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  • MMT2

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    Miguel Prado
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    The author is skeptical of Laruelle's concept of determination-in-the-last-instance and believes it amounts to a kind of Fichtean materialism where the individual human being is seen as the ultimately determining cause. However, the author argues this view dismisses important factors like history, society, and ideology as having no determining force. It also risks absolutizing the individual human subject and relegating everything else to a causally inert status. The author favors understanding reality as complexly stratified with different causal mechanisms operating at different levels, rather than there being a single ultimately determining instance.

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    The author is skeptical of Laruelle's concept of determination-in-the-last-instance and believes it amounts to a kind of Fichtean materialism where the individual human being is seen as the ultimately determining cause. However, the author argues this view dismisses important factors like history, society, and ideology as having no determining force. It also risks absolutizing the individual human subject and relegating everything else to a causally inert status. The author favors understanding reality as complexly stratified with different causal mechanisms operating at different levels, rather than there being a single ultimately determining instance.

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    435 views1 page

    MMT2

    Uploaded by

    Miguel Prado
    The author is skeptical of Laruelle's concept of determination-in-the-last-instance and believes it amounts to a kind of Fichtean materialism where the individual human being is seen as the ultimately determining cause. However, the author argues this view dismisses important factors like history, society, and ideology as having no determining force. It also risks absolutizing the individual human subject and relegating everything else to a causally inert status. The author favors understanding reality as complexly stratified with different causal mechanisms operating at different levels, rather than there being a single ultimately determining instance.

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    Myimpressionisthatoneofthemostusefultools thatyougetfromLaruelleishisuseof determinationinthelastinstance. Couldyoupleasetellmewhy? IthinktheconceptcandosomeusefulworkbutnotintheforminwhichLaruellehimselfpresents it.I'mbasicallyscepticaloftheallegednonphilosophicalnoveltyofLaruelle'sconceptof determinationinthelastinstance:IfearitboilsdowntoakindofFichteanmaterialismofpractice (orwhatIainGranthascalled"practicism")insofarasthelastinstanceisidentifiedwiththe individualhumanbeinganddeterminationisidentifiedwithhis/herpracticeeventhoughLaruelle hasinmindaveryspecificconceptofpracticethatoftheory.LaruelleconvertsAlthusser's conceptionofphilosophyas"theoreticalpractice"intotheideaofnonphilosophyasa"practiceof (philosophical)theory".WhileIfavouranonteleologicalalignmentoftheorywithpractice,my problemiswithLaruelle'scontentionthatitistheindividualhumanbeingthatistherealofthe"last instance".

    If"I"amtherealofthelastinstance,thenIamtheultimatelydeterminingcause:history, society,culture,ideology,politics,economics,biology,neurology,canbesummarilydismissed (alongwithphilosophy)asredundantabstractionswithnosalientdeterminingforce.Thiseasily degeneratesintoakindoftranscendentalindividualism,wheretheindividualhumansubjectis absolutized(notwithstandingLaruelle'sownprotestsagainstphilosophicalabsolutism).Italso impliesakindofpunitivenominalism,wereeverythingbutthehumanindividualisrelegatedtothe statusofcausallyinertmetaphysicalabstraction.Ultimately,I'mafraidthisnonphilosophical protestagainstthesupposedabsolutismandtotalitarianismofphilosophicaluniversalismendsup beingboththeoreticallyandpracticallyi.e.politicallydebilitating.Ithinkvenerablequestions suchas"Whatisreal?","Whatiscausality?","Whatisdetermination?",arestillunresolvedand urgenttopicsofphilosophicalconcern,whichitwouldbeshortsightedtodismissasantiquated metaphysicalhangups:theypointtotheneedtounderstandthecomplexstratificationofrealityand thedifferentsortsofcausallydeterminingmechanismoperativeatdistinctlevels.Allthistosaythat Idon'tthinkthereisanultimatelydetermininginstanceinLaruelle'ssense;whichstillseemstome tobethatofanupdatedversionoffreehumanagencyoractivitythisisofcoursethecoreof Fichteanism.Ifthereanultimatelydetermininginstance,itcannotbeidentifiedwiththefree activityofthehumansubject.Thisisnottosaythatactivity,whetherpractical,theoreticalorsome fusionofboth,cannotserveasamediumforsomeotherdetermining,materialagency,butthelatter invariablyoperatesbehindthebackofthehumansubjectwhichispreciselywhatLaruelle denouncesandwishestorectifywithhisconceptofmanaslastinstance.Ifavouraconceptionof thesubjectasorganonorautomaton,butonewhoseheteronomyi.e.allocentricdetermination actuallyconstitutesakindofautonomy:thesortsofrulegovernedbehaviourexemplifiedby subjectsengagedindeductiveactivityexemplifyakindof"heterautonomy"wheretheonlyfreedom availableismeasuredbythepotentialfailuretodowhatoneisrationallyobligatedto.Thisisvery Kantianofcourse,butit'saKantianrationalismfreedfromtheencroachmentsofmorality.

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