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Slide 3
Overview
Introduction
Motivation and Applications Technology Overview
Communication
IEEE 802.11p Position-based Routing
Slide 4
3. Active Safety
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Accident Phases
Active Safety Passive Safety
Accident!
Slight Accident Minor Impact
Serious Accident
Phases
1-3
4-6
7
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 7
Phases
1-3
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Telematics Horizon
Communication (C2C / C2I) Local Sensors (e.g. Laserrange/Radar) On Board Systems (e.g. ESP)
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 9
! !
TOC RSU
Congestion Warning: At (x,y), use alt. route
RSU
Slide 10
RSU
Car Manuf.
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Application Categories
eSafety
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eSafety Applications
Traffic signal violation warning Stop sign violation warning General in-vehicle signage Left turn assistant Intersection collision warning Pedestrian crossing information Emergency vehicle approaching warning Emergency vehicle signal preemption Emergency vehicle at scene warning Vehicle safety inspection Electronic license plate Electronic driver's license In-vehicle Amber alert (crime haunt) Stolen vehicles tracking Post-crash/breakdown warning SOS services Pre-crash sensing Event data recording Work zone warning Curve-speed warning (rollover warning) Vehicle-based road condition warning Infrastructure-based road condition warning Cooperative (forward) collision warning Emergency electronic brake lights Blind spot warning / lane change warning Wrong way driver warning Rail collision warning
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
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<Videos go here>
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Legislation
Member States
Japan
AHSRA AVS3
eSafety FORUM
C2C-CC
Road-Op. INFONEBBIA CEPT ITU AIDA Invent NOW Fleetnet Suppl. Insurance Telcos
Standardization
Vehic.-manuf.
Frequency Regulation
National Projects
Stakeholders
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 17
Overview
Introduction
Motivation and Applications Technology Overview
Communication
IEEE 802.11p Position-based Routing
Slide 19
GSM
50
RFID
Broadcaster
Vehicle to Vehicle
Slide 20
Overview
Introduction
Motivation and Applications Technology Overview
Communication
IEEE 802.11p Position-based Routing
Slide 21
Slide 22
Public Safety Public Safety/ Public Safety/ V2V Private Private Ch. 172 Ch. 174 Ch. 176 5.850
Public Safety/ Public Safety/ Public Safety Private Private Intersections Ch. 180 Ch. 182 Ch. 184 5.925
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 23
DSRC Performance
Slide 24
Overview
Introduction
Motivation and Applications Technology Overview
Technology
IEEE 802.11p Position-based Routing
Slide 25
Classification
Ad-hoc Networks Single-Hop Bluetooth 802.11 iBSS static Multi-Hop dynamic
Mesh Netw.
WSNs
Others
VANETs
Slide 26
Highly dynamic network topology Different movement patterns (cities vs. highways) Relatively good availability of resources (esp. energy) compared to small mobile devices
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 27
Routing in VANETs
Often position based addressing
GeoBroadcast: send to all nodes within a region All cars in the area of Ulm/B10: Accident on Adenauerbridge when heading towards Neu-Ulm GeoAnycast: send to arbitrary node within a region How are traffic conditions three km ahead?
Slide 28
A
Path: ACDE
B
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
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U V X W
Slide 30
Local Maximum
What to do when there is no better neighbor? Strategies
GPSR: parameter-Mode; left-hand rule to escape local maximum CGGC: cache and let mobility resolve the local maximum W U T S
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
X D
Slide 31
Position-based Routing
Advantages Applications often related to position No route discovery/management
Scalability Well suited for high node mobility
GPSR DSR
DSR
GPSR
Slide 32
Overview
Introduction
Motivation and Applications Technology Overview
Technology
IEEE 802.11p Position-based Routing
Slide 33
! !
TOC RSU
Congestion Warning: At (x,y), use alt. route
RSU
Slide 34
RSU
Car Manuf.
Slide 35
Sounds good
BUT
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 36
TOC RSU
! !
! !
RSU
Slide 37
RSU
Position Beacon
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B F2
F1
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 40
Single roadside attacker is able to intercept and drop the entire data traffic in an area
2006 - Frank Kargl - CCC Ulm
Slide 41
Solutions
Provable Positioning Physical Measurement Heuristics
Related work on secure GPS etc. Change GPS??? TOA, TDOA, Additional Hardware for positioning??? Simple, easy Sufficient effective?
Slide 42
M Ar K L
Example
Radio Range
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Slide 45
Other Sensors
Mobility Grade Threshold (MGT)
Based on limited velocity of nodes Maximum node velocity := Vmax
Overhearing
Nodes monitor data traffic of neighboring nodes and try to identify irregularities Own packet is routed to a less suitable neighbor at the next hop Other nodes forward packets to a node that normally should not be able to receive the packet
Map-based Verification
Based on the assumption that vehicles move mainly on roads
Slide 46
Privacy in VANETs
Slide 47
Changing Pseudonyms
Concept:
Nodes change their ID from time to time Observations cannot (trivially) be linked
Drawbacks
Linking pseudonyms might be possible due to
Correlation of identifiers between changes Cross-layer issues, heuristics, hardware fingerprinting, Context of the node (e.g. unique itinerary, few nodes)
Slide 48
Changing Pseudonyms
If pseudonyms change frequently, privacy profits On the other hand, geographic routing performance declines due to invalid neighbor table entries
After a pseudonym change, old (ID,Position)-tupel remain in neighbor tables until expiration Routing metric only respects neighbor position Probability of selecting outdated neighbors as next hop
A C' C D F E
Slide 49
p2
P = loss
2c
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Slide 52
Security Mechanisms
Identified ~20 different security mechanisms needed to conquer the most attacks Examples
PKI for VANET
Prevent sibyl attacks Efficient revocation Cheap operation
Identification & Authentication Concepts Identification Authentication of sender and sender is Authentication of receiver Property authentication Authentication of intermediate nodes Privacy Concepts Resolvable anonymity Total anonymity Location obfuscation Integrity Concepts Encryption Integrity protection Detection of protocol violation Jamming protection Tamper-resistant comm. system DRM Replay protection Consistency/context checking Attestation of sensor data Location verification Access Control/Authorization Concepts Access control Firewall/Checkpoint Closed user groups Filtering (e.g at intermediate nodes) Sandbox
Anonymization layer
Pseudonyms with revocation
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Photo DaimlerChrysler
THE END!!!
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