2

The Use and Perception of Weapons before and after Conflict: Evidence from Rwanda
By Ccelle Meijer and Philip Verwimp

AWorkingPaperoftheSmallArmsSurveyand Rwanda  Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict,

Contents

Tables

About the authors

.......................................................................................................................................................................................

4 5 6 7 9

Table1Perceptionofthemachetebeforeandafterthegenocide Table2 Table3 Table4 Table5 Perceptionofthemacheteandhouseholdcharacteristics:a multinomialanalysis Firearmsthatwereobservedbefore1994insevenrural communitiesinGitaramaprovince Personswhocarriedweaponsinruralcommunities Theimpactoffirearmsduringthegenocide

Acknowledgements

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Acronyms and abbreviations Map 1: Rwanda Introduction

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...............................................................................................................................................................................................

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Research questions

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10 11 14 16 20

A short history of civil war and genocide Research methods

Table6 Socio-economiccharacteristics,ethnicity,andfirearms: descriptivedata Table7 Killedorthreatenedbyafirearm?Abivariatelogistic regression

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The machete: a tool or a weapon?

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Assault rifles, grenades, and ex-soldiers

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The impact of firearms during the genocide ............................................................................................ 23 Resultsfromthequantitativesurvey ....................................................................................................................... 23 Socio-economicstatus,ethnicity,andfirearms ......................................................................................... 23 Observationsinselectedlocalities ................................................................................................................................ 26 The disappearance of arms after the genocide
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28 29 29 30 31 32 33 34 36 38

Tambata: a case study ..................................................................................................................................................................... Winninglocalsupportforthekillings .................................................................................................................... Theuseofarms ............................................................................................................................................................................................ Thespreadofarmsduringandbeforethegenocide ....................................................................... Weapontraining .......................................................................................................................................................................................... Thecurrentsituation ........................................................................................................................................................................... Conclusion Endnotes
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Bibliography

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Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda

About the authors

Acknowledgements

Ccelle Meijer(Cecelle_Meijer@hotmail.com)studiedpolicy,communication, andorganizationattheFreeUniversityinAmsterdamandInternational RelationsattheCatholicUniversityofLeuven.Herresearchinterestsarein thefieldofpeaceandconflictstudies. Philip VerwimpobtainedhisPhDinEconomicsattheCatholicUniversity ofLeuvenwithadissertationonthepoliticaleconomyofdevelopmentand genocideinRwanda.HelecturedinLeuvenandwasapovertyeconomistwith theWorldBank.Hisarticleshaveappearedinseveralwell-knownjournals. Philipiscurrentlylecturingineconomicdevelopmentandconflictatthe InstituteofSocialStudies,TheHague.

TheauthorswouldliketothankJacobBoersema,JeromeChaplier,Arlette Brone,BertIngelaere,ShanleyPinchotti,MarijSpiesschaert,IngeThiry,and ourRwandanresearchassistantsfortheircontributiontothefieldwork.We alsowanttothankEricBerman,KeneEzemenari,TaniaInowlocki,Christina Wille,andJorgeRestrepowhosecommentssignificantlyimprovedthepaper. TheviewsexpressedinthisarticledonotrepresentthoseoftheWorldBank.

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Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda

Acronyms and abbreviations

Map : Rwanda

DRC FAR HRW IDP LDF RPA RPF

Democratic Republic of the Congo DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo Forcesarmesrwandaises,Rwandanmilitary HumanRightsWatch internally displaced person internallydisplacedperson LocalDefenceForces RwandanPatrioticArmy,RPFsuccessor RwandanPatrioticFront,rebelarmy
DEMO CRATIC REPUBLIC O F THE CO NGO
Gisenyi Ruhengeri Byumba

UGANDA UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

RUHENGER I BYUMBA GISENYI Kigali
Kibuye Gitarama

MRND Mouvementrvolutionnairenationalpourledveloppement

UMUTARA

KIGALI-NGALI

KIBUNGO
Kibungo

KIBUYE GITARAMA

Ruyumba

CYANGUGU
Cyangugu

GIKONGORO
Nyamagabe

BUTAR E
Butare

RWANDA
Surveyed area National capital Prefecture capital

BURUNDI

International boudary Prefecture boudary

30 Kilometres

60

90

Water bodies
Sources: NIMA Vmap0, WHO SALB 2000, UN Cartographic Section

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Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda

Introduction

ThemajorityofRwandaspopulationconsidersitselfHutu(morethan80per cent),whereasasmallergroupisreferredtoasTutsi(about15percent).The Twaarethesmallestminority.In1994,afterfouryearsofcivilwar,Rwanda descendedintogenocide.TheTutsiminoritywasthemaintarget,butHutuand Twawhowerenotwillingtoparticipateinthekillingswerealsomurdered.In fewerthanthreemonths,morethan500,000peoplewerebrutallyslaughtered. Imagesofpeoplewieldingmachetesateachotherremainvividtothisday. Indeed,themachetehasbecomethesymboloftheRwandantragedy.Inadditiontothistraditionaltool,however,avarietyofweaponsandtoolswereused toexecutethekillings. Local wars and military conflicts draw not only on regional tensions, but also on the global trade in arms and weapons. Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate, 2001 Recentquantitativeresearchusingalarge-scaledatabaseofvictimsofgenocideinKibuyeprovinceshowsthatmoreyoungmaleadultswithnon-farm occupationswerekilledwithfirearmsthananyothergroup(Verwimp,2003).1 Thisdataalsorevealsthatfirearms,oftenincombinationwithgrenades,were morefrequentlyusedincertainlocationsandeventsthaninothers;inparticular,theywereusedinlarge-scalemassacresinwhichmanyTutsiwerekilled simultaneouslyinthesamelocation,suchastheGatwarofootballstadiumin thecityofKibuye,wherethousandsofpeoplewerekilled.2 ThatyoungTutsiwhowereworkinginthemodernsectoroftheeconomy hadahigherprobabilityofbeingkilledwithfirearmsislinkedtofactorsconstrainingthebehaviouroftheperpetrators:theyhadtosaveammunitionand thususedfirearmsonlyagainstpeoplewhocouldmountresistance(Melvern, 2004).3 Consequently, the victims of firearms were young to middle-aged menwitharespectedstatusinthecommunity.Moreover,theuseoffirearms andgrenadesparticularlywherevermanyTutsihadgatheredwasacostefficientapproachtomasskillings.

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Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda

Research questions

A short history of civil war and genocide

Inbuildinguponearlierresearch,thisstudyasksandaddressesquestionsthat cannotbedealtwiththroughapurelyquantitativeapproach.Byexaminingthe availability,distribution,anduseofsmallarmsandlightweaponsinseveral rurallocalities,itaimstoshedlightonthedailyuseoffirearmsduringthe Rwandangenocide.Thisstudyalsoidentifiesthetraditionalandmodernweaponsusedintheconflict,aswellastheirrespectiveroles.Further,itinvestigates whethertheperceptionoftraditionalRwandanagriculturalandhousehold toolshaschangedsincethegenocideandwhetherthereisanethnicdividein theperceptionofthesetools.4 Officialgovernmentpolicysince1994requiresmodernweaponstobehanded intolocalauthoritiesandanygunownerstohaveapermit,yetnotmuchis known about the provenance or distribution of the weapons used in 1994. Nordoweknowhowmanyandwhatkindsofweaponsarestillincivilian hands.Informationontheavailabilityanddemandforweaponsamongthe populationalsoremainsscarce.Dopeoplefeeltheneedtoarmthemselves forself-protection?AremodernweaponsstillavailableinRwanda?Doestheir presenceinfluenceinter-ethnicrelationstoday? WhileRwandaandtheinternationalcommunitycontinuetofocusonthe countrysprogressinstabilizationandreconciliationingeneral,theimpactof theuseofsmallarmsandlightweaponsonRwandansocietyalthoughcrucial totherebuildingofthecountryremainsunder-explored.Aninvestigation oftheroleoftheseweaponsmayhelppreventtheindirecteffectsofsmall armsavailabilityandmisuse,suchasariseintheincidenceandlethalityof criminality...andthedislocationofsocialcohesionandtrustincommunitiesdevelopmentsthatRwandacannotafford(SmallArmsSurvey,2003,p. 130).

BetweenAprilandJuly1994,theRwandanmilitary(Forcesarmesrwandaises,FAR),localpolice,nationalguard,andmilitiacalledInterahamwe killed at least 500,0005 Tutsi, or about 75 per cent of the Tutsi population, alongwithmanyHutuwhowereknowntobeopponentsofPresidentJuvnal Habyarimana.Afewyearsearlier,inOctober1990,arebelgroupcalledthe RwandanPatrioticFront(RPF)hadattackedRwandafromUganda.Thisgroup was mainly composed of Tutsi refugees, who had left Rwanda during the 195962revolution,andtheirchildren.Theattacksparkedacivilwarbetween theFARandtherebelarmyRPFinwhichthecivilianpopulationinnorthern Rwandasufferedthemostcasualties.WhiletheRPFclaimedtofightagainst thedictatorshipofPresidentHabyarimana;thelatterprofessedtorepresent thecountrysmajority.Thebattlesbetweenbotharmieswereparalleledby peacenegotiationsandthird-partyinterventions.Abriefoverviewofrecent historycanhelpshedlightontheeventsthatfollowed. TheethniccompositionofthepopulationhasbeenamajorfactorinRwandan politicssincethetimeofcolonization.At the Berlin conference of AttheBerlinconferenceof1885Rwanda wasassignedtoGermany.TheGermanshoweverneverreallymadetheremark inRwandabecausealreadyin1916BelgiuminvadedRwandaandoccupied theterritoryuntiltheendofWorldWarI.Belgiumwassubsequentlyofficially entrustedwiththeadministrationunderaLeagueofNationsmandate.The The BelgiancolonizershadinitiallyfavouredtheTutsirulingclass,considering themraciallysuperiortotheHutu,whowereseenasafarmingpeople.Inthe 1950s,withthespreadofanti-colonialandindependencemovements,theruling TutsibegantodemandindependenceforRwanda.AtthattimeaHutucounterelitewasgiventheopportunitytostudyatCatholicseminaries.WithBelgian militaryandpoliticalaid,thisnewgroupofHutuleaderssucceededintoppling the ruling Tutsi regime and replacing it with the Parmehutu, the party for Hutuemancipation.Grgoire Kayibanda, a seminarian, became Rwandas first GrgoireKayibanda, Kayibanda,aseminarian,becameRwandasfirst presidentwhenRwandagainedindependencein1961.Meanwhile,theethnic

0

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dividedidnotjustremainintact,itintensified.Thenewrulers,atthenational aswellasatthelocallevel,establishedtheirpowerbyremovingallTutsifrom positions of power. Ordinary Tutsi who were not associated with political powerwerealsotargetsofreprisalandmurder.
6

Duringthecivilwar(199094),whichprecededthegenocide,atotalof2,000 Tutsiwerekilledinanumberoflocalmassacres.Thesemassacreswerenot spontaneousoutburstofviolencefromapoorpeasantpopulation;theywere organizedbytheAkazu(Habyarimanasentourage).8Withtheshootingdown ofHabyarimanasplaneon6April1994,Rwandaentereditsdarkestperiod. Afterthegenocide,asubstantialpartoftheFARandseveralhundredsof thousandsofcivilianrefugeesfloodedintoneighbouringBurundi,Tanzania, andZaire(nowtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,DRC).Fortwoyears, warrior-refugees(ex-FAR)andcivilianrefugeesresidedincampsalongthe borderbetweentheDRContheonehandandBurundi,Rwanda,andUganda ontheother.InNovember1996,theRwandanPatrioticArmy(RPA,successor totheRPF)attackedtheCongolesecamps,killingthousandsofarmedex-FAR membersaswellasunarmedcivilians.Themajorityofthesurvivingrefugees returnedtoRwanda.Asizablepartoftheex-FAR,Interahamwe,andcivilian refugeesfleddeeperintoCongoleseterritory.Duringthefollowingyears,from 1997to2000,mostoftheremainingrefugeeseitherdiedorwererepatriated.

In1965KayibandaappointedJuvenalHabyarimanaasMinisterofDefense. In1973agroupofarmyofficersaroundHabyarimanatookpowerthrougha coupdtat.FrustratedbytheoligarchicalcharacterofKayibandasregime, whosepowerbasewasthecentralprovinceofGitarama,Habyarimanaand his followers, who hailed from northern Rwanda, perceived the people of Gitaramaaspoliticallyprivileged.Withthecoupdtat,Habyarimanabecame thenewpresidentandestablishedtheMouvementRvolutionnairenational pourledveloppement(MRND),thecountryssinglepartytowhomevery Rwandanautomaticallybelonged. Inthe1970s,thankstohighpricesforcoffeethecountrysmainexport cropand generous donor support, Habyarimanas popularity was high and generous donor support, Habyarimanas popularity was high and amongpartsofthepopulation.7HeupheldthecontinueduseofethnicidentitycardsandforbadeofficersandsoldierstomarryTutsiwomen.Inorderto controlpopulationmovements,hesetupadetailedsystemofregistrationand reportingofdemographicchangesatthelocallevel.Healsorequiredevery adult to participate in umuganda (weekly communal labour) and to attend weeklyinstitutionalizedsessionsinhishonour. AkeycharacteristicoftheHabyarimanaregimewasitsdoctrineontherelationbetweenpopulationandland(Verwimp,2003).Thepresidenthadnever beenanadvocateofafamilyplanningpolicy.Onseveraloccasionshedeclared thatchildrenwerethewealthofeveryRwandanfamily.Groupssetupbythe MinistryoftheInteriorattackedpharmaciesthatsoldcondoms.Thepresident wasfullysupportedbytheCatholicChurch,whichwasomnipresentinRwanda. ThefertilityrateofRwandanwomenwasamongthehighestintheworldand theaveragesizeofcultivatedlandperfamilywasshrinkingrapidlyfrom1.2 hectaresin1984to0.9hectaresin1990(NationalAgriculturalSurveys,1984 and198991).Manyfamilieshadtoolittlelandtoearnalivingandfeedtheir children.In1986,whendiscussingthefateofthe195962refugees,theCentral CommitteeoftheMRNDdeclaredtheirreturnimpossiblebecausethecountry wasoverpopulated.
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Research methods

Inaddition,oneofthestudentsremainedinthefieldforthreeadditional weekstoconductspecificin-depthinterviewsontheuseandimpactofmodern andtraditionalweaponsduringandafterthegenocide.Anotherparticipant inthelargerproject,acriminologystudent,undertookinterviewswithsome 70 prisoners in the central prison of Gitarama. She interviewed prisoners

Theresearchforthiscontributionispartofalargerresearchprojectonsocial capitalandthemechanismsofgenocideinRwanda.Theprojectstudiesthe structureofhorizontalandverticallinesofaffiliationandrelationsuchas kinship and family ties, occupational networks, rural associations, church groups,andpoliticalpartiesinseveralruralcommunities.Eightgraduate studentsfromBelgiumsCatholicUniversityofLeuvenundertookthreemonths offieldworkinsevenlocationsinthecentralRwandanprovinceofGitarama inJulyAugust2004.AnexperiencedRwandanresearchassistantaccompaniedeachstudent.Priortoentryinthefield,studentsbecamefamiliarwith relevantliterature,attendedseminarsonRwanda,wrotepapers,andimproved theirinterviewskills. Althoughthefieldworkdidnothaveaspecialfocusonfirearms,students oftengatheredinformationabouttheiruseandimpact.Withoutbeingasked questionsaboutweapons,localrespondentsprovidedusefulrelatedinsight. Towardstheendofthefieldworkforthemainproject,theRwandanresearch assistantsfieldedarelativelyshortquestionnaireineachofthesevenlocalities. Thisquestionnaire,withpre-codedquantitativequestionsaswellasopenendedquestionswasespeciallydesignedforthisstudyonsmallarmsandlight weapons.Inthecourseofoneweek,theresearchersinterviewed114households (16perlocality,with18inoneofthelocalities).Thehouseholdswererandomly selectedandconstitutedasub-sampleofalargeagriculturalsurveyprojectthat predatedthegenocide. Thestudyisthusabletocombinedatacollectedbefore
9

fromthesameareasasthoseinterviewedbytheotherstudents,allowingfor thetriangulationoffindings.Byfocusingonthemechanismsofparticipation inthegenocide,theprisonworkyieldedusefulbackgroundinformationfor thestudyoftheimpactofsmallarmsandlightweapons. Lastbutnotleast,thiscontributiondrawsonpriorgenocide-relatedfieldworkundertakeninthesamelocations(Verwimp,2003).Consequently,this research is able to present findings from a variety of sourcesqualitative, quantitative,specificallyrelatedtosmallarmsandlightweapons,andsources relatedtothemechanismsofgenocidetoshedlightontheincidenceand impactofmodernandtraditionalweaponsduringtheRwandangenocide. It should be noted, however, that the study is limited geographically as wellasbythenumberofhouseholdsinterviewed.Giventhesmallsample sizeandtheconcentrationofthefieldworkinoneprovince,thisstudyisnot representativeofthewholeofRwanda. The province of Gitarama, in the heart of Rwanda, has often played an importantpoliticalroleinthecountryshistory.ThecourtoftheMwami,the Rwandanking,waslocatedinthesouthernpartoftheprovince.Attheend oftheperiodofcolonization,inthesecondhalfofthe1950s,theprovincewas home to Kayibanda. Economically, it is neither the poorest nor the richest province.InApril1994,Gitaramawasrelativelycalm,untiltheinterimgovernmentmarchedintototheprovincialcapitalandexhortedtheburgomasters (headsofcommunalauthorities)toextendthegenocideintotheircommunes. Thankstothepresenceofsanctuaries,localresistance,andtherelativelyearly arrivaloftheRPFinsomecommunes,thegenocideinGitaramawasnotas devastatingaselsewhereinthecountry.ThisbackgroundmakesGitaramaan interestingcasestudy.

theconflictwithdatacollectedaftertheconflict.Thequestionnaireentailed threesections:onefocusingonthesituationpriortothegenocide,asecondon thegenocide,andathirdontheperiodfollowingit.Itaskedonememberof thehousehold,usuallytheheadofthehousehold,open-endedandmultipleanswerquestionsregardingtheincidenceandimpactoffirearmsinrelation tothegenocide.Therecallperiodwastenyears.Answerstotheopen-ended questionwerecodedafterallinterviewshadbeencarriedout.

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The machete: a tool or a weapon?

used in these fights. Three quarters of the respondents, however, said that theydidnotregardmachetesasweaponspriortothegenocide;instead,they sawitasatoolpeopleusedinandaroundthehouse.Yetalmosthalfofthe respondentswhohadwitnessedafightinvolvingoneormoretraditionaltools saidtheyhadperceivedmachetesasweaponsbeforethegenocide.Therewas

Thirty per cent of the 114 respondents say they witnessed a fight between Rwandansinvolvingtraditionaltoolsbeforethegenocide.Halfofthefights revolvedaroundlandissuesorwerelinkedtodrunkenness.Mostrespondents identifiedmachetes,clubs(withorwithoutnails),spears,orhoesasthetools

nostatisticallysignificantdifferencebetweenHutuandTutsirespondentswith referencetotheperceptionofthemachete.ResultsarepresentedinTable1. Responsesdidnotreflectadifferenceaccordingtooccupationoreducation either. AnevengreaterpercentageofHuturespondentssaidtheydidnotregard themacheteasaweapontenyearsafterthegenocidethanpriortothegeno-

Table  Perception of the machete before and after the genocide

Regarded machete as a weapon before the genocide (%), N=114 Witnessed fight with trad. arms No Yes Ethnic affiliation Hutu Tutsi . . . . 0. No . . Yes . . chi-square test for significance 0.00*

cide;instead,theysaidtheysawitasanagriculturalorhouseholdtool.This responsemaybeinfluencedbyatypeofpoliticalcorrectness,sinceitmay beseenasunacceptabletoconsideramacheteaweapon,especiallyforHutu. Incontrast,morethanone-thirdoftheTutsirespondentsconsiderthemachete aweaponandnotatooltenyearsafterthegenocide.Thedifferencebetween thetwoethnicgroupswasnotstatisticallysignificantbeforethegenocide,but itisnow.Indeed,onlyhalfoftheinterviewedTutsirespondentsnowconsider themacheteanordinarytool,comparedto76.7percentbeforethegenocide. Tenpercentoftherespondentssaidtheyhadalmostforgottenthatsomany peoplewerekilledwithmachetes.10Thisreplywasalsochosenbyrespondents withahistoryofmortalityinthefamily(althoughfamilymemberswerenot necessarilykilledwithamachete).Mostpeoplesaidtheyseethemacheteas ahouseholdtool,eveniftheylostmembersoftheirownfamily.Peopledo notwanttoforgetthattheirfamilymemberswerekilled,buttheymaywant toforgetthecrueltyinvolvedinthekillings.Theteststatisticintheyes/no questiononfamilymortality,however,isnotstatisticallysignificant.Aregression analysismayprovidedeeperinsightintotheeffectofthedeathofhousehold membersontheperceptionofthemacheteasaweaponratherthanatool.See Table2.

Regards machete as a weapon ten years after the genocide (%), N=114 Household members died in past 10 years No Yes Ethnic affiliation Hutu Tutsi
Note: ***significantatthe1percentlevel

No . .

I almost forgot . 0.

Yes . .

chi-square test for significance 0.0

. .

.0 0.0

. .

0.00***

ThemultinomiallogitregressioninTable2demonstratesthattheperception ofthemachetebyrespondentsisnotindependentofhouseholdcharacteristics.11 Itshowsthatboththenumberofhouseholdmemberslostinthepasttenyears andtherespondentsethnicaffiliationdeterminetheperceptionofthemachete

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Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2

asaweaponoratool.Forexample,arespondentwhosehouseholdisheaded byaTutsiandwhohaslostmanyhouseholdmembershasahighprobability ofregardingthemacheteasaweaponratherthanatool.Thevariablemeasuringthenumberoflosthouseholdmembersalsohasastatisticallysignificant effectontheprobabilityofproducingthereplythatIalmostforgotthatthe machetewasusedtokillsomanypeople,whencomparedtothefirstcategory ofrespondents,whoperceivethemacheteasatool.Asnotedabove,thisreply mayindicatethatRwandanswanttoforgetthecrueltyofthekillingsoftheir familymembers.Fromthelocationvariables(communedummies),onlyRimba commune,whichislocatedveryclosetoKigaliandwasthesceneoffierce battlesbetweentheRwandanarmyandtherebelarmy,showsastatistically significantandpositiveeffectontheprobabilityofregardingthemacheteasa weaponorhavingforgottenaboutit.Thiseffectisrelativetothecommunethat wasleftoutoftheregression,Birama. Duringoneinterview,aHuturespondenttoldtheresearcherthatallhouseholdsinhiscommunitystillownedoneormoremachetesandotheragricultural tools.Hesubsequentlystoodupandtookhisownmachetefromunderhis

bed,helditupintheairandsaid:Yousee,hereismymachete,itisthesame oneasIusedin1994whenwehunteddowntheTutsi.12Thisman,whilenot representativeofthecommunitywhereheisliving,showedacertainpridein hisactiontakenin1994. Intwolocations,thesectorsofVutovuandBembe,respondentsreported anincreaseintraditionaltoolsusedasweaponspriortothegenocide.Inthe formercommuneofTongata,respondentstoldusthattheburgomasterdistributedmachetes.

Table  Perception of the machete and household characteristics: a multinomial analysis

Variables in the regression Number of hh. Members lost Ethnic affiliation Rimba comm. Constant
Notes: N=108,Loglikelihood=55.89,PseudoR2=0.461.Thedependentvariablehasthevalueszero,oneandtwo respectivelyfortool,Ihaveforgottenit,andweapon.Toolservesasthebaselineintheregression. *significantatthe10percentlevel;**significantatthe5percentlevel;***significantatthe1percentlevel. Non-significantcommunedummyvariablesarenotshowninthetable.Regressionswithabinarydependent variable,whicheitheraddtheIhaveforgottenitresponsetotheitisaweaponorleaveouttheseobservations andonlyconsideritisatoolanditisaweaponproducesimilarstatisticallysignificantresults.

It is a weapon 0.0*** .0* .** -.***

Coeff. Sign. 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.00

I have forgotten it Coeff. Sign. .** -. .*** -.0*** 0.0 0. 0 0



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Assault rifles, grenades, and ex-soldiers

Table  Persons who carried firearms in rural communities (%*)

Prior to the genocide N=49 Type of person During the genocide N=119

Respondentsweregivenarosterwithdepictionsofweaponsandaskedto identifywhichweaponstheyhadpersonallyseenintheircommunity.13These weaponshadtobeonestheyhadnotseenbeforeintheircommunity.They werealsoaskedwhocarriedtheseweapons.TheresultsarepresentedinTables 3and4. Tables3and4revealthatmorethanone-thirdoftherespondentssawone ormorefirearmsintheirlocalcommunitiesbeforethegenocide.Thegreat majorityoftheseweaponswereidentifiedasgunsorassaultrifles.Respondents

Soldiers Ex-soldiers Police or gendarme Militia/Interahamwe Burundians Rebels Peasants Political authorities

. . .  

. . .0 . .0 .0

Table  Firearms that were observed before 1994 in seven rural communities in Gitarama Province (as % of all observations*)
Prior to the genocide N=52 Respondents Did not observe arms Did observe arms No reply Types of firearm observed Guns Assault rifles** Grenades Automatic weapons Launchers
Notes: *Thenumberofobservationsishigherthanthenumberofrespondentsbecauseeightrespondentsobserved twotypesofweaponsandtworespondentsobservedthreetypes. **Asmallpercentageoftheassaultrifleswererecognizedasbolt-actionriflesandequippedwithscopes.

*Somerespondentsidentifiedmultiplecarriersofarms.

During the genocide N=137

mostoftenidentifiedthelocalpoliceascarriersofthesefirearms,followedby former soldiers and then soldiers. Respondents recalled more sightings of assault rifles in the local community during the genocide than before the genocide.Grenadeswhichtakeanimportantsecondplaceamongweapons seenduringthegenocideweremostfrequentlycarriedbyex-soldiers,soldiers, and Interahamwe (youth militia), respectively. The police, who figured in firstplaceamongguncarrierspriortothegenocide,arerelegatedtofourth placeduringthegenocide.Sincethesurveyisolatedweaponstherespondents hadnotseenbeforeintheircommunities,theresultsshowthatseveralgroups ofpeoplewhodidnotcarryfirearmspriortothegenocidebegantodosoas of1994. Thesefindingsindicatethatthenumberoffirearmspresentatthecommunity level increased substantially during the genocide. More significantly, there weremarkedshiftsinthekindsofweaponandthetypesofpersonwhocarried theseweapons.Priorto1994,notablyintimesofpeace,mostfirearmswereseen inthehandsofthestateslawenforcementpersonnel,namelythepoliceand soldiers,respectively.AsRwandasankintoconflict,however,armedsoldiers
Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

0. . .

. 0. .

0   

. . 0. . .

0

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gainedinprominence.Surveyrespondentssaidtheysawex-soldiersthose whoweredemobilizedorofficiallyretiredfromactivedutycarryingarms intheirlocalcommunitiespriortothegenocide,butinparticularduringthe genocide.Theseobservations,togetherwiththoseoffirearmscarriedbythe Interahamwe,showthatthelocalpolicenolongerhadthemonopolyofviolence during the genocide. Instead, ex-soldiers, active soldiers, and militia memberswereidentifiedascarryingmostofthefirearmsobservedforthe firsttimeintheseselectedruralcommunities. Severalfactorsgaverisetothesedevelopments.InJanuary1994threemonths beforethegenocideHumanRightsWatch(HRW)presentedevidencethat thethengovernmentwasbuyingweapons.Paymentsweremadepartlyin cashandpartlywiththepromiseofthefutureharvestoftheteaplantationof Mulindi(HRW,1994,pp.1418).HRWfindsthattheregimewasdistributing weaponsamongthepopulation,usingRwandasadministrationaspartofa civilianself-defenceprogramme.Sometimeearlier,inAugust1991,Colonel SylvainNsabimana,thechiefofstaffoftheRwandanarmy,hadproposedto provideagunforeveryadministrativeunitoftenhouseholds:Atleastone person shouldbe armed per nyumba kumi (unitoftenhouseholds)(HRW, 1994,p.27andapp.C).HRWhasalsodocumentsthatburgomastersordered quantitiesofarmsandammunitionin199293thatfarexceededtheneedsof theirlocalpoliceforces(DesForges,1999,pp.9799).Theyorderedguns,Kalashnikovs, machine guns, grenades, and large quantities of bullets. The HRW reportalsodocumentsthepurchaseofarmsbytherebels,theRPF.14 ThisprojectsfieldworkconfirmstheHRWfindings.Indeed,theresearch showsthatinonecommunetheburgomastergaveanassaultrifletooneyoung maleineachcell(lowestadministrativeunit).Thisgundistributionwasthe result of a national policy, as is clarified in the diary of Colonel Thoneste Bagosora,whichelaboratesonthecivilianself-defenceprogrammeandthe distributionofweapons.Bagosoraalsoidentifieshowmanyrecruitsshould betrained,whatkindsofweapontheyshouldreceive,andhowrecruitsshould betrainedtousethem(DesForges,1999,p.107).

The impact of firearms during the genocide

Results from the quantitative survey

Asnotedintheresearchmethodssectionabove,thesurveysincludedquestions ontheimpactoffirearmsduringthegenocide.Morespecifically,twoquestions andonestatementweredesignedtodeterminetowhatextentthepresenceof firearmsisperceivedashavingfacilitatedtheexecutionofthegenocide.Respondentswereallowedtoprovidemorethanoneresponse(seeTable5). Askedtodescribetheimpactoffirearmsduringthegenocideintheirown words,respondentsmostfrequentlystatedthatfirearmsincreasedthespeed ofthegenocideandthattheyinducedfearinthepopulation.Whilealarge majorityoftherespondentssaidthatfirearmsplayedakeyroleinthegenocide, theyrefrainedfromsayingthatfirearmswerethemainreasonforthegenocide. Two-thirdsoftherespondentsattributedthegenocidetopeopleandauthorities ratherthantoarms;theyarguedthatpeoplewerealsokilledwithtraditional weapons.Nevertheless,one-thirdoftherespondentspointedatfirearmsasthe maincauseforthegenocide,contendingthatarmsempoweredtheexecutors, thatresistancetotheseweaponswasimpossible,andthattheuseofweapons betweentheFARandtheRPFcausedthegenocide. Of114householdssurveyedinthesevencommunities,fiveownafirearm. Inthreecasestheweaponisanassaultrifle,andinthetwoothercasesitisa grenade.Threeofthefivehouseholdscountedasoldieramongtheirhousehold membersandmentionedhimastheownerofthefirearm.Thefourthhousehold receiveditsweaponfromamemberoftheInterahamweandthefifthobtained itfromtheRPF.

Socio-economic status, ethnicity, and firearms

Thisstudylinkstheanswersontheimpactofweaponstodatacollectedprior tothegenocideviaanagriculturalhouseholdsurvey(Verwimp,2003).Inthe
 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2 Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

Table  The impact of firearms during the genocide

1 (open-ended): What was the effect of firearms during the genocide? (%) N=166 Increased rate of killing Induced fear Caused death Used to support traditional arms Breaking of resistance Pressure to participate Empowered executors of genocide Armed conflict between RPF and FAR caused genocide Do not know/other 2: Did firearms play a key role in the genocide? (%)* N=114 No Yes No reply
Note: *Reasonsprovidedfortheyesornoanswerswerepre-codedbutarenotcomparabletoanswerstothefirst open-endedquestion,whichwerecodedaftertheinterviews.Duetothesediscrepancies,thepre-codedanswers weredisregardedandanalysiswasbasedontheopen-endedanswers.

lightofthisdata,itappearsthattheuseofsmallarmsandlightweaponsduringthegenocidewasnotindependentofthesocio-economiccharacteristicsof thevictims.Table6showstheaveragelandsizeofhouseholdswhosemembers wereeitherthreatenedorkilledwithafirearm.Thetablealsoshowsthepercentageofheadsofhouseholdswhohadatleastaprimaryschooldegree. ForTutsi,owninglanddoesnotseemtohavehadasignificanteffectonthe probabilityofbeingkilledorthreatenedbyafirearm.Still,educatedTutsiwere morelikelytobekilledorthreatenedbyafirearmthannon-educatedTutsi. ForHutubothlandsizeandeducationmattered.Itshouldbenotedthatin thisstudyssample,Hutuwerealmostexclusivelythreatenedorkilledwith smallarmsandlightweaponsbyotherHutu,indicatingthatnotonlyethnicity matteredinthegenocide.Especiallywithrespecttotheuseofamodernversus atraditionalweapon,apotentialvictimssocio-economicstatusplayedadeterminingrole.
. . . . . 0. . . .0 . . .

Table  Socio-economic characteristics, ethnicity, and firearms15

Hutu N=76 Land owned in 1990 (averages, in hectares) Not killed or threatened by firearm 0. 0. . 0. 0.0** . . . . 0.0** Tutsi N=11 0.0 0. 0. -0. 0. . 0 0 . 0.0** All N=87 0. 0. . 0.0 0.0* 0. . . . 0.0**

3 (open-ended): Firearms are the main reason the genocide took place. (%) N=114 Do not agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Why not agree? Genocide executed by people and authorities, not by arms People were also killed with traditional weapons Why agree? Arms empowered executors Resisting firearms was not possible Armed conflict between RPF and FAR caused genocide Do not know . . . N= . . N= . . . .

Killed or threatened by firearm Pearson correlation coefficient between land ownership and confrontation with a firearm Level of significance % of heads of the hh. with prim. school degr. Not killed or threatened by firearm Killed or threatened by firearm Chi-Square test for primary school degree and confrontation with a firearm Level of significance
Notes: *significantatthe10percentlevel **significantatthe5percentlevel

 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2 Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

Table  Killed or threatened by a firearm? A bivariate logistic regression

Variables in the regression Killed or threatened Coeff. Land owned in 0 Head of the hh at least prim. school Constant
Notes: N=85,Loglikelihood=53.55,PseudoR2=0.233.Dependentvariablehasthevalues0or1. **significantatthe5percentlevel ***significantatthe1percentlevel Communeleveldummieswereincludedintheregressionbutarenotshowninthetable.

Althoughsomefarmersalsoreceivedfirearms,mostrespondentssaidthat thepossessionofafirearmorgrenadesignalledtheownersleadershipstatus. Yetrespondentsrecalledthatleadersdidnotoftenusetheirweaponduringthe killings,butrathertothreatenormobilizethepopulation. Theserecollectionsareconsistentwiththeabove-mentionedresultsofthe quantitativeresearch.Firearmswereusuallyusedtothreatenandplunder.In thesectorsofBembe,Betenyo,andGayenzi,respondentsnotedthatInterahamweleaderswerefiringintotheair,causingfearamongthepopulation. Theseeventsseemtohavemadeaverystrong,fearfulimpact,asevidenced bythefactthatmanyrespondentsmentionthemalthoughtheresearchersdid notfocusontheuseofsmallarmsandlightweaponsduringtheinterviews. AleaderoftheInterahamweinGayenzireportedlyfiredintotheairafterhe told Hutu to start killing Tutsi or be killed themselves. He also reportedly firedatashopownedbyaHutuwhomaintainedgoodrelationswithTutsi. Respondentsarefarlessclearabouthowpeopleobtainedtheseweapons. InthesectorofVutovo,somerespondentsidentifiedthecommuneofficeas thelocationwhereweaponsweredistributed,buttheywerenotclearabout howmanypeoplereceivedfirearmsthere.InGogandothelocalInterahamwe leaderissaidtohavehadconnectionswiththearmy.InBembe,gunswere apparently present beforeApril 1994, but respondents had no information aboutwheretheycamefrom.

Sign. 0.0 0.00 0.00

0.0** .0*** -.0***

TheresultsofthedescriptivedatainTable6areconfirmedinabivariate logisticalregression(seeTable7).Indeed,largelandownersandmembersof householdsheadedbyaneducatedpersonhadahigherprobabilityofbeing threatenedwithorkilledbyafirearmthanRwandanswhoownedlittleorno landorhadreceivedalimitededucation.Therewasnosignificanteffectofany ofthecommunedummiesinthisregression.

Observations in selected localities

Althoughthesurveyedlocalitieshaddifferentexperiencesduringthegenocide, similaritiesdoexist.Firearmsandgrenadesseemtohavemadeanenormous impressioneverywhere;duringtheinterviews,peoplerememberedveryvividly when,how,andbywhom,firearmswereusedintheconflict.AlmostallrespondentsintheBambasector,forexample,recalledseeingalocalInterahamwe leadercarryinggrenades,usuallytiedtoabelt,thoughpurportedlynotused. Inalllocalities,onlyafewpeopleoftenlocalofficialsandcivilservants seemtohavecarriedfirearmsandgrenades,whichhelpsexplainwhyrespondentswereabletoprovidedetaileddescriptionsofweaponowners.Inthe Vutovosector,thedirectoroftheCatholicschools,anagronomist,ateacher, andtheassistantburgomasterwereidentifiedasfirearmcarriers.InBetenyo sector,respondentssaythepolicesergeantandanex-soldiercarriedweapons.
 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2 Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

The disappearance of arms after the genocide

Tambata: a case study17

Thelargemajorityoftherespondentssaythatsmallarmsandlightweapons havedisappearedfromtheircommunities.Onlysoldiersandthepoliceare carryingarmsatthemoment,reminiscentofwhatrespondentsrecallfromthe periodbeforethegenocide.Nevertheless,afewpeoplewarnthatLocalDefence Forces(LDF)alsocarryarmsandthatsomeweaponsarehiddenamongthe population.TheLDFisallegedlyanunpaidcorpsaidingthepolicewiththe maintenanceoflawandorder. After1994,smallarmsandlightweaponsdisappearedfromthecommunities,largelybecauseownersfledwiththeirguns.Thesearmedflightsareamong thereasonswhyrefugeecampsineasternCongobecamefloodedwitharms. ArmsalsodisappearedfromRwandansocietythroughgovernment-sponsored collectionprogrammes.Inaddition,afewrespondentsrecalledthatthepopulationitselfdisarmedtheownersoffirearmsafterthegenocide,suchasinthe sectorofBamba,inthenorthoftheprovinceofGitarama. Thedonor-fundedMulti-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Multi-CountryDemobilizationandReintegrationProgram fortheGreaterGreatLakesRegionofAfricaisdesignedtohelpthedisarmed is designed to help the disarmed ex-combatantsreturntotheirformerresidencesandstartupnew,productive livesasacivilians.
16

The final part of this study entailed in-depth qualitative interviews in two smallvillagesincentralRwanda:RigorandRagor,locatedintheGedobasector, inMabayadistrict(formercommuneTambata),intheprovinceofGitarama. Eachoftheseneighbouringvillageshasadistinctcharacter.Rigorisacommercialcentreandisstrategicallyplacedalongtheroad.Ragorisamorerural community,largelycomprisedofsmallfarmers.Nevertheless,thehistoryof thetwovillagesiscloselylinkedbecauseofthemassacreinApril1994atthe parishintheneighbouringtownofTambata.Thankstotheresistanceofthe burgomasterofTambata,Ndagijimana,againstthekillingsthathadbegunin partsofthecountry,theparishhadbecomeanimportantshelterfortheTutsiof Tambataandothercommunes.Untilhismurderon21April,theburgomaster helpedthelocalpoliceandpopulationdefendtheinternallydisplacedpersons (IDPs)againstattacksbythemilitiaandInterahamwefromoutsidethecommune.Ndagijimanasdeathmarkedthebeginningoflarge-scalekillingsin thecommune;afteronlythreedays,mostpeopleattheparishhadbeenkilled onsiteorinthesurroundingarea,whileattemptingtoflee.Inheraccountof theRwandangenocide,Leave None to Tell the Story,DesForgesestimatesthat 5,000to7,000peoplewerekilledthere(DesForges,1999,p.277).Localpeople speakabout20,000to30,000dead,butthesefiguresmaybeoverestimates.

Winning local support for the killings

TambataremainedcalmduringthefirstweeksofApril1994,whilesurrounding regionssuchasSevera,Ceruru,andTongatahadalreadysuccumbedtothe beginningsofgenocidalkilling.Duringthisperiod,theonlyreportedkillingin RigorandRagorwasthatofamanwhohadattemptedtoincitethepopulation to hunt down Tutsi. Motivated by the words of the burgomaster, He who wantstostartkillingwillbekilledhimself,agroupoflocalpeopleattacked andkilledtheman.
 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2 Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

 TheinterimgovernmenttogetherwithInterahamweandthemilitarygrew determinedtoquashthisresistance.AfterseveralfailedattacksinTambata,they decided to kill the burgomaster, who, as the highest local authority, representedtheirgreatestobstacle.Followinghisdeath,somelocalleadersbacked bythemilitarywereabletoincitethepopulationtostartthekilling.Bythistime, thepopulationhadalreadybeenexposedtoanti-Tutsipropagandaforyears. Themilitaryplayedacrucialroleinspreadingthekillingsthroughoutthe country: The military encouraged and, when faced with reluctance to act, compelled both ordinary citizens and local administrators to participate in attacks, even travelling the back roads and stopping at small marketplaces to deliver the message(Des Forges,1999,p.8). Tambataisacaseinpoint.AtthemarketplaceofRigor,themilitaryincited peopletoviolencebybroadcastingmessagessuchas,Wewantyoutodestroy TutsihousesandkillTutsi(DesForges,1999:277)andSomeofyouarealready eatingcows[fromTutsiwhofled],butwherearetheTutsicorpses?.

Otherresearch,however,showsthatalackofchoicewasnotalwaysthecase; indeed, under certain circumstances, assailants deliberately used firearms (Verwimp,2003).Firearmswereusedstrategically.Inparticular,respondents saidthattheuseofmodernweaponssuchasassaultriflesandgrenadeswas necessaryinthekillingsattheparishofTambata.Earlierattemptstoattack theIDPshadfailedbecausetheyoutnumberedtheattackersandwereableto defendthemselveswithtraditionalarms.Asonerespondentputit: Modern weapons made it possible to carry out the genocide quickly. If they had not brought in modern arms, the Tutsi would have been able to defend themselves because they also had some traditional arms. Before, they had tried a couple of times without modern weapons, but they did not succeed. Withmodernarms,theattackerswereabletokillalargenumberofIDPs ontheveryfirstdayofthefinalattack.Onthesecondday,mostattackers killedsurvivorswithtraditionalarmssuchashoes,spears,machetes,clubs, bowsandarrows,andropes.Afterthekillings,Interahamweandthelocal populationsearchedforsurvivors.

The use of arms

SoldiersatRigorsmarketplacewerereinforcingtheirmessagebyfiringtheir gunsintotheair.Somesurveyrespondentssaidthatbesidesspreadingfear amongthepopulation,thepresenceofgunsalsoencouragedpeopletoparticipate,sincetheyunderstoodittoindicategovernmentsponsorship.Onerespondentargued: The guns proved to the population that the execution of the genocide was supported by the government and the people thought they had to help the government by searching for and killing Tutsi everywhere. Askedwhethertherewasaspecialreasontochooseaparticulartypeof weaponoracertainwayofkilling,mostrespondentsansweredthatitwas notamatterofchoice.Onerespondentsaid: Everybody was killing with what was available. People didnt think about the type of weapon to use, they were just looking for something that could kill.
0 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2

The spread of arms during and before the genocide

AlmosteveryRwandanhouseholdpossessedtraditionaltoolsbeforeApril 1994. Results of the quantitative survey confirm that most people viewed machetesasessentialtools,althoughsomerespondentsnotedthattheycould alsobeusedasweapons,especiallyforself-protectionatnight.Inaddition, Rwandanswererequiredtocarryatraditionalarmattheobligatorynightpatrols. Interviewresultsindicatethatneitherfirearmsnorothermodernarmswere widespreadamongthepopulation.InTambata,asintheothersurveyedlocations,onlythelocalpolicecarriedfirearmsbeforethegenocide.Duringthe genocide,however,severalmodernweaponswerehandedout.Thedistributionofthesemodernweaponsgunsandgrenadeswashighlyorganizedin Tambata.AleadingarmymajorfromneighbouringCerurusuppliedthearms; hisassistantandsomelocalfigures,includingaformerburgomasterandthe agriculturalspecialistofthecommune,werechargedwithdistributingthem,
Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

initiallyfromthecommunaloffice.Especiallyex-soldiersandInterahamwe receivedthearms,buttheywerealsohandedouttolocalpeoplewhowere seen as capable of using them. Weapons were not stored at the communal officeforanyperiodoftime;asector-specificpick-upscheduleensuredthatthe weaponswerepickedupquickly.Severalrespondentsmentionedtheweapons stockwashiddeninacivilianshousewhentheRPFarrived.

civilian assailants, armed with such weapons as machetes, hammers, and clubs, finished the slaughter (DesForges,1999,p.8).

The current situation

Mostrespondentsindicatedthattheinclinationtousearmsisgreatertoday thanitwasbefore1994.Killinghasbecomeeasier.Peoplebringtraditional armsevenforsolvingsmallproblems.Itislikeagame,saidonerespondent. Atthesametime,respondentsnotethatthegovernmentisactivelyfighting illegalarmspossessionandcriminality;theyarguethattheinclinationtouse weaponsisthere,butthatthegovernmentiscontrollingthesituation. Yetnotallrespondentsfeltthatthepossessionofarmswasbeingmonitored strictly.Onerespondentcomplainedthatalthoughhehadtoldtheauthorities abouttwopersonswhostillpossessedguns,theydidnotactonhisinformation. Somerespondentspointtothegovernmentprogrammecallednganda,in whichciviliansaretaughthowtouseweaponsaspartofabroaderpolitical educationscheme,asadangerousdevelopment. Withregardtotraditionalweapons,respondentsofferanunambiguousconsensus:everyhouseholdstillownsthem.Infact,asonerespondentnoted, Everymanhastohaveone,itispartofourculture.Heshouldbeableto protecthisfamily. Towhatextentmodernweaponsarestillinprivatehandsismoredifficult todetermine,partlybecausepeopledonotdiscussthistopicfreely.Nevertheless, there are accounts that some weapons are still being kept secretly. One respondent estimated that more than two-thirds of the weapons used arestillpresentinTambata.Somerespondentssaidtheysometimesheardgunshotsduringthenight,butthattheydidnotknowwhowasfiringtheguns. Otherrespondentsreportedthatthepresenceofmodernweaponshada negativeimpactonsocialrelationsinthecommunities.Onesaid:Because people know that others have guns, they are still very afraid. People who ownthosegunscanbehavelikekings.PeopleinRagorcomplainthatHutu andTutsiarelivinginseparateworlds,dividedbyagreatdealoftension. Onerespondentevenspokeofaformofcompetitionconcerningweapons, claimingtheyaremorewidelyspreadthanbefore1994.
Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

Weapon training
Whilemodernweaponswerealsodistributedamongcivilians,theycouldnot haveusedthemproperlywithoutsomesortoftraining.Respondentssuggest thatthearmyhadalreadybeguntrainingyoungadultmalesbyApril1994. AnelectedGacacajudgeexplained: The army took these men away for about a month. They gave them weapon training and sent them home after that. Officially they said that those men were not good enough for the army, but they were the first to receive arms during the genocide. Hefurthernotedthattrainingalsotookplaceduringthegenocide.Specifically,agroupofsixmen,ledbytheabove-mentionedassistantofthearmy major, taught people how to use guns.Another respondent talked about a programmecalledself-defencethatbeganjustafter6April: In every sector there was one military officer responsible for the training of young men. At that time they said that it was a training to fight against the RPF, but we think now that it was for the genocide. Survivorsfromtheparishrecountedthatsomepeoplewereeventaught howtouseagunattheverytimethemassacrewastakingplace.Thisstudys fieldworkconfirmsearlierresearch: Soldiers, national police (gendarmes), former soldiers, and communal police played a larger part in the slaughter than is generally realized. . . . Although usually few in number at sites of massive killing, their tactical knowledge and their use of weapons of war, including grenades, machine guns, and even mortars, contributed significantly to the death tolls in these massacres. It was only after the military had launched attacks with devastating effect on masses of unarmed Tutsi that
 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2

Conclusion

households,governmentauthoritiesandcitizens,andthemenandwomenof Rwanda.

SmallarmsandlightweaponsarenotasideissueoftheRwandangenocide; theyareacentralfeatureofit.Theyareakeytohowpeopleunderstandtheway thegenocidewasexecuted.Respondentsinthisstudyrememberveryvividlythe peopleintheircommunitieswhowerecarryingarmsandthewaytheywereused bythesepeople.Aboveall,smallarmsandlightweaponswereusedtointimidatepeople,inducefear,anddemonstratepower.Theseweaponswereoften carriedbyex-soldiersandInterahamwe,peoplewholackpowerandauthority inpeacetime,orwouldhaveremainedpowerlesswithouttheseweapons. Thisstudysquantitativeresearchalthoughreliantonasmallsamplesize yields the conclusion that small arms and light weapons were not used at random.Theirusewasrelatedtothecharacteristicsofthevictims:landowners andeducatedpeoplehadahigherprobabilityofbeingthreatenedorkilled byafirearm.Theorganizersandperpetratorsofthegenocidemayhavedeliberatelyavoidedtheuseofammunitiontokillpoorpeasants,reservingbullets forpeoplewithacertainstatusinthecommunity,astheycouldhavemounted greaterresistance.Incontrast,machetesandothertraditionalarmswereused bypoorpeopletokillotherpoorpeople.Becauseofpopularparticipationin thegenocide,theuseoftraditionalweaponswasthuswidespread. Tenyearsafterthegenocidemostpeopleinterviewedconsiderthemachete ahouseholdoragriculturaltool.Tutsihouseholdsandanyhouseholdsthat suffered numerous casualties are more likely to perceive the machete as a weaponthanatool.MorethanathirdofTutsirespondentsidentifythemachete primarilyasaweapon,probablypointingtomistrustbetweenneighbours. ThesmallcasestudyinTambatafurtherdemonstratestheexistenceofmistrustamongRwandans.Respondentsweregenerallyafraidtobeinterviewed andrevealinformation.SomesaidthatHutuandTutsilivedapartandthatsome peoplehidtheirweaponsnotknowingwhentheywouldnextneedthem. Thesefindingsshouldservetohighlighttheongoingneedforpoliciesand programmesdesignedtoimproverelationsoftrustbetweenHutuandTutsi
 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2 Meijer and Verwimp Weapons, Conflict, and Rwanda 

Endnotes

1 Thestudydefinesfirearmasagun,arifle,oragrenade. 2 Thisarticleusesthetermfirearmandmodernweaponinterchangeablytorefertomodern This article uses the term firearm and modern weapon interchangeably to refer to modern weaponsandfirearmssuchasguns,rifles,assaultweapons,orgrenades.Themoregeneric termmodernarmcanrefertomanykindsofweapons,butinRwandaitessentiallyrefers torifles.Specificarmsareidentifiedinthisstudywhenevernecessary. 3 Governmentdocumentsfrom199094revealthatregimeleadersrealizedthatfirearmsand ammunitionwereinshortsupplyandthusneededtobeusedeconomically. 4 TheGovernmentofRwanda,throughtheNationalUnityandReconciliationCommission, ispromotingaunifiedRwandanidentity,onedivorcedfromtheethnicaffiliationsofthe past.Thisprocessisdifficult,largelybecauseRwandanscontinuetoidentifythemselves withtheirethnicgroups,whichdeterminedmuchofindividualandfamilyhistoriesinthe pastdecades.Thisstudyusesthesecategoriesinordertofacilitatediscussionofthegenocide andcivilwar.Thisusageinnowayimpliesthattheauthorssubscribetotheuseofthese ethnictermsintheshapingofRwandasfuture. 5 SeeDesforges(1999).OtherscholarssuchasGerardPrunierputthedeathtollbetween 500,000and800,000. 6 Jean-PierreChrtien,DanielledeLame,CatherineNewbury,GrardPrunier,andFilip ReyntjensprovidedetailedassessmentsofthehistoryofRwanda.Seebibliography. 7 ForadiscussionofHabyarimanasdictatorship,withafocusonhispartysestablishment andhisappealtoRwandasfarmers,seeVerwimp(2003). 8 SeeFIDH(1993). 9 For details, see Verwimp(2003). Fordetails,seeVerwimp ( Verwimp 10 ResponsestothetwoquestionsinTable1arenotdirectlycomparablesincethelatterquestion hasthreeresponsecategories.Theadditionalreplynamelythattherespondentalmost forgotabouttheuseofmachetesasweaponsbeforethegenocidecouldnotbeappliedto thefirstquestion.Twoissuesareatstakehere.Thefirstisthatrespondentswhochosethe replyIalmostforgotthatsomanypeoplewerekilledwithamachetemayshowawillingn esstoforgetabouttheuseofthemacheteasaweaponaswellasarecognitionofitsuse duringthegenocide.Ifthisisthecase,theserepliesmaybeaddedtotheyescategory, providingfurtherconfirmationofastrongershiftofperceptionamongTutsithanamong Hutu.Second,thisanswermayalsorevealthepresenceoftraumafromthesideofthe respondents.Theauthorswerenotabletodistinguishbetweenthesetwopossibilities. 11 A multinomial logit regression models the choice of an agent between several alternatives. Amultinomiallogitregressionmodelsthechoiceofanagentbetweenseveralalternatives. Thealternativesarenothierarchical;theystandonequalfooting.Themodelisanextension ofthebinarychoicemodelwhereanagentonlyhastwopossibilitiesfromwhichtochoose. 12 All the quotes in this article are based on confidential interviews held in Rigor and Ragor AllthequotesinthisarticlearebasedonconfidentialinterviewsheldinRigorandRagor (centralRwanda)inSeptember2004. 13 Anadditionalgrenadewasaddedtothestandardrosterofguns,assaultrifles,automatic firearms,grenades,androcketlaunchersusedbytheSmallArmsSurvey.

14 See StephanGooseandFrankSmyth(1994)foradetaileddescriptionandcriticismofthe SeeStephan Goose and Frank Smyth ( Stephan armssalestoRwanda. 15 Thesamplesizeissmallerthan114becausenotallhouseholdsinterviewedforthepregenocidesurveycouldberevisited. 16 For more on the Rwandan demobilization programme, see Verwimp and Verpoorten ( FormoreontheRwandandemobilizationprogramme,see eeVerwimpandVerpoorten(2004). Renner(1997,p.44)discusseseffortsinNicaraguaasafailedexampleofreintegrationof ex-combatants. 17 The names of the places have been changed to ensure confidentiality. Thenamesoftheplaceshavebeenchangedtoensureconfidentiality.



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Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2

PublishedinOctober2005

Small Arms Survey GraduateInstituteofInternationalStudies 47 AvenueBlanc,1202 Geneva,Switzerland Phone: +41 22 908 5777 Fax: +41 22 732 2738 Email: smallarm@hei.unige.ch Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org