UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JAMES B. STEGEMAN,
Plaintiff/Appellant APPEAL NO. 08-16174-C
DISTRICT COURT NO. 1:08-CV-1971

Vs. MOTION TO RECUSE

SUPERIOR COURT STONE

MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT;
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
CYNTHIA J. BECKER;
GEORGIA POWER CO.;
BRIAN P. WATT;
SCOTT A. FARROW;
Defendants/Appellees

Comes Now Appellant who files Motion to Recuse Judges Hull, Marcus

and Wilson from the above entitled matter under 28 U.S.C.S. §455, and Marshall

v. Jerrico Inc,. 466 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980) which

stated: “The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property

will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts of

the law.”

The above is applicable to this court by application of Article VI of the

United States Constitution and Stone v. Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct.

3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976) which held: “…like Federal courts, have a
constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.”

Currently, before the United States Supreme Court is Appellant’s Petition for

Writ of Cert.; United States Supreme Court Docket No.: 08-8320 filed January

20, 2009 and docketed January 26, 2009 (see attached as “A”) from Appeal No.:

07-13540-BB in which Judges Hull, Marcus and Wilson affirmed District Court’s

Order in case No.: 1:06-cv-2954-WSD.

The following paragraphs will show grounds for recusal of the three above

listed judges, who have in the past deliberately violated other litigant’s personal

liberties and /or has wantonly, willingly refused to provide due process and equal

protection to all appellants or appellees before the court, or has behaved in a

manner inconsistent with that which is needed for a full, fair, impartial decision.

A. U.S.C. §455 Recusal Statute

In support of Appellant’s Motion, Appellant relies on 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(2):

“Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in

any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”.

Due to the pending Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed in the United States

Supreme Court1 filed from this Court’s Affirmation of Judge Duffey’s ruling

dismissing Appellant’s complaint for Civil and Constitutional Rights violations;

1
There is a copy of the docketing attached hereto as “A”

2
and this Court like the Trial Court, refused to address Appellant’s “protected class”

status as a disabled individual, as well as his Pro Se status2. An objective observer,

lay observer, and/or disinterested observer would entertain significant doubt of

these three judges’ impartiality.

“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in

which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”3

“Disqualification is required if an objective observer would

entertain reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality…to
conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge
must be disqualified.” [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114
S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).

“…an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the

facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would
entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality”. See
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir.) (1988)
citing Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed. 2d
22 (1980).

B. Due Process and Equal Protection

The Rulings of the Trial Court and Affirmation by this Court in Stegeman v.

Georgia, et., al., resulted in the case at bar. Had Superior Court of Stone Mountain

2
Pleadings of litigants that are disabled “protected class” status, or Pro Se status, are
treated differently than a non-protected class member, or a represented litigant. Both this
Court and the Trial Court failed to view Appellant’s pleadings going against Supreme
Court findings, stare decisis and past case precedent.
3
The American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, R.
2.11(A)(2007).

3
Judicial Circuit been held accountable for its’ actions 4 in Stegeman v. Georgia, et.,

al.,5 the Superior Court most likely would not have continued the now policy of

violating Appellant’s Civil and Constitutional Rights under color of law.

“The Due Process Clause serves two purposes…One is to

produce, through the use of fair procedures to prevent the
wrongful deprivation of interests; …the other is a guarantee of
basic fairness, i.e.: to make people feel that they have been
treated fairly.”6

“[t]rial before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.”

Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord
Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 617 (1993) “due process requires a neutral and
detached judge in the first instance.” (citation omitted)

“justice must give the appearance of justice” Levine v. United

States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954).

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)..., by

ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the
absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with
assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”

“even if there is now showing of actual bias”, “due process is

denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the
appearance if bias” Peters v. Kiff, 407, U.S. 493, 502 (1972)

C. Appellant’s Disabled and Pro Se Status

4
There is no question that denying a litigant the Right of an Appeal, tampering with an
appeal, tampering with records, are violations of Equal Protection and violations under
color of law or color of authority; Judges are not immune from acts under §§241, 242.
5
Appeal No.: 07-13540-BB
6
Lectric Law Library http://www.lectlaw.com

4
 Appellant, having been denied State programs which receive Federal

Funding, has again been forced to proceed as Pro Se in an effort to protect his

interests, property and his Rights. This Court Denied appointment of counsel in

Judge Hull’s Order dated ____ giving no reason for denial.

Georgia Supreme Court’s Equal Justice Commission Committee

On Civil Justice.7 The “Minutes” of the December 4, 2006
Meeting:
“…in August 2006, the ABA endorsed the right to counsel in
certain civil cases, also known as the civil Gideon…The kinds of
cases of which the ABA endorses a civil right to counsel…”
“The ABA’s principles endorse the inclusions of all persons in a
state’s system for the delivery of civil legal aid, including …the
disabled…vulnerable populations…”
“Fourth,…promote …the judiciary and court personnel in
reforming rules, procedures and services to expand and facilitate
access to justice…to support pro se litigants.”
“Clients that most touch the public’s sympathy are children,…
and the disabled.”

Obviously refusing to liberally construe the pleadings of a disabled Pro Se

litigant, who has been denied both protection and Federally funded State legal

programs for which he is eligible and qualified, has resulted in further

unreasonable discrimination, meaningful access to the Courts, and denial of equal

protection by the State. Denial of due process shows bias/prejudice against a

disabled, pro se litigant.

7
U.S. District Court Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. sits on the Committee, Appellant filed
Motion to Recuse Judge Duffey which was denied.

5
 This Court held in it’s Unpublished Opinion of Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-
8
12692 (2007)C11.000153 “…occurs when a disabled individual is treated

differently than a non-disabled or less disabled individual…”

In this Court’s published opinion of Miller v. King, et., al., 449 F.3d 1149, 17

A.D. Cases 1758 (11th Cir. 2006)9 in which the opinion was vacated in full “in light

of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. ___ 126 S.

Ct. 877 (2006)”, it was held:

At [13] “However, the analytical difficulties created by Miller;s

pro se pleadings are now heightened by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Georgia, which indicates that it is important for lower
courts to determine on a claim by claim basis (1) which aspects
of the State’s conduct violate Title II; (2) to what extent such
alleged misconduct also violates the Constitution; and (3)
whether such alleged misconduct violates Title II but does not
violate the Constitution. Georgia 546 U.S. at___, 126 S. Ct. at
882.”
At [20] “*fn 3 Miller filed his complaints pro se and remained
pro se until this Court appointed him pro bono counsel on
appeal.”

Although both the Supreme Court and this Court have previously held that

pro se pleadings are to be held to less stringent standards than those drafted by

attorneys, neither the District Court, nor this Court have provided that privilege to

Appellant. The Judges listed above held Appellant’s pleadings to at least as

stringent as ones drafted by attorneys showing complete bias/prejudice.

8
The case was before Judges Edmondson, Hull and Forrester
9
The case was before Judges Carnes, Hull and Hill

6
“Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to
technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the
same high standards of perfection as lawyers.” Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233

"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair

and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They
should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that
end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in
its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just
judgment." Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)

"Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil

rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's
Pleadings without regard to technicalities." Picking v.
Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of
Appeals

“Pro Se parties have the right to Appeal, and submit their briefs
on appeal even though they may be inartfully drawn”, see Vega
v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). “Courts will go to
particular pains to protect pro se litigants consequences of
technical errors if injustice would otherwise result.” U. S. v.
Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Moreover, “the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to

determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible
theory.” Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331,
1334 (8th Cir. 1975) quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714,
716 (8th Cir. 1971).

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 CONCLUSION

Appellant has shown beyond doubt that these three judges should refrain

from presiding over his appeal. Appellant Moves this Honorable Court to grant his

Motion to Recuse the three above listed Judges.

Respectfully Submitted, this 16th day of February, 2009

BY: ___________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd.
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

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 U. S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

James B. Stegeman, et.,al., vs. Superior Court, et.,al., Appeal No. 08-16174-C

Pursuant to and in compliance with The U.S. Court of Appeals For The Eleventh

Circuit Rule 26.1-1, General Order 34 amending Eleventh Circuit Rules 26.1-2 and

26.1-3, Plaintiff/Appellant submits his Certificate of Interested Persons and

Corporate Disclosure Statement:

Baker, Thurbert A. (Georgia Attorney General)

Becker, Judge Cynthia J_______________________________________________

Duffey, Jr. Judge William S. (United States District Court)

Farrow, Scott A. (Defendant)

Georgia Power Company (Defendant)

McDonald, Janet D. (Plaintiff)

Orland, Devon (Attorney – Defendants Superior Court/Judge Becker)

Reinhardt, Daniel S. (Attorney – Defendants Georgia Power, Farrow, Watt)

Troutman Sanders LLP (Law Firm )

Southern Company (Owner of Georgia Power Co.)

State of Georgia Superior Court (Defendant)

Stegeman, James (Plaintiff)____________________________________________

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Appeal No. 08-16174-C, James B. Stegeman, et.,al., vs. Superior Court, et.,al.,

Watt, Brian P. (Defendant

CERTIFICATION

I, James B. Stegeman the Plaintiff/Appellant, hereby Certify that to the best

of my knowledge and belief, that the above Certificate is complete. I understand

my obligations to include and or omit persons and or entities in future Certificates

and my obligations to abide by 11th Cir. R. 26.1-2 and 11th Cir. R. 26.1-3

concerning future Certificates.

By: ____________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN,
Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I Certify that I have this 16th day of February, 2009 served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Motion To Recuse upon Defendants/Appellees, through their

attorneys on record by causing to be deposited with the U.S.P.S., First Class Mail,

proper postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows:

Daniel S. Reinhardt Devon Orland

Troutman Sanders, LLP State of Georgia Dept. of Law
Bank of America Plaza – Suite 5200 40 Capitol Square, S.W.
600 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30334-1300
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216

_______________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

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