter a war on the side of England against Germany, nor on the side of Germany against England. . . . This pact proves that all attempts to solve European problems without Soviet participation are doomed." It is not yet possible to reconstruct with any confidence the course of the Moscow staff talks of August 12-26. It may be doubted, however, whether these discussions were intended as a ruse by the Kremlin to deceive London and Paris while Hitler and Stalin completed their bargain. Negotiations for such a bargain had been opened long before. But it is more than likely, for reasons already noted, that the Soviet leaders would have preferred a bargain with the West if it could have been had on terms which they deemed viable and free of danger of Anglo-French desertion. Their decision was not made out of a desire to "avoid war." Such a fatuous precept of foreign policy is followed only in befuddled democracies, not in totalitarian dictatorships.-"^ Even
1 Vera Micheles Dean, however, makes a valid point in this connection in "Russia's Role in the European Conflict," F. P. Reports, jMarch i, 1940, p. 311: "There is another consideration that has not received sufficient attention in Western discussions of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Governmentunlike its sympathizers in the Westwas aware that Russia's industrial system, which had proved unable to supply the peacetime needs of the population, would be unequal to the strain of a major war. It also knew that the Red Army, no matter how great its man power and morale, would be no match for the highly mechanized German forces, backed by the Reich's efficient industry. What the Soviet
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had this been their prime purpose, it could have been better served by a pact with the West than by one with Hitler. The former, if effective, would have deterred Berlin from war while the latter enabled Berlin to embark upon war with little risk. Neither was their purpose to "unleash war" between the Reich and the West. In their judgment such a war was already "inevitable" with no encouragement from Moscow, thanks to past collaboration between appeasers and aggressors. Their purpose was to serve the interests of the U.S.S.R. by getting most for least or, still better, by getting something for nothing if that could be had. They probably hoped that the Allied missions would come prepared to accept the Soviet terms. Their disappointment at the undistinguished personnel was enhanced by their discovery that the missions had no authority to sign an agreement. Any terms discussed would have to be referred back to London and Paris. What was more important, Doumenc and Sir Reginald PlunkettErnle-Erle-Drax apparently had no authorization to accept even tentatively the Soviet conception of the proper conditions of military collaboration. These conditions included access to Poland by the Red Army and a hard and fast guarantee of the Baltic States, probably to be enforced by Soviet garrisons on their territories. They may have included a demand that Poland and Rumania substitute for their anti-Soviet alliance an anti-German alliance. Bucharest refused. Warsaw refused. Tallinn, Riga and Helsinki refused. London and Paris would not compel them to cooperate. These were "political" questions to be decided by diplomats, not "military" questions to be decided by strategists. Drax and Doumenc could not give affirmative answers to questions which Seeds, Naggiar, Strang, Chamberlain and Daladier had already answered in the negative. Downing Street and the
Government wanted, above all, was to prevent Germany and Japan from coming within striking distance of the U.S.S.R. and, if war could not be prevented, to divert the main thrust of both German and Japanese expansion from Russia to the territories and possessions of the Western powers. The Soviet Government was not interested in 'collective action' against aggressors, since such action threatened to involve it in war with Germany, or Japan, or both. What it was interested in was 'collective security' which might presumably check aggression before it occurred, shield the Soviet Union against attack from West and East, and permit fulfillment of StaUn's plans for 'building socialism in one country.' Having discovered that France and Britain, on successive occasions, had failed to support 'collective security,' the Soviet Government, in turn, was reluctant to join the Allies in 'collective action' which, in its opinion, could only lead straight to that war with Germany it had been seeking to avoid since 1933."
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Quai d'Orsay undoubtedly rejected any thought of permitting Moscow to use compulsion against the border States. The men of the Kremlin had no interest in trying to make bricks without straw. They had no desire to accept commitments to join Britain and France in fighting Nazi aggression if the Western Powers, allegedly out of deference to the desires of the States that were to be defended, resolutely denied the U.S.S.R. control over, or even access to, the only territories where Nazi aggression could be fought. T o accept terms which would have compelled the Red Army to sit by helplessly until the Reich had conquered Poland and the Balticum and invaded the Soviet Union was unthinkable to the Moscow leaders, for in this eventuality they felt, rightly or wrongly, that Chamberlain and Daladier, whatever they might do at the outset of hostilities, would make peace with Berlin once the Reichswehr was marching against Bolshevism. The Kremlin's refusal to accept such conditions was shaped by the presence of an alternative solution of their problem. In the end they concluded that the alternative was preferable.^ The subsequent explanations in London and Paris of what had happened were even less illuminating than the Soviet statements. In a broadcast of August 25 Daladier said:
. . . In order to organize a peace front against all efforts at aggression we have entered into engagements with other countries, with all who wished to conclude the same engagement with us, in a spirit of human solidarity. It was in that spirit that we began civil and military conversations with Russia in agreement with Great Britain. W e have done everything to bring them to success and we believed that they would shortly end happily 1 Cf. Louis Fischer, loc. cit., pp. 33, 34: "The sum total of it all is this: if Stalin believed that his pact with Hitler would discourage France and England and induce them to remain passive after Hitler had invaded Poland, then he was prepared to be the assistant executioner and partitioner of an independent country. If he hoped to encourage Germany and thereby provoke a war which would weaken Germany and all capitalist states and hasten the world revolution then the crime is heinous. A world revolution born in dishonesty and of deliberately induced mass-murder cannot be creative or welcome to decent humanity. If Stalin expected Hitler to win and become his ally for that reason he stands condemned as a traitor to Soviet Russia's past and to European civilization. These are the three alternative interpretations of Stalin's act. I have searched my brain, as well as the brains of some who try to see the Russo-German pact in a more favorable light, but I have found no fourth alternative." The difficulties with this view are several. Stalin suspected Anglo-French passivity in re Poland because he knew that Chamberlain and Daladier had themselves been the assistant execu-
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when, reversing suddenly her policy and her doctrine, Russia signed with Germany a pact that permits her to escape the obligations that her policy had imposed and that she had always publicly affirmed. Doubtless this treaty seeks to prevent German aggression against Russia and of Russia against Germany. But these two countries have no common frontier. In reality, the obscure circumstances in which this pact was negotiated, the hour at which it was published and the terms of its articles, show that it increases the chances of aggression against the friends of France and against France herself. . . .
On the same day in Commons Chamberlain asserted:

. . . Then, in Berlin and Moscow, it was announced that negotiations had been taking place and were likely to be soon concluded for a nonaggression pact between the two countries. I do not attempt to conceal from the House that the announcement came to the government as a surprisea surprise of a very unpleasant character. For some time past there had been rumors about impending changes in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Government, but no inkling of that change had been conveyed either to us or the French Government by the Soviet Government. T h e House may remember that on July 31 I remarked that we had engaged upon a step that was almost unprecedented in character. I said that we had already shown a great amount of trust and a strong desire to bring the negotiations with the Soviet Union to a successful conclusion when we agreed to send our soldiers, sailors and airmen to Russia to discuss military plans together before we had an assurance that we should be able to reach an agreement on political matters. Nevertheless, moved by the observations of the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that if we could come to a successful conclusion of our tioners and partitioners of an allied independent country at Munich. He did not believe that a pact with Chamberlain and Daladier on their terms would diminish the likelihood of such passivity. He probably believed that it would increase it, since he assumed that the secret hope of the Anglo-French leaders was still to foster a German-Soviet war in which the West would be neutral. That he anticipated war between the Reich and the West is probable. That he expected the Western Powers to abandon Poland, after Berlin and Moscow had made their pact, is also probable. What he anticipated beyond that point it is impossible to say. If he sought to "provoke" a western conflict, this was as "heinous," no less so but also no more so, than the Tory calculus before and after Munich. He did not expect Hitler to win his war. Fischer's three alternatives ignore a crucial fact: Stalin felt that passive "neutrality" and "non-intervention" were certain roads to doom. His choice, as he saw it, was between a pact with the West and a pact with Hitler, not between one of these and passive neutrality. Why he chose Berlin in preference to London and Paris is obvious from what is known about the course of the negotiations.
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military discussions, a political agreement should not present any insurmountable difficulty, we sent the mission. The British mission arrived on August 12. They were warmly received in friendly fashion and discussions were actually in progress and proceeding on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung down. To say the least, it was highly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were proceeding on that basis the Soviet Government was secretly engaged with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects of their foreign policy as we had understood it. I do not propose this afternoon to pass any final judgment upon the incident. That, I think, would be premature until we have had an opportunity of consulting with the French Government as to the meaning and consequences of this agreement, the text of which was only published this morning, but the question which the government had to consider when they learned of this announcement was what effect, if any, this changed situation would have upon their own policy. . . .
Chamberlain and Daladier thus accused Moscow of deceit, dishonesty and betrayal. In ethics the charge was perhaps just. But ethics divorced from national self-interest has no place in Realpolitik, as Chamberlain and Daladier well knew. It is doubtless true that the Soviet leaders did not at any time say bluntly to Anglo-French representatives: "Accept our terms or we shall sign a pact with Hitler." To make any such threat would have been sheer folly in terms of Soviet interests if, as was more than possible, it failed of its purpose. Its effect would have been to confirm the already deep distrust with which London and Paris reciprocated Moscow's distrust of them. Its effect might well have been to drive the Reich and the West together once more and to promote a new program of appeasement at Moscow's expense. Soviet security required that this eventuality be avoided at all costs. The Kremlin's powerful bargaining position required that it negotiate independently and simultaneously with Berlin and the Western capitals to see which could be induced to grant the most advantageous terms. To keep Berlin ignorant of the Allied-Soviet negotiations would have been pointless even had it been possibleand it is seldom possible to maintain complete secrecy about important negotiations which involve democratic governments. Its pointlessness from the Soviet side lay in the circumstance that Hitler at Prague had already abandoned the Ukrainian dream and turned against
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the Western Powers. The new Nazi alternatives were immediate aggression against the West (and its Eastern alHes) and ultimate aggression. Berlin's knowledge of the Allied-Soviet discussions promoted delay lest a new Triple Entente confront the Reich with war on two fronts. It also fostered Nazi interest in the possibility that these discussions might fail and that Moscow, for a price, might be neutralized so that aggression against the West would entail few risks. The U.S.S.R. had little to lose from such calculations in Berlin and could therefore blackmail Wilhelmstrasse with the threat of an Allied-Soviet pact. But for Moscow to inform the Western Powers of its discussions with Berlin was to expose the Soviet Union to dangers which its leaders deemed more definite and more formidable. They were less certain that the Allies had abandoned appeasement than that Hitler had abandoned his designs on the U.S.S.R. The alternatives of the repentant Munichmen, as Moscow saw them, lay between resistance to Nazi aggression and renewed connivance in such aggression if directed against the U.S.S.R. Had the Narkomindel sought to blackmail London and Paris with the threat of a pact with Berlin, it might easily have driven them into the latter course, the more so as Hitler might conceivably reverse himself once more and respond favorably to any Allied appeasement overtures promising him a free hand in the East. Hence Moscow stood to gain from German knowledge of the Allied-Soviet negotiations and from AlUed ignorance of the German-Soviet negotiations. T o pursue both simultaneously promised not only to lay the ghost of Allied appeasement and the bugaboo of Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. but also, in the sequel, to create one of three situations: either the Allies would accept Soviet terms and commit themselves irrevocably to fight aggression by the Reich in any direction; or they would refuse the Soviet terms and yet remain bound to defend Poland; or they would abandon Poland, as they had abandoned Czechoslovakia, and yield to Berlin. In the first case the U.S.S.R. had nothing to fear, for Germany would not challenge such a combination or, if it did, would be defeated. In the second case, Berlin would be willing to come to an understanding with Moscow at Poland's expense. If consummated, Germany would attack Poland and be attacked in turn by the Western Powers in a conflict in which the U.S.S.R. would be the "neutral" beneficiary of what was assumed to be an inevitably
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long war of attrition. In the third case Berlin would have little incentive to come to terms with Moscow. The Soviet Union would be imperiled, however, only if the fall of Poland led to Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. with the West's blessing. But this was improbable. Every aggressor moves in the path of least resistance. After the humiliation of a second Munich at Poland's expense the Western Powers would be all but helpless. Under these circumstances the Fiihrer, with a nice eye for the imponderables, would know that the greenest pastures of future conquest lay not to the East but to the West. For this very reason Western abandonment of Poland was impossible. The Kremlin perhaps assumed that the Allies would defend Poland in any case and that an Allied-German war was certain if the Western Powers declined Moscow's terms for an alliance. Stalin, with an equally nice eye for the imponderables, was in this assumption correct. T o return to the original statements of the Anglo-French leaders: insofar as their purpose was to convey the impression that the Soviet-Nazi pact was a bolt from the blue, the British and French leaders were deliberately concealing what they had known for months, despite Moscow's silence, i.e. that Berlin was attempting to circumvent Allied "encirclement" by a pact with Moscow, and that Moscow was considering a pact with Berlin as a possible alternative to one with the Western Powers. If the Western Cabinets had no official news of this alternative from the Kremlin, they had nevertheless learned of it from a variety of other sources including their own diplomatic representatives.^ For Chamberlain to dismiss these reports as mere "rumors" was either dishonest or was a reflection of his own incapacity to read or evaluate diplomatic dispatches. M. Henri Berenger, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Senate, wrote on October 12:
It can be stated that both Paris and London had been warned by reliable sources that an association was being prepared between Berlin and Moscow to divide among themselves the spheres of influence and even the territories from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea, between the Oder, the 1 Various reputable journalists had predicted such a development, including Otto Tolischus in the New York Times and Henry C. Wolfe in The Qerman Octopus (Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, April 8,1938), pp. 309-11. Stalin's speech of March 10 and Molotov's of May 31 also contained broad hints. The Moscow radio of July 21 announced that trade negotiations with Germany were under way. Cf. G 319.
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Moscoiv
Danube and the Dniester, from the Carpathians to the Balkans. The Western Powers had been informed that constant negotiations were being conducted between the Reich and the KremHn in the diplomatic, military and financial fields in order to link up the present with the pastthat is, to resuscitate the Chicherin-Rathenau agreement concluded in 1922 at Rapallo. The Western Powers were aware of this possibility, but they were not quite sure that it would materialize.^ So long as Downing Street declines to publish or open for inspection the dispatches of its diplomatic agents bearing on this problem, it is impossible to say how much Lord Halifax learned, or might have learned, regarding the danger of a Nazi-Soviet accord and its probable consequences for German policy. But apart from official sources of information, he could have learned much by reading the "Information Service" Bulletin of the "Friends of Europe," an efficient and respectable anti-Nazi organization with secret correspondents in the Reich and with 18 members of Parliament on its board. The June 20 issue of the Bulletin contained a forecast so remarkable as to merit reproduction in full: No. 15
FRIENDS OF EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE.
20th June, 1939
(For Private Circulation Only). HITLER'S MILITARY STRATEGY FOR DANZIG AND POLAND. From a politically well-informed Reich German the following statement has been received: "The political barometer indicates a 'calm which precedes the storm'. A storm against Poland may break out at any moment. Complete preparations have been made in Germany, and Mussolini is well-informed of this situation. Rumours that a German action against Poland would not take place until September, are intentionally circulated by German propaganda in order to create confusion. "The German plan aims at preparing a 'Cannae' for the Polish Army, which is concentrated in the Corridor and in Posnania. This is to be effected by a 'massive and annihilating attack' to be launched from three directions (East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia). "The only means of preventing such an attack is a speedy conclusion of the Pact between Western Europe and Russia. Nazi circles in Berlin do not believe that such a pact between Western Europe and Russia will be realised in the near future. During the past few months ^New York Herald Tribune, October 13, 1939.
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German diplomacy has been very active in Moscow aiming at a partition of Poland between Germany and Russia. T o this end the Germans offered Russia even the possession of the Baltic States. (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, but not Finland.) "Moreover, the solid cohesion of the Berlin-Rome Axis is only based on the fact that both dictators do not believe in the realisation of a Pact between Western Europe and Russia. " T h e following is the German plan for the campaign: " i . T o wait and see whether the pact between Western Europe and Russia will fail, or to wait until it becomes clear that its realisation is not yet possible. "2. T h e next step would be the 'annihilating attack' against Poland launched by four-fifths of the German army, with the object of destroying the Polish army within a few weeks. "3. Defensive in the West, based on the hope that the French army would also remain on the defensive. T h e Western Powers would be threatened from Spain and from Libya, but no direct attack against them would take place. "4. In the initial phase no German air-raids would be carried out against London and Paris, even if hostilities should break out at the fortifications on the Franco-German frontier. T h e reason is that Germany does not want to 'provoke' the military strength of Great Britain and France. Germany also expects that Great Britain and France would not attack Italy in the event of a 'localised' GermanPolish war. A joint German-Italian 'counter-offensive' against Egypt vs'ould be reserved as a subsidiary 'threat'. "5. After the 'annihilation' of the Polish army a 'peace offensive' would be launched in Western Europe, even if hostilities between the fortifications on the Franco-German frontier had taken place in the meantime. In order to prepare the ground psychologically for this 'peace offensive', no German air raids would take place against London and Paris, or, at the most, merely as reprisals if Great Britain and France should make bombing raids against Germany. It would be the purpose of the 'peace offensive' to destroy definitely the security system between Western and Eastern Europe. "6. T h e psychological strategy of Hitler's war plan is based on the assumption that Great Britain and France would at least confine themselves to defensive measures, or, perhaps, even remain neutral. It is further intended that Hitler should make use of this defensive strategy by means of such a 'peace offensive' after the annihilation of the Polish army. This implies that the defeat of Poland would not be followed by a military attack against the Western Powers, (as the Third Reich would crumble as a consequence of such an effort), but,
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on the contrary, by a propagandist 'peace attack' against the Western European masses with full psychological exploitation of what lies in pretending that they should be spared the horrors of war."
The anonymous informant of the "Friends of Europe" was obviously not guessing.^ His report was the blue-print of Nazi grand strategy for the next five months. Is it conceivable that a private organization had better and earlier sources of information than the British diplomatic service and the British Intelligence Service? Is it conceivable that Henderson actually knew nothing or reported nothing (Cf. B 48) about an impending NaziSoviet accord until August 15? If so, Downing Street had ample facts at its disposal at the Quai d'Orsayfacts which in part at least must have filtered through Bonnet who, like some of his British collaborators, preferred not to face them. On December 16, 1938, M. Ristelhueber, French Minister in Sofia, reported the opinion of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister: "M. Kiosseivanov did not consider as impossible an understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the Reich, especially if the Comintern agreed to tone down its propaganda. Such had always been the dream of a section of the German General Staff. In that event a fourth partition of Poland would allow Germany to proceed with her forceful drive eastwards" (F 34). This was little more than a shrewd guess. On May 7, however, Coulondre reported from Berlin that he had learned from a secret source that "the Fiihrer will come to an understanding with Russia" to partition Poland.
My informant became very animated in the course of the conversation, and it is very likely that he finally said much more than he was authorized to tell. Especially as regards Russia, one cannot help being struck by the coincidence between the intentions attributed to the Fiihrer and the resignation of M. Litvinov. . . . If the intention of the Fiihrer really is to attempt a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., it remains to be seen how he intends to exploit this new policy. In my opinion, he may hope to draw advantage from it in three different ways: (i) By arriving at a more or less tacit agreement with the U.S.S.R. which would assure him of the benevolent neutrality of that country in the event of a conflict, perhaps even of her complicity in a partition of Poland. (2) By bringing, through the mere threat of a better understanding with the U.S.S.R., simultaneous pressure to bear on Japan and on Poland, in order to induce the former 1 Cf. Samuel Grafton's comments in the New York Post, September 25, 1939.
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to sign a military alliance, and the latter to agree to the concessions he is asking for. (3) By bringing the Western Powers, under the threat of collusion between Germany and Russia, to accept certain Soviet demands to which Poland and Rumania would be opposed, and thus to sow discord among the Allies. On the other hand, it is not yet certain that Herr Hitler has already decided upon his line of conduct, and already made his choice between a real understanding of the U.S.S.R. or a simple diplomatic maneuver intended to reverse the situation in his favor. One would be rather inclined to adopt the latter conjecture. . . . "When it is a case of carrying out a plan," said X to Coulondre, "there are no legal or ideological considerations that hold good. . . . Just as Hitler did not consider himself in a position to settle the question of Austria and of Czechoslovakia without Italy's consent, he now would not dream of settling the Polish-German differences without Russia. There have already been three partitions of Poland; well, believe me, you will witness a fourth!" (F 123). On the same day Coulondre reported that Hitler had sought earlier to seduce Beck with prospects of a German-Polish partition of the Soviet Ukraine and with promises of giving Poland Lithuania and Memel in return for Danzig and the Corridor (F 124). On May 9 the French Ambassador continued: It appears that, for some time past, Berlin has believed in a possible change in Soviet policy. . . . M. Litvinov's retirement has awakened in certain minds the idea of an intrigue designed to upset the negotiations which are already most difficult between Moscow and the Western Powers and to wreck them in one way or another. Did this idea grow and take definite shape before M. Litvinov's retirement, or was it inspired by this event? This is difficult to ascertain. In any case, for the last 24 hours, the rumor has spread through the whole of Berlin that Germany has made or is going to make proposals concerning a partition of Poland. This rumor is so persistent that the Soviet Charge d'Affaires himself was much struck by it, and when I met him this evening, asked me in an excited manner: "Have you learned that the Soviet Government has decided to change its pohcy?" As I remarked that it was rather for me to put the question to him, he stated that he had received no indication whatever from A'loscow which would justify him in thinking that the rumors circulated were founded on any facts (F 125). On May 22 Coulondre reported in detail on the attitude of Ribbentrop, who opined "that the Polish State cannot last very long. Sooner or later it would be bound to disappear, once more partitioned between Germany and Russia." The Nazi Foreign
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Minister deemed a German-Soviet reconciliation "both indispensable and inevitable," since it would conveniently delete Poland from the map and give Germany the means of destroying Britain. Hitler was dubious, but the High Command and the more important industrialists agreed with Ribbentrop. "At this moment, when the Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations seem to have entered upon a decisive phase, we should keep clearly conscious of this situation and bear in mind that the Reich would do its best to take advantage, to the detriment of France and Great Britain, of any failure, howsoever veiled, in the conversations now taking place with Moscow" (F 127). During June and July the Ambassador continued to warn Bonnet of the danger of a Nazi-Soviet accord and to urge haste in completing the Moscow negotiations as a means of forestalling them. On July 4 M. Garreau, French Consul General in Hamburg, told Bonnet that commercial circles were anticipating a German-Soviet five-year non-aggression pact if an agreement were not soon concluded between London, Paris and Aloscow (F 155). On August I M. de Saint-Hardouin, French Charge in Berlin wrote that a German Blitzkrieg against Poland was probable "provided that Russian neutrality is assured" (F 176). By mid-August Coulondre was urgent: We must "expedite to the very utmost the conclusion of the agreement with the Soviets. I can never repeat too often how important a psychological factor this is for the Reich" (F 194). On August 18: "It is imperative to bring the Russian negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion as soon as possible. I learn from various sources that it is now the military authorities who are most active in pressing the Chancellor to go to war with Poland. The most powerful deterrent would be a pact with the Russians" (F 199). In short, the Western statesmen, despite their denials, knew from the beginning of May that the most likely result of their refusal to meet Soviet terms for a Triple Entente would be a German-Soviet pact eventuating in the destruction of Poland. They nevertheless continued to reject the Soviet terms. Only one conclusion follows: they preferred a Nazi-Soviet pact for the partition of Poland to an alliance with the U.S.S.R. on Moscow's terms. That the Polish Colonels desired to sabotage the negotiations and to oppose every suggestion of Soviet aid in the defense of their country is readily explicable in terms of their fixed
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271
delusion that Poland was a "Great Power" quite capable of defeating the Reich single-handed. But the Anglo-French leaders had no such delusion. They knew that the breakdown of the Moscow negotiations would spell Poland's doom. Yet Henderson could tell Hitler on August 23: "If an agreement had to be made with Moscow, for whom Communism was now merely the cloak for intense nationalism and whose ulterior motives seemed to me highly suspicious, I had rather Germany made it than ourselves" (H 260). Again the question arises, hideous but inescapable, as to whether the ulterior purpose of the Anglo-French leaders in all their moves from March to September was to encompass Poland's destruction as a means of embroiling Russia and the Reich in war over the spoils. A pact with Moscow would save Polish independence if not Polish integrity (which Britain had never guaranteed) and probably prevent war by deterring German action against Warsaw.^ No pact with Moscow, followed by a Nazi pact with Moscow, would unleash war and insure Poland's ruin. London and Paris would declare war but would face no danger and might even make a peace with safety if Moscow and Berlin quarreled over the dissection of the Polish cadaver . . . This hypothesis is plausible. But a different one is more plausible. It is that the Anglo-French leaders, far from being MachiaveUian schemers, were no longer capable of playing Realpolitik. Their fear of Bolshevism prevented them from paying Stalin's price. Hitler had no such scruples, despite all his anti-Bolshevik posturing. Their solicitude for "self-determination," in the name
1 Cf. Coulondre to Bonnet, June i, 1939, (F 132), quoting "a senior official of the Wilhelmstrasse": "The Fiihrer has asked General Keitel, chief of the General Staff, and General von Brauchitsch, C.-in-C. of the Army, whether in their opinion, under existing conditions, an armed conflict would turn in favour of Germany. Both replied that much depended on whether Russia remained neutral or not. In the first case General Keitel replied 'Yes' and General von Brauchitsch (whose opinion has great value) replied 'probably.' Both declared that, if Germany had to fight against Russia, she would not have much chance of winning. Both generals attached considerable importance to the intervention of Turkey, their opinion being that Turkey was likely to act in favour of the Western Powers only if Russia herself joined in. The prevalent opinion at the Wilhelmstrasse is that, if Poland does not yield, Herr Hitler's decision will depend upon the signature of the Anglo-Russian pact. It is believed that he will risk war if he does not have to fight Russia, but that if, on the contrary, he knows that he will have to fight Russia as well, he will give way rather than expose his country, his party and himself to ruin and defeat."
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of which they had dehvered Austria, Czechoslovakia and Spain to the Axis, forbade them to deliver Poland and the Baltic States to Moscovs^. Hitler had never had such inhibitions. That the States they nobly refused to sacrifice viôuld, by virtue of their refusal to sacrifice them, be promptly sacrificed by Hitler to Moscow, and that the Western Powers would be brought to disaster in the process were considerations which they doubtless took cognizance of in the dim way of those already damned. But these considerations seemed less important than their own pre-occupations and illusions.-^ "Sightless, unless the eyes reappear, as the perpetual star multifoliate rose of death's twilight kingdom, the hope only of empty men . . ."
3. HITLER'S B A R G A I N
If the motives and calculations of Stalin and Chamberlain were devious in the diplomacy of 1939, those of Hitler were simple. Chamberlain had sought to buy an alliance against the Reich from the Red Caesar, but was unwilling to pay the price asked. Hitler sought to buy Soviet neutrality and was willing to pay the same price that Chamberlain could not bring himself to pay. Stalin found the British bidder reluctant to pay for services which, if
1 Henderson comments (H 251): "By July the Russian negotiations had ceased to have for me even the superficial appearance of any reality, and I still believe that from the outset Moscovs' never meant them to terminate in agreement vi'ith us. Moscow had become the seat of an Oriental despotism, and the ideological basis of the Soviet regime was now nothing but a sham and a delusion. Stalin's sole objective was to embroil Germany with the Western Powers and to make one or the other pull the chestnuts out of the fire for himself. . . . The British agreement with Poland had relieved Russia of all fear of German aggression against herself and, instead of being obliged any longer to consider her own safety, she could now afford to think only of her personal advantage. Peradventure, if England had been willing to traffic in the honor of neutral Baltic States, the end of our negotiations might have been different. Hitler was less scrupulous or maybe he was in turn duped by Stalin. It was important for Russia that the population of the Polish Ukraine, which was more Orthodox Russian than CathoHc Polish, should be in Soviet hands rather than constitute a lure to German expansion via Poland. A fourth partition was always a possible eventuality; and, if Moscow could restore her influence in the Baltic States and raise a barrier in the Ukraine to the German Drang nach Osten, the Reich would be driven back toward the West again; and that was and must always be the supreme aim of Russian policy." Again (H 259): "Moscow was now unblushingly showing the cloven hoof and was asking for a free hand in the Baltic States. Russia's real objective was thus becoming apparent; and, with Germany secretly in the market, the scales were
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of which they had dehvered Austria, Czechoslovakia and Spain to the Axis, forbade them to deliver Poland and the Baltic States to Moscovs^. Hitler had never had such inhibitions. That the States they nobly refused to sacrifice viôuld, by virtue of their refusal to sacrifice them, be promptly sacrificed by Hitler to Moscow, and that the Western Powers would be brought to disaster in the process were considerations which they doubtless took cognizance of in the dim way of those already damned. But these considerations seemed less important than their own pre-occupations and illusions.-^ "Sightless, unless the eyes reappear, as the perpetual star multifoliate rose of death's twilight kingdom, the hope only of empty men . . ."
3. HITLER'S B A R G A I N
If the motives and calculations of Stalin and Chamberlain were devious in the diplomacy of 1939, those of Hitler were simple. Chamberlain had sought to buy an alliance against the Reich from the Red Caesar, but was unwilling to pay the price asked. Hitler sought to buy Soviet neutrality and was willing to pay the same price that Chamberlain could not bring himself to pay. Stalin found the British bidder reluctant to pay for services which, if
1 Henderson comments (H 251): "By July the Russian negotiations had ceased to have for me even the superficial appearance of any reality, and I still believe that from the outset Moscovs' never meant them to terminate in agreement vi'ith us. Moscow had become the seat of an Oriental despotism, and the ideological basis of the Soviet regime was now nothing but a sham and a delusion. Stalin's sole objective was to embroil Germany with the Western Powers and to make one or the other pull the chestnuts out of the fire for himself. . . . The British agreement with Poland had relieved Russia of all fear of German aggression against herself and, instead of being obliged any longer to consider her own safety, she could now afford to think only of her personal advantage. Peradventure, if England had been willing to traffic in the honor of neutral Baltic States, the end of our negotiations might have been different. Hitler was less scrupulous or maybe he was in turn duped by Stalin. It was important for Russia that the population of the Polish Ukraine, which was more Orthodox Russian than CathoHc Polish, should be in Soviet hands rather than constitute a lure to German expansion via Poland. A fourth partition was always a possible eventuality; and, if Moscow could restore her influence in the Baltic States and raise a barrier in the Ukraine to the German Drang nach Osten, the Reich would be driven back toward the West again; and that was and must always be the supreme aim of Russian policy." Again (H 259): "Moscow was now unblushingly showing the cloven hoof and was asking for a free hand in the Baltic States. Russia's real objective was thus becoming apparent; and, with Germany secretly in the market, the scales were
Hitler's Bargain
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rendered, would obligate the U.S.S.R. to great expenditures of blood and treasure for an object that the West might not, after all, help to achieve once the enterprise was launched. Stalin found the German bidder eager to pay generously for services which promised Moscow large gains with almost no expenditure of blood and treasure. Stalin made the obvious choice. Only much later did he begin to suspect that he had been paid in fool's gold and had perhaps exposed his State to dangers far greater than those which might have been met with had he accepted ChamberIain's terms. For Hitler, however, the price paid was negligible and the bargain seemed all gain and no loss. That this would turn out to be the case was doubtless taken for granted by Ribbentrop and Hitler from the outset. The Fiihrer and his generals were confident that their war against the West would be crowned with victory if Soviet neutrality were assured. Stalin and Chamberlain made no such assumption, since they both underestimated German fighting power and overestimated Allied capacity for resistance. Moscow took it for granted that Soviet neutrality in an Allied-German conflict would mean a prolonged war of exhaustion. London and Paris took it for granted that the West was invincible behind its land and sea defenses and could sooner or later compel German capitulation by blockade operations, regardless of Soviet policy. Had Chamberlain foreseen what was to come, he would either have abandoned Poland
being heavily weighted against the Western Powers. They could not barter away the honor and freedom of small but independent countries, but Germany could. It is to be hoped that some day light will be thrown on the question as to whether Stalin from the beginning was in collusion with Hitler with a view to spinning out his negotiations with us until Germany was ready to strike or whether both Germany and ourselves were merely his cat's paws. I incline to the latter view myself, but it is mere guesswork, and I am prejudiced. From the outset I regarded the Russian negotiations as something which had to be attempted, but which lacked all sense of realities." The Right Honorable Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, Secretary of State for India, wrote in The British Case, with an introduction by Halifax (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1940) p. 85: "The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even a faint hope for an honorable peace. The British and French had found that Russia would not agree even to a benevolent neutrality in the event of German aggression against Poland unless we conceded them the right to dominate by military and naval force the independent Baltic States, and to move their arms, against the wishes of the Poles, into Eastern Poland. This was the price, and we refused to pay it. Some day the world will pay due tribute to Mr. Neville Chamberlain's courage in making this refusal. Herr Hitler, the self-appointed leader of the Anti-Communist bloc, who had denounced the iniquities of the Kremlin for 20 years to the whole world, paid Russia's price without question."
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to the Reich in the name of "peace for our time," if such a course could have been imposed on Pariiament and public, or he would have paid the price of a Soviet pact with the overwhelming approval of the British electorate. In either case disaster would have been averted or postponed. Had Stalin foreseen what was to come, he would doubtless have spurned Hitler's bait and pressed for a bargain with the West on terms representing some compromise between what he had asked and what the Alhed leaders were prepared to give. In fact, only Hitler foresaw accurately the results of the coming test of force. He could therefore afford to surrender any amount of non-German territory to Moscow, whatever the immediate effect might be in strengthening the U.S.S.R. vis-a-vis Germany. He stood only to gain from fostering Stalin's delusion that Soviet security was to be had by control of the borderlands. He knew that a Reich victorious over France and Britain would have Russia at its mercy. Because of this eventuality Moscow might be tempted to attack him in the rear to prevent the defeat of the Western Powers. But this danger he readily discounted in the conviction that the Soviet leaders would continue to assume that occupation of "lost provinces" would give them ample protection. They would therefore refrain from intervention to save the West until the West was beyond saving. In a larger sense the Nazi decision of 1939 was a recognition of realities of grand strategy dating back to the establishment of the Second Reich. The first Sedan, the fall of Paris and the unification of the Germanies by the Hohenzollerns were made possible only by Russian neutrality in the Franco-Prussian war. Russian neutrality was not unrelated to the circumstance that Britain and France had attacked and humiliated Russia sixteen years previously. Bismarck, Moltke and Wilhelm I were firm in their conviction that the Reich must never expose itself to the danger of having to fight simultaneously on two fronts. They were equally clear that conflict with Russia would net the Reich nothing, and that Russian "re-insurance" arrangements were the price that must be paid for French isolation and German hegemony over the Continent. The wisdom of this course was amply demonstrated by the unwisdom of the alternative course upon which Wilhelm II embarked. By refusing to continue Bismarck's policy, the new Kaiser alienated St. Petersburg and was never able there-
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after to rectify his mistake. The French-Russian alliance followed and then the Entente Cordiale, soon transformed into the Triple Entente. The "war on two fronts" lost the Marne in 1914 and lost the war in 1918. Germany had indeed defeated and conquered Russia, but at such cost in time and strength as to allow the formation of a Great Coalition of Western democracies which brought the Second Reich to its ruin. If the lesson of Brest-Litovsk was that Germany could defeat Russia, the lesson of Versailles was that war between Germany and Russia meant the victory of the Western Powers over the Reich. This lesson was taken to heart by some German statesmen and most German military authorities in the aftermath of defeat. The first fruit of their new wisdom was the Treaty of Rapallo of April 24, 1922, wherein Berlin and Moscow cancelled all claims against one another and inaugurated a diplomatic rapprochement which released each from its enforced isolation and challenged, albeit feebly, French hegemony over Europe. Soviet anxieties over the possible implications of Locarno were soothed by the Berlin treaty of April 24, 1926, wherein Germany and Russia pledged themselves anew to non-aggression and neutrality. Under the leadership of General von Seekt, creator of the Reichswehr, German and Russian officers inaugurated secret military collaboration as intimate and continuous as if the two States had been allies. A large section of German big business approved and sought to further trade relations with the U.S.S.R. This collaboration was undisturbed until the fall of the German Republic. The initial Nazi conception of German-Soviet relations was the antithesis of Rapallo and an apparently complete repudiation of the line of Bismarck, Maltzan, Rathenau, BrockdoriT-Rantzau and Stresemann. In the Nazi Weltanschauung, Bolshevism was an instrument of international Jewry whereby the Russian State was being rotted and rendered ripe for easy conquest. According to Mein Kampf, the deadly sin of the Hohenzollerns was not that of having risked war with Russia, but that of having challenged Britain. The Third Reich should make alliances with Britain and Italy in order to secure a free road to the East: "We are abandoning finally the colonial and commercial policy of pre-war times and passing over to the policy of the future, to the policy of territorial conquests. But when we speak of new land in the East we can have in mind at present, in the first instance, only
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Russia and her subordinate border States." And again: "Fate itself seems to give us our direction. When fate abandoned Russia to Bolshevism it robbed the Russian people of the educated classes which once created and guaranteed her existence as a State. The German element may now be entirely wiped out in Russia. The Jew has taken its place. It is as impossible for the Russians to shake off the Jewish yoke by their own strength as it is for the Jew to keep control of the vast empire for any length of time. . . . The enormous empire will one day collapse." The "East orientation" underlying such statements stemmed from General Max Hofmann and from two early converts to National Socialism: Eric von Ludendorff and Alfred Rosenberg. But even at the outset of the Nazi regime, despite incessant public clamor against Bolshevism, there were doubts as to the wisdom of the course advised by the anti-Soviet fanatics in the Party. Hitler could say in his first speech to the Reichstag on March 23, 1933: "Towards the Soviet Government, the Government of the Reich desires to cultivate friendly relations profitable to both countries. The government of the national revolution feels itself especially suited to carry out a positive policy of this kind toward Soviet Russia. The struggle against Communism in Germany is our internal affair. . . . The relations of the State to other Powers which are bound to us by common interests will not be affected by this." The Berlin treaty was renewed by the Hitler Cabinet early in May. Stalin spoke of "continued excellent relations" with Germany on January 25, 1934, and on January 30 Hitler reciprocated. Early in 1936, however, a return to the Rosenberg line was perceptible. By September, when the Niirnberg Party Congress met, Hitler was publicly coveting the Ukraine, the Urals and Siberia, and Voroshilov was offering to carry war into the enemy's territory. The successful remilitarization of the Rhineland convinced the Kremlin that the Western Powers were quite willing to see the Third Reich move eastward and that Hitler could now pursue the Ukrainian dream without hindrance from London and Paris. This was in fact the Nazi program from the summer of 1934 until March 1939. The problem of why the Fiihrer finally returned to Bismarck and abandoned the program he had preached for two decades is not one capable of solution by reference to documentary sources or to the utterances of his advisers. The reversal of course was
Hitler's Bargain
I'j'j
probably due to a growing conviction, which at last became a certainty, that the path of least resistance lay in other directions. This conviction sprang from the phenomenal eagerness of the democratic politicians to strengthen the Triplice and reduce the power of their own States to the vanishing point. It was also due to the obvious error of Hitler's original conception of the Soviet regime. Stalin's State, far from being paralyzed by the Jewish "ferment of decomposition," revealed itself to be a totalitarian Caesar-state ruled by men who were quite capable, despite the slovenliness of their subjects and relative weakness of the industrial plant at their disposal, of returning blow for blow and playing Realpolitik in the most approved fashion. There can be no doubt that Hitler and Rosenberg strove in 1934 and thereafter to disrupt the U.S.S.R. by "Trojan Horse" and "fifth column" tactics, as they disrupted Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Rumania and ultimately Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France. In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, Nazi strategists relied upon the cooperation of elements opposed to the existing regime. Since Stalin was uninhibited by democratic prejudices regarding civil rights and the value of human life, he met the danger by "liquidating" all prominent dissenters in the "purges" of 1935-38. Those who played Hitler's game, those who prematurely sought to bargain with Berlin, those who were merely suspect were ruthlessly disposed of. Hitler had conducted a purge of his own on "Bloody Saturday" of 1934. He knew the uses of terrorism, with or without judicial formalities. He noted that many of the victims of Stalin's purge were Jews. He respected Stalin's ruthlessness.^ His generals respected the Red Army. They respected Stalin's willingness to defend Czechoslovakia before Munich. They concluded correctly that the Russia of StaHn was
1 Cf. The Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 423-72. Henry C. Wolfe, The Imperial Soviets, pp. 102-3, holds that the purges in the U.S.S.R. were primarily designed to liquidate those who were "last ditch opponents of Hitler." The victims, however, included a variety of dissenters: Trotskyites, Bucharinites, Nazi and Japanese agents, some who placed world revolution above Realpolitik, some who sought to appease Berlin and Tokio by an immediate entente at Soviet expense, some who would never under any circumstances have considered an accord with Hitler. The guilt or innocence of the accused (this writer still believes that most of them had engaged in most of the treasonable activities they were charged with) was less important to Stalin than the purposes served by the trials: to maintain intact the monolithic dictatorship and to convince Hitler that aU his hopes of "boring from within" were doomed to frustration before the firing squad.
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a "strong" State, and that the France and Britain of Daladier and Chamberlain were "weak" States. Ernst Fraenkel puts the matter cogently:
Until all secret documents are published, it is impossible to prove exactly which motives influenced Hitler to substitute a policy which he had condemned violently for so many years. Among many points, I want to mention only one which is to be found in the Fiihrer's psychology. Hitler esteems only those politicians who have resisted his own policy. Mussolini and Pilsudski, the statesmen whom Hitler has glorified time and again, were both ready to fight against him. I believe Stalin's firm attitude during the 1938 crisis impressed Hitler just as Mussolini and Pilsudski had impressed him in 1934. Nazi psychology is very simple: alliance with the strong Powers, war against the weak ones. Since Munich had proved that England and France were not ready to fight whereas Russia was, Hitler took the opportunity to come to terms with the latter state, isolated in 1938.1
When Hitler came to his decision is not yet clear. Rosenberg was definitely "out of favor" by the close of 1938. At the diplomatic reception of January 7, 1939, Hitler singled out the Soviet Ambassador for friendly attention. Anti-Soviet articles in the Nazi press diminished and then vanished during the early months of 1939. Hitler ceased denouncing Moscow in his public addresses. Ribbentrop's conviction of British decadence enhanced his interest in a new orientation toward the U.S.S.R. Rumor held that one-eyed General Syrovy, bitter at the betrayal of Prague by Paris and London, sought vengeance by promoting a GermanSoviet rapprochement.^ Rumor also had it that Wilhelmstrasse transmitted to Moscow transcripts of conversations, at Munich and afterwards, between Chamberlain and Henderson on the one hand and Nazi diplomats on the other in which the British appeasers had urged a German attack on the Soviet Ukraine.^ Other rumors held that at the appropriate moment Berlin sent to Stalin photostatic copies of Anglo-German correspondence (or phonograph records made from hidden dictographs) revealing similar Tory motives.* Such stories are interesting, but probably irrele1 "German-Russian relations since 1918," The Review of Politics, The University Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, January, 1940, p. 6i. " Cf. Louis Fischer, Stalin and Hitler, p. 25. 3 Cf. Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, "Washington Merry-Go-Round,'' Washington Times-Herald, June 6, 1939; G. E. R. Gedye, NYT 9.12.40. 4 Cf. H. C. Wolfe, op. cit., p. 214.
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vant. Stalin had no need of testimony from Berlin as to the secret hopes of the Western Munichmen. His problem after the Ides of March was to choose between two suitors. The Anglo-French courtship did not begin until mid-April and was tepid and desultory. The Nazi courtship probably began before March and became ardent after Litvinov's resignation. Berlin hoped at first to use the threat of a bargain with Moscow as a means of achieving a military alliance with Japannot necessarily against the U.S.S.R., but against the Western Powers. By summer this hope had faded. It may have influenced British pohcy toward Japan during the spring. British recognition of Japan's "new order" in July may explain Japanese reluctance to conclude a military pact with the Reich. One does not need allies to outwit a foe who will give way before threats. In any event the secret Nazi-Soviet pourparlers were well advanced by early August. At I p.m. August 23 Ribbentrop and 32 assistants landed at the Moscow airdrome in two huge Condor planes. They were welcomed by General Suvorov, Commander of the Moscow garrison, by Potemkin and his aides, by Schulenberg and the German Embassy staff and by Italian Ambassador Rosso. N o Japanese representative appeared. The visitors were housed in the former Austrian Embassy. After luncheon at the German Embassy, Ribbentrop and Schulenberg entered the Kremlin and conferred for three hours with Molotov and Stalin. The pact was signed. Photographers recorded for posterity the broad smiles of the Nazi visitors and their Communist hosts. The document to which Ribbentrop and Molotov attached their signatures, was published as follows:
TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE U N I O N OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS, AUGUST 23, 1939
Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and basing themselves on the fundamental stipulations of the Neutrality Agreement concluded between Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in April, 1926, the German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics have come to the following agreement: 1. T h e two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive act and any attacks against each other undertaken either singly or in conjunction with any other Powers. 2. If one of the contracting parties should become the object of war-
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like action on the part of a third Power, the other contracting party will in no way support the third Power. 3. The Governments of the two contracting parties will in future remain in consultation with one another in order to inform each other about questions which touch their common interests. 4. Neither of the two contracting parties will join any group of Powers which is directed, mediately or immediately, against the other party. J. In case disputes or conflicts on questions of any kind should arise between the two contracting parties, the two partners will solve these disputes or conflicts exclusively by friendly exchange of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions. 6. The present agreement is concluded for the duration of ten years with the stipulation that unless one of the contracting partners denounces it one year before its expiration, it will automatically be prolonged by five years. 7. The present agreement shall be ratified in the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification are to be exchanged in Berlin. The treaty comes into force immediately it has been signed (G 348).
These words revealed little of the assumptions and purposes of the signatories. Published treaties between totalitarian regimes, whose leaders have freed themselves from all legalistic solicitude for the sacredness of the pledged word, are designed neither to disclose the intentions of the parties nor to bind them to solemn obligations, but only to impress public opinion and third Powers. Hitler had always followed the Florentine's dictum that treaties are to be observed only so long as convenient. Stalin's government, on the other hand, had in recent years won for itself an enviable reputation of fidelity to engagements. This reputation had not been among the least of its moral assets abroad. It was now to be cast away in the interest of the new "realism." After August 23, 1939, treaties with the U.S.S.R. were to become as worthless as those with Germany, Italy and Japan or, be it added, as those with Daladier's France and Chamberlain's Britain. N o scanning of the text of the Nazi-Soviet pact will uncover the actual terms of the bargain struck by the two dictators. Molotov permitted a week to pass before obtaining ratification of the pact from the Supreme Soviet. Was Moscow waiting to see whether Britain and France would now abandon Poland? Was Stalin hoping that London and Paris would now abruptly grant all his demands, in which case ratification of the pact with BerUn might be withheld? Was he seeking to trap Hitler by
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encouraging him to attack Poland and then announcing that Nazi aggression had invalidated the agreement? None of these fears or hopes materialized. The pact was ratified in Moscow on August 31. The German attack on Poland began the following dawn. An impressive Soviet military mission arrived in Berlin on September 3. On October 24, 1939, Ribbentrop declared in Danzig: "When the German army advanced victoriously into Poland, English propaganda declared that the Russian army would certainly not participate in the measures against Poland. Instead, the Russian troopsafter a very few daysmoved forward on the entire front in Poland and occupied Polish territory up to the line of demarcation which we had previously agreed upon with the Russians." "Previously" might mean between September i and 17. Or it might mean before August 23 or between August 23 and September I. That a secret German-Soviet agreement was reached for the partition of Poland and for German non-intervention in the Baltic before the Red Army moved can scarcely be doubted. According to Louis Fischer,^ Moscow did not raise the question with the Allied missions of the entry of the Red Army into Poland "to make contacts with the Reichswehr" until August 15, by which time Hitler had presumably consented to such a step and to the partition of Poland with the U.S.S.R. Warsaw refused, though no formal demand from Moscow seems to have been made upon Beck, since the Kremlin took refusal for granted unless London and Paris should put pressure on Poland. They declined to do so. Fischer believes that the German-Soviet understanding in its original form envisaged Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and Eastern Poland as far west as Warsaw, with Estonia and Latvia to fall within the Soviet sphere and Lithuania within the German sphere. Finland was discussed later. In the final accord Moscow yielded up part of the Polish zone and was granted domination over Lithuania in exchange. The known facts square with this hypothesis. But it remains a hypothesis until the documents speak. The gains accruing to the two partners from their unholy bargain were obvious. What they lost is less tangible. Hitler threw away the one asset which had gained him countless friends in the democracies: his trappings as an anti-Bolshevik crusader and
1 Op. cit., pp. 26f.
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would-be conqueror of the Ukraine. This tattered costume, however, had served its purpose. Under its spell the Western leaders had helped to make the Third Reich invincible and had rendered their own nations ripe for defeat. The discarded clothes, if retained, could scarcely have won any new victories in Europe for the Reich. If the Americas later became an object of interest, the disguise could be resumed with good effect. Stalin threw away the sympathy of Western liberals and radicals who had admired the U.S.S.R. for its firm opposition to Fascist aggression and had hoped that Soviet society would evolve into a socialist democracy. In grasping Hitler's hand, Stalin revealed himself to be but another Caesar, conniving in aggression against the weak and preparing himself to become an aggressor.^ In so doing he not only rendered the surviving Communist parties in the West ridiculous by their ludicrous ignorance of what was happening and their pretense of self-righteous omniscience, but he turned admiration to disgust among millions of sympathizers. Communism's antiFascist role was played out, no less than Fascism's anti-Communist role. Which Caesar lost most in this ruthless liquidation of the moral imponderables? Time will give a final answer. A tentative answer can be put only in a series of paradoxes. Stalin's friends abroad had demonstrated their inability to influence the policies of the Western Powers. Hitler's friends abroad, including the dupes and dunces, had demonstrated their capacity to shape and even control democratic diplomacy in every major crisis. Stalin sacrificed allies who were useless. Hitler sacrificed allies who might still have proved useful. But most of them had future utility only in the event of a Nazi attack on Russia. Others could still be counted upon, even in the event of a Nazi war against the West. Having decided upon the latter course. Hitler had lost little. That little would be nothing if the Western Powers were crushed as he confidently expected. Stalin's alUes in the West, on the other
1 Rosa Luxemburg's words of 1918, quoted in E. Fraenkel, loc. cit., p. 42, were prophetic: "Bolshevism now is threatened by the worst eventuality which can be imagined: an alliance between Bolshevism and imperialistic Germany steps forward like a terrible ghost. This would actually be the last link of the chain . . . retreat, capitulation, and at the end an alliance with German Imperialism. A socialist revolution sitting on German bayonets, a proletarian dictatorship under the protectorate of German imperialismthis would be the most absurd situation we could witness."
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hand, had been helpful in the past only because of the danger of a Nazi-Soviet clash. This danger was now past. They would be useful to the KremHn in the future only in the event of a new threat of Fascist attack on the U.S.S.R. Even in this case their utility for practical politics and military strategy was doubtful. If the Western Powers were crushed by the Triplice, these friends of the U.S.S.R. would count for nothing under any circumstances. Hitler's loss and Stalin's loss of Western good will would prove to be equally negligible if the Third Reich succeeded in conquering France and Britain and in immobilizing America. But it was precisely this eventuality which Hitler took for granted in making his pact with Moscownot because Soviet supplies of raw materials (which were to prove disappointing) were to insure victory by breaking the British blockade, but because Soviet neutrality would be Rilckversicherung which would spell swift military victory over the West. It was precisely this eventuality which appeared to Stalin the least probable outcome of the Second Imperialist War. Josef Vissarionovich knew full well that "the prince who contributes toward the advancement of another power ruins his own." Stalin did not embrace Hitler on the assumption that Germany would then conquer the Western Powers. Such a development would leave the U.S.S.R. helpless before the victor. This was the program of Mein Kampj. Napoleon might have subdued Muscovy had he been able to subdue England first. Hitler might succeed where Napoleon had failed. Russia and the world revolution would then be engulfed in common ruin. Stalin's initial assumption was a long war of attrition, followed by revolution among the vanquished. He hoped that America would intervene to defeat the Reich as in 1917. Red revolution in a defeated Reich was possible. It was unthinkable in a defeated France and Britain, since the Axis would never tolerate it, and a triumphant Axis could not be successfully challenged in arms by Moscow. Stalin's basic error lay in the fact that his initial assumption was as wrong as Hitler's was right. This assumption was all but irrevocable. The U.S.S.R. had thrown away its only possible allies against Great Germany. Chamberlain and Daladier were doubtless impossible as allies. But they and their kind would not survive the war in any case. If France and Britain as Powers also failed to survive, Russia would be left alone to confront a foe so
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formidable as to leave the Soviet Union without hope of survival. For Hitler the pact of August 23 might spell world hegemony. For Stalin it might spell annihilation. In the short run, it was clever and perhaps necessary. In the long run, it threatened to be catastrophic.
CHAPTER
SEVEN
HITLER'S
WAR
I.FEAR O N MAY 27, 1939, Britain's bachelor Ambassador to the Reich visited Hermann Goring at the latter's estate of Karinhall. The corpulent man-mountain of many uniforms complained to his lean friend of "British hostility." Henderson replied that Hitler, by seizing Prague, had broken his promises to Chamberlain. Goring said that Hacha had consented; there had been no threat to bomb Prague until Hacha had warned that some Czech troops might fire on the Germans. Anyway, he had known nothing of the decision until it was taken. The Czechs should not have reverted, under "American encouragement," to the Benes spirit. The Ambassador declared that Britain would forcibly resist any new aggression. His host retorted that Germany was invincible. The Poles were doomed because Britain and France could not, and Russia would not, come to their aid. If Britain did not want war, how was it to be avoided? Henderson replied that "patience was necessary and the wild men in Germany must be restrained." Goring insisted upon showing his guest the alterations under way at Karinhall, including a new and huge dining hall of marble. The walls were to be hung with tapestries which he was about to purchase from William Randolph Hearst for 5,000. He showed Henderson the sketches of the tapestries"mostly representing," reported the Ambassador, "naked ladies labelled with the names of various virtues, such as Goodness, Mercy, Purity, etc." ["I described them as such," wrote Henderson later, "in no disrespectful or suggestive spirit. Had I anticipated that my dispatch would ever be published I should have written 'nude figures'
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I.FEAR O N MAY 27, 1939, Britain's bachelor Ambassador to the Reich visited Hermann Goring at the latter's estate of Karinhall. The corpulent man-mountain of many uniforms complained to his lean friend of "British hostility." Henderson replied that Hitler, by seizing Prague, had broken his promises to Chamberlain. Goring said that Hacha had consented; there had been no threat to bomb Prague until Hacha had warned that some Czech troops might fire on the Germans. Anyway, he had known nothing of the decision until it was taken. The Czechs should not have reverted, under "American encouragement," to the Benes spirit. The Ambassador declared that Britain would forcibly resist any new aggression. His host retorted that Germany was invincible. The Poles were doomed because Britain and France could not, and Russia would not, come to their aid. If Britain did not want war, how was it to be avoided? Henderson replied that "patience was necessary and the wild men in Germany must be restrained." Goring insisted upon showing his guest the alterations under way at Karinhall, including a new and huge dining hall of marble. The walls were to be hung with tapestries which he was about to purchase from William Randolph Hearst for 5,000. He showed Henderson the sketches of the tapestries"mostly representing," reported the Ambassador, "naked ladies labelled with the names of various virtues, such as Goodness, Mercy, Purity, etc." ["I described them as such," wrote Henderson later, "in no disrespectful or suggestive spirit. Had I anticipated that my dispatch would ever be published I should have written 'nude figures'
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in place of the cruder expression I actually used" (H 2 3 7).] "I told him that they looked at least pacific, but that I failed to see Patience among them" (B 12). Goring roared with merriment. Henderson had returned to Berlin on April 24. His first official act was to communicate to Weizsacker on the 26th the circumstances of the British introduction of military conscription. T w o days later Hitler dampened Henderson's hopes of renewed appeasement by denouncing his pacts with London and Warsaw. The Ambassador felt, however, that Germany was entitled to the return of Danzig and some "equitable" settlement of the Corridor question. He still hoped that this could be arranged in a peaceful fashion, despite Polish stubbornness (H 234). His task was to warn the Nazi leaders that further aggression meant war, but he had no desire to see Poland drag Britain into conflict by provoking German attack. The British Embassy in Warsaw shared his view. On the day of Henderson's visit to Karinhall, Charge Norton told Count Lubienski, Directetir du Cabinet at the Polish Foreign Office, that a German coup at Danzig might be effected in such wise as to make Polish counter-action look like aggression. This would provoke war. But if hostilities could be postponed, Germany might become more reasonable because of Anglo-French-Soviet support of Poland. Therefore "in such an eventuality, the Polish Government might delay its reaction in order to leave time to Britain to demonstrate clearly to Germany that in case of a conflict she would range herself on the side of Poland. . . . It would be desirable that Poland should consult its allies before taking any irrevocable position in a doubtful case" ( P 7 9 ) . On May 30 Beck replied that Poland had always shown evidence of "extreme prudence and great calm," qualities which had appeared once more in connection with the Kalthof incident of May 20 when an armed mob led by uniformed Nazis had attacked Polish customs inspectors. Beck agreed on the need of consultation, "but it is impossible to foresee all the eventualities before which the Polish Government might find itself in the course of development of the Danzig situation." If military measures could be delayed without compromising Poland's defense, "a joint pressure ought to be attempted." But Britain should take preparatory military measures to support any demarche at Berlin in order to leave Germany in no doubt and to quiet Polish suspicions "that the dip-
Fear
i^-j
lomatic intervention of Britain might end in proposing to the parties a compromise unacceptable to Poland." France should also act. But Beck doubted whether Soviet intervention "could be accepted favorably by the German Government. It is possible that this intervention might render the pacific settlement of an eventual incident more difficult" (P 80). Here were all the elements of tragedy. The men of Westminster did not trust the men of Warsaw to be reasonable in view of the chauvinistic record of Haller, Zeligowski, Pilsudski and the Colonels. The men of Warsaw did not trust the men of Westminster to be resolute in view of the compromised reputations of Runciman, Perth, Simon, Hoare, Halifax and Chamberlain. Neither trusted the men of Moscow. From the U.S.S.R. they wanted no aid but only promises of aid to impress Hitler. Both knew that Hitler was bent on the recovery of Danzig and the Corridor. Warsaw felt that to yield was to insure Poland's destruction. London felt that not to yield was to insure Poland's destruction. But London was pledged to war if Hitler attacked Poland. Having no appetite for war, London's problem was to induce Poland not to provoke German attack and to induce Berlin not to attack. The first objective required pressure on Warsaw to be prudent, but such pressure (unlike the pressure on Prague the year before) must stop at the point at which it might involve threats of desertion, or expose Poland to partition or extinction. The second objective required pressure on Germany in the double form of warnings of Britain's readiness to fight and offers to aid in the achievement of the German aim, provided Hitler would use "peaceful means" and stop short of Poland's extinction. The men of Westminster never solved their problem. The terms in which they posed it made it insoluble. If they wished to build an effective barrier against further German expansion and to crush the Reich if Hitler risked war, this was possible only by accepting Moscow's terms for collaboration and by compelling Poland to accept them under a clear threat of abandoning Warsaw to its fate. If they wished to continue peace by purchase and to resume compromise with the Reich, this was possible only by compelling Poland to accept the Nazi* terms. These terms per se did not threaten Poland's independence. But the final German goal became one of destroying the Polish State. This goal
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required war, since Warsaw was not Prague and the Western Powers would no longer compel their Eastern allies to commit suicide. War with Poland meant war with Britain and France. But the West could neither save Poland nor defeat the Reich without Russian aid. Had such aid been accepted, Poland would have paid part of the price, but Hitler would not have risked war. Polish leaders, however, and Anglo-French leaders as well, felt that no bread was better than half a loaf. At the end Soviet aid was no longer to be had. Hitler was therewith prompted to challenge the West to mortal combat. The struggle over Danzig became the overture to Armageddon. "Whoever possesses the mouth of the Vistula and the City of Danzig," said Frederick the Great, "will be more the master of Poland than the king who rules there." "Germany, once master of the Free City," observed the French Ambassador in Warsaw on May 15, 1939, "would not be far from having Poland completely at her mercy" (F 126). Hitler and Ribbentrop did not desire to discuss these points. They had proposed what seemed to them a reasonable solution. Polish refusal to accept it was incredible. Such an attitude could be explained only by AngloFrench "encouragement" to the Warsaw "madmen." But the "war of nerves," they believed, would change the situation. "In three months," commented Ambassador von Moltke, "England, France and even Poland will be tired and will not think of fighting any more for the sake of Danzig. Then we shall settle the problem under favorable conditions" (F 128). The tale of how the "war of nerves" was conducted is too tedious to review in detail. The Nazi strategy of terror was a new appHcation of the technique already employed in Austria, in Sudetenland, in Slovakia and in the pitiable remnant of the Czech Republic that had died in March. Nazi organizers among the German minority precipitated "incidents." Polish authorities took remedial action. This stimulated resentment among the German minority, followed by further incidents. New repressions ensued. Simple people on both sides, who might otherwise have lived peaceably as good neighbors or at worst ignored one another, became excited. Mob violence flared. The Nazi press screamed that Germans in Poland were being assaulted, robbed, murdered or driven by thousands from their homes. They were. Warsaw protested that Nazi agents were stirring up the German
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minority to acts of lawlessness to disrupt the Polish State. They were. Warsaw finally had no option but to surrender, or else attempt the liquidation of the entire German minority and thus provoke attack by the Reich. The Fiihrer finally had no option but to acquiesce in the "extermination" of German Volksgenossen at the hands of the Polish "beasts," or else order the Reichswehr to march to the rescue of the victims in the name of humanity. To the tune of this monstrous cacophony of shrieks, groans, curses and threats, the diplomats played their empty game of thrust and parry until the pen gave way to the sword.-*^ By the end of May Arthur Greiser, President of the Danzig Senate, was protesting to Marjan Chodacki, Polish Commissioner General in the Free City, over the "Kalthof incident" while the Danzig Senate was demanding the recall of two customs officials and of Deputy Commissioner Perkowski, whose chauffeur had killed a Marienburg butcher (B 26, 27; G 420, 423). Chodacki replied that the officials would not be recalled; responsibility rested with the Danzig authorities who had taken no steps "to prevent the criminal activities of the disturbers of the peace" (F 131). Greiser demanded a reduction in the number of Polish customs officials and threatened to boycott the three officials whom Warsaw refused to recall. Poland increased the number of its customs inspectors. S. A. men and arms were smuggled into the Free City from the Reich (B 29). Weizsacker told Henderson on June 13 that Britain was permitting the Poles to gamble with their destiny in a fashion diametrically opposed to Henderson's earlier view that the Reich should have a free hand on
1 Cf. Polish Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland, German Library of Information, New York, 1940, with 259 pages of affidavits, horror stories and grisly photographs "proving" that 5,437 (first edition) or 12,857 (second edition, with 45,000 missing) murders had been committed by Poles against Germans before "liberation." A supplementary Pictorial Report on Polish Atrocities, consisting of even more shocking photographs is available to librarians, physicians, officials, historians and "other serious students" on application to the German Library of Information. The German White Book (No. 2) contains additional data (G 349f). Cf. The German Attempt to Destroy the Polish Nation, a mimeographed bulletin issued by the Information Department of the Polish Government at Angers, France, March, 1940, 109 pages of description of German atrocities in occupied Poland. It is here estimated that 2,500,000 Poles "can be considered to have died as the result of war activities, executions, hunger, cold, etc." The Polish White Book and The French Yellow Book contain much material on the Nazi strategy within Poland during the spring and summer of 1939.
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War
the Continent. This looked as if Britain were preparing a preventive war. The Ambassador denied any British will to war. There must be discussion of trade, armaments and colonies. H e seemed to Weizsacker to be worried about the possibility of a summer conflict. "He is not quite at ease about the British relationship with Poland. . . . He does not believe in the Russian pact" (G 307). Both Henderson and Coulondre, however, felt that useful discussions between the Axis and the Western Powers could be initiated if the Anglo-Soviet discussions were successful. Gobbels spoke in Danzig on June 17-18 during a "Kultur Week," saying that Polish policy was passing through "the age of puberty." Germany must wait until the disorder had disappeared. "It is your misfortune," he told the Danzigers, "that your lovely German city should be situated at the mouth of the Vistula. According to the theories of Warsaw, cities at the mouths of rivers always belong to the country through whose territory the rivers flow. Rotterdam, therefore, belongs to Germany since this port is at the mouth of the Rhine and the Rhine is a German river" (F 138). Three days later, at the German Summer Solstice Festival, Gobbels declared, "Germany intends to take back all the territory which has belonged to her in the course of history" a phrase suppressed in the German press (F 143). Coulondre feared that Berlin was planning to take Danzig by an internal putsch. If the Poles retaliated they would be the "aggressors" (F 145; cf. G 314). Bonnet urged HaUfax to make clear that the Western Powers would not abandon Poland in the face of such tactics (F 147). Halifax instructed Ambassador Sir Howard Kennard to tell Beck that consultation was now necessary "so as to insure that Hitler shall not be able so to manage matters as to maneuver the Polish Government into the position of aggressors" (B 30). Beck concurred, but was non-committal and preferred delay (B 32). On July I Bonnet saw Welczeck who had just conferred with Ribbentrop in Germany. The Ambassador said that his chief feared the Polish hotheads might precipitate war. Bonnet reiterated that he had never intended to grant the Reich a free hand in the East. There would be peace if Germany kept the peace. If not, France would support Poland. He gave Welczeck a note covering all possible eventualities, including that of an internal coup in Danzig. Welczeck commented that the Fiihrer could
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291
not understand how Britain and France could fight for Danzig, which was really Germany's last claim. Bonnet expressed skepticism. His note asserted that "any action, whatever its form, which would tend to modify the status quo in Danzig, and so provoke armed resistance by Poland, would bring the French-Polish agreement into play and oblige France to give immediate assistance to
Poland" ( F 150).
Warsaw decided to acquiesce in German military steps in Danzig. "Our tolerance has limits," said Chodacki to the French Consul, "but they have not yet been reached, and our conduct should have great elasticity" (F 152). Weizsacker told Coulondre that there would be no German putsch in Danzig and that Beck was giving some signs of seeking a friendly solution. Beck informed Noel on July 6 that "Danzig is under our guns" and that therefore Warsaw would take no action unless Germany sought to close the harbor, the river or the railway. Noel persuaded him that Warsaw should do nothing by way of economic or military measures without consulting London and Paris "unless the march of events did not leave it the necessary time" (F 157). British Charge Norton conveyed similar views of Polish intentions to Halifax, adding: "This attitude may seem oversimplified, but at least it is comprehensible, restrained and well-calculated to counteract German technique of 'psychological terrorism.' It is unfortunately inevitable that the initiative should rest with the would-be aggressor" (B 34). By mid-July the tension had eased somewhat. But Ribbentrop's reply to Bonnet on July 13 declared:
Any violation of Danzig soil by Poland, or any Polish provocation incompatible with the prestige of the German Reich, would meet in reply with an immediate march by the Germans and the total destruction of the Polish army. T h e statement already mentioned, which is contained in the final sentence of your note, would, if taken literally, mean that France recognizes Poland's right to oppose by arms any departure in any respect from the status quo in Danzig, and that, if Germany declines to tolerate that violence should thus be done to German interests, France will attack Germany. If such was in fact the purpose of French policy, I would beg you to consider that such threats could only further strengthen the Fiihrer in his resolve to ensure the safeguarding of German interests by all the means at his disposal. T h e Fiihrer has always desired FrancoGerman understanding and described as madness a fresh war between the two countries, which are no longer separated by any conflict of vital interests. But, if we have reached a point where the French Government
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wants war, it will find Germany ready at any moment. It would then be the French Government alone which would have to bear before its people and before the world the responsibility for such a war (F 163).
Coulondre reported ominous military preparations in the Reich. But Danzig Gauleiter Albert Forster, after conferring with Hitler in Berchtesgaden, returned with assurances to Chodacki that the Chancellor would not resort to war to secure Danzig and a road across the Corridor (F 166). On July 19 General Edmund Ironside, head of a British military mission to Poland, conferred with Smigly-Rydz and Beck. He conveyed assurances of absolute British support of Poland and asked what Warsaw would do if Berlin proclaimed an Anschluss of Danzig with the Reich without any mihtary action. His hosts replied that Poland would favor a tripartite protest in BerUn. And if the Reichswehr openly occupied Danzig? The Polish General Staff would send officers to demand an explanation. What would follow if the "protest" were ignored or the "explanation" proved unsatisfactory was not specified (Charge Seguin to Bonnet, July 20, 1939, F 167; cf. G 443). The report which Ironside and his colleagues took home regarding Polish ability to resist German attack will doubtless make fascinating reading if and when published. Berlin continued to insist that Danzig must return to the Reich, but that this was not a question for war, since Poland must eventually compromise. Foreign diplomats and pressmen in Berlin noted a tendency to retreat, or at least to temporize. Charge de SaintHardouin, however, reported constantly accelerated military preparations and felt that a new crisis "so great that European peace may not be able to survive it" would begin by the end of the harvest, August 15-20, and would continue until early October when autumn rains on the Polish plains would make mechanized warfare difficult (F 171) . . . Anglo-German relations meanv/hile failed to improve, despite Henderson's efforts. On June 23 Downing Street sent a long memorandum to Wilhelmstrasse replying to the German denunciation of the naval accord with elaborate augmentation and with an offer to negotiate a new agreement if Berlin would indicate what "scope and purpose" it would consider appropriate and "how it "would propose to ensure that any action in the shape of denunciation or modification of the new Agreement during the terms of its vaUdity should carry the consent of both parties."
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On June 29 at Chatham House HaUfax declared that all questions could be examined and adjusted if "we all really wanted peaceful solutions. . . . But . . . the threat of military force is holding the world to ransom, and our immediate task is to resist aggression" (B 25). On July 10 Chamberlain told Commons:
Recent occurrences in Danzig have inevitably given rise to fears that it is intended to settle her future status by unilateral action, organized by surreptitious methods, thus presenting Poland and other Powers with a fait accompli. In such circumstances any action taken by Poland to restore the situation would, it is suggested, be represented as an act of aggression on her part, and if her action were supported by other Powers they would be accused of aiding and abetting her in the use of force. If the sequence of events should, in fact, be such as is contemplated on this hypothesis, Hon. Members will realize, from what I have said earlier, that the issue could not be considered as a purely local matter involving the rights and liberties of the Danzigers, which incidentally are in no way threatened, but would at once raise graver issues affecting Polish national existence and independence. We have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence, which she considers it vital to resist with her national forces, and we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking (B 35; G 438).
Weizsacker told Henderson and Coulondre that such public statements could only make the situation worse. He felt even more strongly about Smigly-Rydz's observation, published as an interview in the London News-Chronicle of July 17, and subsequently broadcast in Poland, that "if Germany persists in her plan for Anschluss, Poland will fight, even if she fights alone and without alUes." This defi on the eve of Ironside's visit was perhaps intended to discourage any British efforts to promote a compromise at Poland's expense and to prevent Beck from giving serious consideration to concessions. Henderson had assured Weizsacker, in connection with persistent German reports that Britain would never fight over Danzig, that Herr Hitler "could not possibly be in any doubt" as to British poUcy. "If Germany by unilateral action at Danzig in any form compelled the Poles to resist, Britain would at once come to their assistance. . . . If Herr Hitler wanted war, it was quite simple. He had only to tell the Danzigers to proclaim the re-attachment of the Free City to Germany. Obviously that would put the onus of action on the Poles, but not even that would cause us to hesitate to support
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them, if Germany attacked them" (B 36). Halifax noted the symptoms of German hesitancy toward the end of July and sought to capitaHze upon them to promote a compromise. He instructed Norton on July 21 to urge particular "restraint and circumspection" upon Beck, as "there is some reason to think that German policy is now to work for a detente in the Danzig question. It is nevertheless essential not to destroy possibility of better atmosphere at outset, and I trust that more care than ever will be taken on Polish side to avoid provocation in any sphere and to restrain press. . . . For your own information, I hope to arrange that we shall be informed through High Commissioner and His Majesty's Consul General in Danzig when any concrete question is to be taken up by High Commissioner at the request of Senate, and, of course, of the discussions, in order that we may have an opportunity of discreetly urging moderation on Polish Government" (B 38). There were hopes that Dr. Carl Burckhardt might deal with Greiser and Forster in such fashion as to promote German moves in the desired direction. Beck's suspicions were enhanced by the British attitude toward loans to Poland. "All in all," reported Norton, "M. Beck, while entirely understanding and sharing your Lordship's general desire, did not at present see any facts on which to base a forecast of German change of policy" (B 39). Forster continued to encourage Burckhardt to believe that Germany would take no military action. Beck was skeptical, fearing a German move for a localized war against Poland (B 41). Henderson was convinced that Hitler did not desire to resume negotiations and was playing for time until his military preparations should be complete and the Anglo-Soviet negotiations should fail. The British Ambassador went to Bayreuth on July 29 in the hope of seeing the Fiihrer during the Wagner Festival. But when he arrived Hitler and Ribbentrop had left for an inspection of the Westwall after conferring unexpectedly in Berlin on the 28th. The Fiihrer returned to the Wagner shrine, but Henderson saw him only at a distance in the Festspielhaus during a performance of Die Walkiire. "Contact with the British Ambassador was not part of the game for him. . . . He bided his time and waited for the conjunction of circumstances which would facilitate his final decision. The technique was exactly the same as in 19 3 8 . . . (H253).
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The final crisis began during the first days of August. It is probable that by August i Ribbentrop had assured Hitler that a pact between Berlin and Moscow was far more likely than one between London and Moscow. Such news would have been the green light for which he was waiting. Plans for the victory celebration at Tannenberg at the end of the month aroused alarm abroad, but plans for the Niirnberg Parteitag early in September, this year designated as the "Congress of Peace," were'reassuring. It was advantageous to keep London, Paris and Warsaw guessing. Another bloodless victory was improbable, but war would involve few risks. It was already clear that the "war of nerves" had not produced a sufficient impact to bring about effective AngloFrench pressure on Poland to yield. Many Poles expected their army to seize East Prussia with ease and to defeat the Reichswehr at the gates of Berhn. Beck knew better, but he could neither accept Soviet aid nor yield to. Hitler since Smigly-Rydz and the generals would have turned him out of office. The Poles were too "uncivilized" and self-confident to be paralyzed by the Nazi strategy. Ambassador von Moltke reported on August i:
T h e population of Poland has borne the state of partial mobilization and political insecurity, which has now lasted for four months, without any collapse or appreciable deterioration in morale. . . . T h e special social structure of the Polish population and the propaganda which has been skillfully adapted to it have brought about in Poland that, even among the masses, the determination to resist continues unbroken. . . . Even if, in the course of a war, Poland should be completely occupied by German troops, they are convinced that Poland will finally rise again greater and stronger than ever, thanks to the victory of the Allies. . . . In consideration of the confidence which Poland places-in her allies and which British propaganda nourishes with particular care, a fundamental change in Poland's attitude can not be expected in the near future ( G 444)-
Herring and margarine figured prominently in the initiation of the crisis. Warsaw supplied pretexts for German action, as Berlin doubtless intended. In a belated effort to deter the Danzig Nazis from further infringements on Polish rights, Chodacki gave notice that as of August i Warsaw would no longer permit the dutyfree importation into Poland of herring caught by the Danzig fishing fleet (consisting chiefly of Dutch vessels) or of fats manufactured by "Amada Unida," an English firm with Dutch capital.
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The French Consul, M. de La Tournelle, estimated that this ruling would affect herring shipments of an annual value of 5,000,000 zlotys and margarine to a value of 15,000,000 zlotys, comprising 95% of Poland's imports of this commodity. This action was in reprisal for Nazi interference with Polish customs inspectors, whose number had increased from 27 to 120 since 1929, although tonnage through Danzig had declined with the development of the Polish harbor of Gdynia to the north. The reprisal evoked hot indignation in Danzig. There were outcries that Warsaw was wrecking the customs union. There were retaliatory threats to abolish customs barriers between Danzig and the Reich. The Senate gave orders to its customs officials to disregard those Polish inspectors who were alleged to belong to the frontier guards and not to the customs service. The German press resumed its campaign against the Polish customs authorities in Danzig whom it accused of behaving as "bandits" (F 175, 177, 178; B 42-44). On August 4 Warsaw learned that at four customs posts on the East Prussian frontier the Polish inspectors had been notified by Danzig officials that they could not continue their duties after August 6. Chodacki promptly informed Greiser that
this infringement of the fundamental rights of Poland will on no pretext whatever be tolerated by the Polish Government. I await your answer by August 5 at 6 p.m. at the latest, with the assurance that you have given instruction cancelling the action of your subordinates. . . . I am forced to warn you that all Polish customs inspectors have received the order to appear for duty in uniform and bearing arms, on August 6 of the current year and on subsequent days, at every point on the frontier which they consider necessary for examination of the customs. Every attempt made to hinder them in the exercise of their duties, every attack or intervention on the part of the police will be regarded by the Polish Government as an act of violence against the officials of the Polish State in the pursuance of their duties. If the above-mentioned illegal actions should take place, the Polish Government will take retaliatorymeasures without delay against the Free City, as the responsibility for them will rest entirely on the Senate of the Free City. I hope to receive a satisfactory explanation before the above-mentioned date (G 432, P 82).
This ultimatum was apparently prepared in Warsaw without consultation with the British and French Embassies, though they were informed of it by Beck the evening before its delivery
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(P 81). On the morning of August 5, Greiser phoned Chodacki to the effect that the Senate would not impede the Pohsh officials, but that "for technical reasons" it could not give a written reply before Monday, the 7th (F i 8 i ) . Beck at once informed all Polish diplomatic posts of this communication (P 83). Chodacki expressed the "astonishment" of Warsaw at Greiser's attitude and repeated his warning (G 433). On the 7th Greiser replied in writing with a reciprocal expression of "astonishment" that Chodacki should have made "a completely unverified rumor" a pretext for an ultimatum which "can be understood only as an intentional provocation to bring about incidents and acts of violence of the most dangerous nature." No such order as was alleged had been issued by any responsible authority. "The Danzig Government protest with great energy against the threatened retaliations of the Polish Government which they regard as an absolutely inadmissible threat and the consequences of which will devolve on the Polish Government alone" (G 434, P 84).^ For reasons unknown Noel failed to transmit full copies of the ChodackiGreiser correspondence to the Quai d'Orsay until August 15 (F 193), though both he and Kennard had advised their Governments of the general nature of the interchange at the time it took place. The capitulation of Greiser to the Polish threat temporarily eased the crisis. Beck told Kennard that had the Senate not yielded Warsaw might have resorted to military measures. Noel was of the opinion that Poland had no legal right to do so unless requested to by Burckhardt or by the League Council (F 182). Warsaw nevertheless ordered its customs officials to be armed. At Cracow on August 6 Smigly-Rydz told 150,000 legionnaires that Poland would meet "force with force." The Warsaw journal Czas warned that if the Danzig Nazis attempted a putsch, "Polish guns will speak!" The German press screamed that German guns would also speak and that Poland had "overstepped all limits in her insolence and irresponsibility." Noel felt that Polish resistance had caused the Danzig Nazis to retreat, but "the margin of concessions which Poland is still prepared to make in her wish to
1 The third document in F 193 purports to be an order of August 4 from Dr. Kunst, Director of the Danzig Customs Administration, to the Head Office of the Polish Customs, informing the recipients that the Danzig Senate had notified Chodacki in a letter of July 29 that the Danzig Customs Administration would no longer treat the frontier guards as Polish customs inspectors.
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temporize has become so narrow that any incautious act might well have the most serious consequences. It would be well if Berlin were to understand this" (F 187). What Berlin understood, with full knowledge of the consequences, was that the moment had now come to force a showdown. Forster saw the Fiihrer in Berchtesgaden on the 8th. Plans were apparently laid for the intervention of the Reich in the dispute between Danzig and Poland in a fashion comparable to the German intervention of September, 1938, in the "domestic" controversy in Czechoslovavkia between Henlein and Benes. Henderson had little doubt, as he viewed the situation later, that the Polish note of August 4 "served more than anything else to produce that final brainstorm in Flerr Hitler's mind on which the peace of the world depended." ^ On August 9 Weizsacker transmitted a communication to the Polish Charge Prince Etienne Lubomirski:
T h e Reich Government have been greatly astonished to receive information of the note of the PoHsh Government to the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, in which a demand was made in the form of an ultimatum to revoke an alleged decree intended to hinder the Polish customs inspectors in the exercise of their normal duties (which decree, however, was based on unfounded rumors, and in reality had never been issued by.the Senate of the Free City of Danzig). In case of a refusal, the Free City of Danzig was threatened with retaliatory measures. T h e Reich Government see themselves obliged to point out to the Polish Government that the repetition of such a demand, in the form of an ultimatum, to the Free City of Danzig and the threat of retaliatory measures would lead to greater tension in the relationship between Germany and Poland, and that the responsibility of such consequences would devolve exclusively on the Polish Government, for the German Government herewith repudiates in advance all responsibility for them. T h e German Government further draw the attention of the Polish Government to the fact that the measures taken by the Polish Government to prevent the import of certain goods from the Free City of Danzig into Poland are likely to bring about serious economic loss to the population of Danzig. Should the Polish Government continue to support such measures, there would, in the opinion of the Reich Government, be no choice left 1 "Final Report by the Right Honorable Sir Nevile Henderson on the Circumstances Leading to the Termination of His Mission to Berlin," September 20, 1939, Germany, No. i (1939), Cm. 6115, p. 6. iVluch of this Final Report is reproduced in H.
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to the Free City of Danzig, as matters stand, but to seek other export and, consequently, other import possibilities (G 445, P 85).
The final phrase was an obvious hint of Anschluss between Danzig and the Reich. The language was threatening, but Ribbentrop preferred for the moment to minimize the issue by keeping the communication secret and by utilizing subordinate officials. In a like spirit, Polish Undersecretary of State Miroslaw Arciszewski transmitted a sharp reply on August 10 to German Charge Johann von Wiihlisch, expressing "the greatest surprise" at the German note. Warsaw could not perceive any "legal foundation justifying German interference" in Polish-Danzig relations. "The Polish Government are compelled to point out to the German Government that, as hitherto, they will in the future oppose by such means and measures as the Polish Government alone consider adequate, any attempt made by the authorities of the Free City of Danzig to jeopardize the rights and interests that Poland possesses in Danzig, on the basis of the agreement to which she is a party, and that the Polish Government will consider as an aggressive act any possible intervention of the Government of the Reich which may endanger these rights and interests" (G 446, P 86). Beck had conferred with Kennard and Noel before sending this reply (G 447) and had also informed Halifax through Raczynski. The British Ambassador in Warsaw at once sent the texts of these communications, "strictly confidential," to Downing Street (B 46, 47), but Noel apparently neglected to transmit them promptly to the Quai d'Orsay. Coulondre was away from Berlin on leave. Charge Saint-Hardouin reported the military and psychological aspects of the German decision (F 189-191), but evidently knew nothing of the content or even of the existence of the German-Polish notes for some days. On the morning of August 10 Forster told Burckhardt (who told Chodacki who told Beck) that Hitler was "incensed" at the tone of the Polish press and that the situation was "extremely serious." The Fiihrer, however, desired to avoid incidents. That evening Forster addressed a Danzig mass meeting and two days later a gathering in Furth, emphasizing that Hitler would know how to achieve the return of Danzig to the Reich. Secret conferences of all kinds now became the order of the day. On August 11, as the Allied military mission reached Moscow, Jugo-
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slavia was reported to have rejected Axis demands for "benevolent" neutrality, involving German-Italian use of Jugoslav railways, resources and military centers, and to have called up reserves for maneuvers along the Axis frontiers. On August 11-13 Ribbentrop and Ciano conferred at Salzburg while Burckhardt and Hitler did likewise at Berchtesgaden. What came of these discussions was anybody's guess. By the time Hitler saw Ciano, after Burckhardt's departure, he had seen the text of the Polish note of August 10 and was therefore in no mood to listen to Italian pleas for moderation. In a later report to the League Council (written December 27, submitted to Halifax and published in Geneva April 15, 1940), Burckhardt quoted Hitler as having said that his generals had been "cautious" the year before with regard to Czechoslovakia, but were now eager for battle. They knew that the Red Army had "no offensive power." The Czech army had been excellent, "in all respects different from the Poles." The Polish army was worthless, as he knew from "the plans of the Polish staff, which were then in his possession." The Czech "danger" had been removed. "Calm reigns in Bohemia and the peasants and workers are content with their lot, as they always were when they were offered simplified solutions. All the difficulties came from the intellectuals." As for Poland, he did not believe Burckhardt's assurances that France and Britain were exercising a "moderating influence." But he could wait"on condition that the German minority in Poland ceased to be molested." If he had to fight, he would fight "without mercy" with an air force of a million men. He "had no such scruples as Wilhelm II." By mid-August London, Paris and Warsaw were all guessing as to Berlin's intentionsfearing the worst, hoping for the best, and wondering what plan of action Hitler had decided upon. The Fiihrer kept his cards carefully concealed. The DanzigPolish controversy was minimized in the German press in favor of vague statements about other issues, particularly Polish persecution of Germans. Saint-Hardouin was unclear as to whether the German game was one of preparing a Blitzkrieg, or pressing for a compromise, or merely bluffing to induce surrender (F 190, 191). That a witches' broth was brewing was certain. That it could be prevented from boiling over only by immediate conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet pact was equally certain. But this was not to be, as the German leaders undoubtedly knew. When the
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boiling point should be reached, it seemed probable that the Fiihrer, if assured of Soviet neutrality, would confront the neighbors of the Reich with two equally unpleasant alternatives: a new Munich, with Britain and France compelling Poland to yield, or war in which Poland would be speedily crushed and the Western Powers would be isolated and impotent.
2. C R I S I S
A. T H E P R E L U D E : AUGUST 15-2 I
On August 15, 1939, Ambassador Robert Coulondre, just back from Paris, saw Weizsacker in Berlin. His Government, he said, was as determined as ever to come to Poland's defense against aggression, but was always ready "to use its good offices to promote any settlement to which Poland as a free and sovereign State might think it possible to subscribe." He expressed anxiety over Forster's speeches and his visits to Berchtesgaden and over the tone of the German press. Weizsacker commented that the situation had indeed changed, for the "changeable and excitable" Poles, influenced by the Anglo-French "encirclement" policy, had disappointed German hopes. He showed Coulondre the notes of August 4-5 and 9-10, as well as his daily list of "acts of persecution." He refused to believe "that France intends always to screen these Polish pranks {couvrir les incartades polojuises)." Coulondre replied that Anglo-French policy was a product of the German action of March which had convinced all Frenchmen that "the restoration of a balance of power in Europe" was indispensable for the preservation of their liberty. This was not "encirclement." The French ties with Poland would not be loosened and the guarantees given would operate automatically. When Weizsacker asked whether this would be true even in the absence of "unprovoked" aggression, the Ambassador advised him not to lose himself in "subtleties." Weizsacker, "as instructed," disputed Coulondre's statements and warned him solemnly that France should recognize that the Polish Government "did not really govern the country." The Poles were "running amok." "One could not imagine that either France or Britain would risk her very existence in favor of her friend who had gone
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boiling point should be reached, it seemed probable that the Fiihrer, if assured of Soviet neutrality, would confront the neighbors of the Reich with two equally unpleasant alternatives: a new Munich, with Britain and France compelling Poland to yield, or war in which Poland would be speedily crushed and the Western Powers would be isolated and impotent.
2. C R I S I S
A. T H E P R E L U D E : AUGUST 15-2 I
On August 15, 1939, Ambassador Robert Coulondre, just back from Paris, saw Weizsacker in Berlin. His Government, he said, was as determined as ever to come to Poland's defense against aggression, but was always ready "to use its good offices to promote any settlement to which Poland as a free and sovereign State might think it possible to subscribe." He expressed anxiety over Forster's speeches and his visits to Berchtesgaden and over the tone of the German press. Weizsacker commented that the situation had indeed changed, for the "changeable and excitable" Poles, influenced by the Anglo-French "encirclement" policy, had disappointed German hopes. He showed Coulondre the notes of August 4-5 and 9-10, as well as his daily list of "acts of persecution." He refused to believe "that France intends always to screen these Polish pranks {couvrir les incartades polojuises)." Coulondre replied that Anglo-French policy was a product of the German action of March which had convinced all Frenchmen that "the restoration of a balance of power in Europe" was indispensable for the preservation of their liberty. This was not "encirclement." The French ties with Poland would not be loosened and the guarantees given would operate automatically. When Weizsacker asked whether this would be true even in the absence of "unprovoked" aggression, the Ambassador advised him not to lose himself in "subtleties." Weizsacker, "as instructed," disputed Coulondre's statements and warned him solemnly that France should recognize that the Polish Government "did not really govern the country." The Poles were "running amok." "One could not imagine that either France or Britain would risk her very existence in favor of her friend who had gone
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mad. . . . In the end the Ambassador assured me of his readiness to co-operate in any way towards the maintenance of peace. A European war would end in a defeat of all parties, even of the Russia of today. The victor would not be Stalin but Trotsky" (G 449). Coulondre came away convinced that the danger of attack upon Poland was "formidable and imminent." He felt that the peril could only be met by "absolute firmness," adequate military preparations, an accord with Moscow, and advice to Warsaw to "avoid local incidents" (F 194). Coulondre was worried. No information was available regarding the Hitler-Ciano-Ribbentrop discussions of August 11-13. The degree of Axis solidarity could not be estimated. German mobilization was proceeding secretly, not publicly, as had been the case in the Munich crisis. The German press was challenging Poland's right to existence, as it had challenged Czechoslovakia a year before. Yet no leading Nazi official had made any definite pronouncements . . . (F 195). On August 14 several Polish customs officials in Danzig were arrested, but released two days later. On the 15th a Polish soldier was killed on the Danzig frontier. Yet Chodacki and Greiser were now conferring amicably, and Beck was telling Noel that he would make every effort to achieve a peaceful solution and wôuld if necessary utilize Burckhardt as intermediary (F 196). Weizsacker was also visited on the afternoon of August 15 by Henderson. The two men wrangled over whether Polish persecution of Germans was worse than German persecution of Poles or vice versa. The Secretary was indignant. "The bottle," he said, "was full to the top." Henderson observed that "Germany could never see but one side to any question and always wanted everything modified in her favor." If Hitler wanted war he could have it, since Britain would meet force with force. Weizsacker said that London seemed to have no appreciation of Polish madness. He "would not and could not believe that Britain would fight under all circumstances whatever folly the Poles might commit." Henderson retorted that this sounded like Ribbentrop. T o suppose that Britain would not give Poland full armed support, if German action compelled Warsaw to resort to arms, would be a "tragic mistake." Weizsacker replied that Polish folly had freed Britain from "any obligation to follow blindly every eccentric step on the part of a lunatic." Henderson answered
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that Warsaw was showing extreme prudence and would take no major step without consulting London. Warsaw, replied Weizsacker, had not consulted London before sending its notes of August 4 and 10. Henderson did not deny this. He was impressed by Weizsacker's calm. "He seemed very confident, and professed to believe that Russian assistance to the Poles would not only be entirely negligible, but that the U.S.S.R. would even in the end join in sharing in the Polish spoils. Nor did my insistence on the inevitability of British intervention seem to move him" (B 48). This was the first time that a high German official had hinted to Henderson of the impending German-Soviet pact. The Ambassador did not question him regarding this, but sought without success to discover the results of Ciano's visit to Salzburg. When Henderson attempted to justify Polish policy by referring to German arms smuggling into Danzig, Weizsacker said that Danzig was only protecting itself against its protector. When Henderson alleged that the Danzig Nazis had been instructed by the German Consul General to adopt a more rigorous attitude, Weizsacker said this story was a lie. When Henderson suggested that a postponement of the Danzig question might permit discussion in a more peaceful atmosphere; that Berlin could take the initiative in arranging German-Polish negotiations; and that Anglo-German discussions of colonies, raw materials, etc., might occur later on, Weizsacker cut short his hopes by saying that the Poles would only abuse any delay. Their attitude made any German initiative impossible. He could give no advice except that Warsaw should see reason. Both men agreed that Chamberlain could not again fly to the Reich. Henderson departed, noted Weizsacker, "conscious of the gravity and precariousness of the situation" (G450). The issue was thus squarely posed as to whether the Western Powers would compel Warsaw to yield to German desires. T o do so would be to deal a fatal blow at the whole effort to build a "peace front." The most probable outcome would be another Munich. This was impossible both because of Anglo-French opinion and because it would leave the Western Powers utterly disgraced and helpless. Not to do so was to challenge the Reich to attack Poland and thereby risk war with the West. If no middle way was ever found between these equally ghastly alternatives, the cause lay less in Allied reluctance to arrange a compromise
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than in Hitler's unwillingness to compromise. Whatever his original intentions may have been, his intention after mid-August was to destroy Polandby a Blitzkrieg if need be, by a series of "negotiated settlements" a la Prague if possible. If this meant war with the West, so much the worse for the Westprovided always that the U.S.S.R. should be neutral. Halifax still hoped for delay if only provocations and pretexts could be avoided. He urged upon Kennard (August 15) that it was "of the first importance to get the local issues (customs inspectors, margarine and herrings) settled at once" and to get the Polish Government "to moderate their press." Beck should deal with Burckhardt rather than with Greiser. "I should like M. Beck to treat M. Burckhardt with the fullest confidence, as in my opinion he is doing his best in a very difficult situation." In view of world opinion, it was important that Warsaw should make plain its readiness "to examine the possibility of negotiation over Danzig if there is a prospect of success." Noel would be getting similar instructions. Kennard should "concert" with him before seeing Beck (B 50). Kennard and Noel at once saw Beck and reported that they had obtained assurances that he would act in the manner suggested. If the latest incident (the arrest by the Danzig police of three Polish customs inspectors) could not be settled between Chodacki and Greiser, Beck would use Burckhardt's services. As for the press, the Foreign Minister commented petulantly that the British press had "first suggested that firmness of the Polish Government had caused the [Danzig] Senate to yield in the matter of Polish customs inspectors" (B 51; cf. F 196). The incident was settled without Burckhardt's intervention. But Coulondre expressed new fears to Bonnet: Danzig was receding into the background of German attention only because of a great press campaign over the Polish "terror." This maneuver, coupled with provocations and panic-mongering to induce Germans in Poland to flee to the Reich, was Sudentenland all over again (F 200). Berlin obviously intended to inflame popular feeling and to create the impression that Warsaw, like Prague in 1938, was either a hotbed of criminal lunatics or no longer had effective authority within Poland's frontiers. Lipski had assured Coulondre that most of the German "evidence" was "exaggerated, distorted or even merely fabricated." The French Ambassador felt that Allied propaganda, especially in German language broadcasts, should
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spread the truth (F 197; cf. B 52-55 and F 206). But to compete with Gobbels within the Reich was impossible. T o give negative truths the emotional efficacy of positive falsehoods is beyond the power of any propaganda in a market where lies are mistaken for truth or even preferred to it. "The Germans," observed Henderson, "are prone to convince themselves very readily of anything they wish to believe. . . . Dr. Gobbels' propaganda machine was the ready tool of the extremists, who were afraid lest Herr Hitler should move too slowly in the prosecution of his own ultimate designs."^ On August 18 Coulondre was urging that the French Government should press Poland to "give no grounds for complaint" with respect to minorities and should forbid the French press "to make any attacks which might be taken as a personal insult" to Hitler (F 199). Bonnet did what he could. Beck agreed (F 210, 212). But for this it was already too late.
B. THE CHAMBERLAIN-HITLER LETTERS: AUGUST 2 2 - 2 5
There followed what Chamberlain and Henderson referred to as the "bombshell" of the German-Soviet pact. Three days before the announcement of its impending signature, Henderson had again warned Weizsacker that while Britain would prevent any provocation by Poland it would unquestionably give armed assistance to the Poles if Germany compelled them to fight (G 451). Ribbentrop obviously hoped that his bargain with Molotov would alter British policy in this respect. Rational statesmen do not try to defend what has become indefensible. Poland had now become indefensible. British statesmen were rational. Therefore . . .? Ribbentrop momentarily forgot that British statesmen, like Polish politicians, were also stupid and stubborn. They should have been terrified at the Berlin-Moscow Axis. They should have been panic-stricken by reports now reaching them that Germany had 2,400,000 troops under arms and was moving armored divisions toward the Polish frontier (Cf. F 205, 208, 209). They should have capitulated at news that Germany would invade Poland on August 2 2 or immediately thereafter (F 211, 213). But instead of acting in any such rational fashion, the British Cabinet met on the 22nd and announced that the Moscow pact "could in no way
1 Final Report, p. 7.
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spread the truth (F 197; cf. B 52-55 and F 206). But to compete with Gobbels within the Reich was impossible. T o give negative truths the emotional efficacy of positive falsehoods is beyond the power of any propaganda in a market where lies are mistaken for truth or even preferred to it. "The Germans," observed Henderson, "are prone to convince themselves very readily of anything they wish to believe. . . . Dr. Gobbels' propaganda machine was the ready tool of the extremists, who were afraid lest Herr Hitler should move too slowly in the prosecution of his own ultimate designs."^ On August 18 Coulondre was urging that the French Government should press Poland to "give no grounds for complaint" with respect to minorities and should forbid the French press "to make any attacks which might be taken as a personal insult" to Hitler (F 199). Bonnet did what he could. Beck agreed (F 210, 212). But for this it was already too late.
B. THE CHAMBERLAIN-HITLER LETTERS: AUGUST 2 2 - 2 5
There followed what Chamberlain and Henderson referred to as the "bombshell" of the German-Soviet pact. Three days before the announcement of its impending signature, Henderson had again warned Weizsacker that while Britain would prevent any provocation by Poland it would unquestionably give armed assistance to the Poles if Germany compelled them to fight (G 451). Ribbentrop obviously hoped that his bargain with Molotov would alter British policy in this respect. Rational statesmen do not try to defend what has become indefensible. Poland had now become indefensible. British statesmen were rational. Therefore . . .? Ribbentrop momentarily forgot that British statesmen, like Polish politicians, were also stupid and stubborn. They should have been terrified at the Berlin-Moscow Axis. They should have been panic-stricken by reports now reaching them that Germany had 2,400,000 troops under arms and was moving armored divisions toward the Polish frontier (Cf. F 205, 208, 209). They should have capitulated at news that Germany would invade Poland on August 2 2 or immediately thereafter (F 211, 213). But instead of acting in any such rational fashion, the British Cabinet met on the 22nd and announced that the Moscow pact "could in no way
1 Final Report, p. 7.
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affect their obligations to Poland, which they have repeatedly stated in public and which they are determined to fulfill." Parliament was recalled. Preliminary military measures were taken. The opinion was expressed that "there is nothing in the difficulties that have arisen between Germany and Poland which would justify the use of force, involving a European war with all its tragic consequences, as the Prime Minister has repeatedly said. There are indeed no questions in Europe which should not be capable of peaceful solution, if only conditions of confidence could be restored. H. M. Government are, as they always have been, ready to assist in creating such conditions, but if in spite of all their efforts others insist on the use of force, they are prepared and determined to resist it to the uttermost" (G 453). On August 2 2 Chamberlain addressed a letter to Hitler to remove all doubts:
Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by H . M. Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening. These steps have, in the opinion of H . M. Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. N o greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which H . M. Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil. It has been alleged that, if H . M. Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. W h e t h e r or not there is any force in that allegation, H . M. Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding. If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured. Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. I am certain that it is desired neither by our
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people, nor by yours, and I cannot see that there is anything In the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and should not be resolved without the use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails today. We have been, and at all times will be, ready to assist in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take place, and in which it might be possible concurrently to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest to us and to you. The difficulties in the way of any peaceful discussion in the present state of tension are, however, obvious, and the longer that tension is maintained, the harder will it be for reason to prevail.
The Prime Minister went on to say that if a truce to press polemics and all incitement could be arranged, suitable conditions might be created for direct German-Polish negotiations regarding minorities, with the aid of a neutral intermediary if desired by both sides. Any settlement, however, must be guaranteed by other Powers. "At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you" (B 56, G 454). Henderson was instructed to hand this letter to Hitler in person as soon as possible. Weizsacker expressed fear lest it be published. Henderson told him there was no such intention and gave him a summary. At 8 a.m. August 23 the Secretary phoned that arrangements had been made and that he would join the Ambassador at 9.30 in a flight to Salzburg. By noon they were at Berchtesgaden, "Home of the Evil Fairy," to which Chamberlain had gone, as to another Canossa, less than a year before. Henderson was apologetic over his rank. The urgency of the crisis had left no time for some one more eminent to come. He was conciliatory. But Britain had given its word to Poland, and Britain's word had never been broken. The Fiihrer was in a rage"excitable and uncompromising," said the Ambassador. He had already seen a translation of the letter and was preparing a reply. Meanwhile he observed that Britain had given Poland a blank check, with the result that hundreds of thousands of Germans were being tortured. This he would not tolerate. Warsaw had been informed
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that any further persecution would result in immediate action by the Reich. He had ample evidence of Polish atrocities. Tales of the castration of Germans by Poles seemed to excite his fury in a peculiar fashion. Henderson said he knew of only one case, that of a sex-maniac who had been treated as he deserved. Hitler insisted there were six cases. These things were all due to British support of Czechs and Poles. He would not stand it. If British military measures continued, he would order immediate mobilization. When the Ambassador said war would then be unavoidable, he repeated his threat, which he said was only "a protective measure." Britain had spread false rumors of mobilization. Britain had poisoned the atmosphere and prevented the Poles from accepting reasonable German terms. This he would no longer tolerate. If war came it would be a hfe and death struggle. Britain had more to lose than Germany.^ He would give his written reply in two hours. . . . Henderson returned.to Salzburg, but soon went back to Berchtesgaden on news that Hitler wished to see him again. This time the Fiihrer was calm. He gave Henderson his letter and repeated that he would attack Poland if another German were ill-treated. When Henderson spoke of the tragedy of war, he said that it was all England's fault. "He was, he said, 50 years old: he preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60." England had rejected all his offers of friendship and forced him into agreement with Russia. When the Ambassador said that Britain had only opposed the principle of force, he replied by asking whether "Britain had ever found a solution for any of the idiocies of Versailles by way of negotiations"a tender point with all appeasers and ex-appeasers, despite the fact that Downing Street had yielded up almost all its rights under the treaty "by way of negotiations." It takes two to make a friendship, said the Fiihrer. Henderson commented that he had never believed in an Anglo-Soviet pact, since he was certain that Stalin had procrastinated only to get rid of Chamberlain in order to profit by a war. If anyone had to
1 Cf. B 57, Henderson's report to Halifax, and G 455, Memorandum of Herr von Loesch, interpreter. Tlie second and briefer conversation in the late afternoon is not reported as a separate discussion in The German White Book, which also says nothing of Hitler's preference for war at the age of 50. The British Blue Book similarly says nothing of Henderson's alleged comments on the Soviet pact, though he hints of them in his memoirs. In the absence of denials on either side, it may be assumed that the statements quoted were actually made.
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conclude a pact with Moscow, he preferred that Germany should do so. Hitler retorted: "Make no mistake. It will be a treaty lasting for many years" (G 455; B 58). "Though he spoke of his artistic tastes," wrote Henderson later, "and of his longing to satisfy them, I derived the impression that the corporal of the last war was even more anxious to prove what he could do as the conquering Generalissimo of the next." ^ Hitler's reply to Chamberlain was a longish document: Germany had always desired British friendship and had restricted its interests to this end. But certain interests Germany could not renounce. These included Danzig and the Corridor. Germany had made a very generous proposal. It was rejected, thanks to British reports of German mobilizations and the British guarantee to Polandwhich had let loose "a wave of unspeakable terror" against Germans and provoked Polish efforts to achieve the economic strangulation of Danzig. This was intolerable. Renewed assurances of British determination to support Poland "can in no way shake the determination of the German Government to protect the interests of the Reich. . . , I likewise agree with your assurance that the ensuing war would, in this case, be a long one. If Germany is attacked by Britain, she is prepared and determined to fight. . . . There can be no doubt as to the determination of the new German Reich to accept privation and misfortune in any form and at any time rather than sacrifice her national interests or even her honor." If Britain and France should carry out mobilization measures, despite the fact that Germany "never has intended nor intends in the future to attack either Great Britain or France, I shall order the immediate mobilization of the German armed forces." N o Anglo-German friendship would be possible without a change of attitude on the part of the Powers responsible for the Treaty of Versailles. "During my whole lifetime I have struggled to achieve a friendship between Britain and Germany, but the attitude adopted by British diplomacy, up to the present at least, has served to convince me of the hopelessness of such an attempt. If the future were to bring a change in this respect, none would welcome it more than I." ^ Henderson questioned Hitler as to the meaning of his threat of mobilization in view of the circumstance that "I would, I said,
1 Final Report, p. lo. 2 G 456. B 60 gives the same letter in a different translation.
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regard a general German mobilization as the equivalent to war." The Ambassador found Hitler's reply confusing, but concluded that this sentence was intended as a warning to France, as an indication that Germany could not be intimidated, and as an excuse for general mobilization when and if Hitler should decide on it (B 59). Henderson told Coulondre that he saw no hope apart from the establishment of immediate contact between Warsaw and Berlin. He had therefore urged HaUfax to advise Beck to seek contact with Hitler at once, since he felt that only a few hours were left for this last effort (F 217). Bonnet informed Ambassador Corbin in London on August 24 that he would "make a most urgent demarche" in Warsaw to prevent Polish military action in the event of the Danzig Senate proclaiming Anschluss. Poland must not "take up the position of an aggressor," but "reserve its freedom to defend its rights by diplomatic action" (F 218). Noel reported that evening that Beck had told him that German military preparations had necessitated additional Polish military measures (F 219). Acting apparently at the suggestion of London and Paris, Beck at the same time instructed Ambassador Lipski, who was studiously ignored by Wilhelmstrasse throughout the crisis, to ask for an interview with Weizsacker and assure him that Warsaw was "always ready for discussion under normal conditions" (F 220). This move preceded by a few minutes the dispatch of instructions from Bonnet to Noel (6.40 p.m. August 24) to see Beck "at the earhest possible moment" and tell him
that in the new conditions resulting from the Russo-German Pact, the French Government is more anxious than ever that Poland should at all cost avoid laying herself open to the charge of being the aggressor this being the whole purpose of the German maneuverand thus playing into Germany's hands. The disadvantages arising from such a position would be as grave for Poland as for her allies, on account of the repercussions it might have on the obligations, virtual or actual, which bind the latter to other Powers. In the same way, the French Government urgently recommends that the Polish Government abstain from all military action in the event of the Danzig Senate proclaiming the City's return to the Reich. To any possible decision of this sort, it is important that Poland should reply only by an action of the same kind, that is to say, by making all reservations and stating her intention of having recourse to all legal remedies which may be afforded to her by diplomatic usage (F 222).
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Bonnet added that the French General Staff felt that any Polish army which might advance into Danzig would be in "an extremely delicate position." The question was "solely one of expediency." Poland would not be hampering its freedom of action in case of a German attack nor prejudicing the validity of French obligations to Poland. The danger in Danzig became greater with the action of the Senate on August 23 in approving Gauleiter Forster's appointment as "Head of the State" (cf. B 62). Noel therefore saw Arciszewski again on the evening of the 24th to tell him that "we relied upon the Polish Government not to take any initiative likely to bring about irreparable results without first consulting us. I requested him to inform M. Beck of my conversation without delay" (F 226). Beck agreed. Later in the evening Noel saw the Foreign Minister and conveyed to him the substance of Bonnet's telegram. Beck consented, in case of Anschluss proclaimed by the Danzig authorities, to confer with the Allies and refrain from any miUtary action until faced by direct or indirect aggression (F 232). Smigly-Rydz extended similar assurances to General Faury (F 238). Border incidents led to further French advice that the Polish army should show the utmost restraint. Lipski's efforts in Berlin, however, were in vain, since Weizsacker was in Berchtesgaden and Ribbentrop was in Moscow. Goring had received the Polish Ambassador at 5 p.m. August 24 but made no suggestions aside from remarking that he "no longer had influence to do much in the matter" and that Danzig, etc., were small things compared to Poland's alliance with Britain. He was "friendly," but emphasized that he was speaking only in a personal capacity. He warned of the danger of war and said that the Reich could cooperate only with Britain or Russia and had already made its choice (P 147). Beck, Moscicki, and Smigly-Rydz conferred and agreed to reject any German proposals that the British alhance be terminated (B 67). While Beck instructed Chodacki to challenge the legality of Forster's appointment (B 63), Coulondre reported rumors in Berlin that Germany and the U.S.S.R. would partition Poland at the Vistula, make Lithuania (including Vilna) a buffer state, grant hmited independence to Bohemia and Moravia, and revise the frontiers of the Baltic States and Rumania. The crisis had in the interim precipitated the first of a series of appeals by outside Powers to keep the peace. It was fitting that
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the initial steps should come from seven States of which six would be victims of aggression within nine months and of which five were destined to destructionthanks in large measure to their passion for "neutrality." On August 2 3 King Leopold of Belgium, in the name of the Oslo States, then in conference in Brussels, broadcast a plea to all whom it might concern: "Is our continent going to commit suicide in a frightful war which will know neither victors nor vanquished but which would extinguish the spiritual and material values created by centuries of civihzation? . . . Are there any interests which cannot be better reconciled before than after a war? Let the conscience of the world reawaken! . . . A durable peace can only be founded on a moral order. . . . Hundreds of millions of men are one with us in the heartfelt hope of halting the race to war" (P 87). T w o days later President Ignace Moscicki of Poland replied with an expression of "sincere admiration." Poland had always defended the idea that no durable power could be founded on the oppression of the weak and had always held that "the best guarantee of peace rested in the regulation of international questions by direct negotiations based on justice and respect for rights and mutual interests" (P 88; cf. F 244). Bonnet replied in similar vein (F 243). On August 27 he informed Brussels that if Belgium adopted an attitude of neutrality, France would fully respect it. "Only in the event of Belgian neutrality not being respected by another Power might France be led to modify her attitude in order to secure her own defense" (F 270). Bonnet sent a similar communication to Luxemburg on the 28th (F 279). The Pope meanwhile had issued a radio appeal for peace on Thursday evening, August 24: "Justice advances with strength of reason, not with arms. Empires that are not founded on justice are not blessed by God. Dangers are imminent, but there is still time. Nothing is lost by peace; everything may be lost by war. . . . Pious humanity awaits justice, bread and liberty, not iron that kills and destroys." In reply to King Leopold, Pius XII expressed hope that their common effort might attain its goal (F 239). On August 24 action was taken by Franklin D. Roosevelt. He had left Washington on the 12th on a vacation trip along the Maine coast aboard the Tuscaloosa, apparently convinced that war was probable within two weeks. Five days later Sumner Welles and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., drafted a proposed message to the
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King of Italy and radioed it to the President. On the 23 rd he hurried back to the capital. He had sent the redraft of the message ahead of him. It was cabled on the evening of August 23rd. In Washington he decided to send additional messages to Hitler and Moscicki.^ These well-meaning gestures were of necessity unimplemented by any "commitments" and were therefore not expected by those who made them to have any effect. They had none. Amid much verbiage about civilization, humanity and Christianity, some of it eloquent and most of it irrelevant, Victor Emmanuel was urged to "formulate proposals for a pacific settlement of the present crisis" in which endeavor he was "assured of the earnest sympathy of the United States." The appeal to Hitler declared that the President had received no reply to his message of April 14, but was confident "that the cause of world peace which is the cause of humanity itselfrises above all other considerations." He was therefore urging the Chancellor and President Moscicki to agree to refrain from all hostile acts "for a reasonable and stipulated period" and to seek a solution by direct negotiations or by impartial arbitration or by conciliation through a moderator from one of the traditionally neutral European States or from one of the American RepubUcs. Poland and the Reich should each agree "to accord complete respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the other." America was against military conquest and domination. The United States was still ready "to contribute its share to the solution of the problems which are endangering world peace." The message to Moscicki proposed the same procedures of settlement. On the 25th the President sent a message of approval to King Leopold, assuring him that "the people of the United States whole-heartedly share the hopes and the aspirations so eloquently expressed by Your Majesty." The replies changed nothing. On August 25 Moscicki thanked Roosevelt and declared that Poland had always favored direct negotiation and also considered conciliation "through a third party as disinterested and impartial as Your Excellency to be a just and equitable method in the solution of controversies arising between nations." (The President had not proposed that he himself be moderator.) Poland was not making claims or asking concessions and would of course agree "to refrain from any positive
1 Cf. Josef Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper, pp. 52-7.
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act of hostility provided that the other party also agrees to refrain from any such act, direct or indirect." That evening Roosevelt sent a second message to Hitler advising him of Poland's readiness for direct negotiations or conciliation. "All the world prays that Germany too will accept." Hitler's belated reply was a curt message from Charge Hans Thomsen to Secretary Hull, dated August 31 and received on the afternoon of September i. The Chancellor had "greatly appreciated" the President's messages. He too had "left nothing untried" for peace. "Even at the last hour he accepted an offer from the Government of Great Britain to mediate in this dispute. Owing to the attitude of the Polish Government, however, all these endeavors have remained without result." Victor Emmanuel's reply of August 30 was even briefer: "I am grateful for your interest. I have immediately transmitted your message to my Government. As is known to all, there has been done and there is being done by us whatever is possible to bring about a peace with justice." ^ Commons had meanwhile reassembled on August 24 and heard a review of the crisis from the Prime Minister, while Halifax spoke in similar vein to Lords (B 65). Chamberlain observed that Hitler's reply to his letter of August 2 2 "includes what amounts to a restatement of the German thesis that Eastern Europe is a sphere in which Germany ought to have a free hand. . . . This thesis entirely misapprehends the British position. W e do not seek to claim a special position for ourselves in Eastern Europe. W e do not think of asking Germany to sacrifice her national interests, but we cannot agree that national interests can only be secured by the shedding of blood or the destruction of the interests of other States." There was still hope.
If, despite all our efforts to find the way to peaceand God knows I have tried my bestif in spite of all that, we find ourselves forced to embark upon a struggle which is bound to be fraught with suffering and rnisery for all mankind and the end of which no man can foresee, if that should happen, we shall not be fighting for the political future of a far away city in a foreign land; we shall be fighting for the preservation of 1 Full text in The Department of State Bulletin, I, No. 9, August 26, 1939, pp. 157-61 and No. lo, September 2, 1939, pp. 183-84. The Canadian Prime Minister made appeals to Hitler, Mussolini, and Moscicki on August 26, also without results (cf. F 251). On August 29 Queen Wilhelmina of The Netherlands and King Leopold of Belgium offered their good offices to Poland, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy (cf. P 100-104 and F 284, 292, and 298).
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those principles of which I have spoken, the destruction of which would involve the destruction of all possibility of peace and security for the peoples of the world. This issue of peace or war does not rest with us, and I trust that those with whom the responsibility does lie will think of the millions of human beings whose fate depends upon their actions. For ourselves, we have a united country behind us, and in this critical hour I believe that we, in this House of Commons, will stand together, and that this afternoon we shall show the world that, as we think, so will we act, as a united nation (B 64).
The British Ambassador in Berlin was convinced that the Fiihrer had ordered the German army to advance into Poland during the night of August 25-26, but had countermanded the order in a last hope of separating Britain from Poland (H 271-2). Phone service to Paris and London had been cut for several hours. All German airports were closed. Internal German air service was suspended. Food rationing was introduced. The Tannenberg celebration was cancelled on the 26th and the Niirnberg Congress on the 27th. All of this meant war. But Hitler hesitated.-^ In the early afternoon of August 25 Henderson was invited to the Chancellery by the Fiihrer, who had returned to Berlin on the preceding evening. Hitler declared that upon reflection he "desired to take a step in regards to England which was to be as decisive as the step taken in regards to Russia." T o say that Germany desired to conquer the world was ridiculous. The British Empire had 40 milHon square kilometers, Russia 19, America 9 V 2 and Germany only 600,000. "It was thus quite clear who wanted to conquer the world." Polish provocations "had become intolerable." During the preceding night 21 new frontier incidents had occurred, all provoked by the Poles.
If the Polish Government contested their responsibility . . . this merely proved that they were unable to keep control over their own people. Germany was resolved under all circumstances to put an end to these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier, not only in the interests of law and order but also for the sake of European peace. T h e problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved. T h e British Prime Minister had made a speech which had done nothing towards bringing about a change in the Polish attitude. This speech might, if anything, give rise to a desperate and incalculable war between Germany and England, a war which would cause far greater bloodshed than that of 1914. In contrast 1 Cf. Final Report of Henderson, pp. 8 and 11.
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to the last world war, Germany would not have to carry on a war on two fronts. The agreement concluded with Russia was unconditional and represented a turning point in the foreign policy of the Reich with the greatest long range possibilities. Under no circumstances would Russia and Germany again take up arms against one another. Apart from this pact the agreements made with Russia would safeguard Germany, in economic respects also, for a war of the longest duration (G 457).
Hitler added that a war could bring Germany advantages, but could not bring the slightest gain to England. He had always wanted an Anglo-German understanding. "He himself was a man of great decisions, and he would in this case also be capable of a great action. He approved of the British Empire and was prepared to pledge himself personally to its existence and to devote the might of the German Reich to that end," once the German-Polish problem was settled. All he asked was that his limited colonial demands be metand for this "he was prepared to concede a most protracted time limit"; that his relations with Italy, like Britain's relations with France, remain untouched; and that cognizance be taken of "Germany's unalterable resolution never again to enter into a conflict with Russia." Once these were granted, he would not only guarantee the British Empire, but pledge German aid for its preservation and discuss limitation of armaments. He was "not interested" in Western problems. The Siegfried Line was "the final frontier of the Reich in the West." If Britain would consider these suggestions, "they might end in a blessing for both countries." If not, "war would be inevitable." As soon as the Polish-German question was settled he would make an offer (G 457; B 68). In his covering wire to Halifax, Henderson commented that Ribbentrop was present but said little. Hitler was "absolutely calm and normal and spoke with great earnestness and apparent sincerity." He suggested that Henderson should fly to England to put the case to his Government. T o the Ambassador's comment that the offer would not be considered unless it meant a negotiated settlement with Poland, Hitler said he could not guarantee this, since Polish provocation might compel intervention to protect German nationals. Henderson said this was for Ribbentrop to discuss with Lipski. Hitler retorted that Lipski had seen Goring but had been unable to propose anything new. Henderson suggested that Ribbentrop should see Beck. Hitler replied,
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with Ribbentrop's concurrence, that Beck had refused an invitation last March. When Henderson insisted that the offer would get no consideration unless it meant peace with Poland, the Fiihrer declared: "If you think it useless, then do not send it at all." He repeated that Polish persecution was intolerable. German planes were shot at. There was another case of castration. If war came, Japan would be the only winner. He wanted to end his life as an artist, not as a war-monger. He did not want to turn Germany into a barracks. Once the Polish question was settled, he would settle down . , . (B 69). With Halifax's approval, Henderson flew to London in a German plane on Saturday morning, the 26th, and spent the next two days in consultations regarding the British reply. The important thing in the eyes of the Nazi leaders was not one of substance but of form: Britain must abandon Poland, despite Hitler's statement that "he had no interest in making Britain break her word to Poland." If London did not desert Warsaw, Germany would fight. If it did, the Polish problem could be settled to the Reich's satisfaction and an Anglo-German entente would again be possible. The important thing in the eyes of the British leaders was also formal rather than substantive: Hitler must not use force against Poland. If he did, Britain would fight. If he did not, the Polish problem could be settled to Britain's satisfaction and an Anglo-German entente would be possible. Behind the forms, to be sure, were more tangible considerations. Downing Street feared that no Polish settlement, however achieved, would satisfy Berlin unless it left the Western Powers isolated, and left Poland so helpless as to convince even the Polish leaders that their State, like Czecho-Slovakia after Munich, was at the mercy of the Reich. Berlin feared that no Polish settlement, however achieved, would satisfy London unless it left the Reich "encircled" and left Poland as Britain's ally. Both apprehensions were fully justified. On August 25, 1939, while Henderson and Hitler talked, the tentative Anglo-PoUsh arrangements were converted into a formal Agreement of Mutual Assistance, signed by Halifax and Ambassador Raczynski. This belated instrument of eight articles pledged each party to give the other "all the support and assistance in its power" in the event of either "becoming engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression
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by the latter against that Contracting Party" (Art. i ) . The same obligation applied to any action by a European Power clearly threatening, directly or indirectly, the independence of either in such fashion "that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces." The same would be true of hostilities resulting from action threatening the independence or neutrality of another European State "in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party" (Art. 2). Against attempts to undermine the independence of either "by processes of economic penetration or in any other way," the signatories (Art. 3) would support one another in resistance, and if the aggressor embarked upon hostilities they would apply Article I. MiHtary and diplomatic consultation was envisaged. Each State would inform the other of its mutual assistance pacts, past and future, with third States. Such pacts would neither limit the obligations of Britain and Poland toward one another, nor "create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned" (Art. 6). In the event of hostilities resulting from appHcation of the Agreement, the signatories would not conclude an armistice or peace treaty save by mutual consent (Art. 7). The Agreement was to come into force at signature, to be valid for five years and to remain in force thereafter subject to denunciation by six months' notice (B 19, G 459, P 91) .^ It is noteworthy that in this pact of alliance London granted to Warsaw what it had been unwilling to grant to Moscowi.e. the right at its discretion to resist "indirect aggression" and to protect its security by resisting threats to the independence and security of third States, in this case Danzig or Lithuania. In the treaty and in all discussions in the Polish capital. Beck insisted upon reserving freedom of action to take military measures not only in the event of armed aggression against Poland but also in the event of German efforts to instigate revolution within Poland, or to strangle Poland economically, or to jeopardize Polish security by subverting the independence or neutrality of third States. The KremUn had asked a similar right in the Baltic as a condition of an Anglo-Soviet pact. Downing Street would have
1 Text also published as Cmd. 6101. On August 2 an Anglo-Polish Guarantee Agreement had been signed in London by Hudson and Raczynski for a loan of 8,163,000 to finance Polish purchases in Britain. Cf. Cmd. 6093, 1939.
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none of it. The British statesmen may have been unwilling hitherto to grant such a right to either Warsaw or Moscow and may have changed their views after the resulting failure of the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. Or they may have been willing to grant to Warsaw what they could not bring themselves to grant to Moscow, just as in April they had been willing to guarantee Poland but not the U.S.S.R. against attack. To treat the realm of Smigly-Rydz as a "Great Power" and that of Stalin as a negligible quantity, or to grant Poland a free hand against small neighbors and not to grant such a privilege to the U.S.S.R., was a mistake which Hitler did not make. That Chamberlain appeared to be making it filled the Fiihrer with contempt and fury and drove him farther along the road to war. While he firmly closed the door on Hitler's hopes of British desertion of Poland, Halifax sought simultaneously to promote a German-Polish compromise. Since Berlin could be expected to yield up nothing of its earlier demands (made "once and for all," said Hitler), the best that Hahfax could hope for was that Hitler would not go beyond them. If any compromise was possible, Warsaw must be induced to modify its opposition to these demands. Hahfax doubtless hoped that the pact of August 2 5 might soften Polish stubbornness through removing fears of abandonment by the Western Powers. But the unrealists in Warsaw were no more disposed to make Anglo-French policy the touchstone of their attitude toward the Reich than were the unrealists in London and Paris disposed to make their own obligations contingent on Soviet policy. An Allied frontal attack on Polish intransigence seemed certain to fail. Halifax tried a flanking movement by putting minority problems to the fore, as the Nazi press was doing, rather than territorial issues. He instructed Kennard to urge upon Beck acceptance of possible proposals for (i) a corps of neutral observers, presumably to check atrocity stories, and (2) an exchange of populations as an element in any negotiations and as a pledge to Berlin of Polish sincerity. "If action is to be taken by the Polish Government in this sense it ought to be done immediately" (B 71, Halifax to Kennard, August 26, 5 p.m.). Although he had just received a long report from Lipski (P 93) on the persecution of the Polish minority in Germanya matter which London and Paris did not propose to consider, Beck agreed to the latter suggestion and
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promised to discuss the former with the Cabinet. Since the Vatican had made inquiries as to how it might help, Kennard suggested that Beck tell the Pope to tell Berhn of Warsaw's willingness to consider an exchange of populations and the use of neutral observers. Beck agreed to consider this. The Ambassador warned him "there was no time to lose" and asked him again to inform London of any Polish action contemplated as the result of any âit accompli at Danzig. Beck assented, but "made the reservation that a situation might arise where immediate action would be necessary" (B 72). Noel regretted this as "a reservation made with a view to some wholly unpredictable eventuality" (F 247), but apparently neither he nor Kennard insisted that it be withdrawn. On August 28 HaUfax wired Kennard about the proposed reply to Hitler.
We should not consider intimation by Polish Government of their readiness to hold direct discussions as in any way implying acceptance of Herr Hitler's demands. . . . As Polish Government appear in their reply to President Roosevelt to accept idea of direct negotiations, H. M. Government earnestly hope that in the light of the considerations set forth in foregoing paragraphs [referring to the alliance and to safeguarding of Poland's essential interests in any settlement through an international guarantee] Polish Government will authorize them to inform German Government that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussion with Germany. Please endeavor to see M. Beck at once and telephone reply (B 73; Cf. P 95).
Whether these steps represented the limits of Anglo-French "advice" to Warsaw is uncertain. Nothing further appears in the documents now available. It may be doubted, however, whether Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay gave Poland a completely "blank check" with respect to Danzig and the Corridor. Despite the atrocity stories which filled the German press, the Allied diplomats in Berlin and Warsaw recognized that the "minority problem" would not be discussed by Wilhelmstrasse apart from the future status of the Free City and of Pomorze. The published dispatches, however, reveal advice only on the former issue. The attempt to initiate negotiations through the Vatican or through London seems curious in view of the fact that the German Embassy in Warsaw and the Polish Embassy in
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Berlin were still open for business. But Ribbentrop and Beck were boycotting each other's agents, except for routine matters (cf. P 147), and only an outside channel could serve for the inauguration of Polish-German discussions. "From the end of March till the end of August," wrote Henderson, "all personal contact between Warsaw and Berlin was suspended" (Final Report, p. 5). Count Jean Szembek, Polish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, got the impression from Noel that Henderson had suggested an exchange of populations to Hitler (P 92). Coulondre had phoned Bonnet shortly after midnight August 2 5 that Henderson had asked Hitler whether he would consider an exchange of populations, as in the Tyrol (F 246). Coulondre, Henderson, and Lipski had agreed that this was "a most interesting idea" and should be pressed on Warsaw at once. Bonnet and Noel seized upon the suggestion on the ground, as Noel put it, that this would "bring the problem into the field of nationality questions, and consequently tend to safeguard the territorial status quo" (F 252). Coulondre, having in mind the precedent of Prague, feared any pressure which might demoralize Poland. He reported a comment by Lipski: "What the Germans want is to be able to lay hands on Poland and one day have the Polish army at their disposal" (F 248). At 2.20 a.m. August 26 Bonnet wired Noel to push Coulondre's original suggestion (F 249). Kennard and Noel, who were less worried about Polish surrender than about Polish refusal to make any concessions, vigorously urged Beck to accept both the proposals for neutral observers and those for an exchange of minorities (P 92). He agreed (August 26), but said Warsaw could not take the initiative in proposing negotiations with Germany on this basis "for fear that Herr Hitler should misunderstand their intentions" (F 258; P 92). Both Warsaw and Berlin had indicated a desire for "direct negotiation." But Ribbentrop would not initiate them because Poland had rejected earlier invitations. And Beck would not initiate them, even though he did not reject the Anglo-French suggestions as to a possible point of departure, because he knew too well what had happened to Schuschnigg, Benes, and Hacha. What to do? There were hopes that Hitler would be content with his earlier demands regarding Danzig and the Corridor, and that Warsaw
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might ultimately be persuaded to reconsider them. Coulondre reported to Bonnet early on August 26 that Hitler had repeated to Henderson "his claims of last April, namely, the return of Danzig and access to the Free City across the Corridor" (F 245). But it appeared by evening that Hitler had made no allusion to the "April" proposals and that he had made no comment at Henderson's mention of past exchanges of populations in the Balkans (F 259, 260, Corbin to Bonnet). Warsaw had rejected the earlier demands in October, in January, and again in March before it had received any British guaranteea point of which Chamberlain made much in refutation of Hitler's contention that Polish intransigence was due to British support. Whether Warsaw, now enjoying a British guarantee, could be induced to accept these demands was doubtful. As to whether HaHfax and Bonnet urged Beck to accept them, and if so, when, there is no available evidence. If they did, they were gambling on the hope, or on the first erroneous report of Coulondre, that Hitler might still be satisfied with such a solution and on the further hope that Warsaw could be brought to accept it. The second hope was never to be realized, thanks in part to Hitler's tactics. The first hope was either premature or belated. Hitler in fact preferred to leave his territorial demands vague and concentrate on minority grievances, using these as a wedge to split Poland and Britain and to weaken Warsaw's will to resist. London and Paris also preferred to leave territorial questions in abeyance and to urge Polish acceptance of an exchange of populations, doubtless hoping thereby to obviate the need of considering the status of Danzig and the Corridor or of pressing Warsaw to accept German demands which Beck had already turned down. But Hitler, it soon appeared, had not proposed any exchange of populations. Here too he preferred to be noncommittal. The hesitant maneuvering of the diplomats amid this fog of doubt reveals clearly the insoluble dilemma in which London and Paris had involved themselves, and the confusion with which they sought to grapple with it. The deliberate spreading of confusion and doubt as to his intentions was part of Hitler's invariably successful strategy in dealing with the democracies. In this case, however, the evidence of the record is not conclusive as to his decision (on August 25-26) to reject any and all compromises and to confound his enemies by threats and delays until he should
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be ready to wage war on a predetermined day.^ His purpose was rather to explore the possibilities of inducing London and Paris to treat Warsaw as they had treated Prague the year before. If he could get Danzig and the Corridor, as he had gotten Sudetenland, without warby virtue of an Anglo-French ultimatum to Poland, comparable to the ultimatum to Czechoslovakia of September 19, 1938he was doubtless quite ready to accept a settlement on this basis. Poland would be as helpless as Czechoslovakia in the sequel and the Western Powers would in fact be isolated, whatever the formulas might be. What he was evidently playing for was an Allied demarche at Warsaw similar to that which had followed Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden. If he did not on this occasion, as on that, make his demands explicit, this was perhaps due to his realization that Chamberlain and Daladier were committed to the course upon which they had embarked and could not easily, even if they would, compel an ally as yet unblessed with a Henlein or a Runciman to accept demands that had already been refused. The German-Soviet pact, instead of having the expected effect of breaking AlKed resistance, had committed the Western leaders all the more desperately and uncompromisingly to their obligations of "honor" toward Poland. But given "good will" (i.e. a disposition to buy peace by surrender), they might ultimately be "softened" sufficiently by the "war of nerves" to yield to specific demands presented plausibly and in "moderate" guise. When they were finally formulated in the "16 points" of August 30, they were "reasonable" and bore considerable resemblance to the premature forecast of August 26. W h y they were withheld so long and were not accepted when formulated will be examined in due course.
1 Henderson comments: "Nothing was now going to satisfy Hitler except a fourth partition of Poland. In these circumstances I am still at a loss to understand why he postponed his aggression from August 26 to September r. What, indeed, was the underlying motive of the proposals which he handed to me on August 25? He received the fairest possible reply from H. M. Government; yet it made no difference whatsoever to his plans. Why then did he make those proposals? Did he genuinely have a last hesitation at the thought of war? Or was it merely with the idea of hoodwinking his German people to believe that he had tried to the last to avoid war?" (H 274). The Ambassador gives no answers to his own questions, which rest upon the assumption that the German decision for war was reached before August 25. A careful analysis of the known facts and the probabilities casts considerable doubt on this view.
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LETTERS:
C. T H E HITLER-DALADIER AUGUST 26-27
The next episode of the crisisan entr'acte while Hitler waited for Henderson's return from Londonwas an exchange of communications between Daladier and the Fiihrer. At the end of the afternoon of August 25, following Henderson's departure, Hitler asked to see Coulondre. He requested the French Ambassador to convey a message to his Premier: he had no enmity toward France; he had renounced Alsace-Lorraine; he did not want war with France:
Indeed I find the idea that I might have to fight France on account of Poland a very painful one. T h e Polish provocation, however, has placed the Reich in a position which cannot be allowed to continue. . . . N o t only has the Warsaw Government rejected m y proposal, but it has subjected the German minority, our blood brothers, to the worst possible treatment, and has begun mobilization. . . . T h e situation has now become intolerable. Are you aware [he asked Coulondre emphatically] that there have been cases of castration? T h a t already there are more than 70,000 refugees in our camps? Yesterday seven Germans were killed by the police in Bielitz, and 30 German reservists were machine-gunned at Lodz. Our aeroplanes can no longer fly between Germany and East Prussia without being shot at. . . . N o nation worthy of the name can put up with such unbearable insults. France would not tolerate it any more than Germany. These things have gone on long enough, and I will reply by force to any further provocations. I want to state once again: I wish to avoid war with your country. I will not attack France, but if she joins in the conflict, I will see it through to the bitter end. As you are aware, I have just concluded a pact with Moscow that is not only theoretical, but, I may say, practical. I believe I shall win, and you believe you will win: what is certain is that above all French and German blood will flow, the blood of two equally courageous peoples. I say again, it is painful to me to think we might come to that. Please tell this to Premier Daladier on my behalf. . . . It is very painful for me to think that I might have to fight your country; but the decision does not rest with me . . . (F 242).
Coulondre replied that on his "word of honor as a soldier" France would fight if Poland were attacked, but would do all it could to preserve peace and "would not spare its counsels of moderation to the Polish Government." War would bring untold miseries and the real victor would be Trotsky. "Why then,"
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LETTERS:
C. T H E HITLER-DALADIER AUGUST 26-27
The next episode of the crisisan entr'acte while Hitler waited for Henderson's return from Londonwas an exchange of communications between Daladier and the Fiihrer. At the end of the afternoon of August 25, following Henderson's departure, Hitler asked to see Coulondre. He requested the French Ambassador to convey a message to his Premier: he had no enmity toward France; he had renounced Alsace-Lorraine; he did not want war with France:
Indeed I find the idea that I might have to fight France on account of Poland a very painful one. T h e Polish provocation, however, has placed the Reich in a position which cannot be allowed to continue. . . . N o t only has the Warsaw Government rejected m y proposal, but it has subjected the German minority, our blood brothers, to the worst possible treatment, and has begun mobilization. . . . T h e situation has now become intolerable. Are you aware [he asked Coulondre emphatically] that there have been cases of castration? T h a t already there are more than 70,000 refugees in our camps? Yesterday seven Germans were killed by the police in Bielitz, and 30 German reservists were machine-gunned at Lodz. Our aeroplanes can no longer fly between Germany and East Prussia without being shot at. . . . N o nation worthy of the name can put up with such unbearable insults. France would not tolerate it any more than Germany. These things have gone on long enough, and I will reply by force to any further provocations. I want to state once again: I wish to avoid war with your country. I will not attack France, but if she joins in the conflict, I will see it through to the bitter end. As you are aware, I have just concluded a pact with Moscow that is not only theoretical, but, I may say, practical. I believe I shall win, and you believe you will win: what is certain is that above all French and German blood will flow, the blood of two equally courageous peoples. I say again, it is painful to me to think we might come to that. Please tell this to Premier Daladier on my behalf. . . . It is very painful for me to think that I might have to fight your country; but the decision does not rest with me . . . (F 242).
Coulondre replied that on his "word of honor as a soldier" France would fight if Poland were attacked, but would do all it could to preserve peace and "would not spare its counsels of moderation to the Polish Government." War would bring untold miseries and the real victor would be Trotsky. "Why then,"
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asked Hitler, "did you give Poland a blank check?" The Ambassador recalled the events of March. Hitler recalled atrocities. Coulondre said they were exaggerated in the German press and could be brought to an end by France's moderating influence in Warsaw. Hitler said they were increasing . . . (F 242). In mid-afternoon of August 26 Bonnet asked Coulondre to convey a personal letter from Daladier to Hitler. The Premier replied to the Chancellor's message by declaring that he owed it to Hitler and "to our two peoples to say that the fate of peace rests solely in your hands." You cannot doubt my sentiments toward Germany, nor France's pacific dispositions towards your nation. . . . Unless you attribute to the French people a conception of national honor less high than that which I myself recognize in the German people, you cannot doubt either that France will be true to her solemn promises to other nations, such as Poland, which, I am perfectly sure, wants also to live in peace with Germany. These two facts are easily reconciled. . . . I can personally guarantee the readiness which Poland has always shown to have recourse to methods of free conciliation, such as may be envisaged between the Governments of two sovereign nations. In all sincerity I can assure you that there is not one of the grievances invoked by Germany against Poland in connection with the Danzig question which might not be submitted to decision by such methods with a view to a friendly and equitable settlement. I can also pledge my honor that there is nothing in the clear and sincere solidarity of France with Poland and her allies which could modify in any manner whatsoever the peaceful inclinations of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from helping to maintain Poland in her pacific inclinations. In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no man endowed with human feelings could understand that a war of destruction should be allowed to break out without a last attempt at a pacific adjustment between Germany and Poland. Your will for peace may be exercised in all confidence in this direction without the slightest derogation from your sense of German honor. . . . I am ready to make all the efforts that an honest man can make in order to ensure the success of this attempt. Like myself, you were a soldier in the last war. You realize, as I do, how a peoples' memory retains a horror for war and its disasters, whatever may be its results. My conception of your eminent role as leader of the German people, to guide them along the paths of peace towards the full accomplishment of their mission in the common work of civilization, prompts me to ask you for a reply to this proposal. If the blood of France and that of Germany flow again, as they did 25 years ago, each of the
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two peoples will fight with confidence in its own victory, but the most certain victors will be the forces of destruction and barbarism (F 253; cf. G 460).
In delivering this communication Coulondre commented "for forty minutes," urging Hitler "in ttie name of history and for the sake of humanity" not to reject this last chance to avert bloodshed. Men would admire him. Mothers would bless him. "Perhaps I moved him; but I did not prevail. His stand was taken." Hitler said that Poland was "congealed in morbid resistance." She knew that she was going towards suicide, but thanks to Anglo-French support she hoped for resurrection once more. Things had already gone too far. France in the place of Germany would already have made war. There were reasonable men in Warsaw, but the soldiery of that "barbarous country" had broken loose. Warsaw would not listen to Daladier. When Coulondre said that there could be no way of discovering whether the German and Polish viewpoints were still irreconcilable without discussing them, Hitler replied: "It is useless. Poland will not cede Danzig. And I desire that Danzig return to the Reich." He asserted, however, that he would reply to Daladier in writing (F 261). The Ambassador justified his own action to Bonnet on the ground that it might later have "some psychological effect." He added, with a wary eye to Bonnet's well-known weakness for playing give-away, that "we can expect a happy result only if we carefully guard against giving the impression that we are on watch for any possible bargain, however burdensome it might be. I know certainly that this is not in the minds of the French and British Governments. I have simply emphasized the importance of having appearances correspond to the end to reahty" (F263). On August 27 Ribbentrop gave Coulondre Hitler's reply, adding that "since yesterday the situation has become still more acute. The Polish Government is no longer master in its own country. This may perhaps be as well, as otherwise we should have to hold it responsible for the provocations directed against us. But I must warn you that we shall strike at the first incident" (F 266). Since the German press was reporting new incidents daily, some of them imaginary, this formula left the Reich free to strike when it would. The Polish press was full of other incidents, some of them imaginary, of German attacks on
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frontier guards. In his reply Hitler declared that he too knew the horrors of war as a front-fighter. Germany had renounced Alsace-Lorraine and accepted the western frontier as final. He had sought revision of the Versailles Diktat by negotiation. This proved impossible. But he had achieved solutions without bloodshed. "By the manner in which these solutions were accomplished, statesmen of other nations were relieved of their obligation, which they often found impossible to fulfill, of having to accept responsibility for this revision before their own people." He had made an offer to Poland so generous that it had shocked the German people. "Therefore I could make it only once." Poland, incited by the British guarantee, had rejected his offer and resorted to madness and terror. How would you act if a French province were separated by a corridor in possession of an alien Power?
You are a Frenchman, M. Daladier, and I therefore know how you would act. I am a German, M. Daladier, and you will not doubt my sense of honor and my sense of duty which make me act in exactly the same way. . . . N o nation with a sense of honor can ever give up almost two million people and see them maltreated on its own frontiers. I therefore formulated a clear demand: Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany. T h e Macedonian conditions prevailing along our eastern frontier must cease. I see no possibility of persuading Poland, who deems herself safe from attack by virtue of guarantees given to her, to agree to a peaceful solution. Unless we are determined under the circumstances to solve the question one way or the other, I would despair of an honorable future for my country. If fate decrees that our two peoples should fight one another once more over this question, it would be from different motives. I for my part, JVI. Daladier, would fight with my people for the reparation of an injustice, while the others would fight for its retention. This is all the more tragic in view of the fact that many great men of your nation have long since recognized the folly of the solution found in 1919 and the impossibility of keeping it up forever. I am fully conscious of the grave consequences which such a conflict would involve. But I think that Poland would suffer most, for whatever the issue of such a war, the Polish State of today would in any case be lost ( G 461; cf. F 267).
This adroit effort was perfectly phrased to appeal to the Munichmen of France, many of whom had long since been saying: "Danzig is not worth a war." It failed of its obvious purposeto induce a French abandonment of Poland and an Anglo-French rupture, but it perhaps succeeded in a more subtle purpose: that of further undermining Bonnet's weak will to resist and widen-
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ing the internal schisms in France. Bonnet's behavior on September 1-2 was to show his mettle anew. National demoralization throughout the Repubhc during the next nine months was to show the correctness of the Fiihrer's larger calculus. For the moment, his threats were but the confused stage thunder of a Wagnerian Vorspiel. Whether the drama to follow would be Siegfried or Gotterdafnmerung depended upon the flying Ambassador and his message.
D. THE " U L T I M A T U M " : AUGUST 2 8 - 3 O
At 5.00 p.m. August 28 Henderson's plane brought him back to Berlin where he was received in the Chancellery by Hitler, Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt at 10.30. At the door was a guard of honor. After a roll of drums Dr. Meissner, head of the Chancellery staff, said he was glad to see Henderson wearing the customary red carnation which the Ambassador had always affected, save for the three days preceding Munich. For Germans who knew Henderson it had become a symbol of optimism. The Fiihrer seemed to the Ambassador "friendly and reasonable and appeared to be not dissatisfied with the answer I had brought to him. . . . I used every argument which I could think of to induce him to see reason and come down on the side of peace" ( H 276). Hitler said he must have Danzig, the Corridor and "territorial rectifications" in Silesia. Henderson refused to be drawn into a discussion of specific claims, saying that this was for Berlin and Warsaw to settle by free negotiations on a basis of equality, safeguarding essential Polish interests and under an international guarantee. Hitler said he could not agree to direct conversations with Poland until he had studied the British note. He expressed interest in a possible exchange of populations and said he would give his reply the same day. When Henderson observed, "I am in no hurry," the Fiihrer replied, "But I am" (F 287). Although non-committal, he was conciliatory and calm. The British reply to Hitler's note of the 25th was not written in Chamberlain's usual circuitous style. Its authorship was doubtless mixed, with Henderson, Halifax and others cooperating. The note agreed that a German-Polish settlement was the pre-requisite for any Anglo-German negotiations on larger issues, but insisted that the nature of the German-Polish settlement was fundamental.
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ing the internal schisms in France. Bonnet's behavior on September 1-2 was to show his mettle anew. National demoralization throughout the Repubhc during the next nine months was to show the correctness of the Fiihrer's larger calculus. For the moment, his threats were but the confused stage thunder of a Wagnerian Vorspiel. Whether the drama to follow would be Siegfried or Gotterdafnmerung depended upon the flying Ambassador and his message.
D. THE " U L T I M A T U M " : AUGUST 2 8 - 3 O
At 5.00 p.m. August 28 Henderson's plane brought him back to Berlin where he was received in the Chancellery by Hitler, Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt at 10.30. At the door was a guard of honor. After a roll of drums Dr. Meissner, head of the Chancellery staff, said he was glad to see Henderson wearing the customary red carnation which the Ambassador had always affected, save for the three days preceding Munich. For Germans who knew Henderson it had become a symbol of optimism. The Fiihrer seemed to the Ambassador "friendly and reasonable and appeared to be not dissatisfied with the answer I had brought to him. . . . I used every argument which I could think of to induce him to see reason and come down on the side of peace" ( H 276). Hitler said he must have Danzig, the Corridor and "territorial rectifications" in Silesia. Henderson refused to be drawn into a discussion of specific claims, saying that this was for Berlin and Warsaw to settle by free negotiations on a basis of equality, safeguarding essential Polish interests and under an international guarantee. Hitler said he could not agree to direct conversations with Poland until he had studied the British note. He expressed interest in a possible exchange of populations and said he would give his reply the same day. When Henderson observed, "I am in no hurry," the Fiihrer replied, "But I am" (F 287). Although non-committal, he was conciliatory and calm. The British reply to Hitler's note of the 25th was not written in Chamberlain's usual circuitous style. Its authorship was doubtless mixed, with Henderson, Halifax and others cooperating. The note agreed that a German-Polish settlement was the pre-requisite for any Anglo-German negotiations on larger issues, but insisted that the nature of the German-Polish settlement was fundamental.
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The Chancellor's message deals with two groups of questions: those which are matters now in dispute between Germany and Poland and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Great Britain. In connection with these last, H. M. Government observe that the German Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition, he would be prepared to make to the British Government for a general understanding. These proposals are of course stated in very general form and would require a closer definition, but H. M. Government are fully prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for discussion and they would be ready, if differences between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a sincere desire to reach agreement. The condition which the German Chancellor lays down is that there must first be a settlement of differences between Germany and Poland. As to that, H. M. Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon the nature of the settlement and method by which it is to be reached. On these points, the importance of which cannot be absent from the Chancellor's mind, his message is silent, and H. M. Government feel compelled to point out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to achieving further progress. The German Government wUl be aware that H. M. Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honor. They could not, for any advantage offered Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee. In the opinion of H. M. Government, a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests, and they recall that in his speech of April 28 last the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these interests to Poland. But as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of August 22 H. M. Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which would precede agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other Powers. H. M. Government would be ready, if desired, to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee. In the view of H. M. Government it follows that the next step should be the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include the principles stated abovenamely, the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee. They have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions on this basis, and H. M. Government hope the German Government would for their part
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also be willing to agree to this course. If, as H. M. Government hope, such discussion led to agreement, the way would be open to the negotiation of that wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire.
The note went on to argue the urgency of suppressing incidents and preventing the circulation of unverified reports in order to allow time for a full examination of the possibility of settling minority questions. If Hitler chose peace, world co-operation could be anticipated to effect "the transition from preparation for war to the normal activities of peaceful trade." Failure to achieve a just settlement between Germany and Poland might plunge the whole world into war. "Such an outcome would be a calamity without parallel in history" (B 74, G 463). It is clear from subsequent developments that the one sentence in this message which interested Hitler and Ribbentrop was the statement that the British Government had "received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions." This sentence was taken to mean that London had induced Warsaw to accept such terms as Berlin might draw up, providing that the external forms of "free negotiations," "Polish interests" and an "international guarantee" were preservedas at Munich. This was not at all the British conception of the kind of German-Polish discussions contemplated. But since this had been the pattern of all of Hitler's "bloodless victories" and represented the only conception of "negotiations" which the Nazi leaders knew, it was not unnatural that Hitler and Ribbentrop drew the conclusion suggested. Henderson was not successful in disabusing them. He said in the discussion of August 28 that if Hitler "put forward immoderate demands, there was no hope of a peaceful solution." The choice was his. "He had offered a corridor over the Corridor in March, and I must honestly tell him that anything more than that, if that, would have no hope of acceptance. I begged him very earnestly to reflect before raising his price. He said his original offer had been contemptuously refused and he would not make it again. I observed that it had been made in the form of a dictate and therein lay the whole difference." The Fiihrer spoke of Polish madness and of "annihilating" Poland. He had to satisfy his people; his army was "eager and ready for battle"; he could not tolerate further persecution of Germans.
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In the end I asked him two straight questions. Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles and was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter (though I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers). As regards the first, he said he could not give me an answer until after he had given reply of H. M. Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connexion he turned to Herr von Ribbentrop and said: "We must summon FieldMarshal Goring to discuss it with him" (B 75).
For the rest, all agreed that neither London nor Berlin was "bluffing." When Hitler asked about British willingness to accept an alliance with Germany, Henderson said "he did not exclude such a possibility." When the Chancellor suggested immediate colonial concessions as an evidence of good intentions, the Ambassador replied that "concessions were easier of realization in a good rather than a bad atmosphere" (B 75, 76). On the crucial point Hitler concluded, after reflection, that Downing Street not only had assurances that Warsaw would "negotiate," but was prepared to cooperate in imposing upon Poland at least the terms of A4arch. Chamberlain's address to Commons on August 29 (in which he incidentally rebuked the Hearst press for "inventing" and cabling an alleged text of the confidential British reply) did not create an opposite impression, since his emphasis in discussing German-Polish differences was, as always, on the formal and procedural aspects of the issues, not on the substance (cf. B 77). The evil incubus of Munich played a decisive role, for this had been Chamberlain's method then and it was presumably his method now. He had said then that German demands could be realized without war if only Hitler would abstain from force and "negotiate." He had kept his word. He asked Hitler now to "negotiate" and assured him that Poland was ready. T o Hitler this meant what it had meant in 1938. What did it mean to the British leaders? The answer is elusive. Henderson wrote later that Hitler in Poland "could certainly have attained his ends without loss of life, if he had been wilHng to be patient" (H l o i ) . Chamberlain and Halifax did not have in mind another Munich. Yet they knew that peace was possible only by Polish concessions. Something in between a too-obvious Polish capitulation and a gentlemen's compromise between equals would probably have satisfied them. By "negotiations" they doubtless meant
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steps in this direction. But Hitler meant a Munich/ From this discrepancy in unformulated definitions arose the divergency of views regarding the key sentence in the British reply. And from this seemingly small seed there blossomed viîthin three brief days such flowers of evil as no man dreamed of. Given these differences in basic assumptions, the question of whether the British assurance of PoUsh willingness to negotiate was "sincere" is almost academic. The Nazi thesis of British "war guilt," however, rests upon this point.^ Up to August 28, it is clear from the record of past events that Warsaw had extended
1 Henderson: "There had never been, in fact, for Hitler but the two solutions: the use of force or the achievement of his aims by the display of force. 'If you wish to obtain your objectives by force, you must be strong; if you wish to obtain them by negotiation, you must be stronger still.' That was a remark which he made to a foreign statesman who visited him that year, and it expresses in the most concise form possible the Hitler technique. . . . Possibly if Hitler had secured his objectives by this display of force, he might have been content for the moment, with all the additional prestige which another bloodless success would have procured for him with his own people. But it would only have been to start again once the world had recovered from the shock, and even his own people were beginning to be tired of these repeated crises. . . . Of the two alternatives the most attractive from the point of view of his growing personal ambitions and those of the clique which was nearest to him was war. So he chose war. It is scarcely credible that he or Ribbentrop would have acted as they did if bloody war, rather than a bloodless victory, had not seemed the fairer prospect for them" (H 295-6). 2 The official German reply to The British Blue Book asserted: "Halifax grossly duped the German Government when he declared that he had received an assurance from Warsaw that Poland was ready to negotiate. Kennard consciously delayed the execution of a mission which he received from London, to recommend that Poland enter into negotiations with the Reich, until the deadline, which necessarily had to be set by the Reich as a result of the Polish mobilization, had expired. Polish willingness to negotiate on the moderate German proposals was not evident, only because the Poles believed themselves able to rely on British assistance. The French Government, which manifestly was also interested in the dispatch of a Polish plenipotentiary or representative to Berlin in the last hour, was also deceived by England. In reality England did absolutely nothing toward bringing about these negotiations upon which war or peace were dependent. . . . These are the naked facts which are revealed in documents published by the English. They not only prove England's responsibility for the war; they also reveal much more, namely that the British Government carried on their infamous double-dealing during the decisive days at the end of August. . . . The British Blue Book proves conclusively that instead of promoting direct contacts between Berlin and Warsaw during the four decisive days of August 28 to 31, Britain through a series of malicious intrigues and mendacity devoted its entire diplomatic mechanism to the purpose of giving Poland time to complete her mobilization and to put off Germany with evasive subterfuges. Such is the role Halifax and his diplomatic aides played in the days preceding the outbreak of war" (pp. 518-9, 524, 525, G, Supplement A).
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genera] assurances to both London and Washington of its willingness to negotiate and had even yielded to Allied pressure with respect to neutral observers and a possible exchange of minorities. Beck had not yielded on the question of German annexation of Danzig or a corridor across Pomorze, and there is no proof that Halifax and Bonnet (or Kennard and Noel) pressed him on this substantive point. On the procedural point, he was willing to negotiate, provided that the initiative should come from some other quarter. From the German point of view, this was equivalent to a refusal to negotiate. From the British point of view, it was an expression of willingness to negotiate. There is no evidence, apart from Ribbentrop's subsequent allegations, that Downing Street deliberately "deceived" Berlin or Paris or Warsaw in order to "provoke" war. Downing Street's purpose was to keep the peace, though not this time at the price of sacrificing "vital interests." These were sharply defined to include British obligations to Poland and Polish independence, security, and freedom from armed attack or economic domination. They were not defined at any time to include the "independence" of Danzig as an end in itself nor the territorial integrity of Poland, unless the menace to "integrity" should also be deemed a menace to Polish independence and security. This would not be the case if Poland made small territorial concessions under conditions of free and equal negotiation, effectively guaranteed by other Powers. Downing Street was therefore prepared to urge such concessions upon Warsaw if the condition were met, and was thus ready to meet German desires as to substanceif German desires could be restricted to the scope indicated. Warsaw had not yet yielded to London as to substance, since London was waiting for Berlin to reformulate its substantive demands before formulating its own suggestions to Poland. Warsaw had yielded to British demands as to procedure, albeit reluctantly and with important qualifications. If Berlin would yield to London as to procedure. Downing Street was confident that substantive questions could be settlednot by German dictation in advance nor yet by an Anglo-German bar5jain, but by German-Polish discussions. In the request to Berlin -O "negotiate" and in the report to Berlin that Warsaw was willing to "negotiate," there was no "perfidy of Albion" but only an jnwillingness to accept what proved to be the Nazi definition of
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"negotiation." At the end of a crisis which had originated over questions of herring and margarine, a world was condemned to death because of a difference of views over a question of diplomatic etiquette. This cannot be regarded, however, as evidence that the fate of civiHzation depends upon trivialities. It was ratlier a sign that the schism of the West had become incurable and fatal. T o resume: early in the evening of August 29 Henderson was summoned to receive Hitler's reply, a copy of which had already been sent by plane to London. The Fiihrer was "far less reasonable" than yesterday and the interview was "stormy" (B 79, 80). The text of the reply rehashed old complaints and asserted that Germany could not tolerate further Polish persecution of Germans. The Nazi press that day had reported five more Germans killed. Hitler and Ribbentrop stated more definitely than before what they desired:
. . . T h e German Government note with satisfaction that the British i Government are also convinced on principle that some solution must be found for the state of affairs which has now developed. T h e y further consider they may assume that the British Government entertain no doubt 1 on the fact that this is a state of affairs which can no longer be remedied ! in a matter of days or even weeks but for which perhaps only a few hours yet remain. For in view of the disorganized state of Poland we must at any moment be prepared for the possibility of events occurring { which Germany could not tolerate. If the British Government still believe that these grave differences can be solved by direct negotiations, the German Government on their part regret at the outset that they are unable to share such an opinion. Theyj have already tried to open up a way for peaceful negotiations of thisi nature, without meeting with the support of the Polish Government, andl only seeing their efforts rejected by the abrupt initiation of measures of I a military character in accordance with the general development indicated above. . . . Despite their skeptical judgment of the prospects of such direct nego tiations, the German Government are nevertheless prepared to accept tht English proposal, and to enter into direct discussions. T h e y do so solely, becauseas already emphasizedthe written communication received froii the British Government gives them the impression that the latter alsr desire a friendly agreement along the lines indicated to Ambassado> Henderson. T h e German Government desire in this way to give to th( British Government and to the British people a proof of the sincerity o
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the German intention of arriving at a state of permanent friendship with Great Britain. T h e German Government nevertheless feel bound to point out to the British Government that in the case of a reorganization of the territorial conditions in Poland, the German Government are no longer in a position to take upon themselves any guarantees, or to participate in any guarantees, without the co-operation of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the German Government never had the intention, in their proposals, of attacking vital Polish interests or of questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. Under these conditions, the German Government therefore agree to accept the proposed intermediation of the British Government to send to Berlin a Polish representative invested with plenipotentiary powers. T h e y expect his arrival on Wednesday, August 30, 1939. T h e German Government will immediately draft the proposals for a solution acceptable to them, and, if possible, will make such proposals available for the British Government also before the Polish negotiator arrives ( G 464, F 299, B 78).
As he read through the note, Henderson made no comment until he reached the passage calling for the arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary on the following day. This, he said, sounded like an ultimatum ("hatte den Klang eines ultimatums'''). Hitler and Ribbentrop heatedly denied this and declared that the request only emphasized the urgency of the moment with two mobilized armies facing each other and Germans being "massacred" daily in Poland. Henderson retorted hotly to Hitler's assertion that he "did not care how many Germans were being slaughtered." He asked whether a Polish plenipotentiary, if he came, would be well received and whether the negotiations would be conducted on a basis of full equality. Hitler replied, "Of course" (B 79; H 278-9; cf. F 291, 293). Henderson nevertheless departed in deep gloom, noting with foreboding that the anteroom of the Chancellery was full of officers, Keitel and Brauchitsch among them. He observed to Meissner as he went out that he feared he should never wear a red carnation again in Germany. From this point forward the issue for Hitler and Ribbentrop, despite their denial that their demand was an "ultimatum," was whether Britain could produce a Polish plenipotentiary by the close of Wednesday. The issue for Downing Street was whether the Fiihrer would stay his sword while all sides sought to arrange
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negotiations. The central fact of the next few days was that the British leaders, so far as their acts are revealed in the published records, did not make strenuous efforts to produce a Polish plenipotentiary in Berlin. That they did not is no proof of bad faith, as Ribbentrop later alleged. They were prepared to do what they could to initiate direct German-Polish discussions in an atmosphere of mutual restraint and concessions. They were not prepared to compel Warsaw to capitulate in advance to terms which were not to be defined until the arrival of a plenipotentiary. Neither were they prepared to insist that Poland must send to Berlin by a specified hour an envoy who would have no option but to accept German terms in the name of his Government or to expose his country to immediate invasion. Henderson himself seems to have been willing enough to press Warsaw to send a plenipotentiary at once. He asked Lipski to call on him on the evening of August 29, while he drafted his report to London of the interview he had just had with the Nazi leaders. He told the Polish Ambassador of the German reply and impressed upon him "the need for immediate action" (H 281). He warned Lipski that Poland could not resist the Reich if it came to war, and "implored him, in Poland's own interest, to urge his Government to nominate without delay someone to represent them in the proposed negotiations at Berlin. But," he adds significantly, "I was equally under no illusion as to what this meant, and I telegraphed at the same time to Lord Halifax to the effect that Hitler had made up his mind to achieve his ends, by a parade of strength, if that sufficed, but by the use of force, if it did not" (H 281). Henderson was thus prepared to urge Polish capitulation on the procedural question, knowing that this would mean substantive surrender as well. Halifax dissented. At 2 a.m. August 30 he wired: "We shall give careful consideration to German Government's reply, but it is, of course, unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and Germ.an Government must not expect this. It might be well for you at once to let this be known in proper quarters through appropriate channels. W e hope you may receive our reply this afternoon" (B 81). Henderson conveyed this view to Wilhelmstrasse at 4 a.m. Telegrams came in from Downing Street all day. One transmitted a personal message from Chamberlain to Hitler, notifying
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the Fiihrer of British steps at Warsaw to avoid frontier incidents and begging Berlin to take comparable precautions. Another notified Wilhelmstrasse of British "counsels of restraint" to the Poles and solicited reciprocity (H 282; cf. B 83, 87). Henderson wired Halifax in the course of the morning:
Your message was conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 4 A.M. this morning. I had made similar observation to H e r r Hitler yesterday evening, his reply being that one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in one and a half hoars. I repeated the message this morning by telephone to State Secretary, who said that it had already been conveyed to Herr Hitler. H e added that something must be done as soon as possible. While I still recommend that the Polish Government should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifice for preservation of peace, one can only conclude from the German reply that H e r r Hitler is determined to achieve his ends by socalled peaceful fair means if he can, but by force if he cannot. Much, of course, may also depend on detailed plan referred to in the last paragraph of the German reply. Nevertheless, if Herr Hitler is allowed to continue to have the initiative, it seems to me that result can only be either war or once again victory for him by a display of force and encouragement thereby to pursue the same course again next year or the year after (B 82).
Henderson did not make clear which of these equally distasteful alternatives he preferred. The new formula of the repentant Munichmen had brought them to a desperate pass in the absence of a Great Coalition which could deter Hitler from recourse to violence. Moscow was now losta fact which Henderson faced with almost idiotic complacency and even satisfaction. He found himself trying to convince his superiors that they should try to compel Poland to "negotiate," all the while knowing that negotiation meant a shameful and dangerous surrender for which he had no heart. Hitler's great mistake, he felt, was his "complete failure to understand the inherent British sense of morality, humanity, and freedom" (H 280). Halifax would not coerce Warsaw into yielding. On the 28th he had asked Kennard to tell Beck, urgently and at once, that London "ardently hoped that the Polish Government would be willing to authorize it to inform the German Government that Poland was ready to enter immediately into a direct discussion
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with Germany" (P 95). Beck agreed and so informed Raczynski and Lukasiewicz, requesting more precise information, however, as to what London meant by an "international guarantee" (P 96; of. F 280). Warsaw was busy denying German atrocity stories and protesting to Slovakia over the statement by the Bratislava radio, following German military occupation of Tiso's "independent" State, that Slovakia was threatened by Poland (P 94, 97; cf. F 274, 276). But Beck was now willing to open direct negotiations, provided there was no ultimatum or brow-beating. More than this Halifax did not ask. Coulondre phoned Bonnet at 6.15 p.m. that Lipski had been authorized "to make indirect overtures with a view to settling the question of minorities by exchanges of population. The Polish Ambassador intends to act on these instructions when an opportunity arises" (F 278). But Beck's attitude toward Anglo-French advice to open discussion with Berlin was somewhat similar to that of Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister of 1914. He would negotiate only if no humiliation was likely and no concessions were asked for. Aieanwhile he would prepare for war. On August 29 at 4 p.m. Count Szembek summoned Kennard and Noel to inform them that German preparations had necessitated a Polish order for general mobilization. Anticipating objections, he declared that the order was irrevocable. Kennard complained that this action would give the world the impression that Poland was embarking upon war. It would be "extremely desirable" that Warsaw should await the German reply to the British note before announcing mobilization publicly. Noel agreed, but added that he had no objection to the mobilization as such. Szembek read them an official communique which was about to be published. They asked him to inform Beck at once of their attitude. Beck accordingly delayed the public announcement for several hours (P 98). The communique of August 30 avoided the use of the term "mobilization," but referred to "defensive military measures" necessitated by German threats and troop movements in Slovakia (P 99). At 5.30 p.m. August 30 the German Charge phoned Berlin that notices ordering general mobilization had been posted throughout Poland "since an hour ago," with August 31 decreed as the first day of mobilization (G 465). There is no evidence that Halifax or Bonnet took any initiative to prevent or postpone the Polish mobiUzation. There is no record
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that Kennard and Noel informed their Governments on August 29 of the imminence of Polish mobilization or advised them on the 30th of the situation in Warsaw. Like Paleologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg in 1914, they may have preferred silence lest the Government to which they were accredited appear to their own Governments to be taking an aggressive step and lest Paris and London bring pressure against this, thereby possibly weakening common resistance to Berlin. Mobilization in 1939, however, did not have the significance attached to it in 1914. The Russian mobilization then was understood by all to be the signal for a military attack on Germany. The Polish mobilization, begun August 31, 1939, and never completed, was a desperate and futile measure to meet an impending German attack upon Poland. Halifax apparently advised Kennard early in the morning of August 30 of the German reply of the 29th and solicited his opinion. The Ambassador replied in a wire which reached the Foreign Office at 10 a.m.:
I feel sure that it would be impossible to induce the Polish Government to send M. Beck or any other representative immediately to Berlin to discuss a settlement on basis proposed by Herr Hitler. T h e y would certainly sooner fight and perish rather than submit to such humiliation, especially after examples of Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania, and Austria. I would suggest that if negotiations are to be between equals it is essential that they should take place in some neutral country or even possibly Italy, and that the basis for any negotiations should be some compromise between the clearly defined limits of March proposals on the German side and status quo on the Polish side. Considering that the Polish Government, standing alone and when they were largely unprepared for war, refused the March terms it would surely be impossible for them to agree to proposals which appear to go beyond the March terms now that they have Great Britain as their ally, France has confirmed her support and world public opinion is clearly in favor of direct negotiations on equal terms and is behind Poland's resistance to a dictated settlement. I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government, nor am I communicating to them H e r r Hitler's reply tUI I receive instructions which I trust will be without delay (B 84).
If Kennard received any further instructions on this point, they are not as yet published.'^ At 5.30 p.m. Halifax wired him to
1 G. Supplement A, pp. 522-4, suggests that: "It is possible that he was in possession of secret instructions, obviously not mentioned in the Blue Book. It
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urge Polish authorities to "abstain from personal violence to members of the German minority and prevent similar violence on the part of the populace"; allow German fugitives to leave Poland freely; and stop inflammatory radio propaganda (B 85). Kennard replied that Beck had assured him that the Polish Government have "no intention of provoking any incidents," despite intolerable German provocation at Danzig, and were confident that London "will not express any definite views on problems concerning Poland without consulting Pohsh Government" (B 86, P 105). At 6.50 p.m. Halifax wired Henderson:
W e understand that German Government are insisting that a Polish representative with full powers must come to Berlin to receive German proposals. W e cannot advise Polish Government to comply with this procedure, which is wholly unreasonable. Could you not suggest to German Government that they adopt the normal procedure, when their proposals are ready, of inviting Polish Ambassador to call and handing proposals to him for transmission to Warsaw and inviting suggestions as to conduct of negotiations. German Government have been good enough to promise they will communicate proposals also to H . M. Government. If latter think they offer reasonable basis they can be counted on to do their best in Warsaw to facilitate negotiations.
Halifax thus insisted that Hitler must withdraw his demand for immediate delivery of a Polish plenipotentiary and permit London to judge of the reasonableness of the German terms before putting further pressure on Warsaw. If Henderson thought this line a mistaken one, he did not say so. He arranged to see Ribbenis inconceivable that an Ambassador in such a situation would refuse to carry out the instructions of his Government. . . . Either Kennard's refusal to transmit his Government's instructions to Poland was a ilagrant insubordination or it was collusion. . . . The strange attitude of Kennard unquestionably suggests collusion with the Foreign Office. If Halifax actually had played the role of honest broker, one would assume that he would have instructed his Ambassador in Warsaw, after learning from the latter's telegram of August 28 that he had not as yet delivered the note to the Polish Government, to undertake forthwith everything in his power to compel Poland to enter negotiations. Throughout all of August 30, no instructions to this effect went forward to Kennard. . . . The British Government, therefore, not only lied in its note of August 28, but it waited until the morning of August 31 before informing the Polish Government of the state of things in Berlin and of Germany's readiness to enter into negotiations." The probability is that Halifax knew that Warsaw would not yield to any compulsion and that he had no desire to attempt it. Here again, contrary to the Nazi thesis, this attitude does not demonstrate any British desire for war, but only affords fresh evidence of the incompatibility of the German and British concepuons of "negotiation."
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trop at 11.30 p.m. August 30 to transmit these communications. French diplomacy meanwhile closely adhered to the British line. Corbin, reporting from London on the Henderson-Hitler interview of the 29th, asserted that the Chancellor wanted Silesia as well as Danzig and the Corridor, that he would never return to his March proposals, and that he would negotiate only if assured in advance that Poland would accept all his demands. Chamberlain had commented that "it was ordy Herr Hitler who could imagine that Great Britain, in order to be reconciled with Germany, would let herself be lured into a general conference without regard for the country to which she had given her guarantee" (F 293). Bonnet told Noel that Hitler "for the first time accepts the principle of a direct conversation. . . . It would be difficult to meet it with a flat refusal" (F 294). He suggested troop withdrawals to avoid incidents. Coulondre agreed with Henderson that Warsaw should appoint a plenipotentiary, but if Beck came to Berhn Hitler would humiHate him and increase his demands. If Ribbentrop and Beck were to meet, it should be in some town near the frontier. If the negotiations were to take place in Berlin, the Polish envoy ought to be Ambassador Lipski. "This solution would have the advantage that the Polish Government would not appear to be yielding to a time limit which has every appearance of an ultimatum" (F 296; cf. F 300). Noel was certain that Hitler was counting on a Soviet refusal to join any "guarantee" in order that he could evade his obligations later, as in the case of Czecho-SIovakia. He was equally certain that Poland would never accept terms amounting to enslavement (F 297). On Bonnet's instructions, he supported the steps taken by Kennard. Shortly before he was to see Ribbentrop on August 30, Henderson received from London in code the British reply to Hitler's latest communication. He therefore asked for a half-hour postponement to permit deciphering of the message. Ribbentrop suspected that Henderson had asked for the postponement with malice aforethought in order to arrive after midnight when the "ultimatum" expired. The reply which the Ambassador brought added httle new to the British position and was regarded as irrelevant by Ribbentrop. It declared that Britain "could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain an improvement" in Anglo-German relations. German and Polish "vital interests"
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were not "incompatible." Cognizance was taken of German willingness "to enter into direct discussion" with Poland and to accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made the subject of an international guarantee." Who would participate must be discussed further, but "H.M. Government hoped that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the guarantee H.M. Government have always assumed." (This formula was designed to avert Soviet defection and reflected anxiety lest Berlin seek to utilize such defection as a basis for claiming later that the guarantee was inapplicable.) As for particular demands on Warsaw, London felt that "these proposals will be fully examined during the discussions. It can then be determined how far they are compatible with the essential conditions which H.M. Government have stated and which in principle the German Government have expressed their willingness to accept." The note continued:
H. M. Government are at once informing the Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The method of contact and arrangements for discussions must obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German and Polish Governments, but in H. M. Government's view it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as today. H. M. Government fully recognize the need for speed in the initiation of discussion, and they share the apprehension of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two mobilized armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should undertake that during the negotiations no aggressive military movements will take place. H. M. Government feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking from the Polish Government if the German Government would give similar assurances. Further, H. M. Government would suggest that a temporary modus vivendi might be arranged for Danzig, which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to render GermanPolish relations more difficult (B 89, G 466).
The midnight interview of August 30 in Wilhelmstrasse would have degenerated into an open brawl save that the Ambassador was an English gentleman and the Foreign Minister had long aspired to be an English gentleman. On this occasion Ribbentrop sought to impress his English visitor by a display of fury, "aping Herr Hitler at his worst," Henderson reported (B 92). The Ambassador urged that complete restraint in German-Polish relations was possible only if the German minority refrained from
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provocations. Germans were reported to be committing acts of sabotage. Ribbentrop denounced Polish outrages and said he could not even consent to discuss the matter. When Henderson said that London had constantly given moderating advice at Warsaw, the Foreign Minister replied that it had had "cursed" little effect. Henderson expressed surprise at hearing such language from a Foreign Minister (B 91). He said that London could not advise Warsaw to dispatch a plenipotentiary at once to Berlin and felt that the Reich should transmit its proposals to Lipski. If London were given a copy and concluded that the proposals were reasonable, it would use its influence in Warsaw to achieve a settlement. Henderson asked if the proposals were ready and could be given to him. Ribbentrop's reply was that British intervention had produced only one tangible result: Polish mobilization. Henderson retorted that Hitler had told him the day before that Germany had already mobilized. Germany, continued Ribbentrop, had counted on the arrival of a Polish envoy by midnight. Since none had arrived, there was no longer any question of proposals. But in order to show what Germany had intended to propose, Ribbentrop read out in German at top speed a long documentor, as Henderson put it, "rather gabbled through to me as fast as he could in a tone of the utmost scorn and annoyance" ( H 284). These were the " 16 points" of which Henderson was able to follow only the general drift. When he asked to see the document the Foreign Minister, "who always mistook rudeness for strength," flatly refused, threw it on the table and said it was "iiberholt" (outdated). Then, asked Henderson, the German note of the preceding evening was, after all, an ultimatum? Ribbentrop emphatically denied this. If not, Henderson went on, why did he not hand over the proposals and also transmit them to Lipski for communication to Warsaw? Ribbentrop retorted! angrily that for him to invite the Polish Ambassador to come to see him would be "utterly unthinkable and intolerable." If Lipski asked him for an interview, it might be different. But it was for Hitler to decide. "I returned to H. M. Embassy that night," wrote Henderson, "convinced that the last hope for peace had vanished." He nevertheless saw Lipski at 2 a.m. and told him of Ribbentrop's proposals which he understood included cession of Danzig and a plebiscite in the Corridor, and "were not on the
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whole too unreasonable." In view of Ribbentrop's mood he suggested that Lipski recommend to Beck that Warsaw propose a meeting between Smigly-Rydz and Goring. Lipski assented. Not trusting telegraphic communication, he sent Charge Prince Lubomirski by motor car and plane to Warsaw (P 147). Both Henderson and Lipski realized, if Halifax and Beck did not, that it was no longer the eleventh hour, but long past midnight. (Cf. G
466; B 91, 92; H 283-7.) E. THE F I N A L E : AUGUST 3 I
Many mysteries regarding motives becloud this curious talk between the former wine-vendor and the diplomat of Rauceby Hall during the small hours dividing the last Wednesday from the last Thursday of peace. The "16 points" which Ribbentrop refused to transmit in writing either to Henderson or to Lipski were wholly alien to the spirit of Nazi diplomacy. They were in all respects moderate and reasonable by any standard of judgment. "Danzig shall be forthwith returned to the Reich." The Corridor between the Baltic, Marienwerder, Kulm, Bromberg and Schonlanke, with the exception of Gdynia which was recognized as Polish territory, should decide whether to join Germany or remain Polish through a plebiscite participated in by all persons, German and Poles alike, domiciled in the territory on January i, 1918, or born in the territory on or before that day. The plebiscite should not take place until twelve months had elapsed. Polish authorities should meanwhile evacuate the Corridor in favor of an Anglo-French-Soviet-Italian Commission with sovereign rights. An absolute majority of the votes cast would decide title. If Poland won, Germany should be granted an extraterritorial traffic zone one kilometer wide. If Germany won, Poland should be granted a similar zone to Gdynia. The Reich was prepared to negotiate an exchange of populations in the event of a German electoral victory. Polish rights in Danzig would be respected in return for a grant of similar German rights in Gdynia. Both ports would be demilitarized, as well as Hela Peninsula. All complaints about treatment of minorities would be investigated, with reciprocal indemnification for all damage suffered since 1918. Berlin and Warsaw would exempt members of their respective German or Polish minorities from military service and conclude new agreements to safeguard their
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whole too unreasonable." In view of Ribbentrop's mood he suggested that Lipski recommend to Beck that Warsaw propose a meeting between Smigly-Rydz and Goring. Lipski assented. Not trusting telegraphic communication, he sent Charge Prince Lubomirski by motor car and plane to Warsaw (P 147). Both Henderson and Lipski realized, if Halifax and Beck did not, that it was no longer the eleventh hour, but long past midnight. (Cf. G
466; B 91, 92; H 283-7.) E. THE F I N A L E : AUGUST 3 I
Many mysteries regarding motives becloud this curious talk between the former wine-vendor and the diplomat of Rauceby Hall during the small hours dividing the last Wednesday from the last Thursday of peace. The "16 points" which Ribbentrop refused to transmit in writing either to Henderson or to Lipski were wholly alien to the spirit of Nazi diplomacy. They were in all respects moderate and reasonable by any standard of judgment. "Danzig shall be forthwith returned to the Reich." The Corridor between the Baltic, Marienwerder, Kulm, Bromberg and Schonlanke, with the exception of Gdynia which was recognized as Polish territory, should decide whether to join Germany or remain Polish through a plebiscite participated in by all persons, German and Poles alike, domiciled in the territory on January i, 1918, or born in the territory on or before that day. The plebiscite should not take place until twelve months had elapsed. Polish authorities should meanwhile evacuate the Corridor in favor of an Anglo-French-Soviet-Italian Commission with sovereign rights. An absolute majority of the votes cast would decide title. If Poland won, Germany should be granted an extraterritorial traffic zone one kilometer wide. If Germany won, Poland should be granted a similar zone to Gdynia. The Reich was prepared to negotiate an exchange of populations in the event of a German electoral victory. Polish rights in Danzig would be respected in return for a grant of similar German rights in Gdynia. Both ports would be demilitarized, as well as Hela Peninsula. All complaints about treatment of minorities would be investigated, with reciprocal indemnification for all damage suffered since 1918. Berlin and Warsaw would exempt members of their respective German or Polish minorities from military service and conclude new agreements to safeguard their
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rights. Should the plan be accepted, Germany and Poland would at once demobilize and agree upon measures to carry it out (G466). Whether Polish opinion could have been prevailed upon to accept these terms will never be known. Poland was not a democracy. Beck, Moscicki and Smigly-Rydz could doubtless have imposed such a settlement had they desired to. It is probable that all three leaders would have agreed to these terms if time had been allowed for reflection and for a restoration of some sense of security. That Henderson, Halifax and Chamberlain, along with Coulondre, Bonnet, and Daladier, would have accepted the terms and induced Warsaw to accept them is scarcely open to doubt. Neither Britain nor France was committed to maintaining the now fictitious independence of Danzig and the sovereignty of Poland over the Corridor. Far from constituting a new Munich, the terms implied no threat to Polish independence or security. If guaranteed effectively by the Powers (and Soviet participation would have made such a guarantee far more viable than the empty Anglo-French guarantee to Prague), and if followed by moderation on both sides, the terms might well have become the basis of a German-PoHsh "good neighbor" policy. W h y did Hitler, with his armored divisions and bombing squadrons already poised to annihilate the Polish State, consider such a phenomenal moderation of his own demands? Why, if he had come to regard this as a possible basis for a settlement, did he and Ribbentrop withhold the document from both London and Warsaw until it was "too late"? Henderson found it difKcult "not to draw the conclusion that the proposals in themselves were but dust to be thrown in the eyes of the world with a view to its deception and were never intended to be taken seriously by the German Government itself" (H 284). "Did Ribbentrop and his master not wish them to be communicated to the Polish Government lest the latter might in fact agree to negotiate? It is the only conclusion which one can draw from this episode" (H 286). Had these terms been made known on August 30, it is certain that Paris and London would have pressed Warsaw to consider them and it is possible that Beck would have empowered Lipsld or some other agent to accept them. On the hypothesis that Hitler had already decided to conquer Poland by arms, such acceptance would have been embarrassing in the extreme to the Reich authori-
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ties, for new objectives and a new pretext would have to be devised. Even the duped subjects of the Fiihrer would have found it difficult to understand why they should fight Poland, France, and Britain to achieve demands widely publicized since April and now accepted by Warsaw before the fighting began. Had Warsaw accepted the terms as late as August 31, when they were generally known about although still not officially transmitted, the Nazi leaders would have been equally embarrassed. They could, to be sure, have called off the war and represented Polish comphance as another bloodless victory of magnificent proportions. They could have exploited that victory, both within the Reich and throughout the world, as they had exploited Munich. They could have raised their price in the subsequent negotiations as Hitler had done at Godesberg. Once Warsaw had begun to yield, once London and Paris had moved to press Warsaw to accept, the whole Allied "peace front," feeble as it was, would have cracked. In fact Hitler chose to escape all embarrassment and to avail himself of none of these opportunities by concealing the terms until midnight of August 30 and then declaring that the time for acceptance was past. They were published on the eve of war as evidence of German "moderation." Their "rejection" by Warsaw was presented as proof of Polish wickedness which made war unavoidable. Henderson's conclusions seem sound. It is probable, however, that the calculations of the Fiihrer were at once less Machiavellian and more complex. Nothing is known as yet of the probably divergent views of Hitler's aides as to how the Reich should engineer the final showdown with Poland. In 1936 and 1938 Hitler had overruled his army leaders who advised caution. In 1939 it seems likely that Keitel and Brauchitsch advised war, since they were confident, once the Soviet pact was signed, that their forces could speedily crush Poland and ultimately defeat France and Britain. They had apparently urged invasion on August 25 and, for strategic and meteorological reasons, begrudged the Fiihrer every day lost thereafter. But the Reichswehr was Hitler's servant, not his master. He had overruled it before and could do so again if he concluded that greater advantages or fewer risks were to be met with by so doing. Some of his advisers, probably including Weizsacker and Goring, doubtless urged such a course, not out of any
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passion for reasonable compromise but out of a conviction that abstention from force, coupled with plausible terms (which could later be enlarged), would meet with British approval and eventuate in a diplomatic triumph, followed by a rapid Allied demoralization and collapse. Hitler sought an Anglo-German entente with apparent sincerity. Yet the only purpose of such an entente would be to free the Reich once more to move against Russia. Hitler had already renounced this orientation and made his entente with Moscow. German decisions suggest a confusion of counsels in high Nazi circles, finally resolved by a strange compromise. Preparations for a new Munich required that the terms of settlement be phrased in language calculated to win Chamberlain and Daladier; that they be published or at least communicated to London and Paris fairly early in the crisis to allow time for the appeasers to convert or terrorize their parliaments and publics; that military preparations be as open as possible to obtain maximum psychological effect; and that a date be finally set on which German troops would march in the event of non-acceptance. All of this had been done in 1938 with brilliant success. It might well have worked again in view of the revival of Chamberlain's hopes for appeasement and the failure of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. But the plans of the Reichswehr and the "wild men" for conquering and partitioning Poland and facing war with Britain and France required a wholly different diplomatic strategy. Negotiations in this case could have no purpose save to befuddle the enemy in advance and render the attack plausible, within the Reich and among the neutrals, by presenting it as a result of the rejection of justified German demands. Here the proper course would be to frame demands belatedly and in a form calculated to insure rejection, as in the case of the Hapsburg ultimatum to Serbia in 1914; to mobilize as secretly as possible; to issue a diplomatic ultimatum but not a threat to order troops into action; and to strike unexpectedly after the ultimatum had been formally submitted and rejected. Hitler oscillated between these two conceptions. The course adopted combined the two strategies in an illogical and incongruous fashion. The terms of settlement were made studiously moderate, but were not published in time to allow any serious consideration of them. They were never officially submitted to
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anyone until after they were public knowledge and no longer a diplomatic proposal. London, Paris, and Warsaw were given no date on which troops would march, but military preparations were sufficiently publicized to beget fear. A diplomatic ultimatum was issued, but with no terms included apart from the demand for a plenipotentiary and with emphatic denials that it was an "ultimatum." The blow was struck after the alleged rejection of proposals which had never been transmitted. Who worked at cross purposes with whom in Wilhelmstrasse it is impossible to say, but the result, far from being the masterpiece of consistent maneuvering toward a predetermined objective exhibited in the prelude to Munich, was a mere muddle. It may be surmised that Hitler did not wholly give up his initial plans for another Munich and decide upon mihtary conquest before August 30. By then he was scarcely free any longer to choose between the two alternatives, since he knew that the Western Munichmen would require several weeks to "put over" a new Munich and he also knev/ that the Reichswehr, if it was to crush Poland swiftly, must act at once in order to allow several weeks for the campaign before the autumn rains should cover the Polish roads and fields with mud. Hitler's earlier boasting on August 25, his day of hesitation, that he was a man of "great decisions" suggest the difficulties he was experiencing in overcoming his indecisions. When he decided upon conquest, it was too lategiven the vacillations of the preceding ten daysto set the diplomatic stage appropriately for this course. The "16 points" had been drawn up to pave the road toward Munich and had then been withheld because they were ill-calculated to pave the way for conquest. The demand for a Polish plenipotentiary was at first a procedural suggestion, again on the Munich road, and then became, almost in retrospect, an "ultimatum," albeit lacking all substantive content, to justify unsheathing the sword. This ambivalence persisted through Thursday, August 31. Since the Fiihrer's decision for conquest was evidently reached on Wednesday, with the generals regarding every day as precious, the order to attack would perhaps have been given shortly after midnight of August 30-31, save that Hitler's Munichmen and his warriors were still at loggerheads. Despite his decision, he himself was still wavering. Henderson attributed the further delay to Itahan efforts to restrain
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Berlin. Ribbentrop's conduct at the midnight meeting suggests great inner anxiety, possibly due to stormy controversies earUer in the day with Weizsacker, Goring and others who favored a course different from the one Ribbentrop had induced Hitler to take. In the course of Thursday these doubts and quarrels were resolved and the trumpets of war were blown. The diplomatic score had been a jumble because the maestro did not know until it was more than half over which piece he wanted the orchestra to play. But regrets were now put aside for the work in hand. Hitler's fumbling relieved the AlUes of a final dilemma. Had he overruled the Reichswehr and chosen the Munich road, with the "16 points" as his itinerary, Chamberlain and Daladier would have faced a choice even more painful than the one they actually confronted. They could not, if they would, urge Warsaw to reject such moderate proposals, for by so doing they would have repudiated their own formula of peaceful negotiation and discredited themselves utterly. If they urged Warsaw to accept them and Warsaw nevertheless rejected them, they would be in a position of calling upon their countrymen to risk their lives in defense of an ally as obviously lacking in political wisdom as in loyalty to its guarantors. If Warsaw accepted them, however, a fearful spectre would arise: Beck and Smigly-Rydz, caught between Hitler and Stalin, might well cast their lot with the Axis to save what they could from the wreckage and thus leave Hitler wholly free to attack the West, as Moscow was already doing. This was now far more probable than a reversion to the old program of a German-Polish entente against the U.S.S.R. For the West it would have seemed a far worse catastrophe than immediate war. It was doubtless because of these considerations that London and Paris on the last Thursday did little in the way of urging upon Warsaw either acceptance or rejection of the "16 points." They were not "rejected," as Berlin alleged. Neither were they accepted, for Hitler's war allowed no time to consider them and therefore obviated the need of "yes" or "no." For this at least the Western statesmen must have felt silent gratitude. For them it was better that Poland be destroyed with a common German-Soviet frontier resulting (andwho could tell?perhaps a German-Soviet quarrel over the spoils) than that Poland be obliged on their advice to reject a settlement which everybody would regard as reasonable or to accept a settlement which might
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leave the Western Powers completely isolated. Early Thursday morning Henderson got "from another source in touch with Goring" more details of the "i6 points" which he transmitted to Lipski. According to Coulondre, Henderson had gotten word from a reliable source that unless Warsaw sent a plenipotentiary by noon, the order would be given to attack (F 315). Coulondre and Henderson urged Lipski to establish contact with Ribbentrop. The French Ambassador phoned Bonnet that "this news should not induce us to depart from the dignified composure with which the exchange of views must be conducted. But it seems to me that it would certainly be to the interests of the Polish Government to inform Berlin without delay that it accepts the direct negotiations which, moreover, have been suggested by the French and British Governments, and that, while reserving judgment on the German note, it is preparing to send to M. Lipski the necessary instructions to meet the Germans in the capacity of plenipotentiary" (F 315). The Polish Ambassador was in phone communication with Beck until the Reichswehr severed all connections in the evening. Lipski's emissary, Lubomirski, reached Warsaw before noon (P 147), but what he did there is unclear. At noon Beck told Kennard, in response to a query ordered by Halifax (B 94), that his Government was still prepared for direct negotiations on the basis of the principles set forth earlier by Halifax and was ready to guarantee that Polish troops would not violate the frontier if Germany would give a similar guarantee. A modus vivendi in Danzig should be established. But since he had obtained no enlightenment as to British intentions with respect to the "international guarantee" he was obliged to "reserve his point of view on this question" (Pio8,B97). Lipski reported that Coulondre and Henderson felt that Warsaw should inform Berlin that the Polish Embassy was available for discussion (P 109). HaUfax instructed Kennard to urge the same suggestion on Beck (B 95). At 12.40 p.m. Beck told Lipski to inform Ribbentrop that Warsaw was examining "in a favorable spirit" the British suggestion and would give a formal response within a few hours (P n o ; cf. B 102). At i p.m. Lipski asked for an audience. At 3 p.m. Weizsacker phoned to ask him if he wanted to see Ribbentrop in the capacity of a plenipotentiary or in some other capacity. He replied that he sought an audience
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as Ambassador to present a communication from his Government (P i n ) . Beck had authorized him to say that Warsaw had accepted the British proposals, but had forbidden him to accept any German document if it should be presented, since in view of past experience it "might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum." Beck had told Kennard that if invited to Berlin "he would of course not go, as he had no intention of being treated like President Hacha" (B 96; cf. F 320). At 6.30 p.m. Lipski was received by Ribbentrop who asked him at once if he had special full powers to negotiate. "I repHed no. He then asked me if I was informed that in response to suggestions from London the Reich Government had given its consent to negotiate directly with the Polish delegate, supplied with the necessary full powers, who was awaited yesterday. I replied that I had received only indirect news on this subject. In conclusion M. Ribbentrop said that he had supposed that I was supplied with the necessary full powers. He would make my demarche known to the Chancellor" (P 112). Lipski neither asked for the German proposals nor did Ribbentrop offer them. The Polish Ambassador merely followed his instructions to transmit Beck's message that Warsaw was "weighing favorably" the British suggestions and would give its formal answer within two hours (Bi02;cf.Pi47). Beck, however, had apparently told Kennard in the afternoon that he would authorize Lipski to inform Berlin "that Poland had accepted the British proposals for negotiations" (B 104). It is unclear whether Beck acted in bad faith here or came to the conclusion indicated after the original instructions had been sent to the Ambassador.^ In the latter case he presumably intended to send Lipski new instructions that evening. But when Lipski tried to phone Warsaw after his brief interview with Ribbentrop, he found the wires cut. There was never any official Polish reply to the "16 points," since they were never officially transmitted. Lipski first saw them in full in the extra editions of the Berlin
1 Raymond Leslie Buell comments (Poland: Key to Europe, 3rd edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1939, p. 384): "Certainly Foreign Minister Beck made a serious error when he failed to instruct the Polish Ambassador to receive these proposals [the "16 points"] in his interview on August 31. If these proposals were not officially communicated to the Polish Government by Berlin, it was Poland's fault. Beck's tergiversation can be justified if at all only by the Polish fear that at the last minute Poland would be the subject of a new IVIunich."
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papers Thursday evening (P 147; cf. P 141). The Warsawbroadcasting station summarized the proposals at 11 p.m. and announced that their pubhcation two hours earher in Berlin "proves the undisguised aggressive intentions of Germany towards Poland. . . . Words can now no longer veil the aggressive plans of the new Huns. Germany is aiming at the domination of Europe and is cancelling the rights of nations with as yet unprecedented cynicism" (G 469). On September 2 a Polish communique asserted that the "16 points" were "only a cynical pretext for aggression against Poland. . . . The hand stretched out by Poland was left empty" (P 136). Henderson saw Goring, at the latter's invitation, at 5 p.m. and told him that if, as he had heard, the "16 points" were to be broadcast that evening the last chance of peace would be wrecked. Goring said he could not intervene. The broadcast was necessary to prove German "good faith." The Marshal talked for two hours about Polish wickedness and the advantages of Anglo-German friendship. Henderson feared that if Goring, who had just been named head of the new War Cabinet, had nothing better to do with his time, this must mean that everything was ready for action (H 290). On his return the Ambassador received a call from Weizsacker, from whom he had vainly sought earlier in the day to secure the text of the "16 points." The State Secretary invited him to Wilhelmstrasse at 9.15 where he gave him the text along with an official communique, declaring that the Fiihrer had "now waited for two days in vain for the arrival of an authorized Polish delegate." The German Government "cannot but regard their proposals as having been once more virtually rejected" (G 468). Since both documents had been broadcast at 9 and Weizsacker said he could make no explanatory statement, Henderson concluded that all further efforts to initiate negotiations would be useless. Kennard agreed on the next day, and with more reason. Halifax had wired him at 12.50 a.m. September i, that he was glad that Lipski was establishing contact at Berlin and agreed that Beck should not go to the German capital. But he "did not see why the Polish Government should feel difficulty about authorizing Polish Ambassador to accept a document from the German Government, and I earnestly hope that they may be able to modify their instructions to him in this respect. There was no mention of
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any ultimatum in the report on the German proposals which has been furnished to us, and the suggestion that the demands for the presence of a Polish plenipotentiary at Berlin on 30th August amounted to an ultimatum was vigorously repudiated by Herr von Ribbentrop in conversation with H.M. Ambassador. If the document did contain an ultimatum, the Polish Government would naturally refuse to discuss it until the ultimatum was withdrawn. On the other hand, a refusal by them to receive proposals would be gravely misunderstood by outside opinion" (B 100). He suggested that Lipski be instructed to receive the proposals. Kennard replied Friday evening (B 101) that it would be "clearly useless for me to take the action suggested." Poland had been invaded at dawn. The Supreme Soviet had ratified the NaziCommunist pact on Thursday. The buttons had been pressed in Berlin shortly after Lipsld's last interview with Ribbentrop. Early the next morning Hitler unleashed his war.
3. CONQUEST
The attack upon the Polish armies by Goring's air squadrons and the armored divisions of the Reichswehr was unaccompanied by any declaration of war. At 4 a.m. September i Forster issued a decree proclaiming the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich a decision reenacted later in the day by the Reichstag in accordance with Forster's plea to Hitler (P 131, 132; B 108). League Commissioner Burckhardt, who had been closely watched by the Gestapo since midnight of August 30, was visited at 8 a.m. September I by Forster who told him that his functions were ended and he had best depart within two hours. Gestapo agents hurried him on his way as he fled to Kaunas (B 117). Polish "rights" in Danzig had long since been reduced to a shadow (cf. P 106). German troops from East Prussia apparently entered Danzig before midnight of August 31-September i (P 117). Hitler ordered his generals to open the attack at 5.45 a.m. on Friday and presented it as a "defensive" measure to meet force with force. For several days there had been border clashes, with each side accusing the other of responsibility (P 116, G 470). Berlin claimed that many German customs posts on the frontier were attacked by Polish troops or irregulars on Thursday. Warsaw
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any ultimatum in the report on the German proposals which has been furnished to us, and the suggestion that the demands for the presence of a Polish plenipotentiary at Berlin on 30th August amounted to an ultimatum was vigorously repudiated by Herr von Ribbentrop in conversation with H.M. Ambassador. If the document did contain an ultimatum, the Polish Government would naturally refuse to discuss it until the ultimatum was withdrawn. On the other hand, a refusal by them to receive proposals would be gravely misunderstood by outside opinion" (B 100). He suggested that Lipski be instructed to receive the proposals. Kennard replied Friday evening (B 101) that it would be "clearly useless for me to take the action suggested." Poland had been invaded at dawn. The Supreme Soviet had ratified the NaziCommunist pact on Thursday. The buttons had been pressed in Berlin shortly after Lipsld's last interview with Ribbentrop. Early the next morning Hitler unleashed his war.
3. CONQUEST
The attack upon the Polish armies by Goring's air squadrons and the armored divisions of the Reichswehr was unaccompanied by any declaration of war. At 4 a.m. September i Forster issued a decree proclaiming the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich a decision reenacted later in the day by the Reichstag in accordance with Forster's plea to Hitler (P 131, 132; B 108). League Commissioner Burckhardt, who had been closely watched by the Gestapo since midnight of August 30, was visited at 8 a.m. September I by Forster who told him that his functions were ended and he had best depart within two hours. Gestapo agents hurried him on his way as he fled to Kaunas (B 117). Polish "rights" in Danzig had long since been reduced to a shadow (cf. P 106). German troops from East Prussia apparently entered Danzig before midnight of August 31-September i (P 117). Hitler ordered his generals to open the attack at 5.45 a.m. on Friday and presented it as a "defensive" measure to meet force with force. For several days there had been border clashes, with each side accusing the other of responsibility (P 116, G 470). Berlin claimed that many German customs posts on the frontier were attacked by Polish troops or irregulars on Thursday. Warsaw
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claimed that German patrols and aircraft had violated the frontier at many points between August 27 and September i. The cruiser Schleswig-Holstein, which had been in the port of Danzig since August 28, had remained beyond its allotted time and had moved to an anchorage opposite the Polish fortifications on the Westerplatte. According to the Polish naval commander at Gdynia, its guns opened fire on these positions at 4.45 a.m. September r (P 118). At 5.30 Nazi bombs began falling on the Polish air base at Puck. The Blitzkrieg was fully under way long before noon. Huge bombing squadrons attacked Polish airdromes, oil depots and rail centers at Gdynia, Kutno, Grodno, Cracow, and a dozen other points (P 119). Twenty-nine German divisions poured into the Corridor from Pomerania and East Prussia. Some forty divisions invaded southern Poland from Silesia and Slovakia and moved to join the northern army near Warsaw. Thousands of planes and tanks, aided by an espionage service which revealed every move of the Polish Government and General Staff to the German High Command, blasted pathways for the German infantry with such rapidity that Polish mobilization was never completed. The thirty reserve divisions of the Polish Army were never assembled. The thirty regular divisions lacked artillery and tanks and were blinded by the German air force. Most of the planes of the small) Polish air force were destroyed by German dive bombers before they left the ground. By September 15 all western Poland had! been lost. Warsaw was surrounded. The remnants of the Polish forces which had escaped death or capture were in full flight toward the southeast. How many Poles perished in this wholly onesided campaign may never be known. The heroism of men against machines meant massacre. Within eighteen days the Third Reich had revolutionized the science of warfare and struck down a nation of 34,000,000 inhabitants, theoretically capable of mustering 1,500,000 troops for its defense. According to Hitler's Reichstag speech of October 6, the German forces took 694,000 prisoners and suffered losses of only 10,572 dead, 30,322 wounded, and 3,404 missing. In the face of this fearful miracle wrought by the war-engines of tomorrow, the moves of the diplomats following the unleashing of the Blitzkrieg have the archaic flavor of a Bach fugue or an 18th century court dance. The formahties dated from an
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epoch when Western life was leisurely and chivalrous even in war-time. On September i President Moscicki proclaimed to all the citizens of Poland that "our hereditary enemy" had attacked the Polish State. "The entire nation, blessed by God in a struggle for a just and holy cause and united with the Army, will march in serried ranks to combat and to complete victory" (P 120). Dr. Szathmary, Slovak Minister in Warsaw, told Beck that he was outraged at the brutal disarmament of the Slovak forces and the transformation of his country into a base of operations against Poland (P 134). Aloscicki and War Minister Kasprzycki made provisions for enlisting Slovak and Czech legions to aid in the "liberation" of their nations (P 133). The German Embassy staff in Warsaw asked for its passports. It took its leave by way of Lithuania after entrusting its interests to the Dutch legation. In Berlin Lipski was warned for his own safety to remain inside his Embassy or his home. At i p.m. September i he sent Prince Lubomirski, who had hastened back from Warsaw, to the German Chief of Protocol to ask for his passport. His request to leave by way of Hungary was refused. He entrusted Polish interests to the Swedish legation. On September 2, the sixth anniversary of his arrival in Berlin, the Polish Ambassador left the capital for the Danish frontier to which he was courteously escorted in a special train. After a day's delay he reached Copenhagen on the 5th (P 147). Roosevelt had issued an appeal on the ist to the belligerents to refrain reciprocally from aerial bombardment of civil populations and unfortified cities. Warsaw at once agreed. Wilhelmstrasse went to great pains to convey its assent to the Polish Government (P 122-130) while Nazi airmen dropped bombs indiscriminately on churches, schools, and hospitals and even machine-gunned peasant women in their fields. Meanwhile Hitler, on August 31, had named a "Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich," headed by Goring and consisting of Hess, Frick, Funk, Keitel, and Lammers. One of its first decrees forbade Germans to listen to any foreign broadcasts. Hitler's proclamation to the Reichswehr declared: "The PoHsh State has refused the peaceful settlement of relations which I desired, and has appealed to arms. Germans in Poland are persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their houses. . . . In order to put an end to this lunacy, I have no other choice than to meet force with force from now on" (B 107). The Fiihrer
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summoned the Reichstag on September ist and breathed righteousness, fire, and blood before the cheering deputies:
For months we have all been suffering under the torture of a problem, bestowed on us by the Versailles Treaty, which had degenerated into an intolerable one. Danzig always was and still is a German city. The Corridor always was and still is German. These whole territories owe their cultural development solely to the German people. Without the German people these Eastern territories would be in the thrall of darkest barbarism. Danzig was separated from us. The Corridor was annexed by Poland. The German minorities living there were subjected to the cruellest abuse. More than a million Germans had to leave their homes as far back as
1919 a n d 1920.
As in the past, I have likewise tried in this case to alter these intolerable conditions by proposals of peaceful revisions. It is a lie when the claim is made that we attempted to carry out our revisions by sheer pressure. . . . These proposals were rejected. More than that, they were answered with mobilization, with increased terror, with further pressure on the Germans in these territories and with an attempt to throttle the Free City of Danzig by slow economic, political and, finally in recent weeks, military means, as well as interception of communications. Poland unleashed the fight against the Free City of Danzig. It was likewise unwilling to solve the Corridor question in any way acceptable to or consistent with the interests of both parties. In the final analysis it had not the slightest intention of fulfilling its obligations towards its minorities. . . . I sat with my Government for two full days waiting for the Polish Government to make up its mind whether or not it would finally send a plenipotentiary. Up till last night it sent no plenipotentiary. Instead it made known through its Ambassador that it was considering for the moment whether and to what extent it was prepared to accept the English proposals, and it would inform England accordingly. My Deputies, if anyone expects Germany and the head of its government to put up with such a thing, the German nation would deserve nothing better than to make its exit from the political stage. . . . I have now decided to talk the same language to Poland that it has been talking to us for months. If statesmen of the Western Powers declare that this concerns their interests, I can only regard such a statement with regret. I cannot waver for one instant in the fulfillment of my duty. I have given the solemn assurance and I repeat that we neither demand nor will we ever demand anything from these Western States. . . . I wish to express thanks to Italy in particular, who has given us her support throughout this time. You will understand however that we are unwilling to call in outside help for the carrying out of this struggle. W e
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will fulfill this task by ourselves. The neutral States have assured us of their neutrality exactly as we have already guaranteed ours to them. . . . Germany and Russia fought opposite each other in the world war and were both, in the end, the sufferers. That shall never again happen. The non-aggression and consultation pact which became effective on the day it was signed was given its supreme ratification in Moscow and Berlin as well yesterday. This pact was greeted with exactly the same enthusiasm in Moscow as you are showing for it here. I can only underline every word of Foreign Commissar Molotov's speech. . . . Last night for the first time Poland opened fire on our own territory, this time with regular troops. From 5.45 this morning this fire has been returned and from now on bomb will be repaid with bomb; poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever puts himself outside the rules of the humane conduct of war can only expect us to deal likewise. I will continue this struggle, regardless of whom it may be against, until the safety and rights of the Reich are assured. 1 have spent more than 6 years in building up the German armed forces. During this time more than 90 billions have been devoted to this purpose. To-day they are the best equipped in the world and are incomparably superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them is unshakeable. . . . I desire nothing other than to be the first soldier of the German Reich. In evidence of this I have again put on that old coat which was the most sacred and most dear to me of all. I will not take it off until the victory is ours orI shall not live to see the end. If anything should happen to me in this struggle, my first successor will be Party Member Goring. Should anything happen to Party Member Goring, his successor is Party Member Hess. It would then be your duty to follow these men as Fiihrer with the same blind loyalty and obedience as you follow me. In case anything should happen to Party Member Hess I am now going to ordain a law for the summoning of the Senate which will then select the worthiest, I mean the bravest of its members. As a National Socialist and a German soldier I enter this struggle with a stout heart. My whole life has been nothing but a constant struggle for my people and its resurrection and for Germany. This contest was inspired by one single doctrine of faiththe belief in this people. There is one word that I have never learnedcapitulation. . . . I will close with the statement of faith which I once uttered when I began my struggle for power in the Reich. At that time 1 said: once our determination is so strong that nothing can overcome it, then will that determination and our German steel together shatter and conquer every adversity (G 471).
Hitler's victim looked at once to its allies for aid. Beck asked Raczynski and Lukasiewicz to inform Halifax and Bonnet of the
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invasion: "The Polish Government, resolved to defend to the end the independence and the honor of Poland, expresses the assurance that, in conformity with existing alliances, it will have the benefit in this struggle of the immediate aid of its allies" (P 121). On the 2nd he asked his envoys in London and Paris to make clear that almost all of the German air force was attacking Poland. "Under these conditions a decision of the Allies which would have the effect of occupying a notable portion of the German aviation would be in the interests of all" (P 137; cf. B 112). Kennard hoped that he might be "informed at the earliest possible moment of our declaration of war and that our air force will make every effort to show activity on western front with a view to relieving pressure here" (B 115). On the 3rd Beck asked Raczynski to communicate immediately to Halifax the satisfaction of Warsaw at British refusal to consider any "conference" as long as the invasion continued, but to plead without delay for immediate military aid (P 138). On the 5th Raczynski wrote a letter to Churchill who had been called to his old post of First Lord of the Admiralty upon the British declaration of war. He begged Halifax to initiate aerial operations against the Reich in view of "the urgency of an immediate military action in the west." The Foreign Secretary was reassuring, but said that Britain "could not scatter its forces" (P 140). Other appeals produced no results. By mid-September, with Poland doomed, the Polish leaders realized, perhaps for the first time, that there was no way in which France and Britain could save Poland by military action. It is unlikely that any of the Anglo-French leaders had entertained any illusions on this score. At the beginning of hostilities there were two days of doubt as to whether the British and French Cabinets would fulfill their obligations to Poland by waging war on the Reich. Commons was in no mood to temporize, but some of the members distrusted Chamberlain. Only four members had voted against the Emergency Powers Bill: Cecil Wilson, Laborite; James Maxton, Leader of the Independent Labor Party; T. E. Harvey, Independent Quaker; and old George Lansbury, Laborite-Pacifist. Commons reassembled on the afternoon of September i, appropriated 500,000,000 for defense and enacted other war legislation. The National Executive of the Labor Party issued a manifesto calling
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for firm resistance ro aggression. The War Office and the Admiralty held emergency conferences. Complete mobilization had been ordered in the morning. Halifax had summoned Kordt at 10.50 a.m., but the German Charge said he had no information regarding any attack on Poland and no communication to make. At 11.30 he phoned to say that reports of the bombing of Warsaw and other Polish towns were untrue, but that "since this morning shooting was taking place from the Polish side, and the Germans were shooting back" (B 114). The King called on Chamberlain in the afternoon. At 6 p.m. the Prime Minister went before Parliament, presumably to announce the great decision. He began in a mood that seemed firm: "I do not propose to say many words tonight. The time has come when action rather than speech is called for. Eighteen months ago in this House I prayed that the responsibility might not fall upon me to ask this country to accept the awful arbitrament of war. I fear that I may not be able to avoid that responsibility. But, at any rate, I cannot wish for conditions in which such a burden should fall upon me in which I should feel clearer than I do today as to where my duty lies." But then he seemed to some to waver. He quoted from documents on the recent negotiations, emphasizing that Berlin had never officially communicated to London or Warsaw the proposals whose "rejection" had led to the German attack on Poland. The British and French Ambassadors had been instructed to deliver a communication to Wilhelmstrasse:
"Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German A r m y which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached H. M. Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France that by their action the German Government have created conditions, namely, an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland, which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give H . M. Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, H . M.
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Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland." Chamberlain ignored a Member's question "Time limit?" and w e n t on: If a reply to this last warning is unfavorable, and I do not suggest that it is likely to be otherwise, H. M. Ambassador is instructed to ask for his passports. In that case we are ready. . . . There is one other allusion which I should like to make before I end my speech, and that is to record my satisfaction, and the satisfaction of H. M. Government, that throughout these last days of crisis Signor Mussolini also has been doing his best to reach a solution. It now only remains for us to set our teeth and to enter upon this struggle, which we ourselves earnestly endeavoured to avoid, with determination to see it through to the end. We shall enter it with a clear conscience, with the support of the Dominions and the British Empire, and the moral approval of the greater part of the world. We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi Government. As long as that Government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe. We shall merely pass from one crisis to another, and see one country after another attacked by methods which have now become familiar to us in their sickening technique. W e are resolved that these methods must come to an end. If out of the struggle we again re-establish in the world the rules of good faith and the renunciation of force, why, then even the sacrifices that will be entailed upon us will find their fullest justification (B 105). Halifax had meanwhile wired Henderson late in the afternoon the communication Chamberlain had read and told him: "You should ask for immediate reply and report result of your interview. I shall then send you further instructions. In reply to any questions you may explain that the present communication is in the nature of warning and is not to be considered as an ultimatum. For your own information. If the German reply is unsatisfactory the next stage will be either an ultimatum with time limit or an immediate declaration of war" (B 109). Henderson delivered the note to Ribbentrop at 9.30 p.m. Coulondre delivered an identical one at 10 (F 344, 345; G 473). Ribbentrop said that Poland was the aggressor and he could give no reply without consulting Hitler. He explained why he had been unable to give the Ambassador the text of the "16 points" two nights previously. H e insisted that he had read the "16 points" "slowly and dis-
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tinctly and had even given oral explanations" and had hoped that on the next day Poland would have agreed to them (G 47 2). Reported Henderson: "He was courteous and polite this evening. I am inclined to believe that Herr Hitler's answer will be an attempt to avoid war with Great Britain and France, but not likely to be one which we can accept" (B 111). All day Saturday Poland and the world waited, knowing little of Bonnet's maneuvers and the diplomatic exchanges going on with Rome. At 7 p.m. Halifax and Chamberlain addressed Lords and Commons respectively. No reply to the note had been received from Berlin. "It may be," said the Prime Minister, "that the delay is caused by consideration of a proposal which, meanwhile, had been put forward by the Italian Government that hostilities should cease and that there should immediately be a conference between the five Powers, Great Britain, France, Poland, Germany, and Italy. While appreciating the efforts of the Italian Government, H. M. Government, for their part, would find it impossible to take part in a conference while Poland is being subjected to invasion, her towns are under bombardment and Danzig is being made a subject of a unilateral settlement by force." The whole House cheered. But it sat in silence when he went on to say:
H . M. Government will, as stated yesterday, be bound to take action unless the German forces are withdrawn from Polish territory. T h e y are in communication with the French Government as to the limit of time within which it would be necessary for the British and French Governments to know whether the German Government were prepared to effect such a withdrawal. If the German Government should agree to withdraw their forces, then H . M. Government would be willing to regard the position as being the same as it was before the German forces crossed the Polish frontier. T h a t is to say, the way would be open to discussion between the German and Polish Governments on the matters at issue between them, on the understanding that the settlement arrived at was one that safeguarded the vital interests of Poland and was secured by an international guarantee. If the German and Polish Governments wished that other Powers should be associated with them in the discussion, H . M. Government for their part would be willing to agree (B 116).
This sounded to some like compromise. Acting Labor leader Greenwood said he wondered "how long we are prepared to vacillate at a time when Britain and all that Britain stands for in human civilization are in peril? I do not believe that the French
362
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War
dare at this juncture or would dream at this juncture or going back on the pledge to Poland. If, as the Prime Minister told us, . . . we must wait upon our allies, I should have preferred the Prime Minister to have been able to say tonight definitely that it is either peace or war." Sinclair expressed similar doubts. Chamberlain extended reassurances:
I think the House recognises that the Government is in a somewhat difficult position. I suppose it always must be a difficulty for allies w h o have to communicate with one another by telephone to synchronise their thoughts and actions as quickly as those who are in the same room; but I should be horrified if the House thought for one moment that the statement that I have made to them betrayed the slightest weakening either of this Government or of the French Government in the attitude which we have already taken up. I am bound to say that I myself share the distrust which the right hon. Gentleman expressed of maneuvers of this kind. I should have been very glad had it been possible for me to say to the House now that the French Government and ourselves were agreed to make the shortest possible limit to the time when action should be taken by both of us. It is very possible that the communications which we have had with the French Government will receive a reply from them in the course of the next few hours. I understand that the French Cabinet is in session at this moment, and I feel certain that I can make a statement to the House of a definite character to-morrow when the House meets again. I am the last man to neglect any opportunity which I consider affords a serious chance of avoiding the great catastrophe of war even at the last moment, but I confess that in the present case I should have to be convinced of the good faith of the other side in any action which they took before I could regard the proposition which has been made as one to which we could expect a reasonable chance of a successful issue. I anticipate that there is only one answer I shall be able to give to the House to-morrow. I hope that the issue will be brought to a close at the earliest possible moment so that we may know where we are, and I trust that the House, realising the position which I have tried to put before it, will believe me that I speak in complete good faith and will not prolong the discussion which, perhaps, might make our position more embarrassing than it is.
The difficulty, unacknowledged at the time, was that one Frenchman at least did "dream of going back on the pledge to Poland." His name was Georges Bonnet. He was later to boast at Vichy, after the debacle to which he had contributed so much, that he had been prepared on Saturday, September 2, to accept ItaUan proposals for "peace" at Poland's expense.
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II Duce was more than willing to do what he could to "localize" the German-Polish conflict. A last appeal by the Pope to Berlin and Warsaw on August 31 was without result (P 114, F 310). On the same day Frangois-Poncet reported that Ciano had told him at the Palazzo Chigi at 12.35 p-m.: "Signor Mussolini offers, if France and England agree, to invite Germany to a conference which will take place on September 5 with the object of examining the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which are the cause of the present trouble. The invitation to Germany will be sent only after France and Britain have given their assent. Count Ciano made the same communication to the British Ambassador. He requests an immediate reply for fear that hostilities may begin in the meantime" (F 306). The texts of the British replies to the Italian overtures are not yet available. It is clear, however, that HaUfax and Bonnet discussed through Corbin what answer should be given, that Corbin between 10 and 11 a.m., September i, received by phone the French draft reply and phoned the British reply to the Quai d'Orsay. Corbin added that "the British Government leave it to the French Government to reply to the Italian Government as it sees fit." ^ Bonnet secured the Cabinet's approval of his "positive" reply and left the Cabinet meeting hurriedly. He phoned Frangois-Poncet a reply at 11.45 a.m. September i (six hours after the German invasion of Poland had been launched and almost four hours after Bonnet admitted knowledge of this fact) to the effect that:
T h e French Government values highly the spirit in which the proposal of Royal Government has been made, and reaffirms its willingness to seek all possible means, and to associate itself with any steps intended to facilitate and render possible an amicable settlement of the dispute which has arisen between Germany and Poland. T h e French Government pays sincere tribute to the effort made to this end by the Italian Government, and thanks it for its communication regarding a plan to call a conference, which has been transmitted by the French Ambassador in Rome and to which a favorable reply has been given. T h e French Government must nevertheless point out that in its opinion such a conference could not raise problems touching the interests of Powers not represented, and no arrangement could be made affecting the interests of any Power unless that Power were present. T h e French Government considers that the 1 Cf. Appendix III of The French Yellow Book, containing summaries of Bonnet's telephone conversations on August 31, September i and 2, 1939.
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War
activities of such a conference should not be restricted to an attempt to seek partial and temporary solutions of limited and immediate problems: it should, by raising all the problems of a general character which are at the root of any dispute, result in general appeasement such as will allow the peace of the world to be reestablished and organized on solid foundations" (F 327).
The French Foreign Minister made no stipulation that Germany must cease hostilities. Poland should be "represented," but appeasement a la Munich still seemed desirable to Bonnet. Fran5ois-Poncet delivered the reply at 12.45 P-iî- to Ciano who was "very pleased" (F 332). At 2.45 Ciano asked the French Ambassador whether he believed that Warsaw would consent to a conference. Fifteen minutes later Francois-Poncet phoned Bonnet that Ciano felt he should sound out the Polish Government. If Warsaw agreed to a conference, Mussolini could make a "final appeal" to Hitler. Bonnet meanwhile yielded to British pressure to have Coulondre associate himself with Henderson in presenting a note of warning to Ribbentrop Friday evening (F 335, 337). But he insisted that it must not be an ultimatum. He desired time to press Warsaw to accept the Italian proposal. He asked Noel by direct phone at 4 p.m., by phone via the French Embassy in Bucharest at 4.05 and by wire at 6.25 p.m. September i, to ask the Polish Government whether it would accept a five-Power conference and to inform him of the answer "at your very earliest convenience" (F 338). Half an hour later Bonnet wired all French diplomats abroad a review of "the events of the last thirtysix hours, which reveal the responsibility of the Reich in the acts of aggression which have been committed against Poland" (F 340). Bonnet had difficulty in contacting Noel. He phoned Fran9ois-Poncet at 4.50 that he had not yet gotten a reply from the Polish Government, but would inform him as soon as he received it, meanwhile leaving the initiative to Rome. Frangois-Pbncet reported: "I replied (to Ciano) about 5 p.m. that the attitude of Poland was uncertain, but that it was worth while all the same to give a trial to the course suggested by Signer Mussolini" (F
352).
At 9.31 p.m. Noel wired from Warsaw that Beck had replied: "We are in the thick of war, as the result of unprovoked aggression. The question before us is not of a conference but of the
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common action which should be taken by the AlHes to resist. I have heard nothing, moreover, from any quarter of the Itahan plan." Noel added: "The atmosphere is no longer one for conciliation" {Uatmosphere n'est plus a raccoTmnodement) (F 343). A Havas Note to the Press during the night declared that "after carefully considering the question the French Government has given a 'positive' reply" to the Italian proposal (F 347). Ciano summoned Frangois-Poncet once more at 9 p.m. to say that the Duce feared that Hitler might accuse him of "trying to balk him of his victory," but that he "viâs still on the watch to make use of the first favorable opening" (F 352). That afternoon the Italian Cabinet had decided to take no part in hostilities and Hitler had assured Mussolini that his confidence in the Reichswehr was such that he did not believe there would be need of Italian military aid. On the morning of September 2 the Italian Ambassador in Berlin told Wilhelmstrasse that Rome was "still In a position to seek the consent of France, England, and Poland to a conference on the following basis: i. an armistice, leaving the armies where they now are; 2. the calling of a conference within two or three days; 3. a solution of the Polish-German conflict which, as matters stand today, would certainly be favorable to Germany. This idea, which originated with the Duce, is today particularly advocated by France" ( G 474). Ribbentrop apparently accepted this plan, since it was neatly calculated to give the Reich victory over Poland with British and French connivance. Halifax and Chamberlain said nothing pubUcly about the ensuing exchanges of views until their declarations of Saturday evening in Parliament. Henderson had already told Attolico at noon that the British note was a "warning," not an ultimatum, but that no proposal for a conference could be entertained unless German troops withdrew from Polish territory (H 294-5). Corbin phoned Bonnet from London at 2.30 p.m. September 2 that the British Ministers favored an ultimatum to Berlin with a time limit of a few hours to be followed by a declaration of war if no answer came. If Hitler should agree to stop the war and revert to his "16 points," Downing Street "would be inclined to reply that it was not possible to open negotiations before Polish territory had been evacuated by German troops. Lord Halifax would highly appreciate
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an early intimation of your views on this subject" (F 354).^ By this time, almost thirty-six hours after the German attack upon Poland had been launched, Bonnet was working hand in hand with Hitler's ally in Rome to bring about a conference which would negotiate a settlement, necessarily at Warsaw's expense. His solicitude for "peace" was doubtless sincere. It was now too late to prevent a German attack upon Poland by a firm policy. It was strategically impossible to save Poland from the invaders. For the Allies to attack the Reich in order to fulfill obligations of honor toward Poland seemed to Bonnet a futile and senseless procedure. A conference might save part of Poland, as part of Czechoslovakia had been saved at Munich. Even if the salvation should endure but a few months, this was preferable in Bonnet's eyes to a French-German conflict. Such a conflict would mean the end of Poland. Perhaps Bonnet suspected it would mean the end of France. As in 1938, he had sought, this time in vain, to induce the generals to support his pleas for surrender. This wretched man was now so hopelessly ensnared in the consequences of his own earlier crimes and blunders that his final writhings should perhaps be not too harshly judged. Where all wisdom is gone, along with all honor, all integrity, all vision, and all courage, judgment is meaningless. Suffice it to record the fact that Bonnet was willing to accept the Italian proposals and to press Warsaw to accept them in preference to prompt fulfillment of French pledges to Poland. Daladier at first supported his course, and then, as always, vacillated. Chamberlain and Halifax were not unsympathetic, though they made the crucial reservation already noted.^
1 Oliver Benson in Through the Diplomatic Looking Glass, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1939, p. 200, puts the issue thus: "Halfhopes, the barest of chances, remained that a miracle would be granted to Europe. Berlin and London both saw a faint glimmer through a very narrow cracka glimmer which vanished entirely only when the door was finally slammed shut. But Berlin and London were looking from opposite sides of the door: what Berhn saw was an opportunity to keep the war localized; what London saw was a chance for an armistice during which somehow Germany could be forced to a reasonable settlement, probably along modified hues of the 'rejected' sixteen points." 2 John Elliott in the New York Herald Tribune of September 15, 1940, reporting from Vichy, summarized a series of articles in Le Journal of Paris, "How Peace Perished." According to this account Bonnet accepted the Italian proposal on August 31, but London insisted on German demobilization as a prerequisite of any conference. At a meeting of the French Cabinet on the
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At 2 p.m. September 2 Frangois-Poncet and Sir Percy Loraine were invited to the Palazzo Chigi by Ciano. According to the French Ambassador:
Ciano informed us there that he had finally resolved to inform the Fiihrer and Ribbentrop, but without putting any pressure upon them, that France and Britain had agreed to the suggestion for a conference to which they had hope of bringing Poland. This conference could follow very closely upon an immediate armistice, leaving the adversaries in their respective positions. T h e suggestion had not been at once rejected from the German side, but Hitler had pointed out that, being faced with a French note and a British note which the Ambassadors of the two countries had handed him on the evening of the ist, he wished to know if these notes were in the nature of an ultimatum or not. If so, he would definitely reject them. If the contrary was true, he would ask for some time to think them over until noon tomorrow. Hitler further requested that the answer to his two questions should be sent him through Rome. Ciano then telephoned directly to Your Excellency (Bonnet), who, after stating that the note handed yesterday by the French Ambassador was not in the nature of an ultimatum, gave approval in principle, insofar as the time limit was concerned, subject to the views of the President of the Council (Daladier). Ciano then telephoned to Lord Halifax, who himself also stated that the English note was not in the nature of an ultimatum and said that on the question of the time limit he must consult his Government. H e added that in his opinion to halt the troops on their positions would be insufficient; the occupied territories would have to be evacuated. Ciano replied that in his opinion there was little possibility of obtaining this from the Germans. So as to leave time for the necessary consultations to be held, and after I had pointed out that the consent of the Poles would be harder to get, we decided to part and to meet again in Ciano's room at 4 p.m. (F 360).
Herewith the issue was squarely joined. Bonnet was willing to grant Hitler another day's grace and to agree to a conference with
evening of August 31, a majority of Ministers favored an affirmative reply to Rome without the British reservation, but only if direct German-Polish discussions failed. Bonnet subsequently vetoed any Anglo-French ultimatum to Berlin and informed Ciano by phone on September 2 that Germany could have until Sunday afternoon to reply to the Allied warnings. He also phoned Halifax to plead for a postponement of belligerency and for a conference. Halifax replied at 5.20 p.m. that Britain could not agree unless Germany withdrew her armies from Poland. When Ciano told Bonnet that the British condition made any further Italian efforts impossible, Bonnet said that he would wait for the German reply until Sunday noon regardless of what Britain did. He refused Halifax's plea for a simultaneous declaration of war.
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the German troops remaining where they were on Polish soil.^ HaHfax was not disposed to grant additional time and was emphatic in insisting that the Reichswehr withdraw behind the German frontiers. The Pohsh leaders feared that they were about to be abandoned utterly. For them it was not yet clear that no Anglo-French military action could save Poland. Even if it had been clear, they knew that Anglo-French neutrality would spell irrevocable doom for Poland, that Anglo-French acceptance of any conference could only mean for Poland the fate of Czechoslovakia, and that general war, if terminated by Allied victory, would mean Poland's eventual resurrection. Raczynski urgently pleaded with Chamberlain on Saturday afternoon for the immediate fulfillment of the British guarantee (F 361). At 5.20 p.m. Halifax phoned Bonnet that the British Cabinet had decided "that a favorable reply to the proposed conference can only be given upon one preliminary condition: that is that the German troops are withdrawn from the territories which they occupy." ^ Bonnet now had to choose between abandoning Britain as well as Poland, or accepting British conditions which were all but certain to wreck the enterprise. What anguish of spirit he suffered in the face of so cruel a choice and what course, if any, he urged upon Daladier and his colleagues can only be surmised. Chamberlain and Halifax told Parhament early Saturday evening that they hoped for a French reply within the next few hours. At 3 o'clock Saturday afternoon the French parliament had convened for its first session since the June adjournment. The Cabinet had decreed general mobilization on Friday. President Lebrun addressed a message to the legislators in which he declared that "at the moment when plenipotentiaries were about to meet, Germany brutally attacked Poland, thus bringing about a state of war which nothing could justify." Anglo-French efforts to save peace had been of "no avail" with the men who held war or peace in their hands. And, "unless they should be, even at this hour, wilHng to listen to the appeal of universal conscience which is rising towards them, the worst must be expected. With great calmness, with cool reserve and in perfect order, France has taken the steps required by her own safety and her fidelity to
1 Cf. Report of Bonnet's phone conversations with Ciano on last page of The French Yellow Book. Îbid.
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her obligations. . . . On behalf of the nation I send our land, sea, and air forces an affectionate greeting and the expression of the unanimous confidence which the country has in them. . . . Let us remain united! Long live France!" (F 355). Immediately thereafter Daladier in the Chamber, and Chautemps in the Senate, read a declaration by the Premier full of patriotic fervor. As for the German claim that Poland had rejected the terms of August 31: "That is a lie, since Poland did not even know them." His reference to Italy provoked applause. His expression of readiness to resume negotiations stirred the most unanimous and prolonged applause of the session.
I am happy at this juncture to pay my tribute to the noble efforts made by the Italian Government. Even yesterday we strove to unite all men of good will so as at least to stave off hostilities, to prevent bloodshed and to insure that the methods of conciliation and arbitration should be substituted for the use of violence. Gentlemen, these efforts toward peace, however powerless they were and still remain, will at least have shown where the responsibility lies. They insure for Poland, the victim, the effective cooperation and moral support of the nations and of free men of all lands. . . . If the fighting were to stop, if the aggressor were to retreat within his own frontiers, if free negotiations could still be started, you may well believe, gentlemen, the French Government would spare no effort, even today, if it were possible, to insure the success of these negotiations in the interests of the peace of the world. But time is pressing; France and England cannot look on when a friendly nation is being destroyed, a foreboding of further onslaught, eventually aimed at England and France. . . . Poland is our ally. . . . Poland has been the object of the most unjust and brutal aggression. The nations who have guaranteed her independence are bound to intervene in her defense. Great Britain and France are not Powers that can disown, or dream of disowning, their signatures. . . . For a France which should allow this aggression to be carried out would very soon find itself a scorned, an isolated, a discredited France, without allies and without support, and doubtless would soon herself be exposed to a formidable attack. . . . When tomorrow we should have to fight after losing the respect of our allies and the other nations, we should no longer be anything more than a wretched people doomed to defeat and bondage. I feel confident that not a single Frenchman harbors such thoughts today. . . . I desire to do my plain duty, and shall do it, as an honorable man. . . . If we were not to keep our pledges, if we were to allow Germany to crush Poland, within a few months, perhaps within a few weeks, what could we say to France if we had to face aggressors once more? . . . Gentlemen, today France is in command (F 356).
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Such words as these were gall to Bonnet. They all but closed the door to his last hope. ParUament voted a war budget of 69 biUion francs and by implication gave the Cabinet authority to declare war. If Daladier protested over much, it was because his Foreign Minister was not an honorable man. The Cabinet met in the War Ministry that evening at 7.30 to frame its reply to Halifax and to Ciano. Its members already knew the British decision. N o minutes or memoirs tell as yet what was said. If Bonnet urged acceptance of the ItaUan proposals without the British condition, he found little or no support. Even as the French Ministers discussed their decision, hope was fading in RomeCiano's hope of another bloodless Axis victory or of a "localized" war, and the hopes of Loraine and Frangois-Poncet for peace without defeat. In the Foreign Minister's office the three men waited in the early evening hours for word from London and Paris. At 7.20 Ciano told his guests that HaUfax had accepted the Itahan proposals, but only on condition of the evacuation of Poland. "Ciano told me," wrote Frangois-Poncet in the dispatch which he penned later that night, "that he did not think he was in a position to put forward such a request to Germany. This was likewise Mussolini's opinion. The speech delivered in the Chamber by Daladier intimated that the position of the French Government was the same as that of the British Government. Consequently, it seemed that the Italian suggestion would have to be abandoned. Ciano informed me that he had therefore just telephoned to AttoUco that, in these circumstances, Mussolini did not think he could follow up his suggestion. The above news has been conveyed to your department by a telephone call received by M. Hoppenot" (F 363). Since no further word came through, Sir Percy and the French Ambassador returned to their Embassies. At 9 p.m. Bonnet phoned Ciano of the French Cabinet's decision: "The note of September I did not bear the character of an ultimatum. . . . The French Government is prepared to wait until Sunday, September 3, at noon for the German reply. However the French Government, like the British Government, considers that the conference cannot open under the auspices of force and that, in order that the plan might be successfully realized, it is advisable {il convient) that the German armies should evacuate the territories occupied in Poland." ^ What for Halifax was a siiie qua non was for Bonnet
1 Final Document of The French Yellow Book.
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"advice." But Ciano replied that in his opinion this condition would not be accepted by the Reich Government. The French Foreign Minister thanked him for his efforts. Rome informed Berhn that it could take no further action (B 143). Bonnet's lasr effort at a last Munich had failed. Final instructions to Henderson had already been drafted in London. After a brief midnight meeting of the Cabinet, they were approved. Bonnet needed more time and still preferred not to take joint action with Halifax. At midnight he wired Coulondre that he should expect instructions in the morning for a new demarche to be made at noon. Daladier hinted in his Sunday evening broadcast that some further effort had been made to preserve peace early Sunday morning, but there is no record of this. At 5 a.m. Sunday, September 3, Halifax wired Henderson:
Please seek interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 9 a.m. to-day, Sunday or, if he cannot see you then, arrange to convey at that time to representative of German Government the following communication: "In the communication which I had the honour to make to you on ist September I informed you, on the instructions of H . M. Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, unless the German Government were prepared to give H . M. Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, H . M. Government in the United Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfil their obligations to Poland. "Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform you that, unless not later than 11 a.m., British Summer Time, to-day 3rd September, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government and have reached H . M. Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour." If the assurance referred to in the above communication is received, you should inform me by any means at your disposal before 11 a.m. to-day, 3rd September. If no such assurance is received here by 11 a.m., we shall inform the German representative that a state of war exists as from that hour (B 118).
At 10.20 Sunday morning Bonnet wired Coulondre the decision "of the French Government [not his! ] which I have been charged to transmit to you."
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You should present yourself today September 3 at noon at the Wilhelmstrasse and ask for the German Government's reply to the communication which you handed in at 10 p.m. on September i. If the reply to the questions contained in that communication is in the negative, you should recall the responsibility of Germany which you evoked during your last interview, and you should notify to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich or to his representative that the French Government find themselves, by reason of the German reply, compelled to fulfill as from today September 3 at 5 p.m. the engagements France entered into towards Poland, which are known to the German Government. As from that moment you may ask for your passport (F 365).
At 9 Henderson called at the Auswdrtige Ami and delivered his two-hour ultimatum to Dr. Schmidt. N o reply was received by 11. At 11.15 Hahfax delivered a note to Kordt informing him that since no assurance had been received from Berlin, "I have the honor to inform you that a state of war exists between the two countries as from 11 a.m. today September 3" (G 478). Chamberlain made a similar announcement by radio from 10 Downing Street: "We have a clear conscience. . . . I am certain that right will prevaih . . . " A t 11.20 Henderson was invited to Wilhelmstrasse. Ten minutes later he saw Ribbentrop for the last time. The German Foreign Minister gave him a long memorandum which began: "The German Government and the German people refuse to be handed, to accept and still less to comply with demands amounting to an ultimatum by the British Government." The memorandum went on to accuse Britain of encouraging Polish stubbornness, preventing revision of the Treaty of Versailles, rejecting Mussolini's proposal and thereby incurring responsibility "for all the misery and suffering that has overtaken or is about to overtake so many peoples. . . . The German Government are not willing, on account of British intentions or obligations, to tolerate in the east of the Reich conditions similar to those prevailing in the British Protectorate of Palestine. . . . The German people and the German Government do not intend, as does Great Britain, to rule the world, but they are determined to defend their own freedom, their independence and very Hfe" (G 480, B 119). Henderson's only comment was that history would judge where the blame lay ( H 300). At noon Coulondre saw Weizsacker who insisted that he see Ribbentrop. At 12.30 the French Ambassador asked the Foreign
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Minister whether he could give a satisfactory reply to the note of September i. Ribbentrop told him of the rejection of the British ultimatum. " W e have no feeling of hostility toward France. It is only if France attacks us that we shall fight her, and this would be on her part a war of aggression." When Coulondre asked whether this meant that the reply was negative, Ribbentrop answered "Yes." The Ambassador then declared that it was his painful duty to inform the Foreign Minister that "as from today September 3 at 5 p.m. the French Government will find itself obliged to fulfill the obligations that France has contracted towards Poland." He transmitted his note to the same effect. Ribbentrop said that Germany had no intention of attacking France. If France attacked the Reich, France would be the aggressor. Coulondre replied that history would judge (F 366, 367; G 480,
481).
Coulondre and Henderson took their leave on Monday morning by way of The Netherlands. After a delay at the frontier, they were permitted to cross Tuesday afternoon. By evening they reached Rotterdam whence they went their separate ways (H 302f.). France and Poland signed a protocol on September 4 modelled after the Anglo-Polish aUiance of August 25 and pledging the partners not to conclude a separate armistice or peace (P 139). London and Paris agreed to create a Supreme War Council. On November 17 they agreed to coordinate their economic warfare. On December 4 they agreed to maintain the franc and the pound at a fixed ratio of 176 fr. to 1. On March 28, 1940, a communique of the Supreme War Council declared: "The Government of the French Republic and H. M. Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland mutually undertake . . . not to discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on the conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security." ^ As the lights went out over the Continent the leaders of all the warring nations summoned all patriots to fight with conviction against enemies who were solely responsible for the war. On September 3 Weizsacker informed all German diplomats abroad: "This is the harvest reaped by those in Britain who for years
1 Cf. Andre Giraud (Pertinax), "The Anglo-French Alliance," Foreign A-ffairs, July 1940.
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have preached Germany's annihilation. This course of events clearly shows Britain's full responsibility for the outbreak of the war" (G 482). Hitler issued proclamations to his people and his army denouncing British encirclement: "Germany shall not again capitulate. . . . The battle in the east will have reached its successful conclusion in a few months, and then the power of the whole National-Socialist State stands behind you. . . . Our plutocratic enemies will realize that they are now dealing with a different Germany from that of the year 1914" (B 121). Chamberlain told Commons; When I spoke last night to the House I could not but be aware that in some parts of the House there were doubts and some bewilderment as to whether there had been any weakening, hesitation, or vacillation on the part of H. M. Government. In the circumstances, I make no reproach, for if I had been in the same position as hon. members not sitting on this Bench and not in possession of all the information which we have, I should very likely have felt the same. The statement which I have to make this morning will show that there were no grounds for doubt. . . . This is a sad day for all of us, and to none is it sadder than to me. Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins. There is only one thing left for me to do; that is, to devote what strength and powers I have to forwarding the victory of the cause for which we have to sacrifice so much. I cannot tell what part I may be allowed to play myself; I trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated Europe has been reestablished (B 120). At 7 Sunday evening King George broadcast from Buckingham Palace: In this grave hour, perhaps the most fateful in our history, I send to every household of my people, both at home and overseas, this message, spoken with the same depth of feeling for each one of you as if I were able to cross your threshold and speak to you myself. For the second time in the lives of most of us we are at war. Over and over again we have tried to find a peaceful way out of the differences between ourselves and those who are now our enemies. But it has been in vain. W e have been forced into a conflict. For we are called with our Allies to meet the challenge of a principle which, if it were to prevail, would be fatal to any civilised order in the world. It is the principle which permits a State, in the selfish pursuit of power, to disregard its treaties and its solemn pledges; which sanctions the use of force or threat of force against the sovereignty and independence of other
Conquest
375
States. Such a principle, stripped of all disguise, is surely the mere primitive doctrine that might is right. . . . For the sake of all that we ourselves hold dear and of the world's order and peace, it is unthinkable that we should refuse to meet the challenge. . . . The task will be hard. There may be dark days ahead and war can no longer be confined to the battlefield. But we can only do the right as we see the right and reverently commit our cause to God. If one and all we keep resolutely faithful to it, ready for whatever service or sacrifice it may demand, then, with God's help, we shall prevail. May He bless and keep us all.
At 8.30 Daladier spoke to the French people:

. . . The responsibility for the bloodshed rests wholly on the Hitlerite Government. The fate of peace was in the hands of Hitler. He has willed war. . . . The cause of France is linked with that of justice. It is that of all peaceful and free nations. It will be victorious. Frenchwomen and Frenchmen, we are making war because it has been forced upon us. Each one of us is at his post on the soil of France, in this land of liberty where respect for human dignity finds one of its last refuges. You will combine all your efforts with a deep feeling of union and brotherhood for the salvation of our country. Long live France! (F 370).
On Monday Chamberlain broadcast to Hitler's subjects:

German people! Your country and mine are now at war. Your Government has bombed and invaded the free and independent State of Poland, which this country is in honor bound to defend. Because your troops were not withdrawn in response to the Note which the British Government addressed to the German Government, war has followed. With the horrors of war we are familiar. God knows this country has done everything possible to prevent this calamity. But now that the invasion of Poland by Germany has taken place, it has become inevitable. . . . You may ask why Great Britain is concerned. We are concerned because we gave our word of honor to defend Poland against aggression. Why did we feel it necessary to pledge ourselves to defend this Eastern Power when our interests lie in the West, and when your Leader has said he has no interest to the West? The answer isand I regret to have to say itthat nobody in this country any longer places any trust in your Leader's word. . . . The German-Soviet Pact was a cynical volte face, designed to shatter the Peace Front against aggression. This gamble failed. The Peace Front stands firm. Your Leader is now sacrificing you, the German people, to the still more monstrous gamble of a war, to extricate himself from the
376
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impossible position into which he has led himself and you. In this war we are not fighting against you, the German people, for whom we have no bitter feeling, but against a tyrannous and forsworn regime, which has betrayed not only its own people, but the whole of Western civilisation, and all that you and we hold dear. May God defend the right!
But God, as Napoleon observed, is on the side with the heaviest battahons. On September 5 the Polish Corridor army was surrounded. On September 6 Cracow and Bromberg fell. Brauchitsch's subordinatesHaider, Reichenau, Rundstedt, and Bock drove their armored columns like steel claws into the bleeding body of the Polish State. By September 15 all the western provinces and most of the "industrial triangle" in the south were lost, Warsaw was encircled, Lvov and Brest-Litovsk in the east were under attack while broken groups of Polish troops surrendered or fled in confusion. Poland died. Poland's agony foreshadowed the death of the world unable to withstand the power of vnll and faith and fury in war which the rulers of the Third Reich had unchained against the West.
CHAPTER
EIGHT
STALIN'S
VICTORY
I . P O L A N D t S E P T E M B E R 2 8 , 1939 wrote Machiavelli, "that a person exalts himself from a humble station to great dignity without employing either force or fraud, unless indeed he obtains it by gift or hereditary succession. I do not even conceive that force alone ever sufficed; but we shall find that cunning alone has sometimes succeeded." To make conquests by cunning is less heroic than to make them by force. But it is always less costly and often more effective. In 1920 Pilsudski's Colonels sought to conquer White Russia and the Soviet Ukraine by force in the name of restoring the Polish frontiers of 1772. They failed and all but encompassed Poland's destruction at the hands of the Red Army. The Soviet leaders beHeved that the conquest of Poland by force would open the way for proletarian revolution in Central Europe. The Communist troops therefore advanced on Lemberg and the Corridor and sought, too late, to take Warsaw. They failed and lost half of what they had reconquered. Polish troops retook part of White Russia and the Ukraine. By the Peace of Riga of 1921 Poland retained a million and a half White Russians and perhaps six million Ukrainians. Moscow, disclaiming all interest in irredentism or territorial aggrandizement, made no effort to reconquer these "lost provinces" for eighteen years. In 1939, however, they were retaken, less by force than by cunning. Their retaking sealed the doom of the Polish Republic. The fourth partition of Poland was a logical consequence of the failure of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, the success of which 377
"IT VERY RARELY HAPPENS,"
CHAPTER
EIGHT
STALIN'S
VICTORY
I . P O L A N D t S E P T E M B E R 2 8 , 1939 wrote Machiavelli, "that a person exalts himself from a humble station to great dignity without employing either force or fraud, unless indeed he obtains it by gift or hereditary succession. I do not even conceive that force alone ever sufficed; but we shall find that cunning alone has sometimes succeeded." To make conquests by cunning is less heroic than to make them by force. But it is always less costly and often more effective. In 1920 Pilsudski's Colonels sought to conquer White Russia and the Soviet Ukraine by force in the name of restoring the Polish frontiers of 1772. They failed and all but encompassed Poland's destruction at the hands of the Red Army. The Soviet leaders beHeved that the conquest of Poland by force would open the way for proletarian revolution in Central Europe. The Communist troops therefore advanced on Lemberg and the Corridor and sought, too late, to take Warsaw. They failed and lost half of what they had reconquered. Polish troops retook part of White Russia and the Ukraine. By the Peace of Riga of 1921 Poland retained a million and a half White Russians and perhaps six million Ukrainians. Moscow, disclaiming all interest in irredentism or territorial aggrandizement, made no effort to reconquer these "lost provinces" for eighteen years. In 1939, however, they were retaken, less by force than by cunning. Their retaking sealed the doom of the Polish Republic. The fourth partition of Poland was a logical consequence of the failure of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, the success of which 377
"IT VERY RARELY HAPPENS,"
378
Stalin's
Victory
would have been possible only on terms which implied Polish surrender to Moscow of part at least of the eastern provinces. There is no conclusive evidence that the time and scope of Soviet intervention, or the lines of demarcation between Berlin and Moscow, were agreed upon in any detail prior to the German invasion. Had Paris and London abandoned Poland to her fate in the name of neutrality or appeasement. Hitler could have vetoed or at least restricted Stalin's claims on Polish territory. The Anglo-French declaration of war, however, compelled the Fiihrer to eschew controversies in the East and thus permitted Stalin to seize his share of the booty. This action was variously interpreted in the West as a reversion to Tsarist imperialism, as chauvinistic irredentism, as an effort to spread Bolshevism by the sword or as a manifestation of simple greed and lust for power. Only the leaders of the few surviving Communist parties in the West accepted the official Soviet explanation. These "comrades," however, were never taken into the KremUn's confidence. They therefore piled blunders upon errors, in each case with dogmatic assurance, and finally ascertained the content and direction of Moscow's policy only by reading the "bourgeois" press. Stalin's course is readily comprehensible if it is viewed exclusively in terms of Realpolitik without reference to ideological considerations, whether nationalistic or revolutionary. His assumption was that Soviet security could best be had either by the immobilization or defeat of Germany or by a stalemated war between the Reich and the West. The first alternative required a solid aUiance between Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. on terms giving Moscow control of the Balticum and access to Polish territorya condition which proved impossible of realization. The second alternative presupposed Soviet neutrality on terms which would allow the U.S.S.R. to acquire such strategic bases and territories in the Zivischenland as would render the Soviet Union secure, so Stahn believed, against future German attack. Hitler and Ribbentrop were willing to give Moscow what Chamberlain and Daladier had been unwilHng to give. They assumed that their forces could crush the Western Powers and that the U.S.S.R. would then be helpless, whatever border areas it might seize in the interim. Moscow assumed that the war in the West would be long and that, whatever its eventual outcome, the U.S.S.R. would be safe once it had
Polandi
September 28, ip^p
379
control of broad frontier zones beyond its old borders.^ On the basis of these calculations Moscow and Berlin made their bargain. The stakes of the game were deemed too important by the Soviet leaders for them to feel inhibited by the imperatives of law or ethics. They had concluded a solemn non-aggression pact with Poland on July 25, 1932, extended on May 5, 1934, to 1945 (P 151, 157). They had included Poland in the pacts of July 1933 wherein "aggression" was precisely defined and expressly renounced (P 15 2, 153). Beck and Litvinov had exchanged elaborate assurances of peace and friendship on February 14, 1934, on the occasion of the first visit of a Polish leader to Moscow (P 154-156). These obligations were reaffirmed on the occasion of Soviet entry into the League (P 158), again after Munich (P 161, 162) and once more in June of 1939 (P 165, 166). Even after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact, Moscow not only disclaimed all intention of cooperating with Berlin against Poland but extended assurances of economic support to Warsaw. On August 27 Voroshilov declared in Izvestia:
Assistance in the form of furnishing raw materials and war supplies is a commercial question and therefore it is not at all necessary, in order to give Poland raw materials and war supplies, to conclude a pact of mutual assistance and still less a military convention. Neither the U. S. A. nor a whole series of other States have had pacts of mutual assistance or military conventions with Japan, and yet for ten years they have sold to Japan raw materials and war supplies without taking account of the fact that Japan finds itself in a state of war with China (P 170).
On September 2 Soviet Ambassador Nicholas Charonov presented himself to Beck to ask why Poland did not negotiate with Moscow over the question of furnishing supphes (P 171). Beck sent appropriate instructions (which were delayed, however, by difficulties of communication) to Polish Ambassador Vacslav Grzybowski in the Soviet capital, only to have him report on September 8 that Molotov had told him that the Anglo-French intervention had created a situation which Voroshilov had not foreseen and that the U.S.S.R. must now look after its own interests. "Poland for us is now England." Moscow could only furnish such raw materials as were provided for in existing contracts. It could not supply war materials. Any transit rights of a military
1 Cf. G. E. R. Gedye in NYT 9.1840.
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StaUni's Victory
character would be contrary to the pact with Germany (P 172). The carefully cultivated impression that Moscow was astonished at Anglo-French intervention and at the rapidity of the German advance into Poland scarcely corresponds to the probabilities. The Soviet press was a more reliable index of the new line than the statements of Soviet diplomats abroad, some of whom seem not to have been informed of Stalin's decisions until they were in process of execution. At the International Youth Day ceremonies of September 6 the anti-Fascist slogans of previous years were replaced by: "Long live the wise foreign policy of the Soviet Union, guided by Comrade Stalin's instructions'do not let the country be drawn into a conflict by war provocateurs who want us to pull their chestnuts out of the fire.' " Such anti-Nazi films as "Professor Mamlock," "The Oppenheim Family" and "Alexander Nevsky" were withdrawn from circulation. By mid-September the partial mobilization of the Red Army was well under way. On September 11 Charonov assured Count Szembek at Krzemienic, to which part of the Polish Government had fled, that Poland could buy sanitary supplies from the U.S.S.R. H e said that he had told Noel that France could buy whatever it wished in Russia. He knew nothing of any mobilization. "It may be a matter of five or six classes, which is not a big thing. The Germans are bombarding points on the Soviet western frontiers. The Soviets do not desire to have a common border with totalitarian States. With France they have a pact of non-aggression and a treaty of mutual assistance" (P 173). Five days later, with Poland in obvious dissolution, the Kremlin spoke a different language. As early as September 12 Pravda published an article attacking Polish treatment of minorities and declaring that their fate could not be viewed with indifference by Soviet opinion. On September 15 a Soviet-Japanese accord was signed by Molotov and Ambassador Togo. It provided for an armistice in the sporadic border fighting between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia and for the demarcation of the frontier. Western observers wondered whether Hitler had succeeded in engineering a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. At 3 a.m. September 17 Potemkin summoned Ambassador Grzybowski and read to him a note signed by Molotov, announcing that orders had been given to the Red Army to cross the Polish frontiers. Grzy-
Polajid^ September
28, Ip^p
381
bowski refused to accept the note, protested energetically, and asked for instructions (P 174). The note declared: Mr. Ambassador: The Polish-German war has revealed the internal insolvency of the Polish State. In ten days of hostilities Poland has lost all her industrial regions and cultural centers. Warsaw^ as the capital of Poland no longer exists. The Polish Government has fallen to pieces and shows no signs of life. This means that the Polish State and its government have virtually ceased to exist. Treaties concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have thereby lost their validity. Abandoned to her fate and left without leadership, Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency which may create a menace to the U.S.S.R. Hence, while it was neutral hitherto, the Soviet Government can no longer maintain a neutral attitude toward these facts. Nor can the Soviet Government remain indifferent when its blood brothers, Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians [White Russians] in Polish territory, having been abandoned to their fate, are left without protection. In view of this state of affairs, the Soviet Government has instructed the higher command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelo-Russia. At the same time the Soviet Government intends to take every measure to deliver the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by their unwise leaders and to give them an opportunity to live a life of peace.^ Copies of this note were communicated to Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and a dozen lesser Powers, along with assurances that "the U.S.S.R. will pursue a policy of neutrality in relations between the U.S.S.R. and your country." Through its Ambassador in BerUn, Moscow simultaneously accorded diplomatic recognition to Slovakia, Molotov asserted in a radio address: . . . No one knows the whereabouts of the Polish Government. The population of Poland have been abandoned by their ill-starred leaders to their fate. The Polish State and its government have virtually ceased to exist. In view of this state of affairs, treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland have ceased to operate. . . . The Soviet Government deems it its sacred duty to extend the hand of assistance to its brother Ukrainians and brother Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland. . . . Nobody 1P 175; Tass dispatch, September 17, 1939.
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Staliri's
Victory
could have expected that the Polish State would have revealed such impotence and such svsîft collapse as has now^ already taken place all over Poland. But inasmuch as this collapse is a fact and Polish statesmen have revealed their utter bankruptcy and are incapable of changing the situation in Poland, our Red Army, having received large reinforcements as the result of the recent calling up of reserves, must perform vi'ith credit the honorable duty placed upon it.^
At 4 a.m. September 17 Soviet troops began moving into Poland all along the frontier. Beck, then in Kuty, protested at Soviet aggression and told Grzybowski to demand his passport. He did not, however, ask France and Britain to come to Poland's defense against the U.S.S.R. (P 176-8). The French press denounced the Soviet "stab in the back." The London Daily Express opined that "the two thieves may fall out over the division of the spoils." The Daily Telegraph hoped that "the presence of a powerful Russian army on his Eastern frontier will immobilize a large part of Hitler's forces." Chamberlain and Halifax conferred and decided to take no action. Izvestia on September 18 published a map showing the eastern third of Poland as Russian and the western two-thirds as German. Alexei Tolstoi in the same journal declared: "We are neutral in the Soviet fashion, not in the fashion of bourgeois neutrals who stuff their pockets with bloodstained money. W e repudiate wars of conquest. . . . Our tasks are creating happiness for all peoples. . . . Grim, unswerving, and magnanimous comes the Red Army. Our brothers beyond the border, yesterday's slaves, find that in the future they are to live prosperously and happily." A Moscow broadcast asserted that there would be no clash with Germany and hinted at cooperation to establish a buffer State. The Soviet troops encountered only sporadic resistance. Some of their commanders elicited local "welcomes" by declaring they had come to fight the Germans. In some areas German troops withdrew to make room for the Red divisions. German and Soviet officers conferred in Moscow on September 20-21 and drew a tentative line. By September 27 all the GaUcian oil fields were in
1 The Prussian-Russian-Austrian treaty of February 17, 1772, leading to the first partition of Poland, had declared: "In the name of the Very Holy and Indivisible Trinity, the factious spirit which nowadays sows anarchy in Poland inspired the fear that the State will fall asunder and that the interests of the neighboring Powers will be disturbed. . . ."
Poland f September 28, 1(^3p
383
Soviet hands. Red troops had reached the Hungarian frontier, thus cutting off the Reichswehr from access to Rumania through PoHsh territory. Lloyd George, with something less than good grace, declared that the "improvident Polish Government" had deserted its "brave soldiers" and "poverty-stricken peasants." He opined that "it would be an act of supreme folly to place the Russian advance in the same category as that of the Germans." Berlin prepared to complete its Moscow bargain. On September 26 it was announced that Ribbentrop would again fly to the Soviet capital on the following day. He arrived with a large staff and went into conference with Stalin and Molotov on September 27-28. At 6.40 a.m. September 29 the Moscow radio announced the result. Ribbentrop flew back to Berlin the same afternoon, after a banquet, a ballet at the opera, and a hasty visit to the Agricultural Exposition. The agreements signed under date of September 28 included a declaration:
After the German Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. through a treaty signed today definitely solved questions resulting from the disintegration of the Polish State and thereby established a secure foundation for permanent peace in Eastern Europe, they unanimously voice their opinion that it would be in the interest of all nations to bring to an end the state of war presently existing between Germany on one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments therefore will concentrate their efforts, if necessary in cooperation with the other friendly Powers, toward reaching this goal. Should, however, the effort of both governments remain unsuccessful, the fact would thereby be established that England and France are responsible for a continuation of the war, in which case the Governments of Germany and the U.S.S.R. will consult each other as to necessary measures.
This added nothing to the pact of August 23, save that it reflected Soviet eagerness to see the Reich and the Allies stalemated. If this could be achieved by immediate peace, the Kremlin had no objection. There followed an exchange of letters between Molotov and Ribbentrop expressing willingness to facilitate exchange of industrial products for raw materials, and a "Border and Friendship Treaty" partitioning Poland:
The German Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R., after disintegration of the former Polish State, regard it as their task to
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Stalin's Victory
restore peace and order in these territories in order to secure for nationalities living there peaceful existence according to their national individuality. For this purpose the two Governments have agreed to the following: 1. The German Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. define as their mutual frontier in the territory of the former Polish State a line which is marked on the accompanying map and which will be more closely described in the supplementary protocol. 2. Both parties recognize the borderline fixed in Art. i as final, and will reject any interference in this settlement by third Powers. 3. The necessary public reorganization in territories west of the line described in Art. i will be carried out by the German Government; in territories east of the line by the Government of the U.S.S.R. 4. The German Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. regard the preceding regulation as a secure foundation for a progressive development of friendly relations between their peoples. 5. This treaty will be ratified and the ratification documents exchanged at Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty becomes valid after the signatures are affixed. . . . Annex 2. . . . The borderline begins at the southern tip of Lithuania and from there runs in a general western direction north of Augustow to the German Reich border and follows this Reich border to the Pissa River and thence as far as Ostrolenka. From there it runs in a southeastern direction until it meets the Bug River at Nur. It continues further along the Bug River to Krystnopol and then bends west, running north of Rawa Ruska and Lubaczow to the San River. From there it follows the San River to its source (P 176).
This instrument differed from the earlier arrangements for military demarcation in that the territory between the Bug and the Vistula now fell into the German instead of the Soviet sphere. The language employed {"'co7tmte frontiere des interets d'empire reciproques") did not refer to "annexation" and left the status of the spheres to befixedby Berlin and Moscow respectively. The demarcation closely followed the "Curzon line" of 1919 and represented the ethnographical frontier. The predominantly Polish-speaking areas went to the Reich, the Ukrainian and White Russian regions to the U.S.S.R. Germany gained 18 million people, seven of the nine largest Polish cities and the most of the industrial areas. The Soviet Union gained 14 million people in the agricultural east. An additional protocol of October 5, signed by Molotov and Schulenberg, fixed the frontier more precisely. These steps provoked Polish protests and denunciations of
Polandi
September 28, Ip^p
385
Soviet perfidy by Daladier and Chamberlain. On September 30 the PoHsh Embassies in London, Paris, and other capitals transmitted to the various Foreign Ministers a note protesting "most formally and most solemnly" against the accord of September 28 as "a violation of all international obligations and of all human morality." "Poland will never recognize this act of violence and, strong in the justice of her cause, she will only cease to struggle when her territory will be free of invaders and her legitimate rights entirely re-established" (P 181). Premier Sikorski in a broadcast from Paris, October 6, swore on "the blood of the Poles who fell" that "no Polish Government will ever accept the German-Russian partition of Poland." A subsequent protest was made on October 18 against the Soviet-Lithuanian agreement of the loth by which Moscow transferred Vilna to Lithuania (P
181, 182).
Meanwhile the last embers of Polish armed resistance had flickered out. The Polish leaders fled to Rumania at the time of the Soviet invasion. President Moscicki resigned his post and subsequently left Rumania as a private citizen. Beck and Smigly-Rydz were interned at the demand of Berlin. Under Mayor Stefan Starzynski, the troops and civilians of Warsaw continued to resist German siege. Various proposals for surrender and for the removal of women and children were rejected. Following artillery bombardment on September 8-9, the invaders launched the full force of their aviation and field guns against the doomed capital. The Ministry of Finance, the Grand Theatre, most of the buildings along the Nowy-Swiat, the United States Embassy, the Bourse, the City Hall, the Ethnographic Museum, numerous churches, schools and hospitals and innumerable homes, apartments and business buildings were reduced to rubbish. Great fires raged, filling the sky above the city with immense clouds of smoke, white, black, and multi-colored, through which the slanting rays of the autumn sun shot streamers of light onto the burning ruins. How many thousands died will never be known.^ Starvation and pestilence reduced the survivors to hopelessness. On September 27 the city surrendered. Starzynski was variously reported a suicide, a German prisoner, and (a year later) the victim of a Nazi
1 Cf. Descriptions and photographs in Vlnvasion Allemande en Fologne, Centre d'infoimation et de documentation du gouvernement polonais, Flammarion, Paris, 1940.
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Stalin''s
Victory
firing squad. A small Polish garrison on the Hela peninsula laid down its arms on October i. Four days later German forces entered the wreckage of Warsaw. The Poland of Pilsudski's Colonels was dead. The more democratic leaders of the opposition assumed leadership of Poland in exile. On September 20 a new Polish Cabinet was formed in Parissubsequently to be moved to Angers and then, when France suffered Poland's fate, to London. Its president was Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz; its Premier, General Wladyslaw Sikorski. Commander of the newly recruited Polish detachments in France; and its Foreign Minister, August Zaleski. Beck and Smigly-Rydz were arrested in October, 1940, following German occupation of Rumania. The last gasp of the old Polish State was the final report of Ambassador Grzybowski rendered at Paris on November 6 (P 184). This long and bitter document was an indictment of Stalinism. It was also unwittingly an indictment of the blindness of Smigly-Rydz and Beck during the preceding six years. The Ambassador recalled that when he had first presented his credentials on July I, 1936, Soviet officials had denounced Poland for its "pro-German" orientation. Grzybowski denied the charge, but Warsaw's course toward Berlin since 1934 made the denial unconvincing. He perceived in retrospect early evidences of a growing "ideological imperialism" in the Kremlin. Soviet hostility toward Warsaw reached a high point at the time of the Munich crisis. The subsequent rapprochement was fraught with fears and suspicions on both sides. It was clear to Grzybowski that Litvinov's resignation was the prelude to a possible German-Soviet entente. But no change of Polish policy followed while London and Moscow dickered for a pact. "We could not accept a unilateral guarantee of the Soviets. As for a mutual guarantee, we could not accept it because, in case of a conflict with Germany, our forces would be entirely engaged against that Power and in consequence we would not be in a position to come to the aid of the Soviets. It was difficult for us to engage in multilateral negotiations and we made our final attitude dependent on the results of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. W e rejected all discussion of questions concerning us save by way of bilateral pourparlers. . . . W e did not reject precise forms of assistance on the part of the Soviet in case of a
The Eastlands
387
conflict. W e considered it premature, however, to engage in bilateral pourparlers with the Soviets before the end of the AngloFrench-Soviet negotiations." In June Moscow had made a series of offers of foodstuffs and war supplies. But "these offers were always accompanied by certain unacceptable conditions.... The German-Soviet pact gave the measure of the cynicism of Soviet policy." When Potemkin read him the note of September 17 he appealed in vain to Soviet honor and to "Slav solidarity." At the end Schulenberg and Rosso intervened with Potemkin to insure respect for the immunity of the members of the Polish diplomatic staff. Grzybowski departed by way of Finland . . .
2. T H E
EASTLANDS
The cession of eastern Poland and the extension of Bolshevism 250 miles westward constituted only part of the price which Hitler was obliged to pay to Stalin. Another installment involved the Baltic Republics, earmarked as part of the Reich's Lebetisraum since the days of the Teutonic knights. Here again the precise terms of the original bargain between Berlin and Moscow are still unknown. The course of events reveals the nature of the final payment. On September 18 the interned Polish submarine Orzel escaped from the harbor of Tallinn, Estonia. Moscow protested and ordered the Red fleet to comb Estonian waters for the missing vessel. Apologies and explanations were dismissed as inadequate. Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter went to Moscow on September 24, ostensibly to conclude a commercial agreement. After being called away at midnight from the ballet to confer with Soviet officials, he hastened back to Tallinn by plane on the following day. The Moscow radio declared on the 26th that since "explanations regarding the disappearance of the interned Polish submarine were found unsatisfactory," negotiations had been opened "regarding measures insuring the security of Soviet waters against diversionist acts on the part of foreign submarines hiding in Baltic waters." Moscow reported that one Soviet steamer had been sunk in the Gulf of Finland and another attacked. Selter conferred with President Konstantin Paets and with the head of the army, General Juhan Laidonner. He hurried back to Moscow on
The Eastlands
387
conflict. W e considered it premature, however, to engage in bilateral pourparlers with the Soviets before the end of the AngloFrench-Soviet negotiations." In June Moscow had made a series of offers of foodstuffs and war supplies. But "these offers were always accompanied by certain unacceptable conditions.... The German-Soviet pact gave the measure of the cynicism of Soviet policy." When Potemkin read him the note of September 17 he appealed in vain to Soviet honor and to "Slav solidarity." At the end Schulenberg and Rosso intervened with Potemkin to insure respect for the immunity of the members of the Polish diplomatic staff. Grzybowski departed by way of Finland . . .
2. T H E
EASTLANDS
The cession of eastern Poland and the extension of Bolshevism 250 miles westward constituted only part of the price which Hitler was obliged to pay to Stalin. Another installment involved the Baltic Republics, earmarked as part of the Reich's Lebetisraum since the days of the Teutonic knights. Here again the precise terms of the original bargain between Berlin and Moscow are still unknown. The course of events reveals the nature of the final payment. On September 18 the interned Polish submarine Orzel escaped from the harbor of Tallinn, Estonia. Moscow protested and ordered the Red fleet to comb Estonian waters for the missing vessel. Apologies and explanations were dismissed as inadequate. Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter went to Moscow on September 24, ostensibly to conclude a commercial agreement. After being called away at midnight from the ballet to confer with Soviet officials, he hastened back to Tallinn by plane on the following day. The Moscow radio declared on the 26th that since "explanations regarding the disappearance of the interned Polish submarine were found unsatisfactory," negotiations had been opened "regarding measures insuring the security of Soviet waters against diversionist acts on the part of foreign submarines hiding in Baltic waters." Moscow reported that one Soviet steamer had been sunk in the Gulf of Finland and another attacked. Selter conferred with President Konstantin Paets and with the head of the army, General Juhan Laidonner. He hurried back to Moscow on
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the 27th, accompanied by Professor Juri Uluots, President of the Chamber of Deputies, and by Professor Antonin Piip, an expert on international law. It subsequently appeared that Moscow had presented an ultimatum to Estonia, backed by military and naval threats, and that the rulers of the small republic had yielded. On September 28, 1939, Selter and Molotov signed a mutual assistance pact, prefaced by references to "friendly relations" under the treaty of February 2, 1920, to "independent political existence and non-interference in internal affairs," and to the nonaggression pact of May 4, 193 2. The new agreement obligated the parties (Art. i) "to render each other any mutual aid, also including military assistance, in the case either of a direct aggression or a threat of aggression on the part of some European Great Power against Baltic maritime borders of the contracting parties or against their land borders via Latvian territory, likewise against bases referred to in Art. 3." The U.S.S.R. (Art. 2) would supply the Estonian army with war supplies "on favored terms."
3. The Republic of Estonia shall secure the U.S.S.R. the right to possess on the Estonian isles of Saaremaa (Oesel), Hiiumas (Dago), and in the city of Paldiski bases for the Navy and a certain number of landing fields for air forces on a leasehold basis at an acceptable price. The exact location of bases and landing fields shall be marked out and the boundaries thereof shall be fixed by mutual agreement. In the interests of protection of naval bases and landing fields, the U.S.S.R. shall have the right to maintain at their own cost in the sectors apportioned under bases and landing fields Soviet territorial and air forces in exactly fixed numbers, the maximum number whereof shall be fixed by a special agreement. 4. Both contracting parties shall obligate themselves not to conclude any alliances nor to take part in any coalitions directed against either of the contracting parties. 5. The entering into force of this pact shall in no way infringe upon the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, particularly their economic system and political structure. The sectors which are designated as bases and airfields (Art. 3) shall remain the territory of the Republic of Estonia. 6. This pact shall enter into force upon the exchange of ratifications. This exchange shall take place at Tallinn within 6 days from the date of the signing of this pact. This pact shall be valid for 10 years and in case one of the contracting parties does not abrogate the pact before the expiration of i year prior
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to the termination of its validity, the validity thereof shall automatically be extended for a subsequent period of 5 years.^
A supplementary trade agreement enlarged Soviet transit privileges to Estonian ports. Tallinn consented to the establishment of Soviet garrisons on Estonian soil, totalling 25,000 troops. Ribbentrop was reported to have approved. Moscow next invited Estonia's southern neighbor, Latvia, to send a delegation to the Kremlin. Foreign Minister Wilhelm Munters went on October 2 and conferred with Stalin, Molotov, and Potemkin. On the following day Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys of Lithuania also arrived. On October 5,1931, Munters and Molotov signed a mutual assistance pact, prefaced by references to "friendly relations" under the treaty of August 11, 1920, to "independent statehood and non-interference in internal affairs," and to the non-aggression pact of February 5, 1932. The new engagement pledged the parties (Art. i) "to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of a direct attack, or threat of attack, on the part of any European Great Power, with respect to the sea borders of the contracting parties on the Baltic Sea, or their land borders through the territory of the Estonian or Latvian Republics, or also the bases referred to in Art. 3."
3. In order to insure the safety of the U.S.S.R. and to consolidate her own independence, the Latvian Republic grants to the Union the right to maintain in the cities of Liapaja (Libava) and Ventspils (Vindava) naval bases and several airfields for aviation purposes on leasehold at a reasonable rental. The locations of the bases and airfields shall be exactly specified and their boundaries determined by mutual agreement. For the purpose of protecting the Straits of Irbe, the Soviet Union is given the right to establish on the same conditions a coast artUlery base between Ventspils and Pitrags. For the purpose of protecting the naval bases, the airfields, and the coast artillery base, the Soviet Union has the right to maintain at its own expense on the areas set aside for bases and airfields a strictly limited number of Soviet land and air forces, the maximum number of which is to be fixed by special agreement.
The other Articles were identical with the Estonian treaty.^ "The Soviet-Latvian mutual assistance pact," wrote Izvestia on
^ Department of State Bw/Zetin, November 11, 1939, pp. 543-4. ^ Ibid., November n , 1939, pp. 542-3.
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October 6, "is the outcome of friendly relations based on mutual trust in which the Soviet Union's respect for the independence of other States was a model. The Soviet Union never exploited the position of being a great and strong Power confronting small countries. . . . London politicians sought to exploit Latvia as a base in an aggressive plan against the Soviet Union and also as an agrarian colony and appendage to industrial England. . . . The acquisition of the right to naval bases at Libau and Windau bars any attempt at aggression in the Baltic Sea." Three days later another editorial in Izvestia quoted with approval Bernard Shaw's plea for peace and commented on Hitler's address of October 6:
. . . Even the blind can now see that the Polish State cannot be r e stored in its former shape and on its former territory. Still, the war of Great Britain and France against Germany is waged under the slogan of restoration of Poland. Therefore continuation of the war cannot be justified by anything and constitutes senseless slaughter. Termination of this war would meet the interests of all peoples and countries. . . . "Annihilation of Hitlerism" is now proclaimed as the principal demand. T h e fight against Hitlerian ideology: thus British and French politicians now describe their aims in the present war. . . . Every one is entitled to express his attitude toward one or another ideology, defend it or reject it. But extermination of a people for the reason that some one does not like certain views and an ideology is senseless and absurd cruelty. It throws us back to the dark medieval epoch of devastating religious wars for extermination of heretics and dissentients. . . . One cannot destroy any ideology by fire and sword. One may respect or hate Hitlerism, just as any other system of political views. This is a matter of taste. But to undertake war for "annihilation of Hitlerism" means to commit criminal folly in politics. . . . For whose benefit is this war waged for domination of the world? In any case, not for the benefit of the working class. T h e working class can only suffer in such a war.
Lithuania was next. On October lo, 1939, Urbsys and Molotov signed a mutual assistance pact, prefaced by references to "friendly relations" under the treaty of July 12, 1920, to "independent statehood and non-interference in internal affairs," and to the non-aggression pact of September 28, 1926. The new engagement pledged the parties (Art. 2) "to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of aggression or menace of aggression against Lithuania, as well as in the event of
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aggression or menace of aggression against the Soviet Union over Lithuanian territory on the part of any European Power." The rest of the agreement was identical with the previous treaties, save that it was to run for 15 years plus 10 (Art. 8) and the two parties agreed (Art. 5) to consult and take common measures "in the event of menace of aggression against Lithuania or against the U.S.S.R. over Lithuanian territory." The points at which Soviet garrisons would be established were left unnamed amid rumors of plans for a "A'laginot Line" facing East Prussia. Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania received an illusory reward for compliance. Article i of the treaty declared: "For the purpose of consolidation of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, the city of Vilna and the Vilna region are transferred by the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian Republic and included in the territory of the Lithuanian State." ^ On April 2, 1940, Lithuania notified the League of Nations that it rejected the Polish protest of October 24 concerning Vilna and intended to keep the city. These arrangements gave the U.S.S.R. eifective military and naval control of the Baltic Littoral between East Prussia and the Gulf of Finland. They also made the three Baltic Republics protectorates of the U.S.S.R. During the brief interval prior to their absorption into the Soviet Union, Moscow refrained from intervention in domestic affairs or local administration.^ It presently appeared that Hitler had been obliged to consent to the evacuation of the Germans who had lived for centuries along the Baltic. Alfred Rosenberg's views of this decision are not recorded. Nazi maps showed 20,000 Germans in Estland, 70,000 in Lettland and 40,000 in Litauen.^ In his address of October 6 the Fiihrer declared that "Germany and the Soviet have come to an agreement" for a "resettlement" to "remove at least part of the material for European conflict." Berlin reports of October 7 indicated that all of these peoples would be "repatriated" by negotiation with the Baltic Governments. No time was lost. German ships reached Baltic ports on October 8 to bring "home" the members of the German minority. Those who were uprooted were "invited" to come. The exodus was "voluntary," like Hacha's surrender to
1 Tass communique, October lo, 1939. 2 Cf. Letter of Alfred Bilmanis, Latvian Minister, NYT 12.27.39. 2 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 330-1.
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the Fiihrer. For many, the arrival of the Red troops made them eager to depart. The Balticum was lost to the Reich. The faint clank of armor and rattle of bones beneath the earth was the sound of dead Teutonic knights turning over in their graves. The Kremlin's course was fixed. "Neutrality" meant defense against the Reich by seizure of the Zivischenlaiids with little respect for the rights or desires of the inhabitants thereof. It meant trade with the Reich with little concern if the goods supplied went to the Nazi war machine. It meant trade with the Allies. On October 11 Britain and the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement for the exchange of rubber and tin for lumber. Maisky saw Halifax on October i6. Seeds saw Potemkin on the 20th. Further commercial arrangements were discussed. "Neutrality" also meant verbal support for German peace overtures and a Comintern line which damned not Fascism but Anglo-French imperialism. At an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet Molotov made a report of progress on October 31:
. . . Instead of the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European Powers, we now have a rapprochement and the estabUshment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. . . . In the past few months such concepts as "aggression" and "aggressor" have acquired a new concrete connotation. . . . Today, as far as the European Great Powers are concerned, Germany is in the position of a State that is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, while Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favor of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace. T h e roles, as you see, are changing. . . . Everybody realizes that there can be no question of restoring the old Poland. It is therefore absurd to continue the present war under the flag of the restoration of the former Polish State. . . . T h e British and French have declared something in the nature of an "ideological" war on Germany, reminiscent of the religious wars of olden times. . . . Is it back to the Middle Ages, to the days of religious wars, superstition and cultural deterioration that the ruling classes of Britain and France want to drag us? . . . It is not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war as the war for "the destruction of Hitlerism," camouflaged as a fight for "democracy." . . . T h e imperialist character of this war is obvious to anyone who wants to face realities and does not close his eyes to facts. . . . W e have always held that a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for a durable peace in Europe. . . . T h e total casualties of the Red Army on the territory of western W h i t e Russia and western Ukraine were 737 killed and 1,862 wounded, or a
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total of 2,599. Together the territory of western Ukraine and western White Russia that has passed to us has an area of 196,000 sq. km. and a population of about 13,000,000 of whom more than 7,000,000 are Ukrainians, more than 3,000,000 White Russians, more than 1,000,000 Poles and more than 1,000,000 Jews. . . . All the reports show the population greeting their liberation from the yoke of the gentry with indescribable enthusiasm and rapturously haUing this great new victory of the Soviet system. . . . We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of pacts on a basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all nonsense about Sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemy and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs. . . . Our country, as a neutral country that is not interested in the spread of war, will take every measure to render the war less devastating, to weaken it and to hasten its termination in the interests of peace.^
These themes were repeated during the celebration of the twenty-second anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The annual appeal of the Comintern on November 7 accused Germany as well as the Allies of "waging war for world domination," denounced American greed for war profits, suggested that Italy was "awaiting only a convenient moment to attack whoever is defeated to obtain a share of the loot," and called on the workers of the world to oppose the imperialists. In Red Square Voroshilov cautioned the Red Army to "be ready for war, although we shall not take part in war. . . . Our troops are in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for the security of these countries and that of the Soviet Union, not to interfere with the internal affairs of these sovereign States." Georgi Dimitrov, Secretary-General of the Comintern, called for a new united front to oppose the war. In the Bolshoi Theatre Molotov again reviewed at length the recent victories and asserted that against capitalist decay and imperialist greed stood the Soviet Union "with its policy of peace and its ardent efforts to effect rapid termination of the war." On November 29 Stalin replied to a French report that he desired the war to last as long as possible by saying that he was "not in a position to know in what particular cabaret this lie was fabricated." He declared that France and Britain were responsible for the war since they had "attacked Germany." "The Soviet Union openly supported Germany's peace proposals because it believed and continues to believe that the earliest termination of the war would
1 Tass communique, October 31,1939.
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fundamentally alleviate the position of all countries and nations. The ruling circles of England and France rudely declined both Germany's peace proposals and the attempts of the Soviet Union to attain the earliest termination of the war." This Soviet solicitude for "peace," with its anti-Allied verbiage and its anti-German deeds, was more than hypocrisy or a mere formula to link the new Communist line with the old. The Nazi Blitzkrieg in Poland impressed Moscow more than it impressed London and Paris. Stalin had never believed in the possibility of Allied victory over the Reich without Soviet aid. He suspected that the Allied leaders might make peace after the death of Poland. He hoped that they would make peace, since they would thereby be completely discredited among their own peoples. He was perhaps beginning to hope that they would make peace to avoid the dangers of a complete defeat of the Western Powers at Hitler's hands. Such a defeat would imperil the U.S.S.R. It might be averted by a "negotiated" peace. Such a settlement would enormously enhance German power. But it would leave Britain and France intact under new leaders who would have no option, if they hoped for national survival, but to seek an entente with Mosco'w. A new balance of power might thus emerge, with the U.S.S.R. holding the balance. That advocacy of such a development would fail of its purpose and might in the end contribute to Nazi mastery of Europe did not at once occur to the men of the Kremlin. They sought safety, meanwhile, in extending their frontiers westward and in imposing mutual assistance pacts on their smaller neighbors. Rumania, like Poland, was a special problem which, it was assumed, would ultimately be solved by partition rather than by "protection." Moscow turned its attention to Turkey whose able Foreign Minister, Shukru Saracoglu, had come to Moscow on September 25. Since Italy was neutral and there was no war as yet in the Mediterranean, Turkey had no obligations to come to the aid of Britain and France. Ankara was disposed, however, to complete its accord of May and June with the Allies against the day when Rome might join Berlin in hostilities and seek new conquests at Turkey's expense. The problem was to complete the alliance with the Western Powers without running risks of conflict with the U.S.S.R. If Moscow would agree to a new pact to
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guarantee the status quo in the Black Sea and the Balkans there would be no difficulty. But Moscow was suspicious of the purposes of the visit to Ankara on September 10 of anti-Bolshevik General Weygand, Commander of the French forces in Syria. And Moscow desired to include Turkey in its program of mutual assistance pacts. These divergent purposes proved difficult to reconcile. Saracoglu was alternately wooed and neglected in Moscow while Ribbentrop, Selter, Munters, and Urbsys came and went. On September 30 he hinted to the British and French Ambassadors that he would go home the next day. Ankara let it be known that it would negotiate a new trade agreement with Germany and that the pact with Britain and France was ready for signature. Molotov at once invited Saracoglu to confer. Subsequent threats of going home brought subsequent conferences and made it clear that the Turkish spokesman was not to be worn down. But the negotiations ended in deadlock. Premier Refik Saydam explained on October 17 that Moscow had made proposals beyond those originally mentioned and had presented terms contrary to Turkey's other obligations. In his address of October 31 Molotov branded as "lies" reports that the U.S.S.R. had asked for Turkish territory or demanded a privileged position at the Straits. Moscow had asked a bilateral mutual assistance pact limited to the Straits and the Black Sea and so framed as to involve no danger of the Soviet Union being drawn into conflict with Germany or of having war vessels of outside States admitted through the Bosphorus. Turkey had rejected these conditions and preferred to conclude a pact with the AlUes. Who demanded what from whom is unclear from these statements. Moscow may have asked the right to maintain a garrison at the Dardanelles. Saracoglu departed on October 17 with the deadlock unbroken but with belated protestations of friendship on both sides. The negotiations failed in part because Ankara insisted on its right to open the Straits to Allied aid for Rumania while Moscow sought to close the Straits to all belligerent warships in the event of any spread of the conflict. On October 19 Turkey signed the fifteen-year treaty of mutual assistance with France and Britain that had been initialed in London a fortnight before. The Allies pledged aid to Turkey if
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she should be attacked by any European Power. All the signatories agreed to aid one another in the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean. Italy's entrance into the war on Germany's side would thus presumably bring Turkey in on the Allied side. By Article 3: "So long as the guarantee given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Rumania by the respective declarations on April 13, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom, and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees." This appeared to mean that Turkey was pledged to keep open the Straits if France and Great Britain should be obliged to go to Rumania's aid. But a supplementary protocol asserted: "The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty cannot require that country to take action having as its effect or involving as its consequence entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R." Moscow was thus left with a veto over Turkish policy if it chose to threaten wâr. Should Italy enter the war, Turkey would aid the Allies, but only on condition that the guarantees to Greece and Rumania remained in force and that aid involved no conflict with Russia. This last success of AUied effort to complete the "peace front" was to prove as futile as earher steps. The Italian declaration of war coincided with the collapse of France and the Rumanian repudiation of the British guarantee. Turkey therefore remained neutral. Moscow had made no threats to compel Turkish acceptance of its terms. Turkey would have resisted. War with Turkey might involve war with Britain and France, a contingency for which Stalin had no more taste than for war with Germany. Turkey was not a defeated nation, like Poland, nor a helpless nation like the Baltic States. It had a population more than four times that of Finland and a correspondingly larger army. Since the Turks were not Poles, and the Red Army was not the new Reichswehr, the war would be long and costly. The Baku oil fields were highly vulnerable to air attack. The Soviet leaders, moreover, did not feel that the U.S.S.R. was threatened by Turkey or through Turkey. They therefore preferred to acquiesce in Turkish refusal to accept their demands.
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3. F I N L A N D ' S SORROW
Another of the Soviet Union's western neighbors chose, like Turkey, to resist Moscow in the autumn of 1939. Unlike Turkey, Finland was feeble and without allies. These crimes are always heavily punished in epochs when the ogre of power devours the weak. The Soviet assault upon Finland was legally and ethically on a par with the aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany against China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Poland. Attempts at "justifying" Soviet aggression rested upon accusations which were largely false, assumptions which were invariably wrong and "successes" which were bloody and bitter. Finland's error lay in diplomatic and military resistance to demands which had finally to be accepted in harsher form after fearful losses. Helsinki hoped, contrary to all experience, that the sympathy of the Western Powers might become more than a feckless gesture. Yet it is probable that Finland's heroic defense preserved, or at least prolonged, Finland's independence. These events were but an incident in the ruin of the world, albeit an incident of epic proportions and one displaying in purest form the courage of soldiers, the myopia of politicians, the dishonesty of Caesars and the befuddlement of democrats. The rugged people of "Suomi"arctic land of many lakes, white summer nights, long winter darkness and heavy snowshave an old saying: "Swedish we are not; Russian we do not want to become; therefore we must be Finnish." ^ After six centuries of Swedish rule Finland passed to Russia an an autonomous Grand Duchy in 1809. It remained Russian until independence was won in 1917. In the brutal civil war of 1918 the Finnish Communists, supported by Moscow, were beaten, exterminated, or dispersed by the "Whites" who were supported by Berlin and led by Baron Karl Gustav von Mannerheim. Following the failure of an attempt to estabUsh a monarchy, a republican constitution was adopted in 1919. Unlike the other Baltic Repubhcs, the Finns followed the example of the Scandinavian Kingdoms in evolving a political order resting upon Western concepts of freedom; an economic
1 Cf. Max B. Thatcher, "Russia Turns Aggressor," Events, January 1940, for an excellent account of the negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities.
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3. F I N L A N D ' S SORROW
Another of the Soviet Union's western neighbors chose, like Turkey, to resist Moscow in the autumn of 1939. Unlike Turkey, Finland was feeble and without allies. These crimes are always heavily punished in epochs when the ogre of power devours the weak. The Soviet assault upon Finland was legally and ethically on a par with the aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany against China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Poland. Attempts at "justifying" Soviet aggression rested upon accusations which were largely false, assumptions which were invariably wrong and "successes" which were bloody and bitter. Finland's error lay in diplomatic and military resistance to demands which had finally to be accepted in harsher form after fearful losses. Helsinki hoped, contrary to all experience, that the sympathy of the Western Powers might become more than a feckless gesture. Yet it is probable that Finland's heroic defense preserved, or at least prolonged, Finland's independence. These events were but an incident in the ruin of the world, albeit an incident of epic proportions and one displaying in purest form the courage of soldiers, the myopia of politicians, the dishonesty of Caesars and the befuddlement of democrats. The rugged people of "Suomi"arctic land of many lakes, white summer nights, long winter darkness and heavy snowshave an old saying: "Swedish we are not; Russian we do not want to become; therefore we must be Finnish." ^ After six centuries of Swedish rule Finland passed to Russia an an autonomous Grand Duchy in 1809. It remained Russian until independence was won in 1917. In the brutal civil war of 1918 the Finnish Communists, supported by Moscow, were beaten, exterminated, or dispersed by the "Whites" who were supported by Berlin and led by Baron Karl Gustav von Mannerheim. Following the failure of an attempt to estabUsh a monarchy, a republican constitution was adopted in 1919. Unlike the other Baltic Repubhcs, the Finns followed the example of the Scandinavian Kingdoms in evolving a political order resting upon Western concepts of freedom; an economic
1 Cf. Max B. Thatcher, "Russia Turns Aggressor," Events, January 1940, for an excellent account of the negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities.
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Victory
order resting upon small business, independent farming, highly developed cooperatives and a measure of state socialism; and a social order combining private initiative and opportunity with public security for all. Helsinki flourished as a garden city, graced with modern architecture at its best. The Finnish-Soviet frontier twenty miles northwest of Leningrad was ever a line between cleanliness, order, and plenty on the one side and sprawling poverty and slovenly striving toward Utopia on the other. What Stalin sought from Finland in inviting negotiations on October 5, 1939, was not the annexation of the Republic nor the extinction of its independence nor even a mutual assistance pact, though the latter proposal had been originally made and then withdrawn. Stalin sought to strengthen the Soviet's strategic position with respect to the Gulf of Finland, the Red naval base at Kronstadt and the city of Leningrad. Moscow had already opposed the fortification of the Aaland Islands, commanding the mouths of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland. As early as June Moscow had suggested that Helsinki grant a naval base on the peninsula of Hanko opposite Paltiski in Estonia and cede the four demilitarized islands of Suursaari, Tytarsaari, Lavansaari, and Seiskari lying southwest of Viipuri (Viborg) and roughly midway between Helsinki and Leningrad. Whether these demands played a role in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations is uncertain. Helsinki displayed no enthusiasm. On October 7 the Finnish Cabinet appointed a delegation of five, headed by Finance Minister Vanio Tanner and Dr. Juho Paasikivi, Finnish Minister to Sweden. Foreign Minister Eljas Erkko declared: "Finland will not sign a dictated agreement incompatible with her integrity and her neutrality. . . . The fact that Finland has sent representatives to Moscow only denotes that Finland is prepared to conduct friendly negotiations." Paasikivi arrived on October 11 and saw Stalin and Molotov on the 12 th. Written Soviet proposals, presented two days later, asked both for territorial cessions and new treaty arrangements. The latter comprised a thirty-year lease on the port of Hanko and its environs for construction of a naval base with a garrison of 5,000 men and coast artillery capable of blocking access to the Gulf of Finland; anchorage rights in the Bay of Lappohja; strengthening of the non-aggression pact by inclusion of a provision forbidding the signatories "to join any groups or alliances directly or indi-
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rectly hostile" to either party; and suppression of the fortified zones along the Soviet-Finnish frontier. The territorial proposals envisaged cession to the U.S.S.R. of the four islands, plus Koivisto (Bjorko) near the mainland; part of the Karelian Isthmus between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf; and the western part of the Kalastajasaarenti (in Russian, Rybachi or Fisherman's Peninsula) near Petsamo on the Arctica total of 2,761 sq. km. In return Moscow offered to grant Finland permission to fortify the Aaland Islands, providing that no foreign Power, including Sweden, should have anything to do with them, and proposed to cede to Finland 5,529 sq. km. of Soviet territory in central Karelia about midway between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic.^ Since power relationships are always relative and no objective criteria of judgment exist, it is fruitless to discuss whether these initial proposals were "just." Helsinki did not regard the territorial "exchange" as fair, despite the larger area offered, since the territories Finland was asked to cede or lease would give the U.S.S.R. complete naval domination of the Gulf and require abandonment of most of the "Mannerheim Line" on the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet control of Estonian bases made the former issue somewhat academic. As for the latter, Moscow alleged that the Finnish frontier 32 km. from Leningrad represented a potential "threat" to the former capital. Helsinki contended that the surrender of the Isthmus and of border defenses would leave Viipuri and all of southern Finland at the mercy of the Red Army. The Finnish leaders were willing to compromise, but not to the extent of jeopardizing the "security" and "neutrality" of Finland. The Kremlin was willing to compromise, but not to the extent of being willing to abandon demands the realization of which was deemed essential to make Soviet defenses in the northwest impregnable. Neither side mentioned the only Great Power in a position to threaten either: Germany. Moscow hated and distrusted Mannerheim who was a Germanophile, a cruel and inveterate anti-Bolshevik, and an ex-officer of the Tsar who had massacred fifteen thousand or more Communists in 1918 and had sought to lead the
1 This and subsequent documents will be found in full in "The Appeal of the Finnish Government to the League of Nations: a Summary Based on the Official Documentation," Special Supplement to the Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, December 1939, and in The Finnish Blue and White Book, Helsinki, 1939.
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Finns in an attack on Red Petrograd. The Kremlin later alleged, without ever adducing any proof predating the Soviet attack, that Finland was "backed" by Britain and France for purposes hostile to the U.S.S.R. Although the ultimate fate of the Baltic States was not yet foreseen, Helsinki, like Warsaw earlier, feared that surrender of strategic positions to its totalitarian neighbor might imperil its very existence. Hitler's record, and Stalin's emulation of Hitler's record, rendered such anxiety fully comprehensible. In the Finnish case, far more than in the Polish case, there was no "outside" pressure from other democracies to refuse Caesar's terms. The Finnish delegates returned to their capital to confer while Erkko asserted that Helsinki could not accept proposals which "would strengthen the security of one side at the expense of the other." On October 12 the United States, through Ambassador Steinhardt, expressed to the U.S.S.R. "its earnest hope that nothing may occur that would be calculated to affect injuriously the peaceful relations between Soviet Russia and Finland. This is a unilateral and entirely independent action." ^ Rumor held that an American loan might be extended to Finland, since the Finns alone among the war debtors had not defaulted. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark also expressed their hopes to Moscow on the same day that "nothing would occur which would prevent Finland from continuing independently to maintain her neutral position." President Kyosti Kallio conferred in Stockholm with the Scandinavian Kings. Had the other northern States been prepared to announce military support of Finland against aggression, Stalin might well have been deterred. But they preferred "neutrality"and those who make this choice rather than run risks of common action for common defense must expect to be destroyed piecemeal. On October 23 the Finnish delegation returned to Moscow with counter-proposals which expressed confidence, "given mutual goodwill," that Soviet objectives could be achieved "without detriment to Finland's security and without violating her neutrality." Helsinki offered to cede "against territorial compensation" three of the four islands; to discuss an arrangement regarding Suursaari; to reconsider the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus; and to redraft the non-aggression pact "in clearer and
1 Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1939, p. 369.
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more definite terms." But the lease of Hanko could not be discussed, since "the cession of mihtary bases to a foreign Power is in itself incompatible with unconditional neutrality." Soviet forces on Finnish territory "could also be used for an attack on Finland." Molotov at once submitted a reply: the original proposals were "minimum terms." Hanko must be leased. Moscow would restrict the garrison to 4,000 men and "maintain this force on the territory of Hanko only up to the end of the war between England, France, and Germany." Koivisto must be ceded, but the U.S.S.R. was willing to compromise as regards the Isthmian frontier. On the 25th Paasikivi and Tanner went home for new instructions. They returned on November i and two days later submitted fresh proposals which revealed no panic over Molotov's references on the 31st to the "serious consequences" of Finnish recalcitrance. Hanko and Lappohja could not be ceded or leased. "The Government of Finland takes its stand on the integrity and neutrality of Finland. It cannot consent to the stationing of troops in Finnish territory or to the use of that territory as a naval base in any way whatsoever." On the Isthmus "it cannot possibly accept the new line of demarcation," but proposed a different one of its own. Neither could Finland agree to dismantle its frontier fortifications. In return for territorial compensation, however, Finland would negotiate the cession of the western part of Fisherman's Peninsula. Since the areas offered by Moscow were of "no corresponding value either from the military or the economic point of view," the U.S.S.R. should compensate Helsinki for State property in the ceded districts and also for the immovable property of private citizens. Finland had "gone as far as its independence, security and neutrality permit." The Kremlin was adamant. Molotov suggested that in lieu of a lease of Hanko Finland might cede several islands nearby. In this case Helsinki's objections to troops or bases on "Finnish territory" would not apply. On November 9 Paasikivi replied that his Government was "of the opinion that the reasons which prevent our granting a military base at Hanko apply also to the islands in question." The Red Premier retorted that this was a misrepresentation of the Soviet attitude. A long discussion in Stalin's presence failed to break the deadlock. On the loth Paasikivi and Tanner submitted memoranda to the effect that their
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Government "does not consider it possible to cede in any form "whatsoever territories situated at Hanko or in any other regions of the Finnish coast with a view to their being employed for the establishment of military bases." The Finns left Moscow on November 13, expressing hope that negotiations might be resumed later. The Soviet press denounced Finland with increasing violence, warning of "a fate like Poland's." What followed in secret conferences in Moscow can only be guessed at. Stalin and his aides were determined to have their way. Their determination was increased by Finnish obstinacy. W h y should so small and weak a State defy the Soviet colossus? T h e Baltic States had yielded. Finland was not Turkey. The only answer which seemed plausible to the Kremlin was that "hostile" forces, possibly German, probably Allied, were supporting Finland for purposes inimical to the U.S.S.R. Finland's rulers were "bourgeois imperialists" who were alleged to be harboring dreams of extending Finland to the Urals. No matter that it would be contrary to all reason for a nation of 4 millions to attack one of 183 millions. No matter that the events of 1918-19 were twenty years past. If Helsinki "would not yield, then Finland must be a tool of capitalists plotting war against the Socialist Utopia. The wish was father to the thought. If these things were so, then the U.S.S.R. was in danger. If there was danger, there was no time to be lost through efforts to wear down Finnish resistance by mere diplomatic or economic pressure. The Western Powers, although at war, might combine to use Finland to destroy the U.S.S.R. The Marxian dialectic led to further interesting conclusions: if the U.S.S.R. resisted Finnish "attack," the "exploited workers and peasants" of Finland would see whither their traitorous bourgeois leaders had led them. They would rise as one man to overthrow "Butcher" Mannerheim and his "clique." They would make Finland a Soviet RepubKc. Hence there would be no need of conquering Finland, and thus no occasion to make elaborate preparations for conquest. A few bombs from the Red air fleet, a few shots from a few third-rate divisions would cause Finland to fall like the walls of Jericho. The Finnish "masses" would at once rally to their "liberators." That these assumptions were fantastic is no proof that they were not "sincerely" held by Stalin and Molotov. The realism with which they had dealt with Soviet interests in the grand strategy of Great Power politics was
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now all sicklied o'er with the pale cast of Marxist dogmas and Stalinist hallucinations. The result was a criminal blunder costing the lives of thousands of brave and simple people, Finns and Russians alike. The former died in defense of their homes. The latter died for old purposes which could have been achieved without violence, and for new purposes which were beyond attainment save at the cost of the extermination of the Finnish people. On the evening of November 26 Molotov handed to the Finnish Minister, Baron A. S. Yrjo-Koskinen, a note declaring that at 3.45 p.m. seven artillery shells had fallen near the village of Mainila on the Isthmus, killing three Red soldiers and one officer and wounding nine others. "In consequence of the provocative firing on the Soviet troops from Finnish territory, the Soviet Government is obliged to declare now that the concentration of Finnish troops in the vicinity of Leningrad not only constitutes a menace to Leningrad, but is in fact an act hostile to the U.S.S.R. which has already resulted in aggression against the Soviet troops and caused casualties. . . . It desires that revolting acts of this nature shall not be committed in the future." Helsinki was invited without delay to withdraw its troops on the Isthmus 20 to 25 km. Compliance with this request would have meant Finnish abandonment of most of the Mannerheim Line. On the 27th the Minister submitted a reply from his Government: an inquiry had revealed that no shots had been fired from the Finnish side. The Finnish forces in the vicinity had no guns which could reach beyond the frontier. "It seems possible that this may have been an accident which occurred in the course of firing practice on the Soviet side. . . . It is my duty to reject your protest and to state that Finland has committed no hostile act against the U.S.S.R." Helsinki nevertheless expressed willingness to cooperate in a joint investigation and to negotiate for a mutual withdrawal of troops. Molotov retorted on the 28th that this reply "reflects the deepseated hostility of the Finnish Government toward the U.S.S.R." It could be "explained only by a desire to mislead public opinion and make light of these casualties." Soviet troops were no menace to Finland, but Finnish troops were threatening Leningrad. "It is needless to stress the fact that actually the Soviet troops cannot be withdrawn anywhere, since their withdrawal to a distance of 20-25 km. from the frontier [Helsinki had not proposed this]
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would mean that they would have to be posted in the suburbs of Leningrad, which would be absurd from the point of view of the safety of the city." If Finland refused to accept the Soviet "minimum" proposal for withdrawal, "that means that its intention is that Leningrad should remain under a direct threat from its troops." This was "a hostile act which is incompatible with the Treaty of Non-Aggression. . . . In consequence, the government of the U.S.S.R. is obliged to state that it considers itself, as from today, released from the obligations ensuing from the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Finland, obligations which are being systematically violated by the Finnish Government." On the 29th, before the Minister had an opportunity to transmit a Finnish reply, Potemkin informed him of the severance of diplomatic relations, due to continued "attacks" on Soviet troops. Shortly after midnight, however, the Minister delivered a reply to the Narkomindel, denying the charges, challenging the denunciation of the pact, invoking Article 5 as a basis for proposing a conciliation commission or "neutral arbitration," and offering to withdraw Finnish troops on the Isthmus, with the exception of frontier guards and customs officials. There was no rejoinder. As early as the evening of November 29 Soviet troops violated the frontier near Petsamo and captured three guards. At 9 a.m. November 30th Soviet bombers began a series of raids on Helsinki and other towns in which 85 people were killed, including 65 in the capital. Red soldiers simultaneously crossed the border at several points on the Isthmus and between Lake Ladoga and Petsamo. On December i Moscow announced the establishment of a "Peoples' Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland" in the Isthmus village of Terijoki, composed of political refugees headed by Otto Kuusinen, one of the founders of the Finnish Communist Party and Commissar of Education in the Red regime of 1918.^ Finnish efforts on December 4 to reopen negotiations through the Swedish Min1 The "Declaration" of the Kuusinen regime issued on December i spoke of "the criminal policy of the contemptible government of Cajander, Erkko, and Tanner," "the overthrow of the tyranny of hangmen and war provocateurs," "the reactionary avid plutocracy," "White Guard hell for toilers," "the criminal government of war provocateurs," etc. The new regime, however, was not "Soviet." Its economic program was moderately socialistic. It was described as "provisional," pending establishment of a permanent regime when Kuusinen should
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ister in Moscow were met with the reply that the only Finnish Government which Moscow recognized was the Kuusinen "Government." Despite a parliamentary vote of confidence, Cajander's Cabinet resigned and was replaced by another headed by Risto Ryti, Governor of the Bank of Finland, with Tanner as Foreign Minister and Paasikivi as Minister without Portfolio. An appeal from Roosevelt to refrain from bombardment of civilian populations was dismissed by Moscow as "pointless." On December 2 the Kremlin announced the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with Kuusinen, granting all the Soviet demands, plus additional islands in the Gulf and the Rybachi (Fisherman's) and Sredni (Middle) peninsulas on the Arctic in exchange for Soviet Karelia and 18,400,000with which Kuusinen & Co. would presumably make themselves the government of Finland. While Steinhardt hastened back to his post from Stockholm, the United States and other Powers offered their good offices. Helsinki accepted them. Moscow rejected them. Finland appealed to the League of Nations on December 3.^
reach Helsinki. The "treaty" of December 2 followed the model of the Baltic mutual assistance pacts, save for territorial and financial provisions. Its preamble referred to the established Finnish Government as "a most dangerous seat of war created near the borders of the Soviet Union by the former plutocratic power in Finland to please the imperialist Powers." For texts, cf. The U.SS.R. and Finland, Soviet Russia Today, New York, 1939. 1 In the New York Times of December 10, 1939, the writer published the following letter: The Soviet Union was the first Great Power to ratify the Kellogg-Briand Pact which was put into effect between the U.S.S.R. and its neighbors, including Finland, by the Litvinov Protocol of February 9, 1929. Moscow thereby bound itself to "renounce war as an instrument of national policy" and to seek "the solution or settlement of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be," only "by pacific means." On January 21, 1932, the U.S.S.R. and Finland concluded an agreement (later extended to 1945) renouncing aggression. By Art. 5: "The high contracting parties declare that they will always seek to solve in the spirit of justice all conflicts, of whatever character or origin, which may arise between them, and that in the regulation of these conflicts they will resort exclusively to peaceful means." A subsequent Convention on Conciliation Procedure was signed by the U.S.S.R. and Finland on April 22, 1932. In September 1934 the U.S.S.R. assumed all the obligations of the League of Nations Covenant. On July 3 1933, Litvinov committed his Government to an agreement with all the neighbors of the U.S.S.R. (including Finland, which adhered on July 22) to the effect that "the aggressor in an international conflict will be considered the State which will be the first to commit any of the following acts: i. Declaration of war against another State; 2. Invasion by armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State; 3. An attack by armed land, naval,
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The words and deeds which followed these events epitomized the tragedy of a world in which honor and wisdom were lost, and courage was futile against mechanized brutality. Moscow soon discovered that the heroic patriotism of the Finnish people rendered the conquest of Finland from within impossible. Conquest from without was equally impossible without risking war with Germany or the Allies or botha risk from which Stalin shrank. The Finns soon found that effective defense against the invader was impossible without prompt and generous military aid from Finland's friends abroad. All failed to aidthe Scandinavian
or air forces, even without a declaration of war, upon the territory, naval vessels, or air craft of another State; 4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State; 5. Aid to armed bands formed on the territory of a State and invading the territory of another State; or refusal, despite demands on the part of the State subjected to attack, to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive the said bands of any aid and protection [Art. 2]. No considerations of a political, military, economic, or any other nature can serve as an excuse or justification of aggression as specified in Art. 2 [Art. 3]." An appendix to this Convention asserted: "None of the circumstances mentioned below may be used to justify any act of aggression in the sense of Art. 2 of the said Convention: the internal position of any State, as for example its political, economic, or social structure; alleged shortcomings of its administration; disorder following upon strife, revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, and civil war; the international conduct of any State, as for example infringement or a threat of infringing the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its citizens; rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; measures of economic or financial boycott; conflicts in the sphere of economic, financial, or other obligations in connection with foreign governments; border incidents which do not fall under any of the cases of aggression indicated in Art. 2." All of these obligations, which the U.S.S.R. took the initiative in proposing, are still binding today. All of them cover precisely the situation arising out of the Finnish-Soviet dispute of November. All of them have been wantonly swept aside by the U.S.S.R. in a fashion legally and ethically indistinguishable from the lawless aggressions committed by Japan, Italy, and Germany. None of the possible justifications which can be adduced in defense of Soviet poUcy toward Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania applies to Finland. Moscow stands condemned by the language of its own treaty obligations. The commitments assumed under the Pact of Paris, moreover, mean that Moscow, along with Berlin, Rome, and Tokio, has violated its treaty obligations toward the United States. The U.S.S.R. has thus joined the forces of international anarchy and criminality. Since the treaty rights of America, no less than those of Finland, have been infringed upon, the United States is legally entitled to protest and to retaliate. And, since Americans are not and cannot afford to be "neutral" in any conflict between order and lawlessness, it is to be hoped that the President and the Secretary of State will find effective means of bringing home to the rulers and people of the U.S.S.R. the enormity of the crime which they are committing and the revulsion with which American citizens view the outrageous conduct of the Kremlin. Williamstown, Mass., December 6, 1939.
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States because their leaders dreamed of peace through "neutrality" and because they feared AUied and German intervention; the Reich because its leaders dared not quarrel with Stalin so long as the war in the West continued and because their only interest was in keeping open the routes to Swedish ore and therefore keeping Allied forces out of the Northlands; the Allies because their only interest was in weakening Germany and because they oscillated between challenging Moscow and appeasing Moscow until it was too late; America because America's devotion to the myth of "neutrality" was greater than America's love for Finland or America's hatred of Bolshevism, deep as were these passions. At the beginning, successful Finnish resistance led Finland's friends to conclude that outside help was unnecessary. At the end, Finland's defeat caused her friends to decide that outside help would be futile. Caught in the mazes of a military problem which was hopeless, hypnotized by a vocabulary which was obsolete, torn by hopes and fears and indecisions ruinous to any course of action, the democratic world spoke empty words and at length abandoned Finland to a fate which differed from that of other victims of aggression only because the aggressor was also selfdefeated and unwilling to face the dangers of adhering to his original purpose. "The Finnish nation," declared the Parliament at Helsinki on December 10, "is fighting for independence, liberty and honor. . . . Our fight involves defense of a cause common to all humanity. . . . The whole civilized world cannot abandon us in the face of the enemy's overwhelming numbers. As the outpost of Western civilization, our nation has the right to expect help from other civilized nations." A week later President Kallio asserted: "Finland needs more active help than she has so far obtained. . . . The civilized nations cannot leave us to fight alone.... W e dare to hope that these joint cultural values and principles of justice will be also jointly defended." On December 22 Premier Rysti: "Finland must have help in men and materials soon." Other appeals followed. Finland, having worshipped "neutrality," had no alUes. The Finnish leaders were too shrewd to assume that other States would aid them out of sentiment. But they hoped that other States would recognize their own selfish interest in helping to halt aggression and that help would therefore be forth-
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coming. Kallio might have come to different conclusions had he been able to consult Chiang Kai-shek or Haile Selassie or Negrin or Schuschnigg or Benes. The Scandinavian Kingdoms were most immediately menaced by Finland's fate. But quite apart from their fears of Moscow, they were caught between the hammer of the Reich and the anvil of the Allies. Both belligerents threatened intervention in the event of Scandinavian aid to FinlandLondon and Paris in the name of aiding Finland but for the purpose of striking at the Reich, Berlin in the name of championing Nordic neutrality but for the purpose of thwarting the Allies. Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm therefore preferred the doubtful safety of "non-intervention." They limited themselves to moral support, economic collaboration and a trickle of volunteers to aid their neighbor. Britain and France considered a different course, but lost their way in debate and finally reached a decision to act when the time for action had passed.^ Chamberlain in Commons on December I expressed "deep regret" over the invasion. Halifax told Lords on Dec. 5:
. . . W e have witnessed what has been condemned universally as an inexcusable act of aggression by one of the largest upon one of the smallest, but most highly civilized nations in Europe. Open towns have been bombarded, and women and children mutilated and done to death, on the pretext that a nation of fewer than 4,000,000 had hostile designs against one of 180,000,000. T h e British people have been profoundly shocked by the circumstances of the Soviet attack, and they have profoundly admired the magnificent resistance of the Finns. . . . T h e Russian attack on Finland seems to me to be a direct consequence of German policy. Early in the year we tried to improve our relations with Russia, but in doing so always maintained the position that rights of third parties must be retained intact and unaffected b y our negotiations. I think events have shown that the judgment of the insistence of H . M. 1 On December lo, 1939, Major George Fielding Eliot wrote: "It is an absolute necessity to Britain that the attack on Scandinavia should be beaten back. It is not a question of whether it must be stopped; it is only a question of where it must be stopped. . . . The capabilities of the two dictators in the Baltic are of a sufficiently disquieting nature to call for the strongest sort of action on the part of the Allies. If this action is not forthcoming, it will be an ominous comment on the quality of the Allied leadership" (New York Herald Tribune
12.10.39).
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Government in refusing an agreement with the Soviet Government on terms and formulas covering cases of indirect aggression on the Baltic states were right, for it is now plain that this formula might well have been a cloak to ultimate designs; and I little doubt that the people of this country would prefer to face difficulties and embarrassments rather than feel we had compromised the honor of this country and the commonwealth on such issues. . . .
A few British voices were raised in defense of Moscow. G. B. Shaw opined that "Finland has been misled by a very foolish government. She should have accepted Russia's offer for readjustment of territory. She should have been a sensible neighbor." Dean Hewlett Johnson of Canterbury: "Russia feared with reason a united Western attack." H. G. Wells: "There is much to be said for the preventive security measures being taken by the Soviet Government. I see no reason for blaming Russia. Now, naturally, all of Russia's enemies talk about the sacredness of Finnish democracy, not because they love democracy but because they hate Russia." ^ This hatred was intense and all but universal in all the Western democracies, but the dangers of acting upon it were regarded as too grave to permit open aid to the Finns. There was no direct diplomatic protest to Moscow by the Allies. When Sir William Seeds left on leave on January 2, Molotov reproached him and complained of British hostility and secret help to Finland. But there was no diplomatic break. Chamberlain asserted on December 14: "By their act of aggression the Soviet Government have outraged the conscience of the whole world." But "we must never lose sight of our objective"Germany. "Several European countries recently supplied war materials to Finland, and would have supplied more but for the fact that the German Government made difficulties regarding transit." On February 23 Leslie Hore-Belisha, former War Minister, urged immediate military aid: "Unless the weak can be supported by the strong and justice supported by might, the land lost may not be regained for generations. To this inspiring task we are summoned by the plight of the Finns. If we don't respond with promptness and decision, the cause we too have undertaken will be harder to uphold." Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson, arch anti-Bolshevik, made a similar plea in Commons three days later,
1 The U.SS.R. and Finland, Soviet Russia Today, New York, 1939, pp. 28-30.
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but it was intimated in Cabinet circles that Finland had not asked for direct military aid, that Sweden and Norway were unwilling to permit troops to pass through their territory, and that little could be done beyond aid "short of war." The French Cabinet likewise deemed discretion the better part of valor and contented itself with oratory, supplemented by such feeble assistance as was compatible with respect for Soviet "neutrality" in the Western war. Axis policy was a medley of Nazi sympathy for Moscow and Fascist sympathy for Helsinki. Early in December, and repeatedly thereafter, Berlin denied reports that Germany was sending any war materials to Finland (or to the U.S.S.R.) or permitting any to be sent over German territory. On Christmas day, in reply to birthday congratulations, Stalin wired Ribbentrop: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented by blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm." By January Berlin was threatening Norway and Sweden with Poland's fate if they permitted the AlUes to send arms across their territories. Meanwhile the Italian and Vatican press praised Finland and damned Aioscow. Gayda wrote on December 4: "Finland has the right to demand and expect sanctions against Russia. The slave State of Ethiopia did not have this right, for it was guilty of thirty years' aggression against Italy." Some Italian planes were sent to Finland, but those dispatched by way of Germany were apparently halted. Whether Ribbentrop and Molotov had reached a prior understanding was uncertain. But it was clear that the Reich would neither participate nor permit the Scandinavian States or the Allies to take part in the Finnish war. One Great Power, the United States, was free to aid Finland without running risks of counter-blows from either Germany or the U.S.S.R. But any eifective governmental aid was precluded by the paralysis afflicting all the neutral democracies. On December I Roosevelt condemned Moscow's resort to violence and asked American manufacturers not to sell aircraft to nations "obviously guilty of unprovoked bombing." On December 5 he instructed Secretary Morgenthau to hold the Finnish debt payment of $234,696 (paid in full on December 15) in a separate account with a view toward Congressional authorization of its return to Finland. On December 10 Jesse Jones announced the opening of a credit of f 10,000,000 through the R.F.C. and the
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Export-Import Bank for Finnish purchases of agricultural surpluses and other civilian supplies. Under the direction of Herbert Hoover a million dollars was privately collected in the United States for Finnish relief during the winter. All Americans were agreed that Finland needed arms for defense, and might have had considerable cash for the purchase of such arms had she not paid her debts regularly to the United States. All Americans were agreed that the successful defense of Finland would serve American interests better than the Soviet conquest of Finland. But "neutrality" forbade any effective aid. The President on January 16 urged upon Congress the opening of new credits for Finland for "agricultural surpluses and manufactured products" (of which the Finns had no need whatever), "not including implements of war" (of which the Finns had desperate need). Such a move, he contended, "does not in any way constitute or threaten any so-called 'involvement' in European wars." In reply Congress did nothing for several weeks, lest American neutrality be jeopardized. Dorothy Thompson and many of her fellowcitizens found this attitude "simply incredible." Its incredibility was enhanced by the circumstance that the Neutrality Act of 1939, although used to bar American shipping to the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland, had never been applied to the Finnish war. Here, as in the Far East, the contestants were not "belligerents." America had no reprisals to fear from any source as a consequence of supplying arms to the Finns. Nevertheless, despite eloquent speeches, numerous tears for "heroic little Finland," and generous private contributions for relief, the net result of two months of American moral indignation was a policy based upon the view that America should run no risks of irritating Moscow in order to aid Finland against the aggressor. This policy doubtless comforted the last days of Senator William E. Borah, who died on January 19. The American decision, as Arnold Toynbee once wrote of the British decision to permit Italian conquest of Ethiopia, was made "neither on the absolute criterion of morality nor on the relative criterion of expediency, but on that trivial distinction between this moment and the next which keeps the sluggard cowering between the blankets when the house is burning over his head." ^
1 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, II p. 450.
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On February 28 the House belatedly followed the Senate in approving an increase in the capitalization of the Export-Import Bank, permitting a further credit to Finland of 12 0,000,000for non-military supphes. Sweden had already contributed $70,000,000 in supplies and $25,000,000 in cash to the Finns. Finland, however, needed men, munitions, artillery and planes. Said Congressman Celler of New York: "Finland asks for bullets and we give her beans. She asks for powder and we give her tea. She asks for guns and we give her broomsticks." A timorous and befuddled America would give no military aid. The Finnish people, like the Ethiopians (in the words of Haile Selassie), were left "to climb alone their path to Calvary." One prompt gesture, to be sure, was made by the Western democracies, although in this the United States had no hand. The gesture was a piece of hypocrisy which inflicted no injury on the aggressor, brought no aid to his victim and helped to destroy the organization through which it was made. It was the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations. On December 3 Secretary-General Joseph Avenol received from Rudolf Holsti, former Foreign Minister of Finland, a note to the Council invoking Articles 11 and 15 of the Covenant against the Soviet Union. On the following day the Argentine delegation at Geneva, with the support of other Latin Americans, submitted a note to Avenol urging the expulsion of the U.S.S.R. from the League. Avenol transmitted the Finnish appeal to Moscow and convoked the Council and Assembly. Molotov replied that there was no basis for League action since "the Soviet Union is not in a state of war with Finland and does not threaten the Finnish people with war." The Helsinki regime "cannot be considered the authorized representatives of the Finnish people." Moscow therefore could take no part in the League meetings which were "manifestly incompatible with requirements of due respect for the Soviet Union." The League Council nevertheless met on December 9 and the Assembly on the i ith. The Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, meeting in Oslo on December 7, had urged League efforts to inaugurate peace negotiations, but the Soviet attitude doomed these hopes. The Council referred Finland's request to the Assembly which elected Carl J. Hambro of Norway as President, heard M. Holsti and appointed a Committee of Thirteen. On the motion of Sweden, supported by Britain, the
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Committee wired Moscow that the Assembly invited a cessation of hostilities pending arbitration, that Finland had already accepted the invitation and that a Soviet reply was expected within twenty-four hours. Molotov's curt rejoinder merely cited his telegram of December 4. Argentina threatened to quit the League unless the Soviet Union were ejected. On December 13 the Committee of Thirteen recommended expulsion and coordinated aid to Finland through the Secretariat. On the 14th, without a roll call, the Assembly accepted the report "unanimously," although the delegates of Mexico, Jugoslavia, and Greece had urged less extreme action. The Council met in the afternoon with Peru, Iran, and the U.S.S.R. not represented. The Assembly had already filled the non-permanent Council seats that fell vacant by re-electing Bolivia and electing South Africa and Finland to replace New Zealand and Sweden. In a formal resolution the Council condemned Moscow and found "in virtue of Article 16, paragraph 4 of the Covenant that by its act the U.S.S.R. has placed itself outside the League of Nations. It follows that the U.S.S.R. is no longer a member of the League." No negative votes were cast, but Greece, Jugoslavia, Finland, and China refrained from voting. Britain, France, Belgium, South Africa, Egypt, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic voted affirmatively. The vote was technically "unanimous" and therefore legally effective. WeUington Koo whistled and exclaimed: "China got nothing like that." Nor had Ethiopia, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, or Poland. In each previous crisis only one eloquent voice had been raised on behalf of the weak and in condemnation of lawless violence. That voice was the voice of Litvinov. His own State, so often the accuser, was now the accused. Its expulsion left only two Great Powers in the League, since earlier lawbreakers had ceased to be members by their own withdrawal: Germany on October 14, 1935, Japan on March 27, 1935, and Italy on December 11, 1939. The cream of the jest lay in the fact that the war which the two League Powers were waging against another aggressor was studiously ignored by all the delegates at Geneva. The old League of Woodrow Wilson had long since been slain by its own members. A new League as an anti-Communist alliance was here reborn, but in the very act of rebirth it died anew. The Soviet press ridi-
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culed the proceedings, along with the subsequent expulsion of the U.S.S.R. from the I.L.O. on February 5. On December 18 Avenol sent a telegram to all League members, drawing their attention to the Assembly resolution and asking for aid to Finland and for abstention from any action which might weaken Finland's power of resistance. President Carl J. Hambro said pathetically at the close of the Assembly's session:
. . . W e do not know what the near future may bring. W e cannot even foretell tomorrow, but we feel in our heart of hearts that we all, as delegates to this Assembly, have tried to act upon the principles of law and equity, with natural hesitation but without ambiguity. So we leave this Assembly in grave anxiety for every nation, with ill will against none, but with a new hope in our own minds because a member State has applied to the League for assistance and has not applied in vain, and because the flame has been kept alive in the storm of terrible events. W i t h the limited foresight of human beings, we are convinced that the only possible road towards a future of better international understanding and peace will be found in the growth and development of mutual responsibilities and international solidarity. In a more open and more courageous adherence to the principles of right and justice, we have performed our task, and it is our great hope that, when this Assembly meets again, it will be a proof that the feeble efforts we have made have not been entirely in vain. I now declare the twentieth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations adjourned.^
The "feeble efforts" were in fact "entirely in vain." Hambro's own nation was destined for destruction by lawless aggression within four months. The League had long since become a set of devices through which the Western democracies had repeatedly condoned Fascist attacks upon the weak.^ This circumstance deprived the condemnation of Moscow not only of all efficacy but of all dignity. The Assembly never met again, nor did the Council. Before six months had passed the members of the League Secretariat were dismissed and the white sepulchre in Ariana Park was closed and boarded up. Avenol resigned his post, after ac1 Special Supplement to the Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, December 1939, page 66, also containing texts of resolutions and correspondence and summaries of speeches. For full proceedings, cf. Official Journal of the League of Nations, Proceedings of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. 2 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 220-38, 353-5, 412-13.
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cepting an offer from Princeton to move certain files and a few non-political officials to the University over which Woodrow Wilson had once presided. Save for this shadow of a dream, the League was dead. Behind the fagade of these pitiable gestures, the Allied leaders at long last gave serious consideration to military action against the U.S.S.R. The French General Staff sent Commandant Genoval to confer with Mannerheim. He departed on December 20 and returned a month later. N o action, however conceived and executed, offered promise of saving Finland. This was a minor consideration. Western diplomats and strategists were interested primarily in the possibility of cutting off Russian sources of supply to Germany and opening up a Scandinavian or Balkan front. That responsible Anglo-French statesmen could have contemplated waging war on the Soviet Union and thereby driving Stalin completely into Hitler's arms is in retrospect incredible. Even at the time, Soviet allegations to this effect seemed too preposterous for credence, since such an Allied enterprise would have been manifestly suicidal. Later evidence indicates, however, that this course was by no means outside the calculations of London and Paris. Since these calculations were necessarily secret, contemporary reports of them were little more than rumors. On December 14 the Moscow radio charged that the Allied-Turkish pact contained a secret clause providing for the establishment of an antiSoviet army of a million men in Anatolia under Petain. Downing Street at once issued a denial. The fourth meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council, held in Paris on December 19, was reported to have discussed aid to Finland. On December 22 the Popolo di Roma reported from its Damascus correspondent that Weygand was planning military action in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Le Temps of December 26 held that the Reich and the U.S.S.R. should be considered one common enemy, dependent upon the oil fields which were vulnerable from Turkey and the Black Sea. Subsequent disclosures make possible a reconstruction of Allied deliberations. On December 9 Weygand, who was Commander of the Allied Forces in the Near East and a much more passionate anti-Bolshevist than anti-Fascist, reported to Daladier that Allied military intervention in the Balkans would ultimately be neces-
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sary (G6, 21) .^ He did not as yet suggest a campaign against the U.S.S.R., but this project was doubtless broached shortly thereafter. On January 19, 1940, Daladier requested General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan to prepare an expose concerning possible operations to cut Germany off from Russian oil, either through naval operations in the Black Sea or an attack on Baku or the instigation of revolt among the Moslem peoples of the Soviet Caucasus (G6, 7). On February 2 Ambassador Massigh wired Daladier from Ankara that Turkish leaders were giving close attention to the Caucasian Moslems and to Allied-Soviet friction. He believed that AIHed encouragement of "Pan-Turkish" sentiment might be useful (G6, 22). Meanwhile voices were raised in the British Cabinet for a similar course. Hore-Belisha's resignation as War Minister on January 5, for reasons unspecified, may have been due to his enthusiasm for an anti-Soviet campaign. Churchill's appeal to the neutrals on January 20 to abandon their neutrality and cast their lot with the Allies was inspired by difficulties in the way of aiding Finland and creating a Balkan front. Scandinavian and Balkan reactions were frigid. On February 2 Scandinavian pressmen in London were invited to a dinner for Churchill. According to M. Martinsen's report to Erik Colban, the Norwegian Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty was bitter over the response to his speech. He urged that Norway and Sweden aid Finland and request AlUed aid for this purpose. He complained that Swedish ore was going to Germany not only directly but by way of Narvik and through Norwegian territorial waters. Such shipment should be stopped in the name of defense of Finland. If Germany retaliated, Britain would come to the aid of the Scandinavian Kingdoms, save for Denmark which Churchill had already "written off." He appreciated the difficulties of the neutrals, but said he
1 Document No. 21 of German White Book No. 6, {Politische Geheimdokumente des franzosischen Generalstabs iiber die britisch-franzosischen Plane zur Niederiuerjung Deutschlands) available at the time of writing in mimeographed form as issued by the German Library of Information, New York. This and the other documents of this series, hereafter cited as G6, were pubUshed as excerpts from the confidential political records of the French General Staff, allegedly captured by German troops in June 1940 in a half-destroyed railway train at La Charite on the Loire. The writer has found no reason for doubting their genuineness, though it is not impossible that instead of being captured they were made available to Berlin shortly after they were written by unknown German agents or sympathizers close to the French General Staff itself.
Finland's Sorrow
417
might even prefer that they should enter the war on the German side "so that one could choose the strategical points needed and have done with it." "An icy silence ensued" (G4, 28B)} The Allied Supreme War Council secretly reached a belated decision on February 5 to send troops to the defense of Finland. But the diplomatic difficulties in the way of carrying out this plan proved insuperable. On the 17th the Norwegian Foreign Office feared that Britain was planning to announce open support of Finland and simultaneously to occupy Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik (G4, 25). Oslo and Stockholm (G4, 26) remained firm in their refusal to give Finland military aid or to permit passage of Allied troops. They rejected a Finnish bid for direct aid on February 16. Four days later M. Holma, Finnish Minister in Paris, asked Daladier to prepare an expeditionary force in preparation for a formal Finnish request for aid. Steps were taken in this direction, either in the hope that Norway and Sweden would later agree to cooperate or would offer no resistance if confronted with a jait accompli. Whether such a force saved Finland or no, it would be able to sever communications between the Reich and the Swedish ore fields. But the Finnish request never came. According to one reliable observer, the reason was that the German Minister in Helsinki let it be known on February 28, that if the request were sent, German troops would intervene.^ Chamberlain and Daladier hesitated and then decided to press Norway and Sweden for cooperation on the assumption that a change of
1 Britain's Designs on Norway. Documents Co7icerning the Anglo-French Policy of Extending the War (Dokimie?its zur englisch-franzosischen Politik in der Kriegsaustoeitung; Reichsdruckerei, Berlin, 1940). White Book No. 4, Published by the German Foreign OfSce, German Library of Information, New York, 1940. These documents, issued by Ribbentrop with an explanatory statement to the diplomatic and press corps in Berlin on April 27, 1940, to "prove" that the German invasion of Norway had forestalled British plans for an invasion, are based upon materials seized in the Foreign OfSce in Oslo and captured from British forces near Lillehammer. Facsimiles are reproduced in the second part of the American edition. Again there seems little reason to question the authenticity of these documents, though they are by no means the whole story nor do they reveal anything of the time and circumstances of the initial German preparations for the conquest of Scandinavia. Here cited as G4. 2 Edgar Ansel Mowrer in The Chicago Daily News, March 14, 1940. German denials that any such threat was made scarcely deserve serious consideration, since it is inconceivable that Berlin, out of "respect" for Scandinavian "neutrality" (which by then would have become fictitious), would have refrained from military intervention if Allied troops entered northern Norway and Sweden to aid Finland.
418
Stalin's
Victory
policy might be possible if the Allies could demonstrate their abihty to defend Scandinavia against German counter-measures. On March 2 Downing Street asked Stockholm and Oslo to permit the passage of Allied troops. The Quai d'Orsay supported the request. According to a statement of Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Giinther before the Rikstag on April i, this was the first definite AUied request for military transit rights. It was supported by a telegram from Daladier to King Gustaf whose Cabinet had received a Soviet protest at Swedish aid to Finland on January 6. The King had reaffirmed Sweden's "strict neutrality" before the Swedish Crown Council on February 19. The Norwegian Cabinet met on the evening of March 2 to consider its reply. Foreign Minister Flalvdan Koht held that Norway should refuse the request unless Sweden assented. If Allied troops came regardless, Norway should protest but not offer armed resistance. He was confident, however, that Sweden would refuse. Premier Nygaardsvold agreed and firmly declined to give aid to Finland in any other way as some of his Ministers urged. "I declared positively that our country will not go to war voluntarily so long as I was Premier." The Cabinet was unanimous that a negative answer should be given to the Allies (G4, 27). Such a reply was transmitted by both Oslo and Stockholm. This reply was not unexpected in London and Paris. Daladier had wired Corbin on February 21 that Sweden had not and probably would not consent either to aid Finland directly or permit the AUies to do so, since Berhn had notified Stockholm that it would consider any Swedish military aid to Finland a casus belli (G6, 26). The French Premier felt, however, that a swift Allied occupation of Norwegian ports might allay Swedish anxiety. The Altmark episode could be utilized as a pretext for British action in this direction. "The quicker the action is carried out, and the better our propaganda recalls to memory Norwegian connivance in the Altmark incident, the more will world public opinion consider the action as justified. . . . Our main objective must not be overlooked. It is to cut off Germany's ore supply" (G6, 26). On March 9, following the negative replies from Norway and Sweden, the Sub-Committee of the Allied Supreme War Council which was considering the Scandinavian problem met in London. The Allied Governments had been informed on the preceding day of the opening of Finnish-Soviet peace negotiations. Church-
Finland's Sorroiv
419
ill argued that a naval demonstration outside Narvik might induce Norwegian compliance with the landing of troops. Opinion was divided as to whether Bergen and Stavanger should be included in the operation (G6, 27). Two days previously Weygand had wired Gamelin that Allied aviation officers were secretly surveying the Turkish districts of Diabekir, Erzerum, Lake Kars, and Lake Yan with a view toward preparing landing fields for AUied planes which could bomb Baku and Batum (G6, I). Gamelin, acting on the advice of Mannerheim and Genoval, had favored an Allied landing at Petsamo (in Russian hands from the beginning of the Finnish war) and occupation of Norwegian harbors and Swedish ore fields. A brigade of Chasseurs Alpins had been prepared for debarkation by March i. Command of the proposed expedition was to be left in British hands. Britain would send six or seven divisions, one of which would be withdrawn from France with the balance made up of new conscripts. The difficulties of the operation were fully appreciated. Several months would be required to achieve any results. Gamelin felt that more was to be gained in the Balkans and the Caucasus, but here the attitudes of Turkey and Italy were obstacles (G6, 2). All of these plans came to nothing. "It is the old trouble," said Lloyd George, "too late! Too late with Czechoslovakia, too late with Poland, and certainly too late with Finland. It is always too late or too little or both, and this is the road to disaster." Norway, Sweden, and Turkey recalled too vividly the fate of others to place their faith in Allied promises of defense against the Reich. The Finnish leaders came at last to the same conclusion. By the time London and Paris had overcome their scruples and were ready to consider coercing Norway and Sweden into cooperating, the Red Army had broken through the Mannerheim Line. Helsinki knew that Finland would be overrun long before any effective Allied aid could reach the front. Such aid, moreover, would merely convert all of Scandinavia into a battlefield, since Germany would intervene. If the Allied forces by some miracle fought their way across the northlands, Finlandif Finland still survivedwould become an arena of combat among British, French, German, and Soviet troops. Stalin was offering terms. Helsinki was already engaged in secret peace negotiations. Finland acknowledged defeat and terminated hostilities before the Allied High Command could move.
42 o
Stalin^s
Victory
The termination of the fighting in Finland, however, did not cause London and Paris to abandon all hope of establishing a northern or a southern front against the Reich. On March 12 Gamelin instructed Weygand to pursue the Caucasus project (G6, 3). That Moscow knew of the plan is indicated by reports that American engineers were consulted as to methods of combating conflagrations in oil fields caused by aerial bombardment. Their verdict was apparently discouraging (G6, 4). Gamelin felt that "the Russo-Finnish armistice need not change anything in the essential aims which we can set for ourselves for 1940. But it must cause us to act more quickly and energetically" (G6, 5). Massigli feared that Turkey could never be brought to consent openly to the use of its territories for operations against the U.S.S.R. But if confronted with a fait accompli, it might acquiesce. "If the Soviet Government should voice a protest, it is important that Ankara should be able to declare that it had nothing to do with the matter." As for naval operations in the Black Sea, "it must unfortunately be admitted that a solution of the problem is not easy to find," since active Turkish participation was precluded. "The easiest operations to organize will be those against Baku" (G6, 6). On April i Massigli reported that Turkey could not be expected to join in any operations against the U.S.S.R. before the end of summer and then only after an agreement with the Allies regarding Italy (G6, 23). On April 5 a tentative plan was apparently formulated for bombing the refineries and harbor areas of Batum, Ptoi, Grozny, and Baku on the calculation that the destruction of a third of the facilities could be effected within six days {G6, 8). On April 17 Weygand reported to Gamelin and to General Vuillemin, Commander of the French air force, that adequate preparations would require two months or more. It should not be planned before the end of June or early July (G6, 8). There is no evidence that Daladier, Reynaud, Chamberlain, or Churchill approved of these plans. Richard A. Butler conceded in Commons on July 11, 1940, that the General Staffs had made "hypothetical plans" to halt Russian oil shipments to Germany by bombing Baku, but he threw no further light on the program. Those who considered it, like those who contemplated Alhed action in Scandinavia, were overtaken by the Nazi war machine long before they could act. T o return to Finland: the decision for peace in this, as in all
Finland's Sorrow
421
wars, was a product of the verdict of arms. All the world marvelled that Finland was not at once crushed by the Soviet colossus. Stalin's Blitzkrieg was so completely lacking in Blitz that the conclusion was at once reached in the West that the Red Army had been enormously overrated and was in fact all but worthless, thanks to the purges and incurable incompetence. Lindbergh's evaluations before Munich and French military estimates of 1939 were recalled as proof.^ There can be no question but that the Soviet soldiery during December and January exhibited most of the weaknesses and few of the virtues of Muscovy's troops of old. The major blunders, however, were not those of the local commanders nor even of the General Staff, but of Stalin. All available evidence suggests that he and his political advisers had no expectation that Finnish resistance would have to be broken by a large scale campaign. Appeals to the Finnish proletariat to overthrow its exploiters and rally to Otto Kuusinen were expected to do the trick. In consequence no plans were made for a serious campaign until it slowly dawned on the Red Caesar that the Marxian dialectic left much to be desired and that the Finnish armies would have to be beaten in the field. Once this realization percolated through the Kremlin, appropriate military steps were taken to win a tarnished victory.^ The initial Soviet drives, conducted by third-rate troops in every way inferior to the Finns, probably even as to numbers, were aimed at Petsamo on the Arctic, at Kuolajaervi further south, at Suomussalmi and Uleaborg in the center (to cut Finland
1 Cf. "Red Army Myth," by Earl Reeves, Events, February, 1940. 2 Leon Trotsky, who had at first denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact and the invasion of Poland as evidence of Stalin's reactionary "Bonapartism," viewed the imposition of protectorates on the Baltic States with mixed feelings and defended the Soviet attack on Finland as a legitimate means of spreading socialism. Some of his followers, such as Max Schachtman, split with him over the issue. Others raised the cry of "defending the Soviet Union despite and against Stalinism" and affirmed that the Red Army would achieve both the "hberation" of Finland and the overthrow of Stalin. The Byzantine bickerings and splinterings of the various schools of heterodox Communists were matched only by the bizarre sycophancy and fantastic theological gyrations of the orthodox Communists in demanding "defense" of the U.S.S.R. against the "aggressions" of the "Mannerheim bandits." On August 21, 1940, Trotsky died in Mexico City from wounds inflicted upon him the previous afternoon in his fortress-like residence at Coyoacan by one of his confidants and disciples whom he had met through Sylvia Ageloff, sister of his former secretary. The assassin, who had crushed Trotsky's skull with an Alpine pick, was Jacques Mornard van den Dresche alias Frank Jackson alias Leon
42 2
Stall?!'s Victory
in two if possible) and at Sortavala north of Lake Ladoga to outflank the Mannerheim Line. N o attacks were made for weeks on the Isthmus fortifications. Petsamo was taken, since it was indefensible, but elsewhere all the drives failed. Amid bitter frost and heavy snows, during the coldest winter in years, Finnish troops cut off advancing Soviet columns and inflicted heavy losses. These successes were repeated during January. Whole Soviet divisions were destroyed or decimated. Marshal Mannerheim, who had defeated the Finnish "Red Guard" of 1918 with German aid, congratulated himself on the army which he had hounded his countrymen into creating during the preceding twenty years. Confidence was also felt by German-trained Chief of Staff, General Karl Oesch; by Commander-in-Chief General Hugo Ostermann, who fought in the German army in the Great War; and by General Harold Ohquist, in command on the Isthmus. At the end of January, however, the Soviet High Command abandoned efforts to penetrate Finland through the heavy forests, frozen lakes, and icy wastes of the frontier wilderness between Ladoga and the Arctic. It organized a frontal assault on the Mannerheim Line by first-class troops, ably led by General Gregory Stern and supplied with adequate artillery and tanks. What followed was less an application of the Nazi strategy of 1939-40 than a successful revival of the 1918 tactics of artillery barrages, infantry advances, and sustained offensives relying on almost unlimited men, guns, and shells. The Finnish forts were smashed or uprooted by a steady deluge of explosives. On February 26 the
Jacome alias Leon Haikys, allegedly of Canadian nationality and/or American origin and/or born in Jugoslavia or Persia of Belgian parents. He was at once accused by Albert Goldman and other orthodox Trotskyites of being a GPU spy and a hired killer in the pay of Stalin. This is possible, but scarcely probable. Stalin, like Trotsky, disapproved in principle of individual assassination or retail kiUings and advocated terrorism only through wholesale slaughter of class enemies. "Jackson" was more probably one of the many sincere Trotskyites who held that Trotsky was no longer a Trotskyite. How such a conclusion was possible and why it should lead to murder will be comprehensible to those who recognize that ideological fanatics, with instincts and emotions fixated on verbal abstractions, necessarily attach their libido to symbols of orthodoxy and discharge their aggressions against symbols of heterodoxyall with little regard to the conventional inhibitions that restrain better balanced personalities from acts of devotion or criminality. Trotsky was the victim of that fierce hatred of heretics which he himself fostered. His own life was a tragedy stemming from the irrational I worship of rationality and from the blind and burning passion known only to i those who seek to destroy all passion in order to serve the dictates of disembodied Reason.
Finland's Sorrow
42 3
island fortress of Koivisto, western anchor of the Line, was taken. By March 3 the invaders had reached the outskirts of Viipuri. Earlier Western estimates of Soviet prowess were hurriedly revised as military commentators now conceded that the Isthmus offensive showed that Russian troops, material, and staff work were almost equal to the best in the West. Baron Mannerheim, who had said in January that he would need not more than 30,000 foreign troops by May, and in February that he would need not more than 50,000 foreign troops by April, now realized that he needed 100,000 troops at once. They were nowhere to be had. He decided to yield. Stalin was content to abandon the hallucinations of December. He indicated willingness to desert Kuusinen, to deal with Helsinki, and to accept "moderate" terms in preference to risking hostilities with the Allies. Such hostilities could have inflicted little damage on the Soviet Union, apart from possibly serious losses at Baku, but they would inevitably have made Stalin Hitler's open ally. For this he had no appetite. Finland apparently sent a note through Sweden on February 12, seeking to open peace negotiations. Moscow at first refused on the ground that it could recognize only the Kuusinen regime. Other reports spoke of a Soviet demarche at Stockholm as early as January 29. Ambassador Maisky, perhaps in response to a British invitation, approached Richard Butler on February 22 with peace proposals. Downing Street declined to transmit them because of their harshness. Whether this move was related to the strange mid-February journey from Chungking to Moscow by Sir Stafford Cripps is unclear. It was publicly learned on March 6 that Stalin's terms had been transmitted to Helsinki via Stockholm. Tanner later indicated that a Finnish peace delegation had left Helsinki at the same time. On the same day Chamberlain told Commons that the Cabinet had changed its mind regarding publication of a White Book on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations of 1939. Halifax conferred with Finnish Minister G. Achates Gripenberg on March 7, while Helsinki issued a curt bulletin referring to Soviet demands "more far reaching in character than those presented last autumn." Former President Per Svinhufvud was in Stockholm on his way to Berlin and Rome, but it is doubtful whether this ex-regent and German puppet of 1918 played a role in the negotiations. Former Premier
424
Stalin's
Victory
Paasikivi was also in Stockholm. Ambassador Steinhardt conferred with the Swedish Minister in Moscow and then with Molotov on March 8. That these various moves had the approval of Downing Street is probable. The decision of the Allied Supreme War Council on February 5 to defend Finland apparently reflected French eagerness to risk war with the Soviet Union. But Chamberlain had vetoed Daladier. A month later he was still resolved to keep peace with Moscow even at Finland's expense. In the absence of effective aid to the Finns in December, this decision was doubtless wise. But in the execution of it Chamberlain exhibited all those traits of procrastination, vacillation, and egregious blundering which on the larger stage had brought Britain to war and danger of defeat. Once peace was in the ofEng and it was too late to save Finland, Chamberlain and Daladier went through the motions of offering aid. The result was a fiasco. On March 8 and 9 it was hinted that the Allies had offered Finland substantial reinforcements if Helsinki would but request direct Allied intervention and if Norway and Sweden would assent. On the morning of March 8, however, a Finnish delegation consisting of Premier Ryti, M. Paasikivi, General Karl Walden, and Professor Vaino Voionmaa, flew from Stockholm to Moscow where they were received in the Swedish legation and the United States Embassy. While they conferred with Molotov, Sumner Welles arrived in London on March 10. Chamberlain told Commons the next day that the Allies, if asked, would "proceed immediately and jointly to help Finland" with all the available resources at their disposal. As for war with the U.S.S.R., "we have not arrived at that yet." Downing Street hastened to add that "no appeal for further aid has yet been received from the Finnish Government." Daladier told the Chamber on March 12 that 50,000 French troops had been ready since February 26 for transport to Finland, but Helsinki had not asked for direct help because of Norwegian and Swedish opposition. In the early hours of March 13 there was signed in Moscow a peace treaty and protocol dated March 12. Later in the day Soviet troops occupied Viipuri and hostilities ended. Tanner blamed Norway and Sweden for lack of Allied aid and put the best face i possible on the terms: "The right of this country to self-deter-
Finland's Sorrow
425
mination remains inviolable. . . . Kuusinen has been thrust aside." On the 15th the Finnish Diet approved the peace, 145 to 3. President Kaliio made a plea for a Scandinavian defensive alliance to save Finland from Czechoslovakia's fate. This proposal to lock the barn door after the horse was gone came to nothing. Moscow disclaimed any further territorial designs in northern Europe and on March 20, as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified the peace, a Tass bulletin asserted that any Finnish-Swedish-Norwegian alliance would be regarded as contrary to the treaty and hostile toward the U.S.S.R. The peace of March 12, signed by Molotov, Zhdanov, and Commander Vasilevsky for the Soviet Union and by Ryti, Paasikivi, Walden, and Voionmaa for Finland, required the vanquished to cede to the victors, without compensation, the entire Karelian Isthmus, including Viipuri with its Bay and islands; the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, including the towns of Kakisalmi, Sortvala, and Suojarvi; most of the islands in the Gulf of Finland; territory east of Merkjarvi, including the town of Juolajarvi; and part of the peninsulas near Petsamo. The Arctic port and its adjacent nickel mines were restored to Finland. Hanko peninsula and the surrounding waters and islands were leased for a Soviet naval base for thirty years at an annual rental of 8,000,000 Finnish marks ($330,000). Moscow claimed the right of free transit across the Petsamo region to Norway and Sweden and the privilege of constructing a railway to connect Kandalaksha and Kemijarvi, terminus of the Finnish line from the Gulf of Bothnia. By Art. 3: "Both contracting parties undertake mutually to refrain from any attack upon each other, not to conclude any alliances and not to participate in any coalitions against one of the contracting parties." ^ The peace was widely regarded as an AlUed defeat. Chamberlain in Commons on March 19 declared "it was only the German threats which terrified the Scandinavian countries into withholding the help that might perhaps have saved" Finland. "Any suggestion that the Allies in any way failed in their obligations to do their utmost to assist Finland in her need is one that cannot for one moment be entertained." Britain had promised Finland 152 planes, 223 guns, 297,200 shells, 50,000 grenades, 20,500
iTass communique, March 13, 1940, in NYT 3.1340.
426
Stalin^s
Victory
aerial bombs, 100,000 greatcoats and 48 ambulances. Britain had sent loi planes, 114 guns, 185,000 shells, 50,000 grenades, 15,700 aerial bombs, 100,000 greatcoats and 48 ambulances. The expeditionary force had been prepared as Mannerheim requested. But the force could reach Finland only through Norway and Sweden. Germany had threatened these States if they permitted it to cross their territories. "Therefore we felt that we must be ready also to provide a force to come to the assistance of Sweden defending herself if she should be attacked by Germany." Plans were made to send 100,000 troops across Scandinavia in March to reach Finland before the end of April. "We suggested to the Finns that they should make a public appeal for assistance not later than March 5 and after such a public appeal had been made we proposed ourselves to make an informal appeal to the governments of Norway and Sweden to allow the passage of the expedition." Finland preferred to make an informal appeal to Stockholm. Sweden declined to grant passage. "We could not possibly have forced our help upon the Finnish Government." Instead of making a public appeal, Finland had signed peace terms. "I say without hesitation that neither we nor France have anything to reproach ourselves with. . . . Responsibility for this affair stands fairly and squarely on the shoulders of Germany and no other country." Last words were spoken by Molotov before the Supreme Soviet on March 29, 1940:
. . . Inasmuch as the Soviet Union did not wish to become the tool of British and French imperialists in their struggle for world hegemony against Germany, we have encountered at every step profound hostility of their policy toward our country. This has gone farthest of all in connection with the Finnish question. . . . As to the fantastic plans attributed I to the Soviet Union of a Red Army "March on India" "March on the 1 East" and the like, they are such obvious absurdities that one must completely lose his senses to believe such absurd lies. . . . It may be safely 1 said that if Finland had not been subject to foreign influences and if I Finland had been less incited by certain third States to adopt a hostile) attitude toward the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Finland would I have arrived at a peaceful understanding last autumn and matters would! have been settled without war. . . . It was not merely Finnish troops that our troops encountered but also the combined forces of the imperialists of a number of countries, including
Finland's Sorrow
42 7
British, French, and others who assisted the Finnish bourgeoisie with every form of weapon. . . . Chamberlain . . . made something in the nature of an account of how and in what way the British imperialists endeavored to help fan the war in Finland against the Soviet Union. . . . As to France we learn from the French press that she dispatched to Finland 179 airplanes, 472 guns, 795,000 shells, 5,100 machine guns, 200,000 hand grenades, etc. . . . Sweden supplied Finland with "a certain quantity of air craft roughly equal to one fifth of Sweden's total air force at the time." . . . N o r was Italy behindhand. . . . Finland also received military aid from such devotees of "peace" as the United States of America. . . . T h e war in Finland has exacted heavy sacrifices both from us and from the Finns. According to estimates of our General Staff on our side the number killed and those who died of wounds was 48,745 and the number of wounded was 158,863. . . . Our General Staff places the number of Finnish killed at not less than 60,000 without counting those w h o died of wounds, and the number of wounded not less than 250,000.^ . . . T h e hired pen-pirates, scribes, who specialize in fraudulent news and hoaxes, are trying to attribute the conduct of Anglo-French circles to their particular solicitude for "small nations." . . . Did they even raise a feeble voice in protest against Italy's predatory action in forcibly subjugating Albania? . . . T h e rights and interests of small countries are just so much small change in the hands of the imperialists. . . . In the beginning of February the Finns made practically all the moves for termination of the war in Finland. W e learned through the Swedish Government that the Finnish Government desired to ascertain our terms upon which the war could be brought to a close. Before deciding this question we approached the People's Government of Finland [Kuusinen] for their opinion on this question. T h e People's Government expressed the view that in order to put an end to bloodshed and to ameliorate the conditions of the Finnish people, a proposal to terminate the war should be welcomed. Thereupon we proposed our terms, which were soon after accepted by the Finnish Government. . . . In this connection the question arose of the People's Government dissolving itself, which it did. . . . T h e Soviet Union, having smashed the Finnish army and having every opportunity of occupying the whole of Finland, did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for its expenditures in the war as any other Power would have done, but confined its desires to a minimum and displayed magnanimity towards Finland. . . . W e pursued no other object 1 In his Final Order of the Day to the Finnish Army, March 13, Baron Mannerheim declared that "more than 15,000 of you who took the field vi'ill never again see your homes. . . . 200,000 of our enemies are now lying on snow drifts gazing with broken eyes at our starry sky. . . . The destruction of more than 1500 Russian tanks and more than 700 aircraft speaks for deeds of heroism."
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Stalin''s Victory
in the peace treaty than that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, Murmansk and the Murmansk railroad. . . . The task of our foreign policy is to ensure peace between nations and the security of our country. The conclusion must be drawn from this that we must maintain the position of neutrality and refrain from participating in the war between the big European Powers. . . .^ 1 Tass release, NYT 3.3040.
CHAPTER
NINE
WINTERSET
I. W E S T W A L L
DxjRiNG THE WINTER of 1939-40 the Continent still resembled for the last time the Europe of times past. In the midst of the boredom of the Sitzkrieg the lives of Europeans went on much as before. The political map, broken along the Vistula and the Danube, was elsewhere as it had always been. The balance of power, seemingly frozen in a military stalemate, remained at dead center. France and Britain checkmated the Reich.^ Italy was apparently waiting as of old to sell its aid to the highest bidder. The little States felt half-secure in their neutrality. The American colossus gazed from afar on what looked like a "phony war" and bravely resolved to have no part in Europe's quarrels. These appearances were illusions. The deception was itself part of Nazi strategy to drug the West to its doom. But the surface of national life behind the safe frontiers of the belligerents was still familiar to those who lived it. The temper of these last months before the Apocalypse can scarcely be recaptured. The secret plans and deeds of warlords within the Reich, and of traitors, simpletons, and bafHed patriots in the democracies, will be fully recounted, if ever, only many years hence. On the public stage famiUar political figures made familiar political motions during the dull months between the death of Poland and the breaking of the West. Inside Germany the new "Ministerial Council for Defense of
1 Gamelin: "With their Maginot and Siegfried Lines France and Germany have invulnerable armored coverings; the first of the two countries that emerges from its armored shell will be done for." Quoted by Robert de Saint Jean, "The Failure of France," Harpers Magazine, October 1940. 429
CHAPTER
NINE
WINTERSET
I. W E S T W A L L
DxjRiNG THE WINTER of 1939-40 the Continent still resembled for the last time the Europe of times past. In the midst of the boredom of the Sitzkrieg the lives of Europeans went on much as before. The political map, broken along the Vistula and the Danube, was elsewhere as it had always been. The balance of power, seemingly frozen in a military stalemate, remained at dead center. France and Britain checkmated the Reich.^ Italy was apparently waiting as of old to sell its aid to the highest bidder. The little States felt half-secure in their neutrality. The American colossus gazed from afar on what looked like a "phony war" and bravely resolved to have no part in Europe's quarrels. These appearances were illusions. The deception was itself part of Nazi strategy to drug the West to its doom. But the surface of national life behind the safe frontiers of the belligerents was still familiar to those who lived it. The temper of these last months before the Apocalypse can scarcely be recaptured. The secret plans and deeds of warlords within the Reich, and of traitors, simpletons, and bafHed patriots in the democracies, will be fully recounted, if ever, only many years hence. On the public stage famiUar political figures made familiar political motions during the dull months between the death of Poland and the breaking of the West. Inside Germany the new "Ministerial Council for Defense of
1 Gamelin: "With their Maginot and Siegfried Lines France and Germany have invulnerable armored coverings; the first of the two countries that emerges from its armored shell will be done for." Quoted by Robert de Saint Jean, "The Failure of France," Harpers Magazine, October 1940. 429
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the Reich" promulgated further measures of economic mobilization. Since National Socialism was already a military economy, the transition from "peace" to "war" was simple. The Fiihrer in feldgrau uniform toured conquered Poland and spoke at Danzig onSeptember 19: "I have no war aims against France or England." On October 6 before the Reichstag he vaguely and vainly offered peace. The nation rejoiced in the cheapness of the Polish victory and marvelled at the efficiency of the Nazi war machine. Germans wondered "in private" only about one curious episode: the report that General Werner von Fritsch, Brauchitsch's predecessor as Chief of the Reichswehr until February 4, 1938, had been "killed in action" on the Polish front. Since Generals usually die in bed, some whispered that the Gestapo or the S.S. had liquidated an old enemy who once expressed the scorn of the Junker officer caste for the Nazi upstarts. This event was perhaps related to another at Munich on November 8. On this anniversary of the Beer Hall putsch, Hitler met as always with the Old Guard of the Party at the Biirgerbrau. After an address denouncing Britain and affirming the Reich's readiness for five years of war, he departed with his staff instead of lingering far into the night to discuss old times with his earhest Parteigenossen as was his wont in former years. Eleven minutes after he left, the ceiling above the spot where he had spoken was shattered by the roar of a time-bomb. Falling masonry killed seven of the merrymakers and wounded 63. Himmler at once accused the British Secret Service. London denied all knowledge of the outrage, though wits observed that Chamberlain may have had a hand in itsince the explosion came too late. Whether the deed was another "Reichstag fire," arranged by Hitler's intimates to stir enthusiasm over his "miraculous" escape, or was the work of secret "Rohm-avengers," or of Otto Strasser's "Black Front," or perhaps of a group of officers bent on avenging Fritsch was never revealed. The police at once closed all frontiers, arrested hundreds of suspects and offered a reward of $200,000, later increased, for discovery of the plotters. One Georg Elser "confessed" on November 14, alleging that he planned the crime for a year and had received directions from Strasser and money from the British Intelligence Service. But if Elser was subsequently tried, news of the process was suppressed. Meanwhile on November 9 two members of the British Intel-
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ligence Service, Captain Best and Major Stevens, accompanied by a Dutch secret service officer, alighted from a car near an inn at Venio on the Dutch-German border, apparently on some hidden mission. Before they had established contact with those they had come to meet, a number of men rushed out of the inn. They were joined by others from over the border. They shot the Dutchman dead and dragged the two Britishers into Germany. Whether the captives had been bent on secret peace overtures was uncertain. Nazi sources alleged that they were lured to their rendezvous by German agents who had seized a radio set originally supplied by the British to anti-Hitler elements in the Reich. The British technique of showering German cities with propaganda leaflets indicated hopes in London that the war might be won by provoking revolt against the Fiihrer. That the subjects of Caesar never revolt so long as Caesar's armies are celebrating triumphs had perhaps not occurred to Downing Street. Despite much wishful thinking abroad, there was little unrest in Germany. Some hundreds of Czech students were arrested in Prague early in November. A dozen were executed and the university was closed. But among Germans the dominant sentiment was one of pride and complete confidence in the regime and in the Wehrmacht. On January 4, 1940, a new "General Council" or economic general staff was created under Goring's leadership, with Paul Korner as his deputy, to coordinate the activities of the various ministries and give "the firmest authoritarian direction to the entire war economy." While agents of the master race supervised the deportation of the Slavic population of western Poland to the ^'Gouverneinent GeneraP'' in order to make room for German settlers,^ Hitler and his aides concluded that bloodless victory over the West through a "negotiated" peace was not to be had. They made their preparations accordingly. Goring allowed small increases of milk and butter prices to farmers "to assure the German peoples' food and fat supply, no matter how long the war lasts." A new commercial treaty with the U.S.S.R. on February 12 brought new promises of fodder, lumber, oil, manganese, and other raw materials. The Fiihrer boasted in a public speech on February 24 that so long as he was Leader Germany would not perish nor capitulate "even if the world were populated with
1 Cf. Report of Cardinal Hlond, released by the Vatican January 28, 1940.
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devils. . . . God did not create the world for the English alone." Gobbels's press took the cue and denounced British-Jewish plutocracy in unmeasured terms. German Lebensraum would never be safe until Britain was destroyed. Goring called on all Germans in mid-March to deliver all metal objects to the authorities as "the best possible present to the Fiihrer on his fifty-first birthday, April 20." Before the birthday arrived the Reichswehr was once more on the march toward new victories, destined to confound all the hopes of Hitler's foes and bring the West to ruin. German assurance of success through carefully prepared offensives was matched by French confidence in victory through cheap and passive defense. But the confidence was without conviction. The people of the Third Republic embarked upon the last war they were to wage as freemen under leadership which had long since betrayed their best hopes. Their spirit was in confusion. Prospects of action bred fear. Continued inaction bred demoralizing complacency. Few felt enthusiasm for the values which they were called upon to defend. With resignation or despair Frenchmen answered the call to the colors. With bitterness or indifference they endured the ennui of the long months of waiting, happy that their first anxieties over a possible repetition of the mass slaughter of 1914-18 seemed groundless, half-convinced that the enemy could never break through the costly defenses which their leaders assured them were "impregnable," but more than halfuncertain as to why they fought. Their fatal doubts blossomed from the seeds long since planted by the foreign foe and by the friends of that foe within the frontiers. La Grande Nation was mortally ill long before the panzer divisions crushed its prostrate body in the sun of the last French spring. In the words of Jacques Maritain: "Worlds which have risen in heroism lie down in fatigue, for new heroisms and new sufferings come in their turn and bring the dawn of another day." That day was to be black for France and sadder than any night. The themes of the Dance Macabre were anti-Communism at home and non-aggressive "national defense" in facing the Reich across the Rhine. The once powerful French Communist Party, loyal ally of the Socialists and Radical Socialists in the Peoples Front of 1936, might well have died of inanition and despair over the Nazi-Soviet pact, had the Cabinet but left it alone. Maurice Thorez and many of his comrades at first pledged full support to
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the war and then at Moscow's bidding became defeatists. Daladier required scapegoats. As early as August 25 he ordered the confiscation of UHumanhe and Ce Soir and sent the police to raid the Communist headquarters. Two days later Aiinister of the Interior Sarraut suspended both papers indefinitely. Protests were ignored. While taxes were boosted and wages cut, Daladier decreed the dissolution of the Communist Party on September 26 and of all affiliated groups. Following the adjournment on October 5 of a parliament which never sat, the Cabinet stripped the two Communist Senators and the 75 Communist Deputies of their immunities and initiated a man-hunt for all "Reds" who refused to repent. Thorez and other leaders escaped into exile, but hundreds of Communists were imprisoned. Gamelin had opposed these moves for fear of their effect on morale, but the Premier who aspired to be a httle Caesar needed victims for his holiday. All dissent on the Left was crushed. A decree of October 30 requisitioned labor in the defense industries. All "labor agitators" were rounded up in the name of anti-Communism. Concentration camps were established by a decree of November 19 for "individuals considered dangerous to national security." None of these measures had much demonstrable relationship to the conduct of the war, but they aided in the establishment of Daladier's de facto dictatorship. His authority to rule by decree, voted in March for eight months, was extended by the Chamber, 318 to 175, in a twelve hour session on November 30. The Senate concurred two days later, 259 to 23. On January 10 seven Communist Deputies who sought to take their seats were ejected by their colleagues. The Chamber voted on the i6th, 521 to 2, to exclude all Communists from Parliament and from municipal governments if they had not repudiated their party by October 26. Of the Communist Deputies, only 12 retained their places; 36 were in prison; 17 were in the army; and 10 were in hiding. The timorous Premier with the strong chin and the soft, vague eyes thereby created the illusion of strength. On January 29 Daladier denounced the "whispering campaign" against the Government and threatened to "strike without mercy" against all Nazi and Bolshevik propagandists. But the whispering went on. Peasants and burghers rejoiced in Daladier's heavy blows against the Left, since they had far less interest in the war with the Reich abroad than in the war against
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Communism at home.^ But workers grumbled. They viewed the national destiny without faith and without hope. In the bright Avorld of Big Money, disinterested patriotism had long since died. Much of the haute bourgeoisie had no interest in defeating Germany or even in saving France. Its dying gods were Property and Profits and it would have no other gods before these. One of its chief spokesmen, Georges Bonnet, was obliged on September 13 to yield the Quai d'Orsay to Daladier and to content himself with the Ministry of Justice. This strange figure with the beaked nose and high bald head was the symbol of appeasement and defeatism and the chief architect of Munich, even though he had not accompanied Daladier to Hitler's house. Whether, as the wits said, he was "in the pay of every European government except the French" may never be known. His career was a personal triumph and a national disaster. His demotion relieved the fears of some, but there were others, less obvious and in less exposed posts, to take his place. The most dangerous enemies of the Republic were, as always, not abroad but at home, and not on the Left but on the Right.^ Through the heavy censorship a few reports occasionally penetrated regarding the activities of the unrepentant Munichmen who figured so prominently in high society. According to Kerillis in Upoque of December 22, certain of these gentlemen were already plotting to make a separate peace with Berlin after put1 Cf. the descriptions of France at war in Edmond Taylor's remarkably incisive and prescient book, The Strategy of Terror, Houghton Mifflin, Boston,
1940.
2 Bonnet had entered politics as a progressive Radical Socialist under the sponsorship of Camille Pelletan whose niece he married. He first entered the Cabinet under Painleve. His ambitious wife, Odette, pushed him ahead. He served as Ambassador to the United States and as Minister of Finance in 1933 under Daladier who, at the Party Congress of that year at Vichy, referred to him as "that admirable Georges Bonnet." In 1935 he was Minister of Commerce under Laval. Compromised in the Stavisky scandal, he was saved by the Peoples Front. As Foreign Minister (April 1938-September 1939) he was less a conscious tool of Hitler than of powerful financial interests which had no comprehension of Hitlerism and looked to totalitarianism for salvation against radicalism. Rumor held that Daladier had long since come to detest Bonnet, but was unable to dispense with him because of pressure from The City, the Banque Lazard (where Bonnet was long employed) and President Lebrun. Some Radical Socialists spoke of him as "the most despised and the most feared man in France" and predicted in private that he would some day be tried as a traitor. According to Kerillis, Bonnet's Berlin agent, M. de Brinon, distributed hundreds of millions of francs in 1938-9 to Rightist and pacifist papers.
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ting the aged Marshal Petain in the Premiership, This move, however, was to wait upon the defeat which the reactionaries had done so much to assure. The magnates of mining and metallurgy all through the winter sold 550,000 tons of Lorraine iron ore per month to Belgian purchasers and bought coal in exchange. Some of the "Belgian" coal came from Germany. Some of the French ore went to the Ruhr to make the guns and tanks with which the Reich was to strike France down.^ This was perhaps not willful treason, but only "business as usual." The Fiihrer knew, if the Anglo-French plutocrats did not, that democracy's road to death is labelled with this sign, and that when the time should come to make a choice between greed and patriotism, many monied Frenchmen would love their pocketbooks more than la Patrie. Daladier floundered amid problems once created by his weakness and now beyond his strength to cope with. He became more and more inaccessible. His feebleness, first made manifest in his resignation in February 1934 in the face of the Fascist rioters,^ drove him to browbeat those more feeble than he. He had long quailed before the vicious attacks of the ultra-reactionaries who called him "le fusilier," "a sinister comedian" and "the man with the face of an evil priest who has wallowed in blood" {Gringroire). He sought constantly to appease the Right, as he had sought to appease the Reich. He found solace by communing with reactionary generals. He was comforted by his mistress, Marie Louise de Crussols de'Uzes. She was the daughter of a wealthy family of Breton sardine-canners. She had the title of Marquise. Her charms soothed the weary soul of her lover. Her blue blood stirred his pride. He, after all, was but a baker's son. Clemenceau had once observed that French parliamentarians did nothing but "toucher et coucher" Daladier's boudoir adventures were no better and no worse than those of his colleagues. In personal honesty he was probably their peer. But honesty and good intentions were not enough. Behind his back, and often enough under his nose, intrigues went on which threatened disaster. Bonnet schemed to resume appeasement. The "admirable Georges" consorted with many who openly admitted that they would prefer Hitler to Blum in the Palais d'lysee. Marcel Deat and Gaston Bergery organized
1 Cf. "National Unity in France," by Leo Gershoy in Events, Febraary 1940. 2 Cf. Europe on the Eve, pp. 92-4.
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a secret bloc of Senators and Deputies committed to peace. Bonnet was liaison agent with another group headed by Pierre Laval and Adrien Marquet. Deat was arrested early in the war for distributing leaflets demanding immediate and unconditional peace, but he was never prosecuted and was soon released. Otto Abetz had been expelled in June, when certain minor pressmen were made scapegoats for the venality of superiors who had regularly accepted Nazi money and continued to do so after the outbreak of hostilities. Long before the Finnish war Le Tejnps, Le Journal, Le Matin and Le Journal des Debats were demanding a diplomatic break with Moscow. They later demanded war against the U.S.S.R. while they subtly suggested peace with the Reich. Socialist Paul Faure and other pacifists on the Left agreed. Daladier yielded to the extent of waging war on the French Communists and making plans for armed intervention in Finland. For war against Hitler he had no heart.^ By mid-winter voices were being raised for Daladier's dismissal. They came from the Right. They were demands not for a belligerent new leader who would make war, as Clemenceau had made war, but for the venerable Marshal Henri Philippe Petain, aged 84, who would not make war at all. This eminence gris was a friend of Franco. He had been the friend of Colonel de la Rocque and hero of the Fascist Croix de Feu which Tardieu and Laval once secretly subsidized with public funds. From Madrid, where he communed with the German Ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer, Petain made tentative peace proposals. Six years before he had been one of the Croix de Feu candidates for a Fascist "Directory" of five. The other four were Doumergue, Marquet, Laval and Weygand. T w o years before he had been one of the candidates of the "Cagoulards" for a dictatorial quadrumvirate, the other three members of which were to be Jacques Doriot, Jean Chiappe and Weygand. Bonnet, then Finance Minister, had threatened to quit the Cabinet if Petain's connections with the "Hooded Men" were disclosed. Chautemps had hushed up the investigation. Such were the men who gathered against Daladier and schemed to sabotage the war. In this they were to be successful. The defeat of France was to give them their opportunity to destroy the French Republic.
1 Cf. Andre Simone, J'Accuse, The Dial Press, New York, 1940, pp. 320 f.
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The earlier defeat of Finland gave them their opportunity to oust Daladier. On February 9, the Deputies, 262 to 227, overrode Daladier's objections to a two-day secret session designed to lift the veil which the ministers had thrown about their policies. Blum had led the struggle for an interpellation. The proceedings of the secret session remain secret. At its close the Deputies unanimously voted confidence in the Cabinet. But on February 16 Blum led a new revolt against the "incompetent and partial" censorship. Daladier yielded by promising to allow the press liberty of political expression and creating a Ministry of Public Information, headed by Louis Frossard. But the debacle of Allied policy in Finland was too much. In the Senate vote of confidence of March 14, 60 Senators abstained under the leadership of Laval who, as always, demanded further appeasement of Italy. Four days later Duce and Fiihrer met at the Brenner. On March 19 the Socialist and the RepubUcan Federation of Louis Marin withheld confidence by declining to vote in the Chamber; 239 deputies voted to support Daladier; 300 abstained. He resigned. The last Cabinet of Republican France, appointed March 21, retained Daladier as Minister of National Defense along with Cesar Campinchi and Georges Mandel at the Navy and Colonial Ministries. Laurent-Eynac replaced the incompetent Guy La Chambre at the Air Ministry. Lucien Lamoureux replaced Reynaud in Finance. Albert Serol took Bonnet's place in Justice. Yvon Delbos was also dropped. Albert Sarraut was demoted from Interior to Education. Marin's men got no posts, but the Socialists received two Ministries and three Undersecretaryships. The new Premier was Paul Reynaud, small, sharp, impeccablean ardent anti-Munichard who had served as Minister of Finance, Colonies, and Justice under Tardieu and Laval in 1930-32, and then become a vigorous opponent of successive Cabinets during the years of retreat. As Minister of Justice and later of Finance under Daladier, he had sought in vain to checkmate Bonnet. Although a conservative, he had alienated many conservatives by advocating devaluation of the franc and urging as early as 1935 an alliance with the U.S.S.R. and reorganization of the army for offensive warfare. In the winter of 1938-9 he was hailed as the savior of French economy. Reynaud was not the man desired by the dark forces plotting
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treason. The men he was obliged to keep in ofEce, notably Daladier and Gamelin, were not men in whom he had confidence. But parliament would vote no confidence in the Cabinet unless he kept them. "I have come too early," he remarked. In the first vote of March 21 all the Right and many of the Radical Socialists voted against him, with all the Socialists solidly in his favor. He secured a majority of one vote (268 for, 156 against and 111 abstaining) and decided to carry on"to wage war, and to wage war in all fields." Laval, Bonnet, Flandin, Deat and other Munichmen did all in their power to turn him out of office. Wrote Pertinax in UEnrope Nouvelle: "A great number of adversaries of the new Cabinet reproach it, above all, with wishing to make war against Hitler's Germany, when at the bottom of their hearts they would have liked to have allied themselves one day with Germany against Russia." Out of deference to the Right, Reynaud compelled the recall of the Soviet Ambassador, Jacob Suritz, for indiscreet statements at the time of the Finnish peace. In deference to his convictions, he gave a pledge to Britain that France would make no separate peace. His first appearance before Parliament to defend his policies coincided with the launching of the Nazi Blitzkrieg in Scandinavia. The Chambers therefore consented on April 9-11 to defer debate. On April 19-20 both houses accorded him unanimous votes of confidence. Had he come earlier to the helm, or had he been granted a free hand in March, much that followed might have befallen differently. Had he been less preoccupied with the Countess Helene de Portes, and had she been less addicted to meddling in politics, his decisions and indecisions in the face of disaster might have been different. Had he been more courageous at the end . . . But in the face of such reflections, vanquished hope weeps in vain. In England, as in France, the reins of power remained through the weary winter in the hands of those whose policies had brought catastrophe. Only when the full scope of catastrophe became apparent to all did the artisans of Munich display grudging willingness, not to step aside, but to share responsibility with others on terms other than their own. In the interval they strove to vindicate themselves, despite the Polish debacle, by preparing a victory which they believed could be won cheaply if slowly by passive defense, by propaganda leaflets, and by gradual attrition of German resources until Berhn should sue for peace, as in 1918.
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In London, as in Paris, the war began with a swift evacuation of hundreds of thousands of urbanites to the country in anticipation of immediate air raids. In London, as in Paris, the winterlong deadlock was greeted with relief, incredulity, scepticism, bewildermentprecisely as the Nazi psychologists intended. The outbreak of hostilities led to the establishment of a "War Cabinet." But Liberals and Laborites declined to be represented in any Government headed by Neville Chamberlain. He declined to step down. With its huge majority of Tory backbenchers, the Conservative Old Guard saw no need to compromise with the Opposition. Only two well-known critics of the Munichmen, both of them dissident Conservatives, were included. Winston Churchill, who had for five years warned Baldwin and ChamberIain of the consequences of their course, was recalled to the Admiralty. Anthony Eden, dropped as Foreign Minister on February 20, 1938, became Secretary for the Dominions. For the rest, few changes were made. Lord Hankey became Minister Without Portfolio; Lord Chatfield, Minister for the Coordination of Defense; and Leslie Hore-Belisha, War Secretary. The archappeasers. Lord Halifax, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir John Simon and Sir Kingsley Wood, were retained respectively as Foreign Secretary, Lord Privy Seal, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Air Secretary. These men strove as best they could to mobilize sea power, man power, and money power for what they envisaged as a long contest of gold and ships against a Reich which must in the end go down, as the Second Reich had gone down, before superior tonnage and poundage. Food was rationed. Taxes were raised. Resources of all kinds were pooled. Prices were fixed. Steps were taken to insure full economic and military cooperation with France and with the Dominions.^ Complaints were numerous over the stupidities of the Ministry of Information, over the inconveniences of "blackouts," over the bad taste of quartering liceinfested slum children in the stately country homes of the aris1 Australia and New Zealand joined Britain in war at once. The Union of South Africa declared war on September 4, following the parliamentary defeat and resignation of Prime Minister J. M. B. Hertzog, who favored neutrality, and his replacement by Jan C. Smuts. Canada declared war on September 10. Eire remained neutral. India became a belligerent by virtue of British rather than Indian decision. Cf. James Frederick Green, "The British Dominions at War," Foreign Policy Reports, February 1, 1940.
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tocracy. "Business as usual," "grumbling along" and "muddling through" were the watchwords of a war that was vaguely familiar yet passing strange. The first Cabinet shake-up took place on January 5, 1940, when Lord MacMillan gave way to Sir John Reith as Minister of Information, and Hore-Belisha to Oliver Stanley as War Secretary. Sir Andrew Duncan replaced Stanley as President of the Board of Trade. The cause of MacMillan's fall was obvious: incompetence. Hore-Belisha's resignation was variously attributed to the opposition of army oldsters to his modernization efforts, to his advocacy of offensive warfare, and to his conviction that Finland should be defended even at the cost of war with the U.S.S.R. The capitulation of Finland shook Chamberlain's position, but did not unseat him as it did Daladier. Opposition speakers criticised the the composition of the Cabinet and the prosecution (or alleged lack of prosecution) of the war. The Prime Minister yielded reluctantly to pressure by announcing Cabinet changes on April 3 which disappointed everyone. Churchill was given no direction over a coordinated Defense Ministry, as many had urged, but was charged with presiding over periodic meetings of the three war services. Wood was named Lord Privy Seal and displaced as Air Secretary by Hoare. Hudson became Minister of Shipping, while Geoffrey Shakespeare took the vacated post of Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade. The men of Munich still dominated the Cabinet. In view of their past record, their bent for prudence, and their cautious concern for pecuniary rather than martial values, it was scarcely strange that these men failed to stir the hearts of their countrymen and of the world with any dramatic statements of purpose. Democracy as a crusading faith had never been part of their lives. The fervor of 1917 could perhaps not have been recaptured even by a Wilson or a Lloyd George. The Tories of 1939 were for the most part men who knew no way of appealing for mass support and collective sacrifice save by stating the obvious in oblique and halting fashion. The reductio ad absurdum of British war aims was most nearly achieved by Lord Lloyd in a little book entitled The British Case, published by Macmillan with a laudatory introduction by Lord Halifax. The Rt. Hon. Lord loved "freedom," but was in no doubt as to where its worst foe lay and where friends were to be found against a Fascism
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which was noble in purpose but had somehow been perverted by Hitler:
During the first decade after the post-war treaties the main responsibility for European unrest lay with Russia. Subversive revolutions were attempted and for a time succeeded in Finland, Estonia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Poland was almost conquered. A little later Italy was on the verge of red revolution. By 1929 Germany itself was in disorder. A little later again, Spain dissolved into anarchy. Russian agents and Russian money were busy all over Europe (p. 52). Our most ancient and very faithful ally, Portugal, enjoys today greater prosperity than ever before in the modern world under the wise but authoritarian government of Senhor Salazar. The government of Poland itself was definitely authoritarian. Above all, the Italian genius has developed, in the characteristic Fascist institutions, a highly authoritarian regime which, however, threatens neither religious nor economic freedom, nor the security of other European nations. . . . The Italian system is founded on two rocks: first, the separation of Church and State and the supremacy of the Church not only in matters of faith but of morals; second, the rights of labor. The political machinery of Fascism is, indeed, built up on Trade Unionism while that of the German State is built up on the ruins of the German labor movement (pp. 54-5).
A somewhat higher level of awareness of the facts of life was, to be sure, exhibited by some of the members of the Cabinet. A few excerpts will suffice to suggest the spirit in which the Allied cause was formulated by the leading British spokesmen. Halifax, October 7, 1939:
. . . We are fighting in defense of freedom, we are fighting for peace, we are meeting a challenge to our own security and that of others, we are defending the rights of all nations to live their own lives, we are fighting against the substitution of brute force for law as the arbiter between nations and against the violation of the sanctity of treaties and disregard for the pledged word. We have learned that there can be no opportunity for Europe to cultivate the arts of peace until Germany is brought to realize that recurrent acts of aggression will not be tolerated. . . . We are therefore fighting to maintain the rule of law and the quality of mercy in dealings between man and man and in the great society of civilized states.
Halifax at Leeds, January 20, 1940:

. . . What kind of a peace is it at which we aim? Our peace aims, as distinct from our war aim, which is to win the war, have been clearly
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defined by the Prime Minister. We must insist upon the restoration of liberty to small nations that Germany has cruelly deprived of it, and, profiting I hope by experience of the past, we shall do our utmost to secure Europe from a repetition of this disaster. We seek nothing for ourselves. We have said publicly that if we could once again feel security that a German Government would respect its undertakings and honestly cooperate in trying to build, instead of destroy, European peace on terms of live-and-let-live for all nations, we would not seek a vindictive peace or one that would deny to Germany her rightful place among the nations. The only reason why peace cannot be made tomorrow is that the German Government have as yet given no evidence whatever of their readiness to repair the damage they have wrought upon their weaker neighbours or of their capacity to convince the world that any pledge they may subscribe to is worth as much as the paper on which it may be written.
Stanley at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, February 3, 1940:

We are fighting against an enemy who have been taught by every means to hate us, to long for our destruction. Be under no illusion as to the alternative to victory. People call the Treaty of Versailles a hard peace. Do you think that a victorious Germany would give a defeated Britain a Treaty of Versailles? Shorn of our Empire, our fleet, our trade, we should be a small over-crowded island, its recovery impossible, even its survival in doubt. That is why I have only one war aim, to win the war; only one peace aim, that the peace shall be lasting. Whatever else the future may hold for a distracted world, never again must it see, as it has done twice in the past 25 years, the savage assault of this brutal nation. Our grandsons must not be called on to do again what we did 25 years ago and what our sons have to do to-day. Everything that makes life worth living, every hope of progress, every chance of comfort, every opportunity to make full use of what science increasingly makes available, all these are worthless if we are to have a new blood bath every 25 years. For ourselves we want nothing of Germany, or of the Germans. We do not desire their destruction, we do not grudge them their prosperity, we do not want to make of them the helots that they have made of millions, or to make of their land the desert that they have made of a quarter of Europe. We want them to be peaceful and happy members of a peaceful and happy Europe. But never again, under this leader or any other leader, under this regime or any other regime, must they have the power to inflict upon the world the misery and suffering which twice in our life they have done.
Westivall Chamberlain at Birmingham, February 24, 1940:
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As the days pass and Germany abandons one after another every international rule to which she has subscribed and one after another every pretence to respect the commonest considerations of humanity in her treatment of the harmless citizens of countries with whom she is not even at war, the issue grows ever clearer to the world. That system which has been built up by the efforts of civilised people and which, with all its faults, represents a genuine and earnest endeavour to free ourselves from the barbarities of the Middle Ages and establish an order more in keeping with the fundamental principles of Christianity, is at stake, and only by the victory of the Allies can it be preserved.
Halifax at Oxford, February 28, 1940:

The real conflict of ideas is between youth and youth, and the behefs of German youth, nurtured in Nazi doctrines, are in stark opposition to your own. We should gravely err if we were to rate lightly the strength and reality of their beliefs. The racial doctrine, as interpreted in the Nazi creed, may be, and in my view is, sheer primitive nonsense; and we are no more prepared to admit German superiority of race than we are concerned to assert our own. If that were all it would not greatly matter, but when this doctrine is invoked in justification of the oppression of other races it becomes a crime against humanity. . . . The German race, under its present rulers, is betraying both itself and the greater whole of which it is part, and to whose progress it might, and ought to, be making its own distinctive contribution. And the real tragedy of that betrayal, as it affects the German youth, is the enlistment of the honourable instincts of self-sacrifice and devotion in the service of a crudely materiahst philosophy. Until these false creeds are abjured, and replaced by a wider toleration, they must continue to excite resistance. The future of humanity must not be left in the hands of those who would imprison and enslave it.
Churchill, March 30, 1940:

It seems rather hard with Spring caressing the land, and when after the rigors of Winter our fields and woodlands are reviving, that all our thoughts must be turned and bent upon sterner war. When I spoke to you six months ago I said that if we reached the Spring without any great events occurring we should then have gained an important success. 1 still feel that this additional period of preparation has been an invaluable help to the Allies. Peaceful parliamentary nations have more difficulty in transforming themselves into vast war-making organisms than dictator States who glorify and feed their youth on dreams of conquest. The British Empire
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and the French Republic are now joined together in indissoluble union so that their full purposes may be accomplished. An immense progress has been made in almost every direction, in strengthening our forces, in improving our defenses and in adapting our vfhole economy and way of life to the credit of the common cause. . . . There are thoughtless, dilettante or purblind worldlings who sometimes ask us: "What is it that Britain and France are fighting for?" To this I make the answer: "If we left off fighting, you would soon find out." . . . But there is no need for Russia to be drawn into this struggle, unless upon the promptings of obsolete imperialist ambition she wishes to do so on her own volition and on plans of malice prepense she throws her weight on the side of our enemy. Our affair is not with her. Our affair is with Hitler and the Nazi German power. There is the head and forefront of the offending, and it is there, and there alone, that we seek to strike. . . . Few there are tonight who, looking back on these last seven months, would doubt that the British and French peoples were right to draw the sword of justice and retribution. Fewer still there are who would wish to sheathe it till its somber, righteous work is done.
No better words were spoken by the last leaders of the French Republic. T o criticize the spokesmen of the dying is ever an unkindly task. And yet these words betray the illness which laid the democracies low. This plague of mind and spirit first afflicted the wealthy and influential, and from them spread to the multitudes without wealth and influence who looked to their leaders for leadership. The war in the West was lost long before it began because the leaders of the Western Powers, in the name of "realism," betrayed two dreams which, had they but been served well and wisely, would have saved the West. One was the dream of the common man for a more generous share in the produce of societies rich beyond the hopes of Croesus and for a deeper sense of shared purpose with his fellows. The other was a dream of Europe and the world at peace through the passing of the ancient myth of national sovereignty and through the creation of a dynamic central power to enforce law and impose justice. Leaders of France and Britain (Churchill excepted) could not weave these dreams into any clarion call to inspire sacrifice and heroism because they were the very men who had betrayed both visions. In neither case could they plead ignorance of the way. Three generations of liberal intellectuals had pointed the road
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toward a democratic collectivism which alone offered hope of abolishing poverty amid plenty and meeting the crisis of a sick capitalism in a fashion suited to the needs and hopes of the masses. Woodrow Wilson and his disciples had pointed the road toward world unity and peace among nations. The last leaders of the West preferred to seek economic security for their class (and, if possible, for all) by clinging to dead magic and dying gods. They preferred to seek international security for their countries (and, if possible, for all) by repudiating the League, reasserting the privileges of sovereignty, and playing, with shocking ineptitude, the ancient game of balance and threat. They therefore left it to their foe to stir men's minds with a vision of socialism, albeit antidemocratic and dedicated to military madness, and with a vision of world unity, albeit achieved by the conqueror's sword. Those who were summoned to risk their lives were not told that they must fight for what would be, for what must be, for what they longed for passionately with all the eagerness of blind desire. They were called to arms only in defense of what was, what had been, what they half-knew could never be again. Under such leadership the cause they fought for was self-defeated.
2. T R A N S A T L A N T I S The collective wisdom and action of the United States of America during the first year of the Second World War was as little calculated to inspire respect among simple-minded admirers of foresight and courage as were the deeds of the disillusioned Munichmen of the Western European democracies. A nation torn between cynicism and sentimentalism formulated preferences which it had no will to translate into conduct. A Congress which had ignored the pleas of the President doubtfully followed executive leadership when the course of events demonstrated the befuddlement of legislators' assumptions. A President moved by desire for popularity rested content with small achievements despite his knowledge that more was called for. An electorate, only half-able and half-willing to face the issue posed to it by destiny, allowed itself to be bewitched by minorities sworn to purposes which favored the cause of those committed to the destruction of all that America represented.
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toward a democratic collectivism which alone offered hope of abolishing poverty amid plenty and meeting the crisis of a sick capitalism in a fashion suited to the needs and hopes of the masses. Woodrow Wilson and his disciples had pointed the road toward world unity and peace among nations. The last leaders of the West preferred to seek economic security for their class (and, if possible, for all) by clinging to dead magic and dying gods. They preferred to seek international security for their countries (and, if possible, for all) by repudiating the League, reasserting the privileges of sovereignty, and playing, with shocking ineptitude, the ancient game of balance and threat. They therefore left it to their foe to stir men's minds with a vision of socialism, albeit antidemocratic and dedicated to military madness, and with a vision of world unity, albeit achieved by the conqueror's sword. Those who were summoned to risk their lives were not told that they must fight for what would be, for what must be, for what they longed for passionately with all the eagerness of blind desire. They were called to arms only in defense of what was, what had been, what they half-knew could never be again. Under such leadership the cause they fought for was self-defeated.
2. T R A N S A T L A N T I S The collective wisdom and action of the United States of America during the first year of the Second World War was as little calculated to inspire respect among simple-minded admirers of foresight and courage as were the deeds of the disillusioned Munichmen of the Western European democracies. A nation torn between cynicism and sentimentalism formulated preferences which it had no will to translate into conduct. A Congress which had ignored the pleas of the President doubtfully followed executive leadership when the course of events demonstrated the befuddlement of legislators' assumptions. A President moved by desire for popularity rested content with small achievements despite his knowledge that more was called for. An electorate, only half-able and half-willing to face the issue posed to it by destiny, allowed itself to be bewitched by minorities sworn to purposes which favored the cause of those committed to the destruction of all that America represented.
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The American system of unrepresentative government through a Congress whose members speak and vote less for national opinion than for local interests furnishes few opportunities for the formulation of common purposes in the federal legislature. But the American public revealed its ambivalent convictions in unmistakable terms before the outbreak of hostilities. A Gallup poll of January 29, 1939, showed 94% of the American public convinced that Germany, Italy, or both would be responsible if war broke out abroad. Another poll released on September i, 1939, revealed 86% of Americans believing that Hitler's demands for Danzig and the Corridor were unjustified. A further Gallup poll, announced three days previously, indicated that 82% of Americans believed that no more war materials should be sold to Japan. A Fortune poll of August 2 5 showed 61 % of Americans favoring an economic boycott of any dictatorship embarking upon war. Among Americans with an opinion on the subject (Gallup poll, August 20), 76% were certain of American participation in another general war. The poll did not reveal whether the expectation was a product of hope or fear. The percentage had fallen to 46 by October 2 5. On September 17,44% of Americans (Gallup) favored war against Germany and the dispatch of troops abroad in the event that Britain and France should face defeat, but the number of those holding this view fell rapidly in following months. On September 29, 63% of Americans feared a German attack on the United States in the event of Allied defeat. On October 22, 62% favored all possible aid to the Allies short of war, and 84% desired Allied victory. Yet sentiment in favor of amending the Neutrality Act to permit Allied purchases of war materials varied from 57% in April to a bare 50% on September 3, 57% on September 24, 58% on October 29 and 56% on November 3. Thereafter over 90% of Americans were consistently in favor of continued neutrality. It is plain in retrospect that most Americans desired Nazi defeat and Allied victory without being willing to assume responsibihties or run risks to implement their wishes. Americans disliked and feared a Nazi conquest of Europe more than anything else in the world save one thing: American participation in war to avert a Nazi conquest of Europe. Had timely and vigorous action been taken, America could doubtless have achieved its collective purpose without military war. But full economic sup-
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port of the Allies by measures "short of war" might conceivably entail risks of involvement in hostilities. Many Americans therefore bestirred themselves to thwart any aid stronger than words. As war approached, some Congressmen who had refused to repeal the arms embargo began to waver, despite Senator Nye's assurance on August 16 that war was improbable and would not come unless the United States encouraged it by seUing arms to belligerents. On August 28 Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson declared in Boston that the retention of the embargo was "very nearly equivalent to presenting Germany with an Atlantic fleet." Ambassador Hugh Wilson agreed. Roosevelt opined on August 29 that Congressional inaction had become "a contributing factor" to the crisis. Hamilton Fish, ranking Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, toured Europe during August, urging that Hitler be given a "free hand" in the East, offering his own services to arbitrate the Danzig dispute, arguing for Wilson's return to Berlin, and taking tea with Ribbentrop who obligingly supplied him with a plane for Oslo. In the Norwegian capital he attended the Interparliamentary Union Congress where he pleaded for a thirty-day armistice among the Powers and asserted that America would go to war "only if she is attacked or if the British fleet is defeated." President C. J. Hambro of the Norwegian Storting warned on August 17: "We must not give the impression that we are willing to contribute to another Munich." Other isolationists vied with Fish in expressions of determination to prevent any American aid to the Allies. Senator Burton K. Wheeler found the Administration's argument for repealing the arms embargo "so silly it needs no refutation." ^ When hostilities began, the President was the prisoner of a Congress that had insisted on continuing a policy which could benefit only Hitler. At 2.40 a.m. E.S.T. September i, Roosevelt was awakened by a Paris phone call from Ambassador Bullitt who relayed the news from Ambassador Biddle that the German invasion of Poland had begun.^ Welles and Roosevelt at once began
1 "America Faces the Issue," by Dana Frank Fleming, Events, October 1939; of. W. H. Shepardson and W. O. Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs, 1939, Council on Foreign Relations, Harper & Brottiers, 1940. 2 Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner American White Taper, p. i; cf. Ibid. pp. 58f. for an apparently authentic account of subsequent consultations in Washington.
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concocting a scheme for a Pan-American "neutrality zone." Hull and Roosevelt considered how to aid the Allies by methods "short of war." They decided to call a special session of Congress to repeal the arms embargo. At the afternoon Cabinet meeting the President said repeatedly, with an eye to the ambivalence of American opinion, "we are not going in." At 4 a.m. E.S.T. September 3, Ambassador Kennedy called the President to tell him of the British decision for war. Welles dispatched invitations, already prepared, to a Pan-American Conference. The sinking of the British liner Athenia with the loss of 25 American lives (a "British plot," according to Gobbels) provoked no diplomatic action, since responsibility was never clearly established. That afternoon the President addressed the nation by radio. H e repeated old platitudes in praise of morality and in condemnation of force. He warned against propaganda and rumor. He refrained from discussing the probable effects upon America of the victory of either belligerent. He intoned cliches in order to calm hysteria and afford time for opinion to solidify in favor of lifting the arms embargo. He deplored prophesying, profiteering and partisanship; promised two neutrality proclamations; and praised George Washington and the New Testament.
. . When peace has been broken anywhere, peace of all countries everywhere is in danger. . . . Every battle that is fought does affect the American future. [But] let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields. . . . I trust that in the days to come our neutrality can be made a true neutrality. . . . We seek to keep war from our fireside by keeping war from coming to the Americas. . . . This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account of facts, even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience. . . . I hate war. . . . I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I beheve that it will. And I give you assurances that every effort of your government will be directed toward that end. As long as it remains within my power to prevent it, there will be no blackout of peace in the United States.^
On September 5 the President issued a conventional neutrality proclamation under international law, and a second proclamation under the "Neutrality" Act imposing an embargo on exports of arms, ammunition and implements of war to Germany, Poland,
1 Department of State Bulletin, I, September 9, 1939, pp. 201-2.
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France, Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa (September 8), and Canada (September 10). On September 8 he proclaimed a "limited" national emergency under the National Defense Act. Since Allied sea power prevented any American arms from reaching the Reich, the embargo injured only the Allies. Some $80,000,000 worth of war materials, ordered by Britain and France and already licensed for export, were held up In American harbors by the proclamation. On September 13 the President called Congress into special session. He deemed it expedient to ignore the central issue of aiding the AlHes by "methods short of war." When the law-makers assembled on the 2 ist the President appealed to the traditional American policy and to the international law which had been departed from in the "neutrality" statute. "I regret that Congress passed that act. I equally regret that I signed that act." He held that the arms embargo was "most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security, and American peace." Against the initial advice of Cordell Hull and Norman Davis, he did not ask for a repeal of all "mandatory" neutrality legislation. He proposed repeal of the embargo and the substitution of prohibitions on travel by Americans in belligerent vessels, on entry of American vessels into war zones, on lending by Americans to belligerents, and on exports of arms other than those paid for in cash and carried away in foreign vessels. By such devious formulas was the President constrained to seek his ends. These proposals were in no sense a "return to international law." They constituted a complete abandonment of those principles of "freedom of the seas" and "neutral rights" for which America had fought in 1798, 1805, 1812, 1917. Since isolationists and pacifists chose to believe that America had been "dragged into war" in 1917 by virtue of private loans to the Allies and German destruction of American goods, ships, and lives, the way to peace was obviously to ban loans and to keep American goods, ships and lives out of danger. The President yielded to this sentiment and sought to make possible the shipment of arms to the Allies by agreeing to prohibit loans, shipping and travel in the name of "cash-and-carry." The resultant legislation would aid the Allies so long as they had no need of American money and American shipping. Should Hitler's foes later require funds and vessels from the United States, their rights under customary inter-
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national law to secure these services would be denied by statute to the immense advantage of the Reich. Under the conditions of September 1939, however, the President felt that he could secure no more than "cash-and-carry." The ensuing debate ignored the question of whether America should or should not aid the AlUes in the interest of its own security. It revolved around the irrelevant issue of whether the new formula offered more or less promise than the old of "keeping America out of other peoples' wars." On September 14, in a radio address, Senator Borah pictured repeal as equivalent to a declaration of war. On the 15th Colonel Lindbergh informed his fellow-citizens that the conflict abroad was merely "one more of those age-old quarrels" toward which "we must be as impersonal as the surgeon with his knife." Firm vigilance against "propaganda," he suggested, would insure peace. On the 17th Senator Vandenberg proclaimed that "America cannot be an arsenal for one belligerent without ultimately becoming a target for the other." He agreed with Senator Clark of Missouri that repeal of the embargo would be "unneutral." On September 20 the President conferred with Alfred M. Landon, Frank Knox and thirteen Congressional leaders and ascertained that he could count on sufficient non-partisan support for repeal to carry the day. Congress heard the President's message behind the protection of an army of policemen assembled to hold off an army of militant anti-repeal lobbyists. Congress considered the issue in leisurely fashion while Poland died. The Pittman bill of September 25 was so drawn as to aid Hitler to blockade all Allied possessions by barring American vessels from belligerent ports in Asia as well as in Europe. Congressional debate began on October 2. Borah, following a line identical with that of Father Coughlin and the Communist Daily Worker, denounced the "imperialistic war" and asserted that calls for repeal came from "the war hounds of Europe." On October 3 Herbert Hoover asserted that he had "no fears that the Allies will be defeated. . . . W e must keep cool. After all, we must keep out of this war." He later urged the sale of "defensive" but not "offensive" weapons. Lindbergh agreed and suggested the annexation of Canada. "Racial strength is vital. Politics is a luxury." The Senate discussion was tedious, repetitious and desultory. Its nadir was reached when Senator Lundeen of Minnesota
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(t August 31, 1940) urged that while the Allies "were pretty busy on the Western front" the United States should demand prompt payment of the war debts and, failing compliance, should seize the British and French West Indies. "Not a shot would be fired. . . . Let us show that there is some red blood in us." The isolationists talked their case to death. Senator Nye agreed with Borah that "there is nothing ahead of America but hell if we repeal the arms embargo." He averred that "the assumption that the British fleet is our first line of defense" was "conceived in the brain of the Mad Hatter." He repeated his favorite thesis that munition-makers had pushed America into the Great War, but this argument provoked a belated counter-attack, joined by Senator George Norris, lone survivor among the Senators who had voted against war in 1917. Congressman Ludlow pleaded vainly for a total embargo on all trade with the belligerents. Senator Clark of Missouri branded Britain and France as "aggressors" for refusing to make peace on Hitler's terms and thus driving the Germans "into the bosom of Communism." Senator La Follette proposed a popular referendum before any declaration of warand was defeated. The President denounced those who were tearing their hair over "American boys dying on European battlefields" for indulging in "a shameless and dishonest fake." The bill was amended to lighten the restrictions on American shipping. On October 27, after the debate had degenerated into personal vituperation before almost empty benches, the Senate passed the bill 63 to 30. Eight Republicans joined 54 Democrats and i Independent in voting affirmatively, while 12 Democrats joined 15 Republicans, 2 Farmer Laborites and i Progressive in the opposition. The House assented. After further minor revisions, the Senate voted approval on November 3, 55 to 24, and the House 243 to 172. This result was hastened by the capture of the British-bound American freighter City of Flint by the Deutschland on October 9. The captors took the vessel to Norway, then to Murmansk, and finally back to Norway where the local authorities interned the prize crew and released the ship. Such incidents would be made impossible by the new statute. The act which the President signed on November 4, following adjournment of Congress, was entitled "Joint Resolution to Preserve the Neutrality and Peace of the United States and to Secure
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the Safety of its Citizens and Their Interests." Its preamble asserted absurdly that the United States "waives none of its own rights and privileges, or those of any of its nationals, under international law." Its text was an utter abandonment of neutral rights and freedom of the seas. The President was required to issue a proclamation naming belligerent States "whenever the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign States, and that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the hves of citizens of the United States" ( i ) . "It shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any articles or materials to any State named in such proclamation," subject to a fine of $50,000, five years' imprisonment or both. "It shall thereafter be unlawful to export or transport, or attempt to export or transport, or cause to be exported or transported, from the United States to any State named in such proclamation, any articles or materials (except copyrighted articles or materials) until all right, title and interest therein shall have been transferred to some foreign government, agency, institution, association, partnership, corporation or national. . . . No loss incurred by any such citizen in connection with the sale or transfer of right, title and interest in any such articles or materials or in connection with the exportation or transportation of any such copyrighted articles or materials shall be made the basis of any claim put forward by the Government of the United States. . . . No insurance policy issued on such articles or materials, or vessels, and no loss incurred thereunder or by the owners of such vessels shall be made the basis of any claims put forward by the Government of the United States" (2 ) . These prohibitions were not to apply, however, to shipments of goods other than arms by air or inland waters to lands bordering the United States or to ports in the Western hemisphere south of 35 N . Lat. or north of 35 and west of 66 W. Long, (thereby exempting Canada, except for Halifax, Newfoundland and Labrador) or to ports in the Pacific or Indian Oceans or to Atlantic ports south of 30 N . Lat. (cutting across North Africa) unless such ports should be included in "combat areas" proclaimed by the President and barred to American citizens and vessels (3).
Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful for any citizen
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of the United States to travel on any vessel of any State named in such proclamation, except in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed (s). . . . It shall thereafter be unlawful, until such proclamation is revoked, for any American vessel, engaged in commerce with any foreign State to be armed. (6). . . . I t shall thereafter be unlawful for any person within the United States to purchase, sell, or exchange bonds, securities, or other obligations of the government of any State named in such proclamation, or of any political subdivision of any such State, or of any person acting for or on behalf of the Government of any such State, or political subdivision thereof, issued after the date of such proclamation, or to make any loan or extend any credit (other than necessary credits accruing in connection with the transmission of telegraph, cable, wireless or telephone services) to any such government, political subdivision or person (7).
For the rest, the new Act varied little from the old. The clause relating to "civil strife" which had helped to destroy the Spanish Republic was omitted. Solicitation and receipt of contributions for belligerent States (save for rehef) were banned. American Republics engaged in war against non-American States were exempted from the prohibitions unless "cooperating with a nonAmerican State or States in such war" (9). The President was given authority to prevent the use of United States ports as bases of supply for belligerent war vessels and, at his discretion, to ban foreign submarines and armed merchant vessels from United States waters. The National Munitions Control Board was retained (12). The President at once issued proclamations lifting the arms embargo, banning belhgerent submarines from United States waters, and defining a "combat area" including the North and Baltic Seas, the Bay of Biscay except for the north coast of Spain, and the eastern Atlantic beyond 20. American ships and citizens were thus banned not only from European belligerent territories but from the then neutral ports of Eire, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands and Norway south of Bergen. Twenty-two years previously the United States had gone to war rather than accept German terms which would have allowed one American vessel each week to go to Britain. Now the United States itself forbade all its vessels and citizens to go to any European belligerent port or war zone at any time during hostilities, thereby inviting the Reich to sink all neutral shipping on sight without fear of protest from Washington. Berlin at once took advantage of this opportunity. The Nazi leaders realized that the
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new statute was by no means an unmixed blessing for their enemies. Had it been applied to the wars in Finland and China, it would have aided the cause of the Soviet and Japanese aggressors. Wherever it might be applied, it sounded the death knell of the rights of neutrals to lend, sell, and ship goods to belligerent Statesdespite ardent defense of these rights by America for over 150 years. Such a policy on the part of a Government which repeatedly championed "international law" was perplexing. It reflected the dilemma of a President who desired peace for America and victory for the Allies without being able to serve either purpose frankly or wisely. It reflected the causes of that dilemma in the confusions of a Congress and an electorate whose members aimed at contradictory and mutually exclusive goals, without being able to decide what they valued most or how it was to be attained. But America after November 4 was at least no longer giving open aid to the Nazi conquerors of Europe by denying to Hitler's victims, as it had denied to Ethiopia and Spain, the right to buy arms for their defense. The jumble of logic abandoned and law betrayed was worse confounded by a corollary policy limited to the Western hemisphere. This policy had its genesis not in a muddled Congress nor in a confused public but in the fertile brain of Sumner Welles. On September 6 the Foreign Minister of Panama announced that his Government had joined eight other Latin American Republics in requesting all their neighbors to put into operation the procedures of consultation provided for at Buenos Aires and Lima. The agenda prepared by the Governing Board of the PanAmerican Union included Neutrality, Protection of the Peace of the Western Hemisphere, and Economic Cooperation. Representatives of the American Republics assembled at Panama City on September 22. Mr. Welles asserted that the 21 Republics could not allow "their security, their nationals, or their legitimate commercial rights and interests to be jeopardized by belligerent activities in close proximity to the shores of the New World." On the 26th he proposed the establishment of a "safety zone" around the Americas from which all belligerent activities should be excluded. The other delegates agreed. On October 3 a Final Act was approved, embodying sixteen declarations and resolutions. Most of them were cliches (e.g. "maintenance of interna-
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tional activities in accordance with Christian morality") or routine pledges of collaboration. But the "Declaration of Panama" set up a "neutrality zone" including all of South and Central America and North America south of Canada and extending out to sea from 300 to 1,000 miles. Within this vast area of open ocean, covering more than 5,000,000 square miles and encompassing numerous British, French, and Dutch possessions, the American Republics asserted "as of inherent right" and "as a measure of continental self-protection" that they were entitled to keep the waters "free from the commission of any hostile acts by any non-American belligerent nation." No comparable claim to close the high seas had ever been made in modern times by any State or group of States. N o comparable effort had ever been made to ignore or violate the ancient rule that all waters outside the three-mile limit are open on equal terms to the public and private vessels of all nations.^ That such an attack on belligerent rights and freedom of the seas should be made by 21 neutrals, led by the most powerful neutral, all of whom had insisted from time immemorial on full respect for freedom of the seas and for their own neutral rights, verged upon the preposterous. T o relinquish one's own recognized rights, as in the "neutrality" legislation, is in law and fact far different from denying the recognized rights of others, as was done at Panama. Both steps were motivated by an effort to escape involvement in war by fleeing from duty and danger into an imaginary isolationist haven. The President who had proposed only two years before to "quarantine" aggressors in the name of upholding international law now sought to "quarantine" the American neutrals by a formula which violated international law in a fashion impartially damaging to aggressors and their victims alike. Wits referred to the zone as a "chastity belt" or a "prophyl-Axis" and predicted that it would fail of its purpose. It did. Its failure was ignominious. The only major AngloGerman naval engagement in the first year of the war took place well inside the "zone." By October 4 Secretary Hull was explaining that the "patrol service," in which United States war vessels
'^ The so-called "12 mile limit" established by the United States for the enforcement of Prohibition in the 1920's was not an arbitrary and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over the high seas, but a product of specific treaty agreements with other States.
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were already engaged, was for "information" only and that no eflfort would be made to compel belligerents to respect the zone. They were merely being requested to respect it. If they did not, no one knew what would be done next, since no method of enforcement had been provided. The State Department hoped that no occasion would arise for enforcement. But on December 13 the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee under Captain Langsdorff, engaged in commerce raiding in the South Atlantic, encountered three British cruisers, the Achilles, the Ajax and the Exeter while it was pursuing the French merchantman Formose. After a sixteen-hour running fight the Spee fled into the harbor of Montevideo while the British cruisers lay in wait outside to renew the encounter. Four days later, following expiration of the time limit granted by Uruguay, the German commander scuttled his ship in the Rio de la Plata and took his own life. Two days later the German freighter Arauca fled from a British cruiser into Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On the same day the liner Columbus, fleeing from Vera Cruz, encountered a British destroyer 400 miles off the New Jersey coast and was scuttled by her commander. In no instance did any of the belligerents pay the slightest attention to the Declaration of Panama. On December 21, 1939, the zr American Republics, acting through the President of Panama, protested to Britain, France, and Germany and hinted at barring from American ports belligerent vessels committing acts of war within these zones.^ On January 14 Downing Street replied politely that the proposed zone could not "on any basis of international law" be imposed on belligerents by "unilateral action." Britain could accept it only 1 if assured that it would not become a "vast sanctuary" for German raiders. "If the American States were to adopt a scheme of I sanctions for the enforcement of the zone proposal, they would in effect, be offering a sanctuary to German warships, within which H. M. ships would be confronted with the invidious choice of having either to refrain from engaging their enemy or laying themselves open to penalties in American ports and waters." The American Republics should insure that Germany would send no more war vessels into the zone, and should lay up all German vessels already in the zone for the duration of the war. Without
1 Department of State Bulletin, December 23,1939, p. 723.
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this, Britain would "reserve full belligerent rights." The Quai d'Orsay replied in similar vein on January 23. The German reply held that German vessels already in the zone could be dealt with only on the basis of existing law, not on the basis of unilateral innovations. The Reich could not accept the zone unless assurances were had that British and French possessions within it, including Canada, would not be used as war bases.^ On March 16, 1940, the American Republics protested to Britain over the pursuit by a British vessel of the German freighter Wakama, scuttled by its crew fifteen miles off the Brazilian coast. On May 24 a similar protest was sent to both London and Berlin over the scuttling of the Hannover off the Dominican coast.^ What possible justification there could be in protesting over "violation" of a principle which could by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as good law was not made clear. In other respects, likewise, the diplomacy of American neutrality seemed calculated to create maximum embarrassment for the Allies. The Great Power which had abandoned its neutral rights vis-a-vis Germany, and simultaneously sought to deny belligerent rights, repeatedly protested to London and Paris in the name of an international law which America itself was helping to make meaningless. Once freed from the danger of controversies with Washington, Berlin retaliated against Allied blockade measures by sowing magnetic mines in enemy wâters for the indiscriminate destruction of Allied and neutral shipping. This violation of the Hague Convention of 1907 was held to be "justified" by the "illegality" of Allied methods of intercepting German overseas trade. The Allies retaliated in turn early in December by ordering the seizure of all enemy exports in neutral vessels, contrary to the Declaration of Paris of 1856. Secretary Hull promptly protested to London on December 8 and again on December 14 and 27, contending that Americans had a right to buy German goods and that Britain had no right to interfere with American mails or divert American vessels to British ports since they were already forbidden to trade with belligerents. On January 22 he protested sharply over alleged discrimination against American shipping and "wholly unwarranted delay" at Gibraltar in the
1 Ibid., February 24, 1940, pp. 199-205. 2 Cf. Ibid., March 16, 1940, p. 306 and May 25, 1940, pp. 568-9.
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administration of the contraband control. British refusal to buy American tobacco and other farm products provoked some Congressional resentment (but no diplomatic protest), despite the fact that the ban on loans to belligerents compelled Britain to conserve foreign exchange for purchases of arms. Downing Street replied to the State Department's notes politely, evasively, negatively. Few Britons or Frenchmen were able to understand why the United States, whose people and leaders were overwhelmingly pro-Ally, should avoid controversies with Berlin by abandoning its neutral rights and yet insist upon Allied respect for other rights beneficial to the Nazi cause. Among the more bewildering steps at Washington during the winter was the President's decision to send Sumner Welles on a European tour to "gather information." On February i8 the Undersecretary of State sailed for Naples on the Rex along with Myron C. Taylor, whom Roosevelt had named two days before Christmas as his "personal representative" and "Ambassador without portfolio" to the Vatican. Welles landed on the 25th and conferred mysteriously with Ciano and Mussolini on the following day. On March i he proceeded through Switzerland to Berlin where he conferred mysteriously with Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goring, Hess and Schacht. March 7 saw him in Paris and March 11 in London. The Pope received Ribbentrop in Rome. Mysterious conferences with Lebrun, Daladier, Chamberlain, Halifax and King George were followed by Welles' return to Italy where he saw Mussolini, Ciano, and the King. On the 18th, while Fiihrer and Duce conferred mysteriously at Brennero, Welles saw Pius \ XII. On the 19th he sailed for home. Ten days later he reported I to Roosevelt and Hull, one day before Wilhelmstrasse released I Polish documents discrediting American diplomats. The purpose of these confidential discussions was known, if I at all, only to the participants. The Administration in Washington was obliged to proceed obliquely and by indirection. Welles doubtless assumed that he could learn more of the plans of the warring governments than could the regular diplomatic representatives of the United States. That Mr. Hull shared this view is uncertain. The President apparently believed that no harm could come from the journey and that some good might result. The nature of that good was left undefined. Welles' pleas in the Allied capitals for reduction of trade barriers in post-war reconstruc
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tion had the antique aroma of old lavender.^ If the Fascist Caesars hoped to use the mission to promote a "negotiated peace," they were disappointed. In a speech of March 17 Roosevelt declared "Today we seek a moral basis for peace. It cannot be a real peace if it fails to recognize brotherhood. It cannot be a lasting peace if the fruit of it is oppression, or starvation, or cruelty, or human life dominated by armed camps. It cannot be a sound peace if small nations must live in fear of powerful neighbors. It cannot be a moral peace if freedom from invasion is sold for tribute." After Welles' return the President asserted that "though there may be scant immediate prospect for the establishment of any just, stable, and lasting peace in Europe," the information obtained would be "of the greatest value when the time comes for the establishment of such a peace." America remained the victim of a constitutional system and a schism of the soul which forbade it to have a foreign policy. The elected representative of the American people in the White House desired to give all possible aid to the Allies in the conviction that Nazi victory would mean the end of military security for the United States and probably the end of those social values and practices to which Americans believed themselves devoted. The elected representatives of the 48 States in Congress desired to avoid all risks of war in the conviction that their constituents desired peace. The President abhorred all war and hoped to keep America safe without it. The Congress abhorred Hitlerism and hoped that others would halt the Nazi Juggernaut. By the end of March only i % of Americans desired a German victory, 84% desired an Allied victory, 90% were certain of Allied victory, 95% wanted American neutrality to continue. These preferences were mutually incompatible in the world of 1940 so long as American minds were ruled by old words rather than by new realities. A new vocabulary consonant with a new world would have contained no such magic terms as "isolation," "intervention," "neutrality." It might have enabled America to serve effectively the various purposes which Americans professed by
1 By a vote of 216 to i68 in the House on February 23 and 42 to 37 in the Senate on April 5, 1940, Congress extended the Trade Agreements Act to June 12, 1943. But Secretary Hull's hopes for a return to economic liberalism in the post-war world were foredoomed to frustration in the event of Allied defeat and were doubtful even in the event of Allied victory.
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permitting them to use the enormous economic power of America against the Reich. The result would not be "war"-since Germany was physically unable to fight America so long as France and Britain still fought, but "peace"since Allied victory would represent no threat to America and no danger to peace elsewhere. The new vocabulary, however, was non-existent. The old words held sway. The Administration, therefore, could not acknowledge its purposes nor undertake candid explanations of realities without exposing itself to condemnation for "war-mongering." It was obliged to proceed by one step forward and two backwards. It was compelled to reprimand those of its spokesmen (e.g. James Cromwell, Minister to Canada, speaking bluntly in Toronto on March 20) who indulged in frank expressions of official hopes and fears. It was forced by the processes of democracy to remain responsive and responsible to electors wanting "peace" as much as Allied victory, hoping they would never have to choose between the two, and suffering from confusions of purpose so deep and widespread throughout the land as to produce something comparable to paralysis in the high places where "foreign policy" was supposedly formulated. These doubts and inhibitions in the transatlantic world were taken for granted in the totalitarian capitals. The Caesars assumed that the North American Republic and its Latin neighbors loved peace too well to risk its loss by opposing in any effective way the Fascist conquest of Europe. They assumed that the Western 1 European democracies were afflicted with a like disorder of the spirit. They assumed that France and Britain could be speedily 1 crushed before America could act and that America would look on, spell-bound and helpless, while the Allies were struck down. They assumed that in the aftermath America could either be induced to make a Munich or could be crushed in turn after being isolated, by its own choice, for the kill. These assumptions were correct during the first eight months of the war. That they would continue to be correct thereafter was not doubted by the conquerors. "I go my way," said Hitler at Munich on March 14, 1936, "with the assurance of a somnambulist, the way which Providence, has sent me." America's way was also the way of the sleep-j walker. But it had no goal save the goal of safety-and even thisi
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required wisdom and courage which were lacking, and action which few Americans were prepared to take. And America's way most surely lacked assurance. Whether it enjoyed the guidance of Providence was doubtful. Providence usually walks with those who show by deeds that they merit its protection.
CHAPTER TEN
DEATH IN APRIL
I. T H E N O R T H L A N D S f APRIL 9, 1940
of the eighth month of the war the Nazi High Command conquered two kingdoms in a single blow of such swiftness that the conquest of Poland was by comparison a campaign in slow motion. The diplomatic prelude of this thunderbolt, like that of the blows which followed hard upon it, cannot yet be told in detail. But enough is known to allow the outlining of a tale as mad as any in the annals of warfare. The Nordic dilemma posed to the AlUes in their feckless efforts to aid Finland has already been noted. These efforts envisaged the dispatch of troops to Finland across Sweden by way of Narvik, Trondheim and other Norwegian ports. The Allied leaders never succeeded in securing consent from Oslo or Stockholm and never quite brought themselves to the point of acting without consent. Once peace descended on Finland's bloody snows, these plans were laid aside. The expeditionary force which 1 had been assembled was disbanded. Not until the end of March, when fears had arisen of a German move against Norway, were any further steps taken in London and Paris in contemplation of operations in Scandinavia.^ On March 28-29 Reynaud, GameO N THE NINTH DAY 1 Cf. the Allied and Norwegian documents published in German White Book No. 4, Britaifi's Designs on Norway (here cited as G4) and in German White Book No. 6 (here cited as G6), both issued in translation and with facsimiles by the German Library of Information, New York, 1940, from the originals: Doku mente zur englisch-franzosischen Politik in der Kriegsausweitung and Doku mente zur Kriegsavsiveitungspolitik der Westmachte und Generctlstabsbespre chungen Englands und Frankreichs mit Belgien und den Niederlanden, Reichs druckerei, Berlin, 1940. These documents, while highly illuminating and in thi writer's judgment authentic, scarcely justify Ribbentrop's statement of Apri 462
CHAPTER TEN
DEATH IN APRIL
I. T H E N O R T H L A N D S f APRIL 9, 1940
of the eighth month of the war the Nazi High Command conquered two kingdoms in a single blow of such swiftness that the conquest of Poland was by comparison a campaign in slow motion. The diplomatic prelude of this thunderbolt, like that of the blows which followed hard upon it, cannot yet be told in detail. But enough is known to allow the outlining of a tale as mad as any in the annals of warfare. The Nordic dilemma posed to the AlUes in their feckless efforts to aid Finland has already been noted. These efforts envisaged the dispatch of troops to Finland across Sweden by way of Narvik, Trondheim and other Norwegian ports. The Allied leaders never succeeded in securing consent from Oslo or Stockholm and never quite brought themselves to the point of acting without consent. Once peace descended on Finland's bloody snows, these plans were laid aside. The expeditionary force which 1 had been assembled was disbanded. Not until the end of March, when fears had arisen of a German move against Norway, were any further steps taken in London and Paris in contemplation of operations in Scandinavia.^ On March 28-29 Reynaud, GameO N THE NINTH DAY 1 Cf. the Allied and Norwegian documents published in German White Book No. 4, Britaifi's Designs on Norway (here cited as G4) and in German White Book No. 6 (here cited as G6), both issued in translation and with facsimiles by the German Library of Information, New York, 1940, from the originals: Doku mente zur englisch-franzosischen Politik in der Kriegsausweitung and Doku mente zur Kriegsavsiveitungspolitik der Westmachte und Generctlstabsbespre chungen Englands und Frankreichs mit Belgien und den Niederlanden, Reichs druckerei, Berlin, 1940. These documents, while highly illuminating and in thi writer's judgment authentic, scarcely justify Ribbentrop's statement of Apri 462
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lin, Ironside and Churchill apparently prepared new plans for the occupation of Norwegian ports (G6, 28), but there is no reason to believe that they contemplated any such action unless the Reich should strike first. By leaving the initiative to the foe they escaped the accusation (outside of Germany) that they were violating neutral territory. But here, as in the Moscow negotiations of 1939, legal and ethical inhibitions spelled defeat. The moves and counter-moves which finally converted Scandinavia into the first arena of the Western Blitzkrieg extended from Montevideo to Murmansk. When Norwegian authorities released the City of Flint, Berlin protested to Oslo. Foreign Minister Koht rejected the protest on November 5. Denmark and Sweden, along with Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Japan, and the United States protested to London over the Allied decision of late November to seize German exports in neutral vessels. Berlin accused the northern neutrals of conniving at Allied violations of their rights. London accused them of conniving at German violations of their rights. In their painful predicament the Scandinavian governments clung desperately to "neutrality" and
27, 1940, that the British "mines which encircled Norwegian harbors were intended to insure the safety of the British Expeditionary Force which at that time was already in the North Sea. On April 8th the British troops who were intended to occupy Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik had already embarked and had left the harbors. At that moment the British Admiralty received intelligence that German naval forces had appeared in the North Sea. The Admiralty, connecting the appearance of the German fleet with the intended landing, immediately sent out messages to recall the transport ships, and made every effort to contact the German fleet in battle. It was, however, impossible to recall all the transport ships, and several were captured and destroyed by German bombers. The German counter-action on the morning of April 9 took place at exactly the right moment to prevent or frustrate Franco-British landing operations on the Norwegian coast" (pp. xxii-xxiii, German White Book No. 4). If British forces were already on the way (and there is no evidence of this save Ribbentrop's word) German forces were also on the way and all preparations had been made by German agents in Norway itself for the blow to come. There is no evidence that any British forces were dispatched from British ports before German forces left German ports to invade and occupy Norway. Chamberlain later said that the military orders dated April 7 were issued with the stipulation that landings were to be made only if requested by the Norwegian Government or if Norwegian territory should first be violated by Germany. This does not prove that the British leaders were more "moral" than the German or even more "law-abiding." It may merely prove that here, as elsewhere, the Allied leaders were slower and displayed less imagination and initiative than the enemy. The legal question of which belligerent first violated Danish and Norwegian territory, however, is a question of fact. The fact is clear that the Scandinavian Kingdoms were invaded by Germany, not by Britain.
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turned a deaf ear to Churchill's plea of January 20 that they "do their duty in accordance with the Covenant of the League and . . . stand together with the British and French empires against aggression and wrong." His assumption that they must either support the Allied cause or be one by one destroyed was obviously correct. But they feared that support to Powers unable to defend them would only invite destruction. And they could not forget that for nine years Churchill's colleagues had abetted aggression and reduced the Covenant to waste paper. The relationships between legal rectitude and RealpoUtik became increasingly complex with the intensification of war at sea. On February 16 the British destroyer Cossack cornered and boarded the German naval auxiliary Altmark in Joesing Fjord on the southwestern coast of Norway in the presence of a Norwegian torpedo boat. After fighting in which seven Germans were slain, the British seamen took off 300 prisoners. They had been members of the crews of seven British merchant vessels destroyed in the South Atlantic by the Graf Spee. The Nazi press raged at this "most bestial attack." Oslo protested to London. Berlin protested to Oslo. The legal issue resolved itself into a question of whether the Altmark had abused its right of innocent passage and if so, whether British violation of neutral waters was a justified reprisal for Norway's alleged failure to discharge its neutral obligations. Halifax contended that Norway had repeatedly permitted its waters to be misused by German vessels, that Oslo should have interned the Altmark and released the prisoners, and that Britain would neither apologize, pay damages, nor restore the rescued seamen to Norwegian jurisdiction. Halvdan Koht replied on February 19 in an address to the Storting that the Altmark had not called at Bergen or any other Norwegian port, that Norwegian authorities knew nothing of the prisoners and had neither right nor obligation to search a public vessel of a friendly Power passing through their waters, and that the British action was wholly unwarranted. "Norway is a small State and cannot base her rights on power. . . . W e may bring this case before the League of Nations or some other tribunal." Chamberlain in Commons on February 20 retorted that Norway had refused repeated requests to search the Altmark and that all the world knew of the prisoners on board. "Even if such 1 indifference were due to German pressure, it nevertheless in the
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view of H. M. Government viâs inconsistent with an active and impartial exercise of the duty of a neutral toward ourselves as a belligerent." On February 25 Koht reiterated his position and proposed arbitration. London declined, but met Norwegian desires in another field by agreeing that merchant ships possessed of navicerts issued by British consuls in Norwegian ports would not be required to call at British ports for contraband inspection. Berlin growled that acceptance of navicerts was a violation of neutrality. At the same time Foreign Ministers Koht, Giinther, and A4unch (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) met in Copenhagen and declared the determination of their governments to act together henceforth in protesting all belligerent violations of their rights. They hoped for a prompt termination of the Finnish and Western wars and said they would "gladly welcome any endeavor to initiate negotiations." In the sequel the Nazi leaders apparently reconciled themselves to the necessity of a military decision and resolved to break the Allied blockade and outflank Britain by seizing Scandinavia. Chamberlain and Reynaud simultaneously concluded that the Allied blockade must be made more effective by action in Scandinavia and the Balkans. In maneuvering for position, the Allied leaders cautiously contemplated conventional action on the diplomatic, economic, and military fronts. The dynamic Nazi leaders acted in accordance with their perfected revolutionary technique of aggression. Here as always Nazi genius in diplomacy and war was matched by Tory ineptitude. Feeble and fumbling Allied efforts to prevent German misuse of Norwegian waters furnished Berhn with a favorable opportunity to put into operation a plan that had already been worked out to the last detail. A British note to Oslo of April 5 threatened action to close Norwegian waters to German ships. On April 8 London announced that mines were being laid at several points along the Norwegian coast to intercept ore shipments to Germany. Oslo promptly protested. Premier Johan Nygaardsvold and his Foreign Minister evidently had no more inkling than Chamberlain or Churchill that the German forces of invasion were already en route.^
1 The salient passages of the Allied announcement of April 8 were as follows: . . . It is obvious that the German Government are engaged in an indiscrimi-
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At 5.40 a.m. on April 9 a dozen German destroyers emerged from a snowstorm in the Arctic port of Narvik, promptly torpedoed two Norwegian gunboats with the loss of over 500 lives, seized the British vessels in the harbor and landed 2,000 troops. With the aid of other troops that materialized as by magic from
nate campaign of destruction throughout waters in which their unnotified mines are laid or in which their submarines are in a position to operate. . . . The Allies, on the other hand, have never destroyed or injured a single neutral ship or taken a single neutral life. On the contrary, they have not only saved the lives of many innocent victims of these German outrages, but they have also not failed to rescue from drowning German airmen and submarine crews who have been guilty of the inhumanities in question. The position is, therefore, that Germany is flagrantly violating neutral rights in order to damage Allied countries while insisting upon the strictest observance of the rules of neutrahty whenever such observance would provide some advantage to herself. International law has always recognized the right of a belligerent when its enemy has systematically resorted to illegal practices to take action appropriate to the situation created by the illegahties of the enemy. . . . The Allied Governments have observed that the heavy proportion of losses inflicted upon neutral countries, both of human life and in material, has fallen upon the Norwegian mercantile marine. Yet while the German Government repeatedly sink Norwegian shipping and murder Norwegian seamen they continue to demand from the Norwegian Government the fullest use of Norwegian territorial waters for their own commerce, and the Norwegian Government have even felt obliged to provide an armed escort in these waters for German ships, while unable to take effective action against German brutality on the high seas, of which their own vessels have been the victims. Whatever may be the actual policy which the Norwegian Government, by German threats and pressure, are compelled to follow, the Allied Governments can no longer afford to acquiesce in the present state of affairs, by which Germany obtains resources vital to her prosecution of the war and obtains from Norway facilities which place the Allies at a dangerous disadvantage. They have, therefore, already given notice to the Norwegian Government that they reserve the right to take such measures as they may think necessary to hinder or prevent Germany from obtaining in Norway resources or facihties which for the purpose of war would be to her advantage or to the disadvantage of the Allies. If the successful prosecution of the war now requires them to take such measures, world opinion will not be slow to realize both the necessity under which they are constrained to act and the purpose of their action. Their purpose in this war is to establish principles which the smaller States of Europe would themselves wish to see prevail and upon which the very existence of those 1 States ultimately depends. . . . H. M. Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have i accordingly resolved to deny continued use by the enemy of stretches of territorial waters which are clearly of particular value to him and they have therefore decided to prevent the unhindered passage of vessels carrying contraband I of war through Norwegian territorial waters (NYT 4.940).
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the holds of German "merchant vessels" at the docks, they were in full occupation before dawn. Similar actions met with equal success all along the coastat Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger and Kristiansand. Another expedition landed at the Oslo airport and completed occupation of Norway's capital by 4 p.m. At 5.15 a.m. of the same day German troops crossed the Danish frontier and occupied all Denmark without resistance. The victory was a masterpiece of military surprise, meticulous preparation, espionage, treason, perfidy and guileall qualities which are as deplorable in conventional ethics as they are successful in totalitarian politics and indispensable to victory in the wars of the age of Caesarism. King Christian and Premier Thorvald Stauning of Denmark at once acquiesced in German control. King Haakon and the Norwegian Cabinet fled to Hamar and then to Elverum while Major Vidkun Quisling, Norwegian Nazi leader, formed a puppet regime in the occupied capital. The Norwegian Cabinet appointed delegates to negotiate with the German Minister, but rejected the "terms" which he offered. Sweden mobilized, but affirmed "neutrality." What Stalin had failed to achieve in eastern Scandinavia, despite the waste of at least 100,000 lives. Hitler achieved in western Scandinavia at small costat least at the outset. The method whereby this miracle was wrought remains in its details a copyrighted secret of Hitler and his aides. The surface manifestations of the technique, however, were noted by various observers. Leland Stowe ^ in Oslo wondered why the German Minister, Kurt Brauer, had invited officials and army oflicers to the Legation on April 5 to see a German film of the destruction of Polish cities by Nazi bombers. He wondered why Nazi bombers roared over Oslo before dawn of April 9. He wondered why some 30,000 Osloans turned out that afternoon in festive mood to see 1,500 German soldiers, led by General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst and accompanied by detachments of the municipal police, take over a city of a quarter of a milhon people without firing a shot or meeting with the slightest resistance. Strange also (or not strange?) was the reticence of new "Premier" Quisling who, as Minister of War in 1932-33, had appointed and promoted some of the local army commanders who had so strangely sur1 Cf. The Chicago Daily News and Life for April and May 1940.
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rendered their forts and garrisons to little bands of Nazi troops.^ Not until April 11 did German infantry begin arriving in any numbers. As early as March 24 German merchantmen had been loaded below decks with soldiers and arms and sent to their customary Norwegian ports to await the signal. On April 4 German war vessels and transports had begun moving secretly toward appointed destinations. There were few mistakes in the execution of the plot. At the Horten naval base in Oslofjord three Norwegian fighting ships lay at anchor. Shortly after midnight their commander received an order from Koht, accepted in good faith, advising him to put all his men ashore without arms, since German vessels were coming up the fjord and no resistance must be offered. Before dawn several German ships steamed up the narrows without incident. The mine-layer Olav Trygvason, unexpectedly in the harbor for repairs, had not received the "order." Its crew opened fire, damaging the cruiser Emden and sinking a Nazi submarine before getting orders from superior officers to surrender. Also before dawn, Brauer and a group of Nazi agents gathered on one of the Oslo quays to greet the cruiser Bliicher which was to bring the first troops assigned to capture the King and his Ministers before they knew what was happening. But there was a delay and an error. The artillery commander at Oscarsborg ordered his men to fire on the Bliicher in the narrows. It sank with the loss of almost all hands, including the officers who were to take over Oslo. The battleship Gneisenau was also sunk by torpedoes off Oscarsborg. King, Cabinet, and Parliament were able to flee to
1 For a brief time, before greater catastrophes removed him from public attention, Quisling's name became a household word in the Western democracies for a new type of traitor. The Times of London said: "The word Quisling is a gift from the gods . . . suggestive of the questionable, the querulous, the quavering of quaking quagmires, and quivering quicksands, of quibbles and quarrels, of queasiness, quackery, qualms and quilp." Quisling had been leader of the small anti-Communist National Unity Party of Norway. Under German protection, he sought to assume the posts both of Premier Nygaardsvold and Foreign IVIinister Koht, both of whom joined Haakon VII at Hamar. His party did not poll enough votes in 1936 to elect a single representative, despite the Norwegian system of proportional representation. He had served on the General Staff, as military attache in Petrograd and Helsinki 1918-21, as Secretary to Dr. Nansen in Russia 1924-26, and as attache in Moscow. He had a Russian wife and was originally a Bolshevik sympathiser. He became an anti-Bolshevik but ineffective 1 IVIinister of War in the minority cabinet of the Farmers' Party. He was apparently a highly confused and neurotic personality.
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the north after rejecting German demands, presented simultaneously with the attack (5 a.m. April 9), which would have made Norway a German protectorate under Quisling.^ All else went well. Oslo was occupied by air. In most of Norway's ports armed men poured forth from innocent freighters and took control, often with the connivance of local Norwegian officers, such as Colonel Holm Sundlo at Narvik. False orders, local treason, bribery and in some cases sheer apathy precluded resistance. Only in Oslofjord and at Kristiansand, where a battery sank the cruiser Karlsruhe, was any serious opposition encountered. Every detail of each action had been methodically prepared. Many of the German troops spoke Norwegian fluently. As boys during the Great War and immediately thereafter some of them, the "Wiener-barn" had been taken into Norwegian homes by kindly families and saved from the miseries of the beleaguered and defeated Reich. Others had learned the language and geography of Norway as Wandervogel in the 1920's. They now returned with bullets and bombs to thank their benefactors. Luck came to the aid of genius. Of the British naval forces scanning the coast, only the destroyer Gloiv-ôorm encountered any German vessels. The ship it ran upon on April 7 was the cruiser Hipper which promptly destroyed the smaller British boat. On April 8 the mighty Renoivn met the Hipper and the battleship Scharnhorst near Narvik, but a blinding snowstorm made the engagement futile. A British destroyer squadron dashed into Narvik Fjord, sank a German destroyer and several transports, and suffered the loss of two of its own vessels before withdrawing. In the Skaggerak British raiders sank several German transports. The success of the first blows, however, gave the invaders secure bases to which large reinforcements could soon be
1 Cf. Norwegian White Paper issued by the Norwegian Legation in London April 19, NYT 4.ZO40, and appendices of Carl J. Hambro's / Saw It Happen in Norway (D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940). Hambro minimizes the element of treason and makes no mention of Colonel Sundlo in his book, attributing the fall of Narvik to overwhelming German force and the German successes elsevi'here to surprise, duplicity, and aerial superiority. He alleges, for example, that at Kristiansand the invaders issued false orders to the Norwegian commander and brought German destroyers into the harbor under French flags. He likewise presents a more favorable picture of Norwegian military resistance than that drawn by other observers and estimates that 67,000 Germans perished in the campaign, including 25,000 lost at sea. In view of the German casualties in Poland and France, this is probably an over-estimate.
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moved over the narrow seas from Denmark, thanks to German command of the air which kept Allied vessels at a respectful distance. Although fighting followed later, the conquest of Norway, like that of Denmark, was effected in less than a dozen hours. The verbalizations employed by the Nazi leaders to justify their actions were chiefly significant as further confirmation of La Rochefoucauld's maxim that "hypocrisy is the homage that vice offers to virtue." Even the ingenious Ribbentrop made no pretense that Denmark, with which he had signed a ten-year nonaggression pact less than a year before, had been "unneutral," or was a target of AUied designs. A lengthy identical memoranda to Copenhagen and Oslo set forth the rationalizations of the German action:
Contrary to the upright deske of the German people and its Government to live in peace and friendship with the EngUsh and French peoples, and despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for conflict, those in control in London and Paris declared war on the German people. With the unleashing of this long-prepared aggressive war aimed at the existence of the German Reich and the German people, England and France also opened sea warfare against the neutral world. As they attempted at first, in complete disregard of the most elementary rules of international law, to establish a hunger blockade against German women, children and aged, they also subdued neutral States under their reckless blockade measures. . . . . . . The countries of the north were to serve English and French troops as a battlefield while the Scandinavian peoples, true to old English tradition, were intended to assume the role of auxiliary and mercenary troops. When, for the time being, this plan was shattered by the RussianFinnish peace, the German Government received even clearer information that England and France were undertaking definite steps to realize their intentions at the soonest in another form. In the constant effort to prepare intervention in the north, the English and French Governments during past weeks openly proclaimed the thesis that there must be no neutrality in this war and it was the duty of the little countries to participate actively in the fight against Germany. . . . In the course of this typically British warfare, England, in constantly increasing measure and in flagrant breach of international law, has committed belligerent acts on the sea and in the air, in the territorial waters and regions of Denmark and Norway. . . . The Reich Government is in possession of unchallengeable documents that England and France intended to make a surprise occupation of cer-
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tain regions of the northern States in coming days. The Nordic States on their part not only failed to resist earlier transgressions of England and France, but even permitted the most serious interferences with their sovereignty without corresponding countermeasures. The Reich Government must therefore assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will adopt that attitude also toward the action of England and France now planned and about to be executed. But even if the Royal Norwegian Government were willing to take counter-measures, nevertheless, the Reich Government realizes clearly that Norwegian military forces would not suffice to oppose the English and French actions effectively. In this decisive phase of war for existence, forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich's Government can under no circumstances tolerate that Scandinavia be converted by the Western Powers into a theatre of war against Germany and that the Norwegian people be directly or indirectly misused for war against Germany. . . . German troops, therefore, enter Norwegian [Danish] soil not in hostile spirit. The German Supreme Command does not intend to use the points occupied by German troops as operations bases for fighting England as long as not forced to do so through acts of England and France. . . . The Reich Government, therefore, expects the Royal Norwegian [Danish] Government and the Norwegian [Danish] people to have full understanding for Germany's procedure and not to resist in any way. All resistance would have to be and would be broken by every available means by the German armed forces deployed here, and therefore lead only to utterly useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian [Danish] Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed which are necessary to render certain that the advance of German troops can progress without friction and difficulties. In the spirit, long existing, of good German-Norwegian relations, the Reich's Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention through her measures now or in the future of touching upon the territorial integrity and political independence of the kingdom of Norway [Denmark].
April 9, 1940 ( N Y T 4.10.40).
Official reactions in the Allied capitals combined incredulity, indignation and confidence that Hitler had at last made the mistake which would prove his undoing. The Allied Supreme War Council met at once in Paris. Halifax broadcast encouragement to Norwegians and Danes and promised support to liberate Europe "from the menace of Prussian aggression." Downing Street announced that steps were being taken to give full aid to
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Norway. Chamberlain recalled to Commons that he had predicted on March 19 that nothing could save Norway and Sweden except "determination to defend themselves and to join with others who are ready to aid them in their defense." Germany had long planned the invasion. "H.M. Government have decided forthwith to extend their full aid to Norway and have intimated that they will fight the war in full association with them. . . . I have no doubt that this further rash and cruel act of aggression will redound to Germany's disadvantage and contribute to her ultimate defeat." But no effective Allied counter-blows were struck during the next few days. The Danish Faroe Islands were occupied. Danish authorities in Iceland and Greenland repudiated Copenhagen and accepted British protection. Reynaud and Chamberlain breathed optimism. Even the realistic Churchill, who reported to Commons on April 11, revealed little grasp of what the enemy had done:
Hitler committed a grave strategical error in spreading the war so far to the north. . . . We shall take what we want of this Norwegian coast now with an enormous increase in the facility and efficiency of the blockade. . . . It is the considered view of the Admiralty that we have greatly gained by what occurred in Scandinavia and the northern waters in a strategic and military sense. . . . Hitler will now have to fight during the whole summer against Powers possessing vastly superior naval forces and able to transport them to scenes of action more easily than he can. . . . All German ships in the Skaggerak and the Kattegat will be sunk.
The Allied military operations which followed were brief and inglorious. Had Sweden intervened with all its forces, the German invaders could doubtless have been speedily driven from Norway. But Stockholm would run no risks. When German efforts to induce Haakon to submit came to nothing, German divisions moved northward from Oslo and eastward from the western ports while King and Cabinet fled before them, often hiding to escape bombing and machine-gunning from the air. The small Norwegian forces could offer only feeble resistance. Quisling was temporarily dropped by Berlin on April 15 and replaced by Ingolf Christiansen, governor of Oslo province. Gauleiter Josef Terboven became Commissioner of the occupied territory. Berlin acknowledged no state of war until April 26 and later sought to depose the exiled King through a controlled bureau of the Storting. By September's end Quisling was
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again puppet ruler of his conquered country, after the conquerors, despairing of "cooperation," abolished the Storting and the Monarchy and outlawed all parties save Quisling's. N o British troops reached Norway until April 15 when small forces landed at Namsos. Not until April 19 were the initial landings at Namsos and Aandalsnes and near Narvik completed. Apparently no more than 12,000 British troops were landed in all, and these were inadequately supplied with tanks, artillery and aircraft. The debarkations at Namsos and Aandalsnes were intended to cover a frontal naval assault on Trondheim, but the latter blow was not scheduled until April 25. It was in the end abandoned on the ground that the land forces could take Trondheim with lesser risks. The land forces, however, were blinded by the German air arm and were soon overwhelmed by heavy German columns rushing northward up the Gudbrandsdal. By then it was too late to make the naval attack. The decision to abandon everything south of Namsos was reached on April 25 (cf. G6, 28). The reasons for this dismal outcome, explored so thoroughly and lugubriously in the British Parliament on May 7-8, lay in incompetence, in lack of energy, foresight and coordination, and in Nazi aerial superiority. But they also lay in Mussolini's blackmail. The decision of the Admiralty to dispatch additional war vessels to Alexandria was probably the determining consideration behind the conclusion not to take naval risks in the Kattegat and in Trondheim Fjord. As had happened before, notably in 1935-36, London and Paris weakened their position vis-a-vis Berlin by alternately wooing Rome and countering Roman threats by dispersing their own fighting forces. The Allied cause in Norway was speedily lost. The fall of Lillehammer compelled the Norwegian forces north of Oslo to fleesome into Sweden, others up the great valley of Gudbrandsdal leading to the north. The outflanking and seizure of Dombas by German forces advancing up the Osterdal left these troops surrounded and prevented any British aid from reaching them. On April 30 German columns from Trondheim met German columns from Oslo. On May 2-3 the British evacuated Aandalsnes and Namsos. All of southern and central Norway was lost. The last Allied hope was to take Narvik in the far north where the German troops originally landed were still holding out, and thus close at least one route between the Reich and the Swedish
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ore fields of Kiruna and Gallivare. Even this hope was vain in view of the crushing assault which smashed the Low Countries and France in May. Narvik was indeed taken on May 28-29 after a number of German war vessels in the fjord and harbor had been destroyed by naval attack. But on June 9 the campaign ended in defeat: the aircraft carrier Glorious and other Allied vessels were sunk by the enemy off the northern Norwegian coast; the remnants of the Norwegian army surrendered; King and Cabinet fled to London; the last Allied soldiers embarked from the wreck-strewn harbor of Narvik and made for home where their help was desperately needed. All of Norway was in German hands.
2. C H A M B E R L A I N T O
CHURCHILL
As the capitulation of Finland made impossible Daladier's survival as Premier of France, so the conquest of Norway made impossible Chamberlain's survival as Prime Minister of Britain. Neither man could fairly be charged with immediate responsibility for these disasters. But both were responsible in a peculiarly personal sense for contributingat Munich, before Munich, and after Munichto the circumstances which condemned their people to war against a foe they had both served far better than they had ever served the nations which they led. Both were responsible for defeat, since both had lost the war long before it began. Bitterness at Norway's fate was deeper because of the great expectations which had been officially encouraged at the outset of the campaign. After months of waiting the English populace seized eagerly upon every promise of victory. The homecoming of the Exeter to Plymouth of February 15, the honoring of the seamen and officers of the Exeter and Ajax at Guildhall a week later, the daring raid by the Cossack on the Altmark all stirred national pride. The Nazi assault on the Northlands had at first a similar exhilarating effect since Ironside, and Chamberlain after him, assured the nation that Hitler had "missed the bus." Th'e New Statesman and Nation of April 13 commented on events in Norway under the title of "Check to Hitler." Politicians and I pressmen were almost uniformly cheerful, amid efforts of "a 1
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Death in April
ore fields of Kiruna and Gallivare. Even this hope was vain in view of the crushing assault which smashed the Low Countries and France in May. Narvik was indeed taken on May 28-29 after a number of German war vessels in the fjord and harbor had been destroyed by naval attack. But on June 9 the campaign ended in defeat: the aircraft carrier Glorious and other Allied vessels were sunk by the enemy off the northern Norwegian coast; the remnants of the Norwegian army surrendered; King and Cabinet fled to London; the last Allied soldiers embarked from the wreck-strewn harbor of Narvik and made for home where their help was desperately needed. All of Norway was in German hands.
2. C H A M B E R L A I N T O
CHURCHILL
As the capitulation of Finland made impossible Daladier's survival as Premier of France, so the conquest of Norway made impossible Chamberlain's survival as Prime Minister of Britain. Neither man could fairly be charged with immediate responsibility for these disasters. But both were responsible in a peculiarly personal sense for contributingat Munich, before Munich, and after Munichto the circumstances which condemned their people to war against a foe they had both served far better than they had ever served the nations which they led. Both were responsible for defeat, since both had lost the war long before it began. Bitterness at Norway's fate was deeper because of the great expectations which had been officially encouraged at the outset of the campaign. After months of waiting the English populace seized eagerly upon every promise of victory. The homecoming of the Exeter to Plymouth of February 15, the honoring of the seamen and officers of the Exeter and Ajax at Guildhall a week later, the daring raid by the Cossack on the Altmark all stirred national pride. The Nazi assault on the Northlands had at first a similar exhilarating effect since Ironside, and Chamberlain after him, assured the nation that Hitler had "missed the bus." Th'e New Statesman and Nation of April 13 commented on events in Norway under the title of "Check to Hitler." Politicians and I pressmen were almost uniformly cheerful, amid efforts of "a 1
Chamberlain to Churchill
475
willing people trying to stir a lethargic government to action." ^ "The Government's courage," said Liberal Henry White on April 24 of Simon's war budget (termed by The Economist "hopelessly inadequate"), "was somewhat behind the tax payers' determination." By the end of April criticisms of the Cabinet's course in Norway were widespread. Admiral Sir Roger Keyes publicly cautioned the Government to "remember the lessons of Gallipoli, where we failed for lack of a bold policy." HoreBelisha, Lloyd George and even J. L. Garvin added their voices of protest against bungling half-measures. Chamberlain's defense in Commons was not convincing, though he made several prophetic utterances: " W e have no intention of allowing Norway to become merely a sideshow, but . . . we know our enemy holds the central position. They have immense forces already mounted and ready for attack, and an attack can be launched with lightning rapidity in any one of many fields. W e know that they are prepared and would not scruple to invade Holland, Belgium or both. . . . W e must not so disperse or tie up our forces as to weaken our freedom of action in vital emergencies which may at any moment arise." On May 7 Commons opened a full debate on the Norwegian campaign. When Chamberlain rose shortly before 4 p.m. to defend his course, he was obviously without that self-assurance which had enabled him many times in the past to win support for policies of almost incredible shortsightedness. Critics cried out: "TcM missed the bus!" He spoke for an hour, but said nothing significant save: " W e must not forget that there are other fronts which might blaze up into conflagration. . . . I do not think the people of this country have yet realized the extent or imminence of the threat which is impending against us. . . . This is not a time for quarrels among ourselves. . . . I want to get the cooperation of members of all parties." A still, small voice from the Opposition benches said "No." Far into the evening hours the dejected man of Birmingham, who had lost the peace and was losing the war, listened to his opponents assail him. Old scores were recalled. The long shadow of Munich hung over the House. Those who granted the honesty of Chamberlain's intentions in 1938 still felt that he had "snatched
1 Alzada Comstock, Events, June 1940, p. 432.
47*5
Death in April
defeat from the very jaws of victory." Those who were convinced that he had plotted with Hitler to destroy Czechoslovakia and to deceive Parliament and public never forgave him. Loud cheers greeted the closing words of Leopold S. Amery, rebel Conservative, who ended his speech with Oliver Cromwell's injunction to the Long Parliament: "You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say. Let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!" The Tories and their allies had 418 seats to only 197 for the Opposition Laborites and Liberals, thanks to the landslide of 1935, induced by false promises of upholding collective security. T o dislodge Chamberlain seemed impossible. But on May 8 Herbert Morrison pushed the fight. He demanded that Chamberlain, Simon, and Hoare resign. "I feel apprehensive that if these men and others remained in office, we would run the grave risk of losing the war. . . . W e feel that in view of the gravity of events, we must divide the House and end our debate tonight." During Morrison's address Chamberlain yawned repeatedly as he had yawned at Munich in the small hours of September 30, 1938, while the Czech representatives pleaded in vain for mercy. At the end he jumped up to say: "I accept the challenge. I call on my friends . . ." Lloyd George rasped out: "It is not a question of who is the Prime Minister's friend. It is a far bigger issue. The Prime Minister must remember that he has met this foe of ours in peace and in war and he has always been worsted. He appeals solemnly for sacrifice from the nation. . . . I say now solemnly that the Prime Minister can give an example of sacrifice, because I tell him one thing: that there is nothing that would contribute more to victory in this war than that he should sacrifice his seals of office. . . . I hope," continued the Welshman, speaking of Churchill, "that he won't allow himself to be converted into an air-raid shelter to keep splinters from hitting his colleagues." The First Lord of the Admiralty nevertheless rallied to the defense of the Cabinet and spoke for 50 minutes to a hushed and respectful House. He explained the Norwegian failure and pleaded for unity: "At no time in the last war were we in greater peril than now. I urge the members most strongly to deal with these matters not in a precipitous vote . . . but in a grave manner, in due time, and in accordance with the dignity of Parliament." The division followed. It was almost midnight.
477
The vote for adjournment (i.e. for support of the Cabinet) was 281. The vote against was 200. Chamberlain had won again. But a majority of 81 in a House normally conservative by a margin of 210 was a defeat. Almost all the members who were in the fighting services had voted in the Opposition. Chamberlain's enemies shouted "Resign! Go! Go!" But for two days Chamberlain sought to carry on. He appealed in vain to Attlee, Greenwood and Sinclair to join a National Government. They refused. The Labor Party Conference in Bournemouth made it clear that it wanted Chamberlain, Simon and Hoare excluded and Attlee and Greenwood included in a coalition cabinet to be headed by Churchill. Chamberlain hesitated. At dawn of May 10 Nazi hordes poured across the frontiers of Luxemburg, Belgium, and The Netherlands. In a broadcast that night Chamberlain said of Hitler:
. . . In all history no other man has been responsible for such a hideous total of human suffering and misery as he. . . . If he has counted on our internal divisions to help him, he has miscalculated the mind of this people. . . . [I perceived that] essential unity could be secured under another Prime Minister, though not under myself. In these circumstances my duty was plain. I sought an audience viîth the King this evening, and tendered to him my resignation which His Majesty has been pleased to accept. . . . The hour will come when we are to be put to the test, as the innocent people of Holland and Belgium and France are being tested already. And you and I must rally behind our new leader and with our united strength and with unshakeable courage fight and work until this wild beast that has sprung out of his lair upon us be finally disarmed and overthrown.
Chamberlain's last duty was well done, though done, as always, too late. His career had been a personal failure and a world disaster. His political epitaph had long ago been written by Lloyd George: "A vein of self-sufficient obstinacy in the new Minister contributed to the difficulties that baffled all our endeavors. . . . Mr. Chamberlain is a man of rigid competency. Such men have their uses in conventional times or in conventional positions . . . but they are lost in an emergency or in creative tasks at any time." Of the new Prime Minister Harold Nicolson had once written: "He is a man who leads forlorn hopes, and when the hopes of England become forlorn, he will again be summoned to leader-
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Death in April
ship." ^ Churchill was grandson of the seventh Duke of Marlborough. His mother was an American. He was not the business man in politics, but the symbol of the best that was left in the military tradition of the aristocracy and in the literary tradition of the intelligentsia. He went to school at Harrow and Sandhurst and joined the Fourth Hussars. Before he was 25 he had served as soldier and journalist in four campaigns: Cuba, India, Egypt and South Africa. In the Boer war he was captured, but escaped to return, to England as a hero. H e entered Parliament as a Conservative from Oldham, but switched to the Liberals under Lloyd George and served as President of the Board of Trade and as Home Secretary. By 1911 he was First Lord of the Admiralty. As scapegoat of the Dardanelles campaign, he was compelled to resign in 1915. After serving as a major and later as a lieutenantcolonel in France, he headed the Ministries of War and Air in Lloyd George's Cabinet of December 1918. Upon his defeat in Dundee, he went into a long political retirement, devoting himself to briUiant historical and biographical writing, until Baldwin made him Chancellor of the Exchequer. His constant and unsparing criticism of appeasement made him the "stormy petrel" of the Conservatives and kept him from any Cabinet post until Chamberlain was obliged to return him to the Admiralty the day after the declaration of war. The transition of mid-May was scarcely one from age to youth, since Churchill fell only six years short of Chamberlain's 71 years. Neither was it a clean sweep. What the public would have welcomed was anathema to much of the ruling class and to many of the lesser Conservative leaders. In the interest of continuity Churchill retained Chamberlain as Lord President of the Council in the Cabinet announced on May 11. Halifax remained at the Foreign Office. But the other two members of the War Cabinet were Laborites: Attlee as Lord Privy Seal and Greenwood as Minister Without Portfolio. Churchill took the post of Minister of Defense. The Admiralty went to Laborite Albert V. Alexander who had held it under Ramsay MacDonald. Herbert Morrison became Minister of Supply and Ernest Bevin Minister of Labor. T o the Air Ministry went Liberal Sir Archibald Sinclair. Other foes of appeasement returned to office: Anthony Eden as War Secretary and Alfred Duff-Cooper as Minister of
1 Vanity Fair Book, 1931.
479
Information. Of the veteran Munichmen, only Hoare was dropped from the Ministryand later compensated by the Ambassadorship to Fascist Spain. Simon was "kicked upstairs" with a peerage and the post of Lord Chancellor. Sir Kingsley Wood was named Chancellor of the Exchequer. Arch-imperialist Amery went to the India Office, where he was all but certain to infuriate Gandhi's followers. Malcolm MacDonald, who went to the Health Ministry, was displaced in the Colonial Office by Lord Lloyd, one of the blindest of arch-Tories. Sir John Anderson remained Home Secretary, Sir Andrew Duncan President of the Board of Trade and Lord Woolton Food Minister. These were not all heroic nor even competent figures. But the disastrous "National Government" of 1931 was at long last gone. The architects of Britain's bitterest tragedy were no longer at the helm. The new captain who was now called upon so late to face the tempest he had so long foretold was a master of words and a commander of men. If the men of England could still save England, Churchill would lead them to victory. If words of courage and faith could inspire them to miracles, Churchill would supply the words. And if the miracles never came and Britain died, no one knew better than Churchill the causes of her death or could better phrase her requiem. His first address to Commons on Monday May 13 said what had to be said and no more:
. . . In this crisis I think I may be pardoned if I do not address the House at any length today, and I hope that any of my friends and colleagues or former colleagues who are affected by the political reconstruction wUl make all allowances for any lack of ceremony with which it has been necessary to act. I say to the House as I said to Ministers who have joined this government, I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat. We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many months of struggle and suffering. You ask, what is our policy? I say it is to wage war by land, sea and air. War with all our might and with all the strength God has given us, and to wage war against a monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our poUcy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory. Victory at all costsvictory in spite of all terrorsvictory, however long and hard the road may be, for without victory there is no survival. Let that be realized. No survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge, the
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Death in April
impulse of the ages, that mankind shall move forward toward his goal. I take up my task in buoyancy and hope. I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men. I feel entitled at this juncture, at this time, to claim the aid of all and to say, "Come then, let us go forward together with our united strength."
Commons voted on a resolution of confidence: "That this House welcomes the formation of a Government representing the united and inflexible resolve of the nation to prosecute the war with Germany to a victorious conclusion." The vote was 3 81 to o. Norway was lost. The Low Countries were being overrun. France was to perish. Britain was to face her blackest days. But in its new leader the nation had faith.
CHAPTER
ELEVEN
DEATH IN MAY
I . T H E L O W L A N D S f M A Y l o , 1940 of the ninth month of the war the Nazi High Command unleashed its engines of conquest against three more of the "Oslo States" ^ that had clung as tenaciously to their "neutrality" as had Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Netherlands, as a traditional "neutral," had seen no fighting on its soil for over a century. Belgium and Luxemburg had known German occupation in 1914. After Versailles, Belgium had become France's ally and Luxemburg had formed a customs union with Brussels. But French passivity in the face of Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland led to a reversion to Belgium's customary position as a neutral buffer, along with its two small neighbors. Paris had released Brussels from its obligations under the military pact of 1920 on March 6, 1936, one day before the Reichswehr marched into the Rhineland. On October 14 Belgium asked release from the commitments of Locarno. On January 30, 1937, Hitler told the Reichstag that Germany was "ready at any time to acknowledge and guarantee these States as neutral and inviolable realms" ( G 325). The Belgian Government welcomed an Anglo-French declaration of April 24, 1937, releasing it from the Locarno obligations, but pledging defense of the kingdom if it resisted attack. Brussels gladly accepted a similar unilateral declaration by the Reich on October 13, 1937, promising respect for the inviolability of Belgian territory under
O N THE TENTH DAY 1 By the Oslo Convention of December 22, 1930, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg established an "economic entente," joined by Finland in 1933 and later developed into a loose plan of collaboration in other spheres. 481
CHAPTER
ELEVEN
DEATH IN MAY
I . T H E L O W L A N D S f M A Y l o , 1940 of the ninth month of the war the Nazi High Command unleashed its engines of conquest against three more of the "Oslo States" ^ that had clung as tenaciously to their "neutrality" as had Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Netherlands, as a traditional "neutral," had seen no fighting on its soil for over a century. Belgium and Luxemburg had known German occupation in 1914. After Versailles, Belgium had become France's ally and Luxemburg had formed a customs union with Brussels. But French passivity in the face of Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland led to a reversion to Belgium's customary position as a neutral buffer, along with its two small neighbors. Paris had released Brussels from its obligations under the military pact of 1920 on March 6, 1936, one day before the Reichswehr marched into the Rhineland. On October 14 Belgium asked release from the commitments of Locarno. On January 30, 1937, Hitler told the Reichstag that Germany was "ready at any time to acknowledge and guarantee these States as neutral and inviolable realms" ( G 325). The Belgian Government welcomed an Anglo-French declaration of April 24, 1937, releasing it from the Locarno obligations, but pledging defense of the kingdom if it resisted attack. Brussels gladly accepted a similar unilateral declaration by the Reich on October 13, 1937, promising respect for the inviolability of Belgian territory under
O N THE TENTH DAY 1 By the Oslo Convention of December 22, 1930, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg established an "economic entente," joined by Finland in 1933 and later developed into a loose plan of collaboration in other spheres. 481
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all circumstances unless Belgium should "take part in a militaryaction directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. The German Government, like the British and French Governments, are prepared to render assistance to Belgium in the event of that country's being subjected to an attack or invasion" ( G 333, 334). Dutch spokesmen repeatedly declared that the neutrality of The Netherlands was so axiomatic that there could be no negotiations regarding it (G 335, 336). The protection which this "neutrality" afforded was like that of all buffer States. Its continuance depended upon a continued balance of power between mighty neighbors, each of which was able and willing to thwart the other in any designs against the lesser communities between them. Belgium and Luxemburg had once discovered that neutrality promised no safety if one of their neighbors was prepared to seek military advantages by striking across their territory at the other. This danger arose once more as "appeasement" pursued its dismal course. The statesmen at Brussels and The Hague knew no way to meet it save larger appropriations for defense. The Netherlands made plans to put 300,000 men in the field and to mine roads, bridges and dikes to halt any invader. Belgium armed a potential force of 600,000 and relied on the fortified Albert Canal, opened in August 1939, and on new fortresses in the east protecting Liege, Namur and other routes of invasion. Yet it was difficult for even the most optimistic of non-interventionists to feel confident that safety lay in arming to the teeth and eschewing foreign entanglements. The Low Countries were too small and feeble to save themselves alone. What was their alternative? None had been found before the crack of doom. It was Paul Van Zeeland, Premier of Belgium, who had presented the draft resolution at Geneva on July 4, 1936, whereby sanctions were lifted, Ethiopia was abandoned and the League was destroyed as the protector of the weak. All the Oslo States, caught between appeasers and aggressors, vainly sought safety in isolationist neutrality. A Dutch-Belgian union for defense might have offered some hope. But it never quite materialized. King Leopold visited The Hague in November 1938. But all rumors of an alHance were stoutly denied. A flurry of fear over possible German attack in 1 January 1939 produced no change. After the outbreak of war, new fears arose in September and again in November. On No-
The Lowlands f May lo, 1^40
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vember 7 King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina offered their good offices to the belligerents with no result. George VI repUed on November 11 that Europe must be redeemed "from perpetually recurring fear of German aggression." Lebrun replied that "lasting peace can only be established by reparation of the injustices that force imposed on Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland." Churchill on November 12 declared war to the end on "Hitler and his Huns" and expressed confidence in ultimate victory over this "cornered maniac." Ribbentrop told the Dutch and Belgian Ministers on the 15th that "after the brusque rejection of the peace move by the English and French Governments, the German Government also considered the matter closed." Brussels and The Hague had ordered defense measures after the Venlo incident of November 9. It was intimated that Belgium and The Netherlands would defend one another if either were attacked and that in the event of aggression Belgium would admit Allied troops. Secret negotiations were entered into by London and Paris with both governments looking toward military collaboration in the event of invasion. The expected attack failed to materialize. But Leopold and his pacifist, pro-German adviser, Henri de Man, were unwilling to make any commitments or plans for joint defense. On January 14 The Netherlands cancelled military furloughs and Belgium mobilized additional troops in response to new rumors of a German offensive. Brussels indicated that it would support its neighbor in arms if Holland were invaded. But neither of the Low Countries displayed the slightest disposition to join France and Britain against the Reich, although the defeat of France and Britain by Hitler's hosts would unquestionably terminate their independence. A Dutch "Orange Book" issued on April 13 sought to show that The Netherlands had protested with equal vehemence against German and Allied violations of Dutch neutrality. Four days later M. S. Louden, Netherlands Minister in Washington, announced after a conference with Sumner Welles: "I am in a position to state that The Netherlands Government will not admit any preventive protection for any part of the country, from whatever side it may be proposed." On June 28, 1940, Wilhelmstrasse issued White Book No. 5 (Docwnente zur KriegsausioeitungspoUtik der Westmachte und Generalstabsbesprechungen Englands und Frankreichs mit Belgien und den Niederlanden) consisting of captured documents
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Death in May
and maps "proving" that the Low Countries had joined the Allies in plotting an attack on the Ruhr through Belgium and Holland. But the evidence, like that adduced to justify the invasion of Norway, revealed only that some tentative plans had been made for common action in the event of German violation of neutral territory. These plans, as time was soon to show, were too little and too late. Bethmann-HoUweg in 1914 had been more candid. He had at least presented an ultimatum to Brussels and declared before the Reichstag: "We are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law." Ribbentrop's tergiversations were undignified and unnecessary. "The hour has come," declared the Fiihrer on May 10 before leaving for the front, "for the most decisive struggle of the German people. The fight beginning today decides the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years." Luxemburg was occupied with no resistance. The Grand Duchess Charlotte fled to France. Before dawn hundreds of Nazi bombers roared over The Netherlands, Belgium and northern France, striking at airfields and dropping parachute troops over the Low Countries. Armored columns smashed through the frontier fortifications like knives through paper. They struck most heavily not between Namur and Liege on the Meuse, where a successful Nazi ruse of January had caused the Belgians to believe that the attack would come, but at the Maastricht corner and the Albert Canal. The invaders overran the lush provinces whose people were stunned into senselessness by the holocaust of fury and treachery which broke around them. German "salesmen," "tourists" and permanent residents directed parachutists, and in many places emerged, arms in hand, to seize airfields and public buildings and demoralize defenses deep in the rear. They were aided in The Netherlands by the Nazi followers of Anton Mussert and Rost Van Tonningen and in Belgium by the Flemish separatists and the Rexists of Leon Degrelle. Mussert disappeared, later to emerge as puppet "leader" of those he had betrayed. Degrelle was arrested and later reported shot. But the aggressors had ample aid from within. Where treason failed to achieve victory, Schrecklichkeit sufficed. The Hague was attacked by German agents inside the city. At Rotterdam German troops concealed in "freighters" joined local "fifth columnists" to paralyze Dutch resistance. Ger-
The Loivlands^
May lo, 1^40
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man motorized columns reached the city on May 13. A delay in the surrender brought bombing squadrons into action. Between noon and 2.30 p.m. May 14 a quarter of Rotterdam was reduced to ashes. Over 20,000 people died in the flaming wreckage of 26,000 buildings. To the south the Moerdijk bridge, spanning the estuary of the Maas and Waal rivers, fell intact into Nazi hands. Late in the afternoon of May 14 General Henrik Winkelman ordered the Dutch forces to cease fighting, save in Zeeland and on the seas. The Hague was fully occupied on the following day. Sporadic resistance in Zeeland was soon at an end. Queen Wilhelmina, the Royal family and the Cabinet fled to London, where another government in exile was established. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Nazi "Trojan Horse" in Austria in 1938, became Nazi Commissioner of the vanquished. Robert Ley wrote in Der Angriff that "Hitler brought Germany to reason and thereby made us happy. W e are convinced he will bring Europe and the world to reason and thereby make Europe and the world happy. That is his irrevocable mission." ^ From exile in London the Queen of The Netherlands spoke in justification of her decision and in high resolve to carry on:
At this immensely grave moment in the history of mankind, black silent night has settled on yet another corner of this earth. Over free Holland the lights have gone out, the wheels of industry and the plows of the fields that worked only for the happiness of a peace-loving people have come to a dead stop. T h e voices of freedom, charity, tolerance and religion have been stilled. W h e r e only rwo weeks ago there was a free nation there is now the desolation and stillness of death, broken only by the bitter weeping of those who have survived the extinction of their relatives and the brutal suppression of their rights and liberties. It is because Holland's voice must not be allowed to remain strangled in these days of fearful trial for m y people that I have taken the supreme decision to transfer the symbol of My Nation, as it is embodied in My Person and My Government, to London where it can continue to function as a living and a vital force. . . . If the royal authority were to stay and fall into enemy hands, the voice of Holland, the very symbol of Holland, would have vanished from the earth. There would be but a memory, per^ haps quickly fading in these world-shaking times where yesterday's memory is today's oblivion. . . . 1 Cf. the admirable day-by-day account of military and diplomatic developments in "The Downfall of France" by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Foreign Affairs, October 1940, pp. 55-144, and "The Blitzkrieg in the Low Countries" by M. W . Fodor, ibid., pp. 193-207.
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Death in May
Duty lay elsewhere: . . . To speak for Holland to the world, not of the Tightness of its cause which needs no advocacy in the eyes of honest men, nor of the unspeakable horrors, or the infamous tricks inflicted on its gallant army and its innocent population, but of the values, the ideals, the Christian civilization that Holland at the side of its allies is helping to defend against the onslaught of barbarism. To remain true to the motto of the House of Orange, of Holland, of all that immense part of the world that is fighting for what is infinitely more precious than life: Je maintiendrai. I shall maintain.^
Ribbentrop meanwhile had cleared his conscience. To forgive those who trespass against us is hard. To forgive those against whom we trespass is impossible. A short memorandum was sent to Luxemburg:
Britain and France have decided to attack Germany in the immediate future through Belgian and Netherlands territory. . . . The offensive decided upon by France and Britain, in collaboration with Belgium and The Netherlands, will also include the territory of the State of Luxemburg. The German Government therefore is obliged also to extend the military operations they have undertaken to ward off this attack to the territory of Luxemburg. . . . The German Government expects the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg will appreciate the situation created by the sole fault of Germany's opponents and will take the necessary measures for insuring that the population of Luxemburg will put no obstacles in the way of German action. The German Government for their part desires to assure the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg that Germany does not intend, either now or in the future, by these measures to impair the integrity and political independence of the Grand Duchy.
Identical memoranda to Brussels and The Hague declared that the Reich had saved Norway from Allied attack "at the zero hour" and must now confer the same benefits on Belgium and The Netherlands. After the invasion began, the German Minister at the Hague delivered an "ultimatum," promising to guarantee Dutch possessions if no resistance were offered. Foreign Minister Van Kleffens rejected it. Queen Wilhelmina in a proclamation made "a flaming protest against this unprecedented violation of good faith and violation of all that is decent between cultured States." The German memoranda asserted:
. . . Germany has recognized and respected the integrity of Belgium and Holland on the natural supposition that the two countries would 1 Cable of May 25, 1940 to Life Magazine.
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preserve the strictest neutrality in the event of war between Germany on one hand and Britain and France on the other. Belgium and Holland have not complied with this condition. . . . Since the outbreak of the war the Belgian and Dutch press have shown an anti-German attitude. . . . Leading personalities in public life in both countries have to an increasing extent in recent months expressed the view that the place of Belgium and Holland was at the side of Britain and France. . . . Holland, in conjunction with certain Belgian circles, has lent herself to giving support to attempts of the British Secret Service to bring about a revolution in Germany. . . . Measures taken by the Belgian and Dutch Governments in the military sphere make the position even clearer. . . . Facing France no fortifications of any kind have been built. . . . Still more striking proof of the real attitude of Belgium and Holland is the concentration of the entire mobilized Belgian and Dutch troops which is directed against Germany. . . . Documents in possession of the German Government prove that preparations made b y Britain and France on Belgian and Dutch territory for their attack on Germany have already reached an advanced stage. . . . From the very outbreak of the war, contrary to the declaration ostensibly made by their governments, both countries have secretly sided with Britain and Francethat is to say, with the very Powers who had determined to attack Germany and had actually declared war. . . . In the struggle for life and death that was thrust on the German people by Britain and France, the German Government does not intend to await the attack of Britain and France in inactivity and to allow the war to be carried through Belgium and Holland onto German soil. T h e y have therefore issued orders for their troops to safeguard the neutrality of the two countries with all the military means at the disposal of the Reich. . . . T h e responsibility rests on Holland and Belgium. . . . German soldiers are not entering as enemies, since the German Government neither desired nor brought about this development. Germany does not intend by these measures to attack the integrity of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of Holland, whether for their possessions or property in Europe or in the colonies, either now or in the future. . . . Should the German troops encounter opposition, it will be met with every means. T h e Belgian and Dutch Governments alone will bear the responsibilities for the consequent bloodshed which will then become unavoidable ( N Y T 5.11.40).
Ribbentrop simultaneously read a statement to foreign correspondents in Berlin:

Gentlemen, England and France now have let the mask fall. After their thrust in Scandinavia failed, alarm in the Mediterranean came. This great camouflage maneuver was intended to disguise England's true aim: an
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attack on the German Ruhr area through Belgium and Holland. This attack had been prepared with the knowledge of Belgium and Holland, as is known to the Reich Government. Reports in the last few days of the transport of English troops toward Dutch and Belgian harbors speak plain language. Yesterday the Reich Government learned that England advised the Belgian and Dutch Governments of the pending landing immediately of English troops on Belgian and Dutch territory. This communication coincides with the indisputable proof in the hands of the Reich Government about the advance of the English and French armies and the immediately impending attack on the Ruhr region through Belgium and Dutch territory {Ibid.).
Despite Allied reinforcements and a far larger and better equipped army, the defense of Belgium was as futile as that of The Netherlands. Fort Eben Emael, defending Liege, was mysteriously captured on the second day. Most of the bridges across the Albert Canal were mysteriously taken and crossed by German tanks and armored cars. Such bridges as were destroyed were at once replaced by movable structures transported by the invaders and built to specification to fit each place where they were needed. The defeat of the Belgian forces along the Albert Canal was a Caporetto. As the invaders poured in, the Pope sent his blessings to the rulers and people of Luxemburg, Belgium and The Netherlands. Roosevelt sent a message of sympathy to King Leopold and forthwith applied the "neutrality" legislation to Hitler's new victims. But panzer divisions and dive-bombers were not to be halted by benedictions or condolences. By May 17 German forces had . occupied Namur, Malines and Louvain where the Library burned in 1914and rebuilt with American aidwas burned again. They smashed the defenses on the French-Belgian border. They entered Brussels on the 17th and Antwerp on the i8th. On May 19 Hitler issued a decree reannexing Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet to the Reich. His troops pushed irresistibly forward. On May 21 advance divisions, speeding down the Somme and Aisne valleys took Arras, Amiens and Abbeville on the Channel, thus cutting off almost the entire British Expeditionary Force, several French divisions and the whole Belgian army from contact with the French forces south of the Somme. The fate of Belgium was therewith sealed, and much more as well. According to Reynaud's broadcast of May 28, the Allied General Staffs had made plans to defend Belgium in December,
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But the plans took no cognizance of the new German technique of warfare. Allied troops pushing northward to aid the Belgian army now found themselves trapped. King Leopold insisted on leading his own forces. The tension and terror begotten by the magnitude of the disaster broke even royal nerves. The Belgian Sovereign quarrelled with the Allied High Command and then with his own Ministers. Premier Hubert Pierlot tried to persuade him to escape, but he regarded such a course as cowardly, asking "What is Queen Wilhelmina doing in London?" He remained at field headquarters. The Cabinet fled to Ostend on May 17. The battered Belgian troops held the Allied left wing at the north end of a triangular "pocket" which the Nazi divisions sought to break up into smaller pockets, the better to destroy the defenders. According to the King, his soldiers were "in desperate straits, subsisting on hard tack and often without ammunition." On May 24 the Premier, accompanied by Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and other members of the Cabinet, sought out the monarch at Wynendaele Castle south of Bruges. All night they argued, the Ministers urging the King to leave with them to establish an exile government in France, the King urging them to remain with him and not "desert" their army and people. Both failed. The Ministers departed for Dunkirk and London, whence they flew to Paris on May 26 after refusing a royal request by phone to sign two blank decrees. Weygand flew to the King's headquarters, only to be told that the Belgian army must yield unless "substantial new assistance" arrived at once. None was available. Against his Cabinet's unanimous advice, Leopold decided to surrender. A last appeal from the Ministers on Monday, May 27, was without result. Early that morning a delegation carrying a white flag was admitted to the German lines near Bruges to ask for terms. The reply was immediate: unconditional surrender. Leopold agreed that his troops should lay down their arms at 4 a.m. May 28th. A few soldiers joined the hard-pressed Allied divisions and abandoned the ruler w^ho had deserted his Government. The rest yielded. On Tuesday morning the Belgian Cabinet in Paris publicly denounced Leopold's action. Pierlot declared later in the day.
No act of the King has effect unless countersigned by the Ministers. . . . Dissolving the link uniting him and the nation, the King has placed himself under the authority of the invader. Under these circumstances he
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is no longer in a position to govern. . . . The Chambers must meet. During the interval the King's constitutional powers will be exercised on behalf of the Belgian nation by the Ministers meeting in council. The remnant of the Belgian Parliament meeting at Limoges on May 31 supported the Cabinet, condemned the King and resolved to continue the war. Meanwhile Reynaud announced the disaster in a broadcast of May 28: "France can no longer count on the Belgian armies. . . . In full battle King Leopold III, without a word to the French and Belgian soldiers who in response to his anguished appeal had come to the assistance of his country, laid down his arms. It is a deed without precedent in history." Churchill in Commons was (at first) more kindly: I have no intention of suggesting to the House that we should attempt at this moment to pass judgment on the action of the King of the Belgians in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Belgian Army. This Army fought very bravely, and both suffered and inflicted heavy losses. The Belgian Government has dissociated itself from the act and declared itself to be the only legal government of Belgium and formally announced its resolve to continue the war by the side of the Allies, who came to the aid of Belgium on her urgent appeal. Whatever our feelings from facts so far known to us, we must remember that the sense of brotherhood between the many people who have fallen into the power of the aggressor and those who still confront him will play its part in better days than those through which we are passing. The Allied press denounced Leopold as a traitor, a coward, a Quisling and a Nazi sympathizer. Churchill all but agreed in his address to Commons of June 4: The King of the Belgians called upon us to come to his aid. Had not this ruler and his government severed themselves from the Allies who rescued their country from extinction in the late war, and had they not sought refuge in what has been proved to be fatal neutrality, then the French and British armies at the outset might well have saved not only Belgium but perhaps even Holland. At the last moment, when Belgium was already invaded. King Leopold called upon us to come to his aid, and even at the last moment we came. He and his brave and efficient army of nearly half a million strong guarded our eastern flank; this kept open our only retreat to the sea. Suddenly, without any prior consultation and without the least possible , notice, without the advice of his ministers and on his own personal act, he sent a plenipotentiary to the German Command surrendering his army and exposing our flank and the means of retreat.
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I asked the House a week ago to suspend its judgment because the facts were not clear. I do not think there is now any reason why we should not form our own opinions upon this pitiful episode.
Leopold retired to his palace near Brussels, under German "protective custody." He kept silent, save for a confidential letter to Roosevelt explaining his action. He was less a "traitor" than a victim of "neutrality." If treason means betrayal of one's country into the hands of its conquerors, "neutrality" is also treason of a kind. But men and statesmen are ever prisoners of myths and illusions not of their own devising. Leopold had trusted to an empty word and an obsolete formula for safety. His crime was that of Kings Christian and Gustav and Haakon in the north and of the Queen of The Netherlands, the President of the United States and the appeasers of France and Britain who earlier gave him no option but "neutrality." He might, to be sure, have joined Haakon and Wilhelmina and his Ministers in London. The Belgian army in all likelihood would not have been saved thereby. Whether his decision was personally wise only time could tell. Meanwhile he and his country passed under the shadow of the Swastika.'^ The Battle of Flanders ended at Dunkirk. "The German eruption," said Churchill on June 4, "swept like a sharp scythe south of Amiens to the rear of the armies in the northeight or nine armored divisions, each with about 400 armored vehicles of different kinds divisible into small, self-contained units. This force cut off all communications between us and the main French army. It severed our communications for food and ammunition. It ran first through Amiens, afterward through Abbeville, and it tore its way up the coast to Boulogne and Calais, almost to Dunkirk. Behind this armored and mechanized onslaught came a number of German divisions in lorries, and behind them again plodded comparatively slowly the dull brute mass of the ordinary German army and German people, always ready to be led to the trampling down in other lands of liberties and comforts they never have known in their own." Boulogne fell on May 26. Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Greer Dill became Chief of the Imperial Staff, replacing Ironside who briefly became the commander of the home forces and then faded into obscurity. But neither new leadership nor heroism could prevail
^ Cf. Oliver Benson, "Was Leopold a Traitor?" Events, July 1940.
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against an enemy whose genius for war had been tragically underestimated. On the day of the Belgian capitulation Calais was attacked. A few thousand British and French defenders refused to surrender. They resisted, street by street and house by house, until two armored divisions were detoured to destroy them. Only a score of unwounded survivors escaped in ships. This fourday delay enabled the half million Allied troops trapped to the east to hold open the port of Dunkirk. The Belgian defection and the impossibility of organizing any counter-blow to re-establish contacts with the forces south of the Somme left no choice but retirement to the last Channel port still available for evacuation by sea. Churchill feared that the attempted withdrawal, begun on May 29, would fail. Superiority in planes and tanks might enable the enemy to destroy or capture almost the entire B.E.F.an event which would have been "the greatest military disaster of our long history." The actual event was disastrous enough, but was less than a complete catastrophe. The British Navy assembled 220 war vessels and 650 smaller craft in the Channel. The Royal Air Force achieved local superiority in the face of attacks on ships, beaches, docks and troops by hundreds of Nazi planes. A dozen Allied destroyers were lost, along with scores of smaller vessels. Berlin claimed capture of a million Dutch, Belgian, French, and British prisoners between May 10 and June 3 at the cost of 10,000 German dead and 50,000 wounded. London admitted the loss of 30,000 men of the B.E.F., a thousand guns and all mechanized equipment and vehicles. But thanks to sea power and fog, 335,000 soldiers were almost miraculously evacuated from Dunkirk before its fall on June 3. Said Churchill to Commons on the next day:
. . . We must be careful not to assign to this deliverance attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations, but there was a victory inside this deliverance which must be noted. . . . We shall not flag or fail, we shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France and on the seas and ocean; we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air. We shall defend our Island whatever the cost may be; we shall fight on beaches, landing grounds, in fields, in streets and on the hills. We shall never surrender and even if, which I do not for the moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British fleet, will carry on the struggle until in God's good time the New World, with all its power and might, sets forth to the liberation and rescue of the Old.
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2. S E D A N II Specialists in the art of war will dissect and debate to the end of man's time on earth the nation-shattering campaigns of 1939 and 1940. It may finally appear that Allied weakness and German invincibility were due less to "military" factors than to the schisms and confusions and betrayals in the democracies and to the skill of Nazi propagandists and spies. Fear of death wrought more havoc than death itself. Peasants and townspeople were terrified by skillfully spread rumors and occasionally by local massacres indulged in by tankmen and airmen. They fled their homes by millions and clogged all highways with a panicky mass of refugees, making Allied military movements all but impossible in many districts and furnishing everywhere perfect targets for more frightfulness begetting more panic. Incompetence vied with treason among some of the Allied captains and politicians. This carefully written preface to the Nazi book of conquest simplified the task of the German High Command. The last lethal blows, however, were struck by the professional manipulators of violence. These blows were struck with tools that revolutionized the science of war in as striking a fashion as had the phalanxes of Alexander, the legions of Caesar, the long bows at Crecy and Agincourt, the first fire-arms of the West, the massed artillery and heavy cavalry of Bonaparte. No single commanding genius directed the Nazi war-machine. No single arm nor any one novel weapon won victory. The internal combustion engine had existed for half a century. Never before, however, had it been used for war on so wide a scale and with such consummate skill. The Reichswehr of 1940 was the spearpoint of a great industrialized economy mobilized solely for the purpose of conquest. It was the rapier with which hypnotists dispatched victims already bewitched. It was the sharp sword forged by new engineers of Mars who, unlike their foes, had learned the lessons of the bloody stalemate of 1914-18 and had broken forever with the past. The old superiority of the offensive was recaptured by the use of massed dive-bombers as mobile artillery, by parachute troops as cavalry raiders in the rear, by massed tanks as irresisti-
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2. S E D A N II Specialists in the art of war will dissect and debate to the end of man's time on earth the nation-shattering campaigns of 1939 and 1940. It may finally appear that Allied weakness and German invincibility were due less to "military" factors than to the schisms and confusions and betrayals in the democracies and to the skill of Nazi propagandists and spies. Fear of death wrought more havoc than death itself. Peasants and townspeople were terrified by skillfully spread rumors and occasionally by local massacres indulged in by tankmen and airmen. They fled their homes by millions and clogged all highways with a panicky mass of refugees, making Allied military movements all but impossible in many districts and furnishing everywhere perfect targets for more frightfulness begetting more panic. Incompetence vied with treason among some of the Allied captains and politicians. This carefully written preface to the Nazi book of conquest simplified the task of the German High Command. The last lethal blows, however, were struck by the professional manipulators of violence. These blows were struck with tools that revolutionized the science of war in as striking a fashion as had the phalanxes of Alexander, the legions of Caesar, the long bows at Crecy and Agincourt, the first fire-arms of the West, the massed artillery and heavy cavalry of Bonaparte. No single commanding genius directed the Nazi war-machine. No single arm nor any one novel weapon won victory. The internal combustion engine had existed for half a century. Never before, however, had it been used for war on so wide a scale and with such consummate skill. The Reichswehr of 1940 was the spearpoint of a great industrialized economy mobilized solely for the purpose of conquest. It was the rapier with which hypnotists dispatched victims already bewitched. It was the sharp sword forged by new engineers of Mars who, unlike their foes, had learned the lessons of the bloody stalemate of 1914-18 and had broken forever with the past. The old superiority of the offensive was recaptured by the use of massed dive-bombers as mobile artillery, by parachute troops as cavalry raiders in the rear, by massed tanks as irresisti-
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ble engines of assault, by mechanized and motorized infantry as shock-troops capable at small cost of piercing and paralyzing far larger bodies of the foe. Perfect industrial organization, perfect military organization, perfect coordination among all services, perfect skill in flexible strategy added up to triumphs more amazing than any in all the annals of man's inhumanity to man. The Battle of Flanders was won by Hitler's hosts because the Battle of France had already been won, though few knew at the time what had happened. The German plan was a variant of the Schlieffen plan of 1914. Then some 70 German divisions, a million strong, were concentrated on the German right wing, while covering troops in Alsace-Lorraine drew the French right into a costly and futile effort to execute "Plan XVII," calling for an offensive toward the Rhine. The German right smashed the Belgian border fortresses, pivoted around Verdun, swept through Flanders, Artois, and Picardy and descended on Paris from the north. The plan failed because of the younger Mokke's timidity. German fears of the Russian invaders of Prussia contributed to the outcome. Joffre counter-attacked along the Marne at the gates of Paris, penetrating the German center and obliging the German right to fall back toward the Aisne. In the "race to the sea" the Channel ports were held by the Allies. Maneuver gave way to trench warfare from the Yser, the Somme and the Oise to the fringes of the Alps. The ever-imperturbable General Maurice Gamelin anticipated a similar German plan in 1940 and made preparations to rush Allied troops to the defense of Belgium. The German High Command anticipated this anticipation and made the most of it. The assault upon Belgium and The Netherlands led, as expected, to a vast movement of Anglo-French reinforcements toward the north, thereby weakening the Montmedy-Sedan area at the northern extremity of the main Maginot Line. From this point northward the great border defenses were neither linked effectively with the Belgian frontier forts nor extended adequately along the French-Belgian frontier to the sea. The assumption was that the Belgian border forts would hold and that the Ardennes forest would prove impassable. Keitel and Reichenau paid little heed to the Allied troops pouring into Flanders and Belgium. Neither did they count on the weight of their own numbers, though they threw over a million troops into the com-
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bat. They hurled their heaviest panzer divisions across Luxemburg and southern Belgium through the Ardennes against the French Ninth Army under General Andre Corap near the headvvâters of the Oise. Corap was chiefly famous for the capture of Abd-el-Krim, Moroccan rebel of 1925. Like most of his colleagues, he envisaged war on the Continent in terms of holding a line. But the line which he was to hold was already evacuated by French troops moving northward and had not yet been occupied by his own men when the blow fell. Reynaud had written in 1937 (Le Probleme Militaire Frangaise) that France could meet such an attack only by special elite corps of mechanized troops.-^ The German troops that struck at the crucial point perhaps numbered no more than 150,000 men. But they were technicians and engineers in tanks, armored cars and planes. Corap's troops had rifles, machine-guns and some artilleryequivalent to bows and arrows against muskets. For all their bravery, the soldiers of Corap's army were terrified by war monsters resembling the Beast of the Apocalypse. Nazi dive-bombers carried shrieking sirens. Nazi tanks carried flame-throwers and were invulnerable to bullets and shells, for they bore new armor made by Skoda, the Czech armory surrendered to Hitler by Bonnet, Daladier and Gamelin in 1938 in the name of "peace for our time." The French Ninth Army was destroyed. The "little Magi1 In a neglected little book, Vers rar?nee de metier, published in 1934, Charles de Gaulle had written: "Determined to strike us to the heart by the shortest and easiest way, will not the Germans take as their principal direction the sources of the Oise, our weakest point? . . . The Maginot Line leaves the entire northern region exposed. . . . Two thousand tanks, on a ten league front, will move forward simultaneously. . . . Air squadrons, endowed with lightning speed, will strike vertical blows. . . . " In 1935 Reynaud made pleas for de Gaulle's thesis that France must have motorized and armored divisions, but the Chambers paid no heed until it was too late. De Gaulle remained an obscure subaltern, as did all French officers who challenged the conservatism of the General Staff. In the light of the larger strategy of the war, it is of interest to recall that Foch had prepared a memorandum during the Peace Conference, never published but subsequently used at I'Ecole de Guerre, arguing that Germany could never win a war on two fronts, but could never lose a war on one front. In Foch's view, French security demanded either annexation of the Rhineland or a Russian alliance. During the winter of 1937-38 the French General Staff studied intensively the problem of war against Germany and Italy and concluded that such a war could not be won, despite Czechoslovak and Pohsh aid, without a Russian alliance. For reasons of political and class prejudice, both the Quai d'Orsay and the General Staff failed to act on this conclusion and resolutely refused to contemplate the possibility of war with Italy.
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not Line" cracked on May 13. Sedan was occupied on May 14, Rotterdam's day of death. Sedan was the site of Louis Napoleon's ignominious defeat and capture on September 2, 1870. Everyone could then see that France was beaten. No such outward manifestations of disaster were visible on May 14, 1940. The world knew only that Corap's army had been broken and that French soil was being invaded for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities. Yet Sedan in 1940 was even more decisive than Sedan seventy years before. France was broken with the first break-through, for the men to whom France's defense had been entrusted had neither the means nor the skill to save an army and a nation which had relied upon passive defense for safety. At no time after Sedan was the tide to turn. As JofFre's military secretary in 1914, Gamelin had written the memorable Order of the Day before the A4arne. On May 10, 1940, he issued another Order of the Day from his headquarters in the Chateau de Vincennes: "The attack, foreseen since October, was launched this morning. The Germans have started their fight to the death against us. The order for France and her Allies is: Courage, Energy, Confidence." These qualities were futile when in fact the High Command had neither foresight nor energy. Gamelin was a dreamer. Reynaud, whose foresight had come early, but whose appointment came too late, had sought to remove Gamelin at the end of April, but Daladier had to be retained as Minister of War and Daladier insisted on Gamehn's retention. On May 9 the Premier and ex-Premier quarrelled violently over the issue and then suddenly composed their differences in the face of the invasion. Now Corap's bewildered troops, confused by false orders issued from headquarters already in German hands, pounded by weapons against which they had no defense, cut off in small groups from communication with one another, demoralized by suspicions of treason, lost all semblance of a fighting unit. Corap's successor. General Henri Giraud, blundered into German forces and was captured with his staff. On May 17 Churchill conferred in Paris with Reynaud, Daladier and GameUn. The Generalissimo had no plan save "Win or die. W e must win." On May 18 Reynaud formed a new Cabinet, putting Georges Mandel into the Ministry of the Interior, Daladier at the Quai
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d'Orsay, and octogenarian Marshal Henri Philippe Petain, "Hero of Verdun" and Ambassador to Franco, in the Vice-Premiership. Reynaud also took into the Cabinet Louis Marin and Jean Ybarnegary, Vice-President of the Croix de Feu. With these appointments the leading members of France's "Fifth Column" became members of the Government. "National Union" was at last achievedby embracing those who had already betrayed the Republic and who were now to have their opportunity to complete their work. On May 19 Reynaud named Weygand Generalissimo. Gamelin went to tend his roses near Paris. He was not again mentioned in the French press until September 7 when he was arrested, with Daladier, Reynaud and Blum, to be accused of treason by men whose own deeds stamped them as guilty of the charge they hurled against their former colleagues. General Maxim Weygand, aged 73, small, spry and wizened, was born in Waterloo Tavern, Brussels. Rumor held that he was the illegitimate son of the ill-fated Emperor Maximilian of Mexico. This diminutive commander of cavalry had become Foch's chief of staff in August 1914. He had won, or helped to win, the battle of the Vistula against the Bolsheviks in August 1920. He had crushed rebellion in Syria. In 1935 he retired and was succeeded by Gamelin. In August 1939 he returned to Syria to assume command of the French forces in the Near East. These forces were never to fight an engagement. What their function was intended to be, apart from defending the Levant against possible Italian attack, was unclear. Weygand was by background a royalist and a clericalist"up to his ears in priests," said Clemenceau. He dreamed of invading the Soviet Caucasus. He had returned to France at the end of March. W h y Reynaud should have supposed that Weygand could save the day is a mystery. Like Petain, he was anti-Bolshevik, anti-British, an apostle of dictatorship and a friend of the Cagoulard conspirators. Reynaud's equation was a formula for defeat. Following the Sedan break-through, the invaders poured across the Meuse and down the valleys of the Aisne and Somme. By May 21 armored divisions, escorted by fleets of bombers and moving with appalling speed, had taken Arras and Amiens and reached the mouth of the Somme at Abbeville on the Channel, thus completing the severance of the Allied forces. On the same day Weygand flew over the front, saw Leopold and returned
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with gloomy news and a resolve to make decisions. He countermanded, too late, a British counter-offensive on the Somme. He planned simultaneous drives from north and south on the 28th to cut off the German salient. Belgian capitulation made the operation impossible. He decided to risk all in a last stand south of the Somme. "In modem warfare," he warned the Ministers, "the retreating army is a lost army because the advancing one moves much more rapidly. Retreat does not allow one to save armaments or to maintain a continuous front. A modern retreat has no limit." At 4 a.m. on June 5 the Nazi High Command ordered an attack in full force along a hundred-mile front against the hastily improvised "Weygand Line." While hundreds of bombers dumped death on Paris and other cities. Hitler in his Order of the Day thanked his troops for winning "the greatest battle in the world's history." He declared that "today another great battle begins.... This fight for the freedom and existence of our people will be continued until the enemy rulers in London and Paris are annihilated." At the Fiihrer's command, bells were rung for three days throughout the Reich and flags were flown for eight days. In France there were hopes of a "miracle." Reynaud, who had assumed the War Ministry and dismissed fifteen generals, had said to the silent Senate on May 21: "As for myself, if you tell me that tomorrow only a miracle can save France, I shall reply: I believe in miracles, because I believe in France." On June 5 Reynaud dropped Daladier from the Cabinet and took his post, naming as his Undersecretaries Paul Baudouin at the Quai d'Orsay and General Charles de Gaulle at the War Ministry. Reynaud's Helene, pro-Fascist and defeatist, insisted that her lover include her other Paul, who was as pro-Fascist and defeatist as herself, as a counter-weight to De Gaulle. Torn between love and duty, Reynaud chose love. In Flanders 30 Anglo-French divisions had been lost, including the French First, Seventh, and Ninth armies. Weygand could scrape together barely 40 divisions to face the 100 or more under Rundstedt, Bock and Loeb. The defense broke first on the extreme left. Mechanized divisions under Reichenau and Strauss crossed the Bresle, pressed on to Forges-les-Eaux and Rouen, took 20,000 prisoners at St. Valery and Dieppe and menaced Paris from the west. Other divisions under Guderian and Kleist took Soissons,
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Villers-Cotterets and Compiegne and reached the Marne at Chateau-Thierry, threatening Paris from the east. French appeals for British aid were answered, but the effects of the debacle in Flanders made the answers too little and too late.^ After Alay 15 Gamelin had pleaded urgently for ten pursuit squadrons (G6, 10-13). The R.A.F. did what it could to facilitate the withdrawal from Dunkirk and to intercept the waves of enemy bombers hammering at the French divisions. The results were significant in Flanders, but not further south. On May 22 Churchill, Reynaud, and Weygand conferred. The new Generalissimo was bewildered: "Before our eyes a first German attack, still under way, was launched with means of war of a hitherto unknown formula." He beheved that it would be followed "by an offensive in the classical style, with strong artillery support." He reported on his difficulties with Leopold and General Van Overstraaten who rejected his advice as to what role the Belgian army should play. Churchill concurred in Weygand's plan for a Belgian retreat to the Yser, an offensive from the north toward Baupaume and Cambrai, and one from the south to retake Amiens. He promised bombers and pursuit planes to help carry it out. Weygand demanded action to keep refugees off the roads (G6, 16). But coordination between the various units proved impossible. Gort lacked orders and supplies and could establish no contact with his intended collaborator. General Blanchard (G6, 15). Reynaud wired Churchill on the 24th that Weygand's plan must be executed and that British evacuation of Arras was in contradiction to it. "General Weygand is convinced that his plan can meet with success only if the Belgian army and the Blanchard and Gort armies are animated by the fanatic will to make a sortie, which is the only thing which can save them" (G6, 17). But the means were lacking. The Belgian surrender and the Dunkirk evacuation followed as Weygand appealed for British action to save the French rear-guard in Flanders (G6, 19). His original plan came to nothing. He now insisted that the British air squadrons which had been removed to England should return to French bases to help meet the anticipated drive from the Somme (G6, 18). Weygand told
1 The exchanges of communications here referred to were published in German White Book No. 6, Politische Geheimdokumente des frmizosischen Generahtabs iiber die britisch-franzosischen Plane zur Niederwerfung Deutschlands, issued July 3, 1940, and here cited as G6.
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Reynaud that this was "a matter of life and death" and that "our troops will go into battle tomorrow [June 4] with weapons which are altogether inadequate, if they do not get the help of strong pursuit plane units. . . . Our own air-force is unable to give our troops this essential support" (G6, 20). Reynaud appealed to Churchill. British squadrons came. But no weapons in the air or on land were available in sufficient quantity to cope with a strategy of which the Allied military leaders had no conception. That strategy was supported by weapons prepared for seven years and more, manufactured in thousands of units by mass production methods and manned by scores of thousands of carefully trained experts. Both Churchill and Reynaud had for seven years warned of what was to come and had vainly urged adequate preparations to meet the day. But the pacifists and the Munichmen had done their work too well. By June 9 Weygand was warning the Government to leave Paris. Trucks carried off documents from the Ministries. Officials began departing for Tours, where the Cabinet functioned as best it could from June 11 to 14 before fleeing to Bordeaux. Reynaud and Weygand inspected what was left of the "front" on the loth. On the 12th the Cabinet met at Chateau de Cange, ten miles outside of Tours. The Premier and the Generalissimo argued. Weygand insisted that an armistice be requested. "All is lost." Petain agreed: "There are no more military possibilities, hence we must stop fighting." Witzleben's army broke through the main Maginot Line south of Saarbrucken. Verdun fell. Other enemy divisions penetrated the Vosges. Keuchler's advance units entered Paris on June 14. Three days later German forces reached the Swiss frontier west of the Maginot Line, now completely surrounded and outflanked. The end had come. The German High Command estimated that the operations of June 5-25 had netted all the equipment of 5 5 French divisions and 1,900,000 French prisoners at a cost of 16,822 killed, 8,921 missing and 68,511 wounded. At unbelievably small cost, the soldiers of the Third Reich had conquered six nations in nine weeks, including La Grande Nation whose citizens and friends had boasted for twenty years that its army was the finest in the world. On Sunday June 16 General Kurt von Briesen's famed division, victors at Kutno and in a score of other engagements, paraded up
Sedan II
501
the Champs lysees, through the Arc de Triomphe and up the Avenue Foch. A week later the Fiihrer toured the city and visited Napoleon's tomb in Les Invalides. The "City of Light" was intact but almost deserted. Prussian officers saluted the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier under the Arc where burned the Eternal Flame. Here gathered women in mourning, white-faced children, broken old men to do homage to a past which was gone and to a future already dead. France was vanquished.
CHAPTER
TWELVE
DEATH IN JUNE
I. DUCE'S H O U R
of the tenth month of the war Italy's Caesar opened hostilities against France and Britain. The tardiness of this heroism, undertaken when Axis victory seemed all but won, was a product of weakness and vulnerability. Had Rome provoked Allied attack in September, 1939, the Axis cause might well have been lost, for idle Allied fleets in the Mediterranean could have crushed Mussolini's realm and idle Allied forces in Egypt and the Near East could have liquidated Italian Africa, whatever efforts the Reich might make to rescue its feeble ally. Had France and Britain been ruled by statesmen and strategists instead of by Munichmen, an Allied ultimatum would have threatened the Duce with precisely this destiny unless he severed his alliance with Hitler and gave effective guarantees of genuine neutrality. But the Caesars again assessed correctly the spirit of their foe. Despite the terms of the "Pact of Steel" of May 22, the two ends of the Axis were agreed that more was to be gained than lost by Italian "neutrality." They knew that the Western Powers would respect this neutrality and even pay blackmail to insure its maintenance. Only when the Allied cause was obviously lost would it be safe for the Blackshirt Caesar to join the Fiihrer in arms. On December 16, before the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, Ciano undertook to explain the reasons for Italy's failure to join the Reich. His purpose may have been less to reveal Itahan policy than to confuse London and Paris. A week previously the Fascist Grand Council, meeting for the first time since April, had
O N THE ELEVENTH DAY 502
CHAPTER
TWELVE
DEATH IN JUNE
I. DUCE'S H O U R
of the tenth month of the war Italy's Caesar opened hostilities against France and Britain. The tardiness of this heroism, undertaken when Axis victory seemed all but won, was a product of weakness and vulnerability. Had Rome provoked Allied attack in September, 1939, the Axis cause might well have been lost, for idle Allied fleets in the Mediterranean could have crushed Mussolini's realm and idle Allied forces in Egypt and the Near East could have liquidated Italian Africa, whatever efforts the Reich might make to rescue its feeble ally. Had France and Britain been ruled by statesmen and strategists instead of by Munichmen, an Allied ultimatum would have threatened the Duce with precisely this destiny unless he severed his alliance with Hitler and gave effective guarantees of genuine neutrality. But the Caesars again assessed correctly the spirit of their foe. Despite the terms of the "Pact of Steel" of May 22, the two ends of the Axis were agreed that more was to be gained than lost by Italian "neutrality." They knew that the Western Powers would respect this neutrality and even pay blackmail to insure its maintenance. Only when the Allied cause was obviously lost would it be safe for the Blackshirt Caesar to join the Fiihrer in arms. On December 16, before the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, Ciano undertook to explain the reasons for Italy's failure to join the Reich. His purpose may have been less to reveal Itahan policy than to confuse London and Paris. A week previously the Fascist Grand Council, meeting for the first time since April, had
O N THE ELEVENTH DAY 502
Duce^s Hour
503
listened to long addresses by the Duce and his son-in-law and reaffirmed Italy's "non-belligerency"a happy phrase which avoided the liberal and pacifist connotations of "neutrality." The Axis was officially mentioned for the first time since the outbreak of war. Italy's relations with Germany "remained as established by the treaty of alliance and the exchanges of views which took place before and afterwards at Milan, Salzburg and Berlin." Ciano was rumored to have objected at Salzburg (August 11, 1939) to the Nazi-Soviet Pact and to have opposed at Berlin (October i) ItaHan entrance into the war. But, continued the resolution of December 8, "everything that may happen in the Danube basin and in the Balkans cannot help but directly interest Italy." On the 16th Ciano asserted that the aUiance was made on the basis of an unpublished understanding that neither party would be called on to discharge its military obligations until its preparations were complete. Rome had indicated that it would require a minimum of three years. Meanwhile neither partner would raise issues Hkely to lead to war, though, he implied, both hoped for new Munichs. Ciano sought to create the impression that Berlin had not played quite fairly with Rome. At Salzburg and Berchtesgaden Ciano had first learned of Hitler's resolve to force Polish capitulation at any cost. Rome, fearing general war as the sequel to a GermanPolish conflict, proposed a German-Italian declaration of confidence that the Polish question could be solved through normal diplomatic channels. The Fiihrer objected. On Ciano's return, the Duce had suggested an international conference, to be preceded by German annexation of Danzig as a token of Polish and Allied good will. Polish policy and Nazi plans made this impossible. "We did not fail to let the Reich know the reasons why the Fascist Government would have desired a peaceful solution, or at least a localization of the conflict." Rome had been notified of the terms of the Moscow pact only 36 hours before signature. "So far as we directly were concerned, the objective was to arrive at a neutralization of Russia to prevent her from entering and taking part in the encirclement projected by the great democracies, an action therefore limited in eifect, the more so as it did not seem possible to reach wider goals in view of the fundamental position of hostility always held by Nazi Germany towards Russia." Italy's last efforts to keep the peace having failed on August 31, because
504
Death in June
of British insistence on demobilization before negotiation, Rome declared on September i that it "would take no initiative whatever towards military operations"a position with which Hitler concurred.-^ The course of German-Italian relations during the period of "non-belligerency" can only be surmised. Heinrich Himmler, Chief of the Gestapo, visited Rome on December 23, perhaps in connection with new peace overtures. The King and Queen visited the Pope who made a return visit on December 28the first Supreme Pontiff to enter the Quirinal since 1870. Pius XII proposed a five-point peace plan on Christmas Eve. During January Rome concentrated attention on the Balkans. On February 24 Dr. Clodius and Ambassador von Mackensen signed a new German-Italian trade agreement. Four days later the Italian-German Cultural Commission concluded a week's session in Rome, celebrating the "deepening spiritual relation" between the two Fascist Powers. The Finnish peace and the Welles mission inspired Hitler to launch a new peace offensive. The Anglo-Italian dispute over British seizure of 100,000 tons of German coal exports in 13 Itahan vessels apparently convinced Ribbentrop that the time had come to use the Axis for further blackmail. On March 8 Berlin announced that the Nazi Foreign Minister would go to Rome. On the next day London announced agreement with Italy: the vessels would be released and Rome would send no more Italian ships to Germany for coal. After conferring with Ciano and Mussolini on March 10 and with the Pope on March 11, Ribbentrop returned to Germany amid a flood of speculation. On March 15 Welles came back to Rome
1 Relazione Intemationali, December 25, 1939, pp. 1065-70. Ciano also observed: "Hopes of peace, aroused at Munich, were dashed by the 'anti-Munich' which succeeded. What had been an act of wisdom was attacked as an act of capitulation. From this sentiment, which began to make headway in certain of the statesmen who had contributed to its realization, their conclusion was wrong: that Munich must never be repeated. . . . Italian and German views were identical on the necessity of making every effort to preserve and consolidate peace for a long period, necessary to both countries to complete their internal reconstruction and their military preparations. The duration of this period was specified by us as three years and by the Germans as four or five. The German Government agreed with us on the desirability of not raising any questions likely to arouse a new polemic before the aforesaid lapse of time had occurred. This was the premise on which, with a view to crystaUizing the identical determination of^ Italy and Germany to present a united front against encirclement, the forthcoming signature of a pact of alliance was announced at Milan. It was signed in Berlin, May 22."
Duce's Hour
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from Paris and London, preserving the same discreet silence which characterized all other diplomatic moves. Hitler and Ribbentrop startled the world by leaving Berlin on March 17 for Brennero where they conferred on the following day with Ciano and the Duce. Reliable journalists reported that the Fiihrer had proposed to Duce and Pope a plan for immediate peace, based on disarmament, partial restoration of Poland and Czechoslovakia, eventual return of the German colonies and a four-Power pact for war against Russia. Other journalists, equally reliable, reported that Hitler was planning a Rome-Berlin-Moscow bloc to dominate Europe. It is conceivable that he considered promising the first type of settlement to London and Paris and threatening the second in the event of rejection. It is probable that the two Caesars discussed plans in Scandinavia and the Balkans. If the Fiihrer entertained hopes of immediate support from Welles, Mussolini, or Stalin he was disappointed. The Undersecretary of State, departing from Rome on March 19, announced that he had neither received nor conveyed any peace plans and was not carrying any home to the President. Mussolini's spokesmen indicated that no change was contemplated in Italy's status. On March 23 Teleki arrived in Rome to confer with Ciano, Mussolini and the Pope, presumably to discuss Hungary's interest in any German-Italian or Axis-Soviet accord in the Balkans. The final communique of March 26 reaffirmed Magyar friendship with Rome and Berlin and bespoke collaboration "to maintain peace in the Danubian and Balkan area." Nazi victories in Scandinavia were hailed enthusiastically in the Fascist press. German invincibility. Allied weakness and the inevitability of Italian entrance into the war became theme songs of all papers save the Vatican Osservatore Romano, which was roundly denounced for printing Allied communiques and barred in June from Italian newsstands. Military preparations were rushed. Staunchly pro-Nazi Dino Alfieri was named Ambassador to Berlin on April 29. Threats and defiance to the AlUes were the order of the day. Fascist policy toward the Western Powers was not a reflection of Allied pohcy toward Italy, which remained unadulterated appeasement, but a reflection of the Allies' waning fortunes of war. Increased Anglo-French purchases in Italy were welcomed.
5o6
Death in June
Allied gestures to spare Italy from the jgors of contraband control were deemed insufficient. Negotiations for an Anglo-Italian trade agreement broke down in mid-February, apparently as a result of Italian refusal to sell machinery and arms rather than foodstuffs in exchange for metals and coal. British seizure of Italian coal cargoes, followed by their release in the face of threats, did not enhance Allied prestige in Rome. By the end of April the tone of the Italian press had become so menacing that London decided to divert as much British shipping as possible from the Mediterranean, a step which led to new threats from Fascist spokesmen. How and when the final Fascist decision was reached and what measures were taken by Reynaud, Churchill and Roosevelt to stave it off is a tale not yet told. That London and Paris sought to buy peace with Rome during the early weeks of the war by holding out the prospect of colonial concessions is reasonably certain. That Washington exerted pressure (as always without "commitments" and therefore without effect) and that the Allied leaders offered new, eleventh-hour inducements is clear. On May I Sir Noel Charles, British Ambassador, saw Ciano. William Phillips saw Mussolini. Secret conferences and appeals became more and more numerous during the following weeks. Mussolini's paper, // Popolo dltalia, wrote: "Italy has been in the war from the beginning. When she changes her policy of waiting is a matter which concerns only him who has the responsibility of guiding and safeguarding the destinies of the Itahan people." Roosevelt announced at his press conference on May 3 that the United States was striving to prevent any extension of hostilities. Five days later he denied a Rome report that Phillips had offered any "peace plan." Italian reports spoke of a suggestion of "mediation" which the Duce had rejected. On May 15 Phillips delivered to Ciano an urgent appeal from Roosevelt to keep the peace. At the beginning of the western Blitzkrieg, the American Ambassador was alleged to have received assurances that Italy would not at once enter the war. In his Charlottesville address of June 10 President Roosevelt declared:
More than three months ago the Chief of the Italian Government sent me word that because of the determination of Italy to limit, so far as might be possible, the spread of the European conflict, more than two hundred millions of people in the region of the Mediterranean had been enabled to
Duce's Hour
507
escape the suffering and the devastation of war. I informed the Chief of the ItaHan Government that this desire on the part of Italy to prevent the war from spreading met with full sympathy and response on the part of the Government and the people of the United States, and I expressed the earnest hope of this Government and of this people that this policy on the part of Italy might be continued. I made it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States any extension of hostilities in the region of the Mediterranean might result in the still greater enlargement of the scene of the conflict. . . . Again, upon a subsequent occasion, not so long ago, recognizing that certain aspirations of Italy might form the basis of discussions between the Powers most specifically concerned, I offered, in a message addressed to the Chief of the Italian Government, to send to the Governments of France and of Great Britain such specific indications of the desires of Italy to obtain readjustments with regard to her position as the chief of the Italian Government might desire to transmit through me. While making it clear that the Government of the United States in such an event could not and would not assume responsibility for the nature of the proposals submitted nor for agreements which might thereafter be reached, I proposed that if Italy would refrain from entering the war I would be willing to ask assurances from the other Powers concerned that they would faithfully execute any agreement so reached, and that Italy's voice in any future peace conference would have the same authority as if Italy had actually taken part in the war as a belligerent. Unfortunately, to the regret of all of us, and to the regret of humanity, the Chief of the Italian Government was unwilling to accept the procedure suggested, and he has made no counter-proposal. This Government directed its efforts to doing what it could to work for the preservation of peace in the Mediterranean area, and it likewise expressed its willingness to endeavor to cooperate with the Government of Italy when the appropriate occasion arose for the creation of a more stable world order, through the reduction of armaments and through the construction of a more liberal international economic system which would assure to all Powers equality of opportunity in the world markets and in the securing of raw materials on equal terms. I have likewise, of course, felt it necessary in my communications to Signer Mussolini to express the concern of the Government of the United States because of the fact that any extension of the war in the region of the Mediterranean would inevitably result in great prejudice to the ways of life and government and to the trade and commerce of all the American Republics. T h e Government of Italy has now chosen to preserve what it terms its "freedom of action" and to fulfill what it states are its promises to Germany. In so doing, it has manifested disregard for the rights and security
5o8
Death in June
of other nations, disregard for the lives of the peoples of those nations which are directly threatened by the spread of this war; and has evidenced its unwillingness to find the means through pacific negotiations for the satisfaction of what it believes are its legitimate aspirations. On this loth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor. On this loth day of June, 1940, in this university founded by the first great American teacher of democracy, we send forth our prayers and our hopes to those beyond the seas who are maintaining with magnificent valor their battle for freedom.
Before the dagger fell, the Allied leaders made final efforts at bribery. Laval and Flandin, ever willing to abandon French interests to appease Caesar, had apparently suggested to Rome the cession of French Somaliland and Tunis as the price for peace. Early in June Reynaud, now hard-pressed and desperate, lent some measure of official sanction to these suggestions. London dangled the bait of British Somaliland, demilitarization of Aialta, a new order in the iVIediterranean. An American guarantee of Allied promises was hinted at. How specific these proposals were, how authoritatively they were presented, how seriously they were considered are unanswered questions.^ For a moment perhaps, Mussolini hesitated. Hitler demanded "loyalty" and promised a generous share of the spoils. Each day's news made complete Allied defeat appear more and more inevitable. Duce decided. Laval returned empty-handed from Rome to Paris. The unhappy French Ambassador, Andre Frangois-Poncet, was heard to remark: "It is the first case in history where a country offered a chance to receive all peacefully prefers to fight for it in a war dubious as to outcome." He was in error. There was an earlier case: MussoHni and Ethiopia in 1935. The outcome, moreover, was no longer thought "dubious." The Duce apparently decided to await the fall of Paris, but hastened to act earlier when he learned that another Roosevelt peace plea was impending. On June 3 announcement was made in Rome that the Universal Exposition, scheduled to open in 1942, had been indefinitely postponed. Ciano, Bruno and Vittorio Mussolini, and Ettore Muti, new Secretary-General of the Fascist party, prepared to join their air squadrons. June 10 was Navy Day. By 6 p.m. 100,000 people had gathered
1 Cf. "Italy's Entry into the War" by "Henry L. Moore" (pseudonym for an anonymous diplomat). New York Herald Tribune, September 3-4, 1940.
Duce's Hour
509
in the Piazza Venezia to hear Mussolini, whose words all Italians had been ordered to heed. As the hour struck the Duce appeared in the uniform of the Blackshirt militia and spoke for twenty minutes from his familiar balcony. His message was simple: war had been declared and would officially begin at 12.01 a.m. June 11. The rest was the poetry of Fascism:
Fighters of land, sea and air, Blackshirts of the revolution and of the legions, men and women of Italy, of the empire and of the Kingdom of Albania, listen! T h e hour destined by fate is sounding for us. T h e hour of irrevocable decision has come. A declaration of war already has been handed to the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France. W e take the field against the plutocratic and reactionary democracies who always have blocked the march and frequently plotted against the existence of the Italian people. Several decades of recent history may be summarized in these words: phrases, promises, threats of blackmail, and finally, crowning that ignoble edifice, the League of Nations of fifty-two nations. Our conscience is absolutely clear. . . . If today we have decided to take the risks and sacrifices of war, it is because the honor, interests and future firmly impose it, since a great people is truly such if it considers its obligations sacred and does not avoid the supreme trials that determine the course of history. W e are taking up arms, after having solved the problem of our continental frontiers, to solve our maritime frontiers. W e want to break the territorial and military chains that confine us in our sea, because a country of 45,000,000 is not truly free if it has not free access to the ocean. This gigantic conflict is only a phase of the logical development of our revolution. It is the conflict of poor, numerous peoples who labor against starvers who ferociously cling to a monopoly of all riches and all gold on earth. It is a conflict of fruitful, useful peoples against peoples who are in a decline. It is a conflict between two ages, two ideas. N o w the die is cast and our will has burned our ships behind us. I solemnly declare that Italy does not intend to drag other peoples bordering on her by sea or land into the conflict. Switzerland, Jugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Egypt, take note of these words of mine. It depends on them and only on them if these words are rigorously confirmed or not. Italians, in a memorable mass meeting in Berlin, I said that according to the rules of Fascist morals when one has a friend one marches with him to the end. This we have done and will continue to do with Germany, her people and her victorious armed forces. O n this eve of an event of import for centuries, we turn our thoughts to
5IO
Death in June
His Majesty, the King and Emperor, w h o always has understood the thought of the country. Lastly, we salute the new Fiihrer, the Chief of great allied Germany. Proletarian, Fascist Italy has arisen for the third time, strong, proud, compact as never before. There is only one order. It is categorical and obligatory for every one. It already wings over and enflames hearts from the Alps to the Indian Ocean: Conquer! And we will conquer in order, finally, to give a new world of peace with justice to Italy, to Europe and to the universe. Italian people, rush to arms and show your tenacity, your courage, your valor.
2. T H E F R E N C H R E P U B L I C t J U N E 16, 1940 France was not vanquished by the legions of the Caesar of Rome. France's fate was sealed by the legions of the Caesar of Berlin long before the Duce struck his blow. And long before the Reichswehr drove the remnants of Corap's army across the Meuse near Sedan, France's destiny had been irrevocably shaped by her own leaders and her own people. The quest for scapegoats after the debacle became interminable. The details of the witch-hunt are tedious. Each group exculpated itself and blamed its enemies. Democrats denounced lying leaders who deceived the masses. Aristocrats and Fascists blamed democracy. Radicals accused conservatives. Atheists denounced the clericals. Pacifists condemned the militarists. Poor men damned rich men. In each case the targets of accusation accused their accusers. Each saw truly some elements of the total and terrifying truth. France succumbed less to brutal assault from without than to a cancer within which had spread unseen through every organ and limb. The invaders were professional nation-breakers. But the Nazi leaders were themselves amazed at the swiftness of the French collapse. Their victim was already half-dead before the panzer divisions pierced its vitals. If the question be raisedand it will be variously answered a hundred times during innumerable autopsiesas to what disease destroyed the Third Republic from within, the prognosis need not be novel. Other cases are on record. Other societies have
5IO
Death in June
His Majesty, the King and Emperor, w h o always has understood the thought of the country. Lastly, we salute the new Fiihrer, the Chief of great allied Germany. Proletarian, Fascist Italy has arisen for the third time, strong, proud, compact as never before. There is only one order. It is categorical and obligatory for every one. It already wings over and enflames hearts from the Alps to the Indian Ocean: Conquer! And we will conquer in order, finally, to give a new world of peace with justice to Italy, to Europe and to the universe. Italian people, rush to arms and show your tenacity, your courage, your valor.
2. T H E F R E N C H R E P U B L I C t J U N E 16, 1940 France was not vanquished by the legions of the Caesar of Rome. France's fate was sealed by the legions of the Caesar of Berlin long before the Duce struck his blow. And long before the Reichswehr drove the remnants of Corap's army across the Meuse near Sedan, France's destiny had been irrevocably shaped by her own leaders and her own people. The quest for scapegoats after the debacle became interminable. The details of the witch-hunt are tedious. Each group exculpated itself and blamed its enemies. Democrats denounced lying leaders who deceived the masses. Aristocrats and Fascists blamed democracy. Radicals accused conservatives. Atheists denounced the clericals. Pacifists condemned the militarists. Poor men damned rich men. In each case the targets of accusation accused their accusers. Each saw truly some elements of the total and terrifying truth. France succumbed less to brutal assault from without than to a cancer within which had spread unseen through every organ and limb. The invaders were professional nation-breakers. But the Nazi leaders were themselves amazed at the swiftness of the French collapse. Their victim was already half-dead before the panzer divisions pierced its vitals. If the question be raisedand it will be variously answered a hundred times during innumerable autopsiesas to what disease destroyed the Third Republic from within, the prognosis need not be novel. Other cases are on record. Other societies have
France t June 16, i^ô
511
died, or are in process of dying, from the same affliction. It was long ago termed, by a German physician who predicted its advent, the "corruption of Democracy by Money." The infection was deeper than the venaHty of French journaHsts and the dishonesty of French poHticians, diplomats and generals. It extended to almost all the members of the propertied classes and, through them, to all of French society. Many Frenchmen with money had long since abandoned the worship of the Goddess of Reason, the cult of La Patrie, the faith of Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite. Their god was Mammon. Fraternity and liberty perished because equality was a fiction. Those who had most feared those who had least. Their dominant motivation was to keep what they had and to acquire more at any sacrifice of personal honor or national interest. Securite was the national slogan. From the rich, les iniserables learned greed. A society in which the elite lives by greed and the masses by envy is a society in decay. The "200 famihes," and all others of whom they were a symbol, sold France's birthright for counterfeit money which they fancied to be real. Such a France the masses would not defend and could not and did not defend. The specific circumstances of the collapse were almost accidental. Yet even here the symptoms duplicated those which other victims of the disease had exhibited elsewhere. Nazi agents and sympathizers did their work well only because many of the pygmies and parasites who were the last leaders of the Republic placed Property above Patriotism. In their delusions regarding the means by which Property could best be protected, they made Communism at home and the U.S.S.R. abroad their favorite enemies, though neither had power to threaten their privilegesof which they themselves were the worst foes. They admired the Caesars. They turned to them for "protection"and were given the kiss of death. While the liquidation of French Communism proceeded through the last winter, worthless Tsarist bonds climbed steadily in value among the exchangers of securities. While the enemy on the Left was smitten hip and thigh, the enemy on the Right was studiously ignored. The "Cagoulards" of 1937-38 had committed outrages and spun plots to destroy the Republic. They had caches of arms, chiefly of Italian and German origin, in Paris, Clermont-Ferrand and other towns. They had friends in high places, including Weygand, Petain, Laval and numerous army officers. The few conspirators who were
512
Death in June
arrested in 1937 had never been brought to trial. These same men, along with their friends and successors, sabotaged the war from the outset to the end. For them French defeat at the hands of the Fascist Caesars was preferable to French victory in the name of a "democracy" which they equated with Communism and deemed a menace to Property. These and others of Hke mind had already betrayed France at Geneva and at Prague, and in Munich, Madrid, and Moscow. At the end, with the witless connivance of Stalin's agents and the willful collaboration of Hitler's tools, they betrayed France at Paris, Tours, Bordeaux, and Vichy.i The fumbling of the deposed Daladierweak, suspicious, angrywas matched by the indecisions of Reynaudbitter, selfassured, but now in panic. The two men were deadly enemies. Reynaud had said: "Daladier desires the victory of France, but he desires my defeat even more." The Countess de Crussols poisoned Daladier's mind against Reynaud. The Countess Helena des Portes poisoned Reynaud's mind against Daladier. She was the daughter of a rich contractor of Marseilles and widow of a noble husband. Her lover, now separated from his wife, had
1 Cf. among the more interesting commentaries on the fall of France, the series of articles by Edgar Ansel Mowrer in The Chicago Daily News, beginning July 3, 1940, and the ensuing series by E. A. Mowrer and Colonel William J. Donovan on Nazi "Fifth Column" technique in the same paper, beginning August 19, 1940: "What happened to the French officers? For the most part they had ceased to beheve in freedom, democracy or any of the slogans which alone could galvanize the entire country. While not exactly pro-Fascist (and certainly not pro-German), they were hostile to the Third Republic; many had come to believe that an authoritarian regime like that of Italy and Germany was really preferable. It would, they thought, save the position of the privileged classes and really save France from the disagreeable necessity of defending itself. If there was to be a war, then let it be against the Bolsheviks. In other words, at least half and perhaps the majority of influential French citizens had come to believe what Hitler wanted them to believe. . . . For years his agents in France, Friedrich Sieburg the author. Otto Abetz, 'pro-French' consuls like Nolde and many others had 'worked' the French leaders. When necessary they were assisted by beautiful women: the Baroness von Einem, the Princess von Hohenlohe and others of lesser brilliance. They 'got in' with certain of those leading | French women who, at the moment of defeat, exercised such a devastating influ- i ence on certain French statesmen. They went everywhere, saw everybody, came to know everything, dipped into French politics through scandalously venal French newspapers. To the weak and the cynical they preached defeatism; to i the unsuccessful, hatred of the Jews; to all the possibility of living on good ' terms with Germany, if only France would break relations with the Bolsheviks and 'money minded' Britons. . . . During the appeasement period the Germans were actually aided by certain members of the British Embassy in Paris. NoCt
France t June 16, i^ô
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known her for twenty years. Both countesses were jealous, ambitious, meddlesome. Wits whispered of Raynaud that the French fleur de lys had given way to a wilted fleur du lit. These boudoir intrigues contributed to the debacle. But Nemesis marched on wings and wheels of steel and France had neither wheels nor wings.^ The foes of the Republic within the gates could draw but one conclusion from defeat. "At Tours on June 12 and 13," wrote Elie Bois, former editor of Le Petit Parisien ( N Y T 6.30.40), "General Maxime Weygand told the discouraged French Cabinet of Allied armies in confusion and columns of refugees machine-gunned by the invaders. Then, referring to the Russian debacle of 1917 and the Soviet menace, he said, 'We must not let it come to that.' This gave the defeatists in the Cabinet their chance to come forward." The Generalissimo threw the Cabinet into new alarms with tales of "Communist" rioting in abandoned Paris and of Maurice Thorez, leader of the Reds, sleeping in the Palais d'Elysee. Georges Mandel, Minister of the Interior, at once denied these stories and conuntil two months before the outbreak of the war did anyone dare to take action against the numerous German agentsand then the vacillating Daladier talked big and did little." Cf. the view of a typical Roman Catholic clericalist and Fascist, Robert Sencourt, in the (British) Catholic Herald, June 21, 1940: "When Paris fell, the Nazis may well have thought that they saw the final ruin of a country which had been laid low by three mortal diseases: Freemasonry, demoplutocracy and Bolshevism. It was the peculiar quality of M. Raynaud to personify all three. . . . The new men who form the present French Government have always sought a reasonable, dignified and honest understanding with both Franco and Mussolini. . . . All that is vital in the soul of France, purified and glorified m heroic suffering, can look out once more on Europe with a clear Christian purpose." Cf. also Heinz Pol, "Who Betrayed France?" The Nation (New York), July 6 and 13, 1940; Marceau Pivert, "Why France Surrendered," Common Sense, August, 1940; Robert de Saint Jean "The Failure of France," Harpers Magazine, October, 1940; ]'Accuse by Andre Simone, The Dial Press, New York, 1940 and Tragedy in France by Andre Maurois, Harpers, New York, 1940. For typical series of articles dealing in gossip and revealing, unwittingly, what had happened to the liberal inteUigentsia, cf. Andre Maurois "What Happened to France," in Colliers, September, 1940, and Jules Romains "Seven Mysteries of Europe," The Saturday Evening Post, September 21, 1940, and the following issues. 1 Andre Maurois, Tragedy in France, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1940, p. 124: "A great civihzation saw itself foredoomed because 5,000 tanks and 10,000 airplanes, which we could have built or bought without trouble, were not constructed in time." One may be permitted to wonder, however, whether this lack of mechanical gadgets was the "cause" of the fall of France or merely a manifestation, among many others, of causes which ran far deeper than questions of gadgets.
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firmed his denial by telephoning Paris Police Chief Langeron. The deserted capital was completely quiet. Ambassador Bullitt assisted the local authorities in maintaining municipal services and preparing an orderly entry of German forces. Weygand, however, insisted upon immediate capitulation in the name of preserving "law and order." T o continue fighting in France or to carry on the war from Britain or the colonies would expose Property and Religion to the Red Menace. Surrender to Hitler was preferable. Weygand was supported by Vice-Premier Petain. This aged reactionary, "with all the clearness of mind of an octogenarian" (Bois), was to play the role in the demise of the French Republic which Hindenburg had played in Germany. He and Weygand found support from Camille Chautemps, who was to be Vice-Premier in the Petain Cabinet, and from Paul Baudouin, who was famous chiefly for having acted as Bonnet's secret agent in Rome in February 1939 in obscure negotiations for the cession of French territory to Italy. These men, wrote Bois, "would rather lose the war and be reelected than win the war and be out of office." Reynaud had vowed never to capitulate, but he had been persuaded to make his appeal to Roosevelt on June 10 in a form which played into the hands of the defeatists. Roosevelt was forced to reply at Charlottesville with a feeble "yesshort of war" that meant "no." Despite this reply, Mandel and De Gaulle vigorously resisted Petain, Weygand, and Chautemps. But Reynaud and Mandel were beaten by the capitulators first at Tours, which dive-bombing Stukas soon turned into an inferno, and more decisively at Bordeaux to which the Cabinet fled on June 14. Churchill had met Reynaud on the Loire on the 13 th and had dechned the Premier's request that he release France from her obligation not to make a separate peace. They agreed on a further appeal to America. The circumstance that the appeal was at once made public, despite the certainty that the answer ( would again be negative, suggests that the capitulators desired I to crack what little was left of French morale. Reynaud pleaded I for "clouds of airplanes" and asked whether the American people would still "hesitate to declare themselves against Nazi Germany." Roosevelt at once replied on the 15th, expressing "sympathy" and "admiration." The United States would "redouble! its efforts" to enable the Allies to secure planes, artillery, and!
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munitions "so long as the Allied governments continued to resist." The United States would "not consider as valid any attempts to infringe by force the independence and territorial integrity of France." "I know that you will understand that these statements carry with them no implications of military commitment. Only the Congress can make such commitments." On Sunday, June 16, Reynaud informed Churchill of the "unsatisfactory" American reply and renewed his request to be released from the pledge of March. The Prime Minister intimated that his Government would assent provided that the French fleet were dispatched to British ports to remain there during the armistice negotiations. As Churchill prepared to leave London that evening for Bordeaux, Reynaud, Mandel, and De Gaulle found themselves outvoted by the capitulators. Churchill suddenly offered "Union Now"a full Anglo-French federation with common citizenship, a common empire, a common defense, a common Cabinet. But this too came too late. After a first vote of 13 to II to continue the war, Henri Queuille and LaurentEynac switched to Petain's view. Reynaud's Helene was already with the defeatists. By Sunday night the vote was 14 to 10 to sue for peace. Like Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich, the French Ministers chose "peace with honor"with "honor" defined as cooperation with the Axis. Reynaud resigned. President Lebrun at once named Petain Premier in a Cabinet including as Minister of Foreign Affairs the elegant Paul Baudouin and as Minister of Justice the infamous Pierre Laval who had already been negotiating for surrender through the Spanish Ambassador, Jose Lequerica. For reasons unknown, Georges Bonnet and Pierre Etienne-Flandin, Laval's outstanding collaborators in betraying the French Republic to the Axis, were not included in the Cabinet of capitulation. Bonnet had lost Ribbentrop's confidence. The last leaders of the Republic became victims of tragedy and maUce. On June 28 Reynaud and his lady motored from Bordeaux to the Riviera. But he was not destined, after public misfortune, to enjoy private happiness. His car ran off the road. The deposed Premier suffered a serious head injury. Helene died in the wreckage. De Gaulle fled to London and formed a rebel "government" of "Free Frenchmen" on June 23. Mandel had been temporarily arrested in Bordeaux. By the 20th even Petain was wavering in
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the face of the German terms and contemplating the possibility of continuing the war from Morocco. With this end in view Mandel, Campinchi, Delbos, Daladier and his son Jean were dispatched, along with other leaders, to Casablanca on board the Massilia. Mandel was to head the new regime. General Nogues was absent from Rabat, but Mandel called London and asked that agents be sent to plan war from the colonies. But he was tricked by the local police into returning to his vessel, which was then ordered out to sea. When Gort and Duff-Cooper arrived by plane, they were unable to find Mandel and returned emptyhanded.^ By mid-September Laval had brought about the arrest and incarceration in the Chateau de Chazeron of Mandel, Daladier, Reynaud, Gamelin and Blum in order that they and their colleagues might be tried for "treason" at Riom. De Gaulle had already been sentenced to death in absentia. The leaders approved by the "Hooded Men" as rulers of France made short work of French democracy: On July 9 the rump parliament at Vichy, to which the Government had fled after a brief stopover at Clermont-Ferrand, authorized Petain to prepare a new totalitarian constitution, to be fashioned after Falangist and Fascist models. Laval, now Vice-Premier, assumed his place under Petain in a triumvirate of which the other two members were Weygand and Adrien Marquet, anti-Bolshevik mayor of Bordeaux and renegade Socialist who had turned Naziphile in 1933. Marquet was later dropped. Weygand suffered injuries in a plane crash and was dispatched to Africa. Laval was little Caesar. He made repeated journeys to Paris to confer with the forces of occupation. Bonnet and Flandin became his loyal supporters. The followers of Jacques Doriot and Colonel de la Rocque preached anti-Semitic Fascism. Reynaud, then still at liberty, appeared with bandaged head to join in the almost unanimous vote of July 9: 395 to 3 in the Chamber and 225 to I in the Senate. Blum and Herriot participated in this last
1 Cf. Harry J. Greenwall, "Witch-Hunt at Riom," The Nation, September 14, 1940, citing Le Temps for details of Mandel's misadventures. At the time of the capitulation there were large numbers of well-equipped troops in the French North African colonies. Had Petain chosen to continue the war from the colonies, , these forces could easily have invaded and occupied Libya and, with the aid of the Anglo-French forces in the Near East, could have liquidated Mussolini's empire. But the capitulators chose "peace with honor"because they had no desire to fight Italy, no comprehension of Hitlerism and no confidence that their i own privileges and comforts would survive a long conflict.
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act of disgrace. On July 10 the enabling act was approved by both houses in the Vichy Casino, 569 to 80, with a farcical concession to dead democracy in the form of a provision for a plebiscite. This plan was later abandoned. Preparation of the constitution was deferred. The Laval regime was but a stop-gap until new leaders should emerge or Hitler should make arrangements of his own for the governance of the vanquished. The Third French Repubhc thus died in the fashion earlier prescribed by its own degenerate leaders for the Republics of Spain and Czechoslovakia, and urged upon Poland by Bonnet on September 2, 1939. The forces of democratic patriotism, feckless and betrayed, gave way to the forces of clericalism, big business, high finance, and feudal reaction. The spokesmen of these groups, here as always, willed capitulation to Fascism as a safeguard against popular radicalism. They had insured France's defeat before the outbreak of war. They had worked for France's defeat during hostilities in secret ways which became known only slowly. "The big war aim," wrote Edmund Taylor, quoting a French observer in mid-winter, "is not the smashing of Germany, but the smashing of Communism in France." ^ In the debacle the smashers joined the enemy in preference to any other course. "If by submitting to the Germans," wrote Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "one could avoid punishment.for one's own slackness and incompetence and deceit, would that not be tempting to weak men? Moreover, the fear of revolution which has long haunted many rich French, could be conjured by submission, for then German machine-guns would perhaps aid in shooting French workmen who dared to revolt." " At least this goal, product of the blind greed of a decadent plutocracy, was achieved. For its achievement all else was sacrificed. This sickening aftermath of surrender was but the sequel to the chronicle of Nemesis which had doomed European democracy elsewhere. But at Bordeaux and Vichy that which died was more (or perhaps less?) than Liberte, galite, Fraternite. France died as a Great Power, or as a Power of any magnitude. For an indefinite future La Grande Nation ceased to exist as a subject of diplomacy and became merely a helpless object. On the fatal evening of June 16, while celebrating plutocrats
1 The Strategy of Terror, p. 252. 2 Dispatch from Lisbon, The Chicago Daily News, July 6, 1940.
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Death in June
drank champagne toasts in Bordeaux's swankiest restaurants to the national defeat which they beHeved had insured the victory of their class, Petain phoned Franco's Foreign Minister, Juan Beigbeider, and the German Ambassador in Madrid, Eberhard von Stohrer, to ask for an armistice. He extended new assurances to Churchill regarding the fleet, but he had neither the power nor the desire to abide by these pledges. On Monday in a radio message filled with false compassion, he announced that he had applied for an armistice. With fine irony. Hitler suggested that he have recourse as intermediary to General Franco, whose troops had occupied Tangiers on the 14th and whose press was clamoring for Andorra, Gibraltar and French Morocco. Mussolini and Ciano, rejoicing in cheap victory, left Rome for the Reich on the evening of the 17th. Boudouin declared in Bordeaux that "we are never ready to accept shameful conditions which mean the end of the spiritual freedom of our people. If we are given the choice between resistance and honor, the French army and the French people will know what to do." The Bordeaux politicians also knew what to do. Duce and Fiihrer held a four-hour conference on the i8th in the Fiihrerhaus in Munich to fix a common pohcy toward the French request. Petain conferred on Wednesday with Lequerica who submitted Berlin's reply and arranged for a meeting of plenipotentiaries. Amid air raids on Bordeaux and rumors of a possible rejection of the terms, the French Cabinet appointed General Charles Huntziger, Air General Jean Bergeret, Rear Admiral Maurice Le Luc and Leon Noel to receive the German terms. An Italian communique of the 20th asserted: "The French Government this morning sent word to the Italian Government through the Span- \ ish Government asking to negotiate an armistice with Italy. The i Itahan Government has replied through the same medium in; terms analogous to those or the German Government." Berlin made this appeal to Rome a condition of negotiation. After itss acceptance Hitler, with finer irony, designated the place of meet-l ing: the dining car in the forest of Compiegne near Rethonde, 45; miles northeast of Paris, where Foch and Weygand had accepted! the German capitulation 22 years before. A tablet on a near-by| monument bore the memorial inscription: "Here on Novembei II, 1918, perished the criminal arrogance of the Imperial German Reich, defeated by the free peoples whom it sought to enslave."
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Here the two delegations met on June 21, 1940. Hitler sat in Foch's chair while General Wilhelm Keitel, in the presence of Goring, Raeder, Hess, and Ribbentrop, read to his guests a brief preamble, referring to the "dishonor and humihation," the "broken promises and perjury," of 1918 and stating the purposes of the German demands: ( i ) to prevent a resumption of hostilities; (2) to offer the Reich guarantees for continuation of the war against Britain; and (3) to create "preconditions for formation of a new peace whose essential contents will be reparation of the wrong done to the German Reich by force." From Compiegne a thirty-page German communication was forwarded to Petain whose censors kept all news of the "negotiations" from the French public. At 6.50 p.m. June 22, within forty minutes of the final German deadhne, Huntziger joined Keitel in signing a document whereby (Art. 23) hostihties were to cease six hours after notification of the signing of an armistice with Italy. The French delegates at once flew to Rome, via Munich, in a German plane. At 3.15 p.m. June 23 they were met by Ciano, Marshal BadogHo, Admiral Cavagnari and Generals Pricolo and Roatta in the isolated Villa Manzoni outside the Italian capital. At 7.30 they received the Italian terms. The French-Italian armistice was signed at the Villa Incisa at 7.15 p.m. June 24. Ciano notified Berlin twenty minutes later. Hostilities in France ceased at 12.35 a.m. on Tuesday the 25th of June. The twenty-four published articles of the German armistice defined the occupied territory and required the surrender of all arms and the complete demobilization of all French forces "except only those units which are necessary for maintenance of domestic order. Germany and Italy will fix their strength" (Art. 4). "The French war fleet is to assemble in ports to be designated more particularly and under German and/or ItaHan control, to be demobiUzed and laid up with the exception of those units released to the French Government for protection of French interests in its colonial empire" (Art. 8). Germany ,olemnly disclaimed any intention of seizing the fleet at the conlusion of peace or using it for war "with the exception of units lecessary for the purpose of guarding the coast and sweeping nines." French citizens were forbidden (Art. 10) to fight elsevhere against Germany. The French Government was required Art. 19) to'surrender all German military and civil prisoners in
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Death in June
French custody and "upon demand all Germans named by the German Government in France, as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorates, and mandates." De Gaulle alleged in October that a secret article provided for the immediate reincorporation of Alsace-Lorraine into the Reich. The twenty-six articles of the Italian armistice were similar. They required French demilitarization of a 50 km. zone behind the Italian lines on the European frontier, a comparable zone in Tunisia, a 200 km. zone in Algeria adjoining Libya, all the coast of French Somaliland and the naval bases of Toulon, Bizerte, Ajaccio and Or an (Arts. 3 and 6). Italy was given full use of Jibuti and of the French railway to Addis Ababa. Article 12, relating to the French navy, was almost identical with Article 8 of the German agreement. Both instruments established armistice commissions to issue supplementary regulations. The first step in this direction was taken on June 30 when General Huntziger (who later succeeded Weygand as Commander-in-Chief) went to Wiesbaden to meet General Heinrich von Stuelpnagel. The city had been the headquarters of the French High Commission from 1919 to 1930. The day was the loth anniversary of the final Allied evacuation of the Rhineland. Neither armistice agreement contained any provisions for annexations or indemnities. The formula approximated the Wilsonian formula of 1918surrender and disarmament first, negotiation of peace terms later save that there were here no "fourteen points" to limit the victors' ! subsequent plan of action. The final peace was presumably to be 1 concluded after the defeat of Britain. By mid-July it was hinted ( in Berhn and Rome that a treaty might be unnecessary, since the 1 perpetuation of an independent French State was doubtful. Axis hopes of acquiring most of the French fleet were frustrated by a British act of imagination and audacity reflecting j Churchill's will to victory. The Prime Minister told Commons on July 4 what had been done. The Bordeaux Government, with "callous and perhaps even malevolent" intent, had surrendered' 400 captured German air pilots to the conquerors, despite Rey naud's pledge to send them to England. It had made preparation? to surrender the French navy. "With aching hearts but witl clear vision," the British Cabinet had come to a unanimous deci sion. At dawn of July 3 British forces boarded the French war ships in Portsmouth, Plymouth and other English ports, includ
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ing 2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers, numerous smaller craft and sundry submarines, including the giant Surcouf. Only on board the Surcouf was there any resistance. This was speedily crushed with the loss of three lives. Some of the seamen joined the British navy, others joined De Gaulle, still others were permitted to return to France. The French squadron at Alexandria was taken over without incident. The major portion of the French fleet lay at Mers el-Kebir near Oran in Morocco. Its officers were granted the alternatives of joining the British fleet to continue the war, sailing to a British port, or sailing to the French West Indies for demilitarization. Admiral Gensoul rejected the British ultimatum. At 6 p.m. July 3 Vice Admiral Somerville, commanding a powerful British squadron including the mighty Hood, gave the order to fire. The Dunkerque and seven light cruisers were damaged, but escaped to Toulon. The Bretagne was sunk, the Strasbourg driven ashore and most of the smaller French vessels destroyed. The Richelieu was subsequently blasted by British guns off the harbor of Dakar and immobilized.
A large proportion of the French fleet [said Churchill] has therefore passed into our hands or has been put out of action or otherwise withheld from Germany by yesterday's events. The House will not expect me to say anything about the other French ships which are at large except that It is our inflexible resolve to do everything possible in order to prevent them from falling into German hands. I leave the judgment of our actions with confidence to Parliament; I leave it to the nation; I leave it to the United States of America; I leave it to history.
These melancholy but necessary operations led the men of Vichy to sever diplomatic relations with Britain on July 5. Ambassador Corbin had already resigned. Foreign Minister Boudouin blamed Britain for the French defeat. The miserable efforts of the French Munichmen to buy favors from the conqueror are scarcely worth recounting. Men worthy of leadership would have attempted, like the men of 1871, to organize a war of liberation. Laval and his colleagues preferred to become puppets of the xîctor, hoping somehow that they could salvage their own privieges from the wreckage of the nation they had brought to ruin. n the name of "Fatherland, Work, and Family," they imitated heir masters. On July 11 Petain assumed the Presidency as well :s the Premiership and began using the royal "we" in his role as 'Chief of State." He deprived Parliament of all its powers, pro-
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Death in June
claimed a "moral purge," and led the hunt for scapegoats. Ybarnegary created a "phalanx of youth." Freemasonry was banned. The cost of maintaining the armies of occupation was crushing. The colonies were in chaos. The homeland was stalked by pestilence and hunger. The Caesars treated the men of Vichy with merited contempt. Their regime seemed less a government, or even an executive committee for the Axis, than a silent crowd of monstrous spiders feeding on the body of a France that was dead.^
1 P. J. Philip, a former admirer of Laval, wrote (NYT 9.20.40): "He has the merit necessary to an incipient dictator of being a very patient man of the spider species who spins his web and waits. Into his net at the outset he has drawn his predecessors in office who are awaiting trial at Riom. Now are following those who disapprove of his regime; and he has this advantagethat with the country paralyzed by the German occupation, by hunger, lack of transport and the complete throttling of the press, there is no possibility of protest." Cf. Suicide of a Democracy, by Heinz Pol (Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1940); Chronology of Failure: The Last Days of the French Republic, by Hamilton Fish Armstrong (Macmillan, New York, 1940); and / Saw France Fall by Laval's proVichy son-in-law Rene de Chambrun (Morrow, New York, 1940).
CHAPTER
THIRTEEN
PEACE BY THE SWORD
I. U R B I S E T O R B I S 1940, Winston Churchill, leader of the world's largest empire, addressed the "mother of parliaments" in the world's largest city. He and his auditors were alike under the shadow of what he called the "colossal military disaster" in France. Defeat had been inflicted by a foe apparently invincible, possessed of crushing superiority in machines and men on land and in the air, and now joined in arms by the Caesar of Rome. Britain and all the British commonwealths scattered over the globe were facing the gravest peril that had ever confronted them. An immediate invasion of England was in prospect. The Caesar of the Reich hoped to do again what Julius Caesar had done two thousand years before, what none after him had done for ten centuries until the coming of William the Norman, what none after William had ever done. Even as the first of the large scale Nazi air raids unleashed its fury, Churchill breathed confidence and called for unity:
O N JUNE I 8 ,
There are many who wish to hold an inquest upon the conduct of the Government and of Parliament during the years which led up to this catastrophe. They wish to indict those who were responsible for the guidince of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. I here are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search lis speeches, as I frequently search mine. Of this I am quite sure, that if we ipen a quarrel between the past and the present we shall find that we have ost the future. . . . The military events which have happened in France during the last fortight have not come to me with any sense of surprise; indeed, I indicated
CHAPTER
THIRTEEN
PEACE BY THE SWORD
I. U R B I S E T O R B I S 1940, Winston Churchill, leader of the world's largest empire, addressed the "mother of parliaments" in the world's largest city. He and his auditors were alike under the shadow of what he called the "colossal military disaster" in France. Defeat had been inflicted by a foe apparently invincible, possessed of crushing superiority in machines and men on land and in the air, and now joined in arms by the Caesar of Rome. Britain and all the British commonwealths scattered over the globe were facing the gravest peril that had ever confronted them. An immediate invasion of England was in prospect. The Caesar of the Reich hoped to do again what Julius Caesar had done two thousand years before, what none after him had done for ten centuries until the coming of William the Norman, what none after William had ever done. Even as the first of the large scale Nazi air raids unleashed its fury, Churchill breathed confidence and called for unity:
O N JUNE I 8 ,
There are many who wish to hold an inquest upon the conduct of the Government and of Parliament during the years which led up to this catastrophe. They wish to indict those who were responsible for the guidince of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. I here are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search lis speeches, as I frequently search mine. Of this I am quite sure, that if we ipen a quarrel between the past and the present we shall find that we have ost the future. . . . The military events which have happened in France during the last fortight have not come to me with any sense of surprise; indeed, I indicated
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Peace by the Sword
a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst possibilities were open and I made it perfectly clear that whatever happened in France it would make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, if necessary for years, and if necessary alone. . . . I do not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which lies before us, but I believe that our countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it and carrying on in spite of it at least as well as any other people in the world. It will depend upon themselves, and every man and woman will have the chance of showing the finest qualities of their race and of rendering the highest service to their cause. . . . In casting up this dread balance sheet and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great reasons for intense exertion and vigilance, but none whatever for panic or despair. During the first four months of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment, and yet at the end their morale was higher than that of the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph to another. During that war we repeatedly asked ourselves the question, "How are we going to win?" and no one was ever able to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us and we were so glutted with victory that in our folly we cast it away. We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French I resistance will be prolonged both in France and in the French empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting away their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will have read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen and of our own hearts, we have proclaimed our 1 willingness to conclude at the darkest hour in French history a union of! common citizenship in their struggle. However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or another French Government, we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comrade-i ship with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure what they have suffered, we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gainaye, freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of om just demands. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch and Belgians, who havi joined their causes with our own, all shall be restored. What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. The Battlt of Britain is about to begin. On this battle depends the survival of Chris tian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life and the long con tinuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might o
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the enemy must very soon be turned upon us. Hitler knows he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad sunlit uplands; but if we fail, the whole world, including the United States and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister and perhaps more prolonged by the lights of a perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty and so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and Empire last for a thousand years, men will still say "This was their finest hour."
The diplomatic prelude to the "Battle of Britain" must as to its details remain an untold story for many months and perhaps for years. The fact of a diplomatic prelude, however, is not in doubt. Despite threats and boasts, the Nazi war-lord and his Italian ally had no illusions as to the risks and difficulties of attempting an invasion of Britain. The Reich's mechanized divisions, once on the ground, might again wreak havoc upon Britain's defenders. England's troops had lost their arms in Flanders and would not again be well equipped for months to come. The arms that were lost had not sufficed to halt the Reichswehr. Without them Britain's regiments would be as helpless as the Polish cavalry. But between the ports of the Continent and the shores of England lay the same grey strip of choppy sea, guarded by guns ashore and guns afloat, that had baffled Bonaparte at Boulogne. Without parity of seapower the adventure seemed foredoomed. Air power alone could not smash the enemy's fleet nor carry troops in sufficient numbers to make effective landings. What might have been achieved by a sudden sortie in late June, with all England confused and demoralized by the debacle across the Channel, will never be known. The Reichskanzler weighed the dangers and decided to seek victory in easier ways. What specific overtures he made and how he made them are still matters of speculation. On July 7 Hitler and Ribbentrop received Ciano in Berlin, with Ambassadors Alfieri and von Mackensen in attendance. Duce's son-in-law visited occupied France and returned to the Reich to confer again. They looked to Britain's Munichmen, as they had looked to their counterparts in France, to betray the island kingdom. T o offer "peace" on the basis of the status quo and "respect" for the Empire might tempt
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such men to accept terms which would later insure England's doom. "The wise victor," the Leader had written in the Book, "will, if possible, always impose his claims on the defeated people stage by stage, dealing with the people that had grown defeatist, and this is every people which has voluntarily submitted to force. He may then rely on the fact that in not one of these further acts of aggression will there seem to be sufficient reason to take up arms again." The identity of the men of England who might be expected to consider "negotiations" was clear from the record. How to reach them? Vichy was not useful as intermediary, for on July 8 the Marquis of Castellane, acting French Ambassador in London following the resignations of Corbin and Counsellor Roger Cambon, asked Halifax for his passport and took his leave. The Vatican was available. Stockholm was available. Here, said rumor, British and German agents actually conferred. Better yet was Madrid, for here was arch-appeaser Sir Samuel Hoare, come as Ambassador to Franco on the 8th of June. Here too were the Duke of Windsor, never too unfriendly toward the Reich, and Wallace Warfield Simpson, once a friend of Ribbentrop.^ Whether, as Wythe Williams insisted from his secret sources, Hoare and Franco actually discussed the possibility of peace can neither be affirmed nor denied. Windsor conferred with Hoare and Franco, but perhaps not about peace. He had been appointed Governor of the Bahamas on June 9, however, and shortly took his leave. Rumor held that Hitler was offering a "guarantee" to the British Empire in return for the retrocession of the Cameroons and German East Africa, possession of the Belgian Congo, continued control of conquered lands and a free hand for Italy in dealing with Spain, Jugoslavia, and Greece.^ Rumor held that Neville Chamberlain was angling for peace. He denied the allegation on June 28, but on the following day Baron Strabolgi (Lieut. Commander J. M. Kenworthy, Laborite) published an open letter demanding resignation of Hoare and Halifax along with Chamberlain. "So long as he is in the inner War Cabinet, the German propagandists will find credence for their fairy tales about Britain suing for an armistice." The man from Birmingham,
1 Cf. M. W. Fodor in The Chicago Daily News, June 29, 1940, on Nazi hopes i of using Windsor as puppet ruler of a conquered Britain. 2 Cf. The Chicago Daily Tributie, July 27, 1940.
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anxious and haggard, felt obliged to broadcast his views on June 30th: "Anyone who imagines than any of us would consent to enter upon peace negotiations with the enemy is just playing the Nazi game. . . . W e are a solid and united nation that would rather go down to ruin than admit the domination of the Nazis. . . . W e will fight (the foe) on every road, in every village, and in every house, until he or we are utterly destroyed." Whatever the cause. Hitler's maneuver failed. In a broadcast on Bastille Day, Churchill echoed Chamberlain and gave voice to a new spirit abroad in the land:
Should the invader come to Britain, there will be no placid lying down of the people in submission before him, as we have seen, alas! in other countries. We will defend every village, every town, and every city. The vast mass of London itself, fought street by street, could easily devour an entire hostile army, and we would rather see London laid in ashes and ruins than that it should be tamely and abjectly enslaved. . . . Faith is given to us as a help and comfort, and I proclaim my faith that some of us will live to see another 14th of July, when a liberated France will once again rejoice in greatness and in her glory, and once again stand forward as the champion of the freedom and rights of man. . . . All depends now upon the whole life strength of the British race in every part of the world and of all our associated peoples and of all our well wishers in every land, doing their utmost night and day, giving all, daring all, enduring all, to the utmost, to the end.
The Fascist and the Nazi press warned of the horrible destiny in store for England if such an attitude were persisted in. Gobbels told parading troops in Berlin on July 18 that they were fighting for "the greater and more glorious Reich," while their enemies had been "whipped into the war by Jews and plutocrats." "You have just one more battle to win; then bells of peace will ring. . . , Then we will build a better Europe." On July 19 Hitler addressed the Reichstag, with Ciano in the audience. He reviewed the course of the war and dispensed honors to his victorious commanders. His words to England were a last warning:
In the opinion of the British politicians their last hopes, apart from Allied peoples consisting of a number of kings without thrones, statesmen without a nation and generals without an army, seem to be based on fresh complications which they hope to bring about thanks to their skill in such matters. A veritable wandering Jew among these hopes is the belief in
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the possibility of a fresh estrangement between Germany and Russia. German and Russian relations have been finally established. The reason for this is that Britain and France, authorized by certain lesser Powers, continually accredited Germany with the desire to conquer territory which lay outside the sphere of German interests. It was said at one time that Germany wanted to possess the Ukraine, again that she intended to invade Finland, yet again that she had threatened Rumania, and finally fears were entertained for the safety of Turkey. In these circumstances I saw it proper to enter into straightforward discussions with Russia in order to define clearly, once and for all, what Germany believes she must regard as the sphere of interests vital to her future and which Russia on the other hand considered essential for her existence. This clear definition of their several spheres of interest was followed by a new basis of German-Russian relations. All hope that the completion of this might give rise to fresh tension between Germany and Russia is futile. Neither has Germany undertaken any steps that would lead her to exceed the limits of her sphere of interests nor has Russia done anything of the kind. Britain's hope that she could, by bringing about a new European crisis, better her own position amounts, insofar as this concerns Germany's relations with Russia, to a false conclusion. British statesmen are always somewhat slow in grasping facts, but they will learn to see this in time. . . . Neither in this world nor the next can Mr. Churchill and M. Reynaud answer for the suffering they have caused by their counsels and decrees to millions of people. All this, as I said once before, need never have happened, for in October I asked nothing from either France or Britain but peace. But the men behind the armaments industries wanted to go on with the war at all costs and now they have got it. . . . They declare they will carry on the war and that even if Britain should perish they will carry on from Canada. Presumably only those gentlemen interested in the continuance of the war will go to Canada. The people, I am afraid, will have to remain in Britain and the people in London will certainly regard the war with other eyes than their so-called leaders in Canada. Believe me, gentlemen, I feel a deep disgust for this type of unscrupulous politician who wrecks entire nations and States. It almost causes me pain to think that I should have been selected by fate to deal the final blow to the structure which these men have already set tottering. It never has been my intention to wage wars, but rather to build up a State with a new social order and the finest possible standard of culture. Each year that this war drags on is keeping me away from this work. . , . I realize that this struggle, if it continues, can end only with the complete annihilation of one or the other of the two adversaries. Mr. Churchill may believe this will be Germany. I know that it will be Britain. In this
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hour I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on. I am grieved to think of the sacrifices it will claim. . . . Possibly Mr. Churchill again will brush aside this statement of mine by saying that it is merely born of fear and of doubt in our final victory. In that case I shall have relieved my conscience in regard to the things to come. These words evoked no British response save defiance and contempt. The Times said his terms involved "the reduction of most of Europe to serfdom in the interest of the hegemony of the selfchosen German race. That is the supreme violation of the dearest principle held by the Enghsh-speaking people." "No words, no threats of his," declared the Yorkshire Post, "will deceive the people of Britain into believing that any peace obtainable from an undefeated Nazi Germany means anything but servitude and shame." The Axis press again warned London to reconsider. Duce sent Fiihrer a congratulatory telegram (". . . The Itahan people whatever may happenwill march together with your people until the end, that is to say, until victory") and received thanks; "United in our ideologies and in the force of our arms, Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany will victoriously conquer for our peoples' liberty." Halifax replied by radio on July 22: Many of you will have read two days ago the speech in which Herr Hitler summoned Great Britain to capitulate to his will. . . . There was in his speech no suggestion that peace must be based on justice, no word of recognition that the other nations of Europe had any right to self-determination, the principle which he has so often invoked for Germany. His only appeal was to the base instinct of fear, and his only arguments were threats. . . . We realize that the struggle may cost us everything, but just because the things we are defending are worth any sacrifice, it is a noble privilege to be the defenders of things so precious. . . . People of the United States did not build their new home in order to surrender it to this fanatic. . . . We may take heart from the certain knowledge that that great people pray for our victory over this wicked man and his ways as fervently as any of his present victims. The foundations of their country, as of ours, have been Christian teaching and belief in God. . . . Where will God lead us? Not, we may be sure, through easy or pleasant paths. That is not His way. He will not help us to avoid our
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difficulties. What He will do is to give to those who humbly ask, the spirit that no dangers can disturb. . . . Those of us who cannot serve in the armed forces must all do our best in other ways to help them. I'm sure we shall and there is one thing we can all do, soldiers, sailors, airmen and civilians, men, women and children, all together, which may be much more powerful than we know. And this is to pray. . . . This, then, is the spirit in which we must march together in this crusade for Christianity. We and our great dominions overseas stand, and shall continue to stand, four square against the forces of evil. We shall go forward, seeing clearly both the splendor and the perils of the past, but strengthened by the faith through which by God's help, as we try to do His service, we shall prevail.
The German press answered with one voice: "sanctimonious hypocrite," "blasphemous dialectics," "sickly and repulsive," "the die has been cast." Rome denounced the "refined hyprocrisy" and "irresponsible appeal to fanaticism" in the "negative and Jesuitical speech" of "Jew Halifax." Downing Street replied by according diplomatic recognition on July 23 to the "Provisional Czechoslovak Government" in London, headed by Benes with Jan Masaryk as Foreign Minister. Haile Selassie, already in the Sudan to stir his people to revolt against the conqueror, was also recognized as Britain's ally. Hitler heard Gotterddmmermig at Bayreuth. Rumor spoke of German designs on Spain, Portugal, the Azores, the Canaries . . . While England rearmed and prepared for the test to come, two voices continued to speak clearly through the gathering storm. One was hoarse, hysterical, revengeful, assured. The other was the voice of Britain's last leader in Britain's lonely battle, firm, confident and inspired with courageous dignity. Thus Adolf Hitler in Berlin's Sportpalast on September 4:
Whatever may come, England will break down. I recognize no other termination than this one alone. The people of England are very curious and ask: "Why in the world don't you come?" We are coming. . , . All of England's allies will not help herneither Haile Selassie, nor King Zog, nor King Haakon, nor even Queen Wilhelmina. . . . In the East we stand on the river Bug. In the North we stand at North Cape and Narvik, and in the South on the Spanish frontier. . . . The fight is for existence or nonexistence, to decide whether in the future a situation can be created in which it is possible for one nation to get a strangle-hold on Europe. Both Germany and Italy will take care that this will never occur again.
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Thus Winston Churchill to the Commons on September 5:

No one can say how far Herr Hitler's empire will extend before this war is over. But I have no doubt it will pass away as swiftlyperhaps more swiftlythan did Napoleon's army, although of course without any of its glitter or glory. . . . We must be prepared for heavier fighting in this month of September. The need of the enemy to obtain a decision is very great, and if he has the numbers with which we have hitherto credited him, he should be able to magnify and multiply his attacks during September. Firm confidence is felt by all responsible officers of the R.A.F. in our ability to withstand this largely increased scale of attack and we have no doubt that our peoples will take the example from our airmen and be proud to share their dangers with them. . . . No one must suppose that the danger of invasion is past. The Secretary for War is absolutely right in enjoining the strictest vigilance upon the great and growing armies which are now entrusted in this country to the command of Sir Alan Brooke. . . . There must not be any relaxation of effort or wise precaution, both of which are needed to save our lives and save our cause. . . . Both at home and abroad we shall persevere along our course, however the winds may blow.
And again the voice of Churchill by radio to Britain and the world, September 11:
This effort of the Germans to secure daylight mastery of the air over England is, of course, the crux of the whole war. So far it has failed conspicuously. . . . Nevertheless, all Hitler's preparations for invasion on a great scale are steadily going forward. Several hundreds of self-propelled barges are moving down the coasts of Europe from the German and Dutch harbors to the ports of northern France, from Dunkirk to Brest, and beyond Brest to the French harbors in the Bay of Biscay. . . . There are some preparations made of ships to carry an invading force from the Norwegian harbors. Behind these clusters of ships or barges there stand very large numbers of German troops awaiting the order to go on board and set out on their very dangerous and uncertain voyage across the seas. We cannot tell when they will try to come. We cannot be sure that in fact they will try at all. But no one should blind himself to the fact that a heavy full scale invasion of this island is being prepared with all the usual German thoroughness and method and that it may be launched at any time now upon England, upon Scotland, or upon Ireland, or upon all three. . . . We must regard the next week or so as a very important week for us in our history. . . . Every man and woman will therefore prepare himself and herself to do his duty whatever it may be, with special pride and care. . . . It is with devout but sure confidence that I say let God de-
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fend the Right. These cruel, wanton, indiscriminate bombings of London are of course a part of Hitler's invasion plans. . . . What he has done is to kindle a fire in British hearts here and all over the world which will glow long after all traces of the conflagrations he has caused in London have been removed. He has lighted a fire which will burn with a steady and consumingflam.euntil the last vestiges of Nazi tyranny have been burned out of Europe and until the Old World and the New can join hands to rebuild the temples of man's freedom and man's honor upon foundations which will not soon or easily be overthrown. . . . We shall draw from the heart of suffering itself the means of inspiration and survival, and of a victoryone not only for ourselves but for all; a victory won not only for our own time but for the long and better days that are to come.
Meanwhile the Battle of Britain had been joinednot by attempted invasion but by other means which, if successful, might make invasion feasible. The means were the Luftwaffe. The fanaticism of the German airmen; the valor and skill of the R.A.F. in beating back attacks by a superior foe and in bombing the Channel ports, the barges of the invaders, the harbors and factories of Germany and the capital of the Reich; the feats of the defenders of London; the grim resolve of weary and red-eyed Britishers determined to "carry on" whatever wrack and ruin the foe might visit upon them; the slow emergence of an iron will to resist, comparable to the spirit of the people of Madrid in Spain's agony all this has elsewhere been told and will be retold a thousand times so long as men are fascinated by battle and death, and moved to admiration by sacrifice and heroism.^ During July and early August the Luftivaffe limited its attacks to convoys, coastal points, and shore cities, pending completion of new German bases in northern France and the Low Countries. The Royal Air Force, commanded originally by Sir Cyril Newell and after October by Sir Charles Portal, former head of the bomber command, retaliated by striking at Nazi concentrations in France and at military objectives in the Reich. While Spitfires and Hurricanes battled German raiders over Britain, squadrons of Blenheims, Wellingtons, Hamptons, and Lockheed-Hudson bombers carried war into Germany. On September 6 the R.A.F. executed its heaviest raid to date on Berlin. On September 7-8
1 In 1937 this writer wrote: "By 1940 London might be a flaming shambles, comparable to Shanghai in 1932 and Addis Ababa and Madrid in 1936" (p. 442, International Politics, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, May, 1937).
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the Luftwaffe, with its many hundreds of Junkers, Heinkels, Domiers and Messerschmitts, opened its "all out" assault on the British capital, with occasional attacks on other centers of population. Night after night a hail of steel and a rain of blood descended from London's skies. In the daylight hours scattered raiders penetrated the defenses in an attempt, which was never quite successful, to make the assault continuous. Showers of incendiary bombs, tons of heavy explosives and aerial torpedoes, and crippled bombers plummeting earthward left the huge and shapeless face of London pockmarked with craters, fires, and debris. With complete impartiality flying death struck rich and poor alike, shattering hovels, palaces, stores, churches, hospitals, and mansions. Buckingham Palace and St. Paul's were targets along with tenements, docks, and railway stations. Eight million Londoners learned to sleep and eat in man-made caves and to work as best they could between alarms. By early November almost 15,000 civilians had been slain and over 20,000 wounded, most of them in the London area. N o surcease was in prospect. What mattered most, however, was not the dead and dying nor yet the gutted streets and buildings but rather the failure of the Luftwaffe to break Britain's will to resist. The casualties were negligible in comparison with the numbers of those left unscathed. The structures demolished were but the smallest fraction of those left undamaged. Months and even years of daily assault on the largest scale possible for the Reich offered no promise of killing enough people or destroying enough houses to compel capitulation by the survivors. Pestilence and hunger, to be sure, might come later in the wake of the raiders. But by mid-autumn of 1940 London was still a functioning community with no essential services permanently disrupted and no perceptible collapse of morale. To the Nazi threat of September 14, "Surrender as Paris surrendered or suffer the fate of Warsaw," Londoners, with thumbs up and heads high, replied with Churchill's slogan: "We can take it." Under these conditions no invasion could be attempted. On September 15-16 Goring flew over the capital while 185 of his aircraft were shot down and British bombers struck fiercely at French ports and at fleets of Nazi barges. Whether an invasion was in fact attempted and abandoned in mid-September was a question on which opinions differed. Suffice it to say that in the
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opening phase of the "Battle of Britain" the first war lord of the Third Reich failed to achieve his purpose. Axis spokesmen waxed indignant over the "barbarism" of British raids on German and Italian cities and wondered anxiously whether their enemy consisted of "47,000,000 Churchills." The exultation of successful resistance, coupled with the agonies of retribution, profoundly changed the soul of Britain, though no one could say how much, how permanently, or how effectively in terms of future war-potential. Lines of caste and creed grew blurred in common sacrifice. A sacred union for survival left little room for social conflict, for mass unrest, for class betrayal. Politics was in abeyance. A united government led a united nation. Even in Britain's blackest hour the old deep habits of toleration and compromise forbade any transition from democracy to depotism. Oswald Mosley, Captain Archibald Ramsay, M.P., Franz von Rintelen, and numerous other servants of the Caesars, including enemy aliens, were arrested late in May. Yet the tiny handful of Communists, all as defeatist as if they took their cue from Hitler rather than Stalin, was permitted to carry on as before. The Emergency Powers Defense Act of May 22, 1940, passed by Parliament in less than three hours, gave the Government full authority to conscript persons and property, A "Treachery Bill" of May 23 sanctioned the death penalty for espionage and sabotage. But Britishers, far from weeping over the "end of freedom," cheered the fact that their leaders at long last were willing and able to act. Yet they refused to be dealt with as were the subjects of the Caesars. The "Silent Column," organized by the Ministries of Information and Home Security (Duff-Cooper and Anderson) to discourage rumor-mongering by imposing penalties on gossips, was abolished in Commons on July 23. "Cooper's snoopers" were curbed. Local Defense Volunteers ("Parashots") organized themselves throughout the land. In some fields of action, however, the sluggish complacency of the past still dogged the Government's steps. On July 2 the National Union of Railway Men asked for the removal of Chamberlain and Halifax from the Cabinet. Other unions made the same demand, despite efforts of the Labor Party to stifle such sentiments. Chamberlain underwent an operation for cancer late in July, but kept his post in the Government. On July 19 Sir Alan Brooke succeeded Ironside as Commander-in-
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Chief of the Home Forces. On August 2 Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production, became a member of the War Cabinet. Not until October 3 did Chamberlain finally resign. He retired, sick unto death, to his country home in Hampstead. Even here fell bombs from the planes of the tyrant with whom the Man from Birmingham had made "peace with honor" only two years before. But Neville Chamberlain was spared the final measure of his folly's aftermath. On the 9th of November, 1940, his last sun went to rest while kindly death brought peace at last to his weary frame and his broken hopes. Aieanwhile, his post as Lord President of the Council had been taken by Sir John Anderson who was succeeded as Minister for Home Security by Herbert Morrison who was succeeded as Minister of Supply by Sir Andrew Duncan who was succeeded as President of the Board of Trade by Captain Oliver Lyttelton. Lord Caldecote (Sir Thomas Inskip), whose appointment as Minister of Defense by Baldwin in 1936 caused a well-known member of Parliament to observe, "There has been no similar appointment since the Roman Emperor Cahgula made his horse a consul," was made Lord Chief Justice and reheved of the Dominions Office in favor of Viscount Cranborne. Sir John Reith became Minister of Works and Public Buildings, and Lieutenant Colonel John Moore-Brabazon, Minister of Transport. Into the inner War Cabinet, already including Attlee, Greenwood, Beaverbrook and Halifax, Churchill took Ernest Bevin, belligerent Minister of Labor and former leader of the transport workers and of the General Strike. Bevin favored "giving 'itler 'ell" and had bitterly rebuked pacifist George Lansbury in 1935 for "carting his conscience around from conference to conference asking to be told what to do with it." But Churchill also included Sir John Anderson and Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Kingsley Wood, thereby disappointing those who hoped for a "clean sweep." The Prime Minister was unanimously elected leader of the Conservative Party as Chamberlain's successor. On October 8, during one of the worst air raids on London, he summoned Commons to new courage:
A month has passed since H e r r Hitler turned his rage and malice on to the civilian population of our great cities, and particularly on London. H e
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declared in his speech on Sept. 4 that he would raze our cities to the ground, and since then he has been trying to carry out his fell purpose. . . . I hesitate to say anything of an optimistic nature because our people do not mind being told the worst, but they resent anything in the nature of soothing statements which are not borne out by events, and, after all, war is full of unpleasant surprises. O n the whole, however, we may, I think, in all reserve, reach provisionally the conclusion that the German average effort against this country absorbs a very considerable part of their potential strength. I should not like to say we have the measure of their power, but we feel more confident about it than we have ever been before. . . . O n Thursday a week, we were told 251 tons were thrown upon London in a single night. T h a t is to say, more tons were dropped that night than were dropped in this country throughout the last war. N o w , we know exactly what our casualties were. On this Thursday particularly 190 persons in London were killed as a result of the bombing that night. T w o hundred and fifty-one tons of bombstherefore it took one ton of bombs to kill three-quarters of a person. . . . This appears not only to be remarkable but also reassuring. . . . London, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham may have much more to suffer, but they will arise from their ruins more healthy, and I hope, more beautiful. W e must not exaggerate the material damage that has been done. . . . Neither by material damage nor by slaughter will the people of the British Empire be turned from their solemn, inexorable purpose. Because we feel easier in ourselves and see our way more clearly through our difficulties and dangers than we did some months ago, because foreign countries, friends and foes, recognize the giant, enduring, resilient strength of Great Britain and the British Empire, do not let us dull for one moment the sense of the awful hazard in which we stand. D o not let us lose the conviction that it is only by supreme and superb exertions, unwearied and indomitable, that we shall save our souls alive. N o one can predict or even imagine how this terrible war against German and Nazi aggression will run its course. Long dark months of trial and tribulation lie before us. N o t only many dangers "but many more misfortunes," many mistakes and disappointments will surely be our lot; death and sorrow will be our companions on the journey, hardship our garment, constancy and valor our only shield. W e must be reunited, we must be undaunted, we must be inflexible. Our qualities and deeds must burn and glow through the gloom of Europe until they become the veritable beacons of its salvation.
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N o one knew better than Churchill that wars are never won by passive defense, however successful. No one knew better than he that a Britain without aUies could not hope to defeat the conquerors of the Continent. The Dominions were awakening from lethargy and putting forth increasing efforts, despite French defeatists in Quebec, Boer defeatists in South Africa and anxiety about Japan in the Antipodes. Eire clung stubbornly to "neutrality," however, and refused cooperation with Belfast and London for common defense. Egypt, although invaded by Italy and defended by Britain, remained "neutral" and limited itself to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Rome on June 12. Of the eastern States guaranteed by Britain in 1939 Poland was gone, Rumania was helpless, Greece was waiting, Turkey was fearful. None would move to the aid of Britain unless directly attacked by the Axis. Refugee rulers of Ethiopia, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland did as much as they could, but their much was little. The United States was busy providing for "national defense" and electing a President. British isolation and Japanese blackmail drove Churchill reluctantly down the Chamberlain road of appeasementwith the usual result. Japan's aerial terrorization of China continued with the aid of British and American oil. Foreign Minister Arita notified the belligerent Powers, the United States and Italy on May 11 that Tokio was deeply concerned over the status quo of the Dutch East Indies. The British, French and Dutch envoys at once extended assurances that no change was contemplated. The collapse of France inspired Japanese army circles to cast covetous eyes on IndoChina. The French Ambassador was induced to sign an agreement similar to the Anglo-Japanese accord of July 24, 1939, recognizing that hostilities gave Japan special rights for the "maintenance of peace and order" in China, and permitting Tokio to install inspectors at Hanoi to halt war supplies for Chungking. Pressure against Britain led to an Anglo-Japanese agreement on June 19 whereby London yielded to Tokio's demands at Tientsin. On June 24 Japan demanded that Britain halt all shipments to free China by way of Hong Kong and the Burma Road. Japanese forces blockaded Hong Kong to induce comphance. On July 17 London agreed to close Burma Road to war materials for three months. "What we have made," Churchill told Commons, "is a
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temporary agreement in the hope that the time so gained may lead to a solution just and equitable to both parties of the dispute and freely accepted by them both." On the same day army pressure compelled the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet and led to the return of Prince Fumimaro Konoye to the Premiership which he had relinquished on January 4, 1939. The Cabinet installed on July 22, 1940, was "totalitarian" and bellicose. Yosuke Matsuoka, new Foreign Minister, declared: "The government is through with toadying; henceforth it will not make vain efforts to grasp the hands of countries who cannot be made friends." Konoye substituted for the "New Order in Eastern Asia" the concept of "Greater East Asia," including the Indies, as Japan's sphere in the reordering of the world. Following repeated Japanese "requests" and the arrest of British subjects in Japan and Korea, London announced on August 9 the withdrawal of its forces at Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai. Any hopes that may have been entertained at Downing Street that such a course of bowing and scraping would forestall Japanese cooperation with the Axis were speedily dashed by the developments of September. Meanwhile Britain's most formidable foe, thwarted in his efforts to terrorize his victim into submission, turned his attention toward the possibility of striking a lethal blow at the lifeline of the Empire in the Mediterranean. His weak southern ally could do little alone. Italian forces in the middle sea and in Africa would doubtless have been liquidated had the men of Vichy continued hostilities from the French colonies. When General Eugene Mittelhauser in Syria and General August Nogues in North Africa decided to abide by the armistice, Italy's strategic position was strengthened and Britain's correspondingly weakened. Libya and Italian East Africa had been potentially threatened from two sides. Now Egypt, the Sudan, and British Somaliland were similarly threatened by Italy. Here as elsewhere Britain was compelled to remain on the defensive. But Italian sea forces warily avoided Sir Andrew Cunningham's Mediterranean fleet which effectively blockaded the Duce's realm and retained almost undisputed mastery of the Gibraltar-Malta-Suez-Aden route to the East. For six weeks Anglo-Italian hostilities were Hmited to air raids and border skirmishing. On June 28 Marshal Italo Balbo, Governor General of Libya, was reported killed in an aerial encoun-
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ter near the Egyptian frontier under circumstances not dissimilar to those attending the demise of General Werner von Fritsch in Poland. Balbo was succeeded by Marshal Graziani. Italian forces in Ethiopia, enjoying local superiority in numbers and equipment, succeeded in taking Cassala and Galabat in the Sudan and Moyole and the Dolo salient in Kenya. Thanks largely to Italian occupation of French Somaliland, two Italian divisions were able to invade British Somaliland on August 4 and to compel British evacuation of the colony on the 19th. Graziani's long-heralded drive into Egypt from Libya reached Sidi Barrani, 55 miles east of the border, on September 17, but made no immediate progress toward the next objective, Mersa Matruh, coastal terminal of the railway to Alexandria. In the absence of naval control of the Mediterranean no effective assaults on Gibraltar, Egypt, or Palestine seemed possible.^ Caesar's hope of changing the balance of forces in Mare Nostrum depended upon the success of attempts to clear the way for land operations around both ends of the Mediterranean. A Fascist press campaign against Greece during August seemed to foreshadow an Italian effort to annex Corfu and Epirus and perhaps to occupy Salonika. Tyrant John Metaxas had not renounced his British "guarantee," but he knew that no one could restrain the Duce from aggression save the Fiihrer whom "Little John" had made his model. On August 15 the Greek cruiser Hella was sunk by an "unknown" torpedo (marked: "Turin, 1930") fired by an "unknown" submarine in the harbor of Tinos, while "unknown" planes bombed a Greek excursion steamer off Crete. On the i6th two Greek destroyers in the Cyclades were attacked by bombers. Athens called up reserves. Italian forces massed in Albania. On August 23 Metaxas announced that Greece would resist if attacked. The initial steps in the partition of Greater Rumania were meanwhile completed. King Carol issued a royal decree on June 21 making himself a totalitarian ruler. This effort to curry favor with the Caesars saved neither his country nor his crown. Moscow occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina on June 26. Budapest
1 Cf. Edgar Mclnnis, The War: First Year, with a Foreword by Raymond Gram Swing (Oxford University Press, New York, 1940) for a useful sketch of the first twelvemonths' military operations.
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and Sofia pressed for return of their lost provinces. At the suggestion of the Axis and in the shadow of fear of Russia, RumanianMagyar negotiations opened at T u m u Severin on the Danube on August 16. Hungarian demands for two thirds of Transylvania were rejected. Troops were called up when the discussions reached deadlock. The parley was declared closed on August 24 and then immediately reopened under Axis pressure. Teleki and Czaky conferred with the German and Italian envoys. On the 27th Rumanian stubbornness was tempered by an outbreak of border fighting with Soviet troops near Dorohoi, accompanied by clashes with Hungarian forces in the West. At this point Germany and Italy "mediated." Ribbentrop and Ciano lunched with Hitler in the Berghof on August 2 8 and then flew to Vienna where they met Teleki and Czaky as well as Foreign Minister Mikail Manoilescu and his aide, Valerian Pop. On August 30, after stimulants were administered to the Rumanian agents, the Axis Foreign Ministers "pronounced an arbitral sentence" by which Hungary recovered the ridge of the Carpathians and the northeastern half of Transylvania, including Cluj and the district of the Szecklers. Budapest and Bucharest both agreed to grant special privileges to their German minorities. The Axis "guaranteed" Rumania's new frontiers. Ciano and Ribbentrop then went hunting before returning to their capitals, whence they exchanged congratulatory telegrams. Rumania had no option but to yield or face armed conquest. Simultaneous negotiations with Bulgaria at Craiova resulted in an accord of August 21 (signed September 7) whereby Sofia recovered Southern Dobrudja (Durostor and Caliacra) up to the frontier of 1912. By midSeptember Bulgar and Magyar troops had completed occupation of the lost provinces. The blow was too much for any non-democratic regime to survive. An attempted putsch by the Iron Guard in Bucharest was frustrated on September 3. Premier Ion Gigurtu resigned on the next day and was succeeded by General Ion Antonescu, recently liberated from prison. A royal decree dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution and made Antonescu dictator. On September 6 King Carol II of the House of Hohenzollem, who had returned from exile ten years before, abdicated in favor of his 18year-old son Michael and fled the country with Magda Lupescu.
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As his train sped through Temesvar, it was fired upon by Iron Guardists. He and his mistress took refuge in Spain where she was arrested in October. Bucharest demanded Magda's extradition for "trial." "I make this sacrifice," Carol declared in his last proclamation from Bucharest, "to save the country. I pray God it will not be in vain. . . . I pray that my country may be safeguarded by the God of my ancestors and that she may have a splendid and magnificent future." The future soon arrived in the form of German troops who occupied what was left of Rumania to "protect" it and prevent sabotage in the British-owned oil fields which were already in process of expropriation by the Antonescu regime. Beginning on October 8 German divisions moved overland and down the Danube through a compliant Hungary and Jugoslavia into Carol's lost kingdom, ostensibly to aid in reorganizing and training the Rumanian army. Their ultimate objective was to be disclosed by subsequent events. The occupation assured the Axis exclusive use of Rumania's oil production, estimated at 6,240,000 tons in 1939. The Rumanian fields were partially wrecked by the disastrous earthquake of November 10. German sources, moreover, estimated the needs of the Continent for the year to come at 19,000,000 tons and Soviet exports at less than 1,000,000 tons. Beyond Rumania lay Bulgaria, Thrace, Istanbul, Anatolia, Syria, and Iraqstations on the road to the oil of Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and to the encirclement of Egypt from the east. Premier Dragisha Cvetkovich of Jugoslavia breathed defiance on October 13 and urged resistance rather than territorial concessions. War Minister Milan Nedich declared that his people were willing to die for "our independence and right to live our own lives in our own way." But on October 19 Foreign Minister Alexander Cincar-Markovich announced signature of a new economic agreement with Germany which was expected to increase the German share in Jugoslavia's foreign commerce from 50% to 60% on terms of exchange more favorable to Berlin. The Nazi advance toward the Straits, like other diplomatic and military manoeuvers during October, represented a first step in the execution of a grand design for the defeat of Britain in the Mediterranean. This design was doubtless discussed and perhaps formulated in some detail by Hitler and Mussolini at a meeting in
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Brennero on October 4, 1940officially described as a "cordial conference in line with a routine exchange of views." The Caesars and their foreign ministers had conferred during October with Ramon Serrano Suner, Franco's brother-in-law, Minister of the Interior and leader of the Falangists. Suner had declared in Berlin on September 17 that Spain's "non-belligerency," announced after Italy's declaration of war, was only "temporary." While observers were led to expect full Spanish adherence to the Axis, perhaps accompanied by Franco's open participation in hostilities. Fascist diplomats secretly prepared the German-Italian-Japanese alliance agreement announced and signed on September 27. The plan drawn up at Brennero apparently contemplated offensives against Britain's far-flung front between Gibraltar and Palestine, with Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey to be coerced into active cooperation or passive acquiescence, and with France, Spain, and possibly Portugal enlisted as Axis allies in the western theater of operations. By their decision of June the men of Vichy had irrevocably committed themselves to collaboration in Axis designs. Whether that collaboration was to be express or tacit, public or covert, eager or grudging, depended upon the balance between Hitler's pressures and inducements and Laval's calculations of advantage. Baudouin sent repeated protests to London against British efforts to thwart the use by the Reich of French ports, ships, and colonies. Vichy asserted on July 24 that it intended to maintain "the ties that unite French colonies to the mother country." Vichy expressed concern over the plans of Washington regarding the West Indies. Vichy announced on August 2 that the African colonies were being regrouped into larger administrative units, except for Dakar in Senegal. But if Vichy proposed, Berlin disposed. German planes arrived at Dakar on August 2. Five days later Britain concluded a formal agreement with De Gaulle's Volunteer Corps whereby recruitment costs and pensions would be paid by London while the Corps would retain its French character under British command. Churchill promised, "when victory has been gained by Alhed arms, to secure the full restoration of the independence and greatness of France." On August 9 De Gaulle announced that the New Hebrides had rallied to his standard. A plebiscite in Tahiti and neighboring
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islands resulted in an almost unanimous repudiation of Petain. TThe Chad district in Central Africa joined De Gaulle on August 26. By September i almost all of French Equatorial Africa had rejected Vichy's authority. Weygand went to North Africa to stem the tide. Revolts in Morocco, Senegal and Indo-China were suppressed. Laval conferred with Ambassador Otto Abetz and other German authorities in Paris. Pierre Cot and Guy le Chambre, both in America, were the targets of the first indictments in the Riom "trials." Herriot trustingly returned from Switzerland to France and was promptly arrested. On September 6 Vichy announced that Marquet, Ybarnegary and other "politicians" had been dropped from the Cabinet in favor of nonentities more subservient to the clericalist and anti-Semitic clique headed by Laval and Petain. On the same day Ambassador Gaston HenriHaye reached the United States to plead for the return of impounded French gold reserves. In its first open test of force with De Gaulle's supporters, Vichy pleased its overlord by maintaining its authority successfully. On September 11 three French cruisers and three destroyers from Toulon, manned by hand-picked Vichy partisans, were permitted to pass Gibraltar, thanks to what Churchill later called "a series of accidents and some errors which have been made the subject of disciplinary action." They proceeded to Dakar which De Gaulle had been led to believe was ripe to join his cause. When he and his followers attempted a landing on September 23, under the protection of British naval forces, they were repulsed by the fire of the French ships and shore batteries, aided by the beached battleship Richelieu. De Gaulle and his British allies withdrew rather than indulge in major operations against Frenchmen who obeyed Vichy. Laval authorized two retaliatory air raids on Gibraltar from French Morocco. These developments simplified Hitler's task. In the hope of thwarting the Fiihrer's French collaborators, Churchill broadcast a plea to the French people on October 21, asking for unity against the Boche, promising British command of the air by 1941, quoting Gambetta and warning that Hitler, "this evil man, this monstrous abortion of hatred and deceit, is resolved on nothing less than the complete wiping out of the French nation and the disintegration of its whole life and future. . . What we ask at
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this moment in our struggle to win the victory which we will share with you is that if you cannot help us, at least you will not hinder us. . . . Remember, we shall never stop, never weary and never give in, and that our whole people and empire have bowed themselves to the task of cleansing Europe from the Nazi pestilence and saving the world from the new Dark Ages." On the following day Hitler and Ribbentrop conferred with Laval near Paris to discuss collaboration. Vichy denied that any declaration of war was contemplated and affirmed that Laval was merely discussing "questions of a general nature concerning immediate French-German relations." On October 23 Hitler conferred with Franco near Hendaye on the French side of the Spanish frontier. The Caudillo had meanwhile replaced Juan Beigbeider by Suner as his Foreign Minister. The discussion was deeply secret, as was Laval's conference at the Hotel du Pare in Vichy with Petain and the Cabinet. Vichy's eminence grise, accompanied by Laval, was received by Keitel, Ribbentrop and Hitler later the same day in a railway car near Tours. According to Swiss reports they discussed territorial cessions to Germany and Italy in a definitive peace, joint FrenchItalian administration of Tunisia and French-Spanish administration of Morocco, use of French aerial and naval bases by the Axis and French "protection" to Axis forces attacking Egypt. The Fiihrer treated Petain with great deference. His experiences with Hindenburg had taught him how to bend octogenarians to his purposes. "I am sure you did not want war," he told the "Hero" of Verdun, "and I regret to make your acquaintance under these circumstances." After visiting a few of the two million French soldiers still held in Nazi prison camps, Petain returned to Vichy in a fog. Laval's policy temporarily foundered on Spanish and ItaUan demands for French territory. Laval was willing, but Weygand and the French colonial forces (and increasing numbers of Frenchmen at home) were not. Laval's task was to be rendered more difficult by German expulsions of Frenchmen from i Lorraine in mid-November. Despite appeals and warnings from President Roosevelt and I Britain's King, Petain on Saturday evening, October 26, secured! unanimous Cabinet approval for the "principle" of collaboration \ with the Reich. Laval forthwith took over the post of Foreign
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Minister. Baudouin became Secretary of State in Petain's entourage. Fernand de Brinon, Bonnet's erstwhile agent in Berlin, became Vichy's "Ambassador" to deal with Nazi commissioner and "Ambassador" Otto Abetz who was Ribbentrop's erstwhile agent in Paris. All discussion of the Cabinet's secret course was forbidden. In a broadcast of October 30 Petain said nothing of the content of the accord, but called for obedience:
The policy is mine. The ministers are responsible to me alone. History will judge me alone. Hitherto I have spoken to you as a father. Today I speak to you as the leader. . . . It is in honor and to maintain French unity in a framework of constructive activity in a new European order that I enter today a path of cooperation. . . . Cooperation is envisaged between our two countries. I have accepted the principle of it. . . . At a time when France has many obligations to victorious Germany, there should be no divergence of opinion. . . . To those who doubt as well as to those who remain obstinate I would recall that excessive attitudes of reserve and pride lose their force. . . . Follow me! Preserve your confidence in France eternal!
Having betrayed France m June, the Munichmen of Vichy betrayed Britain and Europe in October and openly acknowledged their vassalage to the Caesars. Their subservience to the Axis, far from being the result of French defeat, was the cause of that defeat and antedated by many years the final success of their efforts. Ambassador Henri-Haye assured Sumner Welles that his government was not making territorial cessions to the Reich nor handing over its fleet nor opening its bases to the Axis nor even discussing a permanent treaty to replace the Armistice. But deeds said more than words, and Vichy's words in France were more eloquent than the Ambassador's words in Washington. Jacques Doriot called for French collaboration with Germany against Britain and the building of a new Europe based upon Nazi hegemony and anti-Semitism. Laval told pressmen ( N Y T 11.1.40) that democracy was dead all over the world, that Britain was doomed and that "we shall continue to study the practical form we can give to collaboration serving the interests of France, Germany, and Europe." In this wise France was gleichgeschaltet. No sooner was Vichy's decision made known than the Axis struck in the Balkans. Earlier reports from Cairo held that the Caesars were demanding territorial and strategic concessions from
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Greece and the resignation of Premier Metaxas and King George II. On October 26 Rome charged that Greek troops had attacked an Albanian outpost. Athens denied the accusation. Rome reported new "incidents" amid rumors of revolt in Albania. At 3 a.m. October 28 Emmanuele Grazzi, Italian Minister in Greece, presented an "ultimatum," accusing Greece of "unneutrality," of tolerating use of its ports and waters by British forces, of plotting to place strategic points at British disposal for attacks on Albania and Italy, of oppressing its Albanian minority and provoking border disturbances. All this could no longer be tolerated by Italy:
T h e Italian government has, therefore, determined to ask the Greek government, as a guaranty of Greek neutrality and of Italian security, for the right to occupy with its own armed forces for the duration of the present conflict with Great Britain certain strategic points in Greek territory. T h e Italian government asks the Greek government not to oppose this occupation nor to hinder the free passage of the troops who carry it out. These troops do not present themselves as enemies of the Greek people, and in no way does the Italian government intend that the temporary occupation of some strategic points, dictated by the contingent necessities of a purely defensive character, should prejudice the sovereignty and independence of Greece. T h e Italian government asks the Greek government to give immediately to the military authorities the orders necessary for the peaceful accomplishment of this occupation. Should the Italian troops meet with any resistance, this resistance would be overcome by arms and the Greek government would have to assume the responsibility which might ensue.
Premier Metaxas at once rejected the ultimatum and ordered full mobilization and resistance. Italian columns crossed the Albanian frontier at 5.30 a.m. Bombers raided Piraeus, the Athens airport, Patras, and other towns. Full aid was pledged by Churchill to Metaxas and by George VI to George II. While the Italian attack proceeded throughout the day, Duce and Fiihrer conferred mysteriously in the Palazzo Vecchia in Florence. Despite earlier defiance of the Axis and warnings that Greece would be supported if attacked, Turkey kept silent. Turkish sources indicated that Ankara would give Greece all possible aid "short of war," but would not send troops unless Bulgaria intervened. Without troops, Greece would be lost. Britain had none to send. If Greece were lost, Turkey would be lost. If Turkey were lost, all the Near
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East would be lost. If the Near East were lost, the strategic position of both Britain and the Soviet Union would become untenable. Rome and Berlin refused to sever diplomatic relations with Athens and expressed confidence that Greece would soon submit, with Metaxas perhaps giving way to a puppet and the crown passing to George's brother, Prince Paul, whose wife was Princess Frederika Louise of Brunswick. In this setting the Caesars embarked confidently upon their winter campaign to break British power in the Mediterranean and the Near East. With the connivance of Vichy and Madrid and with no effective resistance in the Balkans, they anticipated victory. Land power and air power cannot vanquish sea power. But the fall of Gibraltar, of Malta and of Alexandria, or the effective closing of the Straits and the Canal by artillery or planes from near-by bases would compel London either to abandon the middle sea or face the prospect of having the Mediterranean fleet bottled up. Axis mastery of North Africa and the Levant would not by itself compel Britain to sue for peace if the homeland still stood firm against the world and could count on ever larger supplies from across the Atlantic. Defeat in Africa and hither Asia, however, would expose India to overland invasion and compel Britain to rely on the long route to the East around the Cape of Good Hope. If Spanish and French bases along the African coasts were available to the Axis, even this route might be rendered dangerous and costly. Meanwhile the aerial assault on London and the Midlands continued night and day, smashing Coventry and badly damaging Birmingham in mid-November, gradually reducing British production of planes and guns and wearing down the will to carry on. Troops in Britain could not be sent elsewhere so long as the danger of invasion remained acute. The Caesars could be counted upon to keep it so. Troops in Britain could scarcely resist invasion if civilian morale should be shattered, if production should be paralyzed, if imports of food and arms should be halted. Planes and submarines took an ever-mounting toll of British and neutral ships. The week of October 14-21 was marked by the largest weekly loss to date, just short of 200,000 tons, including the giant Empress of Britain. German surface raiders in the North Atlantic inflicted severe damage and enhanced Britain's need of American aid to keep the seaways open.
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With winter's advent the imperial city that was London was bit by bit disintegrating. As the doubtful New Year dawned the "fortress built by nature for herself against infection and the hand of war" was manned by ever-wearier defenders faced by a Europe and a world armed for its destruction. In isolation had been found no safety. In isolation could be found no victory and no means even of averting defeat. If Churchill's England, like the lost realm of Haile Selassie four short years previously, like Spain and Austria and Czechoslovakia only yesterday, was to be abandoned and left to climb alone its path to Calvary, the journey's end could scarcely be in question. Old allies were gonegiven away or conquered. Of new allies, there was none. Only two great repositories of power against the Triplice remained intact in the outer world: the Soviet colossus and the great republic of Transatlantis. With aid from these, Britain could survive and could win victory. Without aid from these, Britain would be lostand America and the Soviet Union would be lost as well. Every dictate of self-preservation therefore counseled aid to Britain from Moscow and Washington to crush the Triplice before its members had achieved in the world arena that invincibility which was already theirs in western Europe and eastern Asia. But in epochs of decadence, rulers and peoples seek safety not by doing what is requisite for safety, whatever the cost, but by avoiding all responsibilities and risks until too late and thereby insuring their destruction. Nemesis ruled in Russia and America as she had earlier ruled by the shores of Lake Geneva and on the banks of the Seine and the Thames. Britain's destiny and the world's fate depended upon how long her reign would last.
2. S T R O N G E R T H A N
WORDS
America in transition from the world of 1940 to that of 1941 presented a spectacle puzzling to participant observers. The direction of change in popular attitudes and pubhc policies was clear enough, despite eddies and cross-currents stirred by those bent upon standing still or moving in reverse.^ But the tempo was ir1 Cf. The London Economist, July 6, 1940: "American opinion has followed much the same evolution as British opinion, with a time lag of one to three years, and many of the illusions from which we have awakened are still prevalent on the
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With winter's advent the imperial city that was London was bit by bit disintegrating. As the doubtful New Year dawned the "fortress built by nature for herself against infection and the hand of war" was manned by ever-wearier defenders faced by a Europe and a world armed for its destruction. In isolation had been found no safety. In isolation could be found no victory and no means even of averting defeat. If Churchill's England, like the lost realm of Haile Selassie four short years previously, like Spain and Austria and Czechoslovakia only yesterday, was to be abandoned and left to climb alone its path to Calvary, the journey's end could scarcely be in question. Old allies were gonegiven away or conquered. Of new allies, there was none. Only two great repositories of power against the Triplice remained intact in the outer world: the Soviet colossus and the great republic of Transatlantis. With aid from these, Britain could survive and could win victory. Without aid from these, Britain would be lostand America and the Soviet Union would be lost as well. Every dictate of self-preservation therefore counseled aid to Britain from Moscow and Washington to crush the Triplice before its members had achieved in the world arena that invincibility which was already theirs in western Europe and eastern Asia. But in epochs of decadence, rulers and peoples seek safety not by doing what is requisite for safety, whatever the cost, but by avoiding all responsibilities and risks until too late and thereby insuring their destruction. Nemesis ruled in Russia and America as she had earlier ruled by the shores of Lake Geneva and on the banks of the Seine and the Thames. Britain's destiny and the world's fate depended upon how long her reign would last.
2. S T R O N G E R T H A N
WORDS
America in transition from the world of 1940 to that of 1941 presented a spectacle puzzling to participant observers. The direction of change in popular attitudes and pubhc policies was clear enough, despite eddies and cross-currents stirred by those bent upon standing still or moving in reverse.^ But the tempo was ir1 Cf. The London Economist, July 6, 1940: "American opinion has followed much the same evolution as British opinion, with a time lag of one to three years, and many of the illusions from which we have awakened are still prevalent on the
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regular and halting. Those who rode with the current were of many minds as to where the stream was flowing and where it ought to flow and how to reach destinations which were ever fluctuating. As in other evening lands, the men and women of America were victims of that "schism in the soul" which is the earmark of futility and despair. With few exceptions, they were aware that their world had become darker and more dangerous than ever before in the life of the Republic. Yet they knew not how to define the purposes of their common action. They felt that the dangers must somehow be warded off, that their own beacons must be kept burning. But primal striving for safety furnished no basis for stating ends in terms relevant to the nature of the world. Still less did it supply any formula for devising means to serve such ends as might be dimly seen. The American Commonwealth therefore moved hesitantly and even irrelevantly through labyrinths of peril and mazes of meaningless words toward goals unknown or unacknowledged, with no man perceiving surely what the destination of its tortuous course would be. To some the words of John Milton seemed applicable: "Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation, rousing herself like a strong man after sleep and shaking her invincible locks." To others the shrewd and disquieting observation of Niccolo Machiavelli, in his Discourses on Livy, appeared better suited to the scene:
Those who have been present at any deliberative assemblies of men will have observed how erroneous their opinions often are; and in fact, unless they are directed by superior men, they are apt to be contrary to all reason. But as superior men in corrupt republics (especially in periods of peace and quiet) are generally hated, either from jealousy or the ambition of others, it follows that the preference is given to what common error approves, or to what is suggested by men who are more desirous of pleasing the masses than of promoting the general good. W h e n , however, adversity other side of the Atlantic. For example, there is the almost universal qualification that aid must stop short of war, the delusion that hostile acts can be taken with impunity. Or there is the determination of Americans that, even if they are dragged into the war, they will not send an army to Europe. That . . . in its French context is the delusion of the Maginot Line. . . . These hesitations and inconsistencies will disappear; events can be relied upon to bludgeon them out of existence. . . . It is not the direction in which American policy is evolving, or :ven the goal at which it will arrive, that is in doubt, but only the speed with >vhich it is moving."
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comes, then the error is discovered, and then the people fly for safety to those wiiom in prosperity they had neglected. . . . Certain events also easily mislead men who have not a great deal of experience, for they have in them so much that resembles truth that men easily persuade themselves that they are correct in the judgment they have formed.
The bare record of policies and politics will not resolve the issue, for its resolution lies in a future as yet unreached as these words are written. But the record at least suggests the dilemma which America imposed upon itself and reveals the potentially tragic cleavage in American minds and hearts. This social schizophrenia had its genesis in widespread unwillingness to concede that Destiny had posed alternatives to the United States as sharp as the ultimate "eitheror" and as clear as the final "to be or not to be." America could accept British defeat, make what terms it could with the victors and face the perils of a totalitarian world with such devices as prudence might suggest. Or America could hold that its security required the breaking of the power of the Caesars and could mobilize all its might to this end. The former course would spell "peace," at least for a time, followed by irremediable disaster or perhaps by "safety" of a kindif adaptation to world totalitarianism were swift and effective. The latter course would require "war" at once and without stint or limit, for each delay and each defeat of potential allies abroad would multiply ten-fold the costs of final victory. Settled habits of appeasement and escapism left no viable middle course between i these roads. But only a handful of Americans desired either of i these courses.^ Nine out of ten desired "peace" for America and I
1 This writer ventures to believe that the most intelligent plea for the former ) course was Lawrence Dennis's The Dynamics of War and Revolution, The Weekly Foreign Letter, New York 1940 and that his own letter in The New 1 Republic^ July 8,1940, and H. N. Brailsford's From England to America, Whittlesey House, New York, 1940, represented intelligent briefs for the latter course. The formulas of "liberal" isolationists (e.g., Norman Thomas) were not intelligent for they consisted for the most part of faculty reasoning from erroneous premises flowing from fundamental misconceptions regarding the nature of I world politics. Cf. Current History and Forujn, July 1940. Columnist Ernest K. Lindley wrote (unintelligently) on April 28, 1940 that "intelligent isolationists" were well fortified against everything that had happened. He himself had written four years previously: "Much as we may regret it, we should be prepared to accept the possibilities that a large part of Europe may sink into chaos, that the i white intruder may be thrown out of large sections of Asia, that democracy may \ be extinguished elsewhere, that more nations may go Communist or Fascist, that the British Empire may collapse. . . . By wasting our substance, as we did in the
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victory for Britain. They dreamed that both could be had at once sans risk or sacrifice through measure of aid "short of war," coupled with gigantic rearmament at home for the passive defense of something which had reality only as a geographical expression: "the Western Hemisphere." The inevitable awakening from these illusions promised to produce a decision and a national dedication to a new and dangerous mission ordisintegration. The fall of Copenhagen, Oslo, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris confronted Washington with the necessity of making choices not foreseen in the legislative and executive formulas of 1939. Each new victim of Nazi aggression was dutifully punished for the crime of being weak and neutral by Presidential proclamations barring American ships, citizens and money from its territory. At the same time the American bank balances of the victims were impounded, lest the victors seize the foreign assets of the vanquished. T o Rome and Tokio went warnings and pleas, necessarily unimplemented since Congress and public forbade "commitments" or "entanglements." Rome replied on June 10, Tokio later. On April 13, five days after the event, Roosevelt condemned the German invasion of Denmark and Norway: "If civilization is to survive the rights of the smaller nations to independence, to their territorial integrity and to the unimpeded oplast World War, we might do something, but the results probably would be as far removed from our hopes as were the results of 'the war to end wars.' The greatest service which we can render to ourselves and to civilization generally is to preserve peace in that area of the globe where we have the means and at least a chance of preserving peace: namely, the western hemisphere, and especially North and Central America." Lewis W. Douglas, President of the A-Iutual Life Insurance Company told (intelligently) the United States Chamber of Commerce on May 2, 1940: "There are some who may hold the opinion that we can isolate ourselves from world events, crawl into our economic and political cyclone cellar, draw the trap door after us, and thus preserve the essential elements of the American experiment. But this course means ultimately the creation of a government here vested with sufficiently broad and arbitrary powers to restrict our production to our internal demands, to plan our consumption so that it meets our production and thus to distribute whatever products we may cultivate or manufacture, not by the measure of the individual's capacity, but by the standards of a central planning authority, dispensing favors here, subsidizing efforts there, directing the production of synthetic articles which could be produced and obtained elsewhere in the world for less, expending an ever increasing part of our production and our patrimony in a necessarily expanding system of national defense. To retreat to the cyclone cellar here means, ultimately, to estabhsh a totalitarian state at home." Cf. Denna Frank Fleming, "Can We Stay Out?", Events, June 1940.
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portunity for self-government must be respected by their more powerful neighbors." On April 17 Hull issued a statement declaring that America had an interest in the rubber and tin of the East Indies and that any violent alteration of the status quo would be prejudicial to the "stability, peace, and security" of the "entire Pacific region." He recalled that Japan had promised to respect the rights of The Netherlands. He urged that "policies of force be abandoned." These lofty statements of aspiration produced no visible effect on the actual, as distinct from the hoped-for, condition of the world. On May 12 the President warned the American Republics that until recently "too many citizens believed themselves safe." A "definite challenge" had to be faced. "Can we continue our peaceful construction if all the other continents embrace, by preference or by compulsion, a wholly different principle of life?" The President's personal answer to his own question was clear. But his political answer had to be different, since millions of his fellow-citizens firmly refused to face the question or insisted upon answering it in a fashion more consonant with spiritual comfort than with mental clarity or moral courage. On May 16 the President went before Congress to ask for huge defense appropriations and a plane-building capacity of 50,000 units per year. There was no notable dissent until Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh three days later demanded by radio that America "stop this hysterical chatter of calamity and invasion. . . . No one wishes to attack us and no one is in a position to do so." There was little response, however, to the appeals of the man who had aided Hitler to prepare the "peace" of Munich and had subsequently accepted the Service Cross of the Order of the ( German Eagle with Star, second highest decoration in the Nazi Reich. The President had asked for a billion dollars for arms. AI few days later he asked for another billion. The Senate voted al-! most two billions to the army and a billion and a half to the navy, \ 74-0. The House approved, 400-1. Wendell Willkie commented I on May 29 that Allied victory would save America "billions ofl dollars, billions of tons of armament, billions of hours of wasted and unfruitful work. Just on the most selfish basis, it is enormously to our advantage to have them win." Vandenberg de manded "insulation," but soon urged full aid to the Allies, "shoi; of war" and "within international law." Against an effort at an
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nulment, Hiram Johnson defended his Act of 1934 forbidding loans to defaulting foreign governments. Senator Taft told Kansans on May 18 that "this is no time for the people to be wholly absorbed in foreign battles simply because the newspapers with screaming headlines devote the first three pages exclusively to news from Europe." Two days later in St. Louis he opined that Nazi control of Europe would be "preferable to present participation in the European war." Most Americans agreed, but insisted that all possible aid should be given to Britain ("short of war") to prevent Nazi control of Europe. At the end of the month President Conant of Harvard urged the nation to give Britain aU possible aid and face the fact that this might lead to hostilities. "Fear of war is no basis for a national policy." No one was more cognizant of this fact than Mr. Roosevelt. N o one knew better than he that Britain's defeat would bring disaster to America. N o one knew better than he that passive defense of the United States or of the "Western Hemisphere" would become a strategic impossibility, mathematically certain to insure defeat, the moment that Britain surrendered. Yet he could say none of these things openly lest he be accused of "warmongering." As a leader who preferred to follow his followers, as a prospective candidate who felt obliged to march behind the electorate rather than in front of it, he knew that a slowly awakening public would approve rearmament, would balk at nothing to serve "national defense" and would applaud aid to Britain of a scope far beyond anything permissible under the customary international law of neutrality. He also knew that the public would flee, as from the devil, from any suggestion of belligerent participation, and that a motley crowd of pacifists, appeasers, isolationists, enemy agents and muddleheads would seize upon his every move to impede the march of the aggressors as a basis for charging him with aiming at dictatorship and scheming to send American boys to die on foreign soil. He therefore moved slowly and cautiously in the expectation that the impact of events and the boiling fermentation of public talk would ultimately lead the nation to sanction measures which he hoped would not be too little and
LOO late.
The fall of France created the conditions necessary for the first ,tep. William Allen White's "Committee to Defend America by \iding the Allies" grew by leaps and bounds throughout the
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country. Under the direction of Clark Eichelberger it exercised vast influence in arousing the public and mobilizing pressure on Congress, despite the outcries of a few Congressmen that it was a "committee to get America into war." Under its auspices General John J. Pershing made a radio plea on June 8 for "unlimited quantities" of aircraft, guns and munitions to the Allies. But Senator Claude Pepper's motion to authorize the immediate dispatch of army planes was voted down in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 22-1. Senator Key Pittman, silvery chairman of the Committee,^ urged a month later that the British Government "end Hitler's ambition for world conquest" by abandoning the British Isles. After reflection and a talk with the President, however, he opined that an "understanding" between the British and American fleets might "localize Hitler in Europe." On June 6 a trickle of army planes to the AUies began by virtue of Presidential exercise of statutory authority to exchange old planes for new ones, with the manufacturers willing enough to sell the traded-in goods to new customers. In his address at the University of Virginia on June 10, denouncing the Duce's "stab-in-theback," Roosevelt stated a new policy:
Perception of danger, danger to our institutions may come slowly or it may come with a rush and a shock as it has to the people of the United I States in the past few months. In this perception of danger, danger in a world wide areait has come to us clearly and overwhelminglywe perceive the peril in a world wide arena, an arena that may become so narrowed that only the Americas will retain the ancient faiths. Some indeed still hold to the now somewhat obvious delusion that we of the United States can safely permit the United States to become a lone island, a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force. Such ! an island may be the dream of those who still talk and vote as isolationists. Such an island represents to me and to the overwhelming majority of ( Americans today a helpless nightmare, the helpless nightmare of a people i without freedom; yes, the nightmare of a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the con-1 temptuous, unpitying masters of other continents. It is natural also that we should ask ourselves how now we can prevent the building of thati prison and the placing of ourselves in the midst of it. Let us not hesitateall of usto proclaim certain truths. Overwhelm-i ingly we, as a nation,and this applies to all the other American nations 1 Senator Pittman died on November lo, 1940, and was succeeded as chairmani of the Committee by Senator Walter F. George of Georgia.
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are convinced that military and naval victory for the gods of force and hate would endanger the institutions of democracy in the Western vi'orld, and that equally, therefore, the whole of our sympathy lies with those nations that are giving their life blood in combat against these forces. . . . In our, in our unity, in our American unity, we will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. All roads leading to the accomplishment of these objectives must be kept clear of obstructions. We will not slow down or detour. Signs and signals call for speedfull speed ahead. . . . I call for effort, courage, sacrifice, devotion. Granting the love of freedom, all of these are possible. Andand the love of freedom is still fierce, still steady in the nation today.
Congratulatory telegrams poured into the White House. Colonel Henry L. Stimson declared on June 18 that the world "cannot endure permanently half slave and half free . . . America can cling to the dreams of a mistaken fiction of neutrality no longer applicable to her interest or her safety; she can leave the British fleet to its fate and face the consequences of a future which may leave her virtually defenseless to a Fascist attack. . . . Or she can frankly realize that now as for many years past our own immediate safety depends in part upon the continuance of British sea power, and she can lend her resources to make our joint sea power effective for that purpose." The former Secretary of State urged repeal of the Neutrality Act, full access to all American ports by British and French vessels and prompt dispatch of planes and arms "if necessary in our own ships and under convoy." He also urged military conscription and condemned defeatism. "I believe that if we use our brains and curb our prejudices, we can, by keeping command of the sea, beat her [Germany] as we did in 1918." Wendell Willkie, also committed to aid to the Allies, asserted at the same time that "we must stay out of war. . . . No man has the right to use the great powers of the Presidency to lead the people indirectly into war." When Roosevelt on June 20 named Stimson as Secretary of War and another distinguished Republican, Colonel Frank Knox, editor of The Chicago Daily News, as Secretary of the Navy, the Repubhcan National Committee "read out" both men from the party. Material aid "short of war" could not save France, since France
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was beyond saving by any American action. Even a declaration of war could have done no more than to strengthen Reynaud's hand against the Munichmen and enable him to continue hostilities from the colonies. In his plea to Roosevelt of June 10 he pledged continued resistance in the provinces and French possessions and asked for all aid "short of an expeditionary force." In his reply, released June 15, the President extended admiration and sympathy and promised "redoubled efforts" to give material aid. But "only the Congress" could make military commitments. Congress would commit itself to do nothing beyond frantic rearmament. Most Republicans and many Democrats in both Houses gave aid not to the Allies but to the obstructionists who were bent upon preventing aid to the Allies. The President's efforts to transfer a number of small torpedo boats were abandoned after the Attorney General cast doubt on their legality and the Senate Naval Affairs Committee introduced a measure (passed June 28, 1940) designed to forbid any executive transfer of naval vessels. Democratic Chairman David I. Walsh of Massachusetts asked: "Who in God's name thought that these contracts for our own protection would be modified or changed in order to assist one side or the other, or all sides, of belligerents at war? . . . The Committee has inserted into the bill . . . every possible safeguard to see that there is not in the future any attempt made to lessen our defenses so far as the navy is concerned." The collapse of France and the possible defeat of Britain meant far less to the Senator than the approbation of his Irish constituents who, like their neutral kinsmen in Eire, were ruled by the goddess of doom disguised in the garments of Anglophobia. The level of awareness exhibited at the National Conventions i was scarcely higher. The certainty that America in 1940 would I be even more paralyzed than usual by its quadrennial election campaign entered into Axis calculations. The hopes of the Caesars 1 were almost, although not quite, realized. Both Conventions i sought to capitalize on pro-Ally and anti-war sentiment. Both platforms, in accordance with honored custom, were collections of "weasel words" designed to please everybody and offend nobody.^ But the candidates were of one mind as to the necessity of i
1 Democratic: "The American people are determined that war, raging in Europe, Asia, and Africa shall not come to America. We will not participate ini foreign wars, and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight ini
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all possible aid to Britain. The Republican convention nominated Wendell L. Willkie and Charles L. McNaiy on June 28, the Democratic convention Franklin D. Roosevelt and Henry A. Wallace on July 18. The President and his opponent both pledged themselves to "keep America out of war," to rearm for "defense" only, to abstain from sending American troops overseas. Some Republicans, ranging from a few industrialists to John L. Lewis of the C.I.O., declared that the President's record showed him to be a "war-monger" and that his candidacy for a third term revealed him to be a potential "dictator." Some Democrats acforeign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack. W e favor and shall rigorously enforce and defend the Monroe Doctrine. The direction and aim of our foreign policy has been, and will continue to be, the security and defense of our own land and the maintenance of its peace. . . . Weakness and unpreparedness invite aggression. We must be so strong that no possible combination of powers would dare to attack us. We propose to provide America with an invmcible air force, a navy strong enough to protect all our sea coasts and our national interests and a fully equipped and mechanized army. . . . In self-defense and in good conscience, the world's greatest democracy cannot afford heartlessly or in a spirit of appeasement to ignore the peace-loving and liberty-loving peoples wantonly attacked by ruthless aggressors. We pledge to extend to these peoples all the material aid at our command, consistent with law and not inconsistent with the interest of our own national self-defense, all to the end that peace and international good faith may yet emerge triumphant." Republican: "The zero hour is here. America must prepare at once to defend our shores, our homes, our lives and our most cherished ideals. . . . Our national defense must be so strong that no unfriendly Power shall ever set foot on American soil. To assure this strength our national economy, the sure basis of America's defense, must be free of unwarranted government interference. . . . The Republican Party is firmly opposed to involving this nation in foreign war. . . . The Republican Party stands for Americanism, preparedness and peace. We accordingly fasten upon the New Deal full responsibiUty for our unpreparedness and for the consequences of involvement in war. We declare for the prompt, orderly, and realistic building of our national defense to the point at which we shall be able not only to defend the United States, its possessions and essential outposts from foreign attack, but also efficiently to uphold in war the Monroe Doctrine. To this task the Republican Party pledges itself when entrusted with lational authority. In the meantime, we shall support all necessary and proper defense measures proposed by the Administration in its belated effort to make ip for lost time; but we deplore explosive utterances by the President directed it other governments, which serve to imperil our peace, and we condemn all xecutive acts and proceedings which might lead to war without the authoriation of the Congress of the United States. Our sympathies have been prooundly disturbed by invasion of unoffending countries and of disaster to nalons whose ideals most closely resemble our own. We favor the extension to all leoples fighting for liberty, or whose liberty is threatened, of such aid as shall .ot be in violation of international law or inconsistent with the requirements of ur own national defense."
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cused Willkie of being the Axis candidate and a potential appeaser. The tumult and the shouting brought comfort to the Caesars. If they hoped for Roosevelt's defeat (Herbert L. Matthews, NYT, was expelled from Italy for saying so), their hopes rested less on any assumption that Willkie's sympathies and probable policies would be different from Roosevelt's than on the assumption that they had all to gain and nothing to lose by a two months' inter-regnum in the United States, to be followed by the trial-and-error fumbling which every new leader of necessity indulges in. American diplomatic moves during the early summer were carefully confined to irrelevancies. By the end of August the release of American war stocks to Britain had practically ceased. Senator Walsh, who conceded that the "two ocean" navy could not be completed before 1946 and that the United States, if it lost control of the seas, could be defeated without invasion, continued his obstructionism. The United States had the largest destroyer fleet in the world. Britain was in desperate need of destroyers. American policy was to give all possible aid to Britain "short of war." But no American destroyers were made available I during June, July, or August. On July 23 Sumner Welles denounced the "dehberate annihilation" of the Baltic States: "From the days when the peoples of these Republics first gained their i independent and democratic form of government the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-1 government with deep and sympathetic interest." This statement I was strange in view of the fact that the United States, alone among | the Great Powers, had withheld recognition from the Baltic States 1 (in the name of preserving the "territorial integrity" of Russia) I for five years after they first gained their independent and demo-i cratic form of government. At the Second Consultative Meeting, of ministers of foreign affairs of the American RepubUcs at Ha vana, July 20-30, arrangements were made for Pan-Americar economic collaboration and for a provisional international admin istration of colonial territories in the Western Hemisphere in th event of threats of a transfer of sovereignty. In the Far East the United States moved hesitantly towart goals which were unclear. Hull condemned the Anglo-Japanest agreement of July 17. London Hfted eyebrows since the Unite* States in 1939 supplied 65% of Japanese oil imports and 85% o
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Japanese imports of scrap iron and steel. Tentative and partial embargos were imposed during July under the terms of the May Act, ostensibly designed to conserve resources for "national defense." Tokio expressed resentment. Further friction ensued when American forces sought to take over part of the Shanghai International Settlement, following British evacuation in mid-August. For many years three out of every four Americans had favored aid to China and an embargo on exports of war materials to Japan. But nine out of ten Americans wished to "keep out of war" in the Far East. The August Fortune poll showed only 17% willing to fight to prevent Japan from seizing the East Indies. In all of these moves there was no sign as yet that Americans were in process of achieving any effective integration of their conflicting desires or that their Government dared to take any effective action in support of China and Britain and in opposition to the Triplice if "effectiveness" should require the assumption of obvious risks and responsibilities. Both candidates for the Presidency tacitly recognized that Americans would not willingly risk war until their hemisphere was invaded, their cities bombed, their houses burned over their heads. Both knew that it would then be too late to fight. Both knew that the fall of Britain would render America defenseless in a world of enemies capable of outbuilding and outarming the United States on land and sea and in the air. Yet both felt obliged to make no mention of unpleasant realities and to extend reassuring promises. The only living Republican ex-President bestirred himself with the best of motives to contribute to Britain's defeat by breaking the blockade of Nazi Europe. On August 10 Herbert Hoover revealed that his European Food Distribution Commission was negotiating with London through Hugh Gibson and with Berlin through John Hartigan to supply food to the vanquished in Poland, Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium. "There are 18,000,000 persons in the four countries," he declared, "who are going to die unless food is gotten to them at once." He urged that Germany agree not to take any of the produce of these lands and permit controlled imports and distribution. He urged that the British "agree that ships carrying cargoes solely of food for these peoples should be allowed to pass their blockade so long as the guarantees are observed." It apparently did not occur 10 him that the plan would defeat the purpose of the British block-
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ade and would be of enormous aid to the Reich whose authorities were already taking possession of the food stores and livestock of the conquered and announcing that they had no obligation to feed them. Nazi spokesmen voiced interest in the plan. British spokesmen informed Mr. Gibson that it could not be considered since the German war industries were using potatoes for fuel alcohol, fats for nitroglycerine, and milk for aircraft plastics. Sumner Welles indicated on August 12 that he had no comment to make on the Hoover proposal and would have none in thei future. On August 17 Berlin proclaimed a "total blockade" of the British Isles by sea and air and disclaimed all responsibility for the safety of the refugee-laden army transport American Legion^ outward bound from Petsamo, if it persisted in a course through mine-strewn seas. The humanitarian impulses which Mr. Hoover symbolized found Congressional expression in an amendment to the Neutrality Act, August 27, permitting American vessels to evacuate refugee children, thereby facilitating (it was hoped) a large-scale transfer of British children to the United States. But Congress, fearing that attack upon such vessels might "drag America into war," specified that no such voyages would be lawful unless all belligerents granted "safe conduct." This was unobtainable. Britain lacked war vessels as convoys. Congress did not dream of authorizing American war vessels to protect refugee ships. Churchill therefore ordered a cessation of transfers of children after several score had lost their lives in submarine attacks. While Kluxers and Bundsmen held a joint rally and marched to Nazi songs at Camp Nordland, N . J. on August 18, Ambassador William C. Bullitt ^ spoke in Philadelphia in warning to his countrymen against the strategy of treason by which the French Republic was done to death:
. . . The destruction of the British Navy would be the turning point of , our Atlantic Maginot Line. . . . What stands today between the Americas 1 and the unleashed dictatorships? The British fleet and the courage of the British people. . . . It is as clear as anything on this earth that the United I States will not go to war, but it is equally clear that war is coming toward the Americas. . . . On the loth day of last May the people of France were as confident as are the people of the United States today that their country could not be conquered. . . T am certain that if Great Britain is de1 Rear Admiral William D. Leahy was named Ambassador to Vichy on November 23 after Pershing declined on grounds of health.
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feated the attack will come, and that all the strength of this nation will be neededmobilized, organized, equipped and readyif we are to parry it and save the independence of our country. Why are we sleeping, Americans? When are we going to wake up? . . . Our fate and the fate of our children depends on what each one of us doesnow.
Senator Clark of Idaho declared Bullitt's address "very little short of treason." Senator Clark of Missouri said, "If Ambassador Bullitt should succeed in getting us into the war, he will find a safe place for himself to hide out." Senator Wheeler accused him of being a friend of Molotov. Congressman John Schafer of Wisconsin urged that Bullitt be "locked up." These voices represented a minority. But in Congress and outside of it those who feared for America's safety if America permitted Britain to be conquered found few vigorous spokesmen aside from a handful of Administration officials, academicians and journalists. These Cassandras were invariably vilified by the isolationists and were incapable of stirring to relevant action the inert mass of legislators and citizens whose blind fear of war caused them to believe that America was in no danger or could somehow be defended after the arrival of an invader. Under these conditions the President had the alternatives of doing nothing, apart from urging measures of defense which he knew could never by themselves defend America, or of exercising his executive discretion without regard for Congress. He chose the latter course. On August 18 the President and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada, attending army manoeuvers in northern New York, announced their agreement "that a permanent joint board on defense shall be set up at once by the two countries" to "commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems" and "consider in the broad sense the defenses of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere." Since public response was favorable, Roosevelt took another step which was kept secret until completed. On September 3 he sent a communication to Congress:
I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State on Sept. 2, 1940, under which this government has acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland and in the Islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Antigua and
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Peace by the Sword
in British Guiana; also a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated Aug. 27,1940, regarding my authority to consummate this arrangement. The right to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are giftsgenerously given and gladly received. The other bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for fifty of our over-age destroyers. This is not inconsistent in any sense with our status of peace. Still less is it a threat against any nation. It is an epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger. Preparation for defense is an inalienable prerogative of a sovereign State. Under present circumstances this exercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance of our peace and safety. This is the most important action in the reinforcement of our national defense that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase. Then, as now, considerations of safety from overseas attack were fundamental. The value to the Western Hemisphere of these outposts of security is beyond calculation. Their need has long been recognized by our country, and especially by those primarily charged with the duty of charting and organizing our own naval and military defense. They are essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico and our own Eastern and Gulf seaboards. Their consequent importance in hemispheric defense is obvious. For these reasons I have taken advantage of the present opportunity to acquire them.
Lothian's note defined the leaseholds on the Avalon Peninsula, on the south coast of Newfoundland, and in Bermuda, granted "freely and without consideration," as well as the West Indies bases, granted "in exchange for naval and military equipment and material." AU the leases were for ninety-nine years and "free from all rent or charges" save compensations to owners of private property needed for the bases. Hull's note "gladly" accepted these "generous" proposals and agreed to transfer fifty 1200-ton destroyers. Robert Jackson's opinion was a masterpiece of legal I casuistry, interpreting statutes to mean things never intended by [ them and finding the transaction consonant with international I law by the simple expedient of ignoring the distinction between private and governmental transfers of arms from neutrals to belrenewed assurances that the British fleet would not be surrendered! ligerents. A simultaneous exchange of communications conveyed I or scuttled if the British Isles became untenable. This pledge was of dubious value since a successful invasion of England would
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bring into power a Petain or a Laval who would do the victor's bidding, while the demoralized seamen might be expected to do what was needful for the safety of their famihes rather than for the defense of a remote and neutral America. Since the bargain was an "executive agreement," requiring no legislation or appropriations. Congress was outflanked. The anguished outcries of America's Munichmen were less loud than expected. Willkie endorsed the purpose of the agreement, but found it "regrettable" that the President had not obtained prior approval from Congress, (He knew that no such approval would have been forthcoming, for his own partisans in Congress invariably voted by large majorities in favor of all measures in foreign affairs which he opposed and against all measures which he favored.) Britain registered joy, although Churchill warned that "it would be a mistake to try to read into the official notes more than the documents bear on their faces." The Axis press interpreted the bargain as a further step in the disintegration of the British Empire. No formal protest was made to Washington, despite the flagrant violation of tradition conceptions of neutrality, lest interventionist sentiment in America be increased.^
1 On August 20, in Commons Churchill had hinted at the impending agreement: "Some months ago we came to the conclusion that the interests of the United States and of the British Empire both required that the United States should have facilities for the naval and air defense of the Western hemisphere against the attack of a Nazi Power which might have acquired temporary but lengthy control of a large part of Western Europe and its resources. We have therefore decided, spontaneously and without being asked or being offered any inducement, to inform the Government of the United States that we should be glad to place such defense facilities at their disposal by leasing suitable sites in our Transatlantic possessions for their greater security against the unmeasured dangers of the future. . . . Undoubtedly this process means that the two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. For my own part, looking out upon the future, I do not view the process with any misgivings. No one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps roUing along. Let it roll. Let it roll on in full flood, inexorable, irresistible, to broader lands and better days." The question of whether the destroyer transfer was contrary to international law was discussed at length in the October 1940 number of The American Journal of International Law by Harold W. Briggs, Edwin Borchard, Charles Fenwick and Quincy Wright. All agreed that the transaction was wholly incompatible with the obhgations of neutrality. Quincy Wright argued cogently, however, that the United States was no longer a "neutral," since Germany and Italy were not lawful belligerents but "aggressors," whose violations of law released other States from the obligations of traditional neutrality.
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Peace by the Sivord
American action "short of war" was now "stronger than mere words." The Caesars were not slow in replying. Throughout the summer the Fascist press warned America against departing from "neutraUty" and hinted that the United States, if well behaved, would be allowed to share in the partition of the British Empire. The Fiihrer, however, was not in the habit of answering challenges with rhetoric. Neither was he confident that the immobilization of America could be assured by America's pacifists, isolationists and appeasers. In diplomacy, as in war, a potential enemy can best be paralyzed by outflanking operations. Even the most hard-headed of realists in America might shrink from war on two fronts. T o create the threat of such a war was not beyond the Fiihrer's skill. His reply to the destroyer transfer was the Triple Alliance of September 27, 1940. The immediate diplomatic background of the new pact is still a secret of the Caesars. The larger background was writ large for all the world to see. The original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 was designed to befuddle the democracies with the chloroform of "anti-Bolshevism" in order to afford to the Reich ample time to prepare the conquest of Europe and to allow Japan an opportunity to continue the conquest of Asia. Step by step the flag of the Rising Sun moved southward: Canton and Hankow, October 1938; Hainan, February 1939; the Spratley Islands, March 1939; Kwangtung and Kwangsi, adjacent to IndoChina, November 1939; demands on France for "inspectors" in Indo-China, June 1940. On September 22, after threats, border skirmishes, "accidental" invasions and bombings, a Vichy-Tokio pact was signed permitting the establishment of three Japanese air bases in northern Indo-China and the dispatch of Japanese troops to the French colonies. Governor-General Jean Decoux described the agreement as "one of the greatest marks of confidence one country can give to another," while General Maurice Martin, local French Commander, said it was "the first manifesta-1 tion of a durable friendship between France and Japan." Secretary Hull complained that "the status quo is being upset and this is being achieved under duress" despite repeated American statements "in disapproval and in deprecation of such procedures."! Meanwhile Tolao had been stirred to indignation by Roosevelt's proclamation of July 2 (under the "Act to Expedite the Strength-
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ening of National Defense" of the same date), licensing exports of machine tools, various chemicals and non-ferrous metals; his order of July 2 5 licensing oil products and scrap metal; and his order of July 31 embargoing exports of aviation gasoline to countries outside the Western hemisphere. Nazi efforts to conclude a Japanese alliance finally met with success, thanks to the secret mission to Tokio of Ribbentrop's special envoy, Heinrich von Stahmer. Konoye and Matsuoka perceived the utility of participating in the division of the AngloFrench booty and confronting the United States with a joint "hands off" warning applicable to both Europe and Asia. Having secured Indo-China from Vichy (i.e. from Berlin) as a first payment in advance, they were willing to sign. On September 27 Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Ambassador Saburo Kuruso attached their signatures in Hitler's Chancellery to a document:
T h e governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavors along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly, the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows: 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in estabUshment of a new order in Europe. 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia. 3. Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. T h e y further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. 4. W i t h the view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, members which are to be appointed by the respective governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay. 5. Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in
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any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia. 6. The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force ten years from the date of its coming into force. At the proper time before expiration of said term the high contracting parties shall at the request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal. In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this pact and have affixed hereto their signatures. Done in triplicate at Berlin, the 27th day of September, 1940, in the eighteenth year of the Fascist era, corresponding to the 27th day of the ninth month of the fifteenth year of Showa [the reign of Emperor Hirohito]. Emperor Hirohito explained that Japan's mission was "to enhance justice on earth and to make the world one household. . . . W e fervently hope for a cessation of disturbances and hope a restoration of peace will be realized as swiftly as possible. Accordingly we commanded our Government to deliberate on the matter of mutual assistance and cooperation with the governments of Germany and Italy, which share the views and aspirations of our empire. W e are deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between these three Powers." Kurusu opined: The final aim of this pact is the establishment of general and lasting world peace based on right and justice. It is self-evident that we cannot deny our collaboration to those countries who share our views and endeavors, nor does this pact in any way affect the present political situation existing between Japan, Germany and Italy on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. The chivalrous spirit of Japan was originally symbolized by the sword, but the essential principle of the proper handling of the sword does not consist in unthinkingly killing human beings but in protecting them with the sword. I feel impelled to express the hope that this pact, in the hands of the champions of justice in Japan, Germany and Italy, may become a sword I in the hand of the righteous warrior and will thus contribute to the reestablishment of universal peace. Ciano agreed: "These Powers have no intention of challenging [ or threatening anyone. Their pact, as confirmed by today's treaty,, aims at preventing any unnecessary extension of the present conflict, and the bloc ensuing from union of the military and civil i
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forces of our three empires represents an insurmountable rampart that will shatter every attempt to spread the conflict beyond its present confines." Ribbentrop assented: "The pact which has been signed is a military alliance between three of the mightiest States on earth. It is to serve toward bringing about a just order both within the European sphere and also in the greater Asiatic sphere. Above all, it is to help to bring peace to the world as quickly as possible. Every State which meets this bloc with the intention of helping restore peaceful relations between peoples is welcomed uprightly and gratefully and will be invited to cooperate in the political and economic reorganization. Any State, should it harbor the intention of mixing in the final phase of the solution of these problems in Europe or Eastern Asia or attacking one State signatory to this three Power pact, will have to take on the entire concentrated might of three nations with more than 250 million inhabitants. That means that this pact will, in any case, help reestablish peace or continue war." The United States was thus menaced with war in both oceans if it "attacked" the Axis in Europe or Japan in Asia. The term was left undefined. The implication was that any aid to Britain or China which promised to be effective in cheating the Triplice of victory would be regarded as "an attack." Konoye declared on the 28th that Germany, Italy and Japan were "ready to display the power of their military alliance in case of necessity" in order to help create "a new era in the entire world." So long as Britain and China resisted, the Triplice could not wage war on America. But its leaders hoped and believed that America would be deterred by the threat from increasing aid to China and Britainor, at worst, would delay its aid until it should be too little and too late. This expectation was realized only in part in the weeks immediately following the signature of the Pact of Berlin. Hull asserted on September 27 that the alliance "does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years." On September 2 5 the ExportImport Bank announced another loan of $25,000,000 to China. On the 26th the President imposed an embargo, to be effective October 16, on all exports of scrap iron and steel except to Britain and the Western hemisphere. Sumner Welles, however, declared in Cleveland on September 28 that the way was still open for an
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"equitable settlement" with Japan. "There is no problem presented which could not be solved through negotiation, provided there existed a sincere desire on the part of those concerned to find an equitable and fair solution which would give just recognition to the rights and the real interests of all concerned." On October 17 Downing Street, with Washington's approval, reopened the Burma Road to arms for the troops of China. Hong Kong remained closed. Japanese bombers, operating from IndoChina, sought to smash bridges and culverts along the route through Yunnan to halt supplies coming by way of Rangoon and Mandalay. Tokio encouraged Thailand to press the French authorities in Indo-China for territorial concessions. By the end of October, however, a Chinese offensive had recaptured Nanning and driven the invaders from Kwangsi. On October 8 the State Department had urged all Americans in the Far East to return home and arranged for the dispatch of three liners to speed the evacuation. Tokio registered anxiety.^ Sumner Welles conferred
1 The contrast in tone in Japanese statements before and after the Washington action of October 8 was striking. BEFORE: Prince Konoye, Oct. 4: "If the United States refuses to understand the real intention of Japan, Germany and Italy and persists in challenging those powers, in the belief that the pact is a hostile action, there will be no other course open to it than to go to war." On the same day Mr. Suma, the Foreign Office spokesman, asserted that recent moves by the United States in the Far East "clearly indicate that it is taking step after step in a direction that may precipitate it into the vortex of armed conflict." Also on October 4, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in a news interview, stated that Japan would declare war "if the United States entered the European struggle." "I fling this challenge to America. If she in her contentment is going to stick blindly and stubbornly to the status quo in the Pacific, then we will fight America. For it would be better to perish than to maintain the status quo." Hsin Min Pao, a Japanese-owned paper published in Peiping: "The American army is weak and the quality of her soldiers poor. They know more about comfort than about fighting and are, moreover, not brave enough to die . . . As to the talk of America hampering Japan's policy in East Asia, that is a pure joke . . . Should America, with her usual hypocrisy, attempt to interfere with the reconstruction of East Asia, we peoples of East Asia will fight her with all our resources and to the last man. It will be very unfortunate for her should she lightheartedly venture to embark on a trial of strength with us. After all, what have we to fear from her?" AFTER: On October 9, Mr. Suma declared: "There is no reason to be so nervous. We wish Americans would understand that there is nothing to be alarmed about." Matsuoka, October 10: "The tripartite pact was not entered into with the intention of directing it 'against' the United States, but was directed, if at all, 'for' the United States. The parties to the pact wished earnestly that such a powerful nation as the United States, in particular, and all other nations at pres-
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with Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky and released several delayed consignments of machine tools for the U.S.S.R. The Metals Reserve Company, subsidiary of the R.F.C., arranged to buy $30,000,000 worth of tungsten from China. Aerial defenses of the Philippine Islands were strengthened. The navy disclosed plans to purchase 50 ships as fleet auxiliaries. By early October Congress had appropriated 12.4 billion dollars for defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, as compared with 8.4 bilhons for 1918. Congress had likewise authorized the President (Augustiy) to call up the National Guard and Reserve Officers for one year's active service in the Western Hemisphere or United States possessions, and had for the first time during peace in the history of the Republic introduced conscription in the Compulsory Military Training and Service Law (September 16) making all men between 21 and 3 5 liable for military duty. The "Two Ocean Navy" bill of July 19 authorized a 70% increase in sea forces. These measures were impressive to Berlin, Rome, and Tokio. The more important military steps, however, would require years for completion. Other moves were not all they seemed to be. No agreement with Britain for the use of Singapore and other Far Eastern bases could be entered into before election lest timid voters be frightened. No embargo on imports from Japan was imposed, although a cessation of purchases of silk would seriously cripple Japanese economy. The embargo on metal exports did not include old ships, steel rails, class A steel, or other forms of iron and steel other than scrap. All forms of oil products other than high-octane gasoline could still be sold to Japanese purchasers.^ Under these conditions the Japanese war-lords, whose military and naval machine had for years been built, equipped and fueled from American and British sources, could not be expected to take American gestures seriouslythe more so as none of the major speakers for either party during the election campaign deemed it expedient to refer directly to the new Triple Alliance. The Presient neutral would not be involved in the European war or enter by any chance into a conflict with Japan because of the China incident or otherwise." Cf. the excellent articles by Chas. A. Beard, G. Nye Steiger, Denna Frank Fleming and Herbert Heaton in Events, November, 1940. 1 Major George Fielding Eliot (The New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1940): "Is this an embargo, or is it a joke? . . . Either we should embargo all steel and iron to Japan, or none."
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dent went no further than his Dayton address of October 12: "No combination of dictator countries in Europe and Asia will stop the help we are giving to almost the last free people fighting to hold them at bay. . . . Our decision is made. We will continue . . . to help those who resist aggression and who now hold the aggressors far from our shores." The Babel of voices during the last week of the campaign might well have persuaded the tyrants of the Triplice that the leaders of America were irresponsible charlatans engaged in the collective befuddlement of a nation of imbeciles. This impression would have been erroneous, but few spokesmen for either party managed to rise above the lowest common denominators of non-rational fears and hopes among the masses.-^ Thus:
1 Major General John F. O'Ryan, speaking at the Engineers' Club of New York (NYT 10.3140) displayed appreciable awareness of some of the facts of life which were taboo to all candidates for public office: "If Hitler promptly vanquishes Britain he will succeed in reducing the United States to a second class Power without any actual invasion of this country. . . . The consequences to the people of Britain, were they to sink their fleet at the last moment or transfer it to the United Staes, would be so punitively dreadful to a distracted people that their new leaders, chosen by acclaim to accomplish as best they can the restoration of livable conditions, will repudiate any plan or agreement which would add to the misery of the population . . . Hitler will use his sea power to levy upon and collect from American major cities on the Atlantic seaboard heavy indemnities for relief from air bombardment for the ensuing two years. In view of the inferiority of our naval forces, their dispersion and the fact that these cities (incredible as it may seem to responsible-minded citizens) have no anti-aircraft defenses and will not have for a year or more to come, I doubt whether their populations, by virtue of any Spartan willingness to do so, would suffer fruitlessly as an alternative to compliance with the Hitler demands . . . Let every American organize his friends to send telegrams to members of Congress urging legislation with the least possible delay directing that a substantial part of our air force (bombers, interceptors and fighters) and their well-trained personnel, together with additional destroyers, light cruisers and submarines be sent at once to insure the security of the British fleet, to keep open the supply lanes to and from British ports and to cooperate with the British defense generally. W e need send no troops. They could not be used. Fortunately Hitler can do nothing effective against us, except rave, while the British fleet remains under British control." Colonel Lindbergh, while not endorsing either candidate, did his best to persuade his fellow citizens that they should do nothing to resist "the wave of the future." He declared at Yale (NYT 10.31.40): "I believe very firmly that our involvement in this war would be a disaster both for our own country and for Europe . . . It would confuse and aggravate our internal problems, which are critical enough without war . . . The relationships of European countries cannot be solved through American interference in their affairs. . . . We are not in a position to enter this war successfully. . . . If democracy is to be saved, it will not be by the forceful imposition of our ideals abroad, but by the example of their successful operation at home. . . . This talk of invasion over
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J O H N L. L E W I S : Those who have studied the public addresses of the President . . . will understand his motivation and his objective. It is war. . . . Reason would seem to prompt a course of national action designed to restrict and abate the war, rather than to expand and intensify its scope and destruction. . . . Personal craving for power, the overwhelming abnormal and selfish craving for increased power, is a thing to alarm and dismay. . . . America needs no superman. J O H N K E N N E D Y : There is no more harmful step which could be taken from the viewpoint of Great Britain than our declaration of war. W E N D E L L W I L L K I E : Aid to Britain to the limits of prudence for our own safety is essential. . . . W e are against sending our boys into any war other than the defense of our own country. T h e Third T e r m Candidate has also pledged himself to peace. . . . On the basis of his past performance with pledges to the people, w h y shouldn't we expect to be at war by April 1941 if he is elected? . . . Appeasement is the surest way to war. N o American would stand for appeasement. . . . I give you the pledgeno American soldier boy will be sent to the shambles of any European trench. F R A N K L I N R O O S E V E L T : Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign war. . . . T h e purpose of our defense is defense. . . . T h e British have now asked for permission to negotiate again with American manufacturers for 12,000 additional planes. I have asked that the request be given most sympathetic consideration. . . . W e are telling the world that we are free, and we intend to remain free and at peace. H E R B E R T H O O V E R : W e want to keep out of other peoples' wars. . . . Mr. Roosevelt began steadily to involve the United States by dabbling in foreign power politics. . . . Mr. Roosevelt has been continuously sticking pins in tigers all over the world, . . , T o uphold moral standards in the world does not require playing with power politics. . . . Does any sane person think that if the'English were to call for an armistice they would hand their fleet over to the Germans? . . . It must be obvious to any cool-headed person that this country is not in any present danger of invasion. . . . If we are to engage in war we must create a dictatorship at home. . . . W e can stay out if we have the resolute will to do so. . . . I am not an isolationist. I am not an interventionist. I am neither a militarist nor a pacifist, I am not for appeasement, I am concerned with America first . . . Arctic air routes and South American jungles has arisen from a combination of propaganda, hysteria and party politics. . . . Aviation has strengthened our position." Lindbergh's views were substantially identical with the position taken during the campaign by the Communist candidates, Earl Browder and James Ford, and by the Socialist candidates, Norman Thomas and Maynard Kreuger. This position was heartily endorsed by all Nazi and Fascist organizations in the United States.
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Such fantasies and confusions were a product neither of malice nor ignorance but of the obvious circumstance that the mass of Americans reacted toward Europe's tragedy and America's danger not through trial-and-error experimentation (which might have enabled them to arrive at the "right"i.e. the effectivesolution), but through two contradictory and inconsistent sets of stereotypes. The key symbols of one set of responses were: DownWith Hitler Down With Stalin DownWith Fascism CommunismNazismDownWithDictatorshipDownWithAggressionHelp DemocracyAidBritainHeavenHelpUsIfHitlerWins. The key symbols of the other mode of adjustment were: DownWith War Save Neutrality Save OurBoys AvoidForeign Entanglements Keep Out of EuropeTheYanksAre Not Coming Save AmericaFirstDon't FightForEnglandPromiseUsPeace. In their pure form these two kinesthetic substitutes for the "real" nature of the world cancelled one another out and led to political paralysis and failurethe equivalents in mass action of individual frustration, anxiety and neurosis. Messrs. Willkie and Roosevelt partially resolved the conflict by advocating aid to Britain "short of war" and heavy rearmament for "peace." This formula, viewed objectively, was irrelevant to diplomatic reality. Insistence that America could be made safe by passive "defense" at home and abstention from all "meddling" abroad was dangerously irrelevant to strategic realities. But the formula was political wisdom in terms of the unresolved struggle inside the soul of America. By the same token it was political wisdom for Republicans to accuse the Democrats of war-mongering, dictatorship and neglect of defense and for Democrats to accuse Republicans of appeasement, irresponsibility and neglect of defense. Through such competitive processes of manipulating conditioned reflexes the American electorate was moved to its decision of November 5, 1940. The re-election of President Roosevelt did not constitute any resolution of the schism within the hearts and minds of Americans.^ The bitter partisanship of the campaign perhaps deepened that schism. Whether appeals for unity, reinforced by the pressure of events, would resolve it remained to be seen. The result of the election indicated only that the majority of Americans, with no choice in the foreign policy presented to 1
1 The popular vote was 27,000,000 for Roosevelt, 22,000,000 for Willkie. The electoral vote was 449 to 82.
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them, had made a choice between two leaders and between divergent pictures of the future. Their choice suggested a preference for the control of economics by politics and a reluctance to return to the leadership of a business elite which was not yet ready, despite Mr. Willkie's bold vision and able leadership, to assume the open role of a governing group in a new society and in a new world.^ Whether the old elite would obstruct and paralyze the new, whether the new would antagonize and infuriate the old, whether the two could rebuild together a united nation, resolute and firm in the promotion of social justice, in the wise defense of its interests and in the willing assumption of its necessary responsibiHties in the worldall these were (questions which would find their answers in 1941.
3. D I L E M M A I N
MUSCOVY
The rule of Nemesis over the vast expanses of the Soviet Union was of a different order from her rule in America. The masses of men and women in Sovietland were not called upon periodically to express preferences among candidates for high office. They were not periodically entertained, frightened, cajoled, threatened and promised favors by competing politicians and propagandists. The muscle-sets and glandular secretions which they were expected to display in the presence of symbols of social significance were highly standardized. They were prepared for them by the higher medicine men of the Party in more or less palatable capsules and crammed down throats which swallowed willinglyor else! As in all the Caesar-States, the elite was stable and sharply defined. It elicited consent less by discussion and benefits than by force, mysticism and magic. The masses, relieved of the painful necessity of hesitating in the presence of alternatives,
1 An outstanding characteristic of the present epoch is the progressive disappearance of the business man from politics. In America President Hoover vâs the last national political leader recruited from the ranks of business. In Britain Mr. Chamberlain was the last, and in France M. Laval, long a corporation attorney with a large independent fortune. New leaders all over the world were sons of an old aristocracy (e.g., Churchill, Konoye and, with qualifications, Roosevelt), of a military caste (e.g., Franco, Chiang Kai-shek), or of a new and rising political elite recruited from proletarian or lower middle class strata (e.g., Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini). America's choice in 1940 was thus not dissimilar to that already made in other lands.
Dilemma in Muscovy
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them, had made a choice between two leaders and between divergent pictures of the future. Their choice suggested a preference for the control of economics by politics and a reluctance to return to the leadership of a business elite which was not yet ready, despite Mr. Willkie's bold vision and able leadership, to assume the open role of a governing group in a new society and in a new world.^ Whether the old elite would obstruct and paralyze the new, whether the new would antagonize and infuriate the old, whether the two could rebuild together a united nation, resolute and firm in the promotion of social justice, in the wise defense of its interests and in the willing assumption of its necessary responsibiHties in the worldall these were (questions which would find their answers in 1941.
3. D I L E M M A I N
MUSCOVY
The rule of Nemesis over the vast expanses of the Soviet Union was of a different order from her rule in America. The masses of men and women in Sovietland were not called upon periodically to express preferences among candidates for high office. They were not periodically entertained, frightened, cajoled, threatened and promised favors by competing politicians and propagandists. The muscle-sets and glandular secretions which they were expected to display in the presence of symbols of social significance were highly standardized. They were prepared for them by the higher medicine men of the Party in more or less palatable capsules and crammed down throats which swallowed willinglyor else! As in all the Caesar-States, the elite was stable and sharply defined. It elicited consent less by discussion and benefits than by force, mysticism and magic. The masses, relieved of the painful necessity of hesitating in the presence of alternatives,
1 An outstanding characteristic of the present epoch is the progressive disappearance of the business man from politics. In America President Hoover vâs the last national political leader recruited from the ranks of business. In Britain Mr. Chamberlain was the last, and in France M. Laval, long a corporation attorney with a large independent fortune. New leaders all over the world were sons of an old aristocracy (e.g., Churchill, Konoye and, with qualifications, Roosevelt), of a military caste (e.g., Franco, Chiang Kai-shek), or of a new and rising political elite recruited from proletarian or lower middle class strata (e.g., Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini). America's choice in 1940 was thus not dissimilar to that already made in other lands.
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enjoyed the peace of soul which is known only to those who have all answers to all questions supplied to them and who never (or hardly ever) question the omniscience and omnipotence of their leaders. So perfect were the devices for mobilizing acquiescence that the leaders had no difficulty in commanding love of democracy and hatred of Hitler one year and love of Hitler and hatred of democracy the next. America's dilemma was a product of splitpersonality in masses whose assent was necessary for leadership and who had little eif ective leadership so long as they could come to no decisions consonant with their incompatible desires. Russia's dilemma was a product of inner doubt among leaders who, being officially all-wise and all-powerful, could never acknowledge doubt or error. The Soviet leaders had displayed unusual astuteness in playing the game of power, despite local blunders which were costly but not serioussave to those who suffered or died because of them. Yet their central error was not unhke that of the Munichmen, despite the brilhant successes of Stalin and the disastrous failures of Daladier and Chamberlain. This error cast its dark shadow over the steppes during the summer of 1940. T o stand aside while Britain was done to death would expose the Soviets to invasion and annihilation at the hands of the Axis. T o attack the Axis in the rear while Britain still fought might save Britain and insure the defeat of Italy and Germany. It might also promote an AngloGerman compromise peace at Russia's expense. Between these dangers the Kremlin vacillated. Its initial "solution" of the dilemma, albeit a temporary one and a futile one should the Axis crush Britain, was not dissimilar to America's solution. It consisted of affirming "neutraUty," arming to the teeth and securing control of bases, border areas and possible avenues of Fascist attack. These steps had to be limited in scope and had to be fantastically presented in Moscow as moves against Anglo-French "warmongers" taken in full collaboration with Berlin and Rome. They might otherwise have precipitated a premature rupture with the Axis. They had to be accepted in like guise in Rome and Berlin, since the Axis could not hope to conquer Britain if its forces, like those of Napoleon, were deflected eastward against Muscovy before all the West were finally subjugated. Thus a grim comedy
Dilemma in Muscovy
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played itself out in the East and moved toward a denouement as yet unpredictable. Since the fall of France increased the ultimate dangers to which the Soviet Union was exposed, Moscow at once accelerated its defensive measures. On June 10 Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys of Lithuania joined Premier Antonas Merkys in Moscow for discussion of new Soviet demands. On the same day the Reich and the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement to regulate "border incidents." Kaunas balked at the Kremlin's suggestion. An ultimatum was sent to Lithuania on June 15, alleging "outrages" against Red soldiers and a "plot" with Latvia and Estonia in violation of the mutual assistance pacts of 1939. Kaunas yielded. New Soviet armies poured in and took up positions along the East Prussian frontier. A new government "friendly" to Moscow replaced the old. The process was repeated in Latvia and Estonia on June 17. Berlin and Rome professed unconcern. Germany expelled Ralph Barnes of the 'New York Herald Tribune for reporting Nazi resentment over the Soviet action. On July 14 and 15 the voters of the three Baltic States "elected" new representativesfrom a single list approved by Moscow, with no opposition permitted. The incorporation of the three Sovietized Republics into the Soviet Union ensued in August. Dr. Alfred Bilmanis, the wise and genial Latvian Minister in Washington, joined his colleagues in refusing to recognize the change and declared brokenheartedly that Latvia and her neighbors had been "compelled to bow before force of arms, but every Latvian patriot hopes that justice and democracy will finally prevail and that Latvia will regain her independence and liberty. God bless Latvia!" ^ With elaborately "friendly" interest the Kremlin watched the moves of the Axis to compose disputes in eastern Europe. Sweden granted passage to German troops (unarmed) and ignored British protests. Rosenberg hailed the common Nordic front with the Reich. Rumania ousted British oil interests and increased the flow of supplies to Germany. Meanwhile on June 13 Moscow had appointed Arcady Lavrentiev, Minister to Bulgaria, as new Minister to Rumania. In alarm over possible Soviet designs, King Carol had sought reconciliation with the Iron Guard and looked to the Axis
1 Latvian Information 'Bulletin, issued by the Latvian Legation, Washington,
July 21, 1940.
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for protection. On June 21 he dissolved the "National Renaissance Front" and founded a single, anti-Semitic, totalitarian "Party of the Nation" headed by himself and open to the Iron Guardists. On June 25 Frank Kluckhohn (NYT) reported from Washington that "well informed diplomatic quarters" knew of a Nazi-Soviet agreement for Russian occupation of Bessarabia during the Axis attack on Britain. Two days later a Soviet ultimatum to Bucharest demanded the cession of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. The Rumanian Government ordered mobilization and looked pathetically to Berlin. The German Legation in Bucharest scored the Soviet move as a "British plot" to spread the war. Rome registered surprise and alarm. But the Axis press soon recovered an appearance of complacency and insisted that Stalin had acted in full accord with the Caesars. In a Tass communique of June 28, Molotov reviewed the "negotiations" and justified Soviet demands in terms of Ukrainian linguistic unity and reparation for the Rumanian "crime" of 1918. Rumania yielded at 11 a.m. June 28. Three hours later Soviet troops crossed the Dniester and hastily occupied all of the ceded territory after some confusion and sporadic violence. In panic lest Sofia and Budapest also seek to recover their "lost provinces," the Cabinet of George Tatarescu made a further bid for Axis support by announcing on July i the renunciation of the Anglo-French guarantee of Rumania's integrity. On July 4 he was displaced in the Premiership by Germanophile Ion Gigurtu in a Cabinet including six Iron Guardists and five followers of the late Octavian Goga. Six days later Foreign Minister Mikail Manoilescu made the empty gesture of announcing Rumania's withdrawal from the League of Nationsalready dead with the closing of its offices, the dismissal of the secretarial staff and the resignation of M. Avenol. These measures did not long save the remnants of Carol's realm. For the moment the Red Army halted at the Pruth and the mouth of the Danube. Peace in the Balkans was essential for the Axis offensive against Britain. On July 3 Wilhelmstrasse released new documents allegedly seized in France, revealing Anglo-French plans of March for bombing the Baku oil fields from Turkey. Ankara denounced the documents as a forgery. Moscow pretended to believe in their authenticity. On July 7 Ciano arrived in Berlin to confer with the Nazi leaders. On July i o he j oined Hitler and Ribbentrop at Munich in warning Teleki and Czaky that
Dilemma in Muscovy
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Magyar claims against Rumania must be deferred. Minister Viorel Tilea was recalled from London to Bucharest on July 25 while Downing Street recognized the "fundamental justice" of Bulgaria's claims to Dobrudja and authorized the seizure of Rumanian tankers at Port Said. London refused on August 2 to receive the new Rumanian Minister, Basil Stoica. On July 26 Hitler and Ribbentrop conferred with Gigurtu and Manoilescu at Castle Fuschl near Salzburg and at the Berghof. Bulgarian Premier Bogdan Philov and Foreign Minister Ivan Popov were received on the following day while the Rumanians went to Rome. Tiso and his aides came on the 28th. On the 29th it was announced in Bucharest that Rumania was "willing and ready" to cede territory "in principle" to Hungary and Bulgaria. Sofia and Budapest, however, insisted upon having it in more tangible form. The Caesars assented. The partition of Rumania followed under the circumstances already reviewed. Moscow had meanwhile exchanged ministers with Jugoslavia on June 24 (Milan Gavrilovich and Victor Plotnikov) and signed a new trade agreement with Finland on the 29th. Turkey had ordered partial mobilization after the Italian declaration of war, but was persuaded by considerations of discretion and possibly by advice from Moscow to refrain from entering the conflict. A new German-Turkish trade agreement was signed on June 13. A German-Greek trade agreement followed on the 28th. Rumors that Saracoglu would again go to Moscow failed to materialize. Premier Refik Say dam told Parliament on June 2 6 that Turkey would not enter the war. Soviet policy remained one of "watchful waiting." On July 17, it was reported that Sir Stafford Cripps had seen Stalin on the first of the month and had been told that the U.S.S.R. was determined to remain neutral and was unconcerned about German domination of Europe. On July 18 Regime Fascista in Rome had asserted: "Russia has too many other things to think about. W e don't believe it would be wise of her to open up accounts which would be settled with the same swiftness and strength as those of Poland and France were settled and as those of England are about to be settled. . . . The United States on the other hand, which always has been for intervention but only when she is sure she is betting on the winning side, is not willing to undertake an attempt to save persons already on their death beds."
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Molotov spoke on August i to the Supreme Soviet in St. Andrew's Hall in the Kremlin, where the annexation of Bessarabia and the Baltic States was formally approved. His themes were German-Soviet friendship, British hostility, American imperialism and Soviet security:
It is possible that we are now on the eve of a new stage of the intensification of the war between Germany and Italy, on one side, and England assisted by the United States on the other. All of these events have not caused a change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. True to the policy of peace and neutrality, the Soviet Union is not taking part in the war. Our relations with Germany, which underwent a turn nearly a year ago, remain wholly as laid down in the Soviet-German agreement. This agreement, strictly observed by our Government, removed the possibility of friction in Soviet-German relations when Soviet measures were carried out along our Western frontier and at the same time it has assured Germany of a calm feeling of security in the East.
It is "difficult," said the Soviet Premier, "to expect that SovietBritish relations would develop favorably" in view of Britain's previous "hostile acts against the U.S.S.R.," even though Cripps' appointment "reflects a desire on the part of Britain to improve relations." London had rejected Hitler's peace plea because "it does not wish to give up colonies" and prefers to "continue the war for world supremacy." Germany had "achieved great successes," but "she has not yet achieved her principal objectivetermination of the war on terms she considers desirable." As for relations with the United States "there is nothing good that can be said about them." Some Americans were "not pleased" with the successes of Soviet foreign policy in the Baltic countries. "But we must confess we are little concerned over this fact inasmuch as we cope with our tasks without assistance of these displeased gentlemen. However, the fact that authorities in the United States unlawfully placed an embargo on gold that our State Bank recently purchased from banks of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia meets with a most energetic protest on our part." Molotov expressed confidence in Soviet power and in the greed of Japanese and American imperialism:
Imperialist appetites are growing. In the United States there are not a few people who like to conceal their imperialist designs behind well advertised "concern" for the interests of the entire "Western Hemisphere,"
Dilemma in Muscovy
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which these gentlemen are prepared to turn into their property. . . . All this harbors the danger of further extension and fanning of the war and its transformation into a world imperialist war. Under these conditions the Soviet Union must enhance its vigilance in the matter of its external security and in the matter of strengthening all its positions both at home and abroad. . . . To insure the further indispensable successes of the Soviet Union we must always bear in mind Stalin's words that "we must keep our entire people in a state of mobilization and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack." If we all remember this, our sacred duty, no events will catch us unawares and we will achieve new and even more glorious successes for our Soviet Union.
Trotsky's view of the future, while not wholly different from Stalin's, was even more interesting. He asserted in Mexico City on August 7 that the United States would become "the legitimate inheritor" of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and "a little bit of Latin America." "The job of smashing England is left by the United States in the hands of Germany." But America would have to fight Germany and Japan later. This latter hope, sooner rather than later, was the keystone of Soviet policy. Soviet leaders took comfort in the reflection that "inevitable" American entry into the war was now approaching. Pravda rejoiced that the war was "acquiring a greater scale and a more tenacious and prolonged character." Like other neutrals, the U.S.S.R. had gambled its safety on the hope that somebody else would halt Hitler. Unlike other neutrals, the U.S.S.R. had connived in Hitler's aggression and sought to protect itself from the consequences by a policy of aggrandizement. Since the security thus afforded would prove wholly illusory if Britain fell, Moscow hoped and believed that America would save Britain even while it instructed Earl Browder to oppose American intervention in the "imperialist war" with all his might. The first anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet pact was hailed on both sides with hollow enthusiasm. Izvestia declared that the agreement had "fully stood all trial" and "proved its unshakeable firmness." Pravda asserted that it had given Germany "calm certainty in the east." Wilhelmstrasse spoke of it "as a sure foundation on which the progressive, secure ê^ construction of the Old World can be attempted and completed, despite the powers of envy." Yet the Kremlin had misgivings. Berlin, far from ceding the "Gouvernement General" in Poland to the U.S.S.R. as rumored in
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July, proclaimed its full incorporarion into the Reidh. Berlin, far from inducing Budapest to relinquish Carpatho-Ukraine, sponsored Hungarian ambitions in Transylvania and offered to "protect" the remnants of Rumaniapresumably against the Soviet Union. The Caesars acted as if they believed that the Balkan future was for the Axis alone to determine. The Soviet censorship shrouded the Kremlin's foreign policy, as well as the course of domestic events, in such obscurity that The Neiv York Times withdrew its correspondent, G. E. R. Gedye, early in September. Other foreign pressmen were reduced to guessing or relaying official handouts. Both Berlin and Moscow denied all friction and all possibility of friction. The first anniversaries of the partition of Poland, the "protection" of the Baltic States and the opening of the war against Finland brought Stalin little comfort. British success in preventing invasion and enduring aerial attack was reassuring. America's abandonment of "neutrality" in favor of all aid to Britain "short of war" was reassuring. These developments still promised a prolonged war of attrition followed by a stalemate which might afford security to the U.S.S.R. and perhaps even furnish an opportunity for extending Communism, despite the universal discrediting of the Communist cause in all countries and among all classes. But the Axis efforts to crush British power in the Near East threatened, if successful, to confront the Soviet Union's southern flank with a formidable menace. Even the preparations for the enterprise were disquieting. In the north, Finland granted passage to German troops going to and from Norway's Arctic coast. In the south the "protective" occupation of Rumania in October brought Nazi armored divisions, bombing squadrons and submarines to the Black Sea. Berlin at first ignored the Soviet demand of September 13 to be represented on the new Danube Commission but yielded grudgingly by the end of October. The new Triple Alliance, despite its saving clause and despite German efforts to promote a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact, was a warning to the U.S.S.R. no less than to America. Wilhelmstrasse intimated that Moscow's "sphere" in the new world order had been agreed upon. Pravda opined that the alliance was a "further aggravation of the war and an expansion of its realm." The Fascist tyrants apparently had no intention of consulting the Communist tyrant regarding their plans. A Tass statement of
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October 14 declared that reports abroad, obviously of German origin, that the U.S.S.R. had been fully informed of German plans for the occupation of Rumania "did not correspond to the facts." A Tass statement of October 31 asserted that rumors of Soviet plane shipments to Salonika in defense of Greece were "fantasy" and did not correspond to the facts "in any respect whatever." Aside from such hints, the Kremlin preserved deafening silence. This silence was not a reflection of confidence but of doubt. Stalin knew full well that if the Axis won its war the Nazi-Soviet pact would be discarded as lightly by Berlin as other and earlier pacts that had served their purpose. He knew that the new positions along the frontiers would not afford security against a triumphant Reichswehr. He knew that if the Axis gained control of the Straits, of Anatolia, of the shores of the Black Sea from the Danube to Batum (either in the process of smashing Britain or in the aftermath of British defeat), the Ukraine and Transcaucasia would be exposed to conquest and occupation as in 1916-18. He also knew that if the U.S.S.R. struck at the Axis while Britain still fought, it would face war with Japan and would encourage all the discredited Munichmen of Britain and the silent but hopeful Munichmen of America to press for a "deal" with the Reich at Russia's expense. He knew that if he waited until Britain was on the point of collapse, his State would face the full fury of Fascist attack and would be crushed. What was to be done? The Kremlin might resolve its dilemma by some brilliant and unexpected coup, as it had resolved another dilemma in August 1939. The elements of such a solution, however, were not discernible in the autumn of 1940. Events might relieve Moscow of the necessity of a decision. American intervention in hostilities would assure security to the U.S.S.R., for such a step would remove the danger of British collapse and inaugurate a prolonged combat between the Triplice and the English-speaking world. Neither contestant in such a struggle could win a decisive victory without Soviet aid. T o withhold aid or to extend it sparingly to the weaker side might leave the U.S.S.R, as ultimate victor. But if America preferred peace to security, or if American aid reached Britain too late, then Moscovy would be doomedunless the Triplice left the East in peace in order to sub-
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jugate the Western hemisphere. More probably, however, Axis victory over Britain would be followed by simultaneous offensives against Russia and America, the former through invasion of Siberia, the Caucasus, the Ukraine and European Russia, the latter through tactics of disintegration. The transatlantic colossus could readily enough be outflanked in Latin America, distracted by naval threats in both oceans and perhaps rendered helpless by adroit appeals to come to terms with those who would again be engaged in "saving the world from Bolshevism." Even if America waged war after the fall of Britain, it could give no direct aid to the U.S.S.R. and would in all likehhood be unable, and perhaps unwilHng, to save the Soviet Union from defeat. Time would give answer to Stalin's problem by the spring of 1941 and perhaps before. Meanwhile Moscow did the obvious thing. It concentrated heavy forces in Poland and Bessarabia. It directed Communist parties in Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Greece, France and China to support resistance to Axis aggressions, even while Communist parties in Britain and America adhered to their defeatist line. It cautioned Turkey to remain firm but non-belligerent. It used Ankara as a bridge to London. It toyed with the thought of giving the Axis a free hand in the Near East in return for carte blanche to the Soviets in the Middle East and India; rejected the thought, at least for the present, because of its strategic unwisdom; took steps to keep the Straits and Anatolia out of Axis hands; and waited to see what success the Axis would meet with in its attempt to cut the life-line of the British Commonwealth. If the attempt failed, Moscow could afford to remain passive. If it promised to succeed, Moscow could strike at the exposed left flank of the Axis. By the time of the twenty-third anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution the Kremlin's dilemma had become serious but not yet insoluble. The U.S.S.R., like the United States, still had opportunities for relevant and effective action. If America supported Britain to the full and fought the Triplice to victory or stalemate, the Soviet Union would be safe without resorting to war. By the same token America would be safe without resorting to war if Moscow took a comparable step with like results. Danger lay in the possibility that Moscow and Washington would each wait for the other to act until it was too late for either to act. A rapprochement leading to concerted action was almost unthinkable, since
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American diplomacy was debarred by constitutional inhibitions and popular attitudes from being "realistic," however realistic Moscow might be. A Soviet-American entente in 1941 appeared less probable than the improbable German-Soviet pact of 1939. In the absence of a swift change of American sentiment or an "accidental" clash with Japan, America might muddle and drift. Stalin's reluctance to put Soviet economy to the test of total war might well have a similar effect on Soviet decisions. The security and even the survival of America and Russia as Great Powers required the defeat of the Triplice. America and Russia together, aided by Britain and China and the conquered peoples, had the means of defeating the Triplice by joint action if they would. Yet the prospects were that they would not. If they did not, only an indulgent Providence could stay the hand of Nemesis and save the United States and the Soviet Union from the retribution already inflicted upon France and Britain. If Providence should prefer to serve those willing to help themselves, America and Russia alike would resound with the vain lamentations of new Jeremiahs: "A shocking and horrid thing has been committed in the land: the prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests administer to them, and my people love to have it so. But what will you do in the end thereof?"
4. U N I O N
TOMORROW
O, race of mankind! What storms must toss thee, what losses must thou endure, what shipwrecks must buffet thee, as long as thou, a beast of many heads, strivest after contrary things! Thou art sick in both thy faculties of understanding; thou art sick in thy affections. Unanswerable reasons fail to heal thy higher understanding; the very sight of experience convinces not thy lower understanding; not even the sweetness of divine persuasion charms thy affections, when it breathes into thee through the music of the Holy Spirit: "Behold how good and how pleasant a thing it is, brethren, to dwell together in unity!"
These words were written by Dante Alighieri in the Year of Our Lord 1309. The poet-jurist of medieval Florence looked backward to the unity of the classical world, faintly reflected in the broken mirror of the "Holy Roman Empire" but forever lost with the rise of the secular nation-States of modern Chris-
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American diplomacy was debarred by constitutional inhibitions and popular attitudes from being "realistic," however realistic Moscow might be. A Soviet-American entente in 1941 appeared less probable than the improbable German-Soviet pact of 1939. In the absence of a swift change of American sentiment or an "accidental" clash with Japan, America might muddle and drift. Stalin's reluctance to put Soviet economy to the test of total war might well have a similar effect on Soviet decisions. The security and even the survival of America and Russia as Great Powers required the defeat of the Triplice. America and Russia together, aided by Britain and China and the conquered peoples, had the means of defeating the Triplice by joint action if they would. Yet the prospects were that they would not. If they did not, only an indulgent Providence could stay the hand of Nemesis and save the United States and the Soviet Union from the retribution already inflicted upon France and Britain. If Providence should prefer to serve those willing to help themselves, America and Russia alike would resound with the vain lamentations of new Jeremiahs: "A shocking and horrid thing has been committed in the land: the prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests administer to them, and my people love to have it so. But what will you do in the end thereof?"
4. U N I O N
TOMORROW
O, race of mankind! What storms must toss thee, what losses must thou endure, what shipwrecks must buffet thee, as long as thou, a beast of many heads, strivest after contrary things! Thou art sick in both thy faculties of understanding; thou art sick in thy affections. Unanswerable reasons fail to heal thy higher understanding; the very sight of experience convinces not thy lower understanding; not even the sweetness of divine persuasion charms thy affections, when it breathes into thee through the music of the Holy Spirit: "Behold how good and how pleasant a thing it is, brethren, to dwell together in unity!"
These words were written by Dante Alighieri in the Year of Our Lord 1309. The poet-jurist of medieval Florence looked backward to the unity of the classical world, faintly reflected in the broken mirror of the "Holy Roman Empire" but forever lost with the rise of the secular nation-States of modern Chris-
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tendom. The world imperium of Rome was a realm of a yesterday which men could recall but never recapture. The world imperium of the late 20th Century will be a realm of tomorrowas historically necessary in Western civilization as was the Empire of the successors of the first Caesar in the civilization of ancient days. Its necessity is indeed more urgent, since union was scarcely a prerequisite of survival for the peoples of the little world of the middle sea in an age of local agrarian economies. Today no people anywhere in the Great Society of an industrialized planet can hope to survive the successive holocausts of poverty and war that spring from political anarchy in the community of nations. Modern man will either build a united world in this generation or see himself and all his works descend into a night which will know no dawn for centuries to come. The central issue of power politics in the 1940's is the issue of who will unify the world. The question will be answered by arms. The victors will be those who know the nature of their task and have the greatest capacity for blood, tears, toil, and sweat. The vanquished will be those who are ignorant of what must be done for their own survival and lack the will for sacrifice and heroism. Those who win will rule the world, wherever the centers of their own power may be. Those who lose will become subject peoples and be stricken from the list of nations, even unto the farthest continents and the remotest islands of distant seas. There will be no bystanders, no havens of safety, no isolated provinces where dreamy souls can escape the world and placidly let history pass them by. Those who triumph will be masters of all. Those who falter and fail will be left with nothing. "Unto everyone that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." Who then stands to win? The disciples of three great faiths are aspirants for the honor of bringing political unity to mankind: Communism, Fascism, Democracy. Each commands the allegiance of hundreds of millions of peoples. Each controls millions of troops, thousands of war planes, mighty battle fleetsalready locked in combat or poised to join the fray. Each strives to spread its gospel among peoples where rival gospels rule, the better to disintegrate them for defeat. Each controls the territory and citi-
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zens of one or more "Great Powers." The equilibrium between them is such that any one by joining another can defeat and destroy the third, or by supporting the weaker of its two rivals can insure a stalemate. The Fascist Triphce plus the U.S.S.R. can crush Britain and America. The United States and the British Commonwealth, supported in arms by the U.S.S.R., can bring the Triplice to ruin. The Triplice, with Anglo-American cooperationwhether active or passive, whether induced by indifference or defeatcan destroy the Soviet Union. None of these possible combinations had yet emerged or was in immediate prospect when these words were written. Each contestant strove to promote distrust between the two camps of its potential enemies, hoping to find safety in the weakening of its rivals, yet fearing danger if one should overcome the other and turn against the third. In the game of balance Chamberlain played badly and failed. Stalin played well and succeeded. Hitler played so astutely during the years of appeasement that he was enabled to neutralize his most formidable foes, conquer the weaker democracies and place Britain and America in mortal peril. He hoped to win once more by thwarting any Anglo-American-Soviet combination against the Triplice. If successful during 1941, he and his allies would win the world. If unsuccessful, the Triplice would ultimately be overwhelmed. The better to grapple with his problems directly, Molotov at length swallowed his pride and journeyed to the Reich. Whether his trip to Berlin was designed to explore possibilities, to warn Hitler, to placate the Axis or to frighten Britain was anybody's guess. His protracted conferences on November 12-14, ' 94*^' with Hitler, Ribbentrop and the leaders of the Reichswehr were all conducted in utmost secrecy and were not at once conclusive as to the course of Soviet pohcy. The Kremlin's riddle was complicated by a perceptible shift in the trend of the war in mid-November. The Fiihrer boasted in Munich on November 8, a few hours before British bombers paid their respects to the cradle of National Socialism, that he was the "hardest man" in German history and would mobilize all the resources of the Continent to crush England. But there were difficulties. The full "coordination" of Vichy was hampered by fear that in the French colonies even the ad-
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ministrators and commanders who obeyed Petain and Laval might not obey orders to yield territories to Axis forces. Under these conditions no definitive treaty with France seemed possible. Weygand tarried in North Africa. On November 10 De Gaulle's forces took Libreville in Gabon on the Equator. Despite rumors of proposals to buy peace from Madrid with loans and grain shipments, London warned Franco sharply that no fortification of Tangier would be permitted. Suner and the Caudillo hesitated the more so as the Duce had fallen upon evil days. T o the Greeks was reserved the honor of winning the first victories on land over Axis troops. In the first three weeks of fighting, the Italian invaders were thrown back with heavy losses and Albania was in turn invaded. On the evening of Armistice Day, 1940, British bombers raided Taranto. Their aerial torpedoes inflicted great damage on three of Italy's six battleships as well as on several smaller vessels. Cunningham's fleet was undisputed master of the middle sea and even ventured to cut Italian lines across the Straits of Otranto to Albania, where the victims of the new Guadalajara straggled back in disorder and lost Koritza on November 22. These Anglo-Athenian successes, however, produced no immediate change in the diplomatic and military rigor mortis which prevailed in Belgrade and Ankara. On November i President Ismet Inonu told the National Assembly that "together with our ally, Great Britain, we now are studying and trying to envisage the results of the situation. . . . Our relations of confidence with the Soviet Union, which have a past of nearly 20 years, after experiencing difficulties which cannot be attributed to either of us, have returned to normal friendship. . . . At a time when England carries on a heroic struggle for its existence under difficult conditions, it is my duty to proclaim that the bonds of alliance which unite us to her are solid and unbreakable." But Turkey could not act to aid the Greeks unless Moscow approved. Still less could Jugoslavia, despite "accidental" Italian bombing of Bitolj (A-Ionastir) on November 5promptly attributed by Italian sources to Greek or British planes. War Minister Nedich resigned. Rumania swarmed with Nazi troops. Bulgaria was prepared to admit German divisions. Should Hitler decide to humiliate Mussolini by sending his own forces to conquer Greece, Athens could scarcely hope to continue resistance. The Duce could not afford to admit defeat. The Fiihrer could not afford to
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permit Italian defeat. But his larger plans hinged on Turkey and the U.S.S.R. Franz von Papen was accordingly summoned home for consultations shortly before Molotov's visit. Teleki and Czaky journeyed to Vienna and made Hungary a signatory of the Triple Alliance on November 20. In Berlin Antonescu and Foreign Minister Costin Sturda made Rumania a member on November 23. Slovakia, Bulgaria and, if possible, Turkey viêre scheduled to join, as well as France, Spain and other puppet States. Moscow encouraged Turkey to resist Papen's demands and warned Bulgaria, whose King Boris had secretly visited the Reich. Tass declared that German reports of Soviet approval of Hungarian adherence did not "correspond with the facts in any particular." Molotov's problem was baffling. He no longer feared an immediate British collapse. He hoped anew for a full fledged AngloAmerican war against the Triplice. Muscovy must throw its weight to the weaker side to prevent or delay a decisive victory by either. Which side was weaker? To make a new bargain with the Triplice would be a safe gamble if it did not give the Axis control of the Near East and did not result in eventual British defeat. Either of these results would be disastrous to the U.S.S.R. A bargain to frighten Britain into coming to terms with Moscow would be wise. But Britain was far from defeat and refused to be frightened. Stubborn confidence in ultimate victory caused Downing Street to reject all Soviet overtures and to ignore all Soviet threats. So long as the godly Halifax remained Foreign Minister, so long as Britain refused to recognize Soviet title to the Balticum and declined to release Baltic ships and gold to Moscow, no AngloSoviet rapprochement appeared possible. But a Soviet-Axis rapprochement leading to British defeat would be a course of suicide for the Kremlin, whatever paper pacts might be signed with Berlin and Tokio in the interim. By mid-November little light was to be had as to how Stalin proposed to meet this issue. T o weigh the prospects of Liberalism and of the two current varieties of totalitarianism for the conquest, mastery and unification of the earth is to speculate about imponderables. Not to weigh them is to ignore for the present and for the future the most important single problem in the contemporary world. Speculation is therefore necessary. The oldest of these visions of a world made one is the Marxist
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dream of proletarian world revolution. Its disciples, led by a lowermiddle-class intelligentsia openly pledged to the destruction of the old elites of land and money, conquered Russia in 1917, made themselves a new elite and sought in vain to rally the workers of the world to revolt. Had they succeeded. Communism would have been extended by the Word and the Sword over much of Europe and Asia. With Germany and China in the Communist camp, the Soviet giant would not only have become invulnerable but perhaps invincible in its further efforts to extend its domain. But the world victory of 1918-20 was a victory of Liberalism, not of Communism. Lenin's rule was restricted to Russia. In fear of the AlHed interventionists, Moscow courted the vanquished. The later triumph of counter-revolution (anti-1776 and ami-1789 no less than anti-1917) brought to power in Central Europe and in Japan a Fascist elite, also led by a lower-middle-class intelligentsia secretly pledged to the destruction of the old elites of land and money. Its program was the annihilation of Liberalism and Communismi.e., the subjugation of France, Britain, America and the Soviet Union. Which victim would first be assaulted was a matter of circumstance and expediency. The war banner of the new Caesarism, however, was inscribed with the slogan: "Anti-Bolshevism." Those who bore the banner cried in chorus: "/7z hoc signo vinco." Moscow therefore sought united action with the West against the Fascist Powers. But the old elites of the evening lands no longer understood the world. They had already thrown away their victory. Their fecklessness determined the direction of Fascist aggression and reduced to ashes all the devices through which the U.S.S.R. had sought safety: "Peoples' Fronts," mutual assistance pacts, League of Nations, collective sanctions against aggression. In the long retreat of the West before its destroyers, Moscow's hopes went glimmeringboth the initial hopes for world revolt and the later hopes for security through making common cause with the democracies. The German-Soviet entente and the war of 1939 were necessary corollaries of democratic defeatism. But the rapprochement between Fascism and Communism was not envisaged by the Kremlin, despite the verbiage of the new "party line," as a pact for consummating the destruction of the Western Powers and the redivision of the world between the Soviet Union and the Triplice.
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The practitioners of Realpolitik in Moscow knew that any such compact would insure the ultimate ruin of the "Socialist Fatherland" at the hands of its "allies." Victory over the West would render them invincible. Their revolutionary dynamism would inevitably drive them to attack and subdue the U.S.S.R. Moscow's hope was a war of exhaustion in which the Reich and its satellites would be ultimately bled white and beaten by an Anglo-American coalition whose weak leaders and befuddled peoples would lack wit and will to reorder the world and would therefore throw away their victory once more. In the breakdown and despair of 1943-44 Moscow might accomplish what Moscow had failed to accomplish in 1919-20: rally the wretched survivors to the Red flag and unite the world on Leninist-Stalinist foundations. Only under such conditions could the Marxist dream of world union be realized. This was a possible outcome of Armageddon. Yet it appeared at New Year's of 1941 the least probable outcome. A worldwide victory of the Fascist Triple Alliance was far more likely, unless the Red Army should assault the Caesars while Britain and China still fought and America was not yet outflanked and immobilized. What verdict would be rendered by the god of battles in the event of such a Soviet decision was unclear. Not to attack was to risk disaster. T o strike a new "bargain" with the Triplice, to sacrifice the Far East and the Near East in return for paper promises and a possible share of Britain's domain in Asia would be to insure disaster if the bargain led to Britain's defeat. T o do nothing was to stake all on the hope that America and Britain would together crush the Triplice. In any event the Soviet Union would be lost on the day the Triplice won its war. It would be relatively safe if the Triplice lost, since a victorious Anglo-Saxony would scarcely have the will or the means to launch a new crusade against Moscow. Whether the sequel to Fascist defeat would be world revolution by virtue of the incompetence of the victors, or a LiberalCommunist clash for mastery of the wreckage, or a pacific modus vivendi between the U.S.S.R. and a democratic-capitalist federation was a secret of the future. Communism's course in the world of tomorrow will of necessity be devious and dangerous. At best the journey's end will fulfill Lenin's highest hopes. At worst it will realize Stalin's darkest fears and put an end to his realm. Worst is more likely than best.
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The Fascist Caesars had less to fear. They would face irreparable ruin only if Britain withstood their heaviest blows and the United States and the Soviet Union waged war upon them swiftly and to the utmost of their might. In this event Italy and Japan would swiftly crumble and the beleaguered Reich would finally fall even if the Wehr7iiacht should win a new "Battle of the Pyramids" and should follow the route of Bonaparte's Grand Army to Moscow. To the Filhrerschajt of the Triplice this outcome appeared improbable. Stalin's battle-cry was "Peace." So long as the Axis drive did not threaten too seriously the defenses of his land and so long as he hoped for American intervention, he would not act. America was pledged to action "short of war." That course, if persisted in, would not suffice to save Britain from defeat. A stronger course would be futile if adopted late. It might well be futile at any time in the absence of American-Soviet cooperation and the early defeat of Japan. These things might come to pass. The prospects were more favorable, however, for democratic vacillation in which the Caesars could seek and find their chance to break through the last barriers between their ambitions and a mastery of the planet. Britain alone could never reconquer the Continent. Only in the last extremity would Churchill and Halifax pay Stalin's price for support.^ Should Stalin strike at the Reich in self-defense, with no pledges from London, the Anglo-Soviet bloc would not by itself suffice to crush the Triplice. War with Russia would aid the Nazi cause in America, for millions of Americans were prepared to believe once more that Communism was the enemy and that a Reich at last turned eastward was no menace to their safety. Under these circumstances Washington might even press London for a "negotiated peace." Neither Washington nor London desired Moscow as ally. London lacked the means and Washington the will to undertake the arduous task of attacking Continental Europe, liberating the conquered, invading the Reich and rallying all the vanquished to a fearful ordeal for the winning of a new victory and the building of a new world.
1 By mid-November of 1940 Downing Street was still refusing recognition of Soviet title to the Baltic States, championing the restoration of the old Poland in its old frontiers and protesting to Moscow over Soviet representation and British non-representation on the new Danube Commission.
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In a long test of endurance Anglo-Saxony might well conclude that acceptance of the status quo was preferable to so costly and hazardous an enterprise. Such acceptance would spell Fascist victory. With Rilckversicherung in the West, the Axis could conquer Russiawith the West's blessing. Chamberlain's dream and Stalin's nightmare would then become realities. With all the shipbuilding and plane-building facilities of Europe and Asia at hand, with machines and ships and men outnumbering those of the remaining democracies many-fold, the Triplice could prepare in peace the subjugation of England and America, meanwhile capitalizing upon democratic demoralization, spreading poison and hatred, propagating anti-Communism and anti-Semitism, preempting markets, waging economic war on a world scale, pushing into Africa, winning Latin America through bribery and intrigue and arming gigantically for Der Tag to come. That Britain and America would both succumb to a final assault, if properly "softened" by such a prelude, was not doubted in Rome, Berlin, and Tokio. Beyond the horizon of a not improbable final victory over the West will loom a world remade on foundations of Fascist totahtarianism. That world may conceivably be a world of endless anarchy with the vanquished revolting against the victors and provoking bloody suppression, with Germany challenging and conquering Italy, with Japan and the Reich at loggerheads, with the Americas fighting a new war of independence, with the millions of China, India, and Africa rebelling blindly against intolerable misery, with no order or law or peace ever emerging out of chaos. In such an event the unification of the world will never in this century be attained. But no such ghastly hope of cheating the Caesars of their booty is likely to be realized. German genius for Ordnung, and Nazi talent for dispensing force, fraud and favors, may well prove adequate for the reordering of the world as well as of Europe. Peoples who have thrown away the weapons of victory in order to reconcile themselves to defeat do not become rebels under the conqueror's heel, but fellahin content with the meagre blessings of "peace." They are quite prepared to abandon hopes of riches and freedom in favor of a poor security and the comforts of mysticism. This fact has long been known to Hitler. It is the secret weapon of his conquest of Europe. The peoples of a
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vanquished Russia, the peoples of the dark lost East, the peoples of the Western twilight, if frustrated and broken, will not act otherwise once their leaders have brought them to disaster. With such a weapon as this the Triplice may conquer the globe.^ The world imperium of Caesarism can be dimly discerned. With no new continents to conquer, the military socialism of war must needs give way to an alternativenot to a competitive economy of profit and welfare but perhaps to a gaudy feudal socialism of pyramid-building. In a Fascist world economy and a Fascist world polity, class conflict will doubtless wane, since each man will know his place and keep it. Workers will have no liberty, but they will have jobs and honors. Employers will have no freedom, but they will enjoy ownership and dividends on condition that they obey the will of political power-holders. The discriminating selection of a new elite to lead, to rule, to administer will proceed in new ways. Most men and women, even unto the poorest and least free, excepting only the pariahs and scapegoats, may find the result not unwelcome. "There will be a ruling caste," said the Leader to Hermann Rauschning, "a historical class tempered by battle and welded from the most varied elements. There will be the great hierarchy of the Party. . . . And there will be the great mass of the anonymous, the serving collective, the eternally disfranchised, no matter whether they were members of the old bourgeoisie, the big land-owning class, the working class, or the artisans. . . . Beneath them there will still be the class of the alien subject races; we need not hesitate to call them the modern slave class." To contend that modern mankind will find such an order intolerable is to forget that numberless generations of men will1 "In such a war there will be no longer victors and vanquished, but survivors and those whose name is stricken from the list of nations. Many an apparently invincible Colossus in reality stands on feet of clay, and what one or two generations ago was impossible has today already become possible: with a single powerful blow to break a nation's spiritual backbone, to destroy it forever and trample it in the dust. "Just this is the essence, the numbing aspect of the war of annihilation. The elite lies torn to shreds and poisoned on the battlefields. The survivors, a leaderless, demoralized mob of human beings crushed and broken by nameless horrors and sufferings, by unspeakable terror, stand defenseless and without any will before their victorsclay in the potter's hands. . . . Their number does not matter. . . . Fifty million trembhng fellaheen are not more difficult to bring into subjection than five; for many million times nought is still nought. A nation will no longer want something from its opponent, but will put an end to its opponentmike an end of it, once and for all." Deutsche Wehr, June 13, 1935.
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ingly endured such a way of life for endless centuries in every Culture before freedom was bom and after freedom died.^ If this prospect, as it draws near, appears to the peoples of Britain, America and the Soviet Union too appalling to be endured, they will still have in their hands, for a short time, the means of preventing its attainment. Its realization is unlikely to be prevented unless Britain, America and the U.S.S.R. unite all their forces to wage unlimited war on the Triplice and destroy utterly by the combined power of their arms the military machines and the political systems of the Caesars. Such an enterprise is by no means beyond the power of Britons, Americans, and Russians. Its successful accomplishment, moreover, will not call for any such appalling slaughter as took place between 1914 and 1918. The new science of war is relatively merciful and cheap in lives if not in money. Victory over the Triplice can be won by coordinated offensives with great fleets of warships, immense squadrons of planes and innumerable armored divisions possessing superior striking power by virtue of more and better tanks, more and better guns and more and better strategists than the Triplice has at its disposal. The United States, the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union have in abundance the physical facilities for building and operating war machines which can strike down the machines of those who must conquer or be conquered. The obstacles in the way of the enterprise are moral and ideological. West and East do not lack the weapons which are guns but only the weapons which are ideas. The material difficulties will prove unimportant if the psychological difficulties are overcome. By the same logic the vast material resources of a possible Anti-Fascist Triplice will be of no avail if the psychological difficulties are unresolved. These resources will never be mobilized and used effectively unless the men and women who must act to use them are inspired with courage and faith at least equal to that which possesses the subjects of the Caesars. Those armed with these ancient and half-forgotten virtues find tasks of seemingly insuperable difficulty easy of accomplishment. Those without them find the simplest tasks beyond their strength. To state this
1 Cf. Eric Voegelin, "Extended strategy" and "The Growth of the Race Idea." The Review of Politics, May and July, 1940; Hans Kohn, "The TotaUtarian Philosophy of War," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, J'ebruary, 1940; Fritz Thyssen's Letters, Life, April 29, 1940; Hermann Rauschning, "Hitler Could Not Stop," Foreign Affairs, October, 1939.
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fact is to state an obvious platitude. T o overlook this fact is to ignore the single element of wâr potential (and peace potential) which is decisive for the outcome of today's struggle and tomorrow's destiny. What are the psychological prerequisites of victory over the Fascist Caesars? This question can be simply answered, for the march of their legions, the shattering impact of events, the fearful agony of tragic years have blazoned the answer in letters of fire and blood for all with eyes to see. The prime prerequisite is recognition that the world society is one, that it must be reconquered from the barbarians and reordered as a single polity in which justice for each is protected by the organized might of all. This vision is not new. It was the vision of Woodrow Wilson and of Lenin. It is the vision of Clarence Streit who, like Hitler, knows that the world is a unity. The peoples who accept it as the basis of their action will prevail and survive. Those who deny it, or flee in fear before it, will perish. The Great Powers whose peoples and leaders hope to avert conquest by Fascism can escape this fate only by pledging themselves irrevocably to the unification of the world. Such a pledge is not a matter which can be relegated to the agenda of the next peace conference. It is the sine qua non of victory in war. Nothing less than this will unite the peoples who must act unitedly to win victory, or inspire them with the will to deeds without which victory cannot be had. Nothing less than this will furnish the military means of victory. For each to fight alone for "national survival," for "sovereignty," for "political independence" is to fight a battle which can never be won against enemies whose leaders know that these things are forever lost. T o fight together for such empty goals as these will spell defeat. To fight to destroy "Hitlerism," to crush "Germany" and "Italy" and "Japan," to restore "France," "Czechoslovakia," "Poland," "Rumania," and a dozen petty States is to fight for purposes beyond all possibility of attainment. N o vain and empty vision of returning to the anarchic State System of the 1930's, no scheme of patching together a broken Humpty-Dumpty world based on "sovereign" States, linked loosely once more in a feckless League, will make men act to seize the future for themselves. Even the conquered peoples will prefer the yoke of their conquerors to such a prospect, whatever hopes may be entertained by "governments in exile" aspiring
Union Tomorrow
595
to recover a past that is beyond recapture.^ The Fascist vision of a united and ordered world can be overcome only by a better vision of a united and ordered world put forward by the democracies and fought for with comparable foresight and valor. The means to the end are ready at hand. The first and indispensable step is a full federal union of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States of America,^ with other communities subsequently invited to crawl out of the dark and noisome holes of national sovereignty into the sunlight which can only shine on a federated world. To such a union must be added in the fullness of time the liberated peoples of the Continent, the Latin American Republics, the millions of China and India, and the peoples of Germany, Italy, and Japan as well, each equal in rights to the others and free to exercise such influence in the remaking of the world as their numbers and talents warrant. To such a union must be added the Soviet Union in the confidence that its collaboration would be at least as vigorous and forthright
1 At the time of writing the most recent convert to the Allied cause, among many representatives of a dead past, appears to be the "Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine," sponsoring "The Ukrainian-American Committee To Aid The Allies." Cf. The Trident, October, 1940. The hope of its members is that Britain and America, if victorious, will repartition Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. in the interest of the Ukrainian Nationahsts-in-Exile, who only yesterday looked to Hitler to help them attain their ends. Other groups of Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, Austrians, Norwegians, Dutchmen, Belgians etc. in Britain and America cherished similar aspirations, all with the loftiest of motives and with the support of Lord Halifax and other surviving Munichmen. Such "allies" of the Allies helped to make impossible any rational formulation of war aims and peace plans by Churchill and other democratic spokesmen. 2 Dorothy Thompson (The New York Herald Tribune, October 30, 1940): "The way to end this war is to effect a union of the English-speaking peoples of the worldof the United States and all the free commonwealths, leaving it to the rest of the British Empire to decide whether they want to stay with us or not. . . . I have never believed that Hitlerism would be conquered by war. I have always believed that it could be defeated by the implicit force of this Continent, plus a better idea than Nazism. And if we cannot think up anything better, we deserve the horrid fate we are likely to get. We probably will not do this until driven to it after many tears, because it presumes a realization on the part of the American people that we live in a completely changed world. . . . We will do everything possible except exercise our intellects and imaginations. One crowd will say, 'Help Britain.' And the other will say, 'Isolation.' . . . We have become a raceGod help us!of 'practical' people. So we will sit and shiver and shove guns into Britain, and remain without an idea in our heads. Or will we?" Cf. Clarence Streit Union Now (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1939) and Federal Union World and other publications of "Federal Union," Union House, 10 East 40th Street, New York City.
59<5
Peace by the Sword
as its early collaboration in the work of the League, and in the hope that its internal evolution would once more approximate that of other democracies in a worldwide climate of ideas in which democracy would again flourish as a living and fighting faith. An Anglo-American Federation, as the nucleus of a new world order, with the U.S.S.R. as ally, can win the war and make the peace. The peace, if wisely made, will inaugurate a new epoch in the striving of mankind to reconcile liberty and authority within a frame of order and law. Nothing less than this will serve. Within this world dominion of the future the relations of producers to consumers, of entrepreneurs to workers, of politicians to businessmen must undergo a series of transformations as revolutionary and dynamic as those called for in the reconstruction of the community of nations. The secret rule of the lords of property, wielding power through political puppets and pressmen, must give way to the open rule of a political elite, dedicated to human dignity and the enrichment of civilization and administering to social needs in an economic order planned by creative intelligence and directed by a new statesmanship.^ The democratic socialism of the days to come must be at least as efficient in production and distribution, as capable of subordinating private interest to public Avelfare, as worthy of inspiring devotion and sacrifice in the service of its purposes as the "National Socialism" of the Third Reich. If not, its cause is lost. If democracy is to survive the assault of its foes, its disciples must cure themselves of the irresponsibility which permits freedom of speech and action to sworn enemies of democracy and to paid agents of prospective invaders. They must overcome the fiabbiness which permits leaders to evade the duties of leadership or obliges them to engage in dubious battle with self-seeking lobbies, pressure groups and stubborn minorities in legislative assemblies. They must support government that governs. They must relegate to the dead past the belief that liberty can be safeguarded by limiting to narrow scope the powers of government or by maintaining checks-and-balances which spell paralysis. They must escape from the things which Clare Booth e found in the European democracies in the spring of 1940: "Lethal inertia,
1 Cf. Charles E. Merriam, Prologue to Politics, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1939; Lewis Mumford, Faith for Livi7ig, Harcourt Brace & Co., New York, 1940; Max Lerner Ideas Are Weapons, The Viking Press, New York, 1939.
Union Tomorroiv
597
woeful ignorance, blind patriotism, corroding jealousies, mortal miscalculation and criminal complacency." They must abjure partisan politics, class politics, all politics save the politics of union now and forever for the remaking of man and the rebuilding of the world. They must fight "despotism" by the means used in all ancient democracies, by the only means which will servei.e., by "dictatorship" to meet crises, by one-man rule if need be so long as danger threatens, and it will threaten until the world is reborn.^
1 Cf. "American Communique 1940" by Edwin Franden Dakin, Today and Destiny: Vital Excerpts From the Decline of the West of Oswald Spengler (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1940) pp. 330-3: There looms at least one certainty. Truly creative menthe men who want great power to build what they dream of greatly, the sort of men who once worked their way to the top in banking, market manipulation, and the control of great manufacturing and distribution organismswill now tend to reach for the political control that can bring them entree into these other realms automatically. And this must be equally true for men who seek power for power's sake alone. Thus Spengler, telling young men of the future to go into politics, once more saw true. When, finally, one of Roosevelt's most able and determined opponents abandoned the industrial arena from which he had been leading his opposition and took a presidential nomination in order to wage his battle more effectively, evidence mounted that Amicrica was beginning to understand a new category of facts. For when power has emigrated to the seat of politics from the seat of industry and finance, when the nods of the entrepreneurs are no longer obeyed in the Capitol, then the men who want power must enter politics forthwith. And when, conversely, they do enter politics, they confirm power's departure from the fields in which they have previously wielded its sceptre and prerogative. A further conclusion suggests itself; and it, too, stems from Spengler. Spengler insists that in these times, programs become increasingly unimportant. In the Thurman Arnold sense, the important thing is to do the necessary, whatever the rituals required to satisfy the mind while it is being done. Amassing the power to do it is the goal. To Spengler, behind all the slogans and the fight over apparent ideas, the struggle for power emerges ever more clearly. In an age that has been torn by the war of various idea systems, their ultimate unimportance is hardly demonstrable; but events like the attempted British-Russian pact, and the successful Hitler-Stalin deal, have made it evident to some who might otherwise have remained unconvinced. Yet the career of Roosevelt II had even previously written indications of it on the front pages. For it is to be noted that some of his most bitter critics were those who had lost influence under him rather than money; indeed, the Roosevelt measures often served to better the financial fortunes of various self-proclaimed enemies who had almost been collapsing under Mr. Hoover. The devout enmity felt for Roosevelt by so many could not be adequately explained on any other than a power-loss basis. . . . There is no reason npw to suppose that the present period of emergency for the United States will pass for a number of years; for ours is a rich nation vis-a-vis an increasingly hungry and hostile world. There is thus every ground for expecting Roosevelt to be followed by other men who will be strong men in quite the same traditionmanipulating Congress, the courts, the organs of publicity and opinion, and the vote in much the same way and with more or less success. There is nothing particularly un-
598
Peace by the Sword
In short, the War of the World Revolution will be won only by those who are revolutionists and by those who are more dynamic and imaginative than their enemies in their ardor to change the world. The revolution of Fascism can be beaten only by a revolution of Liberalism. Those who would unify the world around a myth of racial megalomania and hate-filled fanaticism can be overcome only by those who would unify the world around a myth of catholic tolerance and crusading faith in Man. Those who would create a new society dedicated to the commonweal, however mad their cult of Mars, can be overcome only by those with greater faith in a new society no less dedicated to the commonweal, albeit pledged to social justice. This is the price which the peoples of the West must pay for survival, for victory, for the remaking of the world on terms compatible with the preservation of Western culture. The price may never be paid. Those called upon to pay it may prefer to denounce those who state the price as Utopian visionaries. They may continue to believe, even unto their last hour, that some lesser payment will save them. Britain's leaders may carry on to the end with no program save survival and the hopeless restoration of Europe and the world as it was before Munich. America's leaders may cling to "peace," to illusions of Continental security, to strategic conceptions of national or hemisphere "defense" which events will show to be disastrous. Russia's leaders may make new bargains with the Triplice, they may cling to the hallucination that their own formula for world revolution can be applied if only the "bourgeois imperialists" destroy one another, they may insure the destruction of themselves and their State by permitting the Fascist Caesars to win the world. London and Moscow or Washington and Moscow may find collaboration impossible. Even London and Washington may find collaboration impossible. All may collaborate and yet lose the battle, thanks to the too many surrenders of the past. All may collaborate, win victory and then throw away the peace to come in new strife between Liberalism and Communism or in a new and foredoomed effort to restore the world of 1939 or 1919. If the cost of victory in tears and blood appears too great,
American in such an outlook. And, indeed, even the most theoretical 'liberal" would hardly venture to wish our nation to be endowed with a weak government in Washington, in any future we can now foresee.
Union Tomorrov)
599
America may abandon Britain and China and seek safety (in vain) in throwing up a Maginot Line around the New World. Liberals and peace-seekers may insist upon peace at any price, peace for our time, paralysis of leadership, tolerance for intolerance, compromise with forces which brook no compromise. The Nemesis which has so long blurred the vision and slowed the steps of democrats everywhere and delivered them times without end into the hands of their destroyers may rule unchallenged in unending night and bring the West to ruin beyond repair. These things are possible. As the year 1940 stumbles toward its close, they seem far more probable than any alternative suggested. East and West may persist in their refusal to understand the world and to do what must be done. At each given moment it is easier to do nothing. Those who continue to do nothing will remain sightless and lose their all as empty men, forever hypnotized by "shape without form, shade without color, paralyzed force, gesture without motion." If this is indeed the choice which East and West must make, then the consequences of this choice can be predicted with crystal clarity. They will assume one of three guises. The most probable is the conquest and unification of the world by the hosts of the Caesars. Less probable is a stalemate and truce, probably short, possibly long, during which world politics will become a contest between great Continental blocs, each aspiring to world mastery, each reaching out for hegemony of India, Africa, South America and Australasia, each preparing feverishly new weapons, new tactics, new leaders, new armies and fleets of the sea and the air to essay the destruction of its rivals. This future, should it be reahzed, will be but another epoch of transition toward the political unification of the planet in the aftermath of the Third World War, or toward the final disintegration of the Great Society into chaos. Least probable among the alternatives of tomorrow is Allied victory won without any will to reshape the world and therefore followed by a return to anarchy and breakdown. Should this occur, the disorder to come will breed a decade hence new barbarians, new Caesars, new power-hungry and desperate peoples, new revolutions and wars, until "men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book and picture and harmony, every treasure garnered through two millenniums, the small, the delicate, the defenselessall will be lost or wrecked
6oo
Peace by the Sword
or utterly destroyed, . . . There will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage until every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are levelled in a vast chaos." ^ In the days to come the fittest will survive and rule the world. The unfit will fail and lose body and soul. The fittest will be those who know that the world is one. The fittest will be those who know that national sovereignty and international anarchy are marked for death; that laissez-faire, feeble government, the rule of money and property are alike lost forever; that new visions and new life-giving deeds must replace the shibboleths of yesterday. The fittest will be those who know how to reconcile their preferences with stubborn facts. The fittest will be those who realize that the world of tomorrow belongs to the peoples who care enough about their way of living to sacrifice their prejudices and their wish-dreams as well as their safety and their very lives in its defense. Only those are fit who are in form and attuned to the needs of the world as it is, not as they imagine or wish it to be. Only those who see why an old world is dying are fit to make a new world after their heart's desire. The fit will conquer the future.
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Chicago "quarantine" address, October 5, 1937, quoting James Hilton's Lost Horizon.
INDEX
N.B. Entries under names of major Powers are limited to wars and to treaties and other international agreements. For other topics, see names of persons, places and subjects. Abbreviations; c. = cited or referred to; q. = quoted on; a. address of (date); n. = footnote; d. = death of; p./.^p = September i, 1939; 7.40 = July, 1940; T . =: treaty or agreement with; W . = war with.
Aaland Islands, 240, 243, 388, 399 Aandalsnes, 473 Abbeville, 488, 491, 497 Abd-el-Krim, 495 Abernon, Lord d', 175 Abetz, Otto, 67, 436, 5i2n., 543, 545 Achilles, H.M.S., 456 Adams, David, q. 247 Addison, I. A., 203 Admiral Graf Spee, 456, 464 Ageloff, Sylvia, 42 in. Agnew, Andrew, 203 Ajax, H.M.S., 456, 474 Albania, i37f., 241; T . Italy ll.2y.26, 138, 11.22.2j, 138; 546 Albert Canal, 482, 484, 488 Alexander, Albert V., 478 Alexandretta, (See Hatay) Alfieri, Dino, 505, 525f. Alice, q. 34 Allen, Robert S., c. 278n. Alliances, (See T . under names of States) Alsace-Lorraine, 178, 544 Alsop, Joseph, c. i53n., c. 2i5n.,c.447n. Altmark, 418, 464, 474 American Legion, 560 Amery, Leopold S., 479, q. 476 Amiens, 488, 491, 497 Anderson, Sir John, 479, 534, 535
Anti-Comintern, 52, ^6, 61, 62, 217, 564; (See Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Manchukuo, Hungary, U.S.S.R.) Antigua, 561 Antonescu, Ion, 540, 587 Antwerp, 488 Apponyi, Countess Geraldine, 138 Araiica, 456 Araquistain, Luis, c. 5on. Arciszewski, iVIiroslaw, 311 Ardennes, 494 Argentina, 412, 413 Arita, Hachiro, 105, 205, 537 Ark Royal, H.M.S., 138 Armistice of 191S, 15; of 1940, (See France, Germany, Italy) Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, c. 485n., c. 522n. Arnold, T h u r m a n , c. 597n. Arras, 488, 497 Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank T., 38, 106 Astor, Lady, 234; q. i n Athenia, 448 Attlee, Clement, 144, 477, 478; q. 47, q. 53n., q. 108 Attolico, Bernardo, 63, 365, 370 Australia, 439n. Austria, 79; (See Germany) Avenol, Joseph, 412, 414, 576
11 Azana, Manuel, 49 Azcarte, M., 49
Index
Benes, Eduard, 92, 186, 239, 408, 530 Bennet, F. B., 203 Benson, Oliver, c. 49in., q. 366n. Badoglio, Marshal Pietxo, 91, 519 Beran, Rudolf, 37,97, 99; q. 93 Bahamas, 561 Berard, Leon, 52 Bakhmetiev, Boris, 250 Berenger, Henri, q. 265 Balbo, Italo, 139; d. 538 Bergen, 417, 419, 467 Baldwin, Stanley, 162; q. 2on. Bergeret, Jean, Gen., 518 Balfour, Arthur, 8 Bergery, Gaston, 435 Balfour Declaration (191 j), 199 Berle, Adolf, A. Jr., 312 Balkan Entente {ig^4), 195; (See Tur- Bermuda, 561-2 key, Greece, Jugoslavia, Rumania) Berwick and Alba, Duke of, 53 Bank for International Settlements, Bessarabia, 57, 281, 539, 576 202 Best, Cap't., 431 Barcelona, fall of, 49 Besteiro, Julien, 51 Barkley, Senator Alben, 214 Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, q. 484 Barnes, Ralph W., 575 Bevin, Ernest, 478, 535; q. George Barthou, Louis, 73, 223, 224 Lansbury, 535 Baruch, Bernard, 211 Biddle, Anthony, 447 Battles, (See names of places, com- Bilmanis, Alfred, c. 39in., q. 575 manders, and ships) Birmingham (air raids on), 547 Baudouin, Paul, 88, 498, 514, 515, 521, Bismarck, Otto von, 274, 275, 276, q. 54i.545;q-5J8 175 Bayles, W. D., c. i67n. Bitolj (Monastir), 586 Blanchard, Gen., 499 Beard, Chas. A., c. i48n., c. 569n. Blondel, Jules, 86 Beaverbrook, Lord, 535 Bloom, Congressman Sol, 212 Bebb, C. W. H., 4in. Bliicher, 468 Beck, Joseph, 62, 119, 126,129, 136,172, Blum, Leon, 19, 41, 45, 81, 105, 437, 179, 180, 181, 185, 186, 190, 192, 227, 497. 516 292, 294, 295, 296, 302, 304, 311, 316, Bock, Gen. von, 376, 498 378, 382; q. Soviets, 60-61; Carpa- Bohemia-Moravia, 58; (See Czechotho-Ukraine, 61; guarantee to Poslovakia) land, I28f.; visit to London, 133; Bois, Elie, q. 513, q. 514 Jewish refugees, i34n.; great coalition, 141; German-Polish non-agg. Bolivia, 413 pact, 176; Ribbentrop visit to War- Bone, Senator Homer T., 152 saw, 178; a. S-S-39> 191-2; Anglo-So- Bonnet, Georges, 44f.; 190, 191, 197-9, 202, 434n.; non-intervention 45, 46; viet negotiations, 254f.; q. Germanq. non-intervention, 48; recognition Soviet pact, 269; q. German coup at of Franco, 52; q. Spanish independDanzig, 286; final Danzig crisis, ence, 53; q. Munich, 65; q. J. Suritz, 297f.; and Chamberlain-Hitler let67; French-German T. 12.6.38, 68; q. ters, 310; British-Polish alliance, 318; struggle against Bolshevism, 68f.; q. Anglo-French "advice" to Warsaw, 320, 321, 352; "negotiations," 333; "i6 Czecho-Slovakia, 69; q. Ukraine, 69points" 344f., 350; "ultimatum," 337f., 70, 71; q. to Ribbentrop 1.21.39, 71; 338f., 339; war, 355f-; Italian peace a. 1.26.39, 7^; q- French integrity, moves P./-2.3P, 364f.; interned and 82; a. 12.19.38, 83; Italy, 87; Brinon, arrested, 385-6 89; and Czecho-Slovakia, 94-95,97,98, Beigbeider, Juan, 518, 544 103, 104, 107, 119, 121, 124; A l b a n i a , Belgium, 48if.; Anglo-French guaran140; Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 234f., tee, 127; Moscow, 232; peace pro238f.; German-Soviet pact, 268; Gerposal 8.23-24.39, 312, 413; T. France man-Polish friction, 29of.; note to (ip2o), 481; W. Germany, 484^
Index
Ribbentrop 7.59, 291; ChamberlainHitler letters, 310; peace proposals 8.2^-24.^9, 312; Anglo-French "advice" t o Warsaw, 321; Hitler-Daladier letters, 325, 326; "negotiations," 333; and "ultimatum," 338, 341; Polish mobilization, 338; outbreak of war, 357; proposed desertion of P o land, 362f.; Italian peace moves $.12.39, 363f.; 9.2.39, 370; French ultimatum 9.3.39, 37if.; Ministry of Justice, 434, 436; and Vichy, 515, 516 Booth, Claire, q. 596 Borah, Senator W m . E., 150, 152, 207, 214. 450. 45i;_d- 4 " Borchard, Edwin, c. 563 n. Bordeaux, 514 Boris III, King of Bulgaria, 587 Boulogne, 491 Brailsford, H . N . , c. 55on. Brauchitsch, G e n . W a l t e r von, 168, 335f., 346f., 376; q. 27m. Bresle, 498 Brest-Litovsk, T . {1918), 57, 220, 275 Bretag7ie, 521 Briand, Aristide, 19 Briggs, Harold W . , c. 563n. Brinon, Fernand de, 89, 434n., 545; q. 88 Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count von, 275 Brodney, Spencer, xi Brooke, Sir Alan, 531, 534 Browder, Earl, 5710., 579 Briining, Heinrich, vii, 19 Brussels, fall of, 488 Briesen, Gen. K u r t von, 500 Buell, R. L., c. i48n., c. i75n.; q. 35in. Bukovina, 539, 576 Bulgaria, and great coalition, i45f.; and Triple Alliance, 586f.; T . Rumania 9.17.40, 540 Bullitt, W m . C , 127, 150, 211, 514; q. Ukraine, 119, 120; outbreak of war, 447; q. waking-up, 560 Burckhardt, Carl J., 176, 188, 294, 304; Danzig crisis, 297f., 299; q. Hitler, 300; flight t o Kovno, 353 Burma Road, 537, 568 Burnett, Air Marshall Sir Chas., 256 Butler, N . M., 210 Butler, Richard, 209, 230, 256, 420, 423
ui
Caballero, Largo, c. 5on. Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 38,43-44, 132, 232, 252 "Cagoulards," 436, 497, 510 Caillaux, Joseph, 48 Cajander, Aimo, 405; q. 254 Calais, 491, 492 Cambon, Roger, 526 Campinchi, Cesar, 437, 516 Canada, 3i4n.; W . Germany, 439n.; T . U. S. 8.18.40, 561; Hitler q. 528 Caligula, Emperor, 535 Canton, 564 Caporetto, 488 Carol II, King of Rumania, 228, 539, 540, 575; q- 541 Carpatho-Ukraine, 58f., 60, 61, 92, 93, 97, 99, loi, 116, 119, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 218, 580 Castellane, Marquis of, 526 Celler, Congressman Emanuel, q. 412 Chad, 543 Charlotte, G r a n d Duchess of Luxembourg, 484 Charonov, Nicholas, 379; q. 380 Casado, Col. Sigismundo, 50, 51 Cassala, 539 Castle, W m . R., 151 Cavagnari, Adm., 519 Chamberlain, Austin, i n Chamberlain, Neville, NYT q. ix; q. Czech crisis, 22; Xmas card (1938), 38; Munich, 38, 57; q. ii2f.; q. peace with honor, 39; q. his Nazi friends, 39; trip to Rome, 43-44, 89, 90; nonintervention, 45; q. non-intervention, 48; recognition of Franco, 52, 53, q. 53n.; appeasement, 57f., 209f.; limitation of armaments, 76; q. defiance and defense, 106; guarantee to Czecho-SIovakia, 107; q. aggression against Czecho-SIovakia, 108; n o ; a. 3.1S.39, 108-9; a. ?-n-?9, i i i - n 5 ; Carpatho-Ukraine, 116; a. 3.23.39, 127; q. pledge t o defend Poland, 130; a. 4.3.39, 133, 229; Polish commitment, 134, 135, 136, 185; Albania, 139, 140; q. Albania, 142; q. Greece and Rumania, 144; and F . D . Roosevelt message 4.1^.39, 155; and conscription, 156; a. S.12.39,196; a. 6.9.39, 200; a. 6.24.39, 201; q. Czech gold 202; q. "peace loan," 204; a. 11.2,38,
IV
Index
net, 439; q. war aims, 443; q. Russia, 440; Norway, 462; plea to neutrals 1.20.40, 464; q. N o r w a y , 472; q. N o r wegian failure, 476-7; Prime Minister, 478; a. S.13.40, 479; rephes to Leopold and Wilhelmina, 483; q. Leopold, 490; q. Battle of Flanders, 491; q. Dunkirk, 492; W e y g a n d , 499; Reynaud, 514, 515; q. Oran, 520-1; a. 6.18.40, 523-5; a. 7.14.40, 527; a. 9.$.40, 531; a. 9.'ii.40, 5 3 ' ; a. 10.8.40, 535; and Japanese appeasement, 537; q. restoration of France, 542; plea to French people, 543; Greece, 546; q. destroyer deal, 563; Stalin, 590 Chvalkovsky, Frantisek, 93, 95, 97, 99,
100
205; a. 1.24.39, 206; Vatican, 208; q. Moscow, 232; q. U.S.S.R., 233; Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 228f., 2345., 238f., 247; a. S.10.S9, 235-6; q. s-'9.3% 238; q. $.24.39, 240; Baltic States, 249, 251; a. 7.31.39, 255; q. German-Soviet pact, 262; q. Danzig, 293; letter to Hitler, 8.22.39, 306; q. Hitler reply to peace proposal, 8.23-24, 314; and British-Polish alliance, 319; and Anglo-French "advice" t o W a r s a w , 323; and British reply to Hitler 8.2$.39, 331; and "ultimatum," 336f., 341; "16 points," 345f.; outbreak of war, 358, 36if.; a. 9.1.39, 359f.; W . Germany, 372f.; q. outbreak of war, 374, 375; q. Finland, 408,409; Allied plans t o aid Finland, 4i7f.; Finnish peace, 423; q. 425f.; and W a r Cabinet, 439; Cabinet changes 4.3.40, 440; q. war aims, 443; Welles, 458; and N o r w a y , 462n.; q. Altmark, 464; q. N o r w a y and Sweden, 472; conquest of N o r way, 474f.; q. "missed the bus," 474; q. conquest of Norway, 475; q. resignation, 477; Lord President of Council, 478; q. no peace negotiations, 527; d. 534-5 Chambre, G u y le, 437, 543 Chambrun, Rene de, c. 522n. Charles, Sir Noel, 506 Charonov, Nicholas, 247 Chatfield, Lord, 38, 439 Chautemps, Camille, 436, 5i4f.; a. 9.2.39, 369 Chiang Kai-shek, 36, 408 Chiappe, Jean, 436 Chicherin, Georges, 233 China, 82, 243, 413; (See Japan, Manchukuo, Indo-China, and names of leaders, cities and provinces) Chodacki, Marjan, 190, 289, 291, 292, 295, 296, 297n., 311 Christian IV, King of Denmark, 467 Christiansen, Ingolf, 472 Churchill, Winston, q. Spain, 55n.; q. aggression against Czecho-Slovakia, 108; Polish commitment, 134; Russia, 144; q. Soviet foreign policy, 22on.; q. Russia, 229, 238; q. Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 247; q. Baltic States, 250; q. 8.2.39, 256; campaign against U.S.S.R., 4i6f., 420; and W a r Cabi-
Ciano, Galleazzo, 166, 168, 193, 257; Franco revolt, 42n.; Chamberlain trip to Rome, 44; Spain, 47; Ukraine, 80; Albania, 138-9; British-Italian T . , 140, 141; q. Albania, 142; q. GermanItalian alliance, 169; at Salzburg 8.11-13.39, 300; Italian peace moves 9.1-2.39, 363f., 367; 9.2.39,^yo;'Welles, 458; q. "Pact of Steel," 502f.; NaziSoviet pact, 503; Rome conference 3.10-11.40, 504; q. pact of alliance, 504n.; and conference 3.11.40, 505, .506; conference 6.18.40, 518; French armistice, 519; 7.40, 525f.; partition of Transylvania, 540, 576; Triple Alliance, 565; q. Triple Alliance, 566 Cincar-Markovich, Alexander, 157, 541 City of Flint, 451, 462 Clark, Senator Bennet Champ, 151; q. 450, q. 451, q. 561 Clark, Senator D . W o r t h , q. 561 Clarke, Geoffrey, 203 Clemenceau, Georges, q. 435, q. 497 Cliveden, i i i Clodius, Dr., 504 Cluj, 540 Colban, Erik, 416 Collingwood, R. G., q. 38-39 Cohcmbiis, 456 "Combat area," 453; (See Neutrality [U.S.]) Comintern, 393; (See U.S.S.R., AntiComintern, Stalin, Manuilsky, etc.)
Index
"Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies," 553 Compiegne {191S) 15, 499; {1(140) 518 Comstock, Alzada, c. 475n. Conant, James, q. 553 "Condor Legion," 52 Conscription (Br.), 231, 286; (U. S.) 569 Cooper, D'Arcy, 203 Corap, G e n . Andre, 495, 496, 510 Corbin, Charles, 121, 310, 322, 341, 3635., 418, 521 Corfu, 143 "Corridor" (Polish), 179; origin, 174; German-Soviet pact, 269; Henderson, 286f.; British reply to Hitler 8.2$.jg, 328f.-, "ultimatum," 341; "16 points," 344f.; (See Poland, G e r many, Danzig, Gdynia) Corsica, 83 Cortesi, Mgr., 209 Cossack, 464 Cot, Pierre, 543 Coughlin, Rev. Charles E., 450; q. 27 Coulondre, Robert, Ukraine, 67; q. Ukraine, 69-70; q. Bonnet's a. 1.26.39, 73; Brinon, 88; guarantee of Czechoslovakia, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99; q. Carpatho-Ukraine, 117-8, 121; AngloFrench protest to Berlin on Czechoslovakia, 124, 156; q. Hitler a. 4.28.39, 190; q. German-Soviet pact, 268, 269, 27in.; q. German-Soviet reconciliation, 270; German-Polish friction, 29of.; Danzig crisis, 299, 304, 311; VVeizsacker 8.1^.39, 301, 324; Anglo-French "advice" to W a r saw, 321; Hitler-Daladier letters, 325, 326; "ultimatum," 338; "16 points," 350; outbreak of war; French ultimatum 9.3.39, 37if.; W . BritainGermany, 372; leaves Berlin, 373 Covenant, 201,240; (See League of N a tions) Coventry, 547 Cragie, Sir Robert, 105, 205 Cranbome, Viscount, 535 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 423, 577, 578; q. 234 Cristea, Miron, 36 Croce, Benedetto, q. 9-10 Croix, Victor de la, 65, 96 Croix de Feu, 436, 497 CroUa, Guido, 140, 143 Cromvi'ell, James H . R., 460 Cromwell, Oliver, q. 476 Crookshank, Capt. H a r r y , 202 Cunningham, Sir Andrew, 538, 586 "Curzon Line," 175, 384 Cvetkovich, Dragisha, 541 Czaky, Count Istvan, 45, 157, 540, 576, J^7 Czechoslovakia: Ukraine, 57f., 60, 69; partition, 92-103, 227, 241; T . G e r many 3.i;.39, 100; Anglo-French protest to Berlin on, 124; Soviet protest, 125; Poland, 181; gold of, 202; (See Masaryk, Benes, Beran, etc.) Dago, 388 Dakar, 521, 542, 543 Dakin, Edwin Franden, q. 597n. Daladier, Edouard: journey to Corsica and Tunisia, 38, 83; non-intervention, 45, 48; recognition of Franco, 52, 53, q. 53n.; Ukraine, 6;; q. French integrity, 82; Italy, 87f.; fall of Czecho-Slovakia, 104, 105; guarantee to Poland, 132, 185, 189, 199; a. 4.13.39, 145; a. 6.4.39, 200; Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 235, 238f.; and Baltic States, 249, 251; q. German-Soviet pact, 261; Anglo-French "advice" to Warsaw, 323; q. Hitler-Daladier letters, 325-6; Italian peace moves 9-'-2.39> 366; a. 9.2.39, 369, 370; q. outbreak of war, 375; campaign against U.S.S.R., 4i5f., 420; Finnish peace, 424; Communist Party, 433f.; feebleness, 435f.; resignation, 437; Gamelin, 438, 496; Welles, 458; dropped from Cabinet, 498; and Reynaud, 512; arrest, 516 Dalton, H u g h , 252; q. 256 Dante Alighieri, q. 583 Danube Commission, 580 Danzig, 126, 156, 173-83, i9of., 205, 209, 227; Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 253; German-Soviet pact, 269; H e n derson, 286f.; final crisis over, 296f.; British-Polish alliance, 318; British reply to Hitler 8.25.39, 328f., "ulti-
VI
Index
Eddington, Sir Arthur, 64 Eden, Anthony: recognition of Franco, 53; q. on aggression against Czecho-Slovakia, 109; Polish guarantee, 134; Italy, 144; a. 6.!i.^p, 200; q. Russia, 229, 233; W a r Cabinet, 439; W a r Secretary, 478 Egypt, 249, 413, 537-8 Eichelberger, Clark, 554 Eire, 160, 439n., 537, 556 Eliot, Maj. George Fielding, q. 4o8n., 569n. Ehot, T . S., q. 272, 599 Elizabeth, Queen of England, 210 Elliott, John, c. 366n. Elser, Georg, 430 Embargo (U.S. vs. Japan), 565, 569 Emden, 468 Empress of Britain, 547 Engels, Friedrich, 222 Entente Cordiale, 275 Erkko, El) as, 258, 400; Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 248; q. 398 Estonia: non-aggression pact with G e r many, 164; Anglo-Soviet negotiations, 234f., 248, 250, 251; GermanSoviet pact, 281; T . Germany (J.7.39, 165; T . U.S.S.R. 2.2.20, 388, S-4-32, 388, p.2S.$(), 388; incorporation into U.S.S.R., 165, 575 Ethiopia, 79, 81, 198, 411 Eupen, 488 Exeter, H.M.S., 456, 474 Export-Import Bank, 82, 567 Falangists, 57; (See Suiier, Spain) Falkenhorst, Gen. Nikolaus von, 467 Faroe Islands, 472 Faupel, Wilhelm, 52 Faure, Paul, 436 Faury, Gen., 311 Fay, Sidney B., vi Fenwick, Charles, c. 563n. "Fifth Column," 42, 51 Finland, 397-428, 577; non-agg. pact with Germany, 164; Anglo-Soviet negots., 234f., 248, 251; German-Soviet pact, 281; Scandinavian States, 408f.; T . U.S.S.R. 1.21.32, 405n., 4.22.32, 405n., 12.2.39, 405n.; W . U.S.S.R., 404f.; Peace T . U.S.S.R. 3.12.40, iîiî.; German troops, 580
matum," 341; "16 points," 344f.; incorporation in Reich, 353 Darlan, A d m . Jean, 416 Davaz, Suad, 197 Davis, Norman, 449 Dean, Vera Micheles, q. 259n. Deat, Marcel, 435 D e Gaule, Gen. Clias., 498, 514, 515, 542, 543, 586; q. 495n. Degrelle, Leon, 484 D e La W a r r , Earl, q. 111 Delbos, Yvon, 248, 250, 516 Del Vayo, J. Alvarez, 45, 46, 50; q. Spanish war, 43-44n.; q. fall of Barcelona, 49 Democratic Platform (1940), q. 556x1. Denikin, Gen. Anton, q. 60 Dennis, Lawrence, c. 55on. Denmark: non-aggression T . G e r many S.si-39, 164; Finland, 4oof., 4o8f.; W . Germany, 462f., 466f. Derby, Earl of, 64 Decoux, Gov.-Gen, Jean, q. 564 "Despotism," and "dictatorship," vi, 597 Deutschland, 451 Devonshire, H.M.S., 52 Dieppe, 498 Dies Committee, 59n. Dill, Lieut. Gen. Sir John Greer, 491 Dimitrov, Georgi, 393 Dirksen, H e r b e r t von, q. 124 Dobrudja, 540, 577 D o l e salient, 539 Dombas, 473 Dominican Republic, 413 Donovan, Col. W m . J., q. 5i2n. Doriot, Jacques, 436, 516, 545 Douglas, Lewis W . , q. 55in. Doumenc, Gen. Joseph, 257, 260 Doumergue, Gaston, 436 Drax, Admiral Sir Reginald PlunkettErnle-Erle, 256, 260 Duff-Cooper, Alfred, 478, 516, 534 Dumas, Charles, 78 Duncan, Sir Andrew, 479, 535 Dunkerque, 521 Dunkirk, 491, 492, 499 Duranty, Walter, q. 13m.; 230 Dushnyk, V . S., 59n. D u t c h East Indies, 537, 552
Index
Fischer, Louis, c. 223n., c. 27811., c. 28in.; q. 24511., q. 28in. Fish, Congressman Hamilton, 153, 213; q- 447 Fitzroy, H u g h , 107 Flandin, Pierre-Etienne, 508, 515, 516; q. 146, 69-70, 104, 199 Fleming, Denna Frank, c. 447n., c. 55in., c. 569n. Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 495n., 518 Fodor, M. W . , c. 485n., c. 5260. Ford, James, 57in. Ford, H e n r y , 39 Forges-les-Eaux, 498 Fonnose, 456 Forscer, Albert, 193, 292, 294, 299, 311, 353 Fort Ebel Emael, 488 Fortune Poll, 446 Fraenkel, Ernst, c. 282n.; q. 278 Frederick the Great, q. 288 France: post-Versailles alliances, i23f., alliance T . Belgium 1920, 481; T . Italy i.y.jj", 81-87; T . T u r k e y 7.5. S8, i96f., 1.23.39, 197. 10.19.39, 395; T . Germany 12.6.38, 98; T . Poland 9-4-39, 373; T . G t . Brit. 3.28.40, 373; W . Prussia i8-jo, 274, 496; W . G e r many, 344f.; W . Italy, 502f.; armistice, 519-20; agreement with Japan on Indo-China, 564 Franco, Francisco, 41, 51, 152, 518, 526, 586; non-intervention, 45; q. fall of Barcelona, 49; Anglo-French recognition, 52f.; Roosevelt, 54; H i t ler, 544 Frangois-Poncet, A n d r e : q. France and Italy, 37; Munich, 63, 6y, q. Nazi radicals, 65; q. Munich, 66; q. H i t ler's plans, 66; reception in Rome, 80; q. denunciation of Laval-Mussolini accords, 86-7, 90; ItaUan peace moves, 363f., 367, 370; appeasement of Italy, 508 Frank, Hans, 10 r Fredericka Louisa, Princess of Brunswick, 547 French Equatorial Africa, 543 Frick, Wilhelm, 355 "Friends of Europe," q. 266-7 Fritsch, Gen. W e r n e r von, d. 430, 539 Frossard, Louis, 437 Funk, Walter, 37, 355
vu
Gafencu, Grigore, 125, 141, 157 Galabat, 539 Gallacher, WiUie, 233 Gallup Poll, 21 if., 446f. Gamelin, Marshal Maurice: campaign vs. U.S.S.R., 416, 420; Allied plans to aid Finland, 419; Daladier, 438, 496; N o r w a y , 461; Battle of France, 494. 496. 499; arrest, 497, 516; q. 429n. Garreau, M., 270 G a m e r , John Nance, 214-5 Garvin, J. L., 475 Gavrilovich, Milan, 577 Gayda, Virginio: demands Suez Canal, 81; Axis, 172; q. Finland, 410 Gdynia, 177, 296, 344^, 354 Gedye, G . E . R., 580; c. 233n., c..278n., c. 379n.; q. 102 Genoval, Gen., 415, 419 Gensoul, Adm., 521 George, Senator W a l t e r F., 554n. George II, King of Greece, 546 George V I , King of England, 127, 167, 210,478,483,546 Geraldine, Queen of Albania, 139 Germany: Anti-Comintern, 80; guarantee to Czecho-Slovakia, 96; nonagg. T . Austria y.11.36, 79; T . U.S.S.R. 4.24.22, 275, 4.24.26, 275; nonagg. T . Poland 1.26.34, 62, 157, 163; naval T . G t . Brit. 6.18.3;, 63-4, 157, 162, 163, 292; Axis T . Italy 10.29.36, 79; non-agg. T . Lithuania 3.22.39, 102, 164; T . Italy 11.2.38, 61; nonagg. T . France 12.6.38, 98; annexation T . Czecho-Slovakia 3.iS-39> 100; T . Rumania 3.19.39, 125; protectorate T . Slovakia 3.23.39, 101; alliance T . Italy S-^2.39, 171-3, 502f.; non-agg. T . Denmark S.31.39, 164, Estonia 6.-J.39, 165, Latvia 6.-J.39, 165; commercial T . U.S.S.R. 8.23.39, i$i; non-agg. T . U.S.S.R. 8.23.39, 258, 279; boundary T . U.S.S.R. 9.21.39, 382, 9.28.39, 383, io.S.39, 384; commercial T . U.S.S.R. 2.12.40, 431; commercial T . Italy 2.24.40, 504; alliance T . Japan-Italy-Hungary-Ru-
vm
Index
Greece, 143, 196, 413; and great coalition, 145; guarantees, 228, 396; A n glo-Soviet negots., 2 34f.; Fascist press campaign against, 539; W . Italy, 546f. Green, James Frederick, c. 439n. Greenland, 472 Greenwald, H a r r y J., c. 5i6n. Greenwood, Arthur, 361, 477, 478; q.
229
mania-Slovakia (1.27.40, 564?.; W . P o land, 353f.; W . Gt. Brit.-France, 372f.; W , Norway-Denmark, ^66i.; W . Belgium-Neths.-Lux., 484f.; armistice T . France 6.22.40, 519 Gershoy, Leo, c. 1050., c. 435n. Gibbon, Edward, 5, 26 Gibraltar, 543 Gibson, H u g h , 560 Gigurtu, Ion, 540, 576-7 Giraud, Andre (See "Pertinax") Giraud, Gen. Henri, 496 Glendinning, Alexander, q. ii6n. Glorious, H.M.S., 474 Glow-Worm, H.M.S., 469 Gneisenau, 468 Gobbels, Paul Joseph, 153, 157; q. 36, 290, 432, 448, 527 Godesberg Memorandum, 62, 65 Goga, Oclavian, 576 Goldman, Albert, 42in. Goring, Marshal Hermann, 98, 138, i39> i57i 167, 168, 204; and Franco revolt, 42n.; q. Daladier, 66; fall of Prague, 99; Henderson, 285^, 352, 355; Lipski, 311; "16 points," 344f., 346f., 350; W a r Cabinet, 431, 432; Welles, 458; French armistice, 519; over London, 533 G o r t , Viscount, 255, 499, 516 Graziani, Marshal, 539 Grazzi, Emmanuele, 546 G r e a t Britain: guarantee T . Belgium 4.24.^1, 481; guarantee to Prague and peace of Munich, 38, 39, 57, 93, i03f., ii2f.; alliance T . France j.28.40, 373; naval T . Germany 6.18.^s, 63-4, 157, 162, 163, 292; guarantee T . Greece, Rumania 4.13.39, 144; T . Italy 4.16.38, i4of.; Spanish T . Italy 1.12.39, 44; T . Japan ^.24.39, 206; guarantee T . P o land 3-31.39, 130-I' 4-6-39, 135; commercial T . Poland 8.2.39, 3i8n.; alliance T . Poland 8.2^.^9, îji.; guarantee T . T u r k e y S.12.39, 196; alliance T . T u r k e y 10.19.39, 395; commercial T . U.S.S.R. 10.11.39, 392; T . U.S.A. 11.iT.38, 82; T . U.S.A. 9.2.40, 561; T . Japan 6.19.40, 537, 1.11.40, 537; W . Germany, 372f.; W . Italy, 502f., 546f.
Greer, Sir Frederick Arthur, 38 Greiser, Arthur, 193, 289, 296, 297f.; 304 Grenfell, Arthur, 109 Gripenberg, G. Achates, 423 Grzybowski, Vaclav, 60, 380, 382, 379; q. Final Report, 386 Guadalajara, 79, 586 Guderian, Gen., 498 Guesde, Jules, 78 Gunther, Christian, 418, 465 Gustav, King of Sweden, 418 Gutmann, Herbert, 167 Guzzoni, Gen. Alfredo, 139 Haakon, King of N o r w a y , 487, 491 Hacha, Emil, 92, 97, 99, 391 T h e Hague, fall of, 484 Hague Convention of 1901, 457 Haikys, Leon, 42 2n. Haile Selassie, 87, 408, 412, 530 Hainan, 132, 564 Haider, Gen., 376 Halifax, Lord, 43-4, 89; non-intervention, 54; recognition of Franco, 52; Me'm Kampf, 91; a. 2.23.39, 106; q. Czecho-Slovakia, 107; CarpathoUkraine, 64, 121; protest to I5erlin, 124; guarantee to Poland, 132, 134, 140; Albania, 143, q. 142; q. encirclement, 155; a. 6.8.39, zoo; a. 6.12.39, 201; a. 6.29.39, 201; appeasement, 205, 208, 293, 294; Moscow, 226; AngloSoviet negots., 234f., 239f.; G e r m a n Polish friction, 29of.; q. Chatham House, 293; Danzig Crisis, 299; Polish alliance, 319; reply to Hitler 8.2^.39, 331; "negotiations," 333; "ultimatum," 336f., 338f.; "16 points," 345f., 350; advice to Warsaw, 352; Polish mobilization, 338; outbreak of war, 357, 359, 360, 361; Italian peace moves,
Index
363f.; 370; British ultimatum, 37if.; W . Germany, 372f.; q. Finland, 393; Finnish peace, 423; q. war aims, 439, 441-3; Welles, 458; Norway, 464f.; a. 1.22.40, 529; Baltic, 587, 590 Haller, Gen., 287 H a m b r o , C. J., 412; q. 414, 447; c. 469n. Hankey, Sir Maurice, 38, 439 H a n k o , 398, 401, 425 H a n k o w , 564 Hannover, 457 Harmsworth, Cecil, 38 Hartigan, John, 559 Harvey, T . E., 358 Hatay, 197, 198, 249, 251 Havana Conference 140, 558 Hearst, William Randolph, 177, 285 Heaton, Herbert, c. 569n. Hela Peninsula, 344f., 375 Hella, 539 Henderson, Sir Nevile, 4, 38, 98, n o , 191; q. U.S.S.R., 58n., 129, 271, 272n.; q. Czech plebiscites, 62, 63; Ukraine, 63; q. Goring, 65, 285; guarantee to Prague, 95, 97, 124, 128; return to Berlin, 156; German-Soviet pact, 268; Danzig, 286f., 29of.; q. 293; at Bayreuth, 294; crisis, 298f.; Weizacker, 302; Berchtesgaden, 307; A n glo-Soviet negots., 308; q. Hitler, 309; q. Gobbels, 305; crisis negots. with Hitler, 3i5f., 317; q. Hitler and Poland, 32 3n.; reply to Hitler, 328f., 331; q. Hitler technique, 332n.; Hitler's reply, 334; "ultimatum," 335-41; midnight interview, 342f.; "16 points," 345f., 350; Goring, 352; Polish war, 360; Brit, ultimatum, 37if.; Italian peace moves, 3645.; W . Germany, 372; leaves Berlin, 373 Henkel, Annelies, 166 Henlein, Konrad, loi, 323 Henri-Haye, Gaston, 543, 545 Henri, Jules, 49 Herriot, Edouard, 516, 543 Hertzog, J. M. B., 439n. Hess, Rudolf, 458, 519 H e y w o o d , Maj. Gen. T . G., 256 Hilton, James, q. 600 Himmler, Heinrich, 430, 504 Hindenburg, Paul von, 167, 514
IX
Hipper, 469 Hiranuma, Kjchiro, 36, 82, 171 Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, q. 566 Hitler, Adolf: q. Blut und Boden, 3; q. Poland and U.S.S.R., 61; farewêll to Frangois-Poncet, 66; a. /.50.B9J 74~7) 1- America, 74; Mussolini 1933-34, 79; fall of Prague, 99, q 100; a. 4.1.3$, 132; q. F.D.R., 157; q, Czecho-Slovakia, 157; q. Versailles, 158; a. 4-^^-39, 157-62, 190; a. 6.4.39 172; German-Soviet pact, 272f., 282f.; q. Mein Kampf, 275-6; a, 3.23.3s, 276; Ukraine, Urals, Siberia. 276; purges, 277; Danzig, 299f.; q, Bohemia and Poland, 300; H e n d e r son, 308, 3i5f.; reply to Chamberlain, 309; peace proposals, 313; q. war with France, 324; Daladier letters, 325-7; British reply, 330, 334; "ultimatum," 335f., 341; "16 points," 345, 347; a. war, 356f.; a. 10.6.3(1, 391, 430; a. 9.19.39, 430; escape from bomb, 430; a. 2.24.40, 431; q. somnambulist, 460; q. inviolability of Belgium, 481; q. 5.70.^0, 484; q. 6.^.40, 498; in Paris, 501; Italy 3.11.40, 505f.; French armistice, 519; q. wise victor, 526; a. y.19.40, 527; q. Canada, 528; July 1940, s^5^-> a. 9.4.40, 530; Brennero 10.4.40, 541; Laval, Petain, Franco, 544; partition of Transylvania, 576; Molotov, 585; secret weapon, 591; q. hierarchy, 592 Hlinka Guards, 97 Hlond, Cardinal, c. 43 in. Hoare, Sir Samuel, 83, 249, 287, 439, 440, 526; q. peace, 91; Anglo-German T., 162; and Anglo-Soviet negots., 238f.; Ambassador to Franco, 479 Hoffmann, G e n . Max, 276 Holma, M., 417 Holsti, Rudolf, 412 " H o l y Roman Empire," 583 Hong-Kong, 537, 568 Hood, H.M.S., 521 Hoover, Herbert, 411; q. 151, 450, 559, 571 Hoppenot, M., 370
Index
Jacome, Leon, 422n. Jamaica, 561 James, Archibald, q. 239 Japan, 36, 82, 85, 132, 206; Anti-Comintern, 80; German-Italian alliance, 170; U.S.S.R., 243; German-Soviet pact, 268, 279; T . U.S.A. 1911, 207, 215; T . U.S.A. 79/7, 206; T . G t . Brit. 1-24.39,206; T . U.S.S.R. 9.1S.39, 380; T . Gt. Brit. 6.19.40, 537; T . G t . Brit. l-n-40, 537; T . France 9.22.40, 564; Triple Alliance 9.2J.40, 564f. Jeans, Sir James, 38 Jeremiah, q. 583 Jibuti, 81, 83, 520 Joffre, Marshal, 494, 496 Johnson, Dean Hewlett, q. 409 Johnson, Senator Hiram, 150, 213, 553; q- 157 Johnson, Louis, q. 447 Jones, Jesse, q. 410 Jones, S. Shephard, c. i5on. Jordana, M., 52 Jugoslavia, 300, 413, 586; and Fr.-Ger. T . , 68; and great coaUtion, 145 Kalinin, Mikhail, q. 230 Kallio, Kyosti, 400; q. 407, 408 Kalthof Incident, 286, 289 Karin hall, 285 Karlsruhe, 469 Kasprzycki, M., 355 Keitel, Gen. Wilhelm, 168, 494, 544; Albania, 139; q. German-Soviet pact, 27in.; "ultimatum," 335f.; outbreak of war, 355; French armistice, 519 Kellogg Pact, (See Paris, Pact of) Kelmsley, Lord, 257 Keuchler, Gen., 500 Kennard, Sir H o w a r d , 126, 304; G e r man-Polish friction, 29of.; Danzig crisis, 297f.; advice to Warsaw, 319, 320, 352; "negotiations," 333; "ultimatum," 337f.; Polish mobihzation, 339; "16 points," 350; outbreak of war, 358 Kennedy, Joseph, 150, 205, 211; q. Royal visit to U.S., 210-1; outbreak of war, 448; q. declaration of war, 571 Kenya, 539 Keppler, Wilhelm, 99
Hore-Belisha, Leslie, 91, 416, 439, 440, 475; q. 409 H o r t h y , Regent Nicholas, 209 The Hour, c. 5911. Hudson, Robert, 65, 127, 357, 440; Moscow, 226; q. "export or die," 106; q. peace plan, 204 Hugenberg, Alfred, 167 Hull, Cordell, 150, 210, 212, 214, 215, 449; q. Albania, 140; q. aggression, 152; a. S.28.^9, 111; q. embargo, 213; outbreak of war, 448; "neutrality zone," 455; protest to London, 457; Welles' trip, 458; q. East Indies, 552; Anglo-Japanese T., 558; destroyer deal, 562; q. Triple Alliance, 567 H u n g a r y , 45, 505; Anti-Comintern, 80; Carpatho-Ukraine, 61, l o i ; Poland, 134; great coalition, 141, 145; T . Rumania, 540; Triple Alliance, 587 Huntziger, Gen. Charles, 518, 519, 520 Iceland, 472 Ickes, Harold, q. 39 Imredy, Bela, loi India, 439n. Indo-China, 537, 564, 565 Inonu, Ismet, q. 586 Inskip, Sir Thomas (Lord Caldecote), 107, 535 Iran, 413 Iraq, n o , 249 Iron Guard, 540, 575 Ironside, Gen. Edmund, 205, 255, 292, 462, 491, 534 Italy: Anti-Comintern, 80; guarantee of Czecho-Slovakia, 94f.; protectorate T . Albania 11.2j.26, 138; T . Albania 11.22.2y, 138; T . France i.j.SSt 81-7; T . Germany 10.26.36, 79; T . G t . Brit. 4.16.38, 61; Spanish T . G t . Brit. 1.12.3P, 44; commercial T . U.S.S.R. 5.39, 243; alliance T . Germany s.22.3$, 71-3, 502f.; commercial T . Germany 2.24.40, 504; Triple Alliance T . $.21.40, 564f.; W . France and G t . Brit., 502f.; armistice France, 519; W . Greece, 546f. Jackson, Robert, c. 562 Jackson, Frank, 42111.
Index
Kerensky, Alexander, 250 Kerillis, H e n r i de, 46, 88, 104, 105; q. 48, 199 Keyes, A d m . Sir Roger, q. 475 Kia Yi, q. 12 Kindersley, Sir Robert, 203 King, Mackenzie, 210, 561 Kintner, Robert, c. ifsn., c. 2i5n., c. 447n. Kiosseivanov, M., 268 Kleist, Gen., 498 Kluckhohn, Frank, c. 234n., c. 576 Knox, Col. Frank, 450, 555 Koc, Col. Adam, 2oy Kohn, Hans, c. 593 n. Koht, Halvdan, 418, 462, 465, 468n.; q. 464 Koivisto, 399, 401, 423 Konitza, Fiak, q. 140 Konoye, Prince, 36, 538, 565; q. Triple Alliance, 567; q. U.S.A., 568n. Koo, Wellington, 413 Kordt, Hans, 125, 359, 372; q. 128 Koritza, fall of, 586 Korner, Paul, 431 Kreuger, Maynard, 57 m . Kristiansand, 467 Krofta, Kamil, 65 Kubijowytsch, W . , c. fSn. Kuhn, Ferdinand, q. 107 Kunst, M., 297n. Kuomintang, 36 Kurusu, Saburo, 565; q. 566 Kuusinen, Otto, 404, 405, 421, 423f., 425 Kuznetsov, A d m . Nikolai, 257 Kwangsi, 564, 568 Kvvangtung, 564 La FoUettes, 150, 451 Laidonner, G e n . Juhan, 387 Lammers, Hans, 355 Lamoureux, Lucien, 437 Landon, Alf. M., 450 Langeron, M., 514 Langsdorff, Capt. Hans, 456 Lansbury, George, 358, 555 Lapica, Roman, q. 59n. Latvia: Anglo-Soviet negots., 2 34f., 248, 250, 251; German-Soviet pact, 281; peace T . U.S.S.R. 8.11.20, 389; non-agg. T . U.S.S.R. 2.^.32, 389;
XI
non-agg. T . G e r m a n y 6.";.^9, 164, 165; protectorate T . U.S.S.R. lo.^.sg, 389; incorporation into U.S.S.R., 165, 575 Laurent-Eynac, M., 437, 515 Laval, Pierre, 83, 87, 198, 249, 436, 437, 508, 543; non-intervention, 46; q. Ukraine, 69-70; Mussolini, 79; fall of Prague, 105; Allied-Soviet negots., 252; Vichy regime, yiof.; Minister of Justice, 515; Vice-Premier, 516; and Petain, 521; as "spider" (P. J. Philip, q.), 522n.; collaboration with Axis, 542f., q. 545; Hitler, 544 Lavrentiev, Arcady, 575 League of Nations, 147, 158, 159, 179, 197. 237. 239, 243; U.S.A., 27f.; U.S.S.R., 33, 413; non-intervention, 45; Danzig, 174; Covenant, 201; Vilna, 391; Finland, 405, 4i2f.; withdrawals from and death of, 413, 482, 576 Leahy, Rear A d m . William D., 56in. Lebrun, Albert, 127, 458, 483, 515; a. 9.2.39, 368 Lees, A. S., q. 36 Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 205 LeLuc, A d m . Maurice, 518 Lenin, Nicolai, 78, 222, 587, 594; q. free love, 258 Leopold, King of Belgium, 482, 491, 497, 499; peace proposals, 312, 3i4n.; good offices, 483; King George V I , 483; surrender, 489 Lequerica, Jose, 54, 515, 518 Lerner, Max, c. 596n. Lester, Sean, 176 Leverhulme, Lord, 203 Lewis, John L., q. 557, 571 Ley, Robert, q. 485 Libava (Libau), 389 Libreville, 586 Libya, 91 Liddell Hart, Basil, 246 Liege, 482, 484, 488 Lillehammer, 473 Lima, Declaration of, 39 Lindbergh, Col. Charles A., 39, 421; q. 450, 552, 570 Lindley, Ernest K., q. 55on. Lindley, Sir Francis, 247 Lindsay, Sir Ronald, 156
xu
Index
Mclnnis, Edgar, c. 539n. McNary, Senator Charles L., 214,557 MacDonald, Malcolm, 479 MacDonald, Ramsay, 19, 226, 478 Macmillan, Lord, 440 Maastricht, 484 Machiavelli, Nicollo, q. 172, 549; 207,
221, 377
Lipski, Josef, 177, 181, 182, 304, 316; fall of Prague, 126; Br. guarantee, 135; German-Polish non-agg. pact, 176; Anglo-Polish accord, 190; Chamberlain-Hitler letters, 310; Goring, 311; Allied advice to Warsaw, 319, 352; "ultimatum," 336f.; "16 points," 344f., 350; Ribbentrop, 351; outbreak of war, 355 Lithuania, 102, 187, 190; Anglo-Soviet negots., 234f., 250, 251, 253; GermanSoviet pact, 281; Anglo-Pohsh alliance, 318; non-agg. T. Germany 5.22.59, 102, 164; protectorate T. U.S.S.R. lo.io.jc), 385; incorporation of into U.S.S.R., 165, 575 Litvinov, Maxim, 60, 127, 226, 230, 379, 413; protest to Berlin, 125; resignation, 232; German-Soviet pact, 269, 279; Protocol 2.$.2g, 405n.; Convention 7.5.53, 405n. Lloyd, Lord, 479; q. 273n., 441 Lloyd George, David, 19, 440; great coalition, 134; q. U.S.S.R., 229, 234, 239; q. Polish collapse, 383; q. "too late," 419; Norway, 475; q. Chamberlain, 476-7; q. Churchill, 476 Locarno, 481 Locker-Lampson, Oliver, 409 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 150 Loeb, Gen., 498 Loesch, Herr von, 3o8n. Loktianov, Alexander, 257 London, T. 191$, 81, 137 London, bombing of, 523f. Loraine, Sir Percy, 156, 367, 370 Lothian, Marquess of, 156, 562 Louden, M. S., q. 483 Louvain, 488 Low, Ivy, 233 Lubienski, Michael, 286 Lubomirski, Etienne, 344, 350, 355 Ludendorff, Gen. Eric von, 276 Ludlow, Congressman Louis, 451 Lukasiewicz, Jules, 128, 338f., 357; q.
119, 120
Lundeen, Senator Ernest, 450; q. 451 Lupescu, Magda, 540 Luxemburg, Rosa, q. 282n. Luxemburg, 48if.; peace proposals, 312; W . Germany, 484f. Lvttelton, Capt. Oliver, 535
Mackensen, Herr von, 525f. Maddox, William P., q. ix Madrid, fall of, 51 Maffey Commission Report, 83 Maginot, Gen. Andre, 54, 246 Maisky, Ivan, 226, 228, 230, 231, 235, 239, 392; Anglo-Soviet negots., 238!.; Finnish peace, 432; q. 231 Malines, 488 Malmedy, 488 Maltzen, Count von, 275 Man, Henri de, 483 Manchukuo, 80, 82, 380; (See Japan) Mandel, Georges, 67, 437, 496, 513, 514, 515, 516 Mannerheim, Baron Karl Gustav von, 397. 399. 402. 415. 419. 4 " . 4^3. q427n. Manoilescu, Mihail, 540, 576, 577 Manuilsky, Dmitry Z., q. 224 Marin, Louis, 437, 497 Maritain, Jacques, q. 432 Marne, 275 Marquet, Adrien, 436, 516, 543 Martin, Gen. Maurice, q. 564 , Martinsen, M., 416 Marx, Karl, 18, 222 Masaryk, Jan, 530 Masaryk, Thomas, 92 Masefield, Sir John, 64 Massigli, Rene, 416, 420 Mastny, Vojtech, 63 Matsuoka, Yosuke, 565; q. 538, 568 Matthews, Herbert L., 558 Maurois, Andre, c. q. 5i3n. Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 497 Maxton, James, 358 Meissner, Hugo, 328f., 335f. Memel, loi, 102, 164, 181, 182, 241 Merkys, Antonas, 575 Merriam, Charles E., c. 596n. Mersa Matruh, 539 Metaxas, John, 539, 546, 547 Meuse, 484, 497
Index
Miaja, G e n . Jose, 50, 51 Michael, King of Rumania, 540 Milton, John, q. 549 Mittelhauser, G e n . Eugene, 538 Mola, G e n . Emilio, 42 Molotov, Viacheslav, 233, 240, 305, 379, 380, 384, 388, 398f., 409, 425; a. $.31.39, 240-4; q. chestnuts, 241; dilemma of i^sg, 244f.; Allied-Soviet negots., 253; a. S.31.39, 259; GermanSoviet pact, 280; q. intervention in Poland, 381; q. Polish collapse, 382; Stalin and Ribbentrop, 383; Latvia, 389; Urbsys, 390; a. 10.31.39, 392, 395; q. end of war, 393; League of Nations, 412, 413; Finnish peace, 424; a. 3.29.40, 426f.; q. Bukovina and Bessarabia, 576; a. S.11.40, 578; visit to Berlin, 585; dilemma of 1940, 587 Moltke, Hans von, 126, 178, 182, 191, 274> 494; q- :88, 295 Montbas, M. de, 95 Mongolia, 36, 82, 243 Monroe Doctrine, 159, 160, 557n. Montigny, M., 48 Montmedy, 494 "Moore, H e n r y L.," c. 5o8n. Moore-Brabazon, Col. John, 535 Moresnet, 488 Morgenthau, H e n r y , 150, 151; q. 410 Mornard, Jacques, 42in. Morrison, Herbert, 476, 478, 535 Moscicki, M., 179, 247, 311, 312, 313, 345f-. 355. 385 Mosley, Sir Oswald, 205, 534 Mount Temple, Lord, 203 Mowrer, Edgar A., vii; c. 4i7n.; q. 5i2n., 517 Moyale, 539 Mumford, Lewis, c. 596n. Munich, Peace of, 62f., 233, 241, 252, 465, 475; (See Czecho-Slovakia) Munters, Wilhelm, 389 Mussert, Anton, 484 Mussolini, Benito: Chamberlain visit to Rome, 44, 49; q. foreign anti-Fascism, 54; q. imperialism, 78; general policy, 79f.; Ukraine, 79; Laval, 87; q. Spain, 90; q. Roosevelt, 156-7; q. Axis, 170; peace moves, 363f., 370; Welles, 458; N o r w a y , 473; conferences, March, 1940, 504, 505; prep-
xui
arations for war, 508; a. declaring war, 509; in Munich, 512; at Brennero, 541 Muti, Ettore, 508 Myers, Denys P., c. ijon. Naggiar, Paul Emile, 238f., 247, 252, 257, 258 Namsos, 473 Namur, 482, 484, 488 Nanning, 568 Nansen, Dr., 468n. Napoleon Bonaparte, 238, 376, 525, 531 Napoleon, Louis, 496 Narvik, 416, 417, 419, 466, 473, 474 National Munitions Control Board, 453 Nedich, Milan, q. 541 Negrin, Juan, 49, 50, 408 Nenni, Pietro, 78, 79 Netherlands: Anglo-French guarantee, 127; Moscow, 232, 253; foreign policy, 48if.; Orange Book, 483; W . Germany, 484f.; (See Dutch East Indies) Neurath, Baron von, l o i , 167 "Neutrality" legislation (U.S.A.), 149,
152, 211, 4 1 1 , 448f., 45 if., 560
"Neutrality" Zone, Pan-American, 448, 45 5fNevsky, Alexander, 174 Newell, Sir Cyril, 532 Newfoundland, 561, 562 Newton, Basil, 38, n o N e w Hebrides, 542 N e w Zealand, 35, 413, 439n. Nice, 83 Nicolson, Harold, q. 477 Niemeyer, Sir Otto, 203 Nine-Power Pact, 106, 153, 206 Noel, Leon, 302, 304, 311, 380, 518; q. Soviets, 72; q. Danzig, 191, 288; Danzig crisis, 297f.; Chamberlain-Hitler letters, 310; advice to Warsaw, 291, 320; "negotiations," 333; "ultimatum," 338f., 341; Polish mobilization, 339; Italian peace moves, 364^ Noel-Baker, M. P., 233 Nogues, G e n . August, 91, 516, 538 Norman, Sir Montagu, 39, 64, 203, 204 Norris, Senator George, 451 Norton, Clifford J., q. 286, 291, 294
XIV
Index
"Pertinax" (Andre G i r a u d ) , 89, 231; c. 235"., c. 373n.; q. 104, 227, 438 Peru, 40, 413 Petain, Marshal Henri Philippe, 53, 54, ) 435, 436; Vice-Premier, 497; "all is 1 lost," 500; capitulation, 5 i4f.; Premier at Vichy, 515; armistice, 519; c o operation with Hitler, 518, 521, 543, 544; broadcast, 545 Peterson, Sir Maurice, 53 Petsamo, 399, 404, 421, 425 Philip, P. J., q. 199, 522n. Philippine Islands, 569 Philipps, Sir Laurence, 38 Phillips, William, 506 Philov, Bogdan, 577 Phipps, Sir Eric, 45, 140; q. 107 Pierlot, Hubert, 489 Piip, Antonin, 388 Pilsudski, Josef, 175, 191, 287, 377 Pittmann, Senator Key, 150, 152, 153, 212, 450; q. 554; d. 554n. Pius XI (Achille Rati), 44; d. 208 Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelh); election, | 208; peace moves, 209, 312, 363; ; Welles, 458, 504; Leopold, 488; R o m e conference, 504 Pivert, Marceau, c. 5i3n. Plotnokov, Victor, 577 Plymouth, Lord, 82 Pol, Heinz, c. 5i3n., c. 522n.-, q. vii Poland: Ukraine, 57f., 60; T . FranceGermany, 66f., 68; Slovakia, 125, Hungary, 134; great coalition, 141, 146; invasion of Soviet Ukraine (1^20), 175; Soviet dilemma, 225f.; ( guarantee, 228; Anglo-Soviet negots., 234f., 248, 251, 253; German-Soviet I pact, 268, 281; Henderson, 286f.; British dilemma, 287f.; peace p r o posals, 312, 313; mobilization, 338, Bonnet, 362f.; first partition, 382n.; ; peace T . U.S.S.R. 3.18.21, 75, 377; ; non-agg. T . U.S.S.R. T.2^.32, 379; non-agg. T . Germany 1^34, 62, 157, 163; T . U.S.S.R. 2.14.34, 379,11.26.38, \ 60, 2.if.3p, 60; guarantee T . G t . Brit. 3.31.39, 130-1; aUiance T . G t . Brit. 4.6.39, 135; commercial T . G t . Brit. 8.2.39, 3i8n.; alliance T . G t . Brit. 8.25.39, 3i7f-; alliance T . France
N o r w a y : non-agg. T . Germany, 164; Finland, 40of., 4o8f., 4i8f.; Allied note to, 465, 466n.; W . Germany, 466f. Niirnberg Congress 7555, 295, 315 N y e , Senator Gerald P., 150, 151, 158; q-45i Nygaardsvold, Johann, q. 418, 465, 468n. Oesch, G e n . Karl, 422 Oesel, 388 Ohquist, G e n . Harold, 422 Olav Tryggvason, 468 Oran, 520, 521 Orsenigo, Mgr. Cesare, 208 O'Ryan, Maj. Gen. John F., q. 57on. Orzel, 387 Osborne, Francis, 209 Oslo, fall of, 467 Oslo States, 481, 482 Ostermann, Gen. H u g o , 422 Oumansky, Constantine, 569 Passikivi, Juho, 401, 405, 424, 425, 598 Padelford, Norman, c. 44n. Paets, Konstantin, 387 Paldiski, 388, 398 Paleologue, Maurice, 339 Palestine, 96, 160, 198 Panama, Declaration of, 455f. Papee, Casimir, 209 Papen, Franz von, 166, 167, 195, 204, 587 "Parashots," 534 Pariani, G e n . Alberto, 139, 168 Paris, Pact of, 152, 405n., 4o6n. Paris, Declaration of, 457 Paris, fall of, 500 Pascal, q. 107 Pascua, M., q. 44, 49 Paul, Prince of Greece, 547 Pearson, Drew, c. 278n. Pepper, Senator Claude, 554 Peri, Gabriel, 104 Perkowski, M., 289 Permanent Court of International Justice, 147, 159; and U.S.A., 27f. Pershing, Gen. John J., 554, 56on. Perth, Earl of (Sir Eric D r u m m o n d ) , 44, 89, 138, 140, 156, 287; q. 142; (See T . 4.16.38 under Great Britain and Italy)
Index
9-4-39, 373; W . U.S.S.R. 1920, 377; W . Germany, 353f.; partition, 377f. Pollard, Diana, 4in. Pollard, Maj. H u g h , 4 i n . Pop, Valerian, 540 Popov, Ivan, 577 Popov, Herman, 59 Portal, Sir Charles, 532 Portes, Countess Helene de, 438, 498, 512; d. 515; (See Reynaud) Portugal, 52, 441 Potemkin, Vladimir, 60, 157, 231, 238f., 240, 253, 279, 380, 387, 389, 392, 404 Potocky, Jerzy, 119, 120 Prchala, Gen., 97, loi Pricolo, Gen., 519 Queuille, Henri, 515 Quisling, Vidkun, 467, 468n., 469, 472, 473. 490 Raczkiewicz, Wladyslaw, 386 Raczynski, Edward, 128, 132, 205, 257, 299, 357. 368, 388; q. 121, 232 Raeder, A d m . Erich, 168, 519 Rapallo, T., 275 Rathenau, Walter, 275 Rauschning, Hermann, 592; c. 593n. Reeves, Earl, c. 42 in. Reichenau, G e n . von, 376, 494, 498 Reichstag Fire, 430 Reith, Sir John, 440, 535 Renoivn, H.M.S., 469 Republican Platform 1940, q. 557n. Revay, Julian, 58, 92, 97, loi Revyuk, Emil, 59n. Reynaud, Paul: q. Maginot Line, 48; campaign vs. U.S.S.R., 420, 437f.; Norway, 461; plans to defend Belgium, 488; q. Leopold, 490; c. 495; new Cabinet, 496f.; q. miracle, 498; q. Churchill, 499; Italy, 508; Daladier, 512; plea to F. D. R., 514, 556; resignation, 515; Churchill, 515; arrest, 516 Reynolds, Senator Robert R., 153 Rexists, 484 Rhineland, 276 Ribbentrop, Joachim von: career, i66f.; Carpatho-Ukraine, 62; trip to Paris, 67; T . France, 68; q. to Bonnet, 71, 72, 73, 291; Brinon, 88; guarantee to Prague, 94, q. 95; q. Bolshevism, 96;
XV
fall of Prague, 98, 99, 106, 126; Allied protest, 124; Anglo-Polish accord, 136; q. Axis, 169; German-Polish r e lations, 176, 177, 179, i8i, 182, 187, 191, 193, 204, 257; q. Polish State, 269; German-Soviet pact, 273f., 278; visit to Moscow, 279; q. Soviet pact, 281; at Salzburg, 300, 305, 316; Chamberlain-Hitler letters, 328f., 330, 334; Hitler-Daladier letters, 326f.; "negotiations," 333; "ultimatum," 335f., 341; midnight interview, 342f.; "16 points," 345f.; Lipski, 351; outbreak of war, 360, 372, 373; peave moves, 364f.; visit to Moscow, 383; q. Finland, 410; Welles, 458; Pope, 458; q. Norway, 370, 46in., 462n.; Leopold and Wilhelmina, 483; q. Luxemburg, 486; q. Belgium and Neths., 488; Rome conference, 504, 505; French armistice, 519; July 1940,525f.; Laval, 544; Triple Alliance, 565; q. 567; partition of Transylvania, 540, 576; Molotov visit, 585 Richelieu, 46, 521, 543 Riley, Prof., 258 Rintelen, Franz von, 534 Roatta, Gen., 519 Rocque, Col. Frangois de la, 436, 516 Romains, Jules, c. ix; c. 5i3n. Roosevelt, Frankhn D., 19, 146, 150,
159, 160, i 6 r , i<55, 211, 213, 214, 215,
558; Ickes, 39; a. 14-B9, 40-1; Franco, 54; q. W a r m Springs, 153; q. H u n s and Vandals, 153; message 4.iS-39> 154-5, Royal visit, 210; peace proposals, 312; Allied advice to W a r saw, 320; outbreak of war, 355, 447, a. 448; appeal to Moscow, 405; q. Finland, 410, 411; q. Congressional inaction, 447; q. Neutrality Act, 449; Welles mission, 458; q. peace, 459; Leopold, 488; Italy, 506, 508; a. 6.10.40, 506, 554-5; reply to Reynaud, 514; q. invasion of Denmark and N o r w a y , 551; nominated, 557; r e elected, 572; q. naval and air bases, 561; a. 10.12.40, 570; q. war, 571; q.
600
Roper, Daniel C , 210 Rosenberg, Alfred, 57, c. 5811., 59, 276, 277. 278. 391. 575
XVI
Index
Sciborsky, Mykola, q. 59n. Scroggs, W . O., c. 447n. Sedan, 274, 496 Seeds, Sir William, 226, 230, 2 34f.-, 240, 247. 252. 257. 258, 392, 409 Seekt, G e n . von, 275 Seguin, M., 292 Seldes, George C , c. 79n. Selter, Karl, 248, 387, 388 Sencourt, Robert, q. 5i3n. Serol, Albert, 437 Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, 97, 485 Shakespeare, Geoffrey, 440 Shaposhnikov, Gen. Boris, 257 Shaw, G . B., 390, q. 409 Shepardson, W . H., c. 447n. Sidi Barrani, 539 Sieburg, Friedrich, 5i2n. Sikorski, Gen. Wladyslavc, 385, 386; q. 36 Silesia, 175, 328f., 341 Simon, Sir John, 28, 106, n o , 162, 205, 207, 230, 238f., 287, 439, 479; q. 109,
202
Rosenberg, Marcel, c. 5011. Rosso, Augusto, 24, 279, 387 Rothschild, Mme., 166 Rotterdam, 290, 484, 485 Rochefoucauld, La, q. 470 Rouen, 498 Rublee, George, 64 Ruhr, 102 Rumania, 36, 196; T . France-Germany, 68; great coalition, 141, 145; Soviet dilemma, 225f.; guarantees, 228, 396; Anglo-Soviet negots., 234f., 248; T . G e r m a n y 3.19.^9, 125-, T . G t . Brit. 4.13.39, 144; partition, 539^, sisU German occupation, 541; quits League of Nations, 576; T . Bulgaria $.11.40, 540; T . H u n g a r y 8.30.40, 540; T . U.S.S.R. 6.28.40, 576; Triple Alliance, 587 Runciman, Viscount, 203, 257, 287, 323 Rundstedt, Gen. von, 376, 498 Ryti, Rysto, 405, 424, 425; q. 407 Saint-Cyr, Vaux, 136, 189 Saint-Hardouin, M., 270, 292, 299, 300 Saint-Jean, Robert, c. 429n., c. 5i3n. Saint Lucia, 561 Salazar, M., 441 San Luis, Count de, 52 Saracoglu, Shukru, 141, 197, 394, 395, 577 Sarraut, Albert, 437 Savoy, 83 Saydam, Refik, 395, 577; q. 196 Sazonov, M., 338 Schacht, Horace Greely Hjalmar, 36, 39. 64, 458 Schachtman, Max, 42 in. Schafer, Congressman John, 561 Scharnhorst, 469 Schicklgruber, Alois, 216 Schleicher, K u r t von, vii, 181 Schleswlg-Holstein, 354 Schlieffen Plan 1914, 494 Schmidt, Augustus, 248, 328f., 372 Schmitt, Bernadotte E., vi Schroeder, Bruno von, 203 Schroeder, K u r t von, 167, 204 Schulenberg, Count Friedrich von der, 247, 279, 384, 387 Schuschnigg, Kurt, 408 Schwellenbach, Senator Lewis B., c. 2i5n.
Simone, Andre, c. 435n., c. 5130. Simpson, Wallace Warfield, 526 Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 144, 362, 477, 478; q. 54n., 108, 109, 229 Sitch, 58, 97, I d "Sixteen Points," 323, 343f., 360 Skoda, 495 Skoropadsky, Hetman, 59 Slovakia, 58, 92, 97, 99, 246, 381; independence, 98; T . Germany 3.23.39, l o i ; "ultimatum," 338f.; Triple Alliance, 587 Smigly-Rydz, Edward, 129, 179, 180, 185, 186, 228, 292, 341; q. Poland will fight, 293; Danzig crisis, 297f.; British alliance, 3:9; "16 points," 344f.; internment and arrest, 385-6 Smorodin, Ivan, 257 Smuts, Jan C , 439n. Soissons, 498 Somaliland, 81, 83, 539 South Africa, 413, 439n. South T y r o l , 171, 178 Spaak, Paul Henri, 489 Spain: Anti-Comintern, 52, 80; T . G t . Brit., 52; end of civil war, 41-54 Spengler, Oswald, 19, 222, 597n. Spratley Islands, 132, 564
Index
Stahmer, Heinrich von, 565 Stalin, Joseph, 2i6f.; q. 36, 184; Caballero, 5on.; a. ^.10.^9, 216-20; q. chestnuts, 219, 380; a. i.2$.s4, 220, 276; dilemma 1939, 225, iîî., 378, 394; German-Soviet pact, 274f., 282f.; purges, 277; Anglo-PoHsh aUiance, 277; Ribbentrop visit, 383; Latvia, 389; q. end of war, 393; Finland, 398f.; Christmas message to Ribbentrop 1939, 410; blunders in Finland, 421; dilemma 1940, 574, 58if.; Churchill, 590 Stamp, Sir Josiah, 64, 203 Stanhope, Earl, 138 Stanley, Oliver, 65, 106, 440, 442 Starzynski, Stefan, 385 Stauning, Thorvald, 467 Stavanger, 419, 467 Stavisky scandal, 434n. Steiger, G. N y e , c. 569n. Steinhardt, Lawrence A., 257, 400, 405, 424 Stern, G e n . Gregory, 422 Stevens, Maj., 431 Stimson, H e n r y L., 28, 151, 207, 211; q- 152, 555 Stohrer, Eberhard von, 436, 518 Stoica, Basil, 577 Stowe, Leland, c. 467n. Stoyadinovich, Milan, 47 Strabolgi, Baron, q. 526 Strang, William, 38, 252, 257 Strasbourg, 521 Strasser, Otto, 430 Strauss, G e n . von, 498 Streicher, Julius, q. 99 Streit, Clarence, 594, c. 595n. Stresemann, Gustav, 19, 275 Stuelpnagel, G e n . Heinrich von, 520 Sturda, Prince Costin, 587 Suez Canal, 81 Suma, M., q. 568n. Surier, Ramon Serrano, 51, 209, 542, 544. 586 Surcouf, 521 Suritz, Jacob, 67, 127, 140, 238, 438 Suvorov, Gen., 279 Svinhufvud, Per, 423 Sweden: non-agg. pact Germany, 164 Finland, 399f., 4o8f., 413, 4i8f., 423 German attack on N o r w a y , 472f. German troops in, 575
xvii
Swing, Raymond Gram, c. 539n. Switzerland, 127, 231, 254 Syria, 497 Syrovy, Gen. Jan, 276 Szathmary, M., 355 Szccklers, 540 Szembeck, Count Jean, 321, 338f., 380 Taft, Senator Robert A., q. 553 Tahiti, 542 Tangiers, 518, 586 Tannenberg, 295, 315 Tanner, Vanio, 398, 401, 405, 423, 424 Taranto, 586 Tardieu, Andre, 436 Tarragona, 44 Tatarescu, 576 Taylor, Edmund, c. 434n.; q. 517 Taylor, Myron C , 458 Taylor, Paul B., c. 58n. Teleki, Paul, 157, 505, 540, 576, 587 Terboven, Josef, 472 Teutonic Knights, i73f., 387 Thailand, 568 Thatcher, Max B., c. 397n. Thomas, Norman, 55on., 57in. Thompson, Dorothy, 411; q. 595n. Thorez, Maurice, 432, 433, 513 Thouvinin, M., 103 Thyssen, Fritz, vii, c. 593n.; 167, 204 Tientsin, 205 Tilea, M., 125 Tiso, Mgr. Josef, 92, 93, 97, 98, loi, 338 T o g o , Adm,, 380 Tolischus, Otto, c. 265n. Tolstoi, Alexei, q. 382 Tonningen, Rost Van, 484 Tournelle, M. de la, 188, 190, 296; q. .89 Tours, 514 Toynbee, Arnold J., c. iin.; q. i5n.,
22-3
T r a d e Agreements Act, 459n. Translyvania, 540, 576 Treaties (See T . under names of States) Trinidad, 561 Triple Alliance 1940, 542, 564-6, 569, 580, 587 (See Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania) Triple Entente, 275 Trondheim, 417, 467, 473
XVlll
Index
Valens, Emperor, 12 Valera, Eamon de, 160 Valeri, Mgr. Valerio, 208 Vandenberg, Senator Arthur, 150,151, 207, 552; q. 450 Van Kleffens, M., 486 V a n Overstraaten, Gen., 499 Vansittart, Robert, 238f., 252 Van Zeeland, Paul, 482 Vasilevsky, M., 425 Vatican, 51, 151, 208, 209, 320 (See Pius XI and Pius XII) Venlo, 431, 483 Verdun, 500 Verlaci, Shefket, 139 Versailles, T . 29, l o i , 158,161, 220, 275, 308, 327, 372, 442 Vichy, 5i6f. Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, 52, 139, 313, 314 Viipuri, 398, 399, 423, 425 Villers-Cotterets, 499 Vilna, 102, 175, 385, 391 Vindava ( W i n d a u ) , 389 Vladimir, Grand Duke, 59 Voegelin, Eric, c. 593n. Voionmaa, Prof. Vaino, 424, 425 Volosin, Mgr. Augustin, 92, 93f., 97, 101, 233, 240, 276; q. 58, 60, 258, 379, 393. Voltaire, q. v Vorys, Congressman John M., 213 Vuillemin, Gen., 420 Walden, G e n . Karl, 424, 425 Wallace, H e n r y A., 557 Wakama, 456 Walsh, Senator David L, 150, 151, 558; q. 556 W a n g Ching-Wei, 36 W a r s (See W . under names of States) Warsaw, siege of, 385f. Washington, George, 448 Watson, Dorothy, 4in. Weizmann, D r . Chaim, 199 Weizacker, Count Ernst von; Munich, 63; guarantee to Prague, 94, 99; Allied protest, 124; Anglo-Polish accord, 135, 190, 286; German-Polish friction, 289, 29of.; Danzig crisis, 293, 298; Coulondre, 301; Henderson, 302; "16 points," 350; outbreak of ! war, 372; q. 373
Trotsky, Leon, 222, 324; q. 579; d. 42in. Tukhachevsky, Marshal, q. 175 Tunisia, 83, 90, 91 T u r k e y : great coalition, 145, i95f.; guarantee, 228; Anglo-Soviet negots., 234f., 243; U.S.S.R., 394f.; Finland, 4i9f.; T . France 7.5.5^, 196; T . France 6.23.39, 197; T . G t . Brit. 5.12.39, 197; T . Allies, 10.19.39, 395' 4 ' 5 ; Greece, 546; Germany and U.S.S.R., 577 Ukraine, 55f., 581!., 595n. (See Carpatho-Ukraine, Poland, U.S.S.R., Hungary) Uluots, Juri, 388 "Union N o w , " 515 Urbsys, Juozas, 390, 575 Union of Socialist Soviet Republics: peace T . Poland 1921, 175, 377; peace T . Estonia 2.2.20, 388; peace T . Lithuania "J.12.20, 390; peace T . Latvia, 8.11.20, 389; T . Germany 4.2^.22 and 4.24.26, 275; non-agg. T . Lithuania 9.28.26, 390; non-agg. T . Latvia 2.5.32, 389; non-agg. T . Finland 4.22.32, 405n.; non-agg. T . Estonia 4.5.32, 379; non-agg. T . Poland 1.25.32, 379; T . Poland 2.14.34, 379; T . Poland 11.26.38 and 2.19.39, 60; T . Italy 5.39, 243; commercial T . Germany 8.19.39, 257; non-agg. T . Germany 8.23.39, 258-9; boundary T . G e r m a n y 9.21.39, 382, 9.28.39, 383, 10.5.39, 384. 389; T . Japan 9.15.39, 380; protectorate T . Estonia 9.28.39, 388, Latvia 10.5.39, 3^9, Lithuania 10.10.39, 385, 390; commercial T . G t . Brit. 10.11.39, 392; commercial T . G e r m a n y 2.12.40, 431; Kuusinen T . Finland 12.2.39, 405n.; peace T . Finland 3.12.40, 424f.; W . Finland, 404f; partition T . Rumania 6.28.40, 576 United States of America: Constitution q. 27, 29; foreign policy in general, i47f., 445f.; neutrality policy, 3of., 149, 152, 211, 411, 448f., 45if.; Baltic States, 250, 558; Finland, 4oof.; T . Japan 1911, 207, 215; T . G t . Brit. 11.17.38, 82; T . Canada 8.18.40, 561; T . G t . Brit. 9.2.40, 561 Uzes, Countess Marie Louise de Crussols de, 435, 512 (See Daladier)
hidex
Wells, H. G., q. 409 Welles, Sumner, 39, 150, 165, 312, 424, 448, 458, 505, 545, 568, 560; q. neutrality zone, 454; q. trip abroad, 567; q. Baltic States, 558 Welzceck, Count Johannes von, 104,
29of.; q. 72
XIX
Werth, Alexander, c. 450. Weygand, Gen. Maxime, 175, 238f., 395, 4155., 420, 436; 489, 497 (career), 498 (generalissimo); capitulation, q. 22in., 277n. 5i4f.; Vichy, 520, 543; to No. Africa, Wood, Sir Kingsley, 435, 439, 440, 479 586; q. retreat, 498; q. offensive, 499; Woodring, Henry, 151 q. life or death, 500; q. "Communist" Woolf, Leonard, q. 32n. rioting, 513 Woolton, Lord, 479 Wheeler, Senator Burton K., 561; q. Wright, Quincy, c. 563n. 447 Yaroslavski, Emelyan, 36 Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., c. 58n. Ybarncgary, Jean, 497, 522, 543 White, Henry, q. 475 Ybarra, T. R., q. ix White, John W., 39 Yonai, Premier, 538 White, Wilbur W., c. i97n. Yrjo-Koskinen, A. S., 403 White, William Allen, 553 Wilhelm, Prince of Weid, 137 Zaleski, August, 386 Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, 274 Wilhelm II, German Emperor, 274, 300 Zay, Jean, 67 Wilhelmina, Queen of The Nether- Zelogowski, Col., 287 lands, 3i4n., 483, 489, 491; q. 485-6 Zetland, Marquess of, q. 106 Williams, Wythe, 526 Zhdanov, Andrei, 233, 245; q. 253 WilJkie, Wendell L., 557, 563, 573; q. Zionists, 198 Allied victory, 552; q. war, 555, 571 Zog, King of Albania, 138, 139, 239
Wilson, Cecil, 358 Wilson, Sir Horace, 204, 252 Wilson, Hugh, 447 Wilson, Woodrow, 19, 159, 201, 413, 415, 440, 445, 594 Windsor, Duke of, 209, 526 Wilkelman, Gen. Henrik, 485 Witzleben, Gen. von, 500 Wohlthat, Dr. Helmuth, 204 Wolfe, Henry C , c. 265n., c. 278n.;
A NOTE ON THE T Y P E IN W H I C H THIS BOOK IS SET
This book was set on the Linotype in Janson, a reciitting inade direct from the type cast from matrices (now in possession of the Stempel foundry, Frankfurt am Main) made by Anton Janson some time between 1660 and 1681. Of Janson^s origin nothing is known. He may have been a relative of Justus Janson, a printer of Danish birth who practised in Leipzig from 161^ to 163^. Some time between I6J:J and 1668 Anton Janson, a punch-cutter and type-founder, bought from the Leipzig printer Johann Erich Hahn the type-foundry which had formerly been a part of the printing house of M. Friedrich Lankisch. Janson^s types were first shown in a specimen sheet issued at Leipzig about i6j^. Janson's successor, and perhaps his son-in-law, Johann Karl Edling, issued a specimen sheet of Janson types in 168$. His heirs sold the Janson matrices in Holland to Wolff gang Dietrich Erhardt, of Leipzig.
y'
COMPOSED, PRINTED, AND BOUND BY H. WOLFF, NEW YORK PAPER MADE BY S. D. WARREN CO., BOSTON

Schuman-Night Over Europe

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FREDERICK L.

NIGHT OVER EUROPE

N E W YORK . ALFRED A KNOPF

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Williamstoivn, Mass., Armistice Day, 1940

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1. The Barbarians 2. Thoughts Before Darkness 3. The Last Frontiers

1. Blackshirt Blackmail 2. Czecho-Slovakiat March 15, 1939 3. Anger in Birmingham

1. Eastern Front 2. Albania t April 8, 1939 3. Words from Washington

123 137 146

Fascist Axis Danzig's Freedom Poland's Fate Back to Appeasement xiii

166 173 183 195

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1. Stalin's Price 2. Chamberlain's Honor 3. Hitler's Bargain

216 247 272

377 377 387 397

1. The Westwall 2. Transatlantis

1. The Northlands t April 9, 1940 2. Chamberlain to Churchill

1. The Lowlands t May 10, 1940 2. Sedan II

1. Duce's Hour 2. The French Republic t June 16, 1940

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Urbis et Orbis Stronger than Words Dilemma in Muscovy Union Tomorrow

523 523 548 573 583 follows page 600

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DESIGN FOR DYING

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DESIGN FOR DYING

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Design for Dying

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Design for Dying

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Design for Dying

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Thoughts Before Darkness

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Thoughts Before Darkness

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Design for Dying

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Thoughts Before Darkness

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Thoughts Before Darkness

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Design for Dying

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Thoughts Before Darkness

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