Expanding the social contract: Rousseau, gender and the problem of judgment.

Authors: Simon-Ingram, Julia Source: Comparative Literature; Spring91, Vol. 43 Issue 2, p134, 16p Document Type: Literary Criticism Subject Terms: *SOCIAL contract *COMMUNICATIVE competence *COMPETENCE & performance (Linguistics) *FEMINISM *SEX differences (Biology) *PRAGMATICS People: ROUSSEAU, Henri, 1844-1910 HABERMAS, Jurgen, 1929Abs trac t: Defines the formal and structural similarities between Rousseau's social contract and dialogue, using Jurgen Habermas' ideal speech situation as a theoretical model. Relationship constructed between the reader and the text in the dialogue 'Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques'; Issue of the exclusion of women from both the 'civic public' of social contract and philosophical dialogue; Habermas's theory of universal pragmatics; Gender in Rousseau's text.

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EXPANDING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ROUSSEAU, GENDER AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT
Contents 1. Works Cited

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LIKE social contract theory, which has been criticized by Marxists and feminists alike for its conception of a classless and homogeneous "public," philosophical dialogue could be accused of excluding heterogeneous elements.[1] The universal ideals of reciprocity, freedom, and equality, can be read as homogenizing difference and instituting male authority, rather than as preserving difference. In the following analysis, I will first lay out the formal and structural similarities between Rousseau's social contract and dialogue, using Habermas's ideal speech situation as a theoretical model. I will then examine closely the relationship constructed between the reader and the text in the dialogue Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, in an attempt to construct an/other kind of "public." Finally, I will raise the issue of the exclusion of women from both the "civic public" of social contract and philosophical dialogue, thereby calling into question the "universality" of Habermas's universal pragmatics. I will consider whether or not Rousseau succeeds in preserving gender difference with his construction of a "sympathetic reading public." Jurgen Habermas's grounding of a communicative ethic in formal-universalizable principles of speech establishes the theoretical foundation for the link between linguistic structures and political formations. Habermas's conception of the ideal speech situation as a backdrop for all communicative action articulates not only the principles posited by the dialogue form itself, but also the constraints imposed by Rousseau's version of social contract theory.[2] Habermas's theory of universal pragmatics seeks to uncover the conditions for the possibility of intersubjective understanding. He defines understanding as "an accord (between two subjects) concerning the rightness of an utterance in relation to a mutually recognized normative background" ("Universal Pragmatics" 3). As the condition for the possibility of this type of understanding Habermas posits the concept of communicative competence. Communicative competence entails both a priori and a posterior) universals, or mastery of what Habermas calls the ideal speech situation. For him it is the essentially dialogic nature of language, embodied by the ideal speech situation, which establishes the conditions for the possibility of mutual understanding ("Communicative Competence" 369). He characterizes the conditions for the possibility of understanding represented by the ideal speech situation as the linguistic conceptualizations of truth, freedom, and justice ("Communicative Competence" 372). Thus the ideal speech situation posits: 1) a common idiom, 2) a true proposition, 3) truthful self-representation, and 4) unconstrained consensus ("Universal Pragmatics" 2-3). The common idiom entails a shared medium for communication. The true proposition provides for something to be transmitted. Truthful self-representation ensures that the subjects trust one another. And unconstrained consensus provides for the recognition of the rightness of the knowledge transmitted. Ideally, mutual understanding would be constituted by a free and mutual recognition of the rightness of a validity-claim. Habermas's claim that the ideal speech situation represents a basic level of competence is grounded largely in his analysis of the function of pronouns in the constitution of identity. Like Benveniste,[3] Habermas underscores the role of the pronouns "I" and "you" in the structuring of intersubjective relations. His claim that reciprocity is a regulative ideal underlying all communicative action derives from his analysis of pronouns. Every being, who says "I" to himself asserts himself towards the Other as absolutely different And yet at the same time he recognizes himself in the latter as another I, and is conscious of the reciprocity of this relationship; every being is potentially his own Other. These dialogue roles of I and You are reproduced on the level of We and You, while He, She, and They describe roles of virtual or potential participation in the dialogue. ("Communicative Competence" 370, emphasis added) According to Habermas, the basic level of communicative competence, based on the function of pronouns, grounds the regulative ideals of reciprocity, freedom, and equality underlying all communication. Thus, he has grounded a "universalizable" normative background for all communicative interaction. This model of the ideal speech situation, based on cognitive-linguistic universals, also provides the ground for ideology critique.[4] The ideal speech situation establishes the possibility of raising validity-claims and legitimating norms through dialogue. I t is according to these guidelines that legitimate political authority would be established. Under the conditions prescribed by the ideal speech situation, society can legitimately be held to particular norms.

This is true because the ideal speech situation entails the constitution of generalizable interests through dialogue. According to Habermas, If under these conditions [the ideal speech situation] a consensus about the recommendation to accept a norm arises argumentatively, that is, on the basis of hypothetically proposed, alternative justifications, then this consensus expresses a "rational will." Since all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in the practical deliberation, the "rationality" of the discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common interest ascertained without deception. The discursively formed Will may be called "rational" because the formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can arise only through appropriately interpreted, generalizable interests, by which I mean needs that can be communicatively shared. (Legitimation Crisis 108) Legitimate authority is, therefore, constituted by and through conditions of reciprocity, equality, and freedom derived from dialogue, which ensure social justice. Normative claims must be challenged in open dialogue, and ultimately consented to without constraint, in order that general interests be protected. Thus Habermas's notion of communicative competence establishes a theoretical link between linguistic theory and the legitimation of political authority. In Rousseau's formulation of the social contract it is not difficult to trace out the universal constraints of equality, freedom, and reciprocity which ensure the legitimacy of the social bond. In stating the advantages of civil society over the state of nature, he constantly stresses increased liberty and equality. The reciprocity of the contract, in fact, guarantees civil liberty and equality. Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la supreme direction de la volonte generale; et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout. (Du contrat social 51-52) On volt par cette formule que l'acte d'association renferme un engagement reciproque du public avec les particuliers . . . (53,emphasis added) Ce que l'homme perd par le contrat social, c'est sa liberte naturelle et un droit illimite a tout ce qui le tense et qu'il peut atteindre; ce qu'il gagne, c'est la liberte civile et la propriete de tout ce qu'il possede. (55) But the social contract also entails the formation of the general will. Whereas in the state of nature the will of all reflects private interest, the general will of civil society looks out for the common good. The general will, in Rousseau's social contract, represents a universalization of interest which takes on a normative character. Paradoxically, under the social contract, if the general will is functioning properly, the need for discussion or dialogue is precluded by universal consent to the proper course of the state. The ideal state would be a small and homogeneous group of citizens requiring a minimum of legislation because of social unanimity (83,147). One could also argue that due to the universalization and internalization of a particular ideology Rousseau's ideal state would approach totalitarianism. Be that as it may, his social contract, like Habermas's communicative ethic, appeals to the constraints of reciprocity, equality, and liberty as universalizable norms. But whereas in Habermas the function of pronouns in the constitution of reciprocal, intersubjective relations highlights the recognition and preservation of difference, in Rousseau's social contract the efficacy of homogeneity is underscored. For the practical functioning of the state, the homogeneity of private interests subsumed under the general will is desirable. Habermas's use of difference in the grounding of reciprocity as a universalizable norm may, in effect, diminish difference in view of formal similarity. I will return to this point; suffice it to say that in both Rousseau and Habermas the elevation of dialogic presuppositions to the status of universalizable norms leads to the creation of procedural grounds for mediating difference. The general will, insofar as it is constituted by and through shared interest in the common good, guards against the interference of private interest in the public, political realm. But the question of what to do in the case of disagreement inevitably arises. The dialogic genre, and even dialogue as conceived by Habermas in the ideal speech situation, implies disagreement of some kind. Despite the fact that under ideal conditions Rousseau's state would only use the public assembly to explicitly affirm the implicit consensus and unanimity represented by the general will, he must provide for the possibility of disagreement in questions of judgment. In chapter III, Book II of the Contract

social he addresses the question of whether or not the general will can err. His answer seeks to distinguish between the general will, which is an ideal, therefore infallible, and what people actually do: Il s'ensuit de ce qui precede que la volonte generale est toujours droite et tend toujours a l'utilite publique: mais il ne s'ensuit pas que les deliberations du peuple aient toujours la meme rectitude. On veut toujours son bien, mais on ne le volt pas toujours: jamais on ne corrompt le peuple, mais souvent on le trompe, et c'est alors seulement qu'il paroit vouloir ce qui est malt (66) He seems to suggest that although the general will is infallible, people are not. Therefore, when people err, they are not embodying the general will. On the surface such a distinction seems to remedy the problem. If an error in judgment occurs, it is because people have strayed from the general will and have acted according to their own private interests. However, this does not provide a remedy for human error. It does not even offer any grounds for criticizing particular actions. Ultimately, Rousseau is simply acknowledging the fact that people make mistakes in questions of judgment. In lieu of a solution he suggests some procedural guidelines designed to check errors of judgment and to protect against the tyranny of the majority acting out of private interest. The public assembly is designed to allow for an arena in which all points of view can be discussed freely and openly (130-41). Rousseau suggests that the government must guarantee the right of its citizens to discuss questions of legislation openly, as an extension of the right to vote. J'aurais ici bien des reflexions a faire sur le simple droit de voter dans tout acte de souverainete; droit que rien ne peut oter aux citoyens; et sur celui d'opiner, de proposer, de diviser, de discuter, que le gouvernement a toujours grand vein de ne laisser qu'a ses membres; mais cette importante matiere demanderait un traite a part, et je ne puis tout dire dans celui-ci. (147) Although he does not elaborate on the right to discuss matters of public interest openly, his reference to the Roman assembly (147-63) suggests that, although the ideal government under social contract would not require public debate because of social unanimity, in important matters of state the public assembly is designed to promote this social unanimity through dialogue. Because each member of the assembly is equal, all interests are equal, and ought ideally to cancel each other out. The general will is embodied when unconstrained consensus is achieved through dialogue. The regulative ideas of freedom and equality encourage the realization of the general will in the public assembly. Thus, much like Habermas, Rousseau believes in the power of rational argumentation, under ideal conditions, to override private interest in favor of the common good. Rousseau's use of the dialogic form for Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques demonstrates his faith in these regulative ideas. Freedom and equality, as we have already seen in Habermas's formulation, underlie the dialogic form in its claim to attain truth. When Rousseau himself is the object of judgment, he trusts this form to protect him from the tyranny of unjust public opinion. In Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques an error in judgment has already occurred with respect to Rousseau's writing. Rousseau has been misjudged by a reading public manipulated by a league of conspirators. Jean Starobinski describes the relationship between the Contrat social and Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques as follows: cette unanimite qui faisait le caractere exaltant du pacte social, la voici qui se realise contre Rousseau, dans l'inexplicable hostilite de toute une generation. "La ligue est universelle, sans exception, sans retour." Le pronom on, qui dans le Contrat social representait la volonte generale, designe maintenant l'anonymat collectif d'une conjuration universelle. (245) Thus the dialogue, framed by an explanation of the use of the form and a history of the work, attempts to vindicate the misjudged author. It occurs between a Frenchman, presumably part of the league of conspirators, and the character Rousseau, a faithful reader of Jean-Jacques's texts. Jean-Jacques is, then, the much-maligned author and victim of a conspiracy. The introduction to the dialogue sets up a reading contract of sorts. The first footnote insists that the judgment of the text must take place only when the reader has read the text in its entirety.

Qui que vous soyez que le ciel a fait l'arbitre de cet ecrit, quelque usage que vous ayez resolu d'en faire, et quelque opinion que vous ayez de l'auteur, cet auteur infortune vous conjure par vos entrailles humaines, et par les angoisses qutil a souffertes en l'ecrivant, de n'en disposer qu'apres l'avoir lu tout entier (9:102 n.1) The author acknowledges the hardship that this condition presents. He apologizes for the work's frequent repetitions and lack of order by explaining the anguish involved in attempting to make revisions. But the form of the work also serves a particular function: readers who are truly "bons esprits "will be able to penetrate the repetitions and chaos to grasp the truth which it contains. Voyant l'excessive longueur de ces Dialogues, j'ai tense plusieurs fois de les elaguer, d'en oter les frequentes repetitions, d'y mettre un peu d'ordre et de suite; jamais je n'ai pu soutenir ce nouveau tourment: le vifsentiment de mes malheurs, ranime par cette lecture, etouffe toute ['attention qu'elle exige. (9:105) Therefore, those who read the entire text attentively will be in a position to judge it as well as its author. The metamorphosis of the Frenchman in the dialogue provides a model for judging. This one-time member of the league of conspirators assumes the position of the impartial and just judge required by the text by following the example offered by his interlocutor, Rousseau. His transformation in turn models the changes required of the actual reader of Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques.[5] A second requirement for impartial judgment imposed by the text is that all preconceived notions and opinions about the text or its author be abandoned: one must always judge for oneself. En un mot, je juge ici par moi-meme. Nous ne pouvons done raisonner au pair, vous et mod, que vous ne vous mettiez en etat de juger par vous-meme aussi . . . Ne songez point a l'auteur en les lisant; et sans vous prevenir ni pour ni contre, livrez votre ame aux impressions qu'elle en recevra. Vous vous assurerez ainsi par vous-meme de ['intention dans laquelle ont ete ecrits ces livres, et s'ils peuvent etre l'ouvrage d'un scelerat qui couvoit de mauvais desseins. (9:125-26) This attempts to ensure against the corruption which causes people to stray from their true nature. In order to be an impartial judge, it is necessary to ignore corrupt public opinion and convention, and thereby, rediscover the natural goodness of human nature. The act of reading occurs under conditions similar to the state of nature: the reader is alone and unfettered by conventions or public opinion. Only in this state is s/he able to exercise good judgment. The text, for Jean-Jacques, is a transparent medium through which communication or even a kind of communion takes place. Understanding takes place in the instant that a bond of sympathy is created between author and reader. But in order to get at the real Jean-Jacques, one must read the works from a period when he was not beset with the difficulty of defending himself. Ainsi ce n'est plus sur les oeuvres presentes qu'il faut le juger, meme quand on pourroit en avoir le narre fidele. Il faut retrograder vers les temps ou rien ne l'empechoit d'etre lui-meme, ou bien le penetrer plus intimement . . . pour y fire immediatement les ve'ritables dispositions de son ame, que tent de malheurs n'ont pu aigrir. En le suivant dans les temps heureux de sa vie, et dans ceux memes ou, deja la proie de vos messieurs, il ne s'en doutoit pas encore, vous eussiez trouve l'homme bienfaisant et doux qu'il etoit et passoit pour etre avant qu'on l'eut defigure (9:268, emphasis added). Reading provides immediate access to the true self of the author, rather than some type of mediated access. It is as if the souls of the reader and the author achieve communion through the vehicle of the text. The text disappears before the manifestation of the author behind it.[6] Thus Jean-Jacques's work provides access to his true self but also teaches an important lesson. The distinction between appearance and reality is central to his work, and is also critical for judging Jean-Jacques. It is the real Jean-Jacques that the reader is asked to judge, not the appearance. Jean-Jacques teaches the reader to distinguish between appearance and reality for the public good. The art of dissimulation is an evil which covers the natural good in men. The "bon esprit" knows how to recognize dissimulation, and therefore, knows good from bad: Le seul Jean-Jacques me parut chercher la verite avec droiture et simplicite de cocur. Lui seul me parut montrer aux hommes la route du vrai bonheur en leur apprenant a distinguer la realite de l'apparence, et l'homme de la nature de l'homme factice et fantastique que nos institutions et nos prquges lui ont substitue: lui seul en un mot me parut, dans sa vehemence, inspire par le seul amour du bien public, sans vue secrete et sans interet personnel (9:145).

By linking the distinction between reality and appearance to that between good and evil, Jean-Jacques collapses aesthetic and moral judgment into one. The aesthetic surface of the text or its "appearance" is something to be overcome ip judging. Already by treating the text as a transparent medium he had all but eliminated its aesthetic elements. Now, by equating appearance and evil, reality and good, he designates the text as a purveyor of moral truth requiring moral judgment. Those who learn to judge between good and evil will have attained the truth. The truth, for Jean-Jacques, consists in understanding his naturally good essence. Being able to distinguish appearance from reality leads to the truth because it enables one to see beyond the corruption of artifice. The true Jean-Jacques is the good Jean-Jacques, and the impartial and just reader judge sees him. The importance of finding at least one impartial and just reader-judge cannot be overemphasized. For Jean-Jacques it means the beginning of a collective existence. Through the process of reading, a bond forms between author and reader, which is the first step in the establishment of a society. In the reading contract there is the beginning of a social contract. Il m'a dit cent fois qu'il se seroit console de l'injustice publique, s'il ebt trouve un seul coeur d'homme qui s'ouvrit au sien, qui ses peines, et qui les pleignit; l'estime franche et pleine d'un seul l'eut dedommage du mepris de tous les autres. Je puis lui donner ce dedommagement, et je le lui voue. Si vous vous joignez a moi pour cette bonne ocuvre, nous pouvons lui rendre dans ses vieux jours la douccur d'une soaete'Dentabk qu'il a perdu depuis si longtemps, et qu'il n'esperoit plus retrouver ici-bas (9:297, emphasis added) The society of faithful readers has been constituted by the individual contract of each member with Jean-Jacques. This society of "bons esprits" sees through the evil of artifice to the true good of nature in the interest of the public good. Unlike the community formed out of the rational bond of the social contract, which excludes private interests in order to embody the general will, the society of faithful readers is founded on an emotional bond of sympathy. Whereas private interests such as needs and desires disrupt rational will formation in the public sphere, precisely such needs and desires are required of the reader judge. Thus, the society of readers forms a community unlike the rational community established by the social contract. Jean-Jacques explains in the last section that he wrote the dialogue in the faint hope that some reader would someday see the truth. The text as an expression of faith in man's inherently good nature is also a hope for community based on sympathy. I would now like to return to the problem posed earlier, namely, whether or not Habermas's universal pragmatics ultimately effaces difference in view of an ideal of unconstrained dialogue aimed at consensus. As I have already mentioned, Rousseau's social contract, taken to its extreme, would establish a homogeneous group of citizens who would embody the rational unanimity of the general will. Many feminist critics have pointed out the danger of such a conception. Iris Marion Young suggests that Rousseau's construction of the civic public ultimately excludes women: Rousseau conceived that this public realm ought to be unified and homogeneous, and indeed suggested methods of fostering among citizens commitment to such unity through civic celebrations While the purity, unity and generality of this public realm require transcending and repressing the partiality and differentiation of need, desire and affectivity, Rousseau hardly believed that human life can or should be without emotion and the satisfaction of need and desire. Man's particular nature as a feeling, needful being is enacted in the private realm of domestic life, over which women are the proper moral guardians. (65) Young's contention that Rousseau excludes affectivity, need, and desire from the public realm derives from her reading of Rousseau in reaction to Hobbes, whose possessive and egoistic conception of human nature driven by greed and desire Rousseau found unacceptable. As Young reads the social contract, the raising of a conception of reason to a universal normative status in order to ensure the general will also separates the public sphere of politics from the private sphere of affectivity. Thus women are simultaneously locked into the private realm of emotion and needs while they are locked out of the public realm of universal reason. Women's exclusion from the civic public, according to Young, depends upon the association of women with emotion and need, but also, and more detrimentally, with the body. For Rousseau, "women must be excluded from the public realm of citizenship because they are the caretakers of affectivity, desire and the body.

Allowing appeals to desires and bodily needs to move public debates would undermine public deliberation by fragmenting its unity" (66). In a similar vein, Young's critique of Habermas relies upon the exclusion of gesture and facial expression from his consideration of language (71). According to Young, Habermas provides a disembodied conception of language and communication which focuses on what she terms "rational literal meaning." I would suggest that this "rational literal meaning," which theoretically recognizes difference (the pronominal opposition I- you), ultimately effaces it under universal and rational standards of communication. Young offers Julia Kristeva's conception of language as an alternative, more "embodied" view which would have the advantage of recognizing other elements in language: not only "the aim to reach consensus [and] a shared understanding of the world, but also and even more basically a desire to love and be loved" (72). Seyla Benhabib's discussion of the Kohlberg-Gilligan debate in relation to political theory also underscores a potential gender bias in the privileging of a generalized conception of the other over and against a concretized conception of the other. The civic public, embodied by both Habermas's ideal speech situation and Rousseau's social contract, entails precisely such a conception of the generalized other for rational/general will formation. Benhabib argues that "[j]ustice alone becomes the center of moral theory when bourgeois individuals in a disenchanted universe face the task of creating the legitimate basis of the social order for themselves. What `ought' to be is now defined as what all would have rationally to agree to in order to ensure civil peace and prosperity (Hobbes, Locke), or the `ought' is derived from the rational form of the moral law alone (Rousseau, Kant)" (81). In this generalized conception of the other as "a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves, . . . (o)ur relation to the other is governed by the norms of formal equality and reciprocity" (87). In contrast to the point of view of the generalized other is the viewpoint of the concrete other, which "requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution" (87). For Benhabib, Carol Gilligan's challenge to Lawrence Kohlberg's study of moral development shows that for women, such a viewpoint of the concrete other, because of gender socialization, may represent the highest stage of moral development, despite Kohlberg's claim that the viewpoint of the generalized other represents the zenith of moral maturity. For Benhabib neither the view of the generalized nor of the concrete other, in and of itself, is sufficient to ensure "normative validity." She argues that "the point is to think through the ideological limitations and biases that arise in the discourse of universalist morality through this unexamined opposition" (92). Rousseau's bond of sympathy provides a basis for reintegrating this opposition between the generalized and the concrete other and expanding the notion of community beyond the raising of an abstract universal to normative status. As I have shown, the sympathetic bond between reader and author achieved through the text creates a notion of community distinctly different from that of the general will. Whereas the general will excludes feeling and desire in favor of rational universalizable interest in the common good, the bond of sympathy between Jean-Jacques and his readers depends on precisely the emotion and desire the general will excludes. The "reading public," therefore, would represent a community, united by both the desire to love and the desire to be loved, which is left out of Habermas's account of language and Rousseau's civic public. In contrast to the civic public of the social contract, the community of faithful readers, founded on the bond of sympathy, would be made up primarily of women. Book V of Emile ou de l'education (dedicated to Emile's future bride, Sophie) offers reasons for assigning specifically to women the role of the impartial and just reader-judge, and consequently, the role of the "citizen" in the community founded on sympathy. According to Rousseau, women are far more dependent on the force of public opinion than are men. Unlike men's, women's reputations are determined by what others think of them. Rousseau writes, L'homme, en bien faisant, ne depend que de lui-meme, et peut braver le jugement public; mais la femme, en bien faisant, n'a fait que la moitie de sa tache, et ce que l'on pense d'elle ne lui importe pas moins que ce qu'elle est en effet. Il suit de la que le systeme de son education doit etre a cet egard contraire a celui de la notre: l'opinion est le tombeau de la vertu parmi les hommes, et son trone parmi les femmes (475). Oddly enough it is precisely because women are subject to, and often victims of, public opinion that they are such good judges. Their capacity to judge begins to develop at an earlier age than men's. Rousseau writes, "Les femmes

ont le jugement plus tot forme que les hommes: etant sur la defensive presque des leur enfance, et chargees d'un depot difficile a garder, le bien et le mal leur sont plus tot connus" (521). Because they are subject to women's judgment, men seek women's approval. Quel homme insensible et barbare n'adoucit pas sa fierte et ne prend des manieres plus attentives pres d'une fille de seize ans . . . Ces temoignages, bien qu'exterieurs. ne sont point frivoles; ils ne sont point fondes seulement sur l'attrait des sens; ils partent de ce sentiment intime que nous avons tous, que les femmes sont les juges naturels du merite des hommes. Qui est-ce qui veut etre meprise des femmes? personne au monde, non pas meme celui qui ne veut plus les aimer. Et moi, qui leur dis des verites si dures, croyez-vous que leurs jugements me sont plus chers que les votres, lecteurs, souvent plus femmes qu'elles (521,emphasis added). Rousseau reasons that Sophie and Emile are by reciprocal right each other's judge, "Les femmes sont les juges naturels du merite des hommes, comme ils le sont du merite des femmes: cela est de leur droit reciproque, et ni les uns ni les autres ne l'ignorent" (522). Nevertheless, Sophie, as a representative of all women, is ultimately the judge of her judges. Because she is the potential victim of public opinion (the judgment of men), she must develop the capacity to anticipate and evaluate their judgments. Elle devient le juge des ses juges, elle decide quand elle doit s'y soumettre et quand elle doit les recuser. Avant de rejeter ou d'admettre leurs prejuges, elle les pese; elle apprend a remonter a leur source a les prevenir, a se les rendre favorables; elle a soin de ne jamais s'attirer le blame quand son devoir lui permet de l'eviter. Rien de tout cela peut bien se faire sans cultiver son esprit et sa raison (502). Rousseau defends the notion that women must develop the ability to reason so that they will be able to judge. In fact, women's particular strength lies in the area of practical reason: La raison des femmes est une raison qui leur fait trouver tres habilement les moyens d'arriver a une fin connue, mais qui ne leur fait pas trouver cette fin. La relation sociale des sexes est admirable. De cette societe resulte une personne morale dont la femme est l'oeil et l'homme le bras, mais avec une telle dependance l'une de l'autre, que c'est de l'homme que la femme apprend ce qu'il faut voir, et de la femme que l'homme apprend ce qu'il faut faire (492). Women, thus, have the capacity for attention to detail ("l'esprit des details"),[7] while men grasp abstract principles. In Rousseau's gender distinction, the emerging gap between theoretical reason and practice, and hence, the growing importance of the problem of judgment anticipates Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and particularly his Critique of Judgment. But unlike Kant, Rousseau attempts to solve the problem by assigning practical reason to the "moral guardians" of the domestic space and theoretical reason to the guardians of the public realm. He thus relies upon the strength of the union of the sexes in the bourgeois family to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Given women's superior judgment, it is no surprise that they would tend to bond in sympathy with Jean-Jacques. The parallels between the plight of the maligned Jean-Jacques and that of a virtuous woman with an undeserved reputation for vice are quite obvious. Both are keenly aware of the importance of appearance because of the potential danger it poses to good judgment, yet nonetheless believe in a "truer" reality beneath.[8] And women, because of their more affective and emotional characters, would have a natural/socialized sympathy for JeanJacques. Thus, according to Emile's theoretical elaboration of the differences between men and women, the community of sympathetic readers ought to be largely constituted by women. The record of the eighteenth century's response to Rousseau's writing in large part bears out this hypothesis. In The Greet Cat Massacre, Robert Darnton studies the mail Rousseau received in response to Julie ou la nouvelle Heloise. As expected, its common denominator is a profuse outpouring of emotion consistent with the requirement of an emotional bond with the author. Darnton cites some of the responses from Rousseau's male and female readers: "tears," "sighs," and "torment" from the young publisher C.-J. Panckouke; "delicious tears" and "ecstasy" from the Genevan J.-L. Buisson; "tears" and "delicious outpourings of the heart" from A.-J. Loyseau de Mauleon; "such delicious tears" from Charlotte Bourette of Paris that the mere thought of them set her to weeping more; so many "sweet tears" for J.-J.-P. Fromaget that "at every page my soul melted." The abbe Cahagne read the same passage

aloud to friends at least ten times, each time with bursts of tears all around: "One must suffocate, one must abandon the book, one must weep, one must write to you that one is choking with emotion and weeping." (242-43) Women in particular responded to Julie. They were convinced that Saint-Preux could be none other than JeanJacques himself: Women threw themselves at him, in letters and in pilgrimages to his retreat at Montmorency. Marie-Anne Alissan de La Tour cast herself as Julie, while her friend Marie-Madeleine Bernardoni took the role of Claire, and together they deluged Rousseau with letters so artfully turned that soon he was playing Saint-Preux to them in a correspondence that lasted several years. Rousseau later noted with some satisfaction in his Confessions that his novel overwhelmed society ladies, even though it represented a rejection of le monde: "Opinions were divided among men of letters, but in society everyone agreed. Women especially became so intoxicated with the book and with its author that there were few of them, even of the highest rank, whom I could not have had, if I had attempted their conquest." (24546) Thus the bond of sympathy, although not completely gender-specific, seems to have occurred more often between Jean-Jacques and those "moral guardians" entrusted with the domestic sphere, for whom Julie serves as model. Female readers, identifying with Julie's role as center of a model family, identified Rousseau with the long-suffering and devoted Saint-Preux. Their identification with the fictive characters produces the result Rousseau desired: the ability to see through appearance to his naturally good essence. The preceding discussion of Emile and Rousseau's mail raises a final question which can be posed several ways: What is the relationship between Emile or La nouvelle Heloise and the Contrat social? or, what is the relationship between the family and the state? between the private and the public? between fiction and political philosophy? between women and men? or finally, between "Jean-Jacques" and "Rousseau"? If"Jean-Jacques" represents the retreat into complete self-immediacy characteristic of pre-reflective rationality, then does this position necessitate a complementary conception of reason which "Rousseau" represents? Or does women's practical reason require the theoretical reason of men? In other words, has Rousseau created two incommensurable realms--complete with two different conceptions of judgment--differentiated by gender? In the Contrat social, Rousseau explicitly answers the question concerning the relationship between the family and the state: La famille est done si l'on veut le premier modele des societes politiques; le chef est l'image du pere, le peuple est l'image des enfants, et tous etant nes egaux et libres n'alienent leur liberte que pour leur utilite. Toute la difference est que dans la famille l'amour du pere pour ses enfants le paye des soins qu'il leur rend, et gue dans l'Etat le plaisir de commander supplee a cet amour que le chef n'a pas pour ses peuples. (42) The exclusion of the bond of love sharply distinguishes between the two realms, and yet two paragraphs earlier Rousseau notes that the family, though originally based on nature, later depends on convention: La plus ancienne de toutes les societes et la seule naturelle est celle de la famille. Encore les enfants ne restent-ils lies au pere qu'aussi longtemps qu'ils ont besoin de lui pour se conserver. Sitot que ce besoin cesse, le lien naturel se dissout. Les enfants. exempts de l'obeissance qu'ils devaient au pere, le pere exempt des soins qu'il devait aux enfants, rentrent tous egalement dans l'independance. S'ils continuent de rester unis ce n'est pas naturellement, c'est volontairement, et la famille elle-meme ne se maintient que par convention. (41-42) In the political theory of the social contract even the family, when conceived as a precursor to civil society, demonstrates the distinction between the natural bond of love and the conventional bond of obligation and duty. Thus the Contrat sociel divides the public from the private, and hence men from women and reason from affectivity. But the dialogue of Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques and Emile presents another possibility, namely, that affectivity, and thus women and the private sphere of the family, could constitute a different sort of "public," a reading public, based on the bond of sympathy. My reading of Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques in conjunction with Emile and the Contrat social seeks to guard against the homogenizing tendency of rationality. Reading "against the grain," I posit the problem of judgment as the key notion for expanding the civic public of the social contract beyond the rational uniformity of the general will. Although practical reason is necessary in the domestic space for moral issues and education, it is just as useful for deciding political issues. Expanding on Rousseau's account in Emile, it would seem that women's practical reason is

necessary to complement men's theoretical reason both inside and outside the domestic sphere. But beyond Rousseau's gender distinction, good judgment in both the private and public spheres would depend on both "practical" and "theoretical" reason. The bond of sympathy, so crucial to good judgment in Rousseau juge de JeanJacques, is the necessary guarantee against the tyranny of a one-sided, theoretical and homogenizing conception of reason. The reading of Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques which I propose expands the notion of community beyond the rational and universalizable interests of the general will to include the bond of sympathy. This expanded notion of rationality preserves difference by revalorizing affectivity and the specificity of the body. It is precisely such a notion of the "public," which does not attempt to efface heterogeneity, which a critique sensitive to the issue of gender must embrace.[9] Washington University [1] From a Marxist perspective, C.B. MacPherson argues that social contract theory creates a classless society, and from a Marxist-feminist position, Iris Marion Young and Seyla Benhabib argue that the social contract constitutes a homogenenous group both because of the role property acquisition plays in social contract theory, and for reasons of gender. [2] Habermas's conception of the ideal speech situation should be distinguished from his notion of the public sphere (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere). The public sphere refers to the appearance of a realm of "public consciousness" in which citizens use their ability to reason in a critical manner. For Habermas, this phenomenon coincides with the rise of reading circles in the late eighteenth century which enabled critical exchanges and thus facilitated dialogue aimed at rational consensus. But whereas the rise of the public sphere is a historically specific phenomenon, the ideal speech situation is a regulative ideal underlying all communicative interaction. My point is to demonstrate the way in which the ideal speech situation, and not the public sphere, articulates the same regulative ideals as the civic public of social contract. [3] Emile Benveniste argues for the dialectical reciprocity of the deictics "I" and "you" which is crucial to the formation of identity. "La conscience de soi n'est possible que si elle s'eprouve par contraste. Je n'emploie je qu'en m'adressant a quelqu'un, qui sera dans mon allocution un tu. C'est cette condition de dialogue qui est constitutive de la personne, car elle implique en reciprocite que je deviens tu dans ['allocution de celui qui a son tour se designe par jet . . C'est dans une realite dialectique englobante qu'on decouvre le fondement linguistique de la subjectivite" ( 1:260). [4] David Ingram points out that the ideal speech situation in Habermas's later work is limited to defining a formal concept of procedural justice and not any notion of the good life in its entirety (174-76). [5] The entire text relies upon the force of example to reform. Texts serve as an example for Rousseau, who is in turn the Frenchman's model, who in turn becomes the reader's model. This strategy parallels the classical episteme based on representation described by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things (208-11) as well as Foucault's account of the rise of a disciplinary system based on reform in the late eighteenth century in Discipline and Punish. [6] Starobinski argues that Rousseau prefers immediacy and transparency over mediation, which represents an obstacle to a sense of wholeness. Thus, the dialogue could be read as a failed attempt to achieve full self-immediacy in which the self communes with the self. Starobinski points out that the structure of the dialogue contains a contradiction, namely, that Rousseau could argue rationally (mediation) in the place of Jean-Jacques (selfimmediacy). This contradiction inhibits the realization of self-immediacy. "Non seulement Rousseau accomplit ici un dedoublement reflexif mais tout au long de son livre il se compare a ses ennemis pour se situer a sa vraie piace, dans ['innocence de la vie irreflechie. Rousseau parle de Jean-Jacques et demontre qu'il est 'esclave de ses sees', mais pour sa demonstration il ne perd jamais de vue les autres, les mechants, ccox que domine la froide passion de la reflexion. Aussi petit-on dire que les Dialogues vent essentiellement une reflexion dirigee contre la reflexion. C'est la que reside le non-sens, l'erreur capitale des Dialogues" (252). [7] For fascinating study of the association of the detail with the feminine see Naomi Schor, especially chapter 1. [8] Without embarking on a discussion of the role of modesty in Rousseau's conception of the virtuous woman, I would like to point out the sense in which maintaining appearances becomes one of the duties of women. Sarah

Kofman argues that pudeur is the "natural ornament" of women, and to deprive them of it represents a crime (86). She cites la nouvelle Heloise (2e partie, Lettre XVIII) in support of her contention, "Une femme vertueuse ne doit pas seulement meriter l'estime de son mari mais l'obtenir; s'il la blame elle est blamable, et fut-elle innocente, elle a tort sitot qu'elle est soupconnee: car les apparences memes sont au nombre de ses devoirs." Thus, the virtuous woman has an obligation to maintain appearances. Kofman asserts that the danger posed by the actress and the prostitute may be understood as a direct result of the importance of women's modesty. Both the actress and the prostitute abuse their control over appearance, and thereby threaten to destabilize the public realm (127-46). [9] Jean-Francois Lyotard's notion of the differend as the recognition of heterogeneity between different language practices seeks to hold open such disputes in search of a new idiom for expression and judgment of such difference (9). Lyotard is critical of Habermas's faith in the ideal of unconstrained rational consensus, which would represent the mediation of such disputes, and result in a wrong done to one of the parties. In defense of Habermas, it should be noted that the differend cannot arise without the underlying assumptions of his communicative ethic, namely, that rational argumentation between free and equal interlocutors could lead to consensus about the truth. Without the presupposition of the possibility of dialogue and consensus, there would be no different in need of recognition. I would suggest that the notion of dialogic interaction must be expanded to include the body, desire, and other aspects of expression. Certainly, the holding open of the horizon of possibility in search of new idioms could potentially lead to new understanding between the genders. Works Cited Benhabib, Seyla. "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory." Benhabib, Feminism as Critique 77-95. Benhabib, Seyla and Drucilla Cornell, eds. Feminism as Critique. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Benveniste, Emile. Problemes de linguistique generale. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1966. Darnton, Robert. The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History. New York: Random, 1985. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage-Random, 1979. ------ The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences. New York: Vintage-Random, 1973. Habermas, Jurgen. Legitimation Crisis. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon, 1975. ------ The Structural Transformation ofthe Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989. ------ "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence." Inquiry 13 (1970) : 360-75. ------ "What is Universal Pragmatics?" Communication and the Evolution of Society. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon, 1979. 1-68. Ingram, David. Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. Kofman, Sarah. Le respect des femmes. Paris: Galilee, 1982. Lyotard, Jean-Francois. Le differend. Paris: Minuit, 1983. MacPherson, C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Du contrat social. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966. ------ Emile ou de l'education. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966. ------ Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques. Oeuvres completes. 13 vols. Paris: Hachette, 1909. Schor, Naomi. Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine. New York: Methuen, 1987. Starobinski, Jean. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La transparence et l'obstacle. Paris: Gallimard, 1971. Young, Iris Marion. "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory." Benhabib, Feminism as Critique 57-76. ~~~~~~~~ By JULIA SIMON-INGRAM