IMBONG VS. COMELEC G.R. NO.

32432 SEPTEMBER 11, 1970 FACTS: Two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to section 19 of RA No 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both are members of the Bar and are interested in running as candidates for delegates in the Constitutional Convention. Both questioned the constitutionality of the said law, claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates. Gonzales assailed the validity of the entire law especially the particular provisions sections 2, 4, 5, paragraph 1 section 8 of RA No 6132 while Imbong assails the constitutionality of only paragraph 1 section 8. RA 6132 or ConCon Act of 1970 which implements Resolution No 4. It provides that Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320 delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to population, provided that each district shall be composed of two delegates. Section 2 is the apportionment of delegates, section 4 considers all public officers/employees resigned when they file their candidacy, section 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running for public office or from assuming appointive position until the final adjournment of ConCon. Paragraph 1 section 8 bans all political parties or organized groups from giving support to a delegate to the convention. ISSUE: Whether the parameters set by RA No 6132 is constitutional and that the Congress has the right to call for Constitutional Convention HELD: Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly has the authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for a purpose. The apportionment provided for in section 2 cannot possibly be in conflict with its own intent expressed in Resolution No 4. It is not reasonable to grant more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. Section 5 provides the parameters to qualify and disqualify members. The disqualification is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures to control and influence elections as well as the Constitutional Convention. Paragraph 1 of section 8 provides candidates the assurance of equal opportunity since they depend on their individual merits and not the support of political parties as well as to avoid debasement of electoral process. The said provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed constitutional.

OCCEA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-60258 JANUARY 31, 1984 FACTS: This is petition for prohibition seeks the declaration as unconstitutional of Sections 4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, Barangay Election Act of 1982. It prohibits any candidate in the barangay election from representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party. Section 4 provides that the barangay election shall be, non-partisan and shall be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The petitioner contends that the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay official is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law. ISSUE: Whether the questioned provisions are unconstitutional HELD: In Gonzales v. COMELEC, the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable, it is always subject to pervasive and dominant police power and may be regulated to serve public interest. In Imbong v COMELEC, restrictions imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends on the circumstances of each case. The issue is similar to paragraph 1 section 8 of RA 6132. Since the barangay is the basic unit of our politica structure, it is more prudent to insulate the barangays from the influence of partisan politics. The restriction is imposed on barangay elections so that the base of our political structure will not be subject to instability because of influence of political forces. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

CAASI VS. CA G.R. NO. 88831 NOVEMBER 8, 1990 FACTS: Merito Miguel won in the 1988 mayoral elections in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service which would mean that he has a permanent resident of the United States, and not of Bolinao. COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, despite his green card, he has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Commissioner Badoys dissent: A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. Miguels opponent, Caasi also filed a petition for quo warranto. Miguel filed an MTD which was denied by the RTC. CA ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case on the ground that the COMELEC has already ruled on his qualifications. ISSUES: Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States HELD: Article XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. Omnibus Election Code: SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Court took note of: a. in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" Miguel's answer regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," was Permanently." b. on its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. c. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed: Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States." Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. Immigration: removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it. Immigrant: person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. However, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides. This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general entitled to

the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with bylaw" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'2.WON Miguel waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green cardholder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code). Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18,1988. In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a

party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

NOLASCO VS. COMELEC G.R. NOS. 122250 & 122258 JULY 21, 1999 FACTS: A disqualification case was filed by respondent Eduardo Alarilla against Florention Blanco, Mayor-elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Alarilla lost on the election for Mayor. He alleged that Blanco performed acts in violation of the Omnibus Election Codeby giving money to induce voters and election officials, committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy and spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is provided by law. COMELEC in division decided against Blanco and a reconsideration was brought by Blanco to COMELEC en banc. Edgardo Nolasco, Vice Mayor-elect, took part as an intervenor this time. Nolasco urged that Blanco be disqualified and that the position will be turned over to him. COMELEC en banc denied both of their motions. ISSUE: Whether Alarilla be proclaimed the Mayor of Meycauayan Bulacan upon the disqualification of Blanco HELD: Blanco was given the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong, however, he was not able to do so. RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates proclamation. In this case, Nolasco should be proclaimed the Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan upon Blancos disqualification and not Alarilla. In Reyes v. COMELEC, there should be no assumption that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed the winner upon the disqualification of the winning candidate. The Vice Mayor-elect, Nolasco, is eligible to take the position instead because the condition would have substantially changed in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded.

DOMINGO, JR. VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 136587 AUGUST 30, 1999 FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. were both running for mayor of Mandaluyong City. After, respondents proclamation, petitioner filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that during the campaign period respondent asked his ather Benjamin Abalos, Sr., incumbent mayor at that time, to give substantial allowances to public school teachers who were appointed as chairpersons and member of the Board of Electoral Inspector (BEI). The allegations were obtained from the Pasyal-Aral outing for Mandaluyong public school teachers. Petitioner alleged that it was done to influence the BEI and to ensure the respondents victory which constitutes a violation of Section 68of the Omnibus Election Code. He presented evidence to prove his claim such as photographs of the said activity, affidavits of three public school teachers, videotapes showing Mayor Abalos Sr. announcing that respondent is responsible for such release. COMELEC in division and en banc dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether the respondent is disqualified in accordance with Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the petition for disqualification HELD: The petition is dismissed and the COMELEC decisions are affirmed. Nothing in the affidavits and videotapes showed the participation of the respondent in the grant of the allowances. The petitioner failed to prove his claim due to insufficiency of evidence. The Court finds no abuse of discretion on the COMELECs decision to dismiss the petition for disqualification. After a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented, COMELEC finds it insufficient to support the charge of violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

TRINIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 135716 SEPTEMBER 23, 1999 FACTS: Petitioner Ferdinand Trinidad won the May 1995 elections. Respondent Manuel Sunga filed a disqualification case against petitioner in violation of the Omnibus Election Code such as using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, using threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion, vote buying. COMELEC disqualified Trinidad on June 22 1998. Thus, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) claiming that he was deprived of due process. He was again proclaimed winner in the May 1998 elections. Petitioner's was still serving his term as mayor at the time the resolution was issued by the COMELEC. On October 1998, COMELEC denied petitioners MR and annulled his proclamation a Mayor-elect. ISSUE: Whether petitioner's proclamation as Mayor under the May 1998 elections be cancelled on account of the disqualification case filed against him during the May 1995 elections HELD: Petitioner's term as Mayor under the May 8, 1995 elections expired on June 30, 1998. When the first Resolution was issued by COMELEC on June 22, 1998, petitioner was still serving his term. However, by the time the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was filed on July 3, 1998, the case had already become moot and academic as his term had already expired. The second resolution on October 1998, the case had already been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's challenged term of office. Complaint for disqualification private respondent is rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's term of office. COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner from his reelected term of office. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is reelected.

FERNANDEZ VS. FERNANDEZ G.R. NO. L-32675 NOVEMBER 3, 1970 FACTS: The petition before the COMELEC was based on two grounds: (1) that the respondent Vicente B. Fernandez is not qualified to be a candidate for delegate in the second district because he is not a resident of Laguna, (2) that respondent has no bona fide intention to run or to win and that his only purpose is to annul votes with the name Fernandez and to prejudice petitioner's candidacy by causing confusion because of the similarity in the surnames of petitioner and respondent thereby preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. Petitioner Estanislao A. Fernandez is a resident of Lilio, Laguna, well-known and has run for office several times while respondent Fernandez was born in Manila and is a resident of San Juan Rizal. Petitioner petitioned to strike out the certificate of acceptance of nomination of respondent claiming that this was done only to cause confusion. Petitioner also claimed that respondent lacks requisite residence qualification, which is not less than one year immediately prior to his election. ISSUE: Whether respondent Fernandez is a nuisance candidate HELD: Respondent is short of the one year period required by law. The Court also considered other circumstances clearly proven in the record that the respondent in filing his certificate of acceptance and in insisting to run has no other intention but to cause confusion among the electorate by the similarity of his and the petitioner's surnames and that he has no intention to run for the office. Respondent is practically unknown in the second district of Laguna, the greater portion of his business interests, demanding his personal attention, dedication and involvement, being located in the Manila area. The certificate of acceptance of nomination as candidate for delegate filed by the respondent Fernandez should not at all have been given due course by the respondent COMELEC. Respondent Fernandez' certificate of acceptance of nomination is ordered to be stricken out.

BAUTISTA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 133840 NOVEMBER 13, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent were duly registered candidates for the position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the elections of May 11, 1998. Aside from said candidates, a certain Edwin "Efren" Bautista who also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position of mayor. Petitioner filed a petition praying that Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance candidate. COMELEC declared Edwin as nuisance candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor. Edwins Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The votes Efren Bautista, Efren, E.Bautista and Bautista were considered as stray votes. Petitioner filed with COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers and it was dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether Edwin Efren Bautista is a nuisance candidate HELD: Edwin Efren Bautista is a nuisance candidate causing confusion on the petitioners valid votes and his votes. There was grave abuse of discretion in denying the part of petitioners valid votes. Some of the Bautista votes were separated and considered stray votes by the BEI and Board of Canvassers. Election Laws purpose is to give effect to the will of the voter. In case of doubt, it shall be resolved in favor of the will of the voter.

LUISON VS. GARCIA G.R. NO. L-10981 APRIL 25, 1981 FACTS: Anacleto M. Luison and Fidel A. D. Garcia were the only candidates for mayor of Tubay, Agusan. T h e certificate of candidacy of Luison was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality dulysigned by the chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by a candidate for vice mayor. The executive secretary of the Nacionalista Party impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed against Garcia. COMELEC declared Garcia ineligible to run for office. Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the COMELEC, Garcia pursued his candidacy and the board counted the votes of Garcia as valid. He was proclaimed the winner. Luison filed a petition for quo warranto and protest declaring that Garcia is ineligible for his certificate of candidacy was declared null and void by the COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether Garcia is ineligible HELD: The general rule is that the fact a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate does not entitle the said candidate receiving the second highest number of votes to be declared elected since he is not the choice of the electorate. Moreover, the protestee cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and purpose. In this case, the Court declares neither Luison nor Garcia has been validly elected thus no one is entitled to the position of mayor of Tugbay, Agusan.

BAUTISTA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 133840 NOVEMBER 13, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent were duly registered candidates for the position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the elections of May 11, 1998. Aside from said candidates, a certain Edwin "Efren" Bautista who also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position of mayor. Petitioner filed a petition praying that Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance candidate. COMELEC declared Edwin as nuisance candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor. Edwins Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The votes Efren Bautista, Efren, E.Bautista and Bautista were considered as stray votes. Petitioner filed with COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers and it was dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion in denying the inclusion of petitioners valid votes HELD: There was grave abuse of discretion in denying the part of petitioners valid votes. Some of the Bautista votes were separated and considered stray votes by the BEI and Board of Canvassers. Election Laws purpose is to give effect to the will of the voter. In case of doubt, it shall be resolved in favor of the will of the voter.

BAUTISTA VS. COMELEC G.R. NOS. 154796-97 OCTOBER 23, 2003 FACTS: On 10 June 2002, Raymundo Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareorefused to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. Bautista brought the issue with the RTC and it was resolved in his favor. On 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista respondent Divina Alcoreza were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista won while Alcoreza came in second. Bautista was proclaimed the winner and took his oath of office. Meanwhile, COMELEC issued COMELEC resolutions and the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautistas certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc directed the Election Officer to delete Bautistas name from the official list of candidates. Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning candidate ISSUE: Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as the Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of Bautista HELD: COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the second placer in case of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista does not result in the proclamation of Alcoreza who obtained the second highest number of votes because Alcoreza was obviously not the choice of the electorate. When the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautistas disqualification. The Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the votes cast in favor of Bautista are stray votes. Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay.

KARE VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 157526 APRIL 28, 2004 FACTS: Salvador Moll and Avelino Ceriola are both running for mayor in Malinao, Albay. The latter filed a petition for disqualification against Moll on the ground that he was previously sentenced to suffer the penalty of six months to one year and nine months for the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions. Moll won the 2001 elections, however, on May 2003 COMELEC disqualified him and declared Ceriola as the mayor. Vice mayor Emiliana Kare filed a petition against the proclamation of Ceriola and argues that she is the one who is eligible for the position. ISSUE: Whether the proclamation of Ceriola is valid HELD: COMELEC committed a mistake in proclaiming Ceriola as the mayor because the resolution disqualifying Moll took effect after the election that is on March 2003. The court said that it is clear that it was only on March19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued Resolution to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate. On May 14, 2001, when the electorate voted for him as mayor, they believed that he was qualified. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice. In case of the permanent vacancy of the mayoralty position, the vice mayor should take the position instead of the second winning candidate.

MONROY VS. CA G.R. NO. L-23258 JULY 1, 1967 FACTS: Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal when he filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the First District of Rizal in the upcoming elections. Three days later, he filed a letter withdrawing his certificate of candidacy which the COMELEC approved. Respondent Felipe del Rosario, Vice Mayor, then took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor on the theory that petitioner forfeited his office upon filing the certificate of candidacy. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal held that petitioner ceased to be mayor after fiuling his certificate of candidacy and ordered to reimburse salaries that he received in favor of del Rosario. CA affirmed CFIs decision. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is deemed resigned from office after filing his certificate of candidacy HELD: The law provides that any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. In Castro v Gatuslao, wording of the law indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever. Petitioner must also reimburse del Rosario since it is a general rule that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure.

GADOR VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-25365 JANUARY 22, 1980 FACTS: The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamis as independent on the January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980. He filed his certificate of candidacy on the basis of a news item in the Bulletin Today. In the news, it was stated that COMELEC issued resolution for the extension of time for filing of the certificate of candidacy. In view of the President's announcement that the resolution of the respondent COMELEC for the extension of time for filing certificates of candidacy from January 4 to January 10 had been denied. Thus, COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name may not be included in the list of candidates. ISSUE: Whether the certificate of candidacy filed on January 7, 1980 i9s valid. HELD: It is not valid. Section 7 of Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52 provides that the sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980. It is also a factor that the petitioner also admitted that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy. The Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond the required date, the petitioners certificate of candidacy is void.

CONQUILLA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 139801 MAY 31, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Roberto Conquilla assails the certificate of candidacy of respondent Eduardo Alarilla. Alarilla filed his certificate of candidacy with the Municipal Election Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan without indicating the elective position he was running for. However attached and file with his certificate of candidacy was his certificate of nomination and acceptance which states: I , JOSE DE VENECIA, JR (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP) as its Secretary-General, hereby nominate: EDUARDO A. ALARILLA as the Partys official candidate in the May 11, 1998 elections for the position of MUNICIPAL MAYOR of the Municipality of Meycauayan in the Fourth District of Bulacan. Conquilla, however, filed with the COMELEC a petition praying that Alarillas certificate of candidacy be expunged and cancelled on the ground that it was null and void for failing to specify his chosen elective position and that he should be disqualified to run for office. During the pendency of the petition, Alarilla was proclaimed Mayor-elect. Thereafter, the petition was also dismissed in the First Division of COMELEC and COMELEC en banc. ISSUE: Whether Conquilla is right that Alarilla should be disqualified HELD: It is correctly observed by the First Division of COMELEC and affirmed by COMELEC En Banc that the information omitted in the Certificate of Candidacy was supplied in the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached. First Division stated that Alarilla was able to correct his omission by filing an amended certificate of candidacy before the dismissal of the petition indicating that he was running for Municipal Mayor. The purpose in requiring a certificate of candidacy (which is to enable the voters to know before the elections the candidates among whom they are to make a choice. If compliance to a mere technicality would be preferred then the will of the electorate would be frustrated.

GO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 147741 MAY 10, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte on February 27, 2001. The following day, she filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously, she attempted to file with the same provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor. However, provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte. Only few minutes left until the deadline for filing the certificates of candidacy and withdrawal, petitioner decided to send her withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte at 12 in the morning of March 1, 2001. At 1pm that day, the election officer of Baybay, Leyte received the original affidavit of withdrawal. Respondents Montejo and Antoni sought the disqualification of the petitioner for governor and mayor respectively on the ground that the petitioner filed two certificates of candidacy. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is disqualified HELD: Petition was granted. The petitioners filing of the affidavit of withdrawal for mayor was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. Her withdrawal was effective for all legal purposes and left in full force of her certificate of candidacy for governor. Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices. Nothing in the law mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed.

VILLAROSA VS. HRET G.R. NO. 143351 SEPTEMBER 14, 2000 FACTS: An election protest case filed by respondent Ricardo V. Quintos against petitioner Amelita C. Villarosa. They were the only candidates for office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the May 1998 elections. Villarosa was proclaimed the winner. Quintos filed an election protest on the basis of the contents of her certificate of candidacy. Petitioner is the wife of Jose T. Villarosa who was Representative of the District for two terms. He wrote his stage name or nickname as JOE-JTV while petitioner wrote JTV as her nickname. HRET then decided not to count the JTV votes in favor of Villarosa. ISSUE: Whether JTV votes should be counted in favor of Villarosa HELD: Facts established that the use by Villarosa of the JTV nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election process. Therefore, HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ruling that JTV votes should not be counted in favor of Villarosa. Three kinds of votes are considered stray a) a vote containing initials only, b) a vote which is illegible, c) a vote which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it was intended. Those JTV votes are considered stray votes.

CIPRIANO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 158830 AUGUST 10, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Ellan Marie Cipriano filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the 2002 SK elections. However she and several others were disqualified because the COMELEC adopted a resolution recommended by the Commissions law department to this effect because it is said that she together with several others were not registered voters of the barangay were they intended to run, she even won the elections. ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law HELD: The court disagrees. The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus: Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body. Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false.

MIRANDA VS. ABAYA G.R. NO. 136351 JULY 28, 1999 FACTS: Jose Pempe Miranda then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Three days after, a complaint to cancel certificate of candidacy was filed against him by Antonio Abaya which was granted. Shortly after the deadline for filing for candidacy, Joel Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Pempe Miranda. Of course, Abaya filed a disqualification case against Joel Miranda for void substitution. After a motion for reconsideration, COMELEC granted Abayas complaint. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction HELD: A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called substitute to file a new and original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

JOSE LINO LUNA VS. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ G.R. NO. 13744 NOVEMBER 29, 1918 FACTS: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of Canvassers, who, after a canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes, as duly elected governor of said province. Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the CFI and a new trial was ordered. Additional evidence was adduced. Judge McMahon found that the inspectors in Binangonan did not close the polls at 6 oclock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time. The judge then directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. ISSUE: Whether the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid HELD: The ballots were valid. The law provides that at all elections, the polls shall be open from seven oclock in the morning until six oclock in the afternoon. The polls should be open and closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote if the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the regular hours. The ballot of the innocent voter should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his participation in the affairs of his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election inspectors should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they should be punished and not the innocent voter.

LAMBONAO VS. TERO G.R. NO. L-23240 DECEMBER 31, 1965 FACTS: Benedicto Lambonao against Alfredo A. Tero and Daniel B. Vestal. It alleged that petitioner was a candidate for municipal councilor of Anahawan, Southern Leyte in the elections of November 12, 1963; that respondents were proclaimed elected to the office of municipal councilors by the municipal board of canvassers on November 21, 1963; that petitioner received the next largest number of votes; and that respondents are ineligible for said positions because their certificates of candidacy, filed on September 12, 1963, were not in fact signed nor ratified by them but by somebody else, who forged their signatures therein. ISSUE: Whether the provision of law were mandatory HELD: It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter is expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.

LOONG VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 93986 DECEMBER 22, 1992 FACTS: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age. Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition. Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. ISSUE: Whether SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law HELD: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 87193 JUNE 23, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. ISSUE: Whether petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon HELD: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not

permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.

MALINIAS VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 146943 OCTOBER 4, 2002 FACTS: On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds. In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged unlawful acts. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilandos complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881 HELD: The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

CHAVEZ VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 162777 AUGUST 31, 2004 FACTS: Francisco Chavez, stands as a taxpayer and a citizen asked the Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520. Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. However, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator on 2003. After a week, COMELEC issued Reso No. 6520 which contained Sec 32 and directed Chavez to comply with the said provision. He then requested the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Sec 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules. Subsequently, COMELEC ordered Chavez to remove or cause the removal or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Sec. 32 of Resolution No. 6520 is a gross violation of the non-impairment clause HELD: No. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. Furthermore, this Court notes that the very contracts entered into by petitioner provide that the endorsers photograph and image shall be utilized in whatever form, mode and manner not contrary to law and norms of decency, and in whatever form, mode and manner in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law.

LANOT VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 164858 NOVEMBER 16, 2006 FACTS: On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot ("Lanot"), Vener Obispo ("Obispo"), Roberto Peralta ("Peralta"), Reynaldo dela Paz ("dela Paz"), Edilberto Yamat ("Yamat"), and Ram Alan Cruz ("Cruz") (collectively, "petitioners"), filed a petition for disqualification8 under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May 2004 elections. The case was docketed as SPA (NCR-RED) No. C04-008. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him. ISSUE: Whether there was an election campaign HELD: Based on the findings of Director Ladra, the questioned acts attributed to Eusebio all occurred before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. Indeed, Director Ladra applied Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio precisely because Eusebio committed these acts "outside" of the campaign period. However, Director Ladra erroneously assumed that Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80, when Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

ADIONG VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 103956 MARCH 31, 1992 FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements. ISSUE: Whether a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobileplaces whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the prohibition.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 119694 MAY 22, 1995 FACTS: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: Whether Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional HELD: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

OSMENA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 132231 MARCH 31, 1998 FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections.[1] Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmea is candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC was entitled to free space HELD: The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the OBrien test in this case, we find that 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.

TELEBAP VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 132922 APRIL 21, 1998 FACTS: TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC is entitled to free time HELD: Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 11 Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

SWS VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 147571 MAY 5, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media are valid and constitutional HELD: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

JUANITO C. PILAR V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 115245 JULY 11, 1995 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94-040. Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a non-candidate, having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that it is clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine HELD: No. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word shall. As a general rule, the use of the word shall in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule. Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.

BAUTISTA VS. COMELEC G.R. NOS. 154796-97 OCTOBER 23, 2003 FACTS: On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo (Election Officer Jareo) refused to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14 (trial court). On 1 July 2002, the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801[4] mandates Election Officer Jareo to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise. In compliance with the trial courts order, Election Officer Jareo included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareo referred the matter of Bautistas inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department on 5 July 2002. On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Departments recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002. During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza (Alcoreza) were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers (Board of Canvassers) proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay[8] on 15 July 2002. On 8 August 2002, Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay before Congresswoman Eileen ErmitaBuhain of the First District of Batangas. On 16 August 2002, Bautista again took his oath of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony administered by Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible ISSUE: Whether there was a necessity of registration HELD: Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the qualifications that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the peoples choice expressed in the local elections deserves respect. Bautistas invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws is unavailing.

NICHOLAS-LEWIS V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 162759 AUGUST 4, 2006 FACTS: Nicholas-Lewis and the other petitioners were dual citizens who retained or re-acquired their Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizens Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. They filed a petition to the COMELEC praying to avail themselves the right of suffrage under RA 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. The COMELEC rejected their petition. The COMELEC argued that upon acquisition by the petitioners of their foreign citizenship, they have renounced their Philippine citizenship and have abandoned their domicile. The COMELEC further stated that before they could exercise the right of suffrage, they had to meet the residency requirement among others provided in Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution by first establishing their domicile in the Philippines through positive acts. ISSUE: Whether the dual citizens who have retained or re-acquired their Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can exercise their right of suffrage under RA 9189 HELD: Yes. Section 5 of RA 9225 states that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under this act shall enjoy full civil and political rights, subject to certain conditions including the fulfillment of the requirements under Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution and RA 9189. Applying the doctrine of necessary implication, the strategic location of Section 2 Article 5 of the Constitution indicates that it provides for an exception to the residency requirement in Section 1. (as established in a senate debate on the approval of RA 9189).

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. AMADEO CORRAL G.R. NO. L-42300 JANUARY 31, 1936 FACTS: Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with section 432. of the Revised Administrative Code. he following persons shall be disqualified from voting: (a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. (b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United States. (c) Insane of feeble-minded persons. (d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write. (e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who, after failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they are incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective of whether such incapacity be real or feigned. And section 2642 provides: Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled so to do, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one year and by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office for a period of not more than four years. It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court promulgated on March 3, 1910,1 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. ISSUE: Whether the appellant was entitled to vote HELD: The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right.

NICASIO M. VIVERO VS. MATEO G. MURILLO G.R. NO. L-30271 JANUARY 30, 1929 FACTS: Mateo G. Murillo, the defendant-appellee, was born in the barrio of Paliway, municipality of La Paz, of the Province of Leyte, where he lived with his parents and received his primary education. In order to continue his studies he removed first to Tacloban, Leyte, and later to Calbayog, Samar, and finally to Manila until the year 1927, at the same time acting as private secretary to Senator Veloso. Every year he return to his native town to spend his vacations which usually lasted from two weeks to one month, remaining alternately in his parents house and in that of his brothers. While he studied he was supported by his parents. With the approach of the general elections of 1925 Senator Veloso assigned him to Burauen, Leyte, for the purpose of compaigning for him. While in that municipality he he registered there as voter. But before the elections at that year Murillo returned to Manila in order to continue his law studies. In December 1926, he went back to La Paz and formally, though verbally, announced his candidacy for the office of municipal president of said municipality at the general elections of 1928. In the same year 1926 he ordered some wood to be prepared or sawed to be used in the construction of a house for his residence. Later on Murillo returned to Manila and thence wrote to his friends, relatives, and acquaintances, telling them of his candidacy for the office of municipal president of La Paz. For the purposes of said candidacy, Murillo frequently went to his native town. In the month of February, 1927, he brought his family there, leaving them in his parents house when he went back to Manila. In the month of July of the same year he returned to La Paz and lived there with his aforesaid family and later came to manila. Lastly, in the month of November, 1927, he returned to his said municipality, and did not leave it until the general elections in, June, 1928. On April 4, 1928, Mateo G. Murillo went to Pascual Esplanada, a notary public in the town of the municipality of Burauen, Leyte, to subscribe to a petition under oath which was presented to the municipal treasurer of that municipality to have his name as a voter in Burauen cancelled. On April 14 of the same year, in registering as a voter in the second precinct of La Paz, said defendant Mateo G. Murillo presented a copy of his petition for cancellation to the chairman of the board of inspectors of said municipality, Pedro Tubio. The municipality of La Paz was formely a barrio of the municipality of Burauen, having been organized as an independent municipality in 1918. ISSUE: Whether the defendant-appellee had a legal residence HELD: In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, that a student living with his parents in a certain barrio of a municipality, which barrio is later separated to be organized as an independent municipality, who for several years pursues his studies in several provinces of the archipelago, supported by his parents, returning to the latters home during his vacations in the newly organized municipality, does not loose his residence in said municipality, either on account of having resided in different provinces as a student, or of having registered as a voter in the former municipality and is eligible as municipal president of the new municipality even if his registration as a voter in the municipality to which the new one originally belong has not been cancelled.

AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 147066 MARCH 26, 2001 FACTS: Petitoners, representing the youth sector, seek to direct the Comelec to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections of new voters. According to the petitioners around 4 Million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent Commission under R.A. 8189. On January 29, 2001 Commissioners Tantangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 requesting for a two-day additional registration of new voters, to be set on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. Subsequently, Comelec issued Resolution No. 3584 denying said request, it was the consensus. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, which seeks to nullify respondent Comelecs resolution and / or to declare Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. ISSUE: Whether respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584 dated Feb. 8, 2001 as it denies petitioners right to vote. HELD: The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Section 8 of R.A. 8189, provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. In the light of the foregoing the assailed resolution must be upheld. The so-called stand-by powers or residual powers of the Comelec, as raised by the petitioners is provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29 of R.A. No. 6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436, wherein the commission shall fix other periods and dates for the accomplishment of pre-election acts if it is no longer possible to observe the dates and periods prescribed by law, cannot be applied in this case. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies for the purpose of upholding the resolution. Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of and not otherwise. In the case at bar the Comelec stated the operational impossibility of holding the additional two-day registration, and therefore Section 8 of R.A. 8436 may not apply. Comelec acted within the confines of the applicable law in denying the petitioners request.

MERCADO V.S. DYSANGCO A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1301 JULY 30,2002 FACTS: The complainants alleged that prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, forty-eight (48) persons filed with the said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters list. Of these forty-eight (48) petitioners, nine (9) were supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado, while thirty-nine (39) were supporters of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales. Mercado and Gonzales were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Kabulihan, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija. Consequently, Mercado and the other complainants filed an opposition to the petition of the thirty-nine (39) supporters of Gonzales. On May 10 (Saturday), respondent judge, when approached by herein complainants, assured them that he did not issue any order for the inclusion of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners in the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan. However, on the day of the election, complainants were surprised to find thirty-four (34) of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners with an Order signed by respondent judge and attested by respondent clerk of court,[2] directing their inclusion in the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan. ISSUE: Whether Judge Dysangco committed an error HELD: It needs to be reiterated over and over again, until it sinks into the consciousness of every judge, that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity. The reminder applies all the more sternly to trial judges, like herein respondent, because they are the judicial front-liners. They have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.

SARANGANI VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 135927 JUNE 26, 2000 FACTS: On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for certiorari. On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to the respective Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for abolition of precincts and annulment of book of voters. On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the twenty- three (23) barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in Opposition"[3] which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur ISSUE: Whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct HELD: It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one precinct per barangay. In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political units affected.

PANGANDAMAN VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 134340 NOVEMBER 25, 1999 FACTS: The instant cases were filed by petitioners praying that the Commission declare [a] failure of elections in their respective municipalities and to hold special elections thereafter. The petitions were reinforced by reports received by the Commission from its field officers and deputies. A pre-trial for all cases in Lanao del Sur involving failure of elections was set and parties, their counsels, and the election officers of concerned municipalities appeared. During the pre-trial of the above cases, it was shown and admitted by the parties that total failure of election[s] took place in several municipalities. ISSUE: Whether there was a failure of elections HELD: petitioner himself admits that special elections were conducted on a staggered basis on July 4, 18 and 25, 1998. For another, the petition questions the membership of the Board of Election Inspectors for being composed of elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as well as the machine counting of the votes when these events have been superseded by the recent issuance of the Certificates Of Canvass Of Votes And Proclamation Of The Winning Candidates For Provincial Offices dated August 7, 1998. In face of these supervening events, the arguments proffered by the petitioner to seek the annulment of the challenged Omnibus Order rings hollow. Verily "At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."

CAWASA VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 150469 JULY 3, 2002 FACTS: Cawasa and Manamparan candidates for the office of mayor of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. Out of the forty precincts in Nunungan, only thirty-six functioned, as there was a failure of election in the remaining four precincts. Special elections were setconsidering that the number of registered voters in the remaining four precincts would affect the election results. The special elections for Precincts of Barangay Bangko were conducted in the Sultan Naga Dimaporo, Lanao del Norte while those of Barangay Cabasara and Barangay Liangan were conducted in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. After the canvassing of the election returns, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates on the basis of the earlier election returns of the regular elections and the election returns of the 4 precincts subject of the special elections. Prior to the special elections the lead of Cawasa was eighty six. After the May 30, 2001 special elections, Manamparan overcame the margin with a lead of 297 votes. Cawasa was proclaimed mayor. Manamparan filed an appeal and petition to annul the proclamation of Cawasa which was later dismissed by the COMELEC 2nd division. He then filed a petition for the Annulment of Election Results of the Special Elections and Annulment of Canvass and Proclamation. The COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution annulling the results of the special elections as well as the proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as the results in the 4 contested precincts affect the standing of candidates. ISSUE: Whether the Transfer of Polling Places and Appointment of Military Personnel as Members of the Board of Election Inspectors is legal HELD: No. The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of COMELEC Resolution No. 4360 issued on May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also Sections 153 and 154 of the Election Code. As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. However, changes may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the COMELEC after notice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and hearing.

ESPIDOL VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 164922 OCTOBER 11, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Raymond P. Espidol and private respondent Wilfredo L. Tabag were rival candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Ramon, Isabela, in the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Petitioner Espidol, a re-electionist, was the official candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa (Lakas)Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD) coalition, while private respondent Tabag was the official candidate of the Partidong Demokratiko ng Pilipinas-Laban (PDP-Laban).The municipality had a total of 117 precincts. At about 6:00 p.m. of May 10, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Ramon, consisting of Chairman Atty. Agripino A. De Guzman, Jr., Vice-Chairman Pedro L. Gueco and MemberSecretary Rosalinda B. Doroni, convened at the municipalitys Barangay Training Center to commence the canvassing. Actual canvassing started at around 3:00 a.m. of the following day or May 11, 2004, and formally adjourned at about 8:30 p.m., with the MBC scheduling the resumption of the canvass at 9:00 a.m. of the next day. ISSUE: Whether there was a per-proclamation controversy HELD: Granting arguendo that the objections interposed by private respondent Tabag were not proper for a preproclamation controversy, nonetheless, the MBC should have made written rulings thereon. We draw from past experience. A pattern of conduct observed in past elections has been the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest-slogan of some candidates or parties. Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene. It may not be out of place to state that in the long history of election contests in this country, as served in Lagumbay v. Climaco, successful contestant in an election protest often wins but a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire or has expired. Protests, counter-protests, revisions of ballots, appeals, dilatory tactics, may well frustrate the will of the electorate. And what if the protestant may not have the resources and an unwavering determination with which to sustain a long drawn-out election contest? In this context therefore all efforts should be strained as far as is humanly possible to take election returns out of the reach of the unscrupulous; and to prevent illegal or fraudulent proclamation from ripening into illegal assumption of office

CHAVES VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 1052323 JULY 3, 1992 FACTS: This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate. On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution was received by respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to disseminate through the fastest available means and order said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed that COMELEC failed to perform its mandatory function thus the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted. Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for Chavez votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned Chavez votes in favor of petitioner. ISSUE: Whether Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition HELD: It is quite obvious that petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the constitution and the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members (Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores the exclusivity of the tribunals jurisdiction over election contest relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner relating to the election of a member of the Senate. As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.

SAMAD VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 107854 JULY 16, 1993 FACTS: on June 1, 1992, Samad sought the nullification of the proclamation made in favor of Abdula and the calling of a special election in three precincts. In SPC 92-421, which was filed on August 14, 1992, Abdula prayed that the proclamation of Samad be nullified and that he be enjoined from assuming as mayor of Kabuntalan. The two petitions were consolidated and raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC. On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC issued a resolution in SPA 92-314 directing its Law Department to: 1) summon both election registrars Saga and Pagayao to appear before the Commission; 2) conduct an investigation of the matter with a view to the prosecution of any one found responsible for falsification of the election documents; and 3) require Election Supervisor Carmencita Cabacungan to comment on the petition. On that same date, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2489 declaring the termination of all pre-proclamation cases except the 86 cases named in the list annexed thereto. SPA 92314 was not included in the list. (SPC-92-421 had not yet been filed at that time.) On July 2, 1992, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City an action against the private respondent for quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction. This was docketed as SPL Civil Case 2938 in Branch 13. Judge Emmanuel D. Badoy initially opined that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition but he later changed his mind and issued a temporary restraining order, converted into a writ of preliminary injunction on August 14, 1992, directing private respondent Abdula to cease and desist from exercising the powers and functions of the mayor of Kabuntalan and enjoining all officials and entities to respect the proclamation of petitioner Samad. On January 5, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos designated respondent Abdula as officer-in-charge of the Office of the Mayor of Kabuntalan. ISSUE: Whether special elections should be called in the three precincts is also cognizable by the COMELEC under the Omnibus Election Code HELD: It is settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation. 21 All the votes cast in the election must be counted and all the returns presented to the board must be considered as the disregard of some returns would in effect disenfranchise the voters affected. 22 A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all the returns are considered. 23 The canvass of the mayoralty election was incomplete because there were still three precincts with a total of 660 registered voters that had not sent in their returns. Precincts 3-A and 4-A reportedly did not function on election day, and the election returns in Precinct No. 13 were missing. In this situation, the COMELEC should determine whether there was indeed a failure of election that would necessitate the calling of a special election in the said precincts. Regarding the missing election returns in Precinct No. 13, Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates the board of canvassers to obtain them from the corresponding boards of election inspectors. If these returns have been lost or destroyed, the board may, upon prior authority of the Commission, resort to any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission. Any proclamation in violation of this provision is null and void under Section 238 of the Code.

AMPATUAN V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 149803 JANUARY 31, 2002 FACTS: Ampatuan and Candao both ran for governor of Maguindanao. Candao filed a petition with the Comelec for the annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections in several municipalities in Maguindanao. They claim that the elections were a sham since the ballots were filled-up en masse the night before the elections, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots, and other election paraphernalia werenot delivered at all. As a result, Comelec suspended the proclamation of winners. Ampatuan then filed for the lifting of said order which was granted and then led to the proclamation of ampatuan as governor of maguindanao. Candao on the other hand filed a petition to the SC to set aside such proclamation but was unfortunately denied. Despite the assumption into office of the petitioners, the Comelec ordered a consolidation of the respondents petition for declaration of failure of elections. Technical examination of 4 to 7 precincts was also ordered. Petitioners, Ampatuan, filed the present petition. They claimed that the proper remedy for the respondents is not a declaration of failure of election, but an election protest. They argued that the conduct of technical examination would make the summary nature of the proclamation of failure of elections useless. ISSUE: Whether the Comelec has been divested of its jurisdiction to hear and decide repondents petition for declaration of failure of elections after petitioners have been proclaimed HELD: Petition is DISMISSED.A Pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elections. While in the former, examination of the election returns is limited on its face, the latter, may conduct technical examination of election documents, and compare and analyze voters signatures and thumb prints. In this case, the Comelec is not deprived of its jurisdiction even if the petitioners have already assumed office. Their assumption into office does not give rise to the presumption that it is legal since the respondents have put into question the conduct of elections which led to their proclamation. The respondents exhaustive allegation of massive fraud and terrorism should not be taken lightly since if these were proven, could warrant a failure of elections. As provided in Sec. 6 of the OEC, the Comelec en banc has authority to annul election results and/or declare a failure of elections. In the case at bar, the Comelec is duty bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of the respondents allegations.

UTTO V. COMELEC, DATU ANGAS AND THE NEW MUNICIPAL BOARD OFCANVASSERS OF SULTAN SA BARONGIS G. R. NO. 150111 JANUARY 31, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Utto and respondent Datu Angas were candidates for the position of the mayor of the municipality of Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001election.Before the start of the canvass, chairperson Mamalinta distributed to the parties present a report on the status of canvassing. Out of the 98 precincts, the municipal board of canvassers issued 4 separate rulings excluding 5 election returns for reasons such as (1) the copy of the ER for local position is not original, (2) the ER is not theBoard copy and the data on the votes of the candidates are manifestly tampered bytouch and go, (3) the envelope has no outer seal and the ER contained in the envelope has no inner seal. Despite respondents manifestation to appeal the ruling, the municipal board of canvassers proceeded with the proclamation of the candidates for municipal offices. The board proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of the municipality. Comelec subsequently found that the aforementioned 5 election returns were valid and should have been included in the canvass. Comelec issued a resolution directing the inclusion of 5 election returns excluded by the municipal board of canvassers during the canvass of votes and a resolution finding petitioners proclamation to be illegal and void ab initio. Utto files a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul these resolutions. ISSUE: Whether Uttos proclamation was valid HELD: No. An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be made the basis of a proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitted. The fact that a candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise by the Comelec of the authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such proclamation a nullity.

MACABAGO VS COMELEC G.R. NO.152163 NOVEMBER 18, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner had alead of 198 votes over private respondent Jamael M. Salacop.Private respondent filed a petition against petitioner and the proclaimed vice mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur,for the alleged fact that there was a massive substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures in some precincts and a failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election process in those precincts a sham and a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity. In support of his petition, private respondent appended thereto photocopies of random Voters Registration Records (VRRs) evidencing the fraud and deceit that allegedly permeated the electoral process, as well as affidavits tending to prove that serious irregularities were committed in the conduct of the elections in the subject precincts. The petitioner denied the material and averred that it is a preproclamation controversy. The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and issued an order directing the Election Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the questioned precincts for technical examination. After its examination of the evidence submitted by petitioner, the COMELEC concluded that there was convincing proof of massive fraud in the conduct of the elections in the four (4) precincts that necessitated a technical examination of the original copies of the VRRs and their comparison with the voters signatures and fingerprints. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition of private respondent and in issuing the assailed Order HELD: Before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of two(2) conditions must be established, namely: (a) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed bylaw or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; (b) the votes cast would affect theresult of the election. The Court declared in Ricardo Canicosa vs. Commission on Elections, et al., that there are onlythree (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:x x x (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before thehour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogouscauses; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvassthereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.In sum then, the grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition before the COMELEC are those for aregular election protest and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy nor is such petition one for annulment of theelections or for a declaration of failure of elections in the municipality of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC shouldhave ordered the dismissal of the petition instead of issuing the assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a graveabuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The error is correctible by thespecial civil action for certiorari

SALLY A. LEE VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 157004 JULY 4, 2003 FACTS: Sally A. Lee (petitioner) and Leovic R. Dioneda (private respondent)were candidates for mayor of Sorsogon City, Sorsogon in the May 14, 2001elections.During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for privaterespondent objected to the inclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for Precinct No. 28A2 in barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the grounds that 1) no entries were made for the position of congressman, and 2) Labanng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized to fill up election returns. In her opposition to private respondents objection, petitioner alleged that 1) the omitted entry in the election return pertains to the position of congressman which cannot be a subject of preproclamation controversy, 2)the utilization of the watchers, who were under the direct supervision of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), was limited only to the filling up of the entries affecting the party-list and justified by the severe lack of personnel to perform the task, and 3) the alleged defect does not affect the integrity of the election return.On May 18, 2001, the Board of Canvassers (BOC), finding that the 1)questioned election return was clear and regular on its face, 2) there was no pre-proclamation for members of the House of Representatives and partylist, and 3) the grounds relied upon by private respondent are all directed against the proceedings of the BEI and not the BOC, ruled for the inclusion of the return. Private respondent thereupon filed on the same day a notice of appeal of the BOC ruling. In the meantime, or on May 19, 2001, the BOC proclaimed the winning candidates, including petitioner as city mayor. Private respondent thus filed on May 23, 2001 before the COMELEC a petition assailing the ruling of the BOC and praying for the exclusion of the questioned election return and the annulment of petitioners proclamation. Petitioner filed her answer to the COMELEC petition, praying for its dismissal. By Resolution of January 10, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition of private respondent and accordingly excluded the questioned return from the canvass and nullified the proclamation of petitioner. ISSUE: Whether public respondent was without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind election returns and investigate election irregularities in pre-proclamation controversy HELD: Section 243. Issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy . - The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamationcontroversy:(a) Illegal composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers;(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the samereturns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233,234, 235, and 236 of this Code;(c )The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, orintimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places werecanvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of theaggrieved candidate or candidates. The doctrine cited by petitioner presupposes that the returns "appearto be authentic and duly accomplished on their face." Where, as in the caseat bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, severalentries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrinedoes not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there isbasis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.

LUCMAN VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 166229 JUNE 29, 2005 FACTS: Bairansalam Laut Lucman and private respondent Mosama M.Pandi were mayoralty candidates in PoonaBayabao, Lanao del Sur, during the May10, 2004 elections. During the canvassing of votes, private respondent objected to theinclusion of ten election returns. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (Board) overruled private respondents objections on the disputed returns, 2 and proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate. Private respondent filed with Commission on Elections (COMELEC) an appeal from the ruling of the Board, alleging massive fraud and irregularities in the conduct of the elections,e.g., force, threat and intimidation were employed on the voters, double voting, substitution of voters, snatching of ballots, padding of ballots and existence of flying voters. Private respondent also contended that the contested election returns should have been excluded from the canvass, and that the Board was precipitate in proclaiming petitioner as the winning candidate, as private respondent has manifested on record that he is intending to appeal the Boards ruling. Private respondent admits that the exclusion of the contested returns is a ground for election protest, but he also argues that the COMELEC may go beyond the face of the returns to determine whether the elections in the precincts involved are a sham. Private respondent also filed a motion to annul proclamation and/or to suspend the effects of proclamation pendente lite. Petitioner filed his Comment and/or Answer to the appeal, arguing that the grounds relied upon by private respondent are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy but in an election protest. ISSUE: Whether the appeal from the Board of Canvassers to the COMELEC (First Division) interjected by private respondent makes a case for a pre-proclamation controversy. HELD: Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code defines a pre-proclamation controversy as "any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." n the present case, the objections initially raised by private respondent before the Municipal Board of Canvassers were proper in a pre-proclamation controversy, i.e., the election returns is obviously manufactured and/or falsified, it is not authentic, it contains alterations. However, in his appeal to the COMELEC, he further alleged that the elections held in the precincts clustered in the Pooni Lomabao Central Elementary were tainted with massive election irregularities. According to private respondent, there were "massive substitution of voters, snatching of ballots from the voters by people identified with the Lucman who filled them up against the will of the voters, force or coercion, threats, intimidation, casting of votes by double registrants in the same precincts (double entry), and flying voters " Private respondent also alleged that the counting of votes on May 11, 2004, were not prepared simultaneously with the appreciation of the ballots/counting of votes, in violation of Section 44 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6667 (March 16, 2004). Also, private respondents watchers were threatened by petitioners watchers, forcing them to leave the counting room, and that the Board of Election Inspectors merely copied the entries on the tally boards and records of votes made by petitioners watchers. Finally, private respondent alleged that the denial to his objections to the contested election returns were not made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in the prescribed form, and that despite his manifestation that he will appeal the Boards ruling on the returns, it proceeded with petitioners proclamation. Hence, as correctly argued by petitioner, private respondents cause of action before the COMELEC is proper for an election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy, and the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondents petition/appeal. Consequently, all subsequent actions by the COMELEC

in relation to private respondents appeal are null and void, and correctible by the present special civil action for certiorari.

TUPAY T. LOONG V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ABDUSAKUR TAN G.R. NO. 133676 APRIL 14, 1999 FACTS: Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri). Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code. Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC. COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. HELD: The petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 981748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing

Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be selfevident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election. It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act decisively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes

NORODIN M. MATALAM VS. COMELEC AND CANDAO G.R. NO. 123230 APRIL 18, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner Norodin M. Matalam and Private Respondent Zacaria A. Candao were both candidates for Governor of the Province of Maguindanao in the May 8, 1995 elections. Matalam challenged before the respective Municipal Boards of Canvassers the authenticity of the election returns. During the pendency of the said petitions, the Provincial Board of Canvassers on June 30, 1995 proclaimed Respondent Candao as the duly elected governor of Maguindanao. The Second Division of Respondent Commission subsequently nullified on July 11, 1995 the said proclamation of Candao. However, the proclamation of Candao was reinstated. The Comelec held that in the absence of a strong evidence establishing the spuriousness of the returns, the basic rule that the election returns shall be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes must perforce prevail. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, he also filed a motion for technical examination of the signatures and thumbmarks of the registered voters of Maganoy appearing in the Voter's Affidavit and the List of Voters for the purpose of proving that no election was conducted therein. the Comelec en banc denied the motions for reconsideration and technical examination. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the Comelec in a Pre-Proclamation Case go beyond the face of the election returns HELD: No. The petition is not meritorious. That the election returns were obviously manufactured must be evident from the face of the said documents themselves. In a pre-proclamation controversy, the Comelec, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities. The petition must fail because it effectively implores the Court to disregard the statutory norm that pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved in a summary proceeding. He asks the Court to ignore the fact that the election returns appear regular on their face, and instead to determine whether fraud or irregularities attended the election process. Because what he is asking for necessarily postulates a full reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election documents, it is clearly anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy which, by its very nature, is to be heard summarily and decided on as promptly as possible. Again, a technical examination runs counter to the nature and scope of a pre-proclamation controversy.

BARBERS V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 165691 JUNE 22, 2005 FACTS: Robert Z. Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of Senators promulgated are solution proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the elections. The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning candidate for Senator after canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs. On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution proclaiming Biazonas the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator. According to COMELEC, Biazon obtained10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there was failure of elections. Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator claiming that the latters proclamation was void, illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections. On the other hand, Biazon asserts that the COMELEC 1st Division has no jurisdiction to review, reverse or modify the actuations of COMELEC en banc sitting as National Board of Canvassers for Senators and that because he already took his oath, it should not entertain Barbers petition. It also argued that considering his lead over Barbers, the remaining votes in the uncanvassed COCs would not substantially affect the results as to the 12th senator. On the other hand, Barbers countered by saying that there could be no valid proclamation based on an incomplete canvass. COMELEC denied Barbers petition. It ruled that Barbers petition cannot be categorized as a pre-proclamation controversy since the issues cited are not proper for such nor it can be categorized as an election protest since the ground cited also does not make it as such. Besides, the COMELEC also found out that considering Biazons lead over that of Barbers, even if those unincluded votes would be counted in favor of Barbers still it would not affect the results. MR denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition 2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, after having used Provincial Certificates of Canvass in the canvass of election results for Senators up to 2 June 2004, the COMELEC used the Municipal Certificates of Canvass in the final tabulation of the uncanvassed results and that of the special elections yet to be held in certain parts of the country HELD: 1. No. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal that has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this kind of petition in light of Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Senate Electoral Tribunal as well as the ruling in Pangilinan v. COMELEC. In Javier v. COMELEC, it was held that the phrase election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returnsto the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns ; and qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal underscores the exclusivity of the SETs jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that this Court has no

jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazons proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint. 2. No. It is a rule that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election. (Sec. 233,Omnibus Election Code; Sec. 9 COMELEC Resolution No. 6749) In the present case, the report which the COMELEC Supervisory Committee submitted shows that Barbers obtained 6,736 votes in areas where results were not included in the national canvass. As for Biazon, he garnered 2,263 votes. Also, the Supervisory Committees report shows that the total number of registered voters in areas where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931, covering only 19 precincts in three municipalities. Since the election returns not included in the national canvass as well as the results of the special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the elections, it is immaterial whether the COMELEC used PCOCs or MCOCs in the subsequent canvass.

ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. NO. L-83767 OCTOBER 27, 1988 FACTS: On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. ISSUE: Whether Abbas proposal could be given due weight HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

LAZATIN VS. HRET G.R. NO. L-84297 DECEMBER 8, 1988 FACTS: Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code," was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns. ISSUE: Whether the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

DUMAYAS, JR. VS. COMELEC G.R. NOS. 141952-53 APRIL 20,2001 FACTS: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioners objections and proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc. The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare void petitioners proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion declare void petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action. The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality. Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc resolution. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election returns of the contested precincts HELD: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be regular and without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.

LUISON VS. GARCIA G.R. NO. L-10981 APRIL 25, 1968 FACTS: In the general elections held on November 8, 1955, Anacleto M. Luison and Fidel A. D. Garcia were the only candidates for mayor of Tubay, Agusan. The certificate of candidacy of Luison was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice mayor. For this reason, the executive secretary of the Nationalista Party impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed in behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation, issued a Resolution declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office. Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, Garcia continued with his candidacy and the question of his ineligibility became an issue in the campaign. And when the time came for the counting and appreciation of the ballots, the board inspectors, in spite of the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid and credited him with them in the election. Consequently, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan. Believing that Garcia is ineligible to hold office, Luison filed a petition of quo warranto in the proper court of first instance for the purpose of disputing his ineligibility and securing his consequent ouster from office, but the petition was dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed by respondent. Luison took one step further. He also filed a protest in the same court on the same ground that Garcia was ineligible because the Commission declared his certificate of candidacy null and void on Elections. ISSUE: Whether the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained the next highest number of votes, the latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former HELD: Our answer is in the negative. The general rule is that the fact a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. A protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of ineligibility is different from that a protest based on frauds and irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one really elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal votes. Considering the fundamental difference existing between the nature of a petition for quo warranto and that of an election protest, it may be said that a candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. The Court declares that neither protestee nor protestant has been validly elected and so none is entitled to the position of mayor of Tubay, Agusan.

REGATCHO VS. CLETO G.R. NO. L-61946 DECEMBER 21, 1983 FACTS: In the election of May 17, 1982 held at Barangay Balaoen, Sual, Pangasinan, Isabelo Clemente obtained 97 votes, while Teofilo Regatcho obtained 70 votes for barangay captain. Clemente was proclaimed the winner and was scheduled to take his oath of office on June 7, 1982.Nine days after the election of Clemente, Regatcho, the defeated candidate, filed with the Municipal Circuit Court of Labrador-Sual a petition contesting the election of Clemente. Instead of pursuing that municipal court case, Regatcho filed on June 4, 1982with the CFI of Pangasinan a quo warranto action against Clemente on the ground that he does not know how to read and write, as required by Section 7 of the Barangay Election Law. On June 5, 1982, Clemente opposed the petition for quo warranto filed in theCFI. He interposed the defenses that he can read and write a little in Ilocano, that Regatcho had already filed a similar case in the Sual municipal court, and that the action has prescribed because it was filed 20 days after Clementes proclamation. Then, Clemente filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription and lack of personality to file the petition since even if Clemente were declared ineligible, Regatcho could not be proclaimed barangay captain because he did not obtain plurality of votes. The case was dismissed on the ground that Comelec has jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether the municipal trial court or the municipal circuit trial court, and not the COMELEC nor the Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction over quo warranto actions regarding the barangay captains ineligibility HELD: Yes. Jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the appropriate city or municipal or metropolitan trial court pursuant to the 1982 Barangay Election Law, Batas Pambansa Bilang 222, which provides: Sec. 20. Inclusion and exclusion cases; and protests.__...A sworn petition contesting the election of any barangay official shall be filed with the city or municipal or metropolitan trial court, as the case may be, within ten days from the date of the proclamation of the winners. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or city or metropolitan trial court may appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof to the Regional Trial Court (CFI) which shall decide within thirty days from submissions, and whose decision shall be final. That second paragraph of section 20 of the Barangay Election Law is modified reenactment of section 8 of the Revised Barangay Charter and section7 of the Barrio Autonomy Law. Although section 20 refers to election protests, it may be construed as embracing Regatchos quo warranto action which is not compliance as an ordinary quo warrranto case. In the instant case, Regatcho acted correctly in filing a case in the municipal circuit trial court of Labrador-Sual contesting Clementes election. He was mistaken in abandoning the case and refilling it in the CFI. He acted in good faith.Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. (Art. 526, Civil Code). In the interest of justice, he should be allowed to revive the said case in the municipal circuit trial court of Labrador-Sual.

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 120295 JUNE 28, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. ISSUES: 1. Whether Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon 2. Whether the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence HELD: 1. It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. "Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands." 2. Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons: First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer, just that, a second placer."

"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office." Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.

VILLAMOR VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 169865 JULY 21, 2006 FACTS: Virginio Villamor was proclaimed mayor of Carmen, Cebu on May 13, 2004 over his opponent respondent Amytis Batao. On may 17, 2004, respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner on the ground of illegal composition of the MBC, and it was raffled to the Comelec 2nd division. On May 24, 2004respondent filed anelection protest with the RTC and this petition was subsequently denied for lack of jurisdiction for it was filed one day late. Petitioner appealed the order granting respondents motion for reconsideration. Comelec en banc dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. ISSUES: 1. Whether the trial court can act on the motion for reconsideration on election protest 2. Whether the trial court prematurely admitted respondents election protest pending a preproclamation controversy HELD: 1. No. Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the trial court cannot entertain a motion for reconsideration of its decision in an election contest affecting municipal officers filed by the aggrieved party. But may appeal to the Comelec within five days after the receipt of a copy of decision. 2. No. Respondents petition to annul the proclamation is based on the ground of illegal composition of the Board and thus, it is a pre-proc controversy. It should have been filed before the proclamation of the winner. But in this case, it was filed four days after the proclamation of Villamor. The filing of the petition to annul did not suspend the period within which to file an election protest. Thus, subsequent filing of election contest amounted to abandonment of the preproc controversy filed earlier.

COMELEC VS. ESPAOL G.R. NOS. 149164-73 DECEMBER 10, 2003 FACTS: During the elections on May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista was the official candidate of the Lakas for the position of Municipal Mayor of Kawit, Cavite. He executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico Hit Poblete, among others, of violation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section261 of the Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC. The Law Department of the petitioner conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, after which it submitted its comments and recommendations to the COMELEC En Banc. On February 25, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to file necessary information against respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. In the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code (vote selling)against the witnesses of Florentino A. Bautista. The Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaint, in his capacity as a deputy of the petitioner. Thereafter, it issued a resolution finding probable cause against the respondents for violations of Section 261(a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code, and filed separate Informations against them with the RTC of Cavite. On June 23, 2000, the witnesses appealed the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor to the petitioner COMELC, contending under the Section 265 of the Code, it is the COMELEC which has the exclusive power to conduct (the) preliminary investigation thereof, and to prosecute the same. As such, it is also the COMELEC which has the exclusive power to review, motu proprio or through an appeal, the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers in the preliminary investigation. The COMELEC in a resolution, denied the appeal of the witnesses for lack of jurisdiction. But on the same day, the witnesses a motion to withdraw the Law Departments delegated authority to direct the office of the Provincial Prosecutor or to move for suspension of the prosecution of their criminal cases. Acting on the appeal, the COMELECs Law Department, recommended that the petitioner nullify the Resolution of the Office of the Cavite Provincial for the reason thatthe witnesses are exempt, under Section 28(4) of Republic Act No. 6646, from prosecution for violation of Section 261(a)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC En Banc approved the resolution. Thus, a motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner in the RTC of Cavite. The Public Prosecutor opposed the COMELECs motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a) the exemption under the last paragraph of Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6646 applies only to the offense of vote-buying, this exemption will not apply to the charge for vote-selling which was the crime charged (b) the resolution of the petitioner denying the appeal of Bautistas witnesses had become final and executory; hence, it is no longer subject to review by the petitioner; and (c) the review of the Provincial Prosecutors resolution made by the petitioner was a re-investigation of the case, and was done without prior authority of the Court. The trial court denied the motion of the petitioner COMELEC, holding that the petitioner had no absolute power to grant exemptions under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648. The trial court also held that the issue of whether or not the accused are exempt from prosecution and consequent conviction for vote-buying is a matter addressed to the Court and not to the petitioner. ISSUES: 1. Whether there is still a need to revoke the authority of the provincial prosecutor from handling the cases even if COMELEC had already directed the law department to file a motion to dismiss these cases 2. Whether the accused are exempt from criminal prosecution HELD: 1. No. The prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are subject to its authority, control and supervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such

deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the petitioner itself. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the petitioner, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the petitioner. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the petitioner, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the petitioner in relation to election cases such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute. Otherwise, the only option of such provincial or city prosecutor is to seek relief from the petitioner as its deputy. The withdrawal by the petitioner of its deputation of the provincial or city prosecutors may not be interfered with or overruled by the trial court. The conduct of a preliminary investigation of election offenses for the purpose of determining whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, should be subjected to trial is the function of the petitioner. The Court will not even interfere with the finding of the petitioner absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. Neither should the respondent. This principle emanates from the COMELECs exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same except as may otherwise be provided by law. 2. Yes. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner is mandated to conduct a preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. The general rule is that the petitioner must investigate, charge and prosecute all those committing election offenses without any discrimination to ensure a clean, orderly and speedy elections. A joint preliminary investigation thereof must be conducted and the appropriate Information filed in court against all the offenders. To enable the petitioner to comply with its mandate to investigate and prosecute those committing election offenses, it has been vested with authority under the last paragraph of Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 to exempt those who have committed election offenses under Section 261 (a) and (b) but volunteer to give informations and testify on any violation of said law in any official investigation or proceeding with reference to which his information and testimony is given. The law is an immunity statute which grants transactional immunity to volunteers from investigation and prosecution for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate demands of government to encourage citizens, including law violators themselves, to testify against law violators. The statute operates as a complete pardon for the offenses to which the information was given. The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner. This power is concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may this Court interfere with the petitioners exercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the law, unless the petitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V REYES G.R. NO. 115022 AUGUST 14, 1995 FACTS: Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection District II Bureau of Customs , Manila International Container Port, assigned Jovencio D. Ebio, customs operation chief, as special assistant on January 14, 1992.Jovencio D. Ebio filed with the COMELEC a complaint protesting his transfer. He claimed that this transfer violated COMELEC resolution No. 2333 and section 261(h) of B.P. Blg. 881, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections. Respondent Maniego was charged with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.However, Respondent Maniego claimed that he has not done any offense because the above transfer was not within the date the act is punishable by election offense. The trial court granted respondent Maniego motion to quash on September 23,1993 and January 25, 1995. ISSUE: Whether this transfer ipso facto makes respondent Maniego liable for an election offense under Section 261(h) of B.P. Blg. 881 HELD: No. The resolution was effective on the seventh day after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Resolution No.2333 took effect on January 15, 1992, a day after the said transfer was done, thus, it cannot be said that Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 was already enforceable.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO G.R. NO. 149036 APRIL 2, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as Acting Director IV of the COMELECs Education and Information Department. Her appointment was renewed twice still in a temporary capacity. President GMA appointed, ad interim, respondent Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commisioners. They took their oath of office but COA did not confirm their appointments. The President then renewed their appointment but Congress adjourned before COA could act on their appointment so for the 3rd time, the President renewed their appointment. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a memorandum addressed to petitioner reassigning her to the LawDepartment. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her reassignment stating that under memorandum no. 7 transfer of employees are prohibited during election period but was denied by Benipayo stating COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 which says he can transfer or reassign personnel when necessary. She filed instant petition claiming that ad interim appointments of respondents violated the Constitutional provisions on the prohibition on temporary appointments and reappointments of its members. ISSUE: Whether the ad interim appointment of the commissioners constitute a temporary/acting appointment prohibited by the Constitution, if not, whether the subsequent appointments are void for violating the constitutional provisions against reappointments in the COMELEC HELD: Petition DISMISSED, the ad interim appointments are not temporary appointments. No. They are not reappointments. The first appointments are ad interim appointments and are of a permanent capacity despite not being acted upon by the commission on appointments. These are not appointments in a temporary/acting capacity, which are prohibited by the constitution. Moreover, the conflict arises in this interpretation because the succeeding appointments are also ad interim appointments and are of permanent nature. Such action would go against the prohibition on reappointments. The court held that there is a distinction between a permanent appointment confirmed by the COA and a permanent appointment that has not been confirmed. The court looked into the intent of the constitutional commission and found that the purpose of the prohibition was merely to ensure that the COMELEC commissioners do not serve beyond seven years and thus the subsequent reappointments do not go beyond the prohibition, as it does not extend their terms. In sum, the prohibition on reappointments applies only to those who have been confirmed by the COA.

HERRERA VS. CA G.R. NO. 140651 FEBRUARY 19, 2002 FACTS: During the May 11, 1992 elections, the polling places of Mocag and Mabini were located at Mocag Elementary School which had no electric power supply. Due to the circumstances, the parishioners of Baggao, Cagayan had formed the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) to observe and monitor the conduct of elections. On May 12, 1992, Arnold Alonzo, coordinator of PPCRV was informed that the ballot boxes of precinct nos. 35, 37, 37-A, 38, 38-A, 39 and 51 were not yet submitted to the office of the Municipal Treasurer. Also, that the spouses Bernardino and Flordelita Daquioag and Estelita Herrera were the poll chairmen of precincts 38, 39and 51 respectively. The PPCRV went to the houses of the Daquioags and Herrera, and they saw the missing ballot boxes. Both the spouses Daquioags and Herrera alleged that they brought the boxes home since it was already late and they didnt know that they needed permission from the Comelec registrar before they could do so. They charged for violations of Secs. 217, 261 (z) nos. 13,15,21 of the Omnibus Election Code. And all of them were subsequently convicted of the said offenses. Their petitions for reconsiderations were denied. Only Herrera interposed the instant petition for review on certiorari. She alleged that the information is not valid and sufficient for it charges multiple offenses. ISSUE: 1. Whether the information is valid and sufficient 2. Whether the petitioner was properly convicted of the offense of which she was charged HELD: 1. Yes. The Information is valid and sufficient. Although the law provides that the information should charge only one offense and in this case, she was charged with several offenses, it is still considered valid. The remedy of the petitioner would have been to move to quash the information but due to failure to assert this before she pleaded in the information is deemed a waiver. 2. Yes. She was charged with violating sec 217 of the Omnibus Election Code, and it provides that offense is failure by the members of the BEI and watchers to immediately deliver the ballot box, supplies and all pertinent papers and documents to the city or municipal treasurer. And Herrera was charged with transferring the ballot boxes, tally sheets and other paraphernalia from the polling place to her residence. It is clear that she failed to deliver the ballot box to the treasurer on time and that transfer was made without authorization from the Comelec. Therefore, She was properly convicted of the offense of which she was charged.

KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 128054 OCTOBER 16, 1997 FACTS: On December 14, 1993, public respondent Commission on Elections(Comelec) received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of two serious violations of election laws and requesting that these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly. Petitioner, in its letter-complaint alleged that in the October 5, 1993 hearing of the Commission of Appointments, Budget Secretary Salvador Enriquez admitted P70million was released by his department in favour of a private entity, the so-called "Philippine Youth, Health and Sports Development Foundation," headed by Mr. Ronaldo Puno, who had been repeatedly identified by columnist Teodoro Benigno as a key member of the Sulu Hotel Operation (SHO), which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections. Petitioner also alleged that Malacanang illegally diverted P330 from the Countryside Development Fund to the Department of Interior and Local Government which disbursed this huge amount shortly before the May 11, 1992 elections, as revealed by DILG Budget Officer Barata, in a hearing of the Senate Finance Committee held on November 22, 1993.In support of the letter-complaint, documentary evidences like copies of Teodoro Benigno's newspaper articles on the SHO's use of PYHSDFI-obtained CDF, respondent Enriquez's testimony before the Commission on Appointments, DILG Budget Officer Barata's testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, and Norberto Gonzales' affidavit, were submitted by petitioner. The Comelec En Banc promulgated a resolution dismissing the charges against the respondents all on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. The COMELEC En Banc unanimously held that newspaper clippings are hearsay and of no evidentiary value, and that no other evidence except Mr. Benigno's articles were submitted to prove the existence of the so-called Sulo Hotel Operations. Moreover, petitioners contentions as to the nature and amount of expenditure within a short period of time are not sufficient to meet the quantum proof required to establish that said contributions were made for partisan political activity. Hence, Kilosbayan filed a petition to the Supreme Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC for refusing and/or neglecting to gather more evidence of respondents' culpability, pursuant to its constitutional duty to prosecute election offenses. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove a complaint HELD: No. The contention of petitioner Kilosbayan that it is the Comelec that is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove its letter-complaint is downright erroneous. The task of the Comelec as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant. If the complainant fails to proffer the necessary evidence to show probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of denial or any evidence in controversion, of the accusation, the complaint must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is presumed innocent and does not at all have to make a response or reaction to the charges against him. The Comelec, in acting upon an election offense complaint in the course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates the confrontation process between the complainant and the respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing, their respective evidences. Ultimately, the Comelec passes upon the contending parties' respective submission and proofs and weighs the fact and circumstances established therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner Kilosbayan, the preliminary investigation is not an occasion for the Comelec to, as a duty, spoon feed the complainant with evidence needed to prove its case.

BAYTAN VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 153945 FEBRUARY 4, 2003 FACTS: On June 15, 1997, Reynato, Reynaldo and Adrian Baytan decided to register for the May 1998 elections. They met Brgy. Capt. Roberto Ignacio on their way and helped them to register in Precinct no. 83A of Brgy. 18 Cavite City. This registration was evidenced by Voters Registration Record Nos. 41762473, 41762472 and 41762470.After they registered, they realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Brgy 28. Then they proceeded to precinct 129-A of Brgy. 28 to register as evidenced by Voter's Registration Record Nos. 42662969, 42662968 and 42662917. On August21, 1997, petitioners sent a letter to the COMELEC, requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration and also stated the reason for their second registration. On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners voters registration records to Provincial Election Supervisor, Juanito Ravanzo, who endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department, endorsed the case to the Provincial Election Supervisor for resolution. On January 10-1998, Ravanzo recommended filing information for double registration against the petitioners. The Comelec affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration which the Comelec en banc denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether honest mistake and good faith be taken into consideration in double registration 2. Whether Comelec en banc committed grave abuse when they took cognizance of the case in the first instance HELD: 1. No. Double registration is malum prohibitum. The claim of lack of intent and goodfaith cannot be considered. In fact, it shown that in the first registration, their address is 709 T. Gomez Extension st. Brgy 18-Maya, Cavite City. While in the second registration, they registered as residents of 709 Magcawas st. Brgy. 28-Taurus, Cavite City. There are inconsistencies between the two registrations. The letter that was sent to Comelec asking for advice on how to cancel their second registration would not be enough to show that there is good faith. The letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City has already reported their act of double registration to a higher official. 2. No. under the constitution, the Comelec has administrative powers which may be exercised en banc or in two divisions. Therefore, the Comelec en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.

COMELEC V. ESPAOL G.R. NOS. 149164-73 DECEMBER 10, 2003 FACTS: Bautista executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the Poblete, et.al. of vote buying and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC which recommended that the resolution of the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be nullified because the accused are exempt. ISSUE: Whether the accused are exempt from criminal prosecution HELD: The Court sustained the authority of the COMELEC to exempt from prosecution persons charged with vote-buying, vote-selling, and conspiracy to bribe voters who volunteer to give information and testify on any information under Section 28 of R.A. No. 6648.The immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate demands of government to encourage citizens, including law violators themselves, to testify against law violators. The statute operates as a complete pardon for the offenses to which the information was given.

BAYTAN VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 153945 FEBRUARY 4, 2003 FACTS: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation, who, subsequently, recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzos resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration HELD: No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. This letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official. Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation. The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.