GOH KENG SWEE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

43rd COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE

CWS Individual Essay Assignment

Submitted by: <<43037>>

23 pages, including cover page 3835 words (excluding footnotes, endnotes, bibliography)

Markers Report
General Impression:
_________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________

Detailed Comments:
_________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________

Grade Awarded: Grade

Assignment Submission Declaration

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Name: Matriculation No: Title: Course and Code: Lecturer/Tutor: Submission Date: 43037 Individual Essay Assignment CWS Assoc. Prof. Bernard Loo, Dr. Ong Wei Chong 02 July 2012

Keep a Copy of the Assignment

Please make a copy of your work. If you have submitted your assignment electronically also make a backup copy.

Plagiarism and Collusion

Plagiarism: to use or pass off as ones own, the writings or ideas of another without acknowledging or crediting the source from which the ideas are taken. Collusion: submitting an assignment, project or report completed by another person and passing it off as ones own (as defined in the NTU Honour Code. See www.ntu.edu.sg/sao/home for the University Honour Code and Pledge).

Penalties for Plagiarism and Collusion

The penalties associated with plagiarism exist to reward good academic conduct; those who cheat will be severely punished to reflect the seriousness with which NTU views cheating, and its commitment to academic integrity. Penalties may include: the requirement to revise and resubmit an assignment, receiving a lower grade, or receiving an F grade for the assignment.

Declaration
I declare that this assignment is my own work, unless otherwise referenced, as defined by the NTU policy on plagiarism. I have read the NTU Honour Code and Pledge. http://www.ntu.edu.sg/home/yclai/ Signed. Date .

The Wehrmacht was excellent in the waging of battles and campaigns and still lost the strategic contest in World War Two. Critically examine the plausible reasons for this strategy/tactics dichotomy.

In the realm of strategy, the German armed forces, which in two world wars, were very good at fighting but were heroically incapable of waging war successfully. - Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (1999)

INTRODUCTION

With the benefit of hindsight, it is perhaps easy to criticise the failings of wartime Germanys armed forces, the Wehrmacht, consisting of the land force component the Heer, the naval forces, the Kriegsmarine, and the air force, the Luftwaffe. After all, along with fellow Axis Powers, it did indeed end up losing the strategic contest in World War II, succumbing ultimately in a conflict of attrition to the Allies (Newland & Chun, 2011, p. 153).

However, in order to do justice to the examination of the dichotomy between its stunning tactical victories early on in the war and the final strategic collapse of Nazi Germany with the fall of Berlin, it must be recognised that the Wehrmacht was both tactically and strategically successful in the initial phases of World War II, conquering most of western Europe in a matter of weeks by out-manoeuvring its enemies tactically while ensuring that its Eastern flank is secure through the conquest of Poland in a strategic partnership with Russia (Black, 2003).

This paper will attempt to analyse the possible explanations to the stark contrast between the Wehrmachts early successes and its eventual strategic failure by firstly providing clarity on the definitions of strategy and tactics as well as the relationship between the two before illustrating this strategy/tactics dichotomy through a timeline of the Wehrmachts battles, chronicling how some of the major operations undertaken in the eastern and western fronts supported the achievement of Hitlers policy and strategic aims.

It will subsequently investigate the issue at hand using the analysis framework suggested by Colin Gray by examining some of the dimensions of strategy (Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999). By providing justifications using historical examples, the paper will propose that some of the reasons for this dichotomy were the false assumptions of people and their national will, the lack of adequate preparation for war in terms of logistics and intelligence, and the failure of command as well as the inability to manage friction, uncertainty, and chance during the war proper.

Finally, this paper will conclude by restating the suggested reasons to explain the said dichotomy that led to the ultimate demise and capitulation of the Wehrmacht and Nazi Germany.

DEFINITIONS

Before delving into the systematic analysis of the topic proper, it is useful to provide clear definitions to the terms strategy and tactics used in the context of the question posed.

In his thesis On War, Clausewitz described three levels in the structure of war, with each successive dimension taking on an ever broader scope: from tactics, used by units in positions to attain victory, to strategy, employed by armies during campaigns to achieve campaign goals and finally to war plans, implemented by nations to fulfil policy aims (Smith H. , 2004).

Similarly, in modern terms, there exist different realms of conflict within the hierarchy of military art; comprising of grand strategy being of the top order, followed by military strategy, operational art and lastly, tactics, with each preceding level setting the aims and objectives of the following (Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999, p. 21).

Grand Strategy is defined as the adaptation of domestic and international resources to achieve security for a state (Rosecrance & Stein, Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy, 1993). As suggested by Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, its role, representing more than just military leadership in war or deterrence in peace, is to coordinate and direct all resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political objectives of the war the goal defined by fundamental policy (Hart, 1967, pp. 335-336). In this context, the military is but one of the resources, or national powers, at the disposal of a nation to achieve its grand strategy (or policy) aims, with others such as economic, geographic, political and national will (Antal, 1992).

At the immediate subordinate level, Military Strategy is defined as the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or an alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force (US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM)100-5, Operations, 1986, p. 9).

Therefore, there is a need to emphasize the distinction between grand strategy and military strategy, for it is only too easy to place all the blame for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on Hitlers flawed national policies and political leadership without examining the strategic fallacies of the armed forces itself; although it can be argued that the Fhrer, as the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht and chancellor or political head of state (Bullock, 1962, p. 309), was so intertwined in his political and military roles that with the agreement of his generals (Roberts, 2012), did much to contribute to military strategy planning as well as direct its execution during the course of the war and that many of the Wehrmachts missteps can be traced back to national policy failures that it was trying to implement.

Hence, for the purpose of bringing focus to this essay, discussions on strategy will be confined to the military strategy definition more relevant to the level of where the Wehrmacht operates (as one of the national powers of Nazi Germany) while any references to grand strategy of the Nazi regime as a whole will be termed as its policies. However, with wartime Germanys situation as a martial state in general and Hitlers dominance in all aspects of policy and strategy formulation in particular (Newland & Chun, 2011, p. 428), there was bound to be instances of overlap or even reversals where policies were implemented to achieve military strategic goals.

Within this level of strategy, there exist several dimensions that affect its workings and applications. Gray has proposed three categories within his seventeen dimensions 1 with

Specifically, the seventeen are: People, Society, Culture, Politics, Ethics, Economics/Logistics, Organization, Military Administration, Information and Intelligence, Strategic Theory and Doctrine, Technology, Military Operations, Command, Geography, Friction, Chance and Uncertainty, Adversary and Time.

which this essay will utilise in its analysis of the question posed: People and Politics, Preparation for War and War Proper.

Finally, Tactics, at the lowest rung in the hierarchy of the structure of war, can be defined as the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements (US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM)100-5, Operations, 1986, p. 41) while William Lind suggests another definition to be the process of combining two elements, techniques and education, through the search for enemy surfaces and gaps, and the focus of our own main effort with the object of producing a unique approach for the specific enemy, time, and place (Lind, 1981).

As described above, tactics is very much concerned with defeating the enemy and achieving victory on the battlefield using techniques of firepower and movement (Antal, 1992) in order to fulfil the operational objectives in a campaign.

CHRONOLOGY

By exploring the chronology of the Wehrmachts major operations in World War II, from its birth in 1935 as the successor the Reichswehr until its abolition in 1945 following defeat in the war (Bartov, 1992), one can then juxtapose its initial successes with the subsequent failures, both tactical and strategic, in order to pin down the possible rationales for this apparent strategy/tactics disparity.

In the prelude to the war, the Wehrmacht was allowed to build up its military strength as well as establish an air force through diplomacy and coercion, all the time avoiding repercussions

of blatantly contravening the Treaty of Versailles (Blair & Curtis, Great Powers to Superpowers, 2009, p. 36), signed in the aftermath of World War I to keep its numbers to a maximum of one hundred thousand men in the Heer and an additional fifteen thousand in the Kriegsmarine (Treaty of Versailles, 1919).

Along with the increase in manpower, rearmament of the Wehrmacht allowed Germany to address its economic concerns via the rise in production output and decrease in unemployment, which in turn permitted Hitler to consolidate his political power base, allowing him to accomplish his wider agenda in the following years (Blair & Curtis, Great Powers to Superpowers, 2009, p. 36).

Subsequently, using that same military strength as a direct threat to firstly annex Austria in the Anschluss of 1938 and then conquer Czechoslovakia in 1939, the Wehrmacht succeeded in achieving some aspects of Hitlers ulterior motive of Pan-Germanism, his political idea hidden behind the justification of supporting self-determination for the ethnic Germans in Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia (Castano, 1997) as well as securing his southern flank against any enemy attack.

All this time, the British and French governments practiced an appeasement policy, hoping that Hitler will be satiated with Germanys ever-increasing territorial conquests (Rosecrance & Steiner, British Grand Strategy and the Origins of World War II, 1993), allowing the Wehrmacht to continue with its war preparations uninterrupted.

Then, the opening stages of World War II unfolded with the carving up of Poland in September 1939 by the Wehrmacht from the West and the Red Army from the East. Forming

a strategic alliance with Russia, Hitlers diplomatic masterstroke in signing a non-aggression pact with the supposed Bolshevik enemy of his regime secured the eastern flank for the German army. With both the east and the south now protected, the Wehrmacht was able to concentrate on the next phase of the war, the western front (Castano, 1997, p. 1).

In the summer of 1940, waging its own brand of manoeuvre warfare, the Blitzkrieg or lightning war, the Wehrmacht forced the capitulation of Norway and Denmark in April (Amundsen, 2005) followed by France and the Low Countries (Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) in May. In a matter of weeks it had pushed Britain off continental Europe and to the brink of defeat (Foley, 2011), with only the miraculous evacuations at Dunkirk preventing the bulk of the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) from total annihilation (Anderson, 2011).

The Wehrmachts brilliance at the tactical level through the attainment of victory on the battlefield was achieved by integrating air power with combined armoured-infantry thrusts deep into its enemies. In the epitome of this lightning war, it out-manoeuvred the joint AngloFrench defences, bypassing the supposedly impregnable Maginot Line through the Ardennes forest in Belgium (Mirzoeff, 1976), effectively isolating the Allies forces in a pocket to the north of France.

With only Britain in the way of Hitlers dominance in Western Europe, the Wehrmacht set about strategically isolating British Isles by cutting off its sea lines-of-communication from the United States (US) and its colonies. From 1939 to the end of the war, the Battle of the Atlantic was fought by the Kriegsmarine to deliver upon the strategic intent of strangling the

10

British into submission through the use the U-boat wolf-pack tactics to target merchant shipping coming across the Atlantic in a naval blockade (Jones, 1996, p. 41).

In conjunction with the naval effort, the air campaign was contested by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Luftwaffe for air supremacy over Britain. The Battle of Britain began on August 13th, 1940 with the aim of bombing Britain into suing for peace by targeting its civilian population centres and industrial heartland (Richard, 2011) as part of Hitlers strategy secure the western front so that he can direct all military efforts towards the east and its erstwhile ally: Russia.

However, before Operation Barbarossa, the campaign against the Red Army on the eastern front, could begin in earnest, the Wehrmacht had to divert its attention to rescuing its Italian allies from defeat in Greece. Invasion of Greece and the Balkans commenced in April, 1941 before German forces advanced eastwards towards Moscow in June (Robinson, 2011).

This was in line with Hitlers policy of the conquest of agricultural land and living space, or lebensraum, to relocate ethnic Germans to create a German-dominated Europe (Castano, 1997, p. 2). Operation Barbarossa also marked the turning point of the war for the Wehrmacht; for, despite initial successes in its drive towards the Russian interior, the advance was bogged down by logistical issues and the Russian winter. From 1942 onwards, after the Battle of Stalingrad which was to be Germanys final offensive action on the eastern front, the Wehrmacht would be fighting mostly on the defensive for the rest of the war (Rees, 2011).

The D-Day landings in Normandy on Jun 6th, 1944 (Robinson, 2011) effectively signalled end of the Wehrmacht, with Allied forces pushing westwards from the Contentin peninsular

11

and the Russians advancing from the east in Operation Bagration. In spite of the Wehrmacht launching its last major offensive of the war, the Battle of the Bulge, Berlin fell and Nazi Germany surrendered unconditionally on May 8th, 1945, bringing an end to World War II in the European theatre of operations (Sheffield, 2011).

TACTICAL SUCCESS

This section will seek to explain the possible reasons for the Wehrmachts initial tactical, and to a lesser degree, operational victories and argue in the subsequent segment that based on historical evidence, tactical triumphs may not eventually translate into strategic success (Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999, p. 22).

The first plausible explanation may be an inadvertent effect of the Versailles Treaty limitations resulting in the Wehrmacht being forced to select only the best candidates for its forces (Smith M. J., 1942). What was intended to ensure that Germany would never again have an armed force capable to waging another conflict on the scale of World War I, had the exact opposite effect.

The treaty ensured that the Wehrmacht only accepted high calibre recruits with the most suitable qualities. Accompanied by Hitlers diplomatic efforts in delaying the onset of war, the Wehrmacht was given sufficient time to expand and rearm so that by the time of the outbreak of hostilities, it was already a highly motivated and well-equipped conscript army led by a skilfully trained and experienced core of professional soldiers (Mitcham, 2008).

12

Another major reason for the tactical superiority over its enemies is the employment of Blitzkrieg manoeuvres, emphasizing on speed, flexibility and initiative, despite being outnumbered in terms of equipment during the offensive in France in 1940 (Bartov, 1992). The enabler of these actions was the practice of Auftragstaktik or tactics-based orders (McAndrew, 1996) espoused by Moltke the Elder; arguably the father of the modern General Staff system through his reforms in his time as its chief-of-staff of the Wehrmachts predecessor: the Prussian Army (Grossman, 2007, pp. 219-220). As the inheritors of a proud Prussian military legacy, this progeny that is the Wehrmacht would have had a solid tactical and operational foundation to wage such manoeuvre warfare.

Therefore, coupled with well led and highly motivated troops (Frster, 2003), the Wehrmacht was able to score spectacular victories against its opponents, especially against the static French forces along the Maginot Line by outflanking them via Belgium.

On the naval warfront, the Kriegsmarines wolf-pack raiding tactics to blockade British seaborne trade (Lim, 2003) in the Battle of the Atlantic was also increasingly successful in the 18 months of the operation, with German U-boats able to sink more ships that the Allied shipyards could build (Jones, 1996, p. 43).

However, as the battle progressed, especially with the entry to the US into the war, German tactics could not answer to the change in Allied tactics. The increasing use of protected convoys instead of unconvoyed shipping made it more difficult for the U-boats to attack them. Furthermore, in terms of production capacities of both ships and the cargo they were carrying, the US were much better at replacing the losses than the Germans were at sinking them (Jones, 1996, p. 44). Therefore, by the end of the war, the strategy of cutting Britains sea

13

lines-of-communication ended in failure because of a combination of German tactical inadaptability and US economic superiority.

STRATEGIC FALLACIES

Having studied some of the tactical and operational efforts to support the strategic goals of the regime, this section will focus on using the dimensions of strategy as proposed by Gray (Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999) to explain the strategic failures that occurred in spite of the successes at lower echelons.

POLITICS AND PEOPLE

The first reason put forth would be the lack of understanding of the people dimension of strategy. The Luftwaffes strategic bombing campaign in the Battle of Britain was premised on eroding the national will of its people by targeting population and industrial centres instead of destroying military installations, thereby forcing Churchill to sue for peace. While the bombings did indeed achieve its tactical aims of destroying large parts of London and other British cities, the strategic effect did not materialise as Britain fought on through the war and its people endured under the bombardment (Richard, 2011). If the Luftwaffe had been used to prepare for a possible land invasion of the British Isles instead, Hitlers aim of securing the western flank might have just panned out much more differently.

Similarly, during the Russian campaign, the Wehrmachts assumption that they would be welcomed as liberators and assisted by the oppressed Soviet population under the tyranny of Stalins regime did not understand that the concept of Total War practiced by the Wehrmacht,

14

characterised by the bombing of Soviet cities and the loss of thousands of civilian lives (Heuser, 2010, p. 194), served only to alienate them more from the Russian people even as they were initially successful in advancing towards Moscow. From the ethics dimension of strategy, the Wehrmacht was heavily influenced by Nazi ideology, which regarded the Slavs as sub-humans and racially inferior to the Aryan master-race. In this sense, it was found to be morally bankrupt during the campaign as well as in other theatre of operations (Farrell, 2010).

For example, OKW dictated that any abuse committed by the soldiers to Russian peasants would not be considered a violation of military law but instead be handled at the discretion of their commanders. Faced with the atrocities committed by the German soldiers, the peasants chose Stalin over Hitler and their resistance against the invaders never did dissolve. Furthermore, due to the logistic shortfall caused by poor planning (to be elaborated subsequently), the Germans had to appropriate supplies from Russian and Ukrainian civilians, which only served to damage relations even further (Castano, 1997, p. 25).

In the analysis of the social realm, Hitler had managed to achieve initial success to galvanize the entire German nation into supporting his national policies. Exacerbated by the economic hardships suffered as a result of the harsh post war settlements and reparations imposed under the Versailles Treaty, Germany as a country perceived that the punishment was extreme and unfair. The Fhrer was able to harness this resentment for the victors of the previous war and effectively mould German society to become a well-oiled, aggressive war machine. However, as the war dragged on, manpower resources dwindled and ever-younger male citizens were drafted as replacements for those that perished in the Russian winter wastelands, resulting in the war fatigue of the entire German society and the failure of his policy and strategic aims on the home front.

15

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The second possible rationale was the inadequate preparation of war. Whereas Hitler succeeded to provide sufficient supplies to the Wehrmacht to prosecute the war prior to the invasion of Poland and France, he and the OKW were over-confident in their assessments of the length of the Russian campaign, predicting it to conclude well before the onset of winter (Belyakov, 2001, p. 46). Hence, in terms of logistics, the invading troops were not issued with winter gear nor were the vehicles supplied with the suitable type of fuel (Castano, 1997, p. 27). Therefore, as the Germans rolled back the Soviet defences in the opening stages of Barbarossa in the fashion similar to France in 1940, the Russians practiced a scorched-earth policy to deny them the supplies needed to keep the momentum going. With the lack of proper winter equipment and dwindling supplies, especially oil for the tanks (Wong, 2010), by the time winter arrived, the initial advance had ground to a halt.

Intelligence gathering by the Abwehr, the Wehrmachts military intelligence organization, in the lead-up to Barbarossa also proved to be grossly inadequate. Information collected on enemy strength left out entire infantry and armoured divisions and the Soviet Union was the only nation where they were unsuccessful in establishing operatives to undermine the country from within (Belyakov, 2001, p. 48).

WAR PROPER

In the dimension of the war proper, another proposed explanation may be the inability to manage Clausewitzs Friction, Uncertainty and Chance. A case in point can be found in the aftermath of the fall of France where the strategy employed did not provide for further

16

exploitation of tactical success, and was therefore, flawed. Months of indecision and inaction by Hitler and Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) after Dunkirk that led to a missed opportunity to secure the western flank and eliminate the remaining Allied threat, allowing the British army some respite from their reverses in France and Norway (Cooley Jr, 2004, p. 5).

With no provisions for the faster-than-expected collapse of the Anglo-French defences in 1940, the Wehrmacht chose not to annihilate the BEF at Dunkirk and allowed it to preserve the majority of its remaining forces to fight subsequently. This failure to manage friction, handle uncertainty as well as seize the initiative when given the chance, in terms of Grays dimension of strategy (Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999, p. 41), would come back and haunt Hitler later during the Normandy campaign.

Ultimately, command failures on the part of the OKW in general, and Hitler in particular, would seem to be the main reason for the strategic failure of the Wehrmacht. For instance, his decision to open another front to the conflict in the form of Operation Barbarossa without first concluding the campaign in the west eventually over-extended the military resources available to him by the time of the D-Day landings (Robinson, 2011) and the Red Armys push westwards in Operation Bagration in 1944 (Jordon, 2006). This strategic blunder doomed the Wehrmacht to fight a two-front war it could never hope to win. Also, his indecision in directing the main effort of the advance towards either Moscow or Leningrad in the midst Barbarossa left the German army stuck in the mud without achieving its strategic aim of destroying the Russian field army (Castano, 1997, p. 27).

17

CONCLUSION

In summary, the paper has provided an analysis of the essay topic through definitions and historic examples to propose three main explanations to the strategy/tactics dichotomy: (1) the flawed assumptions of people and their national will, (2) the lack of adequate preparation for war in terms of logistics and intelligence, and lastly (3) the failure of command as well as the inability to manage friction, uncertainty, and chance during the war proper.

Finally, this paper will conclude by reiterating that war is an extreme but natural extension of national policies and that military strategy only serves to fulfil political aims (Paret, Craig, & Gilbert, 1986). As with Clausewitzs expression goes: War is a continuation of policy by other means.

18

BIBLIOGRAHY 1. Treaty of Versailles. (1919, June 28). Retrieved July 01, 2012, from Australian Treaty Series: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/1.html 2. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM)100-5, Operations. (1986). Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office. 3. Amundsen, S. (2005, March 18). Strategic Decisions and Implications of the German Assault on Norway in 1940. Pennsylvannia: United States Army War College. 4. Anderson, D. (2011, February 17). Spinning Dunkirk. Retrieved July 01, 2012, from British Broadcasting Corporation History:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/dunkirk_spinning_01.shtml 5. Antal, J. F. (1992). Maneuvre versus Attrition: A Historical Perspective. Military Review, 72 (10), 21-33. 6. 7. Bartov, O. (1992). The Myths of the Wehrmacht. History Today, 42 (30). Belyakov, V. (2001). Operation Barbarossa: Stalin Double-Crossed. World War II, supplementary, 60th Anniversary Commemorative, 42-48. 8. 9. Black, J. (2003). World War II - A Military History. New York: Routledge. Blair, A., & Curtis, S. (2009). Great Powers to Superpowers. In A. Blair, & S. Curtis, International Politics: An Introductory Guide (pp. 27-47). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 10. Blair, A., & Curtis, S. (2009). Great Powers to Superpowers. In A. Blair, & S. Curtis, International Politics - An Introductory Guide (pp. 27-47). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 11. 12. Bullock, A. (1962). Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. London: Penguin Books. Castano, V. J. (1997, April 11). The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth vs. Fiction. Univerity of North Carolina at Pembroke.

19

13.

Cooley Jr, L. S. (2004, May). What Next? The German Strategy Crisis During the Summer of 1940. Louisiana State University.

14.

Cooley, L. S. (2004, May). What Next? The German Strategy Crisis During the Summer of 1940. Louisiana State University.

15.

Corum, J. S. (2004). The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War II: Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation. Air Power History, 51 (2), 4-19.

16.

Corum, J. S. (2009). The Rise of the Wehrmacht: The German Armed Forces and World War II. The Journal of Military History, 73 (1), 306-307.

17.

Farrell, K. W. (2010). Recent Approaches to the German Army of World War II: Is the Topic More Accessible After 65 Years? Global War Studies, 7 (2).

18.

Foley, R. T. (2011, March 30). World Wars: Blitzkrieg. Retrieved June 01, 2012, from British Broadcasting Corporation History:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/blitzkrieg_01.shtml 19. Frster, J. (2003, July). Ludendorff and Hitler in Perspective: The Battle for the German Soldier's Mind, 1917-1944. War In History, 10 (3), pp. 321-334. 20. Gray, C. S. (1999). The Dimensions of Strategy. In C. S. Gray, Modern Strategy (pp. 16-47). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gray, C. S. (1999). The Strategist's Toolkit: The Legacy of Clausewitz. In C. S. Gray, Modern Strategy (pp. 75-112). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 22. Grossman, M. (2007). World Military Leaders: A Biographical Dictionary. New York: Infobase Publishing. 23. Hart, B. H. (1967). Fundamentals of Strategy and Grand Strategy. In B. H. Hart, Strategy (p. 336). Westport: Praeger.

20

24.

Heuser, B. (2010). The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

25.

Hughes, W. P. (1989). The Strategy-Tactics Relationship. In C. S. Gray, & R. W. Barnett, Seapower and Strategy (p. 54). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

26.

Jones, A. (1996). Elements of Military Strategy _ A Historical Approach. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

27. 28.

Jordon, J. W. (2006). The Wehrmacht's Worst Defeat. World War II, 21 (4), 36-43. Lim, I. (2003, October). Fireball on the Water: Naval Force Protection-Projection, Coast Guarding, Customs Border Security & Multilateral Cooperation in Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror.from the Sea. Institute of Defence & Strategic Studies Working Paper No. 53.

29.

Lind, W. S. (1981, September). Tactics in Maneuvre Warfare. Marine Corps Gazette, 65 (9), pp. 36-39.

30.

Loo, B. (2009, December 09). Pitfalls of Joint Warfare: Conjoined or Separated? S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentaries, 123.

31.

McAndrew, W. (1996). Operational Art and The Canadian Army's Way of War. In M. A. Hennessy, & B. J. McKercher, The Operational Art - Developments in the Theories of War (pp. 87-102). Westport: Praeger Publishers.

32.

McKercher, B., & Hennessy, M. A. (1996). The Operational Art - Developments in the Theory of War. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

33. 34.

Mirzoeff, E. (Director). (1976). The War Lords: Hitler [Motion Picture]. Mitcham, S. W. (2008). Expansion and Training. In S. W. Mitcham, The Rise of the Wehrmacht: Th German Armed Forces and World War II (pp. 69-80). Westport: Praeger Security International.

21

35.

Newland, S. J., & Chun, C. K. (2011). The European Campaign: Its Orgins and Conduct. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army Wor College.

36.

Paret, P., Craig, G. A., & Gilbert, F. (1986). Clausewitz. In P. Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (pp. 186-213). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

37.

Rees, L. (2011, March 30). World Wars: Hitler's Invasion of Russia in World War Two. Retrieved July 01, 2012, from British Broadcasting Corporation - History: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_russia_invasion_01.shtml

38.

Richard, J. (2011, February 17). British History in Depth - The Blitz: Sorting Myth from Reality. Retrieved July 01, 2012, from British Broadcasting Corporation - History: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/blitz_01.shtml

39.

Roberts, A. (2012). The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Military History, 29 (2), 71.

40.

Robinson, B. (2011, March 30). World War Two: Summary Outline of Key Events. Retrieved June 26, 2012, from British Broadcasting Corporation - History: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/ww2_summary_01.shtml

41.

Rosecrance, R., & Stein, A. A. (1993). Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy. In R. Rosecrance, & A. A. Stein, Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (pp. 3-21). Cornell: Cornell University Press.

42.

Rosecrance, R., & Steiner, Z. (1993). British Grand Strategy and the Origins of World War II. In R. Rosecrance, & A. A. Stein, Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (pp. 124153). Cornell: Cornell University Press.

43.

Sheffield, G. (2011, March 10). World Wars: Victory in Europe Day. Retrieved July 01, 2012, from British Broadcasting Corporation History:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/veday_germany_01.shtml

22

44.

Smith, H. (2004). On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

45.

Smith, M. J. (1942, Nov). Germany's Wehrmacht: Every Man a Sergeants. Leatherneck, 25 (11), pp. 33-35.

46.

Wong, K. W. (2010, December 7). Transforming the Military: The Energy Imperative. S. Rajaratnam School International Studies Working Papers.

23