Revolution and War Author(s): Stephen M. Walt Source: World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Apr., 1992), pp.

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REVOLUTION AND WAR

BySTEPHEN M. WALT*

I. INTRODUCTION

dividual states;theyare oftenwatershedeventsin international polin itics.Revolutionscause abrupt shifts the balance of power, place alliance commitments and otherinternational agreementsin jeopardy,and for provide inviting opportunities otherstatesto improvetheirpositions. Although true revolutionsare a relatively rare occurrence,theireffects for on international politicsare worthstudying at least two reasons. First, revolutionsinvariablytriggerdisagreementsover how other between advocates of powers should respond. These disputes,typically to appeasement and advocates of intervention overthrowthe new regime, are strikingly similar, whether one considers the European reor sponse to the French and Bolshevik revolutions U.S. reactionsto the in revolutions Mexico, China, Cuba, Iran,and Nicaragua. Yet littleeffort has been made to assemble the theoretical or propositions empiricalevidence to resolve(or at least advance) the various disagreements thatunderlie thesepolicydebates. the Second, froma purelyscholarly perspective, studying international effects revolutionary of change is an obvious way to compare the merits of systemic and unit-levelexplanationsof statebehavior.Systemictheofocuson the constraining ries such as neorealistbalance-of-power theory of distributions impact of international anarchyand the effects different of power, while downplayingthe impact of domesticpolitics,ideology, factors.'But revolutions a unit-level are or otherunit-level phenomenon; over the basic principlesby which sotheyare violentpoliticalstruggles domesticpoliticalstructures, cietyis organized. Not only do theyaffect but revolutionsoftenadvance novel politicalideas and ambitious international objectivesbased upon them.
* I thankthe following on of individualsfortheircomments earlierdrafts thisarticle:James Fearon, Charles Glaser, Jack Goldstone,JudithGoldstein,Louisa Bertch Green, Robert Andrew Moravcsik,KennethOye, JackSnyder, David Laitin,JohnMearsheimer, Johnson, Rebecca Stone, and Stephen Van Evera. I am also gratefulto Elizabeth Boyd and James and to the JohnD. and CatherineT. MacArthurFounMarquardt forresearchassistance, for Peace, and The BrookingsInstitution dation,the Carnegie EndowmentforInternational financial and logisticalsupport. I The locus classicusremainsKennethN. Waltz, Theory International Politics(Reading, of 1979). Mass.: Addison-Wesley,

REVOLUTIONS

in are morethancritical events thehistory inof

World Politics44 (April 1992),321-68

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Yet even when the revolutionaries reject traditionalstate goals and question the legitimacyof the state-system itself, theybegin by seeking controlof an existingstate.If theyare successful, betheyautomatically of come part of the largersystem statesand are subjectto the constraints theories.As a result, studyof and opportunities depictedby systemic the stateshelps one to understandhow the foreignpolicies of revolutionary forcesmodifybehaviorarisingfromdomesticprocesses.At the systemic same time,it can also reveal how unit-levelfactors may alter the impact In of systems-level constraints. otherwords, studyingrevolutionsis one way to explore the links between domesticand international influences on statebehavior. Despite its obvious importance, however,the subjectof revolutionary on foreignpolicyis underexplored. Althoughthe literature revolutionis all enormous,virtually of it focuseson eitherthe causes of revolutionor the domestic consequences of revolutionary change.2There are valuable statesbut veryfew comparative case studieson individual revolutionary or theoreticalworks on the international implicationsof revolutionary change.3 To begin to fillthisgap, thispaper examines the followingquestions: Why do revolutionary statesfight wars almostimmediately foreign after gaining power? Are revolutionary regimesinherently aggressive,or are a theysimplyvictimsof other powers? Are these conflicts direct result of the revolutionary process,or is theassociationbetweenrevolutionand war largelyspurious? In brief,I argue that revolutions cause war by increasingthe level of threatbetween the revolutionary stateand its rivalsand by encouraging both sides to view the use of forceas an effective way to eliminate the threat.By alteringthe balance of power and making it more difficult for statesto measure the balance accurately, revolutions increasethe danger
2 on For surveysof the literature revolution, Peter Calvert,Revolution see and CounterRevolution of (Minneapolis:University MinnesotaPress,1990); JackA. Goldstone,"Theories of Revolution:The Third Generation,"WorldPolitics32 (April 1980); Rod Aya, "Theories of RevolutionReconsidered:Contrasting Models of PoliticalViolence," Theory Society8 and (July1979); Mark N. Hagopian, The Phenomenon Revolution of (New York: Dodd Mead, PoliticalViolence, Crises 1974); and Ekkart Zimmermann, and Revolutions: Theories and Research(Cambridge: SchenkmanPublishing,1983). 3 I know of onlytwo theoretical workson thistopic,neither whichis fullysatisfactory: of Peter Calvert, Revolutionand International Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 1984); and and International Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution System (New York: New York University Press, 1970). Excellent case studies include T. C. W. Blanning,The Origins the French of Wars(New York: Longman, 1986); Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolutionary Revolution,1917-1923, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1953); Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese WarsofNationalLiberation Foreign Policy:Peking's Supportfor (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,1970); and FriedrichKatz, The SecretWarin Mexico:Europe,the United and States, theMexicanRevolution of (Chicago: University Chicago Press,1981).

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of miscalculation.Revolutions also encourage both sides to exaggerate the other's hostility, thus furtherincreasingeach side's perception of threat.Finally, revolutionslead both sides simultaneously exaggerate to theirown vulnerability attackor subversionand to overstatethe vulto nerability the otherside. As a result,war is likelyto be seen as necesof saryto reduce the threatand also relatively easy to win. These expectations are usually mistaken,however. Revolutionsare harder to reverse or to exportthan eitherside expects;thatis, the increasedlevel of threat thataccompanies a revolutionis in part illusory. These dynamicsarise fromthe characteristics revolutionary of organizations and ideologies and the domestic and internationaleffectsof revolutionary change. Internationalconflict thus overdetermined: is although war does not occur in everycase, strongpressuresfor war are presenteven when otherfactors intrudeto preventit. This is not to implythatrevolutions a unique cause of war or that are the dynamicsthatlead revolutionary statesto war do not apply to other states as well. Indeed, several of the causal links outlined below are drawn fromfamiliarpropositionsin international relationstheory.Inare stead, I argue thatrevolutions an especiallypowerfulsource of these familiarphenomena; as a result, war is extremely likelyin the aftermath of a revolutionary upheaval. The main goal of this articleis to advance a set of hypotheses and to illustrate them with appropriatehistorical examples. Section II describes the associationbetween revolutionand war and evaluates several alternative approaches for explaining this relationship.Section III summarizes the nature of the revolutionary some of its process and identifies Section IV presentsmy argumentin detail and explains likely effects. why the interactionbetween revolutionarystates and other powers makes war verylikely.The conclusion,Section V, considersthe implications of these arguments,takes note of some possible qualifications, and suggestswhat these hypotheses tell us about the recentchanges in the formerSoviet empire. II.
DEFINITIONS REVOLUTION AND WAR: COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

A revolutionis the destruction an independentstate by members of of its own societyand its replacementby a regime based on new political The "state,"as used here,means administrative and coercive principles.4
4

For similarconceptions, Franz Borkenau,"State and Revolutionin the Paris Cornsee

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agencies possessinglegitimateauthority over a specificterritorial area.5 A revolutionis more than just a rearrangement the administrative of apparatus or the replacementof old elite. Instead,a revolutioncreatesa new state restingon different social groups,new social and political indifferent stitutions, and novel conceptionsof the polegitimating myths, litical community.This definitionexcludes both simple coups d'etat (where one elite factionreplacesanother)and national liberationmovements (where a colonized group establishesan independentstateby expelling a foreignruler).6It also excludes cases where the ruling elite leaves officevoluntarily, in the restoration civilian controlaftera as of rule. period of military As noted above, revolutions not the only (or even the most imporare conflict. tant) cause of international They are an unusually potentone, however. According to one recentstudy,statesthatexperiencea "revolutionary"regime change (definedas any violentchange of the governing system)are nearlytwice as likelyto be involvedin war in the initial period followingthe change as are statesthat emerge froman "evoluThe patternis even more striking revolutionary"politicalprocess.7 for tions that fitthe more restrictive definition offeredabove. As shown in Table 1, out of ten uncontroversial cases (i.e., where thereis a clear consensus thata revolution occurred),eightfoughtwars withinfiveyearsof the revolution.Moreover,the two exceptionsare near misses: although open warfaredid not occur, the revolutionary governmentbecame involved in a "militarizedinterstate dispute" soon aftertakingpower.8 What explains the strongassociationbetweenrevolution and war? At the risk of oversimplifying existingliterature, alternativeexplathe the nationscan be grouped into severalbasic families.
mune, the Russian Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War," Sociological Review29 (January 1937); JohnDunn, ModernRevolutions: Introduction theAnalysis a PoliticalPhenomAn to of enon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1972),xi; and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order Changing in Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,1968),264-65. and Social Revolutions: Comparative 5 See Theda Skocpol,States A Analysis France, of Russia, and China (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1978),29. 6 Due to the many similarities betweennationalliberation movements and revolutionary successful wars of nationalliberation and successful organizations, revolutions likelyto are effects. generatesimilarinternational 7 See Zeev Maoz, "Joining the Club of Nations: PoliticalDevelopmentand International StudiesQuarterly (June 1989). Maoz carefully 33 Conflict,1816-1976,"International shows how regimechange affects probability war, but he does not offer explanationfor the of an thisassociation.See also Jonathan Adelman,Revolution, R. and Armies, War:A PoliticalHistory (Boulder,Colo.: Lynne Rienner,1985),3-6. 8 The near missesare the Mexican Revolution, where the United Statesintervened twice on a modest scale and considereda full-scale invasionin 1916,and the Cuban Revolution, where the United States sponsoreda numberof efforts overthrowor assassinateFidel to Castro.

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TABLE 1
WAR AND REVOLUTION

Revolution France(1789) Mexico(1910) Russia(1917) Turkey(1919) China (1949) Cuba (1959) Ethiopia(1974) (1975) Cambodia/Kampuchea Iran(1978) Nicaragua(1979)
a

War Postrevolutionary Prussia Austria-Hungary, Spain,England(1792-93) (1916)]a [U.S. Intervention (1919) Alliedintervention Poland(1920) Greece(1920) Tibet(1950) KoreanWar (1950) (1961)]a [BayofPigsinvasion Somalia(1978) (1979) Vietnamese invasion Iraq (1980) UnitedStates (1981)b

in cases. Conflicts bracketsare borderline b I include thecontrawar betweenthe United Statesand Nicaragua due to its 1% scope-at least 30,000 deaths,or approximately of Nicaragua's population. the directly, United States mined Althoughthe U.S. troopsdid not participate armies. Nicaraguan harborsand organized and equipped thecontra
REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY

a foreignpolicyas primarily One popular approach views revolutionary result of the ideology of the revolutionarymovement. The logic is to statescause war by trying exporttheir revolutionary straightforward: They do thisbecause the moveideological principlesto othercountries. to ment'score beliefsprescribesuch efforts, contrary the usual normsof and nonintervention.9 sovereignty of this Not surprisingly, interpretation revolutionary foreignpolicy is especially popular with the opponents of the new regime. After the French Revolution,for example, Edmund Burke argued that England "was at war with an armed doctrine,"just as U.S. leaders blamed the of ideology policyon the revolutionary expansionistthrust Soviet foreign In of Marxism-Leninism.10 much the same way,some analysesof Iranian
9 E.g., theEgyptianNational Charterof 1962proclaimedthat"Egyptwas bound to spread the . itsmissionand put [its]principles .. at thedisposalof all theArabs,disregarding wornin Quoted in Adeed Daout notionthatin doing so it is interfering otherpeoples' affairs." wisha,Egyptin theArab World(London: Macmillan,1976),35. 10See Edmund Burke, "First Letteron a Regicide Peace," in The Works theRt. Hon. of

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its foreignpolicy have attributed bellicose characterto the expansionist strandsof the AyatollahKhomeini's Shiite theology." Despite its popularity, however,thisapproach is an inadequate explanation for war. To begin with, it is one-sided: war is seen as a direct result of the revolutionary regime's "aggressive" beliefs.There is little states often empirical support for this view, however,as revolutionary and are usually the victimsratherthan the initiabehave with restraint tors of aggression.French foreignpolicy,forexample, was remarkably to passive from1789 to 1792,leading manycontemporaries view the Revolution as a serious blow to France's international position.'2 It was the Poles who began the Russo-Polish War in 1920, and the Soviet Union or conflicts international continuedto avoid significant commitments until the eve of World War II.'3 Iraq startedthe war with revolutionary Iran; Somalia attacked revolutionary Ethiopia; and the Chinese interventionin Korea was a reluctant responseto theU.S. advance to the Yalu to River ratherthanan aggressiveattempt advance ideologicalobjectives. Had revolutionary ideologybeen the directcause of conflict implied by thesestateswould have been the aggressorsratherthan thisperspective, the victims.'4 In addition revolutionary ideologies are generallymore flexiblethan a this perspectiveimplies. Instead of prescribing dogmatic campaign of in expansion, most stressthe need for tacticalflexibility the pursuit of on general goals. If so, thenboth war and peace can be justified ideological grounds.'5
EdmundBurke(Boston:Little,Brown,1869),5:250. On Westernappraisalsof Sovietconduct, see George F. Kennan [Mr. X], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," ForeignAffairs (July 25 1947); Nathan Leites,A StudyofBolshevism (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953); and "U.S. Objectivesand ProgramsforNational Security" in (NSC-68), reprinted Thomas H. Etzold and Documents American on JohnLewis Gaddis, eds.,Containment: 1945-1950 Policyand Strategy, (New York: Columbia University PresidentReagan arPress, 1978),386-96. More recently gued that"it was difficult Americans]to understand [Soviet]ideologicalpremisethat the [for forceis an acceptable way to expand a politicalsystem."See "Text of PresidentReagan's United Nations Speech," Washington Post,October25, 1985,p. A23. Iran: Challenge and Response theMiddleEast (Balin " See R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary timore:JohnsHopkins University Press,1986), 19-26; Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, the Khomeini, IslamicRepublicofIran,and theArab World(Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle East Studies, 1987); and CherylBenard and Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Government of God": Iran'sIslamicRepublic(New York: Columbia University Press,1984), 147-55. 12 Blanning (fn. 3), 79-80, 132-35; J. H. Clapham, The Causes of the War of 1792 (1892; reprint, London: Octagon Books, 1969), 15-18; and Steven T. Ross, European Diplomatic 1789-1815:Franceagainst History, Europe (Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969),25. 13 The Soviet Union did send military aid to the republicanforcesin the Spanish Civil was War, but thismodestcommitment motivated defensive concernsand lastedonlyone by year. 14 Of course, revolutionary regimesmay invitewar throughprovocative actions,even if the force. otherstatesinitiate use of military 15 For examples, see Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo(New York:

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As we shall see, ideologydoes affect how revolutionary statesbehave and how they are perceived by others. By itself,however, it does not adequately explain the connectionbetweenrevolutionand war.
DOMESTIC POLITICS

A second approach to understanding revolutionary foreign policydraws on the literaturelinking domestic and internationalconflict.'6 this In view, conflicts within the revolutionary state are believed to encourage aggressivebehavior toward others.The greaterthe divisionswithinthe revolutionary state (eitherwithin the elite or between the government and the populationat large),themore bellicoseitsforeignpolicywill be. takes two distinct One focuseson elite conflict: This hypothesis forms. movement promote concontendingfactionswithin the revolutionary flictswith other statesin order to secure greaterpower for themselves. For example, the Brissotinfaction in the French National Assembly soughta war withAustriaand Prussia in orderto discredit monarchy the in and eliminateitsotherdomesticrivals.'7Similarly, radical factions the Iranian Revolution are believed to have exploited conflictwith the United Statesas a way to underminemore moderateforces.'8 A second hypothesis argues that revolutionary leaders seek conflicts in order to rally popular support,to justifyinternal with other states and to providea scapegoat should domesticproblemspersist. repression, conThus, the radicals in France used the threatof a vast "aristocratic spiracy"to justify suppressionof the clergyand nobility, just as Castro in Cuba and the Sandinistasin Nicaragua used theirconflicts with the of the United States to justify repression domesticopponentsand to excuse their own policy mistakes.'9In each case, an externalenemy was
McGraw-Hill, 1951), 32-35; and Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Behavior,"American PoliticalScienceReRevolutionary Strategy and Peking's International view 59 (September1965),89-90. 16 For a summary and critiqueof thesetheories, JackS. Levy, "Domestic Politicsand see and of War," in RobertRotbergand Theodore Rabb, eds., The Origins Prevention Major Wars Press,1989);and idem,"The Causes of Wars: A Review (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity and Society, Nuclear War of Theories and Evidence," in Philip Tetlock et al., eds.,Behavior, (New York: OxfordUniversity Press,1989),1:262-73. 17 For a superb analysisof the Brissotin campaign forwar, see Blanning (fn. 3), 99-113. See also Clapham (fn. 12), 114-15, 135-36; and Gunther E. Rothenburg,"The Origins, and Napoleon," in Rotbergand Causes, and Extensionof theWars of theFrenchRevolution Rabb (fn. 16),209-12. 18 See Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban in for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 139-41; and Gary Sick, "Iran's Quest forSuper65 power Status,"Foreign Affairs (Spring 1987),698-99. 9 The damage fromthe contrawar notwithstanding, Sandinistas'defeatin the 1990 the failedto make the United Statesa convincing scapegoat electionrevealsthattheyultimately The and theRevolution See Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas: Party (Lonfortheirdomesticerrors. don: Basil Blackwell, 1988),94-95, 119, 183.

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used to solidify regime's the internal and position blamedforcontinued internal problems. Bothhypotheses sharetheassumption revolutionary that foreign policyis determined largely domestic by politics. Despiteitsintuitive appeal, the has flawsas an explanation war. As however, approach serious for withtheideological this approach, explanation assumes thattherevolustateis the principal tionary But aggressor. suchan assumption defies thathas justundergone revolution rarely simplelogic:a state a is ready forwar,and itwouldbe foolhardy itsleaders risktheir for to won newly in of positions a test strength a foreign with power. Although revolutionaryregimes tensions mayexploit withother states cement to their hold on power,one would expectthemto focusprimarily their on internal and to challenges to try avoida direct clashofarms. The empirical evidence this supports view.Revolutionary leadersoftenseek at leastcordialrelations withpotential if enemies, onlyto buy can timeuntilthey secure their internal The positions.20 Bolsheviks, for made manyconcessions their to example, rivalsin an effort foreign to avoidwar,and Mao Zedongwasextremely reluctant enter Korean to the War forfearofjeopardizing moreimportant ofnational the task reconstruction.2' Robert PastorarguesthattheSandinistas Similarly, initially a withtheUnitedStates, goal theCarter sought modusvivendi a adminternal threats justify to their actions rally and popular support, also they tried(unsuccessfully) avoidconflicts could jeopardizetheir to that hold on power.On bothlogicaland empirical grounds, therefore, domestic an politics provides incomplete for explanation thelinkbetween revoluPERSONALITY

istration shared.22 Althoughtheserevolutionary governments use exdid

tion and war.23

REVOLUTIONARY

A third focuses thepersonality on approach traits revolutionary of leaders.24 proponents Its that of begin arguing leaders revolutions usuby are
20 For example,Lenin insistedthatSoviet weaknessleftthemno choice but to ratify the harsh Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1918. See Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin (New York: in Harper Colophon, 1964), 190-223; and Lenin, "The Chief Task of Our Day," and "Report on Ratification the Peace Treaty,"in Lenin,SelectedWorks of (Moscow: ProgressPublishers, 1970),2:618-21, 626-40. 21 For otherexamples of Bolshevikconcessions, see Carr (fn.3), 47, 57, 87-88. On Mao's decisionson Korea, see Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China underThreat:The Politics Strategy Diplomacy(Baltimore:Johns of and Hopkins University Press,1980),25-29. 22 See Pastor, Condemned Repetition: United to The States Nicaragua(Princeton:Princeand ton University Press,1987),191 and passim. 23 More extensive efforts testthehypotheses to linkingdomesticconflict withinvolvement in war have been largelyinconclusive. Levy (fn. 16,"Causes of Wars"), 273-74. See 24 Basic works in thisgenreincludeE. VictorWolfenstein, Revolutionary The Personality:

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allyself-confident, stubborn, suspicious, ruthless. and These traits allegedlymake revolutionary leadersdifficult deterand proneto reckless to either becausethey convinced their are of own infalliforeign policies, bility becausethey or repeatedly to perform actsofrevolutionseek new This approachis mostcommonin biographies journalistic and acon counts;to date,seriousscholarship the "revolutionary personality" weakissuesof foreign Giventheinherent policy.26 has largely ignored is not The nesses this of approach, omission perhaps surprising. main this connection between is theoretical difficultythelack of a strong personEven and a traits foreign ality policy preferences. ifwe knewthat leader thatmay be), this possesseda "revolutionary personality" (whatever would not tellus very muchabouthis or herchoicewhen knowledge for a decision waror peace.For example, Robesfacing specific although of pierrefitsthe classicprofile a revolutionary leader,he opposedthe of Nor was his opposition Frenchdeclaration war in 1792.27 unusual. Revolutionary frequently elites disagree aboutforeign policy, theBolas of with sheviks overtheTreaty Brest-Litovsk Germany themerdid and in itsof "permanent revolution" versus "socialism one country" as and of the Iran's leadersdid overtheexport Islamicfundamentalism, war the of leadersis often In addition, popularstereotype revolutionary inconsistent: same revolutionary the leadersare sometimes portrayed and and and bothas irrational fanatic as disciplined, calculating, crafty.
Press, 1971); Bruce Mazlish, The Gandhi (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Lenin, Trotsky, Ascetic:Evolutionof a Political Type (New York: Basic Books, 1976); James Revolutionary 1971); and Mostafa Agents Change(Philadelphia:J.B. Lippincott, of Haskins,Revolutionaries: Leaders(New Brunswick, N.J.: RutgersUniverRevolutionary Rejai and Kay Phillips,World Revolutionary Movesee sityPress, 1983). For summaries, Thomas H. Greene,Comparative N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1984), and 2d for ments: The Search Theory Justice, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, chap. 4; and Hagopian (fn.2), 318-33. American and Foreign Policy,"in Kissinger, 25 See Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure ForeignPolicy,expanded ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974),39-41; JohnH. Kautsky, Politics1 (July and ManagerialElites in ModernizingRegimes,"Comparative "Revolutionary A Analysis(BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage, 1969); and Patrick Morgan,Deterrence: Conceptual 1977), 162. 26 An exception the is ArthurSchlesinger's attempt attribute cold war in partto Stalin's to of as paranoid personality, well as to Leninistideologyand the domesticstructure the Soviet 46 "The Originsof theCold War," Foreign state.See Schlesinger, Affairs (October 1967),46 A 50. For background,see also RobertC. Tucker, Stalinas Revolutionary: Studyin History and Personality, 1879-1929(New York: W. W. Norton,1973). 27 See J. M. Thompson,Robespierre (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1935),202-8; and Georges et 1791-1792(Paris: Marcel Riviere,1937),51re'volutionnaire, Michon,Robespierre la guerre 55. 28 See Carr (fn. 3), 38-39; Ramazani (fn. 11), 47; and Robin Wright, In thePath of God: Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989),93-95, 136-37. The Khomeini

ary heroism.25

of with Iraq, or the possibility seekingimprovedties with the West.28

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limited an explanation why as for seems this especially In short, approach states revolutionary are so war-prone. into of offers insights thebehavior revoluEach of theseperspectives is within states-even if thepicture incomplete-andscholars tionary the variables. often Nonerecognize roleofother eachofthese traditions attention the revolutionary on focusprimary theseapproaches theless, in thanon thelargersetting whichforeign rather policyis stateitself the moreor lessdirectly from characteristics made; waris seento follow But to oftherevolutionary regime. thedecision go towardoesnotoccur a to that in a vacuum;waris ultimatelyresponse problems arisebetween that revolution war This suggests understanding and twoor morestates. thatfocuses the an international-political on perspective requires, instead, the of between revolutionary and theothermembers state relationship A is to then, explain whyrevoluthesystem. systemic approach needed, sides favor use offorce. to the tions lead both is and with The obvious placeto start realism, specifically, balance-ofIn neorealist theory form, balance-of-power powertheory. its modern of characteristicsstates focuses and instead the on the ignores individual of theory distribution capabilities amongthem.Can balance-of-power between revolution war? If not, and adequately explaintherelationship can itbe improved?
REALISM AND REVOLUTION THEORY

BALANCE-OF-POWER

assumesthatstates essentially are acrational theory Balance-of-power Becauseno sovereign exists tors whoseprimary is survival. authority goal from each other, international is to protect states politics a "self-help" in whichsecurity thehighest is As a result, states strive to goal. system relative provided can increase their provoking power, they do so without in willleavethem worseoff thanbefore. others respond waysthat to of version balance-of-power the In theneorealist theory, distribution Power is conceived variable.29 in of poweris the primary explanatory assets suchas population, military of terms material and GNP, capability, and on so forth, eachstate's depends itspowerrelative security ultimately Becausewar is alwaysa possibility at thebestoftimes to others. only (if use a remote to compete-and ifnecessary force-either inone),states
29 See Waltz (fn. 1), chap. 6. For otherversionsof balance-of-power theory, Edward see V. Gulick, Europe's ClassicalBalance of Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967); Hans J. PoliticsamongNations (New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1973); Inis L. Claude, Morgenthau, Relations Powerand International (New York: Random House, 1962);and MortonA. Kaplan, and in Politics(New York: Wiley, 1957). System Process International

REVOLUTION AND WAR

331

crease theirown power or to weaken potentialrivals.Wars occur because statesare temptedto exploit imbalances of power ("windows of opporWars also resultfrommistunity")to improve theirpositionsfurther. go to war because theybelieve the balance calculation; statessometimes of power is favorablewhen it in factis not.30 According to this perspective,revolutionscause war in two ways. First,revolutions may alter the balance of power and thus create an opfor portunity statesto increase theirpower even more. If a revolution increaseda state'srelativepower,forexample,thenew regimemighttry if to exploit this advantage by attackinganother state. Alternatively, a otherstatesmightbe tempted state'spower is weakened by a revolution, to improvetheirown positionsat itsexpenseor at theexpenseof itsallies. also increasethe danger of miscalculation, because it Second, revolutions to is more difficult predictthe outcome of a war afterone statehas undergone a major politicalupheaval. This explanation is an obvious improvementover the unit-levelapemphasizes the importanceof seproaches discussed earlier.It correctly some of the ways that revolutions make war more curityand identifies with a number of historicalcases, such as the likely.It is also consistent Polish and Japanese invasions of the Soviet Union in 1919-20 and the Iraqi invasionof Iran in 1980. balance-of-power theoryhas two important Despite these strengths, a limitations.First, by itself, shiftin the balance of power could make war eithermore likely or less likely. If a revolutionincreased a state's relativepower,forexample,thestatemightbecome more aggressiveand thus war would be more likely. But greaterpower might also make a able to deterattack,which would lower the statemore secureand better odds of war. Similarly, althoughotherstatesmightattack a revolutionary stateif theythoughtits power had declined,theymightjust as easily conclude that it was no longer a threatand turn their attentionelsewhere. In short,stateswill not go to war simplybecause the balance of power has changed; theymustalso believe thatdoing so will make them more secure in the long run.3'
30 The importance miscalculation apparentin theneorealist Kenis analysisof stability. of is neth Waltz and JohnMearsheimerargue thatbipolarity more stablethan multipolarity, for the because increasing numberof greatpowersmakes it moredifficult statesto assess the theyargue thatnuclear balance of power and predictthe likelyoutcomeof war. Similarly, by weapons increasestability making it easy to calculatewhat an all-out war would mean. See Waltz (fn. 1), 163-76; idem,"The Originsof War in NeorealistTheory,"in Rotbergand in "Back to the Future: Instability Europe Rabb (fn. 16), 39-52; and JohnJ.Mearsheimer, 15 Security (Summer 1990),13-19. afterthe Cold War," International 31 See Robert Gilpin, "Theories of Hegemonic War," in Rotbergand Rabb (fn. 16), 26;

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Second, although balance-of-power theoryacknowledges the role of miscalculationas a cause of war, we stillneed to explain why revolutions acute. As Geoffrey make this problem particularly Blainey points out, wars occur when two or more statesdisagree about their relativebargaining power; if statescould measure each other's power and resolve exactly(and thus predictthe outcome of a war in advance), theycould adjust theirdemands accordinglyand avoid the inconvenienceof fightEven ifa revolution altersthe balance of power significantly, ing.32 however, an outbreak of war implies that the opponentsdisagree about the directionor magnitudeof the change. In particular, need to explain we will improve theirrelativeposiwhy both sides conclude that fighting tions.
BALANCE-OF-THREAT THEORY

These problemscan be overcomeby abandoning balance-of-power thein favor of what I call balance-of-threat ory theory.As I have argued assumes that states reelsewhere, balance-of-powertheoryincorrectly of spond solely to shiftsin the distribution aggregate power. But it is more accurate to say insteadthatstatesrespondto threats.33 Power is an importantcomponentof threat,but it is not the only one. In addition, thereare two otherfactorsthatstatesconsiderin gauging theirsecurity and deciding whethergoing to war will enhance it. First,thegreatera state'soffensive power,thegreaterthe threatit poses to others.Some typesof power are more threatening thanare others, and secure when the former statesare less capabilitiesare easy to acquire and when others possess them in abundance.34Offensivepower is usually defined in terms of specificmilitarycapabilities (e.g., does technology favorattackingor defending?),but political factorscan be equally important.In particular,the abilityto undermine a foreigngovernment throughpropaganda or subversioncan be an equally potentformof offensivepower. In general,the greaterthe threat, largerthe incentive the for other states to take action (including the use of force) in order to containor reduce the danger.
and JackS. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation War," World for Politics 40 (October 1987),83-86. 32 See Geoffrey Blainey,The Causesof War,3d ed. (New York: Free Press,1988),chap. 8. 33 See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins ofAlliances(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987),21-26, 263-66, 275-80; and also idem, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation:The Case of SouthwestAsia," International 42 Organization (Spring 1988). 34 See George Quester, and System (New York: Wiley, Offense Defensein theInternational 1977); RobertJervis, "Cooperationunderthe Security Dilemma," World Politics30 (January 1978); StephenVan Evera, "Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss.,University California,Berkeley, of 1984), 77-171; and idem, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World 9 War," International Security (Summer 1984).

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If Second, the level of threatis also affected otherstates'intentions. by a state is believed to be unusually aggressive,potentialvictimswill be more willing to use forceto reduce its power, to moderateits aggressive if aims, or to eliminateit entirely. contrast, statesview each other's By aims as relatively benign,theywill be less likelyto go to war even when the balance of power is favorable. By focusingon threatsratherthan on power alone, balance-of-threat theory providesa more completeexplanationof whyrevolutions increase the likelihood of war. In addition to changing the overall balance of for power and making it more difficult statesto measure it accurately, revolutionsalso reduce each side's abilityto assess the other'sintentions with confidence. Indeed, revolutions encourageboth sides to believe that are the other'sintentions even more hostilethan theyare, and the use of forceto reduce or eliminatethe threatbecomes a more attractive option as a result. Revolutionsalso produce a particularformof offensive power, based primarilyon each side's fear of ideological subversion.If a revolution embodies novel politicalideas, the rulingelitesin stateswhose domestic is orders are different may feel that theirlegitimacy threatened.At the leaders usuallyface continueddomesticresame time,the revolutionary of sistanceand worryabout the possibility a counterrevolutionary resurgence. Each side thus fearsthatit is vulnerableto ideological challenge, yet each also tends to believe that its opponentsare vulnerableas well. revolutions make war According to balance-of-threat theory, therefore, of more likelyby increasingperceptions threaton both sides and by encouragingboth sides to believe thatthe threatwill be easy to defeat.The are of originsof theseeffects found in the particularcharacteristics revaffect each side's olutionarystatesand the various ways thatrevolutions and opportunities. abilityto evaluate threats To explain preciselywhy this occurs,the next sectionconsidershow the revolutionaryprocess shapes the belief systemsof revolutionary states.The essay thendescribeswhy revolutions increasethe uncertainty both revolutionary and nonrevolutionary facing states,beforeturningto a detailed explanationof the linkage betweenrevolutionand war.
III.
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

Revolutionsare deadly serious contestsfor extremely high stakes. The collapse of internalauthority places all membersof societyat risk: until a new order is established,conflictscan be resolved only by tests of and no one's interests and safety assured. Winners will take are strength

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as all and losers may lose everything; a result,mass revolutionsare almost always bloody and destructive.35 A revolutionis more than the replacementof one set of rulersby another: "a complete revolutioninvolves the creation of a new political a state restson new principlesof order."36 definition, revolutionary By (names, flags, legitimacy, displaysnew symbolsof authority and identity anthems,etc.), adopts new rules for elite recruitment, and creates new and governmental politicalinstitutions procedures.In short,revolutions within a given territory creatinga the by redefine political community "new state" that restson principlesand proceduresthatare a sharp departurefromthoseof the old regime.
REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE "FREE-RIDER PROBLEM"

Successful revolutionsare rare, because even weak and corrupt states usuallycontrolfargreaterresourcesthan do theirinternalopponents.In particular,statespossess greateraccess to the means of violence, which theycan use to monitor,suppress,or co-opt potentialchallengers.This advantage is greatestduring the early stages of a revolution,when the opposition is weak and isolated and when the armed forcesand police It thatmost revare stillloyal to the old regime.37 is thus not surprising movementsdie rapid and obscuredeaths.Indeed, it is perhaps olutionary thatany ever succeed. more surprising of The inherent difficulty overthrowingan existing state is comBecause the alleged benefits a of pounded by the "free-rider" problem.38 successfulrevolutionare collectivegoods thatare in theoryavailable to all, individual citizens can benefitfroma revolutioneven if they have done nothingto help bringit about. Moreover,each individual's contrithe bution is too small to affect outcome,so a rationalactor would inevitablychoose to freeride ratherthan incur the risksand costsof joining movement.39 a revolutionary Indeed, if people were motivatedsolelyby
35 Note the followingdeath tolls in modern revolutions: France, 15,000 dead; Russia, 500,000; China, 3 million; Cuba, 5,000; Iran, 17,000;Mexico 250,000; Nicaragua, between 30,000 and 50,000. See Melvin Small and J.David Singer,Resort Arms:International to and Civil Wars,1816-1980(BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage, 1982). 36 See Huntington (fn.4), 266. 37 Indeed, some theorists assertthatit is impossiblefora revolution succeed so long as to and cohesion.See KatherineC. Chorley, the armed forcesretaintheirloyalty Armies and the ArtofRevolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1943).For additionalbackground, Adelman see (fn.7). 38 On the free-rider problem,see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Camand revisions Olson's arguments, of bridge: Harvard University Press,1971).For extensions Action(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins University see Russell Hardin, Collective Press/Resources forthe Future, 1982). 39 Works that apply collective-goods theoryto the studyof revolutioninclude Samuel in Popkin, The RationalPeasant: The PoliticalEconomy Rural Society Vietnam of (Berkeley:

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and narrow self-interest guided by a completely objectiveassessmentof revolutionswould be largelyimpossible,for lack of costs and benefits, willing participants.40 severalscholarshave sugDrawing in parton collective-goods theory, movementsovercome the free-rider that revolutionary gested problem or eitherby offering positiveinducements by threatening negativesancYet tions.41 thisexplanationis onlypartlysatisfying. Althoughthe ability to provide specificincentives(for example, food, protectionfromlandlords, rural organization) may help convince uncommittedindividuals thesebenefits not explain how do to supporta revolutionary movement, the organizationgets startedin the first beforeit was able to place (i.e., or provide these benefits) why individualswill risk theirlives to expand of the movement.Given the high probability failureand the risks that revolutionaries face (imprisonment, exile,death),thepayoffs would have movementa rational to be enormous to make joining a revolutionary fromseveralrevolutionary choice.42 And testimony leaders suggeststhat theydid not expect to be rewarded at all.43Thus, the puzzle remains: how are individualspersuaded to bear the costsand risksof revolutionin and how do theysustain theircommitment the face of ary activity, prolongeduncertainty, danger,and otherdifficulties?44
of and Revolutionary University CaliforniaPress, 1979); Michael Taylor, "Rationality Coland lectiveAction,"in Taylor,ed.,Rationality Revolution (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Public Choice 11 (Fall Press, 1988),63-97; Gordon Tullock, "The Paradox of Revolution," of Model of Rev1971); Philip G. Roeder,"RationalRevolution:Extensions the 'By-Product' PoliticalQuarterly (March 1982); MorrisSilver,"Politi35 Western olutionary Involvement," cal Revolutionand Repression:An Economic Approach,"Public Choice 17 (Spring 1974); and Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective PoliticalScienceReview80 (June1986). Action,"American 40 See Muller and Opp (fn.39), 472. 41 See Jeffrey in Race, "Toward an Exchange Theoryof Revolution," JohnWilson Lewis, in Calif.: Stanford and Communist Revolution Asia (Stanford, ed., PeasantRebellion University Politics Revolution and Princeton Press,1974); JoelS. Migdal,Peasants, (Princeton: University in Press,1974); and the references fn.39. 42 As Charles Tilly notes, "Why and how ... the group committedfromthe startto transformation thestructure power. .. forms of of remainsone of themysteries fundamental to of our time." See Tilly,FromMobilization Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), 203. 43 Revolutionaries are oftensurprisedwhen theygain power, which suggeststhat they of were notmotivated expectations personalfuture by gain. Lenin tolda socialist youthgroup in January1917 that"we of the older generationmay not live to see the decisivebattlesof thiscoming revolution";the Sandinistaleader Daniel Ortega admittedthatas late as July 1979 he did not expectto see the revolution succeed in Nicaragua; and the AyatollahKhomeini was reportedly surprisedby the speed with which the Shah's regimecollapsed. See Revolution(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity William Henry Chamberlain, The Bolshevik Press,1987),1:131,323; Pastor(fn.22), xiv; and MarvinZonis, "Iran: A Theoryof Revolution Politics (July1983),602. 35 fromAccountsof the Revolution,"World 44 In the wordsof Douglass North: "How do we accountfor... the willingness people of withno evidentpossiblegain (the endless parade of individto engage in immensesacrifice

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action is thatrevolutionary Part of the answer lies in the recognition as motivatedas much by moral commitment by narrow self-interest.45 Those who approach the abolition of the presentorder as a moral imas perativewill view the promiseof individual benefits secondaryor irof relevant.46 Furthermore, perceptions costsand benefits ultimately rest on subjectivebeliefsabout the consequencesof different choices; if indiis viduals believethata revolution possibleand will bringgreatbenefitsof irrespective the true possibilities-theywill be more likelyto support if it, particularly theyalso believe that success requires theirparticipation.47Revolutionarymovements thereforetry to convince potential the members(1) thatseeking to overthrow existingorder is the morally correctposition,(2) thatdoing so will bringsignificant and (3) benefits, of thatthe probability successis high.48 Persuadingtheuncommitted and reassuringexistingmembersof these "facts"is a principalfunctionof a revolutionary ideology.
REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGIES

An ideology is a normativetheoryof action. Ideologies "explain" prevailing social conditions and provide guidelines for how individuals should react to them. In nonrevolutionary societies,for example, the dominant ideology helps discourage disobedienceand freeriding (such as tax evasion) by persuadingcitizens"to conceive of justice as coextento sive with the existingrules,and accordingly, obey themout of a sense of morality."Ideology improvesefficiency reducingthe "enforcement by costs" of obtaining support for the prevailingorder. By contrast,"the is objectiveof a successfulcounter-ideology to convincepeople not only that the observed injusticesare an inherentpart of the systembut also can come about onlybyactive participation individthata just system of
uals and groups who have incurredprisonor death forabstract causes)?" See North,Structureand Changein EconomicHistory (New York: W. W. Norton,1981), 10-1. 45 See James Rule, Theories of Civil Violence(Berkeley: University California Press, of 1988), 35, 39. For a more general discussionof these issues,see JonElster,The Cementof A Society: Study Social Order(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity of Press,1989),chap. 5. 46 For example,see the description of Lenin's "intensefaith"in Marxismin Chamberlain (fn.43), 1:135, 140. with recentsociologicalresearchsuggesting 47 This argumentis consistent that political beliefsabout the seriousorganizationsencouragecollectiveaction by promoting particular ness of the problem,the locus of causalityor blame, the image of the opposition,and the efficacy collectiveresponse.See David A. Snow et al., "Frame AlignmentProcesses,Miof American and Movement Participation," cromobilization, SociologicalReview 51 (August 1986). 48 Thus, Sandinista leader Humberto Ortega admittedto deliberately exaggeratingthe of feasibility revolution: "Tryingto tell the massesthatthe cost was veryhigh and thatthey movement."See should seek anotherway would have meantthe defeatof the revolutionary Tomas Borge et al., Sandinistas Speak (New York: Pathfinder Press,1982),70-71.

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uals in the system."49 Revolutionary ideologies critique the presentsysa for tem (as Marx's analysisof capitalismdid) and offer strategy replacIn ing it with some morallypreferable order.50 short, ideologyserves"to energize groups to behave contraryto a simple, hedonisticindividual
calculus of costs and benefits .
.

. since neither maintenance of the exist-

To ing order nor its overthrow possiblewithoutsuch behavior."51 this is end, revolutionary ideologies tend to emphasize threekey themes.
ENEMIES ARE EVIL AND INCAPABLE OF REFORM

theiropponentsas intrinsically evil Revolutionary groups usuallyportray and incapable of meaningfulreform:if the currentsystemis unjust and at cannot improve,then efforts compromiseare doomed, leaving revolution as the only morally possible alternative.Lenin broke with the "Economists" in Russia and with Social Democrats like Karl Kautsky of over the possibility reforming tsarismand capitalism,and Mao Zer[Itsnature dong told his followersthat" 'imperialismis ferocious.'. will never change, the imperialistswill never lay down their butcher the knives,... theywill neverbecome Buddhas."52 Similarly, Ayatolloh Khomeini opposed compromisewith the Shah by warningIranians that "if you give thisfellowa breathingspell,neitherIslam nor yourcountry nor yourfamilywill be leftforyou. Do not give him thechance; squeeze In his neck until he is strangled."53 each case reformand compromise were rejectedin favorof a radical solution.
VICTORY IS INEVITABLE

will eventuallybear Unless potentialsupportersbelieve their sacrifices a movementwill not get veryfar.Revolutionary idefruit, revolutionary as ologies are thus inherently optimistic:theyinvariablyportrayvictory odds against inevitabledespitewhat may appear to be the overwhelming
North (fn.44), 53-54. Accordingto Mark Hagopian, "There are threestructural aspectsof revolutionary idewhich sugwhich lays bare the shortcomings the old regime;affirmation, of ology:critique, gestsor even spells out in detail thata bettersocietyis not only desirable,but possible; and in recenttimes,strategic guidance,which tells the best way to make a revolution."See Hagopian (fn.2), 258. 51 See North (fn.44), 53-54. 52 See Carr (fn.3), 1:11; and Mao Zedong, "Cast Away Illusions, PrepareforStruggle,"in Works Mao Tse-Tung(Peking: PekingLanguages Press,1961),4:428. Mao Zedong, Selected of to Aftergaining power, Lenin argued that "the [imperialists'] striving take advantage of to everyopportunity attackRussia is incorrigible." Quoted in Leites (fn. 10),406. An 53 Quoted in Arjomand (fn. 18), 102. See also Nikki Keddie, Roots ofRevolution: Interpretation theHistory ModernIran (New Haven: Yale University of of Press, 1981),207. Ratowardthe United Statesand the SovietUnion was mazani argues thatKhomeini'shostility withtheseadversaries was bothdesirableand imposbased in parton his beliefthatconflict sible to avoid. See Ramazani (fn. 11),20-21.
50

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thisbeliefby invokingirrethe it. Furthermore, ideologymay reinforce faithin victory. sistibleor divine forcesto justify Marxists,forexample, saw the "laws" of capitalistdevelopmentas leading inexorablytoward and theemergenceof socialism.Khomeini and his proletarianrevolution followersrestedtheiroptimismon religiousfaith.Revolutionariesmay also invoke the successesof earlier movementsto sustain confidencein in theirown efforts; thus,the Sandinistassaw Castro's victory Cuba as in evidence thattheirown efforts Nicaragua could succeed.54 Optimismcan also be encouragedby depictingone's enemyas a paper were "paper tiger.Mao Zedong argued,forexample,that"reactionaries" but tigers"who "in appearance . . . are terrifying in reality... are not so powerful,"and Marshal Lin Biao assertedthat "U.S. imperialismis but also more vulnerable,than any imperialismof the past."55 stronger, assessmentof imperialismwas similar: as the "higheststage of Lenin's containedboththepower to dominatetheglobe capitalism,"imperialism at and the seeds of itsinevitabledestruction thehands of the proletariat.56 howeverhopeless The methodis an obvious way to sustaincommitment: assured ifonlythe revolutionthingsappear to be, successis nevertheless ary forcespersevere. of At the same timethe real difficulties the struggledemand thatrevis olutionarymovementstempertheiroptimism:even if victory inevitable, for instance, it still requires heroic effortand repeated sacrifice. Thus, Khomeini argued that "it is only throughthe active, intentional that unjust rulerscan be toppled," and Lin Biao pursuitof martyrdom reminded his readers that although U.S. imperialismwas vulnerable, revolutioncan be fulfilledonly "the task of the national-democratic Mao Zedong warned throughlong and torturous struggles."57 Similarly, to while takingfullaccount his followers "despise theenemystrategically of him tactically," meaning that overcomingthe enemy would require careful preparationand repeated sacrificebut that victorywas assured
in See the testimony Gilbert(fn. 19),5, 56. in See Van Ness (fn.3), 40-41; and Lin Biao, "Long Live Victory the People's War," in and People'sWar (New York: Praeger,1966),101. Samuel B. Griffith, Peking ed., in The HighestStage of Capitalism, Lenin (fn. 20), 1:675, 56 See V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: 745-68. Asked what he would do if he gained power, Lenin replied,"We would at once start among all thepeoples now oppressed. . . [and] raise in systematically to inciterebellion of rebellionthe socialistproletariat Europe." Quoted in Theodore H. von Laue, "Soviet 1918-1930,"in GorDiplomacy: G. V. Chicherin,People's CommissarforForeign Affairs, 1919-1939 (Princeton:PrincetonUnidon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert,eds., The Diplomats, versity Press, 1953),236. See also Carr (fn.3), 3-4, 7. 57 See Zonis and Brumberg (fn. 11), 27-28; and Lin Biao (fn. 55), 97. Such beliefsnicely memberswere convincedthatvictory was inevicounterthe free-rider problem:ifpotential to table regardless whether of theyjoined or not,the temptation freeride would increase.
54 5

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because the enemy was vulnerable.58 Lenin similarly warned his followers against overconfidence; victory, though assured, could not be won withoutsetbacksand tacticalretreats along the way.59 movementsbetrays tena Thus, the worldview of most revolutionary sion betweenoptimismand prudence.An important question,therefore, is which of these tendenciesexertsthe greaterinfluenceon the percepof tions and behavior of the new state.The history the movementmay play a role in thisregard; if the path to power is shortand smooth,then the optimistic aspectsof the ideologyare likelyto be reinforced. conBy the when power comes in the wake of a protracted trast, struggle, revoleaders are more likelyto be aware of potentialpitfalls and thus lutionary more likelyto behave with restraint.
OUR REVOLUTION HAS UNIVERSAL MEANING

Although exceptionsdo exist (such as Kemalist Turkey, revolutionary in Mexico, or the Meiji restoration Japan),the ideologies of most revolutionarystates contain strong "universalist"themes. Specifically,the of are principles the revolution believedto applyto othersocietiesas well. In the extremecase, the ideology may go so far as to reject the nationstateas a legitimate politicalunit and call forthe eventualeliminationof itself. the state-system During the French Revolution,forexample,the prowar factionled by Brissot de Warville called for a "universal crusade of human liberty," of arguing thatthe "liberty the entireworld" was wortha few thousand of Orthodox Marxistssaw the "inevitable"triumph socialismas deaths.60 a worldwide process that would bring about a classless,statelesscommonwealth of peace. Chinese officials emphasized that "world revolution relies on the thoughtof Mao Tse-tung.. . [It] belongs not only to And Khomeini's verChina but also has itsinternational implications."61 sion of Shiite theologyforesaw the eventual establishment a global of
58 See Van Ness (fn.3), 40-41. On another thatimperialism occasionMao toldhis followers and had no future," and "we have reasonto despisethem."Yet he also cautioned was "rotten . all that"we should nevertake the enemylightly . . and [should]concentrate our strength Problemsof the Party'sPresentPolicy," forbattle."See Mao Zedong, "On Some Important in Mao Zedong (fn.52), 4:181; and Tsou and Halperin (fn.15), 89. grave and sometimes 59 In "LeftwingCommunism,"Lenin warned that "we may suffer will be even decisive defeats.... If, however,we use all the methodsof struggle, victory in "As certain."See Lenin (fn.20), 3:410-11. At theEighthPartyConference 1919,he stated, are reversals thesituation possibleand hence long as we have notyetachievedfullvictory, of can not even the smallestdoubt or lightmindedness be tolerated."Quoted in Leites (fn. 10), 442. 60 See T. C. W. Blanning, The French Revolution Germany: in Occupation Resistance and in 1792-1802(London: OxfordUniversity theRhineland, Press),63; and Blanning(fn.3), 111. 61 Quoted in Tsou and Halperin (fn. 15),82.

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Muslim community (ummak)followingtheabolitionof the "un-Islamic" nation-state system.62 That revolutionary ideologies tend to include universalistelements should not come as a surprise.Such views promise adherentsan addia tional reward fortheirsacrifices: revolutionis good not only forone's for but own country, it will be beneficial othersas well. Moreover,if the failuresof the old regimeare the resultof externalforces(such as "capitalistimperialism"),then action beyond one's own bordersmay be necessaryto eliminatetheseevils once and forall. Finally,in order to attract popular support,revolutionary ideologies tend to portraynew political truths-which createsa bias toward universalism. ideas as self-evident How, thatis, can a self-evident politicalprinciplebe valid forone group Could the Jacobinsargue that the Rights of Man but not for others? Could Marx's disciplesin theSoviet Union applied onlyto Frenchmen?63 claim that his "laws of history"were valid in Russia alone? Could the Iranian revolutionaries argue that an Islamic republic was essentialfor Persians but not forotherMuslims?
CAVEATS

These ideological themesare neithernecessarynor sufficient conditions for revolutionary success, and one or more of these elements may be occur wheneversome group missingin certaincases. Nor do revolutions adopts these ideological formulas;the likelihood of a successfulrevolution is also affected a host of otherdomesticand international by conditions, including the challengers'abilityto provide material benefitsto Still,it is hard to imagine a mass revolutionsucceeding theirfollowers.64 withoutan ideological programthat both justifiedrevoltand gave participantssome reason to believe theywould win.65 Indeed, it is a striking factthatthe ideological programsof revolutionary movementsas varied as those of the American Founding Fathers, the Russian and Chinese all communists,or the Iranian fundamentalists incorporatedvariations on these three principles.In short,although the inherentdifficulty of revolutionand the logic of the free-rider problem do not require that movementsadopt the ideologicalformulasoutlinedabove, revolutionary
See Ramazani (fn. 11), 19-21; and Zonis and Blumberg(fn. 11),6, 24. A Revolution See Simon Schama, Citizens: Chronicle theFrench of (New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1989),592. "I See Migdal (fn. 41), 226-56; and Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants RevolutionPolitics14 (April 1982). ary?" Comparative 65 According to Franz Borkenau: "If violence is the father of everygreat upheaval, its motheris illusion.The beliefwhich is always rebornin everygreat and decisive historical that afterthis struggleall poverty, suffering, all struggleis that this is the last fight, all oppressionwill be a thingof the past." See Borkenau(fn.4), 74-75.
62 63

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such beliefsare likelyto give them an advantage over rivals who lack a similarset of ideas. Of course, revolutionary ideologies should not be seen as wholly different fromotherformsof politicalbelief.In fact,theyare usually just a more extremeversionof the patriotic ideals thatestablishedregimesuse Justas revolutionary movementsento encourage individual sacrifice. courage similar sacrificesthrough the ideological themes described above, so statesat war portraytheirenemies as evil, victoryas certain, and theirown goals as pure and idealistic(e.g., "to make the world safe fordemocracy,""to promotea new world order"). But because the risks movementsare are great and the odds of success are low, revolutionary than most likely to indoctrinatemembers even more enthusiastically statesdo.
REVOLUTIONS AND UNCERTAINTY

in system. Revolutionsincreasethe level of uncertainty the international First,aftera revolutionneitherside can reliablyestimatethe other'sintentions.Without a record of past behavior to guide them,other states will be honored;thus,important cannotknow whetherprioragreements are and understandings called into question as soon as the commitments also magnifyuncertainties new leaders take power. Second, revolutions about the balance of power. The chaos that accompanies a revolution reduces the state's capabilitiesin certain respects,but the new regime in may be more effective mobilizing national resourcesthan its predeeffects cannot be cessor was. Because the magnitude of these different in advance-particularly when thenew regimerepresents rada known ical departure from the old order-neither side is able to gauge their relativecapabilitieswith much confidence. Third, revolutionsalso damage the normal channels of communication between statespreciselywhen the need foraccurate information is for greatest;this makes it more difficult them to understandthe inforare mation theydo have. Diplomatic representatives oftenwithdrawnor replaced and intelligence networksare disrupted,which makes it more for difficult each side to determinewhat the other is doing and why. Afterthe Bolshevik Revolution,for example, the U.S. diplomatic staff leftMoscow and had only irregularcontactwith the Soviet leadership, in reportsfroma valeaving officials Washingtonto relyon conflicting sources.66 the same way, the revolutionary In governrietyof unofficial
and communication a recurring 66The confusionresultingfromlack of information is themein George F. Kennan,Soviet-American 1917-1920,2 vols.(Princeton:PrinceRelations, ton University Press,1956and 1958).

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mentusually lacksadequatefacilities trained and diplomatic personnel, its to of whichcripples ability evaluatetheconduct others and to comThese problems municate own intentions its foster miscalcuaccurately. and create environment an lationand misperception thereby conducive to conflict war. and
IV. WHY REVOLUTIONS CAUSE WAR
REVOLUTIONS AND THE "SPIRAL MODEL"

thatone statetakesto increase security-such In anarchy, actions its as its military forces-tend to reduce the security other of expanding these actions maylead others infer In states.67 addition, to thatthestate in question aggressive has their intentions, thereby increasing own perevenmore.Thus, twoor morestates of willexaggerate ceptions threat if fail the each other's moaggressiveness they to understand defensive side'sbehavior. This process-whichRobert behindtheother tivations model" -makeswarmorelikely making the has Jervis termed "spiral by and both compromise appearlessfeasible byencouraging sidesto search the fora wayto eliminate threat is comentirely.68 "Spiraling" especially a monafter revolution.
WHY REVOLUTIONARY STATES TEND TO "SPIRAL

are states proneto spiralforseveral reasons. a Revolutionary First, revunsure theintentions other will about of states simolutionary regime be in or ply becauseit has little no direct experience dealingwiththem. it Lacking directevidence, fallsback on ideology, and, as discussed of movements above,the ideology mostrevolutionary portrays opponents hostile.69 as Thus,evena milddiplomatic dispute likely escais to becauseconflict late and concessions is maybe viewedwithsuspicion, and is seen as inevitable becausecompromise viewedas naive or even dangerous. movement harbor a basedon its Second, revolutionary may suspicions
67 in dilemma" identified JohnH. Herz, "Idealist InternaThis is the familiar"security Politics (January 2 tionalismand the Security Dilemma," World 1950).See also Jervis 34). (fn. 68 in and Misperception International Politics(Princeton:Princeton See Jervis, Perception University Press, 1976),chap. 3; and RichardMoss, "The Limitsof Policy: An Investigation in of the Spiral Model, the DeterrenceModel, and Miscalculations U.S.-Third World Relations"(Ph.D. diss.,Princeton University, 1987). 69 Thus, at the end of World War I, Lenin immediately predicted that"world capital will now startan offensive againstus." Quoted in Chamberlain(fn.43), 2:155-56. He also told the Third CominternCongressin June1921 that"the international bourgeoisie. .. is waitwill permitthe renewalof this ing,always on the lookout forthe momentwhen conditions war [withthe SovietUnion]." Quoted in Leites (fn. 10),405.

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own experience.Eager to redresspast wrongs (as is oftenthe case), the revolutionary movementwill be especiallywary of any foreignpowers that it sees as responsiblefor them. Thus, Mao Zedong's suspicions of the United States were based in part on past Western interference in China, and revolutionary forcesin Mexico, Nicaragua, and Iran were preoccupied with the possibility U.S. intervention much the same of for
reason.70

Under such circumstances revolutionary regimestend to assume the worstabout otherstatesand to interpret ambiguous or inconsistent policies in a negativelight:threats signsof oppositionconfirm hostile or the image, whereas concessionsor signs of approval are seen as insincere And indeed, gesturesmasking the opponent'strue (hostile)intentions.71 the policies of other statesare virtually certainto be ambiguous, if only because it takes timeforthosestatesto decide how to respondto the new situation.This problem is compounded by the difficulty understandin ing how a new politicalorder works,by ignoranceabout the beliefsand background of the new regime,and by the absence of reliable informaEven when foreignpowers are not tion thataccompanies a revolution.72 some of their actions and statementswill especially hostile,therefore, the reinforce suspicionsof the revolutionary regime. Third, spiralingis more likely if the elite (or a factionwithin it) exaggeratesa foreignthreatin order to improveits internalposition,that is, by rallyingnationalistsupportforthe new leaders or to justify harsh measures against internalopponents.Such efforts especiallyeffective are when thereis some truth theaccusations,forexample,ifforeignpowto ers had been allied with the old regimeand if theyare clearlysuspicious of the new government.This tacticcan be dangerous if it magnifiesa conflict thatmightotherwisehave been avoided or minimized. The risk can be contained,however,if the revolutionary elite remainsaware that it is engaging in a purelydomesticgambit,so thatits actual policydeci70 See Mao Zedong, "Friendshipor Aggression?"in Mao Zedong (fn.52), 4:447-50; Gilbert (fn. 19), 153-75; and JamesA. Bill, The Eagle and theLion: The Tragedy Americanof IranianRelations (New Haven: Yale University Press,1988),96-97. 71 On the tendency to fitambiguous information into existingbeliefs, Jervis see (fn. 68), 143-54. 72 For example,ignorance of internal politicsin France was an important cause of the war of 1792. Following the royalfamily's failedescape attemptin June1791,Emperor Leopold of Austriawarned the French Assemblynot to harm Louis XVI and his family. SeptemIn ber, Louis' acceptanceof the new constitution gave moderateforcesin the AssemblytemThis development was due primarily events poraryascendancyover the radical factions. to in Paris, but Leopold mistakenly saw it as a directresultof his threats.When he tried to repeat the maneuverby issuinganotherwarning in December, he merelydiscreditedthe moderatesand helped bringthe prowarBrissotin faction power. See Blanning(fn.3), 86, to 89, 102-3.

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assessment others' of intentions rather thanon sionsare basedon itstrue it themyth has manufactured. control difficult. is But maintaining fine such their creators Although are the these myths, campaign that mayknowthat maybe so convincing efforts enhancedomestic to it becomesthe basisforpolicy. Moreover, threats be self-fulfilling: can external ifforeign support exaggerating by therealmotive sucha campaign, behind powersdo notrecognize they state's accusations threats and maytaketherevolutionary seriously. And ifthey thenreact defensively-as wouldexpect-it willmerely one conothers hold. firm bellicose the imagethat already
WHY FOREIGN POWERS SPIRAL WITH REVOLUTIONARY STATES

to Otherstatescontribute the spiralof hostility well,by failing as to hold understand each sidewillinevitably to itsown version histhat of own history a favorable in after tendto view their all tory-all states state light.The revolutionary will naturally emphasizepast injustices, But over interference. foreign such as resentment foreign powerswill seesthem objects hatred as of and notunderstand whythenew regime and will viewtheregime's defensive as of suspicion responses evidence U.S. Secretary State Dean intentions.73 example, For of its aggressive in Achesonsaw Chineseintervention the Korean War as evidenceof and that"no possible communist expansionism Sovietcontrol, claiming in couldhaveexisted themindsoftheChineseComshredofevidence intentions the forces the of munist authorities about the [peaceful] of Like mostAmericans, Acheson believed that U.S. polUnitedNations." As he icyin theFar Easthad beenin China'sbestinterest. a result, failed an in hownegative imageWestern actions theFar East had to recognize Similarproblems producedin the mindsof China'snew leaders.74 afwithCastro:becauseU.S. leaders flicted U.S. relations suchas President U.S. policy believed that had beenbeneficial for DwightD. Eisenhower aggression rather thanas Cuba, they saw Castro's hostility unjustified as reaction past U.S. behavior.75 Even wherelegitian understandable to for exist did mategrounds conflict (as they inboththese cases), ignorance the ofthehistorical basisforsuspicion to encourages foreign powers exthe of state. aggerate bellicosity therevolutionary if domestic Foreign powers mayalsospiral thenewregime's programs
73

451.

On the tendency statesto distort theirown history, Van Evera (fn.34, diss.),399see of

74 See Richard Ned Lebow, BetweenPeace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1981),205-16; Jervis 68), 70-72. (fn. to The United States and theCuban Revolution, 75 See Richard Welch,Response Revolution: of 1959-1961 (Chapel Hill: University NorthCarolina Press,1985),41.

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basis adversely.This situationis alreadya legitimate theirinterests affect will be magnified actions if but,as discussedabove, thethreat forconflict, taken for internalreasons are also viewed as evidence of aggressiveintentions.In hopes of obtainingdiplomatic or militarysupport,groups are affected(such as foreigncorporationswhose assets whose interests thatthe have been seized) may tryto convincetheirhome governments Thus, Castro's land reform new regime is a threatto national security. between the Untied States program exacerbated the spiral of hostility in Arbenz's land reforms Guatemala led the United Fruit and Cuba, and Company to organize a public relations campaign that provided the him.76 backdrop forthe U.S.-led coup thatoverthrew
EXACERBATING FACTORS

alterrelationsbetweenstatesin sevTo make matters worse,revolutions of First, thatencourageexaggeratedperceptions hostility. eral otherways In the other's sense of vulnerability. each side tends to underestimate addition to the burdens of organizing a governmentand rebuildinga statesoftenface continueddomesticoprevolutionary damaged society, Fearful thattheirhold on power is precarious,theyare more position.77 howDespite this sense of vulnerability, likely to overreactto threats.78 in as themselves firmly constatesattemptto portray ever,revolutionary at rectrol,in orderto discouragecounterrevolution home and to attract is other states ognitionabroad. If this public relationseffort successful, state is driven will underestimate extentto which the revolutionary the and will view its defensiveactions as a sign of aggressive by insecurity other intentratherthan as a reactionto legitimatefears.Furthermore, statesmay not recognize thata new regimemust build a reputationfor in defendingits interests order to deter futurechallengesand that this to motivewill encourage themto respondvigorously challenges. The reversemay occur as well. Fully aware of theirown weaknesses, states may find it hard to understand why others view revolutionary
76 On Cuba, see Moss (fn. 68), 160-64, 193-94. On Guatemala, see Richard H. Immerof (Austin:University Texas PolicyofIntervention mann,The CIA in Guatemala:The Foreign Fruit: The UntoldStory and StephenKinzer,Bitter of Press, 1982); and StephenSchlesinger Coup in Guatemala(Garden City,N.Y.: AnchorBooks, 1983). theAmerican 77 One Chinese sourcereports "bandits"remainas manyas 400,000counterrevolutionary faced ing in China in 1950. See Gurtovand Hwang (fn.21), 31. The French revolutionaries numerousuprisingsand a civil war in the Vendee, and the Iranian, Bolshevik,Ethiopian, by were also characterized lingeringinternalviolence Nicaraguan, and Cuban revolutions afterthe seizure of power. not like men on enterthe limelight, 78 As George Pettee once observed,"Revolutionists children,exappearingin the forum,but like fearful conspirators horseback,as victorious (New of house,notsurethatit is empty."See Pettee,The Process Revolution ploringan empty York: Harper, 1938), 100-101.

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themas dangerous.79 Accordingly, theymay view theoppositionof other states as evidence of intrinsic ratherthan as a response to the hostility revolutionary state'sown actions.Foreign powers will be concernedwith as buildinga reputation well, in order to teach the new regimethatthey cannot be exploited.Both sides, then,may interpret even purelydefensive policies as signsof aggressiveintent(which is not to deny thatthere of may also be real conflicts interest). A second exacerbatingfactoris the pernicious influenceof exiles.80 Revolutionsinvariably produce a large populationthatfleesto escape its or consequences. Many are supporters membersof the old regime and are likely to be hostile to the revolutionary governmentand eager to returnto power. They tend to settlein countriesthatare sympathetic to theirplightand tryto obtain foreignassistancefortheircounterrevoluefforts. thisend, theyportray new regimeas a grave threat To the tionary to other states and characterizeit as illegitimateand unpopular (and therefore vulnerableto counterrevolutionary action). Moreover, despite theirobvious biases, emigres are oftenseen as expertson conditionsin As theirtestimony likelyto be overvalued, is theirhome country. a result, are when othersourcesof information scarce.The more creparticularly attitudesin the host coundence theyare given,the more theywill shift tryagainst the revolutionary regime.8" Thus, during the French Revolution emigres from France and its "satellite republics" purveyed a varietyof mythsabout the aggressiveambitionsof the revolutionaries and were at least partlysuccessfulin stoking foreignsuspicion of the More recently, revolutionary government.82 Cuban, Iranian, and Nica79 As Lenin told the Tenth PartyCongressin 1921,"For a long time we are condemned merelyto heal wounds." Quoted in Chamberlain(fn.43), 2:446. 80 See Yossi Shain, The Frontier Loyalty: PoliticalExiles in theAge of theNation-State of (Middletown,Conn.: WesleyanUniversity Press,1989). 81 This is hardly new phenomenon. a In the sixteenth Machiavelliobserved: century,

of How vain the faithand promises men are who are exiles fromtheirown country. As . to to theirfaith, . . whenevertheycan return theircountry othermeans than your by of assistance, theywill abandon you and look to theothermeans,regardless theirpromises to you. And as to theirvain hopes and promises,such is theirextremedesire to return theirhomes thattheynaturally to believemanythingsthatare not true,and add manyotherson purpose; so that,withwhat theyreallybelieveand what theysay they to believe,theywill fillyou withhopes to thatdegreethatifyou attempt act upon them, you will incura fruitless expense,or engage in an undertaking thatwill involveyou in
ruin.

trans.Luigi Ricci and rev. E. R. P. See Niccol6 Machiavelli,The Princeand theDiscourses, Vincent(New York: Modern Library,1950),388-89. 82 See Doctrine and Action, JacquesGodechot,The Counter-Revolution: P89-1804 (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1971),chap. 9; and R. R. Palmer,The Age oftheDemocratic A 2 Revolution: PoliticalHistory Europeand America, vols. (Princeton: of Princeton University Press,1959 and 1964),2:556-58,568.

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raguan emigres in the United States have used domesticmythmaking U.S. oppositionto theserevolutionary and politicallobbyingto reinforce more visible and vocal such groups are, the greater regimes.83 And the stateto conclude thatthe hostcountry the tendencyforthe revolutionary aims of the expatriates. supportsthe counterrevolutionary sympaThe same process occurs in reverse,of course: revolutionary new capital afterthe revolution, eitherto learn from thizersflockto the or to its experiences, providedirectsupport, to obtainassistancefortheir Like the emigres,thesegroups portray their back home.84 own struggles in home countriesas bothhostileand ripe forrevolution, order to obtain Even if the new regime declines to external support for their efforts. supportthem,other stateswill view theirpresencein the revolutionary capital as evidence thatthe new regimeseeks to spread its ideals abroad. Taken together, parallel migrationof counterrevolutionary the emigres and the testimony they provide to and prorevolutionary sympathizers each side's perceptions the other'shostility. of theirhostsreinforces A thirdexacerbatingfactoris the loss of expertisethataccompanies a elites poorly prepared for revolution.Not only are many revolutionary runninga governmentand managing its diplomacy,but revolutionary also oftenpurge individualswith close ties to potentialengovernments removed officialswith close emies.85Thus, the Iranian revolutionaries ties to the United States,and the communistChinese persecutedtheir of own "America hands" in the 1950s. Ironically,as the treatment the the State Department's"China hands" suggests, same processmay occur withinotherstatesas well.86 removingexperiencedindividuals,each By reduces its capacityto understandthe other.Thus, the perside further
83 On Iran, see Bill (fn.70), 276-77. On Cuba, see Phillip Brenner, From Confrontation to withCuba (Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1988),71-75; and JoanDiNegotiation: U.S. Relations dion, Miami (New York: Simon and Schuster,1987). Additional researchon the lobbying activities exiles is badlyneeded. of 84 Examples are ubiquitous: Thomas Paine traveledto France in the 1790s,along with fromthe restof Europe, and socialistssuch as JohnReed, Louise would-be revolutionaries the Bryant, and Emma Goldman journeyedto Russia following Bolshevikseizure of power in 1917. Havana, Tehran, and Managua have been minormeccas forforeignrevolutionary elitesas well. were "lack of cultureand 85 As Lenin once admitted, the Bolsheviks'main deficiencies thatwe reallydo not know how to rule." Quoted in Dunn (fn.4), 47. In November 1918 he but shortageis the lack declared,"We are not oftenshortof propagandists, our mostcrying Lenin and theMythof World leaders or organizers."Quoted in Piero Melograni, of efficient 1989), 1. See also Revolution(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, Chamberlain(fn.43), 1:351. 86 The "China hands" were a group of China experts accused of disloyalty and purged States fromthe StateDepartmentduringtheMcCarthyera. See Michael Schaller,The United Press, 1979), 130; and and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University E. J. Kahn, Jr.,The China Hands: America's ForeignServiceOfficers WhatBefell Them and (New York: Random House, 1975).

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sonnel changes set in motion by a revolutionexacerbatethe prevailing uncertainty and reinforce suspicionon both sides. To summarize: revolutionsunleash a varietyof forcesthat make it for more difficult the revolutionary stateand its neighborsto assess each other's intentionsaccurately.Both sides lack information, and each is likelyto view theotheras more hostilethanit reallyis. Such a conclusion makes it more difficult them to reach a satisfactory for modus vivendi the and strengthens positionof thosewho favordirectaction to eliminate the threat. The tendency spiralingdoes not explain whywar occurs,however. for Afterall, the United Statesand the Soviet Union were extremely hostile throughoutmuch of the cold war, but neithersaw war as an attractive option fordealing with the other.Thus, the finalquestion to consideris why war is seen as a reasonableresponse.
OFFENSE, DEFENSE, REVOLUTION, AND WAR

Other thingsbeing equal, war is more likelywhen national leaders believe that offenseis easier than defense.When offenseis easy, all states are less secure (i.e., the overall level of threatis higher)and will be more motivatedto finda way to improvetheirpositions.At the same strongly because it offers possibility the time,using forcepromisesgreaterbenefits of winning a decisive victoryover one's opponents. The result is inand a greaterriskof war.87 creased international competition lead to war. In This general hypothesis helps explain why revolutions of hostility, addition to creatingexaggeratedperceptions revolutions also and the encourage both sides to exaggerateboth theirown vulnerability of vulnerability theiropponents.This tendencyis partlydue to the inof herentdifficulty estimatingthe balance of power aftera revolution, which makes it more likelythatboth sides will exaggeratetheirmilitary are increased by prospects.Furthermore,perceptionsof vulnerability fearsthat the revolutionwill eitherspread to othercountriesor readily and politisuccumb to counterrevolutionary pressure.For both military revolutionheightenseach side's sense of threats cal reasons, therefore, and opportunities. Taken together, these factorsencourage both parties to believe that the otherpresentsa grave threat, theyalso encourage the beliefthat yet the threatcan be eliminatedfairly easily.Once again, thesedynamicsare statesand foreignpowers best understood by examining revolutionary separately.
87

in See the references fn.34.

REVOLUTION
WHY REVOLUTIONARY STATES ARE

AND WAR
BUT OVERCONFIDENT

349

INSECURE

To begin with,the inherentoptimismof most revolutionary ideologies can encourage them to overstatetheir militarycapabilities. Thus, the Brissotinfactionthatled France to war in 1792 argued thatthe Revolution had createda power thatwould crushits enemies easily.As Brissot told the National Assembly: "Every advantage is on our side, for now everyFrenchman is a willingsoldier! . . . [W]here is the power on earth ... who could hope to master six million freesoldiers?"88 This sort of to argumentis difficult challenge withoutappearing unpatriotic;if opponents are destined for the "ash-heap of history,"expressingdoubts a of about the certainty victory betrays lack of confidencein the revolution itself. The optimismof revolutionary statesalso restson the beliefthat citizens in other countrieswill rise up to supportthem. This hope reflects the universalismcommon to many revolutionary ideologies and implies that their opponents,lacking popular support,will be unable to fight The Brissotinsused this argument to great effect:Brissot effectively. I claimed that"each soldierwill say to his enemy:Brother, am not going to cut your throat,I am going to show you the way to happiness." And his associate Maximin Isnard predicted that "at the moment that the enemy armies begin to fightwith ours, the daylightof philosophywill open theireyes and the peoples will embrace each other in the face of and an approving heaven and earth."89 their dethroned tyrants Many Bolsheviks believed similarlythat their success in Russia would spark revolutionin Germanyand a cascade of upheavals the long-anticipated in the restof Europe. Even Lenin, who had rejected this view in 1917, supportedthe Russian invasion of Poland in 1920 because he believed it an Mao's claim that "a would trigger uprisingby socialistforcesthere.90 single spark can ignitea prairiefire"conveysa similarfaithin the cataof action. Thus, the overconfidence revoluof lyticeffects revolutionary tionarystatesis fueled by the faiththatthe irresistible spread of revolutionaryideas will underminetheiropponents. statescan be further misled if theygive too much creRevolutionary of The latter,desirous of dence to the testimony foreignsympathizers. external support,are prone to exaggerate the prospectsfor revolution
88 Anotherdeputysuggested that"in the face of our brave patriots, allied armies will the fade away like the shade of nightin the faceof the raysof the sun." Quoted in Blanning(fn. 3), 108-9. Schama (fn.63), 597; and Blanning(fn.3), 109-10. 89 These quotationsare from 90See Carr (fn. 3), 3:209-12; and Chamberlain(fn.43), 2:305-8. For an alternative intersee pretation, Thomas C. Fiddick,Russia'sRetreat fromPoland,1920: FromPermanent Revolutionto PeacefulCoexistence (New York: St. Martin'sPress,1990).

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back home. In 1792, for example, the National Assemblyin Paris was fromforeign emissariesclaimingthat reports bombardedwithoptimistic cried out forliberationand thatthe old regimewould theircountrymen collapse quickly if attacked.91 leaders may be convinced that successfulrevolutionary Furthermore, of theycan triumphover seeminglyimpossibleodds. The strength this with which the factoris likely to be affectedby the ease or difficulty strugglewas waged. The unexpectedcollapse of royalaurevolutionary in in thority France may have encouraged the Brissotins theirbeliefthat universalacceptance,just as the relativeease of theirideas would attract Castro's finalcampaign against BatistaconvincedChe Guevara and othforcesin Latin America could triumpheven when ers thatrevolutionary both Lenin and Mao temBy conditions were unfavorable.92 contrast, proclamationswith repeated warningsthat revopered theiroptimistic Mao warned his followlutionsmustbe conductedcautiously.93 explicitly and fear of struggle)and ers to avoid both "rightdeviations" (passivity "left deviations" (overconfidentrecklessness).94 Similarly, although for about thelong-term prospects world revolution, Lenin was optimistic to once in power he usually rejecteddirectefforts promotethis end. In his 1920 pamphlet "'Left-Wing' Communism: An InfantileDisorder," to he warned against ill-timedefforts seize power, and his speech to the in the same year emphasized long-range Second Comintern Congress to prospectsratherthan immediateefforts fomentrevolurevolutionary Having personallyled prolonged tionaryupheaval in other countries.95
91 For example,the German exile AnacharsisCloots,self-proclaimed orateur genrehude in main,told theFrenchAssembly December 1792thatin theeventof war "the German and Bohemian peasants will resume theirwar against their. . . seigneurs;the Dutch and the Germans, the Italians and the Scandinavians,will shake offand shattertheirchains with fury." Quoted in Blanning(fn.3), 109-10.See also Palmer (fn.82), 2:55-57. 92 Accordingto Theodore Draper, "In 1957 and the first monthsof 1958,no one, noteven thatBatistacould be overthrown meansofguerrillawarfare."See Draper, by Castro, thought and Castroism: Theory Practice(New York: Praeger,1965),24; emphasisadded. Che Guevaclaimed thatactsof violencebya small guerrillaband (thefoco)could ra's strategy offocoism of The strategy revolution irrespective the prevailingpoliticalconditions. spark a successful to it was a dismal failureand Guevara died trying implement in Bolivia. See Guevara, GuerReview Press,1961). rilla Warfare (New York: Monthly 93 As Lenin told the SeventhPartyCongressin March 1917: "Yes, we shall see the world but forthe time being it is a verygood fairytale.... Is it properfora serious revolution, tales?" See Lenin (fn.56), 2:589. to revolutionary believein fairy 94 See Richard H. Solomon,Mao's Revolution and the Chinese PoliticalCulture(Berkeley: thatthe Chinese revoof University CaliforniaPress, 1971), 179-89. AlthoughMao stressed he lution was a usefulmodel forothers, avoided the obligationto engage in costlyintervenmovementmust ultimately relyon its own tions elsewhereby statingthata revolutionary Affairs (New efforts. Van Ness (fn. 3), 72; and Michael Yahuda, China'sRole in World See York: St. Martin'sPress,1978),35. 95 Although Lenin supportedthe Soviet invasionof Poland, he warned that "if the exto operationsmore pected uprisingdoes not occur, . . . would it be fitting push military

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revolutionary struggles, both Lenin and Mao had learned that success was oftenelusive and nevereasy. statesare more likely to This discussion suggeststhat revolutionary resistimpetuous efforts exportthe revolutionif the leadership is exto perienced and unifiedand the movementhighlydisciplined.Thus, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China behaved prudentlyin mostcases, despitetheirinherently optimistic ideologiesand the factthat prominent membersof both regimesfavoreda more assertiveapproach. the factionalinfighting France and Iran encouraged exin By contrast, tremists use foreignpolicy-and specifically to supportforthe exportof revolution-as a litmus testfor devotion to the revolutionitself.In the those who opposed such a policy absence of a strongcentralauthority, ideals of the revolutionand risked appearing disloyalto the universalist thus could not contain those who advocated a more aggressiveforeign policy.The radicals in turnwere overconfident regardingtheirabilityto exportthe revolutionand to overcome the oppositionsuch efforts were certainto provoke.96 the veryvulnerability a revFinally, and somewhat paradoxically, of olutionarystatemay create additional incentiveforaggression.Already leaders view fearfulthat their hold on power is fragile,revolutionary column. (In lightof foreignsupdomesticopponentsas a potentialfifth port for counterrevolutionary groups in France, the White armies in Russia, the Kuomintang in China, and the contrasin Nicaragua, such worries are hardly fanciful.)Exporting the revolutionby strikingfirst may be seen as the onlyway to preservepower at home: unless opposing the argumentruns, they will eventually states are swiftly overthrown, state.Thus, the Bolshevikswho adcombine to crush the revolutionary to vocated greaterefforts export the revolutiondid so in part because theybelieved thatcapitaliststateswould join forcesand destroythe new overthrown the spread of socialSoviet stateunless theywere swiftly by ism.97 a minimum,the revolutionaries (At may hope thatthe mere threat of revolutionary subversionmay deter attacks and force opponents to This general argument was also a adopt more conciliatorypolicies.)98
thoroughly, riskinga dangerousturnof events?Withoutdoubt,no!" See Fiddick (fn. 90), 123-24. 96 On France,see Blanning(fn.3), 98-113. On Iran, see Bill (fn.70), 302-3. 97 Trotskyargued that "withoutthe directState support of the European proletariat the dominationinto workingclass of Russia cannotremainin power and convertitstemporary a lasting socialistdictatorship. this therecannot fora momentbe any doubt." Fiddick Of by notesthat"manyBolsheviksfully expectedtheirsparkto be extinguished an international materialin the more advanced, industrial counter-revolutionary deluge if the combustible nationsfailedto catchfire."See Fiddick (fn.90), 75. 98 Piero Melograni argues that "to help convincethe Allies to negotiate,Lenin brought

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in for After describing potent ingredient theBrissotin recipe warin 1792. Franceas besetbya conspiracy foreign of powers and internal traitors, "It Brissot theAssembly, is notmerely told necessary think defense, to of attack the [counterrevolutionary] mustbe anticipated; yourselves you
must attack."99
WHY FOREIGN POWERS ARE INSECURE BUT OVERCONFIDENT

Other stateswill fearthe spread of revolutionary ideas-especially when But they those ideas challenge theirown formof governmentdirectly. also tend to view this as an easy problem to solve. To begin with, the disorder that accompanies a revolutionencourages other statesto view the new regime as weak and vulnerable.For example, most Europeans believed that the Revolution had reduced French power considerably, leading Edmund Burke to describethe French as "the ablest architects When war broke out in 1792,both France of ruin . .. in the world."100 and its opponentsexpectedan easy campaign. Where the French deputiesbelieved that"despotismwas in itsdeath throesand a promptattack a will precipitateits finalagony,"101 Prussian diplomat commentedthat "France is without disciplined armies, without experienced generals, withoutmoney,and the highestdegree of anarchyreignsin all departments." Another official predictedthat "the comedy will not last long. The French armyof lawyerswill be annihilatedin Belgium and we shall "With all three be home bytheautumn." As T. C. W. Blanningremarks, combatantsbelievingtheirside to be invincibleand theiropponent(s) to be on the verge of collapse, the scene was set for the final lurch into war. 102 of the vulnerability the revolutionary This tendencyto overestimate of stateis not surprising, given the inherent difficulty calculatingits abilstates rest on novel formsof ity to fight.By definition, revolutionary movementssucceed because they social organization,and revolutionary
which could create widespread unrest,especiallyin into being a communistInternational a Soviet Foreign MinisterGeorge Chicherininstructed Soviet emissaryin Asia." Similarly, London to "make it clear thatwe are able to cause [England] seriousdamage in the East if we so wish.... Have them picturewhat would happen if we sent a Red Armyto Persia, of Mesopotamia and Afghanistan.... [I]t is onlythe moderation our policywhich causes a situationthere]."See Melograni (fn. 85), 108; and slow development[of the revolutionary Fiddick (fn.90), 171. 99Brissot, quoted in Clapham (fn. 12), 115. On anotheroccasion,he declared thatFrance "cannotbe at ease untilEurope, and all Europe, is in flames."AnotherFrench revolutionary war by saying:"If my neighborkeeps a nestof vipers,I have the rightto smother justified themlestI become theirvictim."See Palmer (fn.82), 2:60, 62. 100 Quoted in Blanning(fn.3), 79-80, 132. See also Clapham (fn. 12), 16; and Ross (fn. 12), 25. 101 Mailhe, quoted in Blanning(fn.60), 63. Jean-Baptiste 102 Quoted in Blanning(fn.3), 115-16.

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for devisea formula mobilizing previously untapped sourcesof social the of institutions makesitdifficult power.Unfortunately, novelty these on forothers assesstheireffect national to As capabilities. Clausewitz it that recognized, was not surprising the Europeanstatesunderestimatedthemilitary powerofrevolutionary France, becausein largepart it was basedon ideasand institutions-best exemplified theleveeen by unknown.103 Similar masse-thatwerepreviously problems outsiders led the to expect rapidcollapseof Bolshevik an powerand prevented accuof rateassessment Iran's military after revolution the there. potential biasesmaycompound tendency this becausestates Ideological basedon to different political principles mayfindit difficult believethata revocouldbe popular effective. problem or This seems lutionary government U.S. perceptions China,forexample.Because U.S. of to have affected was and leadersbelievedthatcommunism illegitimate immoral, they as Sovietsatellite rather thanas an saw Mao's government an artificial substantial independent regimecommanding popularsupport. Thus, thatChina's "foreign of Assistant Secretary StateDean Rusk believed it in had masters" forced to intervene Koreaand thatMao's regime was . The belief "a colonialRussiangovernment.. . [I]t is notChinese."104 state thata revolutionary is inherently inclinesstatusquo unpopular their own ability confront successfully. to it to powers exaggerate the of becausethe Foreignpowersalso exaggerate threat subversion to in ideas and the appealofrevolutionary is impossible measure advance are to to is extent whichthey spreading difficult determine. Havingwitmindful theconfident of nessedan unexpected revolutionary upheaval, of and somemembers proclamations therevolutionary forces, awarethat similar own society states of their overstate the mayharbor ideas,other threat contagion. of Franceas a mortal Thus,Burkesaw revolutionary a of and ofinterest dangerbecause"it has byitsessence faction opinion in .. and ofenthusiasm every if country.. Thus advantaged, it can at all the For was to elimiexistit mustfinally prevail."105 Burke, onlyoption
103 In his words: "Clearly the tremendous effects the French Revolutionabroad were of methodsand conceptsas by radical changesin policies caused not so much by new military of and administration, the new character government, by alteredconditionsof the French had at lastgraspedthenatureof the forces people,and thelike.... Not untilstatesmen that had emergedin France and had graspedthatnew politicalconditions now obtainedin Euall rope,could theyforeseethe broad effects thiswould have on war." See Carl von Clausewitz,On War,ed. and trans.Michael Howard and PeterParet(Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,1976),609-10. in 104 See Schaller (fn. 86), 125; and also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,Patterns theDust: ChiRelations theRecognition and 1949-50 (New York: Columbia Uninese-American Controversy, versity Press, 1983),17,43, 193. 105 See Burke (fn. 10), 5:250.

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nate the source of infection.106 a similarvein Winston Churchill jusIn tifiedthe Anglo-Frenchintervention afterthe Bolshevik Revolution by
describing the new Soviet republic as "a plague-bearing Russia .
.

. of

armed hordes not only smitingwith bayonetand cannon, but accompanied and preceded by swarms of typhus-bearing vermin." The main threatwas ideological subversion:"to make soldiersmutiny, .. to raise . the poor against the bourgeois,. .. the workmenagainst the employers, ... the peasantsagainstthe landowners,to paralyze the country genby eral strikes."107 Although Churchill's pleas for full-scale intervention were ultimately rejected,"the decisivefactorin bringingabout a continuation of. . . limited [Allied] intervention [afterWorld War I] was the
fear ... that Bolshevism
...

might spread to other European coun-

tries."108 Similar fearsaccompanied theChinese,Cuban, and Iranian revolutionsas well. The universalism mostrevolutionary of ideologies compounds these worries,because other states fear a growing alliance of isolated in a revolutionary powers that would leave them increasingly hostileideological sea. Even in the absence of evidencethatthe revolution spreading,other is confident thatsubversivemovementsdo not statescannot be completely lurk beneaththe surface.European fearsof a Jacobinconspiracy and the U.S. Red scares of the 1920s and the 1950s illustratethe tendencyfor the foreignpowers to exaggeratethe ideological appeal (and therefore the threatthese states offensive states.Because power) of revolutionary pose is not simplya functionof material capabilities,revolutionsoften seem even more dangerous than theyare. And the same logic applies in reverseto counterrevolutions. Even when there is no hard evidence, a revolutionary regime cannot be completelycertainthat foreignpowers are not conspiringwith its internalopponents. The tendencyto exaggeratethe threatfroma revolutionary regime and its susceptibility pressurefromoutside is also exacerbatedby testo timonyfromself-interested emigres,who, as one would expect,portray stateas botha dangerousadversary and a disorganized, the revolutionary unpopular,and vulnerabletarget.R. R. Palmer has shown,forexample, thatthe beliefthatrevolutionary France headed a vastinternational conspiracywas a mythmanufacturedby counterrevolutionary ideologues,
106Burke was not alone in this view. Accordingto one Swedish nobleman,"Unless the European powers banded together stop the evil by smothering theywould all be its to it, victims."Quoted in Palmer (fn. 82), 2:60. Even a moderatesuch as Emperor Leopold of Austria was concerned;he wroteto his brotherin July1791 that "it was high time . . . to suppressthispernicious Frenchepidemic."See Blanning(fn.3), 86, 94. 107 Quoted in Fiddick (fn.90), 4-5. 108 See Chamberlain(fn.43), 2:152.

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in several of whom were prominent emigrecircles.109 Accordingto Nita Renfrew, Iraq's invasionof Iran was encouragedby Iranian emigreswho and military weakness of Khomeini's reexaggeratedthe unpopularity gime.110 Cuban and Nicaraguan emigresfed U.S. fearsof Castro and the Sandinistas,while encouragingthe beliefthat these regimeswould collapse once the United States applied pressure.The warning should be clear: reliance upon "evidence" eitherfromcounterrevolutionary emiis sympathizers likelyto entangle one or gres or fromprorevolutionary bothof the adversariesin a destabilizingweb of fearand overconfidence. of Taken together, possibility revolutionary the expansionand the beweakness create strongpressuresfor war. Because lief in revolutionary states tend to grow strongerover time, their opponents revolutionary "window of opportunity." have a temporary Thus, England's decision to enterthe war againstFrance in 1793was based in parton Prime Minister Pitt's belief that "war was inevitableand the sooner it was begun the better.""' Similarly,Iraq attacked Iran in 1979 because it feared the and because it believed the revolution spread of Shiite fundamentalism The Somali invasion of had weakened Iran's militarycapabilities.112 in 1977 reflected beliefthatEthiopia's revolutionary the Ethiopia governAnd U.S. efforts overthrow ment was beset by internaldivisions.113 to Castro in Cuba and the Sandinistasin Nicaragua were justifiedon the grounds thateach would promoterevolutionelsewherein Latin America and that it would be easiest to eliminatethem beforetheyhad the In to opportunity consolidatetheirpositions.114 all of thesecases, the belief thatdelay would make the job more difficult encouraged opponents stateto take action. of the revolutionary
109

and Implications theIraq-Iran Conflict of (New Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins York: OxfordUniversity Press,1988),84. "I Quoted in Blanning(fn.3), 154. Pitt also believed that"the nation was now disposed forwar, whichmightnot be thecase six weeks hence,"and thatthediplomaticenvironment was especiallyfavorable thattime. at 112 See Khadduri (fn. 110),84; Ramazani (fn. 11), 72-74; and Ephraim Karsh, "The IranIraq War: A MilitaryAnalysis," Adelphi Paper,no. 220 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,1987),11-13. 113 See Tom J.Farer, WarCloudson the Horn ofAfrica: The Widening 2d Storm, ed. (Washington,D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), 120-21; and RobertF. on Gorman,PoliticalConflict theHorn ofAfrica (New York: Praeger,1981),65-69. 114 Lloyd Etheredgenotesthatthe CIA accelerated planningforthe Bay of Pigs invasionso that the attack could take place beforeCuban pilots completedtrainingon advanced jet Learn?: American aircraft. Etheredge, See Can Governments AmerForeign Policyand Central ican Revolutions (New York: Pergamon,1985), 13; and also Welch (fn. 75), 69-70. On U.S. policytoward Nicaragua, see George Shultz, "America and the StruggleforFreedom," in America Crisis RobertLeiken and BarryRubin,eds., The Central Reader(New York: Summit Books, 1987),589; and Pastor(fn.22), 231.

110See Nita Renfrew, "Who Startedthe War?" ForeignPolicy66 (Spring 1987), 98; and

See Palmer (fn.82), 2:51-53.

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on effects the balance To summarize: revolutionsexert far-reaching of threats.Each side tends to view the otheras a serious challenge,yet Lacking reliableinformation neithercan estimatethe danger accurately. about the magnitude of the threator theirabilityto overcome it, both more susceptibleto self-interested testimonyfrom sides are therefore when thisadvice conemigresor fromotherrevolutionaries, particularly beliefs. firms preexisting Thus, on theone hand,each side fearstheother, and on the other hand, each is also likelyto believe that the threatcan low cost. In short,the beliefthat opponents be eliminated at relatively are bothhostileand vulnerableworksin supportofa policyof preventive and preemptivewar.
WHY BOTH SIDES ARE WRONG

viable regime,it is not surprisWhen a revolutiontopplesan apparently ing that otherstatesfearthattheymightbe next. Similarly,if the revoextensivedamage and facescontinuedinterlutionarystatehas suffered nal opposition,its leaders have reason to fear that theirsuccess will be are and short-lived. Yet revolutions a relatively poor exportcommodity, efforts face somewhat betterprospects, although counterrevolutionary efforts reversea revolutionfrom outside are usually more difficult to than theiradvocates anticipate.Ironically,then,both sides' perceptions of threatare usuallymistaken. for Contraryto the optimisticvisions of the Brissotins, example, the rebellionsacross Euoutbreakof war in 1792 did not spark sympathetic France eventuallyestablisheda set of To rope."15 be sure, revolutionary "satelliterepublics"acrossEurope, and Napoleon expanded thisto a sizBut able if short-lived empire.116 theseconquests were not the swiftand bloodless victoriesthat the Brissotinspredicted,nor was the collapse of the monarchythe catalystfor world revolutionthat conservativeslike Edmund Burke feared.Few people anticipatedthatthe outbreakof war of in 1792 was the beginningof a quarter century bloody struggle;neitherFrance nor its variousopponentswere as easy to defeatas both sides the had assumed. Similarly, BolshevikRevolutionfailed to inspireother elsewherein Europe were abortive.117 spread of The successes; attempts
115 French forcessuffered series of quick defeatsonce the war broke out. However, a because France's overconfident opponentsdid not press theiradvantage,the French were able to survivethe initialsetbacksand to mobilize the nationforwar. 116 Accordingto Palmer,"Nowhere,exceptin far-off Poland, was thereany revoltagainst in with which France was at war. There was no revolution aid of France. It a government were entirelydependent on the was perfectly evident that the foreign revolutionaries French." See Palmer (fn.82), 2:117,330-31,340; and Ross (fn. 13),chap. 4. 117 The Bolshevik Revolution sparked unsuccessful communistuprisingsin Germany, Hungary,and Finland, and the Soviets invaded Outer Mongolia in 1921 and establisheda

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communism was still nearly three decades off,when the Soviet army imposed similarregimesin Eastern Europe followingGermany'sdefeat in the Second World War. And contrary the recurring to fearsthatcommunistrevolutionwould spread swiftly around theglobe, containingthe Red menace was in factrelatively easy."18 Other cases teach similar lessons. The Mexican Revolution had little impact on revolutionary struggleselsewhere in Latin America; Cuba's efforts promote revolutionary to change in the region have been relativelyunsuccessful. (True, Cuba was a source of inspiration, advice, and materialaid forthe Sandinistasin Nicaragua, and forotherrevolutionaries as well, but a single,short-lived successhardlyconstitutes winning a record after more than thirtyyears.) And although fundamentalist movements have become more active throughoutthe Muslim world, Iran's effortsto export its principles to other countries have proved equally abortive.119 Irrespectiveof its specificideological character,in short,there seems to be littlebasis for the perennial hope and fear of world revolution. At the same time,the beliefthatrevolutionary regimeswill collapse if attacked is equally dubious. In virtually everycase of a major social revolution (France, Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran) oppocould remove the threatat nents have argued that foreignintervention low cost.With the partialexceptionof Nicaragua, efforts do to relatively unsuccessful. While counterrevolutions so were uniformly fromabroad do on occasion succeed, on the whole, the abilityof revolutionary states is to resistsuch attempts striking.120 This argumentdoes notmean thatthefearsharboredby revolutionary statesand otherpowers are groundless.Rather,it means thatthe threat is usually exaggerated,as is the ease with which it can be eliminated.If
satelliteregimethere.See the followingessaysin Thomas T. Hammond, ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975): C. JaySmith,"Soviet Russia and the Red Revolutionof 1918 in Finland"; Werner T. Angress,"The Takeover That Remained in Limbo: The German Experience,1918-23"; Paul Ignotus,"The First Two CommunistTakeovers in Hungary,1919and 1948"; and Hammond, "The Communist Takeover of Outer Mongolia: Model forEasternEurope?" 118 On the overwhelming advantagesenjoyedbythe Westernalliance in itsefforts conto tain Sovietexpansion,see Walt (fn.33, 1987),chap. 8. "9 Zonis and Brumberg (fn. 11),chap. 4. 120 Examples of successful counterrevolutionary efforts includethe Austro-Prussian interin ventionin Belgium in 1790,the Russian and Austrianinterventions Italy and Greece in the 1830s,theU.S.-backed coups in Iran,Guatemala,and Chile, theU.S. invasionof Grenada of in 1983,and the Vietnameseoverthrow the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea in 1979. With came to powerthrough prolongedand a theexceptionof Kampuchea, none of theseregimes and none attempted(let alone achieved) a thoroughsocial violent revolutionary struggle, transformation. Moreover,in all of thesecases the intervening power was overwhelmingly thanthe stateit overthrew. largerand stronger

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the respectivefears and hopes were accurate, the strugglewould be a But swiftand decisivetriumphforthe stronger side.121 insteadof a wave of revolutionary upheavals or the swiftcollapse of the new regime,the typical result is either a briefand inconclusiveclash (e.g., the Russoand bloody struggle(e.g., the wars Polish War of 1920) or a protracted of the French Revolution,the Iran-Iraq War, the contrawar in Nicaragua). hard to exportand why do foreign interventions Why are revolutions rhetoric revolutionary of fail? First,the universalist ideologies notwithand foremost nationalphenomenon.122 a A standing,a revolutionis first campaign to export a revolutionwould immediatelybring the revoluwith the national loyaltiesof the intended retionarystate into conflict cipients.And the principlethatpeople who conceive of themselvesas a nationare entitledto theirown independent statehas consistently proved to be a farmore powerfulsocial forcethan any notion of universalrevto olutionarysolidarity.123 Foreign populationsare likelyto view efforts exporta revolutionas acts of aggression,which makes it easier for the forces.Or as Robespierrewarned rulingelitesto resistthe revolutionary in responseto the optimistic of predictions the Brissotins:"No one likes and no more extravagantidea ever sprang from an armed missionary, the head of a politicianthan to suppose thatone people has only to enter with arms in its hands to make the latteradopt its another's territory laws and itsConstitution.'"124 Moreover,even ifconditionsin othercounthatproduced one revolutriesare broadlysimilarto the circumstances are thatenabled tion (and theyfrequently not),the special circumstances revolutionto succeed are unlikelyto existelsewhere.Thus, exportone thanthe revolutionaries is ing the revolution much more difficult expect. servesas a warningto otherstates:themore danSecond, a revolution gerous it appears, the greaterthe tendencyforothersto balance against it.125Until a revolutionactually occurs, other states may not take the
121 Strength to or in this sense refers military capability to ideologicalappeal or to some of combination the two. 122 When the Bolshevik Revolutionfailed to spread, the Polish communistKarl Radek in concluded thatthe "battlewill be won fromwithin.. . . Revolutions never originate foreign affairs are madeat home."Quoted in Melograni(fn.85), 89; emphasisadded. but 123 On nationalism, see Ernest Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell since 1780: ProUniversity Press, 1983), 1-7; and E. J.Hobsbawm, Nationsand Nationalism gramme, Myth, Reality(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1990),9-12. 124 He continued:"The Declarationof Rights[ofMan] is not like the sun's rays, which in to one moment illumine the whole earth: it is no thunderbolt, strikedown a thousand thrones.It is easier to inscribeit on paper,or engraveit on brass,than to retraceits sacred in characters the heartsof men." Quoted in Thompson (fn.27), 207. 125 On thisgeneraltendency, see Walt (fn.33, 1987),chap. 5.

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But once the danger has been demonstrated, possibility seriously. potential victimswill take stepsto avoid a similarfate(e.g., throughdefensive or alliances, internalreforms, more extensiverepression). Thus, the Cuban revolutioninspiredthe U.S. Alliance forProgressin Latin America (intended to forestalladditional "Cubas" by promotingeconomic and political development) and encouraged Latin American oligarchies to suppress theirdomestic opponentsmore vigorously.Similarly,the Iranian Revolution united Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states withtacitor active support againstthe danger of revolutionary infection, fromthe United States and others.Again, the point is not that revoluthatotherstatescan and will tions pose no danger; the point is, rather, do a varietyof thingsto containthe threat. fail Efforts exportcounterrevolutions for somewhat different to reasons. Revolutionaryleaders are usually dedicated, highlymotivatedindividuals who have been successfulpreciselybecause theyare good at obstacles.They are likelyto organizingsupportin the face of impressive because theycan directthose same skills tobe formidableadversaries, It ward mobilizing the nation for war.126 is thus no accident that the French levee en masse and the Soviet Red Armywere able to defeattheir Iran managed to internaland externalopponentsor that revolutionary rebuilditsmilitary power withremarkablespeed afterthe Iraqi invasion in 1980.127 also fail because theyprovide the domestic leForeign interventions gitimacythata revolutionary regimeneeds: the same nationalistconvictions that make revolutionhard to exportalso work against successful The Russo-PolishWar of 1920 illustrates both tenforeignintervention. dencies nicely:the initialPolish invasionhelped mobilize public support for the Bolsheviks while the Red Army's subsequent counterattack anti-Russiannationalismof the Poles ratherthan aroused the traditional the proletarianuprisinganticipatedby Lenin. The pressureforwar produced by a revolutionresultsfromtwo parallel myths:the beliefthat the revolutionwill spread rapidlyif it is not and the beliefthata reversalof the revolutionwill crushedimmediately, be easy to accomplish. Contraryto these expectations, however, is the more typicalresult:neithera tide of worldwide revolution nor the quick and easy ousterof therevolutionary a regimebut rather prolongedstrug126 On thisgeneral point,see Theda Skocpol "Social Revolutions and Mass Military MoPolitics40 (January bilization,"World 1988). 127 1982: A Staff Paper See William F. Hickman, Ravagedand Reborn:The IranianArmy, (Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution, 1982).

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gle between an unexpectedly capable revolutionary regime and its surresistant adversaries. prisingly V. CONCLUSION
OF REVOLUTIONS AND THE BALANCE THREATS

Why do revolutionsoftenlead to war, and why do these wars proceed than either side expects? The underlyingcause of war bedifferently tween revolutionary statesand foreignpowers is theirconcernforsecurity.Rarely are these wars the direct resultof eitheran ideological requirement to export the new systemor a domestic political struggle. are Instead,thesefactors important as onlyinsofar theyaffect perceptions of threat and the meritsof alternativeresponses.Even in the case of were mostevident,the BrisFrance, forexample,wheredomesticfactors sotin campaign for war was predicated on the erroneous fear that an alliance of aristocratic and foreignmonarchs emigres,internaltraitors, was activelyconspiringto overturnthe revolutionand restorethe old regime. Although balance-of-power theoryemphasizes the importanceof seit curity, is not the aggregatebalance of power thatdrives statesto war. of Rather,it is each side's perception threat. These perceptions arise from and factors. both systems-level unit-level Revolutionsalterthe balance of of threatsby changingthe distribution power, by increasingperceptions and of of hostility, by increasing perceptions an offensive advantage. The problem is exacerbated by uncertainty regardingeach of these factors and by the other dynamicsthat encourage both sides to view the other as especiallyhostileand dangerous. This explanationalso providesa fullerexplanationof why revolutionary statestend to moderatetheirbehaviorover time.Kenneth Waltz has states become "socialized" to the system, suggested that revolutionary but he does not explain how the socialization processactually works.128 As shown above, manyof theproblemscaused bya revolution arise from about power,intentions, likelihoodof similarrevolutions the uncertainty occurringelsewhere,and so forth."Socialization" is simplythe process about how otherswill by which both sides acquire greaterinformation thatpermitsmisperrespond. As evidence accumulates,the uncertainty ceptions to flourishdeclines. Relations between the revolutionary states should become increasingly and the restof the system normal,assuming,
128

See Waltz (fn. 1), 127-28.

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of course,thateach side is capable of evaluatingand revisingits policies in lightof experience.

SOME FURTHER PUZZLES

The argumentspresentedhere are open to several potentialchallenges, them will require additional empirical work. First, this and verifying associatedwithrevolutionarticlehas focusedon thecommon tendencies ary change, but futurework should also consider possible differences. and are these effects, Do different typesof revolutioncreate different circumstances? Do democratic international altered by different effects from those conducted by a vanguard revolutions behave differently of to and if so, why? What is the effect commitment a universalist party, depend on the internal impactof a revolution ideology?Does theforeign of characteristics its neighbors?Although the argumentspresentedin for thispaper have obvious implications thesequestions,futureresearch should seek to providemore completeanswers. the Second, some of the argumentspresentedhere may reflect effects revolutions-that is, on cases of selectionbias. By focusingon successful the where the new statesurvives-the analysismay understate feasibility of counterrevolution excludingthe cases where it succeeded. Indeed, by effort especiallyswift, is such cases may barely if a counterrevolutionary drawn fromthe existingsample of be noticed. If so, then the inferences cases will be biased. this Given these difficulties, article should be seen as a "plausibility and show how theyfita probe" intended to outline a set of hypotheses cases.129 Future work can address numberof well-knownand important these problemsin several ways. For example, the argumentthatrevolutions cause wars via miscalculationcan be testedby examining the success rate of statesthatinitiatewars followinga major regimechange. If these initiatorsfare less well on average than the initiatorsof war between nonrevolutionary states,that would supportthe claim that revolutions encourage optimisticmiscalculationby one or both sides. This hypothesiscould also be tested by examining examples of successful Were theseefforts inspiredby fearsof contagionand counterrevolution. and were thesefearsbased on an accurate magnifiedby exile testimony, was it more diffiand objectiveassessmentof the threat?Alternatively, the revolution than the intervening forcesexpected? If so, cult to reverse then the ideas developed in thisessay will gain additional credence.
129 On "plausibility probes,"see HarryEckstein,"Case Studyand Theory in PoliticalScieds.,HandbookofPoliticalScience(Reading, ence," in Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, 1975),79-128. Mass.: Addison-Wesley,

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WORLD POLITICS

These argumentsimplythatneitherappeasementnor intervention an is mostrevolutions. is often especiallypromisingapproach to Appeasement recommendedas a way to avoid spiralingand to promotegood relations This prescription tendsto downplaythe factthat over the longerterm.130 statesdo presenta threat(forexample, by trying some revolutionary to export their principleswhile avoiding a direct clash of arms) and that fromsuch efforts teachingthem to refrain may require the use of force. beliefthatrevolutionary At the same time,the interventionists' states but is pose an imminent easilyreversedthreat even more fanciful.131 Revonce other states take olutions are usually hard to export,particularly to oftenmake matters stepsto preventit; and efforts reversea revolution worse. In the near termsuch efforts merelyreinforce preexisting images the withinthenew regime, and of hostility strengthen hand of extremists conduct and justifying leading to more bellicose international greater in internalrepression.The "success" of the contras Nicaragua notwithis for standing,armed intervention usually a poor instrument creating stable and humane governments. is A policyof containment the bestapproach towardmost revolutions, a weak revolutionary especiallyforgreat powers confronting relatively a strategy seeks to preventthe spread of revolutionbut state.132 Such to eschews directattempts reverseit or to manipulateitsinternalpolitics. the of Foreign powers should not underestimate difficulty thisapproach, however,or ignore the danger thatambiguous signals-including even as to efforts remain uninvolved-will be interpreted a sign of hostility. to make theirintentions and preferences strive as They should therefore clear as possible (however quixotic that goal may appear) and devote to special attention creatingreliablechannelsforthe flowof information and othercommunicationbetween themand the new regime.National leaders should also heed Machiavelli'sadvice and regardtestimony from exiles with great skepticism.133
130 See, e.g., Anthony Lake, "WrestlingwithThird World Radical Regimes: Theory and Practice,"in JohnW. Sewell, ed., U.S. ForeignPolicyand the ThirdWorld: Agenda1985-86 (New Brunswick,N.J.: TransactionBooks, 1985); and Kenneth E. Sharpe et al., "Security throughDiplomacy: A Policy of PrincipledRealism," in MorrisJ. Blachman,William M. Revolution: Diplomacy Leogrande,and KennethE. Sharpe,eds. Confronting Security through in Central America(New York: Pantheon,1986). 131 For examplesof thesearguments, see W. ScottThompson,"Choosing to Win," Foreign Policy43 (Summer 1981); Nestor D. Sanchez, "The CommunistThreat,"ForeignPolicy52 Session of Congress,April 27, 1983," (Fall 1982),43-50; Ronald Reagan, "Address to Joint in Leiken and Rubin (fn.114); and George Shultz,"New Realitiesand NewWays ofThink63 ing,"Foreign Affairs (Spring 1985),712-13. 132 This approach is sketchedbriefly Zone: The by Richard E. Feinberg,The Intemperate to ThirdWorldChallenge U.S. Foreign Policy(New York: W. W. Norton,1983),254-56. 133 See fn.81.

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1989-91 AND THE

tell Finally,what do thesehypotheses us about the politicalchanges that have engulfed the formerSoviet empire? Although the final outcome therecan be no doubt thatthe USSR has undergone remainsuncertain, What began as an elite-led"reva fundamentalpoliticaltransformation. olution fromabove" has led to theunintendeddemise of theCommunist Partyand the collapse of the politicalorderthathad governedthe region stillexistsas of Noforover seventy years.A weak centralgovernment vember 1991, but the Baltic republicshave been granted full independence, and several othersare not farbehind. The republicsare creating new political institutions, developing new criteriaforelite recruitment, on We and basing theirclaims to authority new politicalprinciples.134 are not one revolutionbut several,and even thoughthe forthus witnessing mer USSR has been replaced (so far) by a loose confederation, is still it different fromthe old communistorder.For studentsof fundamentally the international politics,therefore, overridingquestion is whetherthe exrevolutionsof 1989-91 will eventuallybecome another regrettable ample of the link betweenrevolutionand war.
WHY WAR WITH THE WEST IS UNLIKELY

The good news is that war between the Western statesand the various led partsof the formerSoviet bloc is unlikely.In the past revolutions to war because otherstatestriedto exploitthe new state'sweakness and/or state was seen as a threatto the securityof because the revolutionary other states. Fortunatelyfor world peace, this logic does not apply to relationsbetween the formerSoviet republicsand the othergreat powers-at least not forthe foreseeablefuture-because the usual links between revolutionand war are eitherabsent or overriddenby otherfactors. To begin with,although the "second Russian Revolution" has weakthereis littledanger thattheothergreat ened Soviet power considerably, This powers will use forceto exploitthisopportunity.135 is due in part to
134 The scope and rate of change varies considerably across republics.Until November dissidentnamed 1991, for example, the Georgian Republic was led by an anticommunist accused of dictaZviad Gamsakhurdia,who won a freeelectioneasilybut was subsequently torial methodsand removed.The Ukraine, also well down the road to independence,has In announcedplans to createitsown independent armedforces. Kazakhstan,bycontrast, the PolitburomemberNursultanNazarbayev,who remainsclosely "nationalist" leader is former tied to Gorbachev and the all-Union government. Similarly, althoughByelorussiadeclared leadersare all former the communists. independencefollowing abortivecoup, itscurrent "I Other states are exploitingRussia's weakness to extractdiplomatic concessions,of course.For example,the United Stateshas pushed foradditionalarms reductions and Japan linked economic aid to a settlement the enduringdisputeover the Kurile of has explicitly Islands.

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the the continued existenceof nuclear weapons, but it also reflects forconditionsin which the dissolutionof the Soviet tuitous international Union is occurring.If competitionamong the othergreat powers were especiallyintenseat present,those stateswould be more inclined to exploit Soviet weakness to improvetheirown positionsor to preventothers At fromdoing the same thing.136 the moment,however,the othergreat powers are stillclose allies. Since theydo not regardeach otheras significant security thereis no incentiveto intervene. threats, The danger of war withtheWest is also reduced because the problem of ideological conflict-in particular,the fear that the revolutionwill spread to othercountries-is absent.Unlike the French, Bolshevik,Cuof ban, or Iranian revolutions,the present transformation the Soviet Union is not based on a political model that differs from significantly that of its neighbors.Instead, the Soviet Union and its former allies are to similarto those of the advanced intrying adopt politicalinstitutions dustrial powers. Even if true democracydoes not take root in most of will be some typeof authorithe "post-Soviet"republics,the alternative or tarian regimelacking any universalist pretensions appeal. in the Furthermore, comparisonwith earlier revolutions, problem of should be less severe in this case. Rapid changes inevitably uncertainty but as increasethe level of uncertainty, such institutions CNN and Interfax as well as the various national technicalmeans of intelligence gathering than theytypically provide outsiderswith much more information had In afterotherrevolutions. the past,obtainingaccurate and timelyinforwhich oftenleftotherstatesignorantof mation was extremely difficult, state.Today, we learn of the actual course of eventsin the revolutionary a coup attemptwithinhours,its failureis announced with equal speed, and PresidentsGorbachev and YeltsinfieldquestionsfromU.S. citizens on a live televisionbroadcasttwo weeks later.This greateraccess to inand therefore riskof blunderinginto the formation reduces uncertainty conflict. the For all threereasons,therefore, stronglinkage betweenrevolution and war does not apply to relationsbetweenthe former Soviet bloc and the othermajor powers. The main caveat to thisoptimistic conclusionis thatconflict withinthe former Soviet bloc mighteventuthe possibility ally spread to WesternEurope. Some WesternEuropean stateshave interestsin the East, but the lack of vitaleconomic or politicalstakes and
136 The desire to exploit the revolutionary state'sweakness was a centralmotivebehind the Prussianattackon France in 1793and theJapaneseinvasionof Siberia in 1918.Japanese in ambitionsalso helped persuade the United States to intervene, order to preventJapan fromexpandingits positionin the Far East.

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the obvious difficulty imposing order in this area should discourage of withmilitary themfromintervening force.The European Community's reluctanceto take military action in Yugoslavia supportsthis point and in suggeststhatthe fearof entanglement intractable domesticquarrels is a strongdeterrent outside intervention. to The key actor is Germany,which cannot easily remain indifferent to conflict its easternborders.If German security on continuesto be reinforcedby an alliance with the otherWesternpowers (includingthe U.S. nuclear umbrella), and if this commitmentkeeps Germany's political identity focusedon the West, thenunilateralGerman action is unlikely. In this scenario, the Western European states-including Germanywould seek to insulatethemselves fromturmoilin the East, forswearing and relying directmilitary involvement insteadon economic and diploFor matic instruments. the Germans,in particular, military intervention would also be discouragedby the historical legacyof the world wars and by theirawareness thatunilateralaction would provoke a defensivereto sponse by theirneighborson both sides. But if NATO'S efforts redefine in are and ifGermany itself theabsence of the Soviet threat unsuccessful, is lefton its own, then Germany'sstrategic and politicalorientation will graduallyturnaway fromtheWest. Such a move would erode the sharp betweenEast and West thatevolved duringthe cold war and distinction in would increasethelikelihoodthatconflict theold Sovietempiremight West. To the eventuallyspread to Germany,and possiblyeven further NATOwithoutexpanding its extentthat the U.S. succeeds in redefining to membersof theWarsaw Pact, the danger membership include former of revolutionin the East eventuallyleading to war in the West will be reduced. significantly If subsequent eventsconfirm thisoptimistic then the link prediction, between revolutionand war discussed in this essay must be qualified revolutions somewhat. Specifically, may be less dangerous when (1) relations among the other great powers are amicable, (2) the revolution in reduces the degree of ideological heterogeneity the system,and (3) defensiveadvantages are especiallypowerfuland easy to identify in (as the nuclear revolution).The latterconditionmeans that for both sides will be smaller and the excessive optimism "windows of opportunity" will be constrained. thatnormallyaccompaniesa revolution These qualifications not underminethe theory do but itself, theydo limitits range.
WHY WAR WITHIN
THE "UNION"

Is LIKELY

the Unfortunately, argumentspresentedin this article do appear to fit relationswithinthe formerSoviet bloc, which means that the danger of

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and war therewill be high. The first conflict problem these new states face is an unstableand uncertainbalance of power. The new regimesin Eastern Europe and the formerUSSR varygreatlyin size and military will be potential,but gauging the battlefield impact of these differences Who would win a directtestof strength difficult. betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan, or betweenByelorussiaand the Ukraine? What costswould each side be willing to bear? When the balance of power is unknown to the various parties,it is easier forboth sides to believe theycan win. Second, the independentrepublicsare likelyto view each other's intentionswith considerablesuspicion.Most of thesenationalgroups have historical will be grievancesagainstsomeone else, and theseresentments exacerbatedby the flowering nationalistsentiment of withinthe various republics. Even if quasi-democratic institutions are created, they are likely to be exploited by contendingpolitical elites looking to bolster theirpoliticalpower byinvokingnationalist symbolsand rhetoric.137 The a civil war in Yugoslavia offers soberingexample of this tendency, and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic will not be alone in panderingto xeto nophobic sentiments promotehis own political fortunes. Indeed, the recentstampede to declare independencefollowingthe abortiveAugust coup suggeststhat nationalismwill remain the firstrefugeof political elites (including previouslyloyal communists)who see their hold on power slipping. These conditionssignificantly increasethe danger of spiraling.When arise betweendifferent conflicts interest of republicsor betweendifferent ethnicgroups (as theyinevitably will), each population is likelyto see its own actions as entirelyjustifiedand purely defensiveand those of its This tendency especiallyprois opponentsas aggressiveand illegitimate. and mythologizesits own history nounced when each group distorts in 'we are virtuous,truthful, heroic,noble; "they" are self-serving ways: inferior, deceitful,wicked. Armed with these stereotypical beliefs,nation-states tend to view theirown conductas legitimate and the behavior of rivalsas unjustified aggression. The CommunistParty'shegemonyin education having been broken, each republicwill have freerein to teach itsown versionof history. Ruling elites in search of internalsupport will have a strongincentiveto in enlisthistory the serviceof theircurrentpoliticalrequirements. With of the Ministry Education in each republicoffering citizensa tendenits tious version of the national history, thereis littlereason to expect old enmitiesto die quickly and ample reason to feartheywill get worse.
137 This danger is stressed byJackSnyder, "Averting Anarchyin theNew Europe," Inter14 nationalSecurity (Spring 1990).

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of This problemwill be exacerbatedby the intermingling nationalities across republicsand by the large percentageof ethnic Russians within and have always produced refugees, Great revolutions many of them.138 the dissolutionof the USSR is not likelyto be an exception.This develeffects emigre politicsinto play, as of opment will bring the distorting minoritieswho flee abroad or to their"native" republics(if one exists) seek revenge against those who forcedtheirdeparture.If theybecome an effective political force,theiractivitieswill reinforceperceptionsof about the balance republics.Thus, uncertainty threatbetween different of of power will combine with exaggeratedperceptions opponents' hosand war. tility-a potentrecipe forconflict
How SHOULD THE WEST RESPOND?139

The industrialpowers share several goals regardingthe recentchanges involved objectiveis to avoid getting in the Soviet Union. The overriding faris remotethoughnot entirely in a major war. As noted,thisdanger fetched.The industrializedpowers also seek to discourage large-scale both on humanSoviet republics, violence withinor betweenthe former would threatenthe security itariangrounds and because these conflicts of neighboringstatesand raise the riskof a wider conflict. Although foreignpowers have only limited leverage, the West can further these goals by followingtwo basic principles.First,the United exfromdirectmilitary intervention, States and its allies should refrain sanctioned peacecept perhaps for participationin an internationally to Foreign powers may be temptedto intervene protect keeping force.140 or theirlong-rangesecurityinterests to preventbloodshed, but history situationsrarelyunderin warns that statesthat interfere revolutionary stand what theyare gettinginto. As argued earlier in this article,this and problemresultsin partfromuncertainty is exacerbatedby the biased thatforeignpowers usually receive fromthe and self-serving testimony If various competingfactions. war does break out withinthe formerSoof viet Union, the Westernelites will be besieged by representatives the ethnic groups contendingparties,all pleading theircause. Sympathetic societies(especiallyin theUnited States)will be mobilized withinforeign
138 To note a few examples,Moldavia is 64% Moldavian, 14% Ukrainian,and 13% Rus13% Russian,and 4% Polish; Kazakhstan is 40% Kasian; Byelorussiais 78% Byelorussian, zak and 38% Russian; and Tadzhikistan is 62% Tadzhik, 24% Uzbek, and 8% Russian. For Nationalism,"Foreign additional background,see Zbigniew Brzezinski,"Post-Communist 68 Affairs (Winter 1989-90). on thissubject,but 139 I am indebtedto StephenVan Evera forseveralusefuldiscussions for he bears no responsibility myconclusions. 140 Even in this case, intervention should be undertakenonly to preventthe systematic feasible. murderof unarmedoppositionand onlywhen militarily

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showsthattheUnitedStatesis especially as well,and pastexperience to lobbieswithstrong domestic constituencies. Besusceptible foreign of to cause it would be difficult gauge thelegitimacy thesecontending the the of courseis to claimsor to predict effects intervention, prudent involvement. refrain from military any withthesenew Second,the West shouldmake economicrelations on and external conduct.Because the statesconditional theirinternal is of and a potential cause of war, oppression minorities bothimmoral of rights the creationand enforcement laws guaranteeing minority for with shouldbe a prerequisite Western aid, trade,and investment that should states.141 addition, In states these engagein actsofaggression markets arms also be deniedaccessto theWestern (including private the are a economic sanctions usually fairly weak form of market). Although straits theseregimes that face the currently will leverage, direeconomic of bite.Giventhatthey need theWest givethethreat sanctions greater a policy such wouldcostvery little. and notviceversa, this a consensus Obviously, approachrequires durableinternational the on ends and means.Amongotherthings, industrial powersmust accurate information politfor on developreliable procedures obtaining in thisinformation ical developments the regionand forsharing with And and should eachother organizations promptly. scholars intelligence to and in increase theirefforts monitor analyzepolitical developments and these by pressure uncompromised perareas,unhampered official by to sonalloyalties anyofthecontending groups.142 Like mostrevolutions, recent the upheavalin the SovietUnion has the for conflict. Decisionsforwar created significant potential interstate rest of or peace will ultimately withthe inhabitants the former Soviet can thosecalculations agreeing adbut in by empire, otherstates affect for This apvanceon a commonstrategy dealingwiththeseconflicts. the of cannot eliminate danger war,butitmayhelpthese emergproach the unscathed. ing statesmaneuver through nextfewyearsrelatively a are Becausetheyears following revolution themostdanimmediately thatwouldbe no smallaccomplishment. gerous,
141 withthe human rights provisions the Helsinki Acof These laws should be consistent of is concernfor cords,includingthe principlethatthe protection human rights a legitimate see otherstates.For a briefbut usefulsummary, JohnJ.Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 1975," Security Coopin Alexander George, Philip Farley,and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Lessons(New York: OxfordUniversity Press,1990), 106-22. eration: Achievements, Failures, 142 During the cold war scholarship on the Sovietbloc was probably biased by the disproof portionately high percentage exiles involvedin academic work on thesetopicsand by the is centralroleas a sourceof information. Neithertendency surprising, U.S. government's but for theywere hardlythe bestingredients objectivescholarship.