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Impacts of Severe Storms on Electric Grids

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Task Force on Power Outages

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The Union of the Electricity IndustryEURELECTRIC is the sector association representing the common interests of the electricity industry at pan-European level, plus its affiliates and associates on several other continents. In line with its mission, EURELECTRIC seeks to contribute to the competitiveness of the electricity industry, to provide effective representation for the industry in public affairs, and to promote the role of electricity both in the advancement of society and in helping provide solutions to the challenges of sustainable development. EURELECTRICs formal opinions, policy positions and reports are formulated in Working Groups, composed of experts from the electricity industry, supervised by five Committees. This structure of expertise ensures that EURELECTRICs published documents are based on high-quality up-to-date information. For further information on EURELECTRIC activities, visit our website, which provides general information on the association and on policy issues relevant to the electricity industry; latest news of our activities; EURELECTRIC positions and statements; a publications catalogue listing EURELECTRIC reports; and information on our events and conferences.

EURELECTRIC pursues in all its activities the application of the following sustainable development values: Economic Development Growth, added-value, efficiency Environmental Leadership Commitment, innovation, pro-activeness Social Responsibility Transparency, ethics, accountability

Impacts of Severe Storms on Electric Grids

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TF Power Outages
............................................................................................ Paper drafted by: Paper prepared by: Jan Sundell (chairman), Dietmar Beck (DE), Fehr Gyrgy (HU), Kjell Gustafsson (SE), John L. Harris (DE), Erven Herbert (AT), Aivars Kape (LV), Philippe Lienhart (FR), Albert Maissis (GR), Inge Pierre (SE), Kazimierz Szynol (PL) EURELECTRIC: Gbor Tth, Juho Lipponen.

Copyright 2006 Union of the Electricity Industry EURELECTRIC A.I.S.B.L. All rights reserved Printed in Brussels (Belgium)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In early January 2005, a devastating storm hit southern Scandinavia and the Baltic countries. Gudrun, as the Swedes called it, not only badly damaged roads, railways and other elements of the infrastructure, but left almost 700000 electricity customers without supply in Sweden alone. Electricity companies and individual employees put extraordinary efforts into restoring service to people, showing a great sense of solidarity beyond the line of duty. Naturally and understandably, when the days of need had passed, people and also regulators started to ask whether the occurrence of power outages of varying extent was an inescapable consequence of extreme weather conditions, or whether there were ways to better prepare for them and perhaps to avoid them. Answers to these questions widely vary. In some cases, extreme storms were accepted as acts of force majeure, against which it is hard and/or too costly to develop a perfect defence. In other cases, regulators started setting strict objectives for the reliability of supply and put compensation schemes in place for customers who lost supply for a given period of time. In this report EURELECTRIC examines four different events: freezing rain covering everything up to 90 mm thickness in Canada in January 1998, a windstorm up to 220 km/h in France in December 1999, a heavy snowstorm in Poland in November 2004, and the storm Gudrun with 150 km/h wind in Sweden, Latvia et al in January 2005. While the regulatory and political reactions to these events differ from case to case, certain common patterns can be recognised, perhaps the most conspicuous one being the demand for burying more distribution networks underground. Another consequence is the emergence of different functional demands for distribution networks accompanied by compensation schemes for customers in some countries. EURELECTRIC has analysed the political and/or regulatory consequences of the above events and formulated recommendations on them, partly for distribution companies and partly for decision-makers. The most important conclusion is that there is no uniform solution valid all over Europe. The structure of the grid, the national regulatory framework, the geographical and geomorphological situation along with local weather conditions influence the optimal solution to such an extent that it is doubtful whether it makes sense to look for a single European answer to these issues. The European electricity industry therefore believes that ways to mitigate the effects of extreme weather conditions on electric grids should be sought at company level, closely cooperating and coordinating with national regulatory authorities. It is clearly in the interests of the industry to ensure the best cost-effectively achievable reliability of electricity supply, and the support of a prudent regulatory framework operating with appropriately defined and measured incentives is vital to achieving this. Mutual assistance and cooperation among network companies in Europe have proved to be very useful in cases of emergency. The possibility of institutionalising European or regional coordination of hardware (e.g. mobile generating units) and human resources should be examined within the industry.
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Should compensation schemes for customers be introduced, it must be clear that companies cannot be liable for damages or loss of supply in case of force majeure. There should also be clear rules established for allocating responsibilities and costs, when an operator cannot supply due to events outside his network (e.g. where an incident at transmission level leads to an outage at distribution level). In order to facilitate the fastest possible recovery of supply, network operators should be allowed to own mobile and stationary generating units for emergency situations, to the extent that this is compatible with corresponding rules on unbundling and competition. The report also proposes a number of practical recommendations, which can contribute to prevention and management of major power outages caused by severe storms and extreme weather conditions.

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INDEX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................5 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF EVENTS......................................................9
1.1 CANADA JANUARY, 1998 ................................................................................................................... 10 1.1.1 Overall description.................................................................................................................... 10 1.1.2 Damage caused ......................................................................................................................... 10 1.1.3 Impacts on customers and civil infrastructure .......................................................................... 10 1.1.4 Repair procedures..................................................................................................................... 11 1.1.5 Emergency procedures and cooperation................................................................................... 12 1.1.6 Estimated costs (repair, compensation, investment) ................................................................. 12 1.2 FRANCE DECEMBER, 1999.................................................................................................................. 12 1.2.1 Overall description.................................................................................................................... 12 1.2.2 Damage caused ......................................................................................................................... 13 1.2.3 Impact on customers and civil infrastructure ........................................................................... 13 1.2.4 Repair procedures..................................................................................................................... 14 1.2.5 Emergency and cooperation ..................................................................................................... 14 1.2.6 Estimated cost ........................................................................................................................... 16 1.3 POLAND NOVEMBER, 2004................................................................................................................. 16 1.3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 16 1.3.2 Event description....................................................................................................................... 16 1.3.3 Damage caused. Impact on customers and civil infrastructure................................................ 17 1.3.4 Estimated repair costs............................................................................................................... 18 1.3.5 Political consequences .............................................................................................................. 18 1.3.6 Repair procedures..................................................................................................................... 18 1.3.7 Summary.................................................................................................................................... 18 1.4 SWEDEN JANUARY, 2005.................................................................................................................... 19 1.4.1 Overall description.................................................................................................................... 19 1.4.2 Damage caused ......................................................................................................................... 19 1.4.3 Impacts on customers and civil infrastructure .......................................................................... 20 1.4.4 Repair procedures..................................................................................................................... 22 1.4.5 Emergency procedures and cooperation................................................................................... 23 1.4.6 Estimated costs (repair, compensation, investments)................................................................ 24 1.5 LATVIA JANUARY, 2005 ..................................................................................................................... 24 1.5.1 Overall description.................................................................................................................... 24 1.5.2 Damage caused ......................................................................................................................... 24 1.5.3 Impacts on customers and civil infrastructure .......................................................................... 25 1.5.4 Repair procedures..................................................................................................................... 25 1.5.5 Emergency procedures and cooperation................................................................................... 26 1.5.6 Estimated costs (repair, compensation, investment) ................................................................. 27 1.6 LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................................................ 27 1.6.1 Solidarity ................................................................................................................................... 27 1.6.2 Communication with the public................................................................................................. 27 1.6.3 Autonomy .................................................................................................................................. 28 1.6.4 Priority of restoration ............................................................................................................... 28

2.

PUBLIC, POLITICAL AND REGULATORY CONSEQUENCES ..........................29

2.1 CANADA ................................................................................................................................................ 29 2.1.1 New requirements on design, need for undergrounding ........................................................... 29 2.1.2 New requirements for maintenance........................................................................................... 30 2.1.3 Functional demands for distribution networks ......................................................................... 30 2.1.4 Demands and incentives for investments to enhance security of supply ................................... 30

2.2

2.3 2.4

2.5

2.6

2.1.5 Political tolerance of long and/or widespread outages.............................................................30 2.1.6 Mobile units...............................................................................................................................30 FRANCE .................................................................................................................................................31 2.2.1 New requirements on design, need for undergrounding ...........................................................31 2.2.2 Functional demands for distribution networks..........................................................................31 2.2.3 Compensation for customers .....................................................................................................32 2.2.4 Demands and incentives for investments to enhance security of supply ...................................32 2.2.5 Mobile units...............................................................................................................................33 POLAND .................................................................................................................................................33 SWEDEN.................................................................................................................................................33 2.4.1 New requirements on design, need for undergrounding ...........................................................33 2.4.2 Functional demands for distribution networks..........................................................................34 2.4.3 Compensation for customers .....................................................................................................36 2.4.4 Demands and incentives for investments to enhance security of supply ...................................36 2.4.5 Political tolerance of long and/or wide-spread outages ...........................................................36 LATVIA ..................................................................................................................................................39 2.5.1 New requirements on design, need for undergrounding ...........................................................39 2.5.2 New requirements for maintenance...........................................................................................39 2.5.3 Mobile units...............................................................................................................................39 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................39

3.

EURELECTRIC CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................... 41

3.1 NEW REQUIREMENTS ON DESIGN OF DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS .............................................................41 3.1.1 Undergrounding ........................................................................................................................41 3.1.2 Pole mounted transformers .......................................................................................................42 3.1.3 Introduction of weak links .........................................................................................................42 3.1.4 Life cycle approach ...................................................................................................................42 3.2 NEW REQUIREMENTS ON MAINTENANCE ................................................................................................43 3.2.1 Line maintenance ......................................................................................................................43 3.2.2 De-icing, cleaning .....................................................................................................................44 3.3 COMPENSATION FOR CUSTOMERS ..........................................................................................................44 3.4 DEMANDS AND INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY OF SUPPLY...............................46 3.5 PUBLIC AND POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF LONG AND/OR WIDE-SPREAD OUTAGES...................................47 3.6 INTERVENTION IN COMPANY OPERATION, RESCINDING OF CONCESSIONS ...............................................48 3.6.1 Intervention in company operation ...........................................................................................48 3.6.2 Rescinding of concessions .........................................................................................................48 3.7 EMERGENCY ORGANISATIONS, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ............................................................................49 3.7.1 Mutual assistance ......................................................................................................................49 3.7.2 Own emergency measures .........................................................................................................49 3.8 INTERNAL COMMUNICATION AND CO-ORDINATION WITH EMERGENCY ORGANISATIONS ........................50 3.8.1 Internal communication ............................................................................................................50 3.8.2 Coordination with emergency organisations ............................................................................50 3.9 ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION NEEDS .................................................................................51 3.9.1 Communication during an outage .............................................................................................51 3.9.2 Follow-up communication after an outage ...............................................................................52

1.

Introduction and summary of events

One may have the impression that blackouts caused by extreme weather conditions have increased both in number and in severity during the last decade. Putting aside all speculations about our civilisation influencing atmosphere and weather phenomena, there seem to be reasons enough for improvements of technical and organisational precautions taken by the electricity industry and, specifically, network operators. EURELECTRIC therefore decided to re-establish its Task Force on Power Outages in order to examine the effects of the 2005 January storms in northern Europe plus other recent severe events in distribution networks. Regarding emergency operations, restoration and repair works, the Task Force set out to draw out conclusions covering the following items: sequence of events; weak spots of technology and/or organisation; strategies proven successful; the increasing vulnerability of society to power loss; potential new aspects affecting the decision on underground cables versus overhead lines; regulatory strategies as regards incentives for new investments in infrastructure, rewards for successful grid owners and compensation to customers in case of power outages. The events examined by the group have been chosen arbitrarily, without the intention of being exhaustive or representative regarding the type of events or severity of consequences. Where appropriate, the report will give recommendations for evaluating the present situation and suggest improvements in technologies or emergency measures. The events are discussed in chronological order.
ABBREVIATIONS USED LV MV HV EHV TSO DSO PSO low voltage medium voltage high voltage extra-high voltage transmission system operator distribution system operator Public service obligation

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1.1 1.1.1

CANADA JANUARY, 1998 Overall description

Between January 5 and 10, 1998 a series of exceptionally severe ice storms hit Ontario, the Maritimes, New York and New England. 35 mm of freezing rain fell in 26 hours, then doubled over the following days. Freezing rain settled on everything, ranging up to 3 inches (almost 8 centimetres). Besides the physical damage to transmission and distribution networks, the ice caused the grounded shield wire either to snap or to sag and come in contact with the power conductor. Some offices received more trouble reports in one day than in a normal year. The reasons for power outages were almost solely the tremendous weight of ice; 70, 80 and in some cases 90 mm of ice on lines (3 tonnes of weight on every 100 metres of cable equivalent to two minivans). Ontario Hydro design for ice was 25 mm for 230 kV and 115 kV lines; 50 mm for 500 kV and main trunk 230 kV equivalent of a 50-year event (the Canadian Standards Association called for resistance to 12.5 mm of ice). 1.1.2 Damage caused

In the area of Ontario Hydro the following damage occurred: 130 transmission pylons destroyed; 2100 transformers destroyed or damaged; 10750 pylons pulled down. By January 8, more than 30% of the distribution lines had been destroyed, together with a significant portion of transmission lines and thousands of trees. Some lines were lost again after having been restored the previous day. By Friday (January 9), electricity distribution had suffered the worst ever damage in Ontario Hydros history, with thousands of poles snapping; many lines and facilities, repaired the day before, collapsing again; and new damage occurring at thousands of locations. 34% of distribution stations were without power; 31% of distribution lines were downed or damaged. A specific environmental damage was caused by 791 transformer oil spills (due to polemounted transformers crashing to the ground). In the Hydro-Qubec area, 600 transmission towers collapsed; 300 to 400 more towers were damaged; 4000 transformers were left inoperable; over 3000 km high voltage transmission lines were affected; over 16000 wooden transmission poles were destroyed or damaged; over 2000 additional supporting structures were impacted; and more than 128 transmission lines were affected. 1.1.3 Impacts on customers and civil infrastructure

Of Ontario Hydros customers, well over 600000 people were left without supply for varying lengths of time. On January 6, about 30000 residences and businesses (~95000 people) experienced power outages; most were restored within 24 hours. The following day 50000 residences and businesses lost power. On January 9, supply to 149062 customers (homes, farms, businesses,
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etc.) got interrupted, leaving about 600000 people (half the population) out of electricity in sub-zero conditions.

1,400,000

Ontario Hydro Hydro-Qubec

1,200,000

1,000,000

800,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

0 February 1 February 3 February 5 January 10 January 12 January 14 January 16 January 18 January 20 January 22 January 24 January 26 January 28 January 30 February 7 January 4 January 6 January 8

Number of customers having lost supply

In the area of Hydro-Qubec, 1.4 million customers (~3 million people) were left in the dark, many for close to a month. The storm also left more than 500000 people without power in the US states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and New York. Due to collapsing towers, the transmission capacity to Montral dramatically dropped on January 6, leaving 700000 customers without electricity by end of day. The next day, nearly 300000 customers were reconnected, but freezing rain fell again, cutting supply to 500000 customers. On January 8, further lines failed, and by end of day, over one million customers had lost power. By early afternoon the next day, the cumulative effect of wind, flurries and freezing rain brought large sections of the transmission network down, leaving 1.4 million customers without electricity. 1.1.4 Repair procedures

Due to the extensive damage (e.g. in the so-called Triangle of Darkness), Hydro-Qubec did not simply repair but actually rebuilt its networks. Task forces known as missions , with wide-ranging autonomy were organised for action in a given area, covering technical competencies and also including supply and

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communication capabilities. There were about thirty missions each comprising some 150 people. Customers were treated on a priority basis, with hospitals, fire services, ambulances, etc. in Priority Class 1. High priority was also given to the critical activities of key suppliers manufacturing and transporting the spare parts needed for reconstruction. 1.1.5 Emergency procedures and cooperation

Due to worsening weather forecast, emergency supplies were rushed to the region of Ontario Hydro (poles, conductors, transformers, insulators and other hardware). After the storm, some 85000 insulators, 2800 km of wire and cable, 11647 poles and 2100 transformers were delivered to Eastern Ontario. The army was called on for essential tasks not requiring specialist knowledge. Teams ended up working for five weeks without a break, often for 16 hours a day, in intense cold (to prevent extreme fatigue and ensure a minimum amount of rest, at one moment it was requested that daily work hours be reduced to 12 hours). Accommodation facilities, canteens and child-care facilities were put in place. Retired staff was also mobilised. Showing a strong sense of civic duty, recently laid-off employees came back to give a hand. The reception lobby of the Hydro-Qubec building was transformed into a gigantic studio, where journalists regularly received up-dates on the situation. These concentrated on facts, but technical briefing sessions were also organised from time to time for journalists seeking more specialised information. Staff from the communication department were dispatched to each emergency centre in the areas where television was not working. One person, with a back-up, was appointed to be the regular correspondent of each given media. Having recognised that media broadcasts have as primary audience population groups who are not directly affected by the events, each mission included a person responsible for relations with the public and their representatives, particularly local mayors. As a symbolic gesture, the public lighting of the Hydro-Qubec tower building was turned off. 1.1.6 Estimated costs (repair, compensation, investment)

The estimated costs of damages were Canadian $140 million for Ontario Hydro, and $800 million for Hydro-Qubec. 1.2 FRANCE DECEMBER, 1999

1.2.1 Overall description At the end of 1999, a series of storms caused huge damages all over the country. First storm over the north A high storm coming with hail and rain crossed the northern part of France during the night of December 25 to 26. The gust of wind started on the Brittany Coast around 3.00am. Wind
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speeds of 170 km/h (47 m/s) were recorded in Brest. The storm gained speed and power as soon as it crossed France. At Orly airport, 173 km/h (48 m/s) was recorded; 216 km/h (60 m/s) on the top of the Eiffel Tower, 150 km/h (42 m/s) in Paris streets and 180 km/h (50 m/s) in Vosges Mountains. There are no data in Meteo France archives of such fierce weather ever being recorded. The second storm over the southern part A second storm hit the southern part of France on December 27 around 5 pm. There, wind speeds of 150 km/h (42 m/s) were recorded. 1.2.2 Damage caused

During the first storm, 30 people were killed. Damage was substantial: several houses and other buildings were partially or totally destroyed. Many roads, motorways, railways were blocked. The electrical grid also suffered severe damages: flooded substations, broken or tangled wires, flattened poles, twisted pylons and so forth. The interconnection grid was also badly affected: lines to Germany were temporary out of order. 5500 MV and LV poles needed to be replaced. The storm also caused huge damage to forests. Some of them were completely ruined. Thousands of trees fell on MV and phone overhead lines. Air and railways traffic was severely disturbed. But most damage occurred on the Electricit de France (EdF) grid. For long, EdF had been prepared for white frost or sticking snow on lines, but such a severe situation was completely unanticipated by the company. Nearly 3.4 million household customers were left without electricity. 35 EHV lines ( of the total number) tripped. 180 HV lines were brought to the ground; more than 100 HV/MV substations were out of order. Innumerable lengths of MV and LV lines collapsed under falling trees. 1.2.3 Impact on customers and civil infrastructure

In the morning of December 27, 1400000 household customers were without electricity, mainly in the East, the North and in Paris suburbs. In these regions, the EdF grid was severely damaged: 120 EHV pylons and 67 HV lines. After the second storm, the situation became worse.
Number of household customers without electricity on December 28: REGION Normandie Picardie Nord Est Ouest Sud-Ouest Sud-Est Mditerrane Centre NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS 180000 470000 600000 845000 320000 60000 (of which 25000 in Corsica) 800000

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Ile de France (Paris & suburbs) TOTAL

170000 3445000

1.2.4

Repair procedures

Immediately after the first storm, 8000 people worked in call centres to provide information to customers. EdF gave specific and regular information to the prefectures and city halls concerning the local situation. The EdF website provided regularly updated information to the public. Exceptional measures to restore electricity in a minimum of time were set into force. Thirty helicopters examined lines in order to locate the damage precisely. About 6000 EdF operators started repairing the grid (most of them having interrupted their holidays). They were given help by 6000 other people from public work companies. 5000 technical vehicles were used. In most regions, a co-ordinated plan between authorities, helping organisations, the army and EdF was deployed. After the second storm, new reinforcements were added; consolidated EdF operators and equipment started restoring electricity in the country: 18800 operators specialised in grid maintenance; 40000 logistic and commercial employees; all operators with electrical ability working in any other company; 3600 soldiers; operators and engineers from French overseas territories (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana and Runion); EdF group companies: Clemessy, London Electricity, which sent 6 drilling cranes to create foundations of new pylons; all the EdF staff on holidays and also early retired were called back to help. 1.2.5 Emergency and cooperation

1200 foreign operators from 17 countries contributed to the restoration: e.g. Ireland (176 on Atlantic coast), Great Britain (170 in the North and Vosges Mountain), Italy (151 in Central Mountain and Savoie), Germany (140 in Dordogne, Limousin and Vosges Mountain), Spain (130 in South West), Belgium (115 in the North and East), Czech Republic (30 in Champagne) Netherlands (25 in the North), Portugal (20), Morocco (20), Hungary (15 in Paris suburb Montereau), Croatia (12). Foreign companies sent 300 portable power generators across a broad power scale from some kW to 1.25 MW, which EdF bought or rented. For example, 25 units of 850 MVA were loaded in a plane from Zagreb in Croatia to Bordeaux. German company Ets Wilson sent 22 units transported by German civil security. London Electricity sent 5 powerful units to Prigueux and Limoges. In fact, EdF used all the available portable power generators in Europe and beyond: some of them came from Canada. Altogether, 1600 units were connected. Operational equipment was also sent to France, e.g. Hungary provided two off-road cars and two lifting trucks (12 m and 20 m).
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After days of work, recovery teams concentrated on regions with significant access difficulties, such as forests, mountains or flooded zones. Just before the weekend of January 8/9, 97% of the affected household customers had recovered electricity. The last customer was reconnected on January 14.
4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 January 1 January 2 January 3 January 4 January 5 January 6 January 7 January 8 January 9 January 10 January 11 January 12 January 13 December 27 December 28 December 29 December 30 December 31 January 14

Number of households without electricity (in thousands)

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1.2.6

Estimated cost

The following estimation of direct costs was made immediately after the storm:
GENERATION EMERGENCY REPAIR LOSS OF SALES# COMPENSATION* INVESTMENTS IN
REBUILDING

GRID 455.5 M

FINANCIAL
PROVISION

TOTAL 494.4 M

38.9 M

69.3 M 60 M 785.1 M 38.9 M 1240.6 M 129.3 M

69.3 M 60 M 785.1 M 1408.8 M

TOTAL

# 0.7 TWh was not supplied * an exceptional so-called Millennium Compensation (voluntary by EdF), in form of total rebate of fixed charges for 2000 for customers without supply on December 31

1.3 1.3.1

POLAND NOVEMBER, 2004 Introduction

On November 19, 3 of the 17 administrative regions in Poland, a part of Silesian and parts of the Malopolskie and witokrzyskie voivodships were affected by the snowstorm with heavy snowfall and extremely strong wind blows. The weather conditions caused some serious disturbances in the operation of the national electricity system, both in the transmission grid (400 and 220 kV) and in the 100 kV sub-transmission grid, bringing about many serious damages both to national and international transmission lines. As a result of these disturbances, the dispatching services of the TSO and DSOs had to conduct a series of actions in a very short time in order to minimise the danger, to eliminate the disturbances and also to restore the dispatch of electricity to customers. It can be roughly estimated that the storm caused serious problems with the dispatch, with the disconnection of some 1000 MW electricity demand in the area covered by Katowice DSO. 1.3.2 Event description

As the result of the storm, 400 kV and 220 kV cross-border interconnectors with the Czech Republic tripped. In Poland, three 400 kV lines, six 220 kV lines and one autotransformer 400/220 kV 330 MVA also tripped, as well as four autotransformers 220/110 kV 160 MVA. The disconnection of the 400 kV line between Dobrzyn and Albrechtice (permanent since November 16 due to line damage at Albrechtice station) had a significant influence on the sequence and evolution of this disturbance. The worst hit region was in southern Poland, where the operation of 110 kV line is coordinated by Katowice DSO. The main characteristics of the disturbances were: simultaneous intensive development in the transmission grid at 400 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV levels;

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simultaneous intensive development in the grids of some distribution companies at different voltage levels; with widespread serious damage to equipment, disabling the restoration of electricity supply within a short period of time; large number of disturbances for final customers in a short period of time due to the tripping of the linear connection of 110 kV including several stations in H system/configuration; loss of connections between the 110 kV distribution grid and the superior 400 kV and 220 kV grids (tripping of 4 autotransformers with 3 being switched off permanently). The distribution system operator (OSDE) and the local dispatching system services (ODM) undertook coordinated actions in order to accomplish the following targets: maintaining the connection of 110 kV grids with each other and with the superior grid; introduction of a temporary operation system for distribution grids, in order to maintain the cohesion of the grid and power output from the operating generation units; balancing of the 110 kV sub-transmission grid; recovering the transmission grid that tripped, restoring the voltage after quick analysis of the operation of the security system conducted by the generating units in operation; preventing the formation of island areas; restoring supply to final customers disconnected for security reasons; cooperation with the operation/maintenance services, in order to locate the damage and to determine the date of their readiness to switch back on. 1.3.3 Damage caused. Impact on customers and civil infrastructure

witokszyskie voivodship Some 51 distribution lines and 434 transformer stations were destroyed. Around 13000 customers suffered interruption of electricity supplies. The failures were repaired within two days. Silesion voivodship 6135 failures were recorded. As a consequence, 310000 household and industrial customers, such as steel mills, water conditioning stations, coal mines and cooling plants, lost supply. The loss of supply to the Water Production Plant Goczakowice and Zawada for 24 hours caused shortages in fresh water supply to the Silesian agglomeration. Disturbances in the functioning of public transport also occurred. The traction grid of railway traffic was affected and 25 tramway traction lines were damaged.

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Maopolskie voivodship Due to the damage to HV and MV lines, approximately 200000 customers were left without electricity supplies. On November 20, 757 substations were out of operation and 57 MV lines were damaged. The following day, 1 HV line and 32 MV stations were still out of order. The largest number of failures was recorded in Krakw. On November 22, 1 HV line, 26 sections of MV lines and 24 MV stations remained out of service. About 4000 customers were without electricity. The faults in the MV network were repaired by November 23, and the HV line was put back into operation on the following day. 1.3.4 Estimated repair costs

According to the reports, the costs resulting from these events are estimated at around 20 M. 1.3.5 Political consequences

The situation showed weaknesses in the information flow system as regards links between the distribution companies and the administration bodies at voivodship level. During subsequent meetings between representatives of local administration and distribution companies, new procedures were developed to facilitate information exchange. 1.3.6 Repair procedures

The repair work started immediately. It was well organised and coordinated by local crisis centres, the TSO, DSOs, Polish State Forests and other bodies involved. Actions were executed in an efficient manner. Customers were partly supplied by emergency equipment where possible. Administration bodies were informed about the availability of preferential loans for reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure, and insurance companies compensated damage and losses. 1.3.7 Summary

The November 19 storm was one of the most serious disturbances in the recent history of the Polish national electricity system. Having parallel impacts at all levels of the national grids, it clearly showed how important is cooperation between system operators for the safe operation of the national system. Data analysis shows that the operation services took only a few minutes to make decisions on the necessary connecting, steering and regulating actions. It should be noted that dispatching services were effectively maintained due to the correct information flow, hierarchical system of decision-making and reliable operation of data communication appliances, plus appropriate cooperation with operation services. Recent developments in the grid configuration and effective regulatory actions limited the impact of grid disturbances on the operation of generating units. During the disturbances, two generating units were tripped by the automatic safeguard equipment; one generating unit was disconnected on the dispatchers orders, in order to ensure the safety of equipment; two

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generating units were disconnected in order to balance the system; and output from one generating unit was limited. The location of disconnected and severely damaged lines in the 110 kV grid made it necessary to make a temporary set of distribution line arrangements in the following hours and even days. At that time, some parts of the grid were emergency supplied, with lower reliability, which created a real risk of repeated disconnection of customers. A great problem was the relatively large number of stations without permanent operation personnel and a lack of remote connector-control in many places. 1.4 1.4.1 SWEDEN JANUARY, 2005 Overall description

The storm named Gudrun, which hit southern Sweden on January 8, had devastating effects. The entire infrastructure was hit. Roads and railways in large parts of southern Sweden were obstructed by large number of trees, e.g. there were no trains between Stockholm and Malm for 12 days. Electricity outages were extensive and a large part of both the stationary and mobile telephone traffic in the affected area were hit for a long period. The storm gathered northwest of Ireland and followed a path usual for intense low-pressures passing over Sweden. It was not exceptional from a meteorological point of view, although it hit a larger area than usual. During the storm, there were hurricane winds (more than 117.7 km/h or 32.7 m/s) over large areas and the most powerful gusts were 151 km/h (42 m/s). That had happened several times before during the last 100 years, but had never led to such damage. 70 million cubic meter wood (150 million trees) was cut, corresponding to almost one normal year of woodcutting for the whole of Sweden (the second most severe storm in 1969 cut 25 million m3 of wood). The severe consequences can be explained by a number of contributing circumstances. Among other things, there was no ground frost at the time and the planted spruce trees may not be biotopically suitable for the area. It was primarily in spruce woods that electric lines were cut, causing outages. 1.4.2 Damage caused

The storm caused widespread outages that lasted for a long time. The generation system was also affected. Due to network problems, two nuclear power plants, amounting to 25% of Swedens generation, were shut down for a short period. Barsebck because of line dancing and Ringhals due to salt problems in the switch yard. Sub-transmission networks were proportionally less badly hit than distribution networks, because rights-of-way are normally wider or tree secure. It was only Sydkrafts subtransmission network that was affected to any large extent, and it also took longer for Sydkraft to restore the network seven days compared to less than 24 hours for other network companies. The share of cables in the distribution networks varies considerably among different network companies, as shown below. These areas were of course less affected than those with
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overhead lines. Other factors also influenced the extent of the damage caused. Certain network companies with large percentage of cables may have had problems with their relatively short overhead lines, while others with proportionally less cable were better off. Insulated overhead lines were also affected to a high degree, see chapter 2.4.1.
Length of network [km] 2200 14900 9700 88650 13700 6422 840 644 1030 920 815 650 590 425 545 600 Share of cables [%] 10 54 31 48 38 90 11 47 65 72 54 55 30 74 58 75 Share of insulated overhead lines [%] 15 22 6 19 4 7 14 4 22 17 3 18 50 0 20 15 Share of uninsulated overhead lines [%] 75 24 63 33 58 3 75 49 13 11 43 27 20 26 22 10

Network company Vattenfall Eldistribution Mellan Vattenfall Eldistribution st Vattenfall Eldistribution Vst Sydkraft Fortum Distribution GENAB (Gteborg) KREAB st KEAB Skne Hrryda Energi Ale Elfrening Jnkping Energi Nt Vaggeryd Eleverk Rdeby Elverk Habo Kraft Vrnamo Elnt Alvesta Energi

Length of distribution networks in the affected area and percentage of cables, insulated and uninsulated overhead lines for the distribution network companies (from the investigation by Statens Energimyndighet)

1.4.3

Impacts on customers and civil infrastructure

Immediately after the storm, there were 663000 network customers without electricity supply. Of these, 295000 belonged to Sydkrafts network. There were some other network companies with many affected customers: Vattenfall with 260000 customers facing power outages, and Fortum with 50000. In relative terms, the local distribution company KREAB st was hit the hardest, with 100% of its 7200 customers without electricity supply, mainly due to problems at sub-transmission levels (Sydkrafts 50kV line feeding KREAB was out of service). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sydkrafts customers had to wait the longest time before the electricity supply was resumed, due to extensive damage to the subtransmission network and many poles that had collapsed. 354000 network customers (out of a total 663000) had their electricity supply restored within 24 hours; 159000 customers had to wait for between one and three days; 82000 network customers got their electricity back 4 to 7 days after the storm; 56000 customers were without electricity between 8 and 20 days; and, finally, 12000 customers had to wait for more than 20 days before supply returned. In general, Sydkraft had the most problems with restoring supply, some of their customers being

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without supply for 34 days. The graph and the table below give some figures for how long customers of different network companies had to wait before the electricity supply returned.
Number of customers normally connected to the network of different network companies in the most damaged region and the number of disconnected customers right after the storm: NETWORK COMPANY TOTAL NUMBER OF AFFECTED NUMBER OF PER CENT
CUSTOMERS CUSTOMERS AFFECTED

Vattenfall Eldistribution Mellan Vattenfall Eldistribution st Vattenfall Eldistribution Vst Sydkraft Fortum Distribution GENAB (Gteborg) KREAB st KEAB Skne Hrryda Energi Ale Elfrening Jnkping Energi Nt Vaggeryd Elverk Rdeby Elverk Habo Kraft Vrnamo Elnt Alvesta Energi TOTAL

450000 119200 167200 600000 241100 245870 7200 17000 12400 11600 50000 3700 4100 4000 10366 4769 1948475

111430 45000 107240 295400 52560 13421 7200 6480 4000 5850 8150 1132 2150 641 934 1,612 663200

25% 38% 64% 49% 22% 5% 100% 38% 32% 50% 16% 31% 52% 16% 9% 34% 34%

The share of re-connected customers in the networks of different network companies during the days following the storm: NETWORK COMPANY AFFECTED < 1 DAY 1-3 DAYS 4-7 DAYS 8-20 DAYS >20 DAYS
NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS

Vattenfall Eldistribution Mellan Vattenfall Eldistribution st Vattenfall Eldistribution Vst Sydkraft Fortum Distribution GENAB (Gteborg) KREAB st KEAB Skne Hrryda Energi Ale Elfrening Jnkping Energi Nt Vaggeryd Elverk

111430 45000 107240 295400 52560 13421 7200 6480 4000 5850 8150 1132

88.5% 62% 42% 41% 55% 65% 24% 81% 13% 97% 80% 51.5%

11% 29% 25% 25% 41% 28% 19% 19% 63% 3% 18% 35.5%

0.5% 7% 20% 17% 3% 6.5% 40% 9% 2% 9% 4% 2% 13% 13% 1% 0.5% 17% 15% 0.2% 4%

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Rdeby Elverk Habo Kraft Vrnamo Elnt Alvesta Energi

2150 641 934 1612

70% 94% 41% 82%

23% 6% 30% 15%

5% 25% 0.2%

2%

3%

300,000
Vattenfall Sydkraft Fortum Distribution Others

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Customers of distribution companies without electricity by number of days

In todays society, people rely much more on a secure electricity supply for their normal daily life than even just 10 years ago. Without electricity, almost nothing can function in a normal way. Besides affecting the lights and in most cases the heat supply, there were major problems with communicating and receiving information. Not only did mobile phone batteries run out and computers stop working, but the fixed telephone network was also damaged and mobile stations had insufficient battery capacity to stay in operation for more than 1-2 days. Receiving information therefore became a critical issue for many households. Transportation by car was almost impossible due to the large number of trees fallen across the roads. Many households had a rough time just trying to keep their houses warm, to prepare food and to receive information as to when the electricity supply could be expected to be restored. The quality of life was drastically reduced for many families, despite the terrific efforts by authorities, network companies, the army, municipalities and local companies in attempting to help as many people as possible. 1.4.4 Repair procedures

The repair work started very quickly. However, due to the extent of the damage, Sydkraft soon faced problems with lack of spare parts and people. Vattenfall and Fortum, having fixed their own networks, lent some resources to Sydkraft. In order to provide customers with electricity as soon as possible, more than 1000 small mobile generation units were used and

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connected to the network at strategically important points. The repair procedures for some of the network companies are summarised below. Sydkraft Around 20000 km of network lines were damaged in Sydkrafts network and around 2000 km had to be completely rebuilt. On January 10, almost 1400 people were working on the repairs and on the next day, 600 people were added. At the end of that week (January 15), around 2400 people were working on the repairs following the arrival of personnel from Germany, Poland and the Swedish army. Hercules aircraft were used for transporting spare parts from the northern part of Sweden. A special project organisation was set up for administration of the repair works. In order to facilitate communication, around 100 satellite telephones were bought from abroad. Spare parts were sent from Sydkrafts mother company E.ON in Europe and other parts of the world. Vattenfall Vattenfalls special organisation for large disturbances was put into operation already on January 8 and consisted of around 200 people. For safety reasons, the repair work could not get started during the ongoing storm but as soon as it was considered safe to start, up to 1300 people were active in the repair work. In addition, around 15 helicopters were used. Special resources from northern Sweden were brought to the scenes of the damage. Massive resources were used to get information out to customers, which was difficult due to problems with the telephone network. Fortum Fortum created a special organisation for dealing with the repair work. At the most, 300 to 400 people were engaged in restoring the electricity supply. Fortum also used 4-5 helicopters in the work. Fortum experienced no major problems finding spare parts. Other network companies The 8 smaller network companies affected by the storm had at the most around 600 staff involved in the repair work, some of them borrowed from other network companies and the Swedish army. Some of these people came from other parts of the country. Some 40-50 mobile generation units were used. 1.4.5 Emergency procedures and cooperation

After the storm Gudrun, approximately 5000 persons were engaged in the restoration of the network. In the international company groups, employees from neighbouring countries were also seconded to the restoration work. In Sweden, cooperation between network companies is formed under the aegis of SwedEnergy, the Swedish association of electricity companies. This cooperation was severely tested during the storm. Cooperation procedure had been established after earlier storms and, according to the companies involved, it worked very well during the storm. An important role in the cooperation was played by the Federation of Swedish Farmers. They assisted in clearing roads, transporting food and water, helping sick and old people and so on.

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The cooperation with municipalities and county administrative boards seems to have worked well in most cases. The military helped with transportation, local forestry helped with clearance work and other local organisations and private persons assisted in locating faults. Many network operators have agreements with external contractors in case of emergency. During the storm Gudrun the network operators reported that contributions from these had been of great importance. 1.4.6 Estimated costs (repair, compensation, investments)

The overall cost to the network operators was calculated at about 2350 MSEK (257 M). Of this sum, about (1540 MSEK or 168 M) was spent on clearance, reparation and rebuilding the network. Compensation to customers, paid voluntarily based on the companies own rules, amounted to 616 MSEK (67 M) or a quarter. Cost per customer, worked out on average at 3560 SEK/customer (280/customer). The various companies reported costs ranging from about 300 SEK/customer (33/customer) to 11900 SEK/customer (1300/customer). 1.5 1.5.1 LATVIA JANUARY, 2005 Overall description

The storm, which hit western, southern and northern Latvia on January 8 and 9, was the most severe storm in Latvia during the last 35-year period. The previous similar storm was in 1969. The average wind was 33-35 m/s (118-126 km/h) with wind gusts of 40 m/s (144 km/h). The entire infrastructure was hit. Roads and railways in large parts of Latvia were obstructed by large numbers of trees. In the inland, as winds of only 20-25 m/s (72-90 km/h) may be able to bring down trees, the damage in the woods was extensive in western, southern and northern Latvia. In many cases, trees fell on wires and poles of the distribution and transmission network, broke poles and disrupted wires. 1.5.2 Damage caused

Around 2000 km of network lines were damaged in the transmission network and 54000 km (64%) in the distribution network. Approximately 400000 electricity customers were left without electricity in the immediate aftermath of the storm some 40% of all Latvian customers. The distribution network was badly affected, which contributed to the large number of customers involved. However, the biggest cities Riga, Liepaja, Daugavpils had only small problems with electricity, because the distribution network consists of underground cables. Damage to the transmission system caused a 90-hour long emergency situation. Around 1200 trees fell on transmission lines; 3 transmission line towers were destroyed, and 34 transmission line towers damaged; conductors were damaged at 60 locations in the transmission network.

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Damage to the distribution system caused a 23-day long emergency situation. Around 53000 trees fell on distribution lines. There were 11000 broken poles and 38500 instances of damaged conductors; 2000 kg of wire (about 15 km) was stolen. 1.5.3 Impacts on customers and civil infrastructure

Immediately after the storm, on January 9, 372000 Latvenergo network customers were without electricity supply, and a further 20000 customers of other companies. 224000 customers had their electricity supply restored within 24 hours; 96400 customers had to wait between one and three days. 22000 customers got their electricity back within 4 to 7 days after the storm. And finally, more than 1000 customers got their electricity back only 10 to 26 days after the storm. The damage was so extensive that, despite the tremendous efforts made by the electricity companies, many customers had to live without electricity for several weeks. The last house with permanent residents had their electricity restored on February 1. After that, only 17 small summer cottages, without people living in them in wintertime, remained disconnected, and they were also reconnected during February.
450,000
39 1 ,7 93

400,000

350,000

300,000

250,000
16 7, 86 4 71 ,4 42 ,2 59 71

200,000

150,000

100,000

20 ,

39

6, 22 9

50,000

14

2 6

5, 19 1

84 7

12 ,

08

79 7 1, 30 5

4, 32

3, 25

87 6

62 9

2, 5

3,

99

46

0 February 1 January 10 January 11 January 12 January 13 January 14 January 15 January 16 January 17 January 18 January 19 January 20 January 21 January 22 January 23 January 24 January 25 January 26 January 27 January 28 January 29 January 30 January 31 February 2 January 8 January 9

Customers without electricity by day

1.5.4

Repair procedures

The repair work started very quickly. The storm led to the largest mobilisation ever in the Latvian electricity business. Latvenergo distribution network branches from north-eastern and eastern regions provided material and manpower. Valuable assistance came from contractors, i.e. electro-technical companies. At the peak, approximately 6000 people were engaged on clearance and repair work. There were no major problems with supplying spare parts.

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17

1,

In order to provide customers with electricity as soon as possible, more than 300 small mobile generation units were connected to the network. In summary, the following repair works were needed in the transmission system: 2 replaced 330 kV line towers; 1 replaced 110 kV line tower; 18 provisionally repaired 110 kV line towers; repaired 16 damaged 110 kV line towers; repaired 52 damaged sectors of 110 kV line; 3500 km network was inspected and cleared from broken trees in overhead network protective zones. The damage in the distribution system amounted to were: 2847 replaced 20 kV line poles; damaged wires in 11292 places of 20 kV lines; 8207 replaced low voltage line poles; damaged wires in 27124 places of low voltage lines; around 1000 km had to be completely rebuilt; inspected 84000 km network; broken trees cleared from overhead network protective zones 10345 km. 1.5.5 Emergency procedures and cooperation

At state level, action of units in crisis situation is regulated by: energy law; law on civil defence; different pieces of secondary legislation. A local crisis control centre is run by the Ministry of Economics. A crisis control centre operates within Latvenergo, and there were no problems with coordination of information. There was generally good cooperation with State Fire and Rescue Service, National army, local municipalities, and energy contractors. First, Latvenergo focused on restoring supply to priority customers (hospitals, schools, etc.), which slowed down the restoration of energy supply to other customers. Involvement of nonLatvenergo personnel in the restoration helped improve the situation. Network operators do not have agreements with external contractors in case of emergency. During the storm, network operators reported that it had been a great problem the first day. In Latvia, cooperation between network operators is carried out under the aegis of Latvenergo. According to the involved companies, it worked very well during the storm according. Cooperation with municipalities and county administrative boards seems to have worked well in most cases. State Fire and Rescue Service, National army and local forestry helped with forest clearance work. Other local organisations and private persons assisted in locating faults.

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Workforce contribution by different organisations: ORGANISATION Latvenergo Electro technical companies State Fire and Rescue Service National army Latvian state road service Municipalities Customers Other organisations CONTRIBUTION (PERSONDAYS) 23000 1000 60 950 60 700 550 107

1.5.6

Estimated costs (repair, compensation, investment)

The overall cost to the network operators was calculated at about 3.3 MLs (4.7 M). Of this sum, 3.2 MLs (4.6 M) or ~97% was spent on clearance, repair and re-building the distribution network. The rest was paid to mobile generators not owned by Latvenergo. No compensation was paid to customers, as corresponding Latvian law reads, very severe weather events can be a reason for not giving any compensation to the customer. The experience now shows that only if the whole network had consisted of underground cables, or if no trees had been allowed closer than 20-30 meters from the power lines, would no interruptions have occurred. Latvenergo has now adjusted the technical strategy of transmission and distribution network (see chapter 2). 1.6 LESSONS LEARNED

Some best practices can be drawn from the events described above, particularly regarding the restoration efforts. 1.6.1 Solidarity

The most spectacular element in the restoration efforts is the solidarity that electricity distribution companies showed to each other, even in cases where their supply activities were normally in competition at European level. Logistical support, labour force, spare parts and mobile generators were provided to network operators in difficulties both from within the country and from abroad e.g. in France, where 1,200 foreign operators from 17 countries contributed to the restoration of power. 1.6.2 Communication with the public

Electricity distribution companies also recognised the importance of providing regularly updated and reliable information to the people affected. Extra efforts were in all cases put into organising and operating established channels of information to the press and also to customers without supply. In Canada, having recognised that the primary audience of the media are population groups who are not directly affected by the events, each restoration
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mission included a person responsible for relations with the public and their representatives, especially local mayors. 1.6.3 Autonomy

In emergency cases, centralised organisation of repair works may mean unnecessary bureaucracy, which only slows down the efforts. In Poland, local crisis centres organised the work, while in Canada autonomous restoration missions were set up, responsible for a given area, covering technical competences and including both supply and communication capabilities. 1.6.4 Priority of restoration

Hospitals, fire services, ambulances were given highest priority in the restoration work, along with critical activities of key suppliers manufacturing and transporting spare parts.

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2.
2.1

Public, political and regulatory consequences

CANADA

Following the ice storm, the government set up a scientific and technical commission (the Nicolet Commission) to analyse the happenings, tasked inter alia with analysing: measures planned or considered o to reduce the number of power outages, o to make them shorter or o to lessen the impact on the population and economic activities; the issue of placing certain transmission lines underground; the restoration of electricity in emergency situations. The Nicolet Commission focused its opinions and recommendations on two themes: 1. adoption and implementation of an emergency preparedness policy; 2. protection of energy supplies and, particularly, securing electricity supplies by reinforcing the electrical grid and power system. It is important to note that the phenomenon experienced in January 1998 was deemed to be of an exceptional nature, without parallel in North Americas documented meteorological history. 2.1.1 New requirements on design, need for undergrounding

Reinforcement of the electricity network was immediately started after power was reestablished. The Commission concluded that the ice sleeve accumulated on the conductors by January 6 and 7 probably reached an equivalent radial thickness of less than 25 mm (reaching 40 to 50 mm by the end of the storm). Accordingly, the power-line collapse incidents that occurred on the second and third days were considered premature. De-icing protection techniques had not been developed for transmission and sub-transmission networks by that time. The Commission made preliminary recommendations on the sub-transmission (consideration of extreme contingencies) and the distribution (establishing diversified back-up mechanisms) networks. The behaviour of power networks when subjected to unpredictable events was also analysed. The issue of setting up lines in the same corridor was raised, and it was observed that lines located alongside roads and in corridors exposed to cross winds were the hardest hit. Proposals for looping were examined, having considered controversies over looping and difficulties of implementing any high voltage in an inhabited area. The Commission also proposed implementing de-icing of conductors and, possibly, of overhead ground wires, noting that these techniques, at least for the high voltage network, were highly experimental. The Commission looked into burying the distribution network. They compared overhead and underground networks according to different criteria reliability, service life of equipment,

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visual impact and dealt with costs and financing issues. Finally, it suggested burying part of Hydro-Qubecs network with the government taking direct responsibility. Regarding the networks structural behaviour, the following recommendations were made: changes in the design criteria regarding anti-cascading towers should be applied; public control over good design practices should be considered; a review should be conducted of the basic climate loads and load contributions, improving the mechanical sturdiness of lines, improving the mechanical reliability of lines, improving practices, and managing information on damage caused. The Commission also proposed making better use of existing interconnections with the US. 2.1.2 New requirements for maintenance

The Commission concluded that the automatic control technique adopted by Hydro-Qubec to measure ice accumulation on electric conductors, plus the towers and poles supporting them, did not supply reliable data in the case of an ice storm of the magnitude of the January 1998 storm. 2.1.3 Functional demands for distribution networks

Recommendations were made for publishing service continuity indices for the regions. The Commission suggested that the government set objectives in order to strengthen electricity-supply security. Hydro-Qubec was urged to use risk analysis techniques as standard practices. 2.1.4 Demands and incentives for investments to enhance security of supply

The Commission emphasised that the only solution was to find a compromise between the level of electricity supply security sought by citizens and the price they were willing to pay for it. 2.1.5 Political tolerance of long and/or widespread outages

The Commission suggested adapting rather than redefining energy policy, and emphasised: service quality and supply security are one and the same thing, and part of a comprehensive vision ranging from producer to consumer; the society must keep up with energy efficiency efforts thus creating an energy surplus; with ongoing liberalisation, the critical nature of energy services must be carefully considered. 2.1.6 Mobile units

Certain issues were left unclear, e.g. the government required Hydro-Qubec to supply mobile generators to farmers, although this task was not among the companys responsibilities. Yet, the task was completed.

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2.2

FRANCE

At the end of December, 1999 France was hit successively by 2 huge storms, which crossed the northern, then the southern part of the country. 3445000 household customers were left without electricity, some of them until January 14. 2.2.1 New requirements on design, need for undergrounding

EdF has voluntarily decided to improve grid sturdiness according to a 4-step programme: a. restoring electricity supply as soon as possible b. securing the grid Until May 2000, EdF teams secured all temporary installations from public access. 2200 operators worked and the corresponding cost was 46 M (in 2005 euro). c. consolidating the grid From March 2000 to December 2001, the work was carried out at a total of 82000 building sites over the country, 9100 km of new lines (5280 km for MV grid, undergrounding of 4130 km; and 3820 km in LV grid, undergrounding of 370 km). 1350 operators worked on the project with a the corresponding cost of 494 M (at 2005 value). d. rebuilding the grid The analysis made after the storms showed that 90% of line failures were caused by falling trees. Consequently, this programme consists of a 15-year undergrounding schedule for 51000 km MV lines1, the majority (26000 km) located in wooded zones. At the conclusion of the programme, about 40% of the MV grid will be underground. The estimated cost is 3500 M. By the end of 2004, 5600 km of lines in wooded zones had been undergrounded. 90% of new MV lines will be underground, according to an agreement with the government on public service obligations (PSOs). 2.2.2 Functional demands for distribution networks

EdF voluntarily decided to ensure organisation for such events, in order to restore electricity to 80% of affected customers within 24 hours, and 95% in 120 hours2. EdF decided to set up a special emergency entity called FIRE (Force dIntervention Rapide Electricit) and to create a fleet of portable power generators. The 1999 storms proved that such damage was not uniformly distributed across the country. Damage could be very significant in limited areas. In order to restore electricity promptly in such areas, it proved to be essential that a significant number of operators with adequate equipment be deployable within a short period of time. FIRE has been operational since autumn 2000.

1 2

The total length of underground MV lines is approximately 175000 km, about 30% of the whole MV grid. After the 1999 storms the restoration rate was 55% within 24 hours and 88% within 120 hours 31 January 2006

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FIRE comprises 16 squads distributed across France: almost one for each region. Each squad consists of 150 operators and 100 vehicles from electricity and gas distribution centres. It is not a permanent structure: FIRE is only constituted in cases of emergency. Whenever the weather forecast projects a high level of risk for the grid, the squads turn to alarm state and are then sent out to carry out repairs in cases of severe damage to the grid. In order to remain efficient, training sessions with experience feedback are organised every year. 2.2.3 Compensation for customers

Since the events in 1999, the French legislation has been changed and now prescribes obligations for TSOs and DSOs to provide compensation in case of outages lasting more than 6 hours. The current grid access contracts already include such responsibility conditions. Customers are compensated to the extent of: 2% of the annual fixed part of the tariff for a duration of more than 6 hours and less than 12 hours; 4% of the annual fixed part of the tariff for a duration of more than 12 hours and less than 18 hours; and so on for each 6-hour period. Compensation is nevertheless limited to the annual fixed part of the tariff and is paid irrespective of the origin of the outage (even under force majeure conditions). This compensation cannot be deducted from possible compensation for actual damages. 2.2.4 Demands and incentives for investments to enhance security of supply

In France, a regulation (Arrt Technique) defines the technical conditions that electricity distribution must meet. The latest version dates from 2001 and takes into account the technical conclusions drawn from the 1999 storms. EHV lines constitute the framework of the grid. They are less sensitive to trees and wind (less than 1% of these lines were damaged during the storm). On the other hand, being upstream of all other parts of the national network, their operability and/or capacity to be quickly repaired are essential for security of supply. The French TSO, RTE, is implementing investment and operational programmes in order to: secure every EHV/MV substation with at least one reinforced line able to withstand severe storms; be able to restore all essential lines within 120 hours. At MV level, the actions consist of eliminating the greatest part of the risk from trees by undergrounding the lines or by keeping sufficient distance from trees (specified in the rightsof-way). At LV level, DSOs are proposing solutions to the authorities to guarantee the sturdiness of some special delivery points for each municipality (36000 for the whole country), the list of which is decided upon with the local authorities. The most frequently used technique is either replacing the bare wired lines by lines equipped with twisted insulated cables, or undergrounding one line of each substation.

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2.2.5

Mobile units

After the events, EdF restructured its mobile unit reserves as follows: local fleet for immediate assistance: for its current activity, EdF stores and maintains operational a fleet of 600 power units, distributed throughout the whole country in the electricity and gas distribution centres. Each unit is able to restore electricity in a district or in a small industrial estate. central fleet for reserve: this fleet consists of a broad spectrum of 1860 power units ranging from 10 kW (for a house) to 400 kW (for a village). These units are stored in three places: Bordeaux, Aix en Provence and Orlans. contracted power units: following a tendering procedure, EdF has contracted with a number of companies, which undertake to set up of 850 power units within 24 hours. 2.3 POLAND

As a consequence of the November storms, the crisis management centers set up a consultation with distribution companies in order to work out a new complex system of information exchange regarding damage to and failures of their equipment at voivodship level. This should facilitate the containment and elimination of similar disturbances on the distribution grid in future and reduce the time needed to restore connections. Some additional measures are needed with regard to the design of distribution lines, poles and towers in order to avoid damage caused by falling tree branches. The number of available mobile electricity generators should be increased to provide electricity to disconnected customers. 2.4 2.4.1 SWEDEN New requirements on design, need for undergrounding

In recent years, Sweden has experienced heavy snow-storms and wind-storms. Lessons learned from those storms have led the industry to make wider use of covered conductors and aerial cables able to withstand branches or trees falling over the overhead lines without causing major outages. In areas with favourable soil, ploughing techniques have been used in order to underground the lines at only moderate cost. But in many areas, the current ploughing technique is not applicable. The storm Gudrun revealed a weakness in the new design of covered conductors and aerial cables: the poles supporting the lines broke off due to the mechanical stress caused by the large number of trees falling on the lines. Another weakness of the covered conductors and aerial cables is the longer repair time. There were also problems with the pole-mounted distribution transformers. As the poles had broken, the transformers fell to the ground and were damaged. This meant not only a transformer out of service but also caused an environmental problem due to oil leakage. After the storm, the Swedish Energy Agency proposed that every overhead line over 25 kV be secured from trees. For overhead lines connected to power generation, this level is lowered to 15 kV.

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The damage due to the storm led Swedish DSOs to reconsider their policies for undergrounding. As a result, the companies may plow in cables along the roads where possible, instead of building overhead lines through forests. Where plowing is not feasible, overhead lines will be used but with much wider rights-of-way. 2.4.2 Functional demands for distribution networks

The Swedish Energy Agency is proposing that a functional demand for electricity distribution be added to the Swedish Electricity Act: no customer should have a power outage for more than 24 hours (except very special events). This addition is planned to be in effect by 2011. For distribution to large customers (> 2 MW) and for sub-transmission, guidelines are proposed for maximum interruption times depending on power level. As can be seen in the table, the functional demand LONGEST INTERRUPTION TIME (H) POWER (MW) can be different for single (SINGLE FAULT) (MAJOR/RARE FAULTS) faults than for major and 2-4.9 12 24 very rare faults. The guidelines are proposed to be 5-19.9 8 24 in use by January, 2006. 20 2 24
> 50 2 12 In the current Swedish Electricity Act, there are no functional demands, just some wording laying down that the electricity distribution must be of good quality and that problems must be solved as quickly as possible, but the costs for so doing should be reasonable compared to the damages suffered by the customer due to low supply quality. The Swedish electricity association, Svensk Energi (Swedenergy), has issued a recommendation for planning goals for security of supply. According to this recommendation, the maximum interruption duration should be as shown in the two graphs below. The first graph is for single faults and the second is for major and very rare faults. The estimated time for achieving these goals is up to 10 years, given some large investment needs. In the first graph, the functional demand proposed by the Swedish Energy Agency is inserted as well, plus an earlier recommendation by the Swedish organisation Elverksfreningen.

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hours 30

25

Proposed legal obligation for single and major and rare faults

New planning goal for single faults by Swedenergy in 2004

20

Recommendation for single faults by Elverksfreningen in 1991 Proposed legal obligation for single and major and rare faults

15

Recommendation for single faults by Elveksfreningen in 1991

10

New planning goal for single faults by Swedenergy in 2004

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 MW

Planning goals for duration of interruptions due to single faults according to recommendation by Svensk Energi Swedenergy in 2004 and recommendation by Elverksfreningen in 1991, compared to the proposed legal obligation for all kinds of faults

Functional demands provide good support during planning of the network and operational organisation. The effect of functional demands will come in time. To change the organisation is relatively quick, but to change the distribution system to meet the functional demands in every aspect will take many years.
hours 30

25

20

15

10

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 MW

Planning goal for duration of interruptions due to major and rare faults according to Svensk Energi Swedenergy in 2004

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2.4.3

Compensation for customers

Many Swedish distribution companies already voluntarily offer compensation to customers for long interruptions. All private customers may also obtain compensation for damages caused by interruptions. Although the storm Gudrun was a natural disaster, formally outside the responsibility of grid operators, it triggered an investigation as to whether compensation for long interruptions should be compulsory for all distributors. The purpose of such compulsory compensation would be to give the distribution companies incentives to pursue high network standards by having to bear customers costs for interruptions. The investigation resulted in a proposal for compulsory compensation to network customers who are left without electricity for more than 12 hours. If the outage originates in the higher voltage level networks, the network company is entitled to compensation from the relevant network company. 2.4.4 Demands and incentives for investments to enhance security of supply

The Swedish regulatory model has already built in a quality incentive, meaning that there should be a price decrease if the average interruption time is above a certain level. The price decrease reaches its maximum at 2.5 hours average per customer during one year. The above investigation also resulted in a proposal to strengthen this regulation further by increasing the impact of the incentives and by requiring network companies to report interruptions at individual customer level, not only averages per customer. The increased impact of incentives could also mean that network companies may have pay twice once by offering great price decrease due to interruptions and secondly by having to make payments for outage compensation to customers. 2.4.5 Political tolerance of long and/or wide-spread outages

The storm Gudrun not only caused severe damages to the electrical network and left more than half a million customers without electricity, but also stirred a political storm. Many politicians warned that what happened is not acceptable in a modern society heavily dependent upon reliable electricity supply. Some actions to force network companies to improve their networks were therefore proposed. Main arguments were that the network should be able to withstand severe storms without interruptions, and, if interruptions do occur, they should not be longer than 24 hours. The government asked the regulatory department within the Swedish Energy Agency to carry out a study together with major stakeholders, i.e. members from the electricity sector, authorities, municipals and customers, with the intention of suggesting ways to improve security of supply. A report was produced, and most of its proposals are supposed to be included in a revision of the Swedish Electricity Act.

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The main areas that are covered in this study were: description of how the storm affected the networks and power supply, as well as how the reconstruction work was handled; proposal for formulating functional demands; consideration of whether, and if so, how network companies should undertake risk and vulnerability studies and report interruptions; proposal for rules for compensating customers for interruptions; consideration of and proposal for rules for forced management of network companies in case of mismanagement; consideration of and proposal for new rules for rescinding network concessions if a network company fails to fulfil established rules on security of supply. In the report, tabled in April, all areas mentioned above apart from the new rules for rescinding network concessions are covered in detail. Altogether, there are 14 concrete proposals to be considered. The issue of rescinding network concessions was, in line with the terms of the study, due to handled be presented separately. In brief, the 14 proposals are: 1. A minimum quality level for networks will be established as functional demands. The proposal is to introduce an amendment to the Swedish Electricity Act, prescribing that no customers should ever be without electricity supply for more than 24 hours. This guarantee by law covers single faults as well as extensive/rare faults, even if they are caused by an event such as the storm Gudrun. The only exceptions are wars, terrorist acts and certain natural disasters, such as earthquakes, land slides and ice storms. This change to the Electricity Act should be effective from January 1, 2011. For customers over 2 MW, it is proposed that guidelines with even stricter interruption rules (down to 2 hours) be introduced. 2. Compulsory compensation, enforced by law, will be introduced for all network customers. After more than 12 hours of interruption, network companies will have to pay customers a certain amount of compensation based on the length of the interruption. The following compensations are proposed: Outages at least 12 hours and up to 24 hours Outages longer than 24 hours, additionally Each additional 24-hour period 12.5% of the annual fee, but at least 100 25% of the annual fee Additionally, 25% of the annual fee

The compensation is, however, limited to the amount of three years annual network fee, and does not have to be paid for force majeure events as defined in point 1 above. The compensation should be paid without undue delay and within 6 months at the latest. The compensation cannot be subtracted from any possible compensation for damages. 3. The regulator will to a greater extent consider the quality of the network when network tariffs are being evaluated. That means that a network company with few (and short) interruptions will be allowed to charge a higher tariff than a company with many power

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outages. Beginning in 2010, it will be mandatory for network companies to report to the regulator all interruptions longer than 3 minutes. 4. The network companies will be required to make annual risk and vulnerability studies for their networks. This is mandatory as from January 1, 2006. The organisation for reconstruction of the network after a power outage has to be described. 5. Network companies will have to classify all their customers according to the required quality of power supply. 6. Network companies will be required to create annual plans showing how networks of low quality with many interruptions can be improved and when the actions are estimated to take place. Affected customers must be informed about what exactly it means for them. 7. All customers must be informed at least once a year in written form about their rights to compensation if interruptions occur. Even other rights for the customers to apply for compensation according to the Electricity Act must be included in this information. 8. Possible malfunctions and proposed improvements in the network, involving customers considered to be of extra importance for society, must be discussed between the network companies and these special customers. 9. All overhead (aerial) lines with higher voltage level than 25 kV must be tree-safe. In some specified cases, this also applies to aerial lines with lower voltage level than 25 kV. This rule was due to come into force as of January 1, 2006. 10. For a network area with a concession for aerial lines up to a certain voltage level (normally to 20 kV), it will be possible to install underground cables with a higher voltage level without an extensive permitting process. This proposal will facilitate replacing aerial lines with underground cables. 11. According to the Swedish Electricity Act, and in line with the unbundling rules in the electricity market directive, a network company is not allowed to produce or trade electricity, the only exception being producing electricity to cover network losses or temporarily using mobile units to generate electricity during interruptions in the normal electricity supply. It is proposed now that network companies should be allowed to use even stationary generation units to produce of electricity during interruptions. This could be a cost-effective way to increase the reliability of electricity supply compared to extensive network investments. 12. The regulator will obtain the right to enforce the new rules using the same instruments, such as penalties, that are included in the present Electricity Act. 13. According to the study, it is not necessary to propose new rules for forced management of network companies in case of mismanagement. The revised rules that came into operation on January 1, 2005 seem to be sufficient to enforce the new functional demands. 14. It is proposed to further investigate the possibility of extending the special rules so that households would receive compensation for damages caused by power outages to companies.

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Many of the proposed new rules can be expected to lead to traditional overhead lines being replaced by underground cables. Some politicians have even expressed a view that all low voltage networks (i.e. distribution) should be made up of underground cables. According to some calculations made by Swedenergy, this would result in an investment cost of 60 to 80 billion Swedish kronor (circa 6 to 8 billion). The cost-effectiveness of this way of improving security of supply is questionable, to say the least. According to the report, the cost of fulfilling the functional demand that no customer should ever be without electricity supply for more than 24 hours will cost in total 19 billion Swedish kronor (circa 2 billion). Based on the proposal, a new law has been recently adopted. 2.5 2.5.1 LATVIA New requirements on design, need for undergrounding

Approximately once every three years, Latvia experiences heavy snow-storms and windstorms, with branches or trees falling over overhead lines without causing major outages. In rural areas with favourable soil, LV underground cable lines have been installed with a cable plough. Todays ploughing technique, however, is not applicable to MV cable lines. The mechanical dimensioning of poles has to be done according to construction standards. During the storm, poles supporting the lines broke off due to the mechanical stress because of the large number of trees falling over the lines. A review of wind zones in Latvian building rules is under way at the Latvian Ministry of Economy. 2.5.2 New requirements for maintenance

On the existing overhead lines, forest maintenance procedures have to be developed further. The Ministry of Economy is: reviewing the protective zones for power lines in legislation; prioritising consumers as regards supply restoration; increasing the role of the State Energy Inspectorate; improving cooperation between some institutions in crisis situations. At the same time, Latvenergo: has entered into negotiations with external contractors regarding coordination in emergency situations; is hastening a process of introduction of a uniform concept for dispatch management; is defining more precise priorities for measures to be taken in emergency conditions. 2.5.3 Mobile units

Latvenergo has a small fleet of portable power generators exclusively for its own needs. In crisis situation, these generators are used to ensure power supply for hospitals and vital customers. The National Crisis Centre has recommended creating a fleet of portable power generators within the structure of emergency organisations. 2.6 SUMMARY
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The table below summarises the main regulatory consequences along with voluntary measures taken by the industry itself. Note that only those measures are indicated that were introduced after the storms described in this report; e.g. voluntary compensation mechanisms that were in place in Sweden already before the Gudrun storm are not included in the table.

The last category in the table (allowances) contains measures that have not placed obligations on distribution companies, but for example facilitated a simpler authorisation procedure for undergrounding lines.

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3.

EURELECTRIC conclusions and recommendations

This chapter gives some examples of the kind of conclusions that can be drawn from the above events. The list of conclusions is not exhaustive, partly because EURELECTRIC did not have the intention of conducting a detailed, in-depth investigation of the events, and partly because distribution is a local issue. Huge differences in national weather conditions, in the national regulation, the operating environment for distribution companies make it not only inappropriate to formulate uniform recommendations, but even impossible to draw uniform conclusions. EURELECTRIC believes that the key conclusion is that a proper and fair investigation must be performed at technical level by experts after power outages. Conclusions drawn and requirements re-formulated must be based on these expert reports, in order to avoid any premature reactions. It must be noted that the recommendations given on the following pages only apply to distribution, unless otherwise indicated. These recommendations are not of a universal nature, but rather examples of what may be done. Some of them are directed at distribution companies, while others are aimed at political decision-makers. It is also important to note that most recommendations are not meant to be applied at European level, and their implementation must always take local conditions into account. 3.1 3.1.1 NEW REQUIREMENTS ON DESIGN OF DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Undergrounding

The use of underground cables can significantly decrease the impact of storms, especially when they are accompanied by freezing rain or ice. This technology has some features distinct from overhead lines, which requires thorough consideration of expected benefits and corresponding costs: fault repairing of cables is more complex and takes longer: o costly and lengthy to locate the fault, o costly and lengthy to excavate and joint the cable, o repairs can take hours or even days; overhead lines need height restrictions for structures and activities under them, and maintenance of rights-of-way; cables restrict planting of trees and underground operations deeper than 45 cm; overhead lines are more vulnerable to weather; cables can be the cost-effective solution in densely populated urban areas, particularly crossing hazardous areas (e.g. airports) or those of high ecological interest; in case of cables, extra costs may be incurred for reactive power compensation; cables lifetime is shorter; underground cables may be threatened by floods. Ploughing techniques decrease investment costs compared to excavation, but may shorten the lifetime of the cable. Development of both cable design and ploughing techniques will

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decrease this uncertainty on lifetime and makes its use feasible in more areas. In some areas, ploughing or excavating may remain too expensive a solution. In forest areas, the standard technique will probably be using underground cables or finding an alternative route outside the forest. In a mixed area (i.e. forest and cultivated areas), the use of covered conductors or aerial cables could be the best solution. The use of underground cables in rural areas calls for new solutions in system design. It also stresses earth fault systems; therefore, larger compensation reactors equipped with automatic regulation may need to be installed in the primary substations. For MV grids, the cost of underground cables is around 40 to 80/m, close to that of overhead lines (except in hard ground). However, the overall cost can become much higher with the cost of installing the MV/LV substations (transformers) and LV outputs on the ground, up to 60 to 200/m. 3.1.2 Pole mounted transformers

During storms, problems were also caused by pole-mounted distribution transformers. As the poles broke, the transformers fell to the ground and were damaged. This not only meant a transformer out of service, but also caused an environmental problem due to oil leakage. For medium-sized distribution transformers, a more reliable solution could be using groundmounted transformer stations more widely. For small-sized distribution transformers, polemounting is likely to remain the most economical solution. In some countries, environmentally harmless oils are used. 3.1.3 Introduction of weak links

In order to avoid broken poles for aerial cables and overhead lines caused by trees falling or rain freezing on lines, the break where it is advantageous for us principle can be applied. As a solution, a weak link can be introduced in the wire/cable support so that it breaks before the pole in case of heavy mechanical stress. This means that the wires/cables will fall to the ground instead of the poles being destroyed. Then, instead of re-building the poles, it is only necessary to re-hang the wires/cables. The weak link has to be able to withstand only normal mechanical requirements; at the same time, the pole has to withstand higher mechanical stress. 3.1.4 Life cycle approach

When planning for investments in the network, a life cycle cost approach can be used to assess the most cost efficient solution. The investment cost of various techniques differs substantially, but so also do operation and maintenance costs. Taking all cash flows within the investment lifetime into account helps identify the most cost-effective solutions. Unavoidably, there are many uncertainties due to long investment cycles (25 to 40 years). A crucial uncertainty is the stability of the regulatory framework, which is vital to create a climate attractive to investments. When assessing whether maintenance is the most costeffective for the line, renovation of the (parts of the) line may prove to be a better solution. For the new solutions, equipment should require a minimum of maintenance so as to meet both the customers demands for high availability (i.e. no interruptions) and societys demands for efficiency in the distribution business (i.e. low tariffs). In rural areas, it is not possible to build a distribution system with 100% redundancy, so the maintenance of
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equipment should be done in a simple and quick manner or with live line techniques so as to minimise interruptions. Conclusion Our climate may have shifted towards more frequent extreme variations. Heavy storms, winds, severe ice storms and freezing rain may cause significant damage to electrical grids, and we have seen that the present construction of the electrical grid sometimes cannot withstand these exceptional stresses. Undergrounding cables is an effective way of reducing the number of interruptions due to storms, snow and frosty rain. However, the cost of undergrounding may be too high in comparison to the advantages it brings. There is a trend towards building networks upon very simple and robust components with no or very low maintenance needs, and with components appropriate for live working techniques. A life-cycle-cost approach is increasingly used when planning the networks in order to find the most cost efficient solution. Undergrounding of distribution networks is increasing, in individual cases where it is deemed appropriate. Recommendation In the case of aerial cables, the deliberate introduction of weak links in the cable support should be considered. Research into avoiding environmental problems caused by oil leakage from damaged pole-mounted transformers is needed; solutions that are more reliable or environmentally harmless should be sought and pursued. Any decision to underground a line should always be based on a risk and cost-benefit analysis on an individual basis for a given area and taken by the grid operator. Techniques used for building the most efficient network should be developed by the industry itself, not imposed through legislation.

3.2 3.2.1

NEW REQUIREMENTS ON MAINTENANCE Line maintenance

The development of line inspections and woodcutting of rights-of-ways must continue and be further improved. Tree trimming at transmission and sub-transmission levels may have the greatest potential among solutions due to the large number of customers affected by the maintenance. At distribution level however, there is a huge volume to be maintained and the challenge to find effective ways is correspondingly greater. Potential conflicts of interest

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between forest owners and electricity companies highlight the need for cooperation between forest owners, network owners and contractors. 3.2.2 De-icing, cleaning

The events in Canada show that freezing rain, sticking snow, ice, etc. can be very harmful. In a few cases, power walking can be a successful solution, which means that the iced line is overloaded with some dispatching operations (provided the operational scheme makes it possible), so as to melt the ice. Several methods exist for insulator cleaning, including both dry and wet technologies. Cleaning can be performed on de-energised or on live lines, the latter being more advantageous. Conclusion Maintenance, except that of rights-of-way, is not of particular importance when it comes to power outages caused by extreme weather conditions. Falling trees, however, constitute the main risk for overhead distribution lines. Recommendation The maintenance of rights-of-way in forests, in cooperation with the forest industry and farmers, where applicable, should be given more attention in order to further increase the reliability of supply.

3.3

COMPENSATION FOR CUSTOMERS

One of the main tasks of a distribution company is to supply with as few as possible interruptions. If supply is not in due time because of reckless operation, the customer can generally avail himself of remedies effected under contract law or file complaints with the competent authorities. In some countries, customers can in addition claim penalties or compensation payments for failure to supply in due time. There are, in principal, three kinds of incentive / disincentive schemes for network operators to ensure adequate quality of supply: 1. Quality incentive regulation, which within certain limits entitles the distribution company to higher tariffs for high quality of delivery and mandates correspondingly lower tariffs for low quality. These incentives are often based on average interruption time per customer per year. This means that all customers pay lower prices if some customers face long interruptions. It is important to note that interruptions in the frame of an interruptible contract do not imply lower quality of service, but the quality incentive regulation must refer to interruptions beyond the contracted level. Similarly, the quality of service in the periods between contracted interruptions must meet the agreed requirements. (See also chapter 3.4.)

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2. Penalty or compensation payments to customers that have experienced long interruptions. This compensation is often used voluntarily as for example currently by some Swedish distribution companies or compulsory as in UK (see table below). If it is compulsory, it can be either automatic or paid on the customers request. 3. Compensation to the customer for damage to the customers installations or other property. In this respect, all countries employ culpa standards (i.e. compensation in case of negligence on the distributors side), but the scope and extent of compensation vary from country to country, and not all countries allow compensation for damage to other than private customers.
COUNTRIES WITH
COMPENSATION

FUNCTIONAL DEMANDS AND COMPENSATION MODELS

Compensation is paid after an application is filed by the customer. The compensation is based on the duration of the outage and the annual network fee. After more than 12 hours interruption, 10% of the annual network fee is paid back. The pay-back amount is increased in steps when the duration of the outage is increased. The amount is 25% for 24-72 hours, 50% for 72-120 h and 100% for >120 hours. Functional demands are defined for normal operating and weather conditions and three different categories of abnormal conditions. At normal operating and weather conditions, 99.5 % of the customers should be reconnected within 18 hours. Outages >18h give a compensation of 50 for households and 100 for other customers. The compensation is increased stepwise with 25 for each additional 12-hour period up to 200. Functional demands for the three categories of severe operating and weather conditions are defined from how severe the weather conditions are, how large part of the customers that were exposed to the storm and how many of the exposed customers that were hit by an outage. For unplanned outages more than 4 hours the network company has to compensate household customers 35, small companies 910 and large industries 0.35 per kW subscribed power up to 91000. The model is currently under evaluation. For unplanned outages, the network company guarantees reconnection within 24 hours. Customers without supply for more than 24 hours are compensated with 65 for households and 135 for companies. For each additional 12hour interruption, 35 is paid additionally. According to a 2001 law, all customers have a right to compensation. From 6 hours outage and for each following 6-hour period the transmission and distribution companies pay compensation corresponding to 2 % of the fixed annual charge. The compensation is limited to one years network charge and should be paid automatically. For large and medium-size customers, there is also a standard contract on quality of supply without additional charges, where minimum quality for e.g. flicker and voltage dips is defined. If the quality is not met, the distribution company has to pay compensation. These rules are under discussion in France at the moment. Apart from the standard quality, the customers can pay for extra quality. There is a Public Service Obligation that from 2005 guarantees that 90 % of the affected customers are reconnected within 5 days at large disturbances. Different rules for companies and households, covering the distribution network. For unplanned outages, the network company guarantees reconnection within 24 hours. Customers without supply for more than 24 hours are compensated. Compensation is paid after an application is filed by the customer. No limitations on the amounts to be paid to customers have been found. Very severe weather events can be a reason for not giving any compensation to the customer. Definition of a power outages length starts when the network owner got the information of the power outage. Some kind of committee and routines are under construction in order to solve conflicts. The Hungarian Energy Office prepares an annual evaluation on the basis of reports by market participants. The minimal quality requirements and the expected standards of electricity distribution and public utility supply were specified in resolutions issued by the Office at the beginning of each year. The statistics are made for the current year and compared with the average value of the last three years. The quality requirements are characterised by: 1, Average number of interruptions of longer than 3 minutes (number/total number of consumers) 2, Average length of outages for consumers (hours/ total number of consumers) 3, Number of not supplied consumers (1000 consumers) 4, Energy not supplied per costumer (kWh/consumers) If the operator exceeds the defined level of interruptions, it pays penalty. Each value worth 1% reduction of the profit. If the operator is under the basis level, it is stimulated to keep this by an increase of his profit (about max. 10%). Over 50000 kWh outages the operator has to inform the Office immediately case by case. The Office studies whether the operator acted according to the expectations. If not, the Office fines the operator.

Finland

United Kingdom

The Netherlands Ireland France

Latvia

Hungary

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Apart from compensating customers for damages and hardships caused by interruptions in certain countries, various compensation mechanisms also internalise customers costs for nondelivery in the distribution companys books. This way if customers are compensated at a level corresponding to their actual costs for the interruptions the distribution company will in principle be able to optimise its operations without further regulation. This is, however, not possible in practice and therefore various countries use a number of additional means to regulate quality of supply in distribution. It would be hard to try to define the best regulation and compensation mechanisms, and decide whether compensation should be voluntary or compulsory. It depends very much on country-specific conditions, and should therefore be left to each country. However, compensation to customers should not have to be paid in exceptional cases such as where there is force majeure and must be proportional. Otherwise, a small distribution company, hit by a storm covering its whole area, may be bankrupted by the cost of compensation. Requirements regarding restoration time must also take the safety of personnel into account; companies should be able to wait until storms have passed and there is daylight before major reconstruction work is carried out. Conclusion Voluntary or compulsory compensation mechanisms are increasingly applied in different countries. Recommendation The best solution for quality regulation (e.g. compensation) very much depends on country-specific conditions, and should therefore be left to each country. Apart from penalties, there should also be financial incentives for system operators to ensure a high level of supply security (see chapter 3.4). Clear rules should also be established for allocating responsibilities and costs when an operator cannot supply due to events outside his network (e.g. where an incident at transmission level causes an outage at distribution level).

3.4

DEMANDS AND INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY OF SUPPLY

According to the obligation of transparency, grid operators in some countries are required to publish statistics on quality and security of the grid, and are obliged to give regular statistical information about power outages. Usually, three basic characteristic values are used: 1. energy not supplied (kWh); 2. average length of outages for consumers (hours/one consumer): SAIDI = System Average Interruption Duration Index; 3. average number of interruptions per customer: SAIFI = System Average Interruption Frequency Index If the grid operator company exceeds the given level(s), his revenue is reduced. Similarly, in some countries performing above the standard increases income. When setting target levels

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for SAIFI and SAIDI, regional differentiation (e.g. rural / urban) and at least 3 to 5 years monitoring is necessary. Supply security is more complex than simple network reliability, as this broad concept also includes access to primary fuels, investments in generation and networks and the functioning of the market3. Supply security is determined by choices in the design of the whole system, plus historical and physical characteristics. Accordingly, the acceptable level of supply security is more a matter of political choice than of regulation. Conclusion Quality incentive regulation is becoming more and more common in Europe. Recommendation It should be taken into account when developing quality regulation that country-specific and local conditions are very important. Similarly to compensation schemes, quality-related incentives and/or penalties must not result in unlimited financial risks to grid operators.

3.5

PUBLIC AND POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF LONG AND/OR WIDE-SPREAD OUTAGES

According to many studies, the costs of interruptions to customers have significantly increased during the last twenty years, as societys dependence on electricity has grown. Other infrastructure, such as telephone, water supply and sewer systems, district heating and subways, are also more sensitive to long electricity interruptions than in the past, at the same time as society has in turn become more dependent on this infrastructure. Long and/or widespread interruptions in particular have become more difficult to handle since back-up from alternative heating or communication systems does not nowadays exist to the same extent as before. Therefore, old criteria need to be re-evaluated as demands on electricity availability increase. Price and quality regulation of networks by authorities must be improved, in order to provide adequate incentives for investment. Many countries are now considering output- or performance-based regulation, where the quality component of the regulation is designed to give sufficient incentives to network operators to increase reliability to the degree desired by society. Conclusion Security of electricity supply has become more and more important for society and thus politically, as evidenced by the speedy reaction of the EU legislators in drafting a Directive on security of electricity supply.

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Recommendation EURELECTRIC should continue to participate in the discussions on security of electricity supply. 3.6 3.6.1 INTERVENTION IN COMPANY OPERATION, RESCINDING OF CONCESSIONS Intervention in company operation

In 2004, EURELECTRIC analysed power outages in Europe and America in 2003. It was found that inadequate management of rights-of-way, lack of investments, large and long-distance commercial flows played varying roles in those outages. Consequently, one may reasonably ask whether intervention by the authorities could have reduced the risk of outages by setting stronger rules and regulations. A deeper analysis shows however, that extended intervention in company operation would bring advantages only in exceptional cases. It is also an open question whether an external authority would have the necessary detailed operational experience in grid operation to intervene in the appropriate way. As a basic principle, authorities should concentrate on setting an appropriate framework for market operation, full responsibility for planning and operation remaining with the grid operators. When natural disasters occur, central co-ordination can be taken over by the appropriate authorities. Assistance with co-ordination of communication and provision of information to the public can help grid operators concentrate on their main tasks. 3.6.2 Rescinding of concessions

Throughout Europe, national energy / electricity acts allow for the recall of concessions, usually in a very abstract framework, defining two basic methods: authorisation for grid operation can be denied if the applicant does not possess the personnel, technical conditions or economic performance needed to ensure the intended power supply in line with the goals and regulations; authorisation can be rescinded if the stated requirements are not met during authorised operation. There is no known example of an actual recall to date. Generally, recall of concession must be the very last resort. The regulatory framework should provide enough rules and incentives, ensuring adequate return, for reliable grid operation; thus, rescinding of concession can be limited to exceptional cases. Due to its exceptional nature, clear conditions for an actual rescinding would be very hard to define in advance and thus to integrate into a practical regulatory framework. Moreover, in many European countries grid operators must conclude concession contracts with communities in order to use public places and streets for burying lines under the road. These contracts normally have date limits (usually several decades). So it is possible for authorities and/or communities to refuse to extend the concession on expiry of the term, should a grid operator not show the necessary technical or economic performance.
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Conclusion Specific rules for rescinding concession would be very hard to describe in advance and thus can hardly be integrated into a practical regulatory framework. Recommendation Intervention in company operation should be limited. Any rescinding of a concession should be applied only in exceptional cases. 3.7 EMERGENCY ORGANISATIONS, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

3.7.1 Mutual assistance In most countries, agreements between companies providing for emergency situations within the country exist. Mutual assistance among electricity companies, both inside a given country and from abroad, proved extremely useful in the cases described. After the French storm in 1999, foreign assistance reached an extraordinary level, involving 1200 operators from 17 countries. Foreign assistance was also significant in Sweden in January 2005. In emergency situations, solidarity among electricity distribution companies was strong enough to outweigh the competitive pressures on their mother companies. Such assistance could be institutionalised at a European and/or regional level within the industry. 3.7.2 Own emergency measures According to the situation, it is possible to decide on the installation of portable power generators to supply people until the reparation of the network is finished. However, these generators are not always available and coordination with the army, for example, can provide a good and fast solution. In some cases, legal obstacles prevent network companies from owning generating units, even for emergency situations. Where they exist, these obstacles should be examined, with full compliance with the rules on unbundling and competition. The corresponding costs must be allowed for in setting network tariffs. It is very important that the emergency personnel be trained regularly. Conclusion Mutual assistance proved extremely useful in the cases examined in this report. The regular training of emergency personnel is very important.

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Recommendation The possibility of European and/or regional coordination of hardware (e.g. mobile generating units) and human resources should be examined by the industry itself. Network operators should be allowed to own mobile generating units for emergency situations, to the extent that this is compatible with corresponding rules on unbundling and competition.

3.8 3.8.1

INTERNAL COMMUNICATION AND CO-ORDINATION WITH EMERGENCY ORGANISATIONS Internal communication

Availability of communication means must be ensured during outages. This particularly applies to communication within the electricity industry, as it may bring catastrophic consequences if for example a headquarters were to lose supply and with it the possibility of coordinating restoration efforts. This may mean setting up an autonomous electricity supply for communications. 3.8.2 Coordination with emergency organisations

The whole organisation of modern life is dependent on a continuous and reliable supply of electricity. It is thus well understood that extensive outages are real emergency situations. Usually the key social establishments, such as hospitals, military installations, etc. have their own reserve power supply. However, this normally does not apply to residential consumers and people in rural areas. For them, problems become more acute when at the same time telephone connections are damaged. The management of such situations calls for adequate coordination with local and/or national emergency organisations, as these organisations have infrastructure specifically tailored to face such events, and can also provide valuable solutions to special problems among the population. In many cases, population groups, such as elders and disabled who may need to be transferred to hospitals, need special help. When water supplies are also hit by the power outage, special arrangements are needed to restore supplies of drinking water. Emergency organisations can also help electricity companies to accelerate the restoration of the damaged network. There may be a need for manpower for large scale operations which do not require special skills, such as clearing the network of broken trees. In order to ensure that in a real emergency situation coordination with emergency organisations works properly, a clear link between electricity companies and these organisations should be established, preferably with joint training sessions and crisis management exercises.

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Conclusion Emergency procedures are well developed at national level, through cooperation between the relevant authorities and stakeholders. It is very important that system operators be able to communicate with each other and with emergency organisations during power outages. Recommendation The technical infrastructure must be developed and organisation among network companies and other organisations established. Clear roles and responsibilities between grid operators, the state and all other stakeholders in emergency situations need to be defined and optimised. 3.9 3.9.1 ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION NEEDS Communication during an outage

The cooperation, or at least the patience and understanding, of the public can be of crucial importance during power outages. Therefore, communicating with the affected people is vital. Within electricity companies, protocols should be drawn up to develop a common understanding of the situation as early as possible, thus avoiding contradicting or unclear statements. Ready-to-use scripts should be prepared so as to establish communication channels immediately whenever a major blackout occurs, and trained personnel must be available to answer media enquiries. Regular situation reports should be organised even if there is nothing special to report. People need correct and responsible information about the extent of the damage to the network, the estimated date of reparation, instructions for dealing with the situation, to whom they should apply to solve practical problems, etc. This task is very important. Correct and well-composed information can re-assure people and help them plan their own actions to cope with problems. Due to a large number of enquiries, good intentions for informing people can easily be hampered by a shortage of available phone capacity. If appropriate, an automatic informationproviding system can be installed, where citizens can obtain information without disturbing operating staff during emergency situations. It may be necessary to set up specialised teams to take care of all external communication, in order not to paralyse dispatch centres, which still remain the source of information. When organising communication with the public, it must be taken into account that media reporting is not primarily aimed at those who are directly affected by the crisis. People without power supply usually lack television and internet access, and also phone and radio in more serious or longer cases.

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3.9.2

Follow-up communication after an outage

After an outage, a follow-up letter or other means of reporting to consumers should be organised as soon as possible, thanking them for their patience, briefly explaining the efforts needed to restore normal operation (day and night efforts, technical devices used, number of involved staff, etc.). Conclusion Precise and consistent information is very important for customers who lose their electricity supply. Recommendation The industry must be aware of the importance of providing clear and continuous information to customers during the course of an outage.

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Union of the Electricity Industry - EURELECTRIC - A.I.S.B.L. Boulevard de lImpratrice, 66 - bte2 - B - 1000 BRUXELLES Tel. : + 32 2 515 10 00 - Fax. : + 32 2 515 10 10

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www.eurelectric.org

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