Bih Do Cutiljerova Plana

ISSN 1847-2397
godite II broj 1 2009. | volume II number 1 2009
Nakladnik / Publisher Centar za politoloka istraivanja / Political Science Research Centre Gupeva 14a, Zagreb, Republika Hrvatska, tel./fax: +385 (0)1 3863 113; url: www.cpi.hr; e-mail: cpi@cpi.hr Glavni i odgovorni urednik / Editor in chief Vladimir Lay, Institut drutvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Hrvatska (Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Croatia) Izvrni urednici / Executive Editors Davor Paukovi, Centar za politoloka istraivanja, Zagreb, Hrvatska (Political Science Research Centre, Zagreb, Croatia) Davorka Vidovi, Centar za politoloka istraivanja, Zagreb, Hrvatska (Political Science Research Centre, Zagreb, Croatia) Uredniki odbor / Editorial Board Krisztina Arat, Institut politikih znanosti, Pravni fakultet, ELTE, Budimpeta, Maarska (Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Law, ELTE, Budapest, Hungary) Roland Axtmann, Sveuilite Swansea, Velika Britanija (Swansea University, United Kingdom) Vlatko Cvrtila, Fakultet politikih znanosti, Zagreb, Hrvatska (Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, Croatia) Vladimra Dvokov, Odsjek politikih znanosti, Ekonomski fakultet, Prag, eka (Department of Political Science, Prague School of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic) Gbor Halmai, Sveuilite Szchenyi, Gyr; ELTE, Budimpeta, Maarska (University of Szchenyi, Gyr; ELTE, Budapest, Hungary) Draen Lali, Fakultet politikih znanosti, Sveuilite u Zagrebu, Hrvatska (Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia) Jan-Erik Lane, Sveuilite u enevi, vicarska (University of Geneva, Switzerland) Pero Maldini, Sveuilite u Dubrovniku, Hrvatska (University of Dubrovnik, Croatia) Rafaelle Marchetti, LUISS, Rim; Sveuilite Napoli-Orientale, Napulj, Italija (LUISS, Rome; University of Napoli-Orientale, Neapels, Italy) Ivan Markei, Institut drutvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Hrvatska (Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Croatia) Anelko Milardovi, Institut za migracije i narodnosti; Centar za politoloka istraivanja, Zagreb, Hrvatska (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies; Political Science Research Centre, Zagreb, Croatia) Vjeran Pavlakovi, Sveuilite u Rijeci, Rijeka, Hrvatska (University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia) Mladen Pukari, Hrvatski studiji, Sveuilite u Zagrebu, Hrvatska (Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb, Croatia) Philippe Schmitter, European University Institute, Firenca, Italija (European University Institute, Florence, Italy) Mt Szab, Institut politikih znanosti, Pravni fakultet, ELTE, Budimpeta, Maarska (Faculty of Law, ELTE, Budapest, Hungary) Goran kvar, CARNet - Hrvatska akademska istraivaka mrea, Zagreb, Hrvatska (CARNet - Croatian Academic Research Network, Zagreb, Croatia) Luk Van Langenhove, Sveuilite Ujedinjenih naroda (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgija (United Nations University (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgium) Pierre Vercauteren, Katoliko sveuilite u Monsu, Belgija (Catholic University of Mons, Belgium) Tajnica / Secretary Nikolina Joanc Likovni urednik / Graphic Design Erna Matanovi Grafika priprema / Layout Vieslav Raos Suvremene teme jednom godinje objavljuje lanke na hrvatskom i engleskom jeziku. Contemporary Issues publishes articles annually in Croatian and English language. Upute autorima i ostale informacije pogledajte na http://contemporary-issues.cpi.hr For submission instructions and all other information visit http://contemporary-issues.cpi.hr Copyright 2009 Suvremene teme ISSN 1847-239
Sadraj / Contents
Urednika rije / Editorial ...................................................................................................................4
Understading Female College Students Mind-set towards Television Advertising in Pakistan / Razumijevanje stavova studentica prema televizijskom oglaavanju u Pakistanu Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan ............................................................................................................. 6 The Discourse on the Crisis of the Health Care System and the New Governance Model of Health Care in Quebec / Diskurs o krizi zdravstvenog sustava i novi model upravljanja zdravstvenom zatitom u Qubecu Sabina Stan ........................................................................................................................................ 18 The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societies: The Case of Bulgaria and Russia / Pad povjerenja u postkomunistikim drutvima: Sluaj Bugarske i Rusije Plamena Pehlivanova ......................................................................................................................... 32 U fokusu: Bosna i Hercegovina / In Focus: Bosnia and Herzegovina Oblik dravnog ureenja Bosne i Hercegovine po Cutileirovom planu (18. oujka 1992.) meunarodne zajednice / International Community Polity Proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina according to Cutileiros Plan (March 18, 1992) Saa Mrdulja ..................................................................................................................................... 48 The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Short Review of Political Matter and/or Technical Perplexion / Izborni sustav Bosne i Hercegovine: Kratki prikaz politikog pitanja i/ili tehnikog nesuglasja Maja Sahadi .................................................................................................................................... 61 Usklaenost pravnih propisa o dionikim drutvima u Bosni i Hercegovini s Uredbom o statutu europskog drutva / Coordination between the Regulation of Public Limited Liability Companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council Regulation on the Statute for an European Company Ivana Grubei ................................................................................................................................... 79 Izlaganje sa skupa / Conference Paper The International Community and Future Scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina / Meunarodna zajednica i scenariji budunosti za Bosnu i Hercegovinu Anelko Milardovi ............................................................................................................................. 94
Uvodna rije
suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1
Uvodna rije
asopis Suvremene teme / Contemporary Issues uao je, unato utjecaju globalne gospodarske krize na financiranje znanstvenog izdavatva, u svoju drugu godinu te na taj nain uspio zadrati predvieni tempo i kontinuitet izlaenja. Nastavno na iskustvo prethodnog broja, urednitvo je za drugi broj odabralo radove koji odraavaju multidisciplinarnu i meunarodnu narav asopisa Suvremene teme / Contemporary Issues. U prvom dijelu ovoga broja predstavljamo vam studiju o televizijskome oglaavanju u Pakistanu s naglaskom na enskoj perspektivi, analizu diskursa o reformi medicinskog sustava u Qubecu, kao i raspravu o krizi drutvenog povjerenja u postkomunistikim zemljama na primjerima Rusije i Bugarske. Drugi dio ovoga broja posveen je temi u fokusu Bosni i Hercegovini. Bosna i Hercegovina nalazi se u kritinoj fazi reforme i konsolidacije dravnosti, borbe s ratnim naslijeem te napora oko pribliavanja Europskoj uniji. Iz tog smo razloga odluili u ovome broju dati vie prostora radovima koji se bave pitanjima ove drave. Dva rada su djelo autorica iz Bosne i Hercegovine, dok jedan lanak potpisuje autor iz Hrvatske. Uz to, donosimo i izlaganje s meunarodnog skupa posveenog budunosti Bosne i Hercegovine, odranog u Budimpeti, u studenom 2009. godine. Naposljetku, istiemo kako Suvremene teme / Contemporary Issues, premda novi asopis, imaju za cilj postati hrvatski asopis
za drutvene i humanistike znanosti prepoznat u meunarodnoj akademskoj zajednici. Stoga smo u procesu, odnosno u pripremi, apliciranja za uvrtenje u relevantne svjetske citatne baze. Urednitvo
centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr
Editorial
Editorial
The Contemporary Issues / Suvremene teme journal has, despite the impact of the global economic crisis on financing opportunities for academic publishing, entered its second year and has thus succeeded in maintaining the intended tempo and continuity of publishing. Building upon the experience of the previous issue, the editorial board has chosen papers for the second issue that reflect the multidisciplinary and international nature of Contemporary Issues / Suvremene teme. The first part of this issue contains a study of television advertising in Pakistan with an accent on the female perspective, a discourse analysis of the health care reform in Quebec and a treatise on the crisis of social trust in post-communist societies in case countries Russia and Bulgaria. The second part of this issue is dedicated to our theme in focus - Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently in a critical phase of reform and consolidation of statehood, struggle with its war legacy, as well as efforts at bringing the country closer to the European Union. Those are the reasons we decided to provide more space for papers dealing with the issues of this state. There are two papers by authors from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as one article by a Croatian author. Additionally, we bring you a conference paper presented at an international conference dedicated to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Budapest in November 2009. Finally, we would like to stress out that Contemporary Issues / Suvremene teme, although a new journal, strives to become a Croa-
tian journal for social sciences and humanities which will be recognized in the international scientific community. Therefore, we are currently in process of applying for enlistment of our journal in relevant global indexing and citation databases. Editorial Board
Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students
UDK: 316.66-055.2(549.1) Izvorni znanstveni lanak Primljeno: 1. 6. 2009.
Understanding Female College Students Mind-set towards Television Advertising in Pakistan

JAMSHED KHATTAK College of Commerce, Islamabad, Pakistan ASLAM KHAN HITEK University, Pakistan
Purpose: This study examined the consequences and impact that television advertising has upon the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising in Pakistan. The data was collected from randomly selected 299 female college students. Methods: The respondents from five metropolitan cities like Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Quetta and Ka, rachi were asked to answer a self-administered questionnaire. Descriptive, t-statistics, correlation and regression statistical tools were used to analyse data. Results: The results of the study reveal that these students have negative judgment about the ethical and social consequences of television advertising. However they have positive judgment about the economic impact of television advertising. The students demand more regulation to control the television advertising. The results indicated that there is a significant positive general attitude of female college students towards the television advertising in Pakistan. The study predicted a positive relationship between the consequences/ impact and general attitude of female college students towards the television advertising. Recommendation: The study recommends that marketers and the regulatory bodies have the responsibility to pay proper attention to the rising ethical, social and regulatory concerns of the female college students about the television advertising. Moreover the study provides a useful benchmark for future research studies. Key words: attitudes, television advertising, female students, Pakistan
1. Introduction It is a fact that television is the major and leading communicator of our era. Television is the most reachable media in Pakistan. Television coverage in Pakistan is about 87-90 percent (Parveen, 2009). Advertising is the major ear, ning source of television and a powerful tool to penetrate into different segments of the society. Regardless of the fact that advertising is a su-
ccessful tool for business, along with being a vital element of the modern age and a fast growing industry, the public fondness of advertising is still a matter of great concern (ODonohoe, 1995). It has a great power to influence the consumers vision about values, ethics and norms. Advertising is also criticized for presenting misleading information, promoting adverse values, fake claims, depiction of females as erotic objects and persuading people to buy things they no longer
need (Katona, 1964; Pollay, 1986; Pollay and Mittal,1993). Again, this industry is blamed for spreading unsustainable consumption patterns around the world and encouraging excessive consumption. All the foregoing aspects are apt to hinder its effectiveness as well as efficiency as a marketing tool (Beales et al., 1981; Calfee and Ringold, 1987; Pollay and Mittal, 1993; Wright, 1986). Therefore, it is critical for advertising concerns to follow the public opinion on advertising and its reaching impact on economy, cultural values and on business itself (Wills and Ryans, 1982). Youth is the most excited consumer of television entertainment. Among the youth, female students represent a sizeable segment of the society. They have a dominant role in opinion-making in the modern age. That is why exclusive studies on female students attitude towards advertising are being carried out in different parts of the world today. Understanding female college students attitudes towards advertising in Pakistan is also very important for several reasons. The female population is 53% of the total population in Pakistan. In the last decade, this largest cohort has come out of the shell they have been covered in for many centuries. The changing role of women will have an impact on the family purchasing decisions. They can influence the purchasing decisions of their peers and parents, establish brand loyalties that continue long after college days and ensure a higher standard of living after their graduation (Morton, 2001; Russell, 1996; Wolburg and Pokrywczynski, 2000).They are the important segment for product and service sellers. 2. Problem Statement This study aims at investigating the consequences and impact that television advertising has upon the general attitude of female college students in Pakistan. 3. Research Question This study aimed at investigating the mind-set of female college students towards the consequences and impact of television advertising. The study also examines the impact of the students judgments about television advertising on their general attitude. Keeping in view the ever growing need for understanding female college students, as they are an important segment of the customers, purchasing the products and services, the following research questions were
posed:
Is television advertising creating any ethical, social and regulatory concerns among the female college students in Pakistan? Do judgments of female students about the consequences of television advertising predict their general attitude? 4. Research Objectives lowing: The objectives of this research are fol(1) To study the judgment of female students about consequences and impacts of television advertising (2) To examine female college students attitude towards television advertising in general (3) To determine the impact of different consequences and impacts of television advertising on female college students general attitude towards television advertising.
5. Significance of Study 1. The study provides an adequate guideline for the regulator, the advertisers and media alike to reformulate their strategies in the light of the prevailing trend with the view to making television advertising more effective. 2. The study will provide a benchmark for future studies with regard to female college students attitude towards advertising. 6. Literature Review 6.1. Ethical Consequence The findings of Chung-Chuan Yang (2000) suggest that advertising has negative effects on college students attitude towards advertising. They found that college students in Taiwanese colleges consider advertising as a waste of national resources, which encourages people to waste and persuades them to buy things they should not buy. The college students also agree that advertising is misleading and deceptive. Penny M. Simpson, Gene Brown and Robert E. Widing II (1998) proposed that unethical perceptions of the advertisement significantly and negatively affect all advertising response variables like ad credibility, attitude toward advertising, attitude toward the advertiser, pleasure
and ethical judgment. Reid and Soley (1983) found that despite of doubtful effectiveness, sex appeals in advertising is still thought-out as a useful method to draw attention of consumer to an ad. Muhammad Shahbaz Shabbir, Shabana Kirmani, Hafiz Faiz-Ul-Hassan (2008) conducted a survey on children attitudes towards TV advertisement in Pakistan and found that a greater percentage of respondent children disagree to the claim that TV ads tells the truth. 6.2. Economic Impact Nicholas J. Ashill and Ugur Yavas (2004) suggest that advertising attitudes consist of social and economic dimensions. The target audience judges advertisements on the basis of its social and economic impact. Chung-Chuan Yang (2000) has found that Taiwanese college students agreed that advertising helps a nations economy; advertising promotes competition and benefits consumers and raises their standards of living. ChungChuan Yang (2000) also identified that students consider advertising as an important source of fashion information and helps them keep up with the products and services available in the market place. Beard (2003) replicated Larkins study and found that college students recognize advertising as performing an important economic role. 6.3. Social Consequences Ramaprasad and Thurwanger (1998) studied Malaysian university college students and found that they had average to negative interactions with and beliefs about advertising. These female college students also rated the social impacts of advertising more negatively than its economic impacts. Children in Pakistan feel the annoying qualities of advertisements and agree that most TV advertisement is poor in taste and annoying (Shabbir, Kirmani, Hassan, 2008). Dan Petrovici, Svetla Marinova, Marin Marinov and Nick Lee (2007) found out the perceived socio-economic effects of advertising and consumer beliefs and attitudes toward advertising in Bulgaria and Romania. According to them, there is a common belief (more than 80 percent) that advertising promotes undesirable values and messages. Beard (2003) found that college students of today strongly believe that advertis-
ing persuades people to buy things which they do not need. According to the Harvard Law Review Association (1967), most of intellectuals, since Aristotle, had disliked the materialist aspect of the marketplace. The critics consider advertising being a source of vulgarity and focused on sensual values. 6.4. Advertising Regulations As the intricacy of marketing communication techniques is amplified, the insufficiency of existing general and statutory law to deal with the evils of false and deceptive advertising become more important. In the advent of the marketing arena it is desirable that new regulation must be considered to have complete and useful control over advertising. The regulation must be open to public assessment and condemnation to be more effective (Harvard Law Review, 1967). 6.5. Attitude towards Advertising Sandage and Leckenby (1980), Rettie, Robinson and Jenner (2001) and Zhang (2000) suggested that using meddling tactics in advertising while competing for consumers attention can be frustrating to the audiences and can lead to affinity of generally negative public attitude towards advertising. Attitude is defined as an individual tendency to assess some body, thing or feature around him in an approving or disapproving manner. One way to express an attitude is the verbal opinion of the individual (Katz, 1960). According to Bauer and Greyser (1968), attitude toward advertising is affected by audience behaviour toward advertising. If the decision-makers behaviour is positive towards advertising, he/she will be inclined toward advertising (Pollay and Mittal, 1993). The advertising dimension that was researched extensively was attitude towards advertising (Ramaprasad and Thurwanger 1998). Nicholas J. Ashill and Ugur Yavas (2004) suggest that advertisers in Turkey and New Zealand should create advertisements that are believable. The positive relationship between believability and overall attitudes towards advertising also suggests that advertisers should be sensitive to tactics that generate consumer disbelief. A literature search revealed that, so far, no study on female college students general at-
titude towards television advertising has been carried out in the Pakistani context. It is a fact that female college students in Pakistan represent a large segment of the market and also have a dominant role in opinion-making in the modern age. The segment also has a good deal 7.1. Hypothesis
of purchasing power and influence; they deserve serious attention by marketing researchers.
Keeping in view the purpose of the study, following hypotheses were developed: H 1: Television advertising has ethical consequences for college students in Pakistan. H1a: Television advertising is considered to be deceptive by female college students. H1b: Female college students feel that television advertising has been greatly exaggerated. H1c: They perceive television advertising as pornographic. Television advertising has economic consequences for female college students in Pakistan. H2a: They consider television advertising being a source of economic growth. H2b: They feel that television advertising is a major factor of improving the standard of living. H2c: They perceive that television advertising ensures quality products. The television advertising has social consequences for the college female college students. H2a: Female college students feel that television advertising encourages people to buy things which they do not need. H2b: They feel that excessive television advertising confuses people. H2c: They argue that television advertising degrades the value system by promoting a materialistic way of life. H2d: They criticize television advertising for promoting undesirable values among the youth. Female college students demand new comprehensive advertising regulations. H3a: They demand banning of advertising of products which are harmful to society. H3b: College female students recommend regulations to control deception and puffery in television advertising. H3c: College female students recommend regulations to control proliferation in television advertising. The female college students have generally positive attitude towards the television advertising. H4a: They believe that the television advertising is generally good. H4b: They believe that the television advertising is generally helpful. H4c: They consider the television advertising to be generally believable. Ethical consequences of television advertising are positively correlated to the general attitude of female college students. Economic effects of television advertising are positively correlated to the general attitude of female college students. Social consequences of ttelevision advertising are positively correlated to the general attitude of female college students. Feelings about television advertising governing regulations are positively correlated to the general attitude of female college students.
H 2: H 3:
H 4:
H 5:
H 6: H 7: H 8: H 9:
7.2. Research Model It is apt at this stage to develop a model of the study which is discussed hereunder:
Consequences and impact of television advertising Ethical
Economic
Female students general attitude towards television advertising
Social
Regulatory
The judgment of students about the consequences and impacts of the television advertising (ethical, economic, social and regulatory) are taken as the independent variables, while the general attitude of female students towards the television advertising is taken as the dependent variable. 8. Research Methodology 8.1. Sample The targeted population was limited to female college students, with the aim of understanding the mind-set of female college students towards television advertising. A national investigation was performed in colleges of the six metropolitans (Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Islamabad). A total of 400 questionnaires were distributed, out of which 299 questionnaires were retrieved. The response rate was 75%. 8.2. Measurement of the Variables Bauer and Greyser (1968) adapted Larkins (1977) items to study attitudes toward advertising. Consequently, several other studies (Anderson et al., 1978; Andrews, 1989; Greyser and Reece, 1971; Haller, 1974; Schutz and Casey, 1981; Triff et al., 1987) used the same scale. The study has considered measures to judge the following three attitudinal areas using Larkins scale: The General Attitude scale (good, helpful, believable) is selected from Pollay and Mittal (1993) to measure the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising. To measure the response, the five point Likert Scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree was devised. The demographic information like gender, age and class of the respondents were also sought through the questionnaire. (a) Ethical consequences (deception, puffery, sexual appeals) (b) Social consequences (needless products, clutter, materialisms, undesirable values) (c) Advertising regulations (harmful products, exiting regulations, proliferation)
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8.3. Analysis Tools In order to analyse the consequences, impact of television advertising and governing regulations, descriptive statistics like mean and standard deviation were used. The Pearsons correlation coefficient was used to establish the relationship among various elements of consequences/impact/regulations of television 8.4. Respondents Profile Table 1
City Peshawar Islamabad Rawalpindi Quetta Karachi Total Frequency 55 38 52 96 58 299
advertising the and general attitude of female college students towards this industry. Linear regression analysis was carried out to determine the influence of the television advertising consequences/impact/regulation on the attitude of female college students towards television advertising. All tests were conducted at a 5% level of significance. All statistical measures were generated by SPSS17.
Demographics comparision of respondents

Age Frequency Percent 16 years 5 1.7 17 years 25 8.4 18 years 67 22.4 19 years 202 67.6 Total 299 100.0 Class Frequency Percent Inter. 27 9% Degree 272 91%
Percent 18.4 12.7 17.4 32.1 19.4 100.0
Total
299
100
The respondents comprised of 18.4% from Peshawar, 12.7% from Islamabad, 17.4% from Rawalpindi, 32.1% from Quetta and 19.4% from Karachi. The respondents surveyed in the age of 16 years were 1.7%, 17 years of age 8.4%, 18 years of age 22.4% and that of 19 years age 67.6%. The respondents from intermediate class were 9% while from graduate class 91%. 8.5. Reliability of Scale The study established the reliability of the measuring tools through two reliability methods i.e. Cronbach alpha and Parallel form. The reliability coefficients for the tools are given in Table 2 and 3. Table 2 Cronbach's alpha .634 Cronbach alpha and parallel model reliability coefficient Parallel model reliability statistics Common variance True variance Error variance Common inter-item correlation Reliability of scale Reliability of scale (unbiased) 1.061 .137 .924 .129 .639 .642
N of items 17
Test for model goodness of fit Value 438.355 df 151 Sig .000 Log of determinant of Unconstrained matrix -.654 Constrained matrix .847 Under the parallel model assumption Table 3 Chi-square
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All reliability coefficients of the studys tool suggested that Larkins (1977) scale for attitude towards advertising and Pollay and Mittal (1993) scale for general attitude towards advertising could be definitely applied in the case of female college students in Pakistan for measuring their attitude towards the consequences/impact/ regulations of television adverting as well as their general attitude towards it. The same instrument was applied by Chung-Chuan Yang (2000) in his study about Taiwanese college students attitudes towards and beliefs about advertising and the study recommended that the outcome obtained supports that the scales are valid for application in other Asian countries. Table 4
8.6. Descriptive Analysis To find out the consequences and impact of television advertising on female college students attitude mean and standard deviation of each factor was calculated. The results in Table 3 show that the judgment of the respondents about the consequences of television advertising is negative. The students are positive about the economic impact of television advertising. However, having negative ethical, social and regulatory judgment the results indicate that female students having generally positive attitude toward the television advertising except that currently they do not consider it believable.
Descriptive analysis (The results summary of H1 to H4) N 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 Mean 2.71 1.99 2.64 3.59 3.41 3.94 3.11 2.47 2.16 2.14 1.86 1.61 2.12 2.64 3.62 3.64 2.71 Std. deviation .986 .945 1.279 1.066 1.118 .972 1.216 1.115 1.013 1.022 .983 .943 1.069 1.197 .841 .885 1.007
Deception Puffery Sexual appeals Economic growth Standard of living Quality products Decreasing prices Needless products Clutter Materialisms Undesirable values Harmful products Regulations Proliferation Good Helpful Believable Valid N (listwise)
Note: a) Mean <3 shows negative attitude for (deception, puffery, sexual appeals, needless products, clutter, materialisms. Undesirable values, harmful products, regulations, proliferation) as these are all reverse scaled. b) Mean >3 Shows positive attitude for (economic growth, standard of living, quality products, decreasing prices, good, helpful, believable) these are not reverse scaled.
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8.6.1. The Ethical Consequence The results in Table 4 show that the respondents agreed that most of television advertising is false/misleading, exaggerated information and contains sexual appeals. In the realm of ethical consequences the result indicates that female college students have a negative attitude towards moral consequences of television advertising. 8.6.2. The Economic Impact In the domain of the economic impact the figures in Table 4 disclose that female students consider television advertising to be serving to the development of the national economy, raising the standard of living of the community, assuring quality goods and encouraging competition, leading to price cut-backs of merchandise and services. The result indicates a positive attitude of students with regard to the economic impact 8.6.3. The Social Consequence Female college students admitted that television advertising is convincing people to buy products which they do not really need, therefore 8.7. Correlation Analysis of Variables Table 5
confusing them and also promoting materialism. The result in Table 4 confirms that female college students acknowledge television advertising to be a source of promoting obscene values among the youth. The results imply that the attitude of female college students towards television advertising social consequence is negative and consider having adverse effects on society. 8.6.4. Feelings about Advertising Regulations The mean score of the respondents in Table 4 recommends blocking television advertising of products which have a damaging impact on society. The students have demanded more regulation for control and proliferation of television advertising. The overall outcome proposes that female students are not happy with the ability of existing regulations to control and check television advertising effectively. 8.6.5. The General Attitude towards Television Advertising With regard to the general attitude, results in Table 4 advocate that respondents are convinced that television advertising is good and helpful. However, they oppose on the point that television advertising is believable. The results put forward that female college students general attitude is positive towards television advertising in general.
Correlation matrix of variables Regulatory
General attitude Ethical Economic impact Social Regulatory
General Ethical Economic Social attitude 1 .184** 1 1 .342** .050 .045 .106* .356** 1 .133* .367** .141* . .386** ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
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The results of the correlation coefficients in Table 5 show a significant correlation among all the independent variables and the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising. The results in Table 5 indicate that there exists a positive correlation between the ethical consequences and the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising. The results also reveal that the more ethical television advertising is, the more positive is the attitude of female college students towards advertising. Hence it supports the H6. The correlation coefficient between the economic impact of television advertising and the general attitude of students towards television advertising, as indicated in Table 5, is fairly significant. The study draws the inference that the more positive the economic impact of television advertising is, the more positive is the atti8.8. Regression Analysis
tude of female students towards advertising. We agree to H7. The significant correlation coefficient in Table 5 between the social consequences of television advertising and the general attitude of female college students towards it conclude that the more socially responsible television advertising is, the more positive is the general attitude of female college students. The hypothesis H8 is established. The result in Table 5 demonstrates a significant correlation between the mind-set about television advertising regulations and the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising. We can infer that the more government regulations are set to control the television advertising, the more positive the general attitude of the female college students is towards advertising. Hence the study acknowledges H9.
Table 6 Model R R square
Model summary Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate .57316
1 .383a .146 .135 a. Predictors: (constant), regulatory, economic, ethical, social Table 7 ANOVA Sum of Model df Mean square squares 1 Regression 16.577 4 4.144 Residual 96.583 294 .329 Total 113.159 298 a. Predictors: (constant), regulatory, economic, ethical, social b. Dependent variable: general attitude
F 12.615
Sig. .000a
The results in Table 6 and Table 7 indicate that the independent variables significantly explain the variation in the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising. The results in Table 8 show that the ethical consequences and the economic impact significantly predict the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising. However the social consequences and feelings about the advertising regulation do not significantly predict the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising.
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Table 8 Coefficients Unstandardised Standardised Model coefficients coefficients B Std. error Beta 1 (Constant) 1.722 .234 Ethical .131 .052 .149 Economic .336 .055 .331 Social .030 .059 .030 Regulatory .016 .050 .020 a. Dependent variable: general attitude 9. Conclusion and Recommendations This research study is an effort to secure sufficient evidence on the consequences/impact of television advertising and their relationship to the general attitude of female college students towards it. The outcome of the study evidently discloses that the majority of the respondents experience that current television advertising is unethical because of its deceiving, exaggerating nature and for putting more emphasis on the sex appeals. At the same time, most of the respondents believe that television advertising is imperative for economic growth, enhancement of the standard of living, guaranteeing of quality products and also see it as an effective means to cut back prices. The results of the study explain very significant negative feelings of the respondents about social consequences of modern television advertising. Television advertising is judged to be the source which persuades people to purchase products that they do not need, puzzles the people by creating a clutter effect, encourages materialism and instills obscene values in the youth of Pakistan. The results also portray that female college students demand changes by regulatory authorities with the aim to control television advertising. The general attitude of female college students towards television advertising on the whole is positive, as confirmed by the results of the study. 10. Limitations The generalisation of the results is limited because the study relates to college female college students only. The non-serious approach and other delicate issues related to female college students might manipulate the responses to some extent the consequences and the attitude towards print advertising may be different because the centre of attention of the study was restricted to television advertising.The results of this research have, however, highlighted some
t 7.369 2.498 6.075 .498 .324
Sig.
.000 .013 .000 .619 .747
significant consequences and impact of television advertising and brought to light the need for future research, despite of these limitations. As this area of knowledge has not been investigated by researchers in Pakistan so far, the study also has contributed important information about the consequences and impact of television advertising and the general attitude towards it. 11. Implications The study bring to light an assessing tool to evaluate the ethical and social consequences, and an economic impact of television advertising. The measuring tool will facilitate the marketers and the regulatory authorities to appraise advertising campaigns. The study calls attention of the marketers and the regulatory authorities to shun any disruption well in time in the positive, general attitude towards television advertising. The mounting ethical, social and regulatory concerns in the mind of female students, as brought to light by the results, call for changes in marketing and regulatory strategies.
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References Academy of Educational Planning and Management (NEMIS) (2005-2006): Education Statistics of Pakistan, Islamabad Arruda, M.C.C. de, Arruda, M.L. de (1999): Ethical Standards in Advertising: A Worldwide Perspective, Journal of Business Ethics, 19(2): 159-169 Ashill, N.J., Yavas, U. (2005): Dimensions of Advertising Attitudes: Congruence between Turkish and New Zealand Consumers, Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 23(4): 340-349 Beales, H., Craswell, R., Salop, S. (1981): The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, Journal of Law and Economics, 24 (3): 491-539 Beard, F. K. (2003): Female College Student Attitudes toward Advertisings Ethical, Economic and Social Consequences, Journal of Business Ethics, 48: 217-228 Calfee, J. E., Ringold, J. D. (1998): Consumer Skepticism of Advertising: What Do the Polls Show? Advances in Consumer Research, 15: 244-48 Chingning W., Ping Z., Risook C., Michael D.E. (2002): Understanding Consumers Attitude toward Advertising, Eighth American Conference on Information Systems, 1143 Chung-Chuan Y. (2000): Taiwanese Female College Students Attitudes towards and Beliefs about Advertising, Journal of Marketing Communications, 6: 171183 Drossos, D., Giaglis, G. M. (2005): Factors That Influence the Effectiveness of Mobile Advertising: The Case of SMS, in Bozanis, P., Houstis, E.N. (eds): Proceedings of the 10th Panhellenic Conference on Informatics, Volos, Greece, November 11-13, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 278-285 Harvard Law Review (1967): Deceptive Advertising Source, 80(5): 1005 Katona, G. (1964): The Mass Consumption Society, New York: McGraw-Hill Katz, D. (1960): The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes, The Public Opinion Quarterly Special Issue: Attitude Change, 24 (2): 163-204 Likert, R (1932): A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes, Archives of Psychology, 140: 1-55 Morton, L. P. (2001): Segmenting Baby Boomers, Public Relations Quarterly 46(3): 46-47 Munusamy, J., Wong, C.H. (2007): Attitude towards Advertising among Female College Students at Private Higher Learning Institutions in Selangor, UniTAR e-Journal, 3(1): 31-51 ODonohoe, S. (1995): Attitudes to Advertising: A Review of British and American Research, International Journal of Advertising, 14(3): 45-61 Parveen, R.: Media Matters, Gender Column, SACHET, URL= http://sachet.org.pk/home/gender_ columns/webcolumn_25.asp (accessed on May 26, 2009) Petrovici, D., Marinova, S., Marinov. M., Lee, N. (2007): Personal Uses and Perceived Social and Economic Effects of Advertising in Bulgaria and Romania, International Marketing Review, 24 (5): 539-562 Phillips, B. J. (1997): In Defense of Advertising: A Social Perspective, Journal of Business Ethics 16 (2): 109-118 Pollay, R. W. (1986): The Distorted Mirror: Reflections on the Unintended Consequences of Advertising, Journal of Marketing, 50 (4): 18-37 Pollay, R. W., Mittal, B. (1993): Heres the Beef: Factors, Determinants and Segments in Consumer Criticism of Advertising, Journal of Marketing, 57 (3): 99-114 Ramaprasad, J., Thurwanger, M. L. (1998): South Asian Female College Students Attitudes toward and Beliefs about Advertising: Measuring across Cultures. International Communication Division, AEJMC Annual Conference, Baltimore Reid, L. N., Soley, L. (1983): Decorative Models and the Readership of Magazine Ads, Journal of Advertising Research, 23 (2): 27-32 Rettie, R., Robinson, H., Jenner, B. (2001): Does Internet Advertising Alienate Users?, paper presented at Academy of Marketing, Cardiff, URL= http://www.kingston.ac.uk/~bs_s520/images/rettrob. pdf (accessed on May 3, 2009) Russell, J. T., Lane, W. R. (1989): Kleppner Advertising Procedure (11th ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Sandage, C.H., Lackenby, J. (1980): Female College Student Attitudes toward Advertising: Institution vs Instrument, Journal of Advertising, 9: 29-32 Shabbir, M. S., Kirmani, S., Hassan, H. F. (2008): Children Attitude towards TV Advertisements in Pakistan, European Journal of Scientific Research, 21(4): 693-699
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Simpson, P. M., Brown, G., Wilding II, R.E. (1998): The Association of Ethical Judgment of Advertising and Selected Advertising Effectiveness Response Variables, Journal of Business Ethics, 17(2): 125-136 Singh, R., Sandeep, V. (2007): Socio-Economic and Ethical Implications of Advertising - A Perceptual Study, International Marketing Conference on Marketing & Society, 8-10, IIMK Tactics, Advances in Consumer Research, 13: 1-3 Wills, J. R., Ryans, J. K. (1982): Attitudes toward Advertising: A Multinational Study, Journal of International Business Studies, 13 (3): 121-129 Wolburg, J. M., Pokrywczynski, J. (2001): A Psychographic Analysis of Generation Y Female College students, Journal of Advertising Research, 41(5) 33-50 Wright, P. L. (1986): Schemer Schema: Consumers Intuitive Theories about Marketers Influence, in Lutz, R. (eds): Advances in Consumer Research, Association of Consumer Research, Provo, UT, 13:1-3 Zhang, P. (2000): The Effect of Animation on Information Seeking Performance on the World: Securing Attention or Interfering with Primary Tasks?, Journal of the Association for Information Systems (JAIS), 1 (1): 1
Razumijevanje stavova studentica prema televizijskom oglaavanju u Pakistanu

JAMSHED KHATTAK Ekonomski fakultet, Islamabad, Pakistan ASLAM KHAN Sveuilite HITEK, Pakistan
Svrha: Istraivanje se bavi posljedicama i utjecaju koje televizijsko oglaavanje ima na ope stavove studentica prema televizijskom oglaavanju u Pakistanu. Podatci su prikupljeni na temelju sluajnog uzorka od 299 studentica. Metode: Respondentice iz pet glavnih gradova poput Peshawara, Islamabada, Rawalpindi, Quetta and Karachia su odgovorile na upitnik. Za analizu podataka koriteni su statistiki postupci, poput deskriptivne statistike, T-statistike, korelacija i regresije. Rezultati: Rezultati istraivanja pokazuju da studentice imaju negativne stavove o etikim i socijalnim posljedicama televizijskog oglaavanja. S druge strane, imaju pozitivne stavove o ekonomskim uincima televizijskog oglaavanja. Studentice zahtjevaju vie zakonske regulative koja bi kontrolirala televizijsko oglaavanje. Rezultati upuuju na to da postoji znaajan pozitivan opi stav prema televizijskom oglaavanju u Pakistanu. Studija je predvidjela pozitivnu korelaciju izmeu posljedica/ uinaka i opeg stava studentica prema televizijskom oglaavanju. Preporuke: Preporuke studije za oglaivae i zakonodavce odnose se na preuzimanje vee odgovornosti u rastuim etikim, socijalnim i regulatornim pitanjima s kojima se susreu studentice u pogledu televizijskog oglaavanja. Osim toga, studija moe biti korisno polazite za budua istraivanja i komparacije. Kljune rijei: stavovi, televizijsko oglaavanje, studentice, Pakistan
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Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the Crisis of the Health Care System
UDK: 349:614.2>(71)=111 Izvorni znanstveni lanak Primljeno: 14. 5. 2009.
The Discourse on the Crisis of the Health Care System and the New Governance Model of Health Care in Quebec
SABINA STAN Dublin City University, Ireland
During the last decade, public discourse on the crisis of the health care system in Quebec and Canada soared to the extent that the crisis has come to be seen by many Quebeckers and Canadians as an enduring feature of their health care sector. Based on analysis of articles from the Quebec written media, the article shows that the crisis discourse contributes to promote a market-like governance model of the health care sector and to foster the acceptance of market-oriented health care policies. Key words: health care, governance, discourse, crisis, neoliberalism
1. Introduction Social scientists have recently devoted attention to the popular reception of health news stories (Adelman and Verbrugge, 2000; Brodie et al. 2003; Seale, 2004; King and Watson, 2005). But while health policy scored second among the health news stories which most captured the interest of the American public, the importance of media in shaping public views about the health care system has only started to be envisioned (Davin, 2005; Henderson, 2010). This article takes as a case of study the discourse on the crisis of the health care system developed in the Quebec francophone print media in the last two decades and tries to unveil the manner in which it might have contributed to health policy in Quebec and Canada. The article starts from the premise that media discourse on the crisis of the health care system offers a privileged perspective for dealing with matters at the intersection of media discourse, health policy, organisational ensembles
and social problems. Indeed, as this article will show, the period during which the crisis discourse developed was both preceded and followed by some of the most important reforms that affected the Quebec health care sector since its constitution at the beginning of the 70s. The first was the Rochon reform of 1996-1997, which tried to answer to increased strain on public funds with the ambulatory turn and the corresponding reduction of total hospital capacity (Bernier and Dallaire, 2001). The second reform started in 2003, after the discourse had reached its peak, and stressed the need to change the health care sector along management and market lines. This article aims to show that, while the crisis discourse was triggered by reactions to the first reform, it also contributed to the lean acceptance of the marketising stance present in the second reform. This article will analyse, in the first part, the media discourse on the crisis of the health care system, and will address, in its second part, issues pertaining to its production and to its ideological effects.
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2. Discourse, Social Problems and Policy A number of social scientists have rejected a conception of social problems as simply objective and identifiable societal conditions. Social problems were seen as products of a process of collective definition (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Spector and Kitsuse, 2006), with discourse playing a major role in their construction (Herdman, 2002: 162). Following these approaches, this article sees the crisis and the health care system not as objects existing out there in a separate material world, but as objects of political and managerial intervention that are constructed through discursive practices.1 I envision discourse as a class of related texts that exists beyond the parts which compose it, the unity of which is given by their common production in a particular social field (Chalaby, 1996: 689, 690). The meaning of a particular discourse is given not only by its component texts, but also by its relationship with other discourses, as well as by the social conditions and structural context of its production (Chalaby, 1996; Fiss and Hirsch, 2005). Moreover, as discourse has a processual (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 496) and performative (Kuipers, 1989: 103) character, its meaning is also informed by the manner in which it unfolds in time, by its temporal dynamics. Discourses furnish frameworks for envisioning, and, in fact, systematically shaping not only the problems that span a certain domain of activity, but also the causes of these problems, their possible solutions, and, finally, the object of political and managerial intervention (Foucault, 1971: 71). From the standpoint of public policies and organisations, discourses supply the parameters that fashion the architecture of policy objects, as well as the frames for thinking of the possibility of public intervention (Bridgman and Barry, 2002). Discourses also take part in the symbolic struggle for the production of the common sense and for the monopoly over legitimate processes of naming (Bourdieu, 2001: 307). It is thus important to dwell on their dynamics and on the manners in which they are articulated as hegemonic at different moments (Torfing, 1999: 101). One of the most current techniques in this respect is to render their propositions natural and taken-for-granted (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:
1 A focus on discourse does not mean denying the existence of real problems in the health care system, but it does imply approaching these problems from a perspective that takes into account the constructed, situated and conjectural nature of these problems.
478, Bourdieu, 2001: 209).2 In modern societies, state bureaucracies and their representatives were traditionally considered to be the most important producers of social problems and discourses (Bourdieu, 1994: 2). But in contemporary Western societies, states no longer retain the monopoly to influence public opinion, policies or discourse. In our societies, media acquired a leading role in the production of discourses and of social problems such as crises (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). 3.Methodology The field of discursive production I have chosen is the written francophone press in Quebec. The study used as a selection tool the database Biblio Branche of the media server Eureka.cc.3 The database includes only three of the five main francophone dailies in Quebec province, namely La Presse, Le Devoir and Le Soleil, leaving outside the two main tabloids Journal de Montral and Journal de Qubec. It is due to these limitations in the selection of the journals that the present study does not claim to be representative of all print media. Instead, it aims to highlight some, albeit significant, discursive developments taking place in at least part of the Quebec written media field. Further research on the two tabloids would need to be carried out in order to attain representativeness as well as to investigate further the hypothesis advanced in this article. The limitations present in terms of representativeness are balanced out by some positive gains in terms of significance. Thus, while the three chosen dailies are surpassed in terms of circulation by the two tabloids, they constitute nevertheless important authoritative voices in domains of national importance such as health
2 By seeing discourse as actual "networks of communication" (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 485), I dwell on its character as lived, concrete practice. But I still seek to unveil its "ideological effects" (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 485) by tackling the issue of domination and hegemony. Thus, my approach to discourse departs from Foucaultian ones and nears neoGramscian perspectives such as the one advanced by Laclau and Mouffe (see Torfing, 1999). Recognising that discourses do not strictly correspond to class divisions, that they have diffuse frontiers and that they are indeterminate and produced by a multiplicity of centres, does not prevent us from recognising that, in historically situated moments of time, certain actors and institutions have a hold on the articulation of particular dispersed discourses into a hegemonic one, and, consequently, in negating and repressing alternative meanings (Bourdieu, 2001, Chalaby, 1996, Torfing, 1999). 3 See their website at Eureka.cc for more information.
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care.4 The chosen dailies also reflect various divisions inside the Quebec written media field. Thus, while La Presse and Le Devoir are both published in Montreal, Le Soleil is published in Quebec City. And while La Presse and Le Soleil belong to media empires Power Corporation and Hollinger, and promote more right wing positions, Le Devoir is an independent daily ever since its foundation and is known for left-leaning affinities. Articles were selected using the LEAD = crise ET systme ET sant search of the database. This option searches for articles where the first two paragraphs simultaneously contain the words crise, systme and sant (crisis, system and health, respectively). The search gives a good approximation of the evolution of articles that include references to the crisis of the health care system, while also restricting itself to those media utterances that are most likely to have an impact on readers. The selection was further refined by dropping articles that were not referring to the crisis of the health care system.5 The principal body of data is comprised of 139 articles covering the period 1988-2003. The analysis was based on three careful successive readings of the articles conducted by myself that paid attention to the articulation of the meanings of the crisis, its causes, its object (the system) and its solutions. In addition to this search, I performed several other searches that sought to place the crisis of the health care system in a wider discursive field, by looking at discussion on the crisis of other possible related objects or on chaotic events that affected the system. I thus selected the articles that, during the same period, made references to the crisis of the health care sector (crise du secteur de la sant), the crisis of health care (crise des soins de sant), the crisis of health care services (crise des services de sant), the crisis of the health care network (crise du rseau de sant), the emergency room crisis (crise des urgencies) or hospital
4 As in other countries, in Quebec also the three dailies are seen as being more intellectual than the more popular tabloids. 5 A total of 64 articles were dropped from the initial body of 203 articles. While Le Soleil sometimes duplicates articles from La Presse, the number of duplicates in my corpus of data was limited to 5 articles. I chose to keep Le Soleil duplicates in my corpus because, considering the definition of discourse I am using in this article, they constitute equally worthy texts that contribute to the constitution of discourse. Whereas from a quantitative point of view they are the same with the original, and should be dropped, from the qualitative perspective adopted here, they are different texts and should be counted as separate.
closing (fermeture dhpitaux). Analysis of the resulting data sought to uncover the number of articles, per year, that mentioned the respective phrases. As Graphic 1 shows, the yearly numbers of articles referring to the crisis of the health care system are relatively low up until 1997 (they vary between zero and five). The incidence increases significantly beginning in 1998 (14 articles), reaches a peak in 2000 (39 articles), after which it decreases while still remaining at significant levels (12 in 2001; 24 in 2002; and 16 in 2003). The passage from scattered statements to a fullblown collection of utterances, i.e. a discourse, occurs then only after 1998. 1998 is thus the date of birth of the crisis discourse. This development is apparent not only in the swift numerical intensification of utterances, but also in the qualitative change in their textual contexts. These textual contexts can be divided between, on the one hand, short news texts (actualits), and, on the other hand, editorials and longer articles that discuss and analyse in length the fate of the health care system. For the entire ten-year period 1988-1997, our body of data included only 14 texts of the second type. By comparison, during the six-year period 1998-2003, the number of more consistent texts dedicated to the health care system multiplies by more than seven, to reach 102. In the process, a new vision of the problems affecting the health care system (the crisis) imposes itself in the francophone media. Before 1998, the crisis was seen mainly as a partial and temporary phenomenon. As much as half of the articles from the period 1988-1997 refer to crises IN the health care system (9 out of 18). There are emergency rooms crises (when patients overflow emergency rooms capacity), personnel crises (when lack of sufficient numbers of physicians and nurses is considered dramatic) and labour relations crisis (when physicians or other health care personnel engage in strikes). As they occur in certain precise points of the health care system (a hospital, an emergency room, a regional health board), these crises have rather precise organisational boundaries. Moreover, as such, they are viewed as circumscribed and partial. On the other hand, the other half of the articles from the period 1988-1997 that refer to a crisis OF the health care system construct it either as a future event or as a temporary situation. At the very beginning of the period, in 1988, several articles refer to the crisis of the health care system as a possible future event.
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4. The Development of the Crisis Discourse In the specific form it takes in the Quebec written media, the discourse on the crisis of the health care system has quite distinct temporal boundaries. Graphic 1 Number of articles, per year, referring to a crisis of the health care system in La Presse, Le Soleil and Le Devoir, between 1988 and 2003
Number of articles, per year, referring to a crisis of the health care system in La Presse, Le Soleil and Le Devoir, between 1988 and 2003
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Worried voices warn against the menace of the crisis if measures are not taken to prevent it. Yet, the crisis is nor a current, ongoing reality, neither an imminent one. Its advent is predicted only in five or ten years.6 Later in this first period, articles start to conceive of the crisis as an already present phenomenon. But the crisis has yet to acquire a durable, long-term character. Rather than an intrinsic characteristic of the system, the crisis is seen as a temporary phase through which, unfortunately, the system happens to pass. Indeed, if there are states and situations of crisis, moments and picks of crisis, and even a plurality of crises,7 all of these can be regulated, mastered and overcome. Like the transition crisis that affects the system after the Rochon reforms of 1996-1997,8 these situations of crisis are, by definition, transitory. As other previous years, 1998 begins with an emergency room crisis, which, just as before, is expected to wane once passed the winter peak. But it does not. In January the same year, the unexpected ice storm crisis prolongs it
6 La Presse, February 12, 1988: A8; La Presse,
October 30, 1988: A3
into a longer, more disquieting crisis, marking in the process the beginning of a new era in thinking about the health care system and the crisis. This new vision sees the crisis as a general phenomenon that affects the system in its totality and traverses all its internal sectors. During the period 1998-2003, articles referring to a crisis OF the health care system are more than twice as numerous as articles referring to a crisis IN the system (83 vs. 38). At the same time, even crises IN the health care system are no longer seen as circumscribed, limited crises. Articles that refer to these internal crises see them rather as symptoms and illustrations of the more general crisis that shakes the system. The punctual, localised crises dissolve into a unique, generalised crisis of the system as a whole. For example, the emergency room crisis of the winter 1998-1999 is seen as being only the tip of the iceberg, a bottleneck that reveals the systems dysfunctions.9 One year later, the emergency room crisis is represented as perpetual, and as a larger, more encompassing crisis, which is not only a crisis of the hospitals, but a crisis of the extra-hospital medical sector,10 and, as such,
9 La Presse, February 13, 1999: B2 10 La Presse, March 24, 2000: B3
7 Le Devoir, July 22, 1993: A4; La Presse, December 6, 1994: A4; Le Devoir, March 28, 1996: A7; 8 La Presse, February 27, 1997: B2
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constitutes itself into a window to the fragility of our system.11 Thus, after 1998, the crisis is conceived of as a quasi-permanent feature of the system. If in the spring 1998, there is a very profound crisis that touches the health care system,12 at the beginning of 1999, there is a perpetual state of crisis13 that in several months transforms itself into the most profound crisis of the last ten years [assaulting] our health care system.14 At the beginning of 2000, the problems of the health care system are no longer conjectural,15 and later it is restated that the health care system is in a permanent state of crisis.16 One year later, one is summoned to take notice of the crisis gravity and of how profound a crisis our health care system goes through.17 Thus, after 1998, a new vision of the crisis develops, takes hold of media discourse and becomes the dominant way to qualify the system as a whole in this field. Indeed, now, discussion on the crisis is conducted in a matterof-fact manner that renders its existence evident and natural. In the new vision, the crisis of the health care system is just there. It is a takenfor-granted, normal phenomenon, the existence of which does no longer need to be proven, but only, at most, illustrated. This generalisation and naturalisation of the idea that the health care system is in crisis can be seen as indicative of its institutionalisation and of its transformation into a dominant vision of the present state of the health care system.18 This vision of the crisis supplies the framework for conceiving of the problems of the health care system (the crisis) as permanent, general and profound ones. But the crisis discourse offers not only a framework for envision11 Le Devoir, April 1, 2000: F4 12 Le Devoir, April 20, 1998: A1 13 La Presse, February 24, 1999: B3 14 Le Devoir, July 13, 1999: A6 15 Le Devoir, February 5, 2000: A12 16 La Presse, March 24, 2000: B3; La Presse, June
21, 2002: A10
ing the problems of the health care system; it also comprises visions of the causes of these problems. 5. Articulations: The Causes of the Crisis In order to grasp the manner in which the crisis discourse envisions the causes of the crisis, I will make a couple of distinctions. On the one hand, I distinguish between causes external and internal to the system, that is, between causes that lie in the systems environment and causes that lie in the functioning of the system. On the other hand, I also distinguish between causes that are seen in terms of agency (i.e. originating in the action of real, identifiable actors, such as, in this case, the government, pharmaceutical companies or physicians), and causes that are seen in terms of abstract processes or entities (such as demographic and economic trends or the structure). Within the crisis discourse, few voices seriously consider the contribution of external factors to the development of the crisis. Among external factors, what we could call external agents is very marginal. In fact, only two articles explicitly see the crisis as resulting from the actions of real, concrete agents namely, the Quebec government, and physicians and pharmaceutical companies, respectively.19 Among external causes, the pivotal place is accorded not to identifiable agents, but rather to trends which are seen as inherent in the evolution of our contemporary societies. These are global trends that drive up health care demand and thus health care costs: the ageing of the population, technological developments in medicine, the invention of new drugs and new contagious diseases like SARS (in 2003). It is due to their sheer amplitude that these trends imprint themselves on the health care system so as to render it an abyss without bottom.20 In this way, the crisis discourse takes a natural and abstract turn, as real agents that could be made accountable are discharged in favour of abstract forces for which nobody can be blamed. Thus, the crisis itself is rendered natural, ineluctable, caught in the current, given, order of the world. As one article states, the pressures that threaten us in the future [ensure that] we are heading for a crisis.21 As external abstract causes are natu19 Le Devoir, July 13, 1999: A6, Le Devoir, April 12,
2003: B7
17 La Presse, May 23, 2001: A16 18 The dominance of a new vision of the crisis is also compounded, paradoxically, by the fact that voices that contest the existence of the crisis also intensify during the period 1998-2003. Marginal as they are (of the total articles analysed here, only nine include a negation of the crisis), these voices almost double their strength after 1998. Denials of the existence of the crisis can be seen not so much as participating in a powerful counter discourse, but more as mere reactions to a powerful vision that imposes itself as the prism through which the health care system is read.
20 La Presse, May 23, 2001: A16 21 La Presse, June 5, 2000: B2
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ralised as given, they become a context for more fundamental causes that are related to the specificity of the health care system in Quebec and Canada. After 1998, it is causes internal to the system that are seen as the true roots of the crisis. The debate is thus shifted from external pressures on the system (diminishing resources, increased demand-induced costs) to the internal functioning of the system. As stated in one article, the cause of the crisis rests in the allocation and the use of resources inside the network. In sum, what causes the problem is less the sum of money than the manner in which the latter is spent.22 Vital causes are thus seen to be not conjectural financial problems, but serious structural problems of the system.23 The crisis discourse constructs these internal causes by referring once more to abstract notions, such as structure, organisation, management (gestion), (governmental) bureaucracy, political interference, or technocratic approach. All of these notions are seen as laying at the origin of the vicious functioning of the system, transforming it into a vast impersonal structure and a bureaucratic monster.24 The archaic, anachronistic, lazy and rusted system is characterised by the fundamental vices which are a rigid network and a blind, insulated and superfluous central bureaucracy.25 It is a big steamship difficult to manage, plagued by waste, bad choices and, especially, paralysis.26 In sum, the system has become inefficient, as is characterised by a heavy bureaucracy, a much centralised decision mechanism and rigid collective conventions.27 By using an abstract language that does not lend itself easily to decoding by outsiders, this vision puts forth causes that cannot be easily attributable to the concrete action of specific actors. Who, exactly, has a technocratic approach, what is the structure, and who is and who is not of the bureaucracy? A more attentive analysis unearths nevertheless some distinctions. There is, thus, on the one hand, the structure(s) of the system, a rather vague notion that seems to go along with bureaucracy and organization, and that seems to include the administration of hos22 La Presse, February 24, 1999: B3 23 La Presse, March 24, 2000: B3 24 La Presse, June 3, 2000: B2; Le Devoir, 25 June
1999: A9.
pitals, community centres (CLSCs), the Regional district boards (RRSSS) and the ministry.28 On the other hand, there is health care (les soins de sant), a notion that covers rather unambiguously services offered in the private offices of physicians.29 Like two opposing poles, the two are characterised by contrasting qualities. At one pole, there are heavy and rigid structures. At the other, there are lighter and less expensive30 health care services. Thus, the structure(s), the organization and the management (i.e. the domain of governmental reforms and of public interventions) are set in contrast to programmes and processes of [health] care (i.e. the domain of physicians private interventions).31 The first are bad, the second are good. The causes of the crisis of the system lie in the first package, which thus gets equated with the systems deeper essence. In the end, the system becomes the equivalent of (the bad) structure, organization and management, or of a badly conceived and badly managed object of public intervention.32 6. Articulations: A New Object of Intervention and New Solutions The emphasis on structure, organisation and management serve to construct symbolically a specific object of public intervention: the system. That the system, as defined above, is the true object of the crisis is also proven by the fact that the crisis is much more associated with it than with other possible objects. Indeed, phrases like health care (soins de sant), health care sector (secteur de la sant), health care network (rseau de la sant) or health care services (services de sant) are much less prone to be seen as an object of the crisis in the Quebec francophone media. A search for associations between each of these phrases and the term crisis, during the same 1988-2003 period, gave numbers significantly lower than those found for the association between the health care system and the crisis.33
28 Le Devoir, November 16, 2002: G5. 29 Le Devoir, February 13, 1999: A8. 30 Le Devoir, February 13, 1999: A8. 31 Le Devoir, August 6, 1999: A9 32 Thus one can see at work within the crisis discourse discursive operations (Torfing, 1999: 96-98) of constructing both relations of difference (between health care and bureaucracy) and relations of equivalence (between bureaucracy, public services and bad management) around the discursive nodal point of the system. 33 Namely, there were 15 articles for "the health care
25 La Presse, February 13, 1999: B2; La Presse, March 24, 2000: B3; La Presse, June 7, 2000: B2 26 La Presse, June 9, 2000: B2 27 Le Devoir, May 3, 2000: A7
23
While, within the crisis discourse, other domains of public intervention are obscured and ignored, the system becomes the focal point toward which the problems of the health care sector converge. The costs that matter are not the costs of health care (les cots des soins de sant) but the costs of the public health care system (les cots du systme de soins public).34 Building on organic metaphors so much used in social sciences (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 485), the system becomes an organic-like entity that is endowed with an anatomy (the structure) and a physiology (management). It becomes even a subjective agent. Indeed, there is a loss of trust in the health care system35 (and not in physicians or politicians). What needs to be healed are the evils of our health care system36 (and not of the medical-industrial complex). Finally, when the SARS crisis bursts out in 2003 in Toronto, it is the system that has to deal with the crisis37 and that thus makes errors, and it is it which is submerged and causes havoc38 (and not health care personnel, hospital administrators, officials or politicians). The symbolic production of a new object of public and managerial intervention, the system, is compounded by the articulation of the new visions of the crisis and of its causes that are developed after 1998. Seeing the crisis as general, permanent and intrinsic, as well amenable to internal, structural causes, leads to a totalising vision of the health care network. The system becomes an indivisible entity, of which one can talk as of a singular, identifiable whole. It is seen as homogenous totality and unity, an entity, the functioning and characteristics of which can neither be reduced to its constituent, differentiated, parts, nor emanate from its environment. Instead, they are put into motion by an internal principle of structuring, organisation and management. As it is contrasted with the private intervention of physicians or of companies, this principle could be called, even if it is not formulated as such in the crisis discourse, the public regulation principle. Underlying the crisis discourse is the idea that public regulation of health care services and of public services in general,
sector", 54 for "the health care network", 23 for "the health care services" and 47 for health care. These numbers were obtained after subtracting from the initial sums the articles that also include the term "system".
is bad, and can only lead to the general ills of bureaucracy and of political intervention. This new vision of the crisis, and of the system that bears it, conveys images of a permanent and amplifying crisis that calls for imminent solutions. Constructing the problems of a domain of public intervention as profound, inherent and permanent, envisioning the object of this intervention as a totalising system propelled by a functioning principle, and conveying the feeling of the urgency to act, all contribute to the subtle imposition of a certain set of solutions as good, legitimate, and in need of rapid application. In this vision, the solution follows obviously and naturally from the diagnosis. The system has to be transformed profoundly, and more precisely through a change in the principle that rests at its basis. The public has to give way to the private. In line with the diagnosis of rigid structure, the call is for lightening the structures39 on a model based on private physician cabinets, i.e. by limiting public intervention into the system. In the same vein, the diagnosis of rigid framing (read public framing) calls for introducing in the system technological and scientific progresses and the new management modes that form the basis for the increase in productivity in other sectors.40 Considering that these new management modes are the ones current in the private, market sector, what are called for are more private and more market in the public health care sector. Thus, we can see that the matters at stake in the different symbolic struggles stirred by the crisis discourse are the very foundational principles of the system. The conflicts revolve around one of the most debated themes in health care in Canada and in Quebec, that is, the balance between the private and the public in the health care system. These conflicts pitch the promoters of what I will call marketisation (i.e. the idea of rendering more market-like the health care system) against the defenders of the public character of the system. Therefore, I use marketisation as a short phrase for calls for giving a stronger place to the private sector.
34 Le Devoir, April 1, 2000: F6 35 La Presse, June 3, 2000: B2 36 La Presse, September 13, 2000: B2 37 Le Soleil, June 1, 2003: A3 38 Le Soleil, September 22, 2003: A5 39 La Presse, February 24, 1999: B3 40 La Presse, April 27, 1999: B3
24
Marketisation constitutes one of the most frequent topics tackled in the articles analysed in this article. More than a third of the articles (48/139) do not restrict themselves to diagnosing the health care system, but also give solutions by either proposing or opposing its radical change through marketisation. Graphic 2 shows that, after 1998, in parallel with the rise of a new vision of the crisis and the system, there is also a rise of marketisation as one of the main concerns of the crisis discourse.41 Moreover, marketisation becomes the main solution promoted by the crisis discourse. Of the total number of articles explicitly referring to marketisation (48), only a third opposes it (16), whereas the large majority adopts positions favourable to it (32 articles). Interestingly, the marketisation debate does not neatly follow the right-left divide among the chosen dailies. Indeed, if La Presse is the most fervent promoter of marketisation, with 22 pro marketisation articles against only 4 counter marketisation articles, Le Soleil shows a more balanced picture, with a corresponding score of 4 vs 4. However, most surprisingly, Le Devoir does not oppose marketisation with the same gusto as La Presse promotes it. Indeed, with a score of 6 vs 8, it engages, considering its leftleaning renown, only half-heartedly in the attack on marketisation. This indicates that the cause of marketisation has transgressed classical political frontiers, as its progress is facilitated not only by its strong promotion in right-leaning dailies but also by the left-leaning dailys reluctance to engage with the topic as well as by its frequent embrace of it. The cutting across of political frontiers of the pro-maketisation position is compounded by its discursive fuzziness. Indeed, marketisation covers a rather ambiguous discursive place, as articles do not, contrary to academics and policy makers, dwell on elaborate or even on any definition at all. As we have seen, in the articles analysed here, marketisation is reflected in calls for giving more place to the private sector. It is because of the inherent fuzzy discursive contours of these calls that they can resonate both with positions, advocated by some self-alleged leftwing Quebec experts, that defend the introduction of a market-like governance (that would reno longer an issue in the crisis discourse is 2003. At this point, an expectative attitude towards the policies of the new govern-ment (Parti libral, elected in April 2003) and the quasi-monopolisation of the discoursive domain by the SARS crisis contributed to what can be seen for now a paranthesis in debate.
linquish to the private sector only subcontracted auxiliary services that are not seen as the core of health care services), and with the positions, advocated by right-leaning experts, that militate for the outright privatisation of the system by allowing private hospitals and clinics and private insurance.42 It can thus be said that the discourse on the crisis of the health care system, as developed in Quebec written media, serves mainly as a vehicle for the promotion of the idea of marketisation of the health care system. Indeed, while the crisis discourse was not produced solely by right-leaning privatising voices in media, political and expert circles, and left-leaning analysts have not managed to prevent the imposition and final dominance of a marketisation stance within this discourse and within the larger policy arena. By constructing the system as a public domain disjointed from private health care provision, and, as such, prone to crisis, the crisis discourse made space for a neat articulation of marketisation propositions. Moreover, marketisation becomes the main solution promoted by the crisis discourse. Of the total number of articles explicitly referring to marketisation (48), only a third opposes it (16), whereas the large majority adopts positions favourable to it (32 articles). Interestingly, the marketisation debate does not neatly follow the right-left divide among the chosen dailies. Indeed, if La Presse is the most fervent promoter of marketisation, with 22 pro marketisation articles against only 4 counter marketisation articles, Le Soleil shows a more balanced picture, with a corresponding score of 4 vs 4. However, most surprisingly, Le Devoir does not oppose marketisation with the same gusto as La Presse promotes it. Indeed, with a score of 6 vs 8, it engages, considering its leftleaning renown, only half-heartedly in the attack on marketisation. This indicates that the cause of marketisation has transgressed classical political frontiers, as its progress is facilitated not only by its strong promotion in right-leaning dai42 It could be further argued that the distinction many promoters of the new public management make between the introduction of market mechanisms (such as competition, contracts and outsourcing of auxiliary services to the private sector) and outright privatisation (which they define as the introduction of private hospitals and cabinets and of private insurance) is in itself a manner of promoting not only marketisation, but also at least a partial privatisation of the health care system (in the sense that some parts of the system are brought under the control of private interests). See, for such an alternative view on the privatisation of the health care system, Armstrong and Armstrong (1996, 2008) and Lewis et al. (2001).
41 The only time after 1998 when marketisation was
25
Graphic 2
Number of articles, per year, defending (M+) or opposing (M-) marketisation in La Presse, Le Soleil and Le Devoir, between 1988 and 2003
Number of articles, per year, defending (M+) or opposing (M-) marketisation in La Presse , Le Soleil and Le Devoir , betw een 1988 and 2003
12
10
M+ M-
0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
lies but also by the left-leaning dailys reluctance to engage with the topic as well as by its frequent embrace of it. The cutting across of political frontiers of the pro-maketisation position is compounded by its discursive fuzziness. Indeed, marketisation covers a rather ambiguous discursive place, as articles do not, contrary to academics and policy makers, dwell on elaborate or even on any definition at all. As we have seen, in the articles analysed here, marketisation is reflected in calls for giving more place to the private sector. It is because of the inherent fuzzy discursive contours of these calls that they can resonate both with positions, advocated by some self-alleged leftwing Quebec experts, that defend the introduction of a market-like governance (that would relinquish to the private sector only subcontracted auxiliary services that are not seen as the core of health care services), and with the positions, advocated by right-leaning experts, that militate for the outright privatisation of the system by allowing private hospitals and clinics and private insurance.43
43 It could be further argued that the distinction many promoters of the new public management make between the introduction of market mechanisms (such as competition, contracts and outsourcing of auxiliary services to the private sector) and outright privatisation (which they define as the introduction of private hospitals and cabinets and of private insurance) is in itself a manner of promoting not only marketisation, but also at least a partial privatisation of the health care system (in the sense that some parts of
It can thus be said that the discourse on the crisis of the health care system, as developed in Quebec written media, serves mainly as a vehicle for the promotion of the idea of marketisation of the health care system. Indeed, while the crisis discourse was not produced solely by right-leaning privatising voices in media, political and expert circles, and left-leaning analysts have not managed to prevent the imposition and final dominance of a marketisation stance within this discourse and within the larger policy arena. By constructing the system as a public domain disjointed from private health care provision, and, as such, prone to crisis, the crisis discourse made space for a neat articulation of marketisation propositions. 7. Whose Discourse? The notion of a crisis was applied to social phenomena ever since analysts tried to make sense of the political, economic and social transformations that shook the Western world at the end of the 18th century. Consequent to its steady success over time, the notion was transformed, in the second half of the 20th century, to an all-pervasive rhetorical metaphor (Holton, 1987: 502-503) and a ready-made catchword
the system are brought under the control of private interests). See, for such an alternative view on the privatisation of the health care system, Armstrong and Armstrong (1996, 2008) and Lewis et al. (2001).
26
(Starn, 1971: 13). But, while the notion of crisis is all pervasive and is used to advance diverse political agendas, it has nevertheless been mobilised with more success by the right. Indeed, as it was applied with a vengeance in analyses of post oil crisis developments in Western societies, the notion was turned into a major component of neo-liberal bashing of the welfare state. In this discursive process, the discipline of management played an important role. Thus, on the one hand, in the struggle over the legitimate definition of and scholarship on the notion of crisis, management succeeded in gaining hold on the notion by transforming it into another of its domains of expertise.44 On the other hand, the late 20th century also witnessed the introduction of management theories in public administration. The resulting new public management brought into conjunction both systemic and crisis visions of public services. This conjunction transformed older strains of meaning of the notion of crisis. Indeed, older dramaturgical, historical and medical meanings construct the crisis as a key but temporary moment in a developmental cycle (Holton, 1987: 504, Masur, 1975, Starn, 1971). By contrast, in the health care crisis discourse analysed above, the crisis is seen as a permanent state and an inherent condition of the system. In a wider perspective, the discourse on the crisis of the health care system developed in Quebec can be seen as contributing to the wider discourse on the crisis of public health care systems, which is itself part of the even wider discourse on the crisis of the welfare state. As with the latter, the discourse on the crisis of the health care system is a global one. Indeed, the last decade witnessed the development of a transnational neo-liberal reforming common sense in respect to health care (Serr and Pierru, 2001). Produced by international financial and health organisations, this new consensus is based essentially on an economic and managerial vision that obscures and disqualifies political approaches to health issues. Through the production of
44 This was specifically done through the "crisis management" branch. See, for example, the special number of the Journal of Business Administration edited by Smart and Stanbury in 1978, under, significantly for the merger between management and public policy, the Institute for Research on Public Policy. The special number was titled Studies in Crisis Management. Ever since the beginning of the 90s, a journal was, specifically dedicated to the topic under the title Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. It is interesting to note that management studies take-over of crisis scholarship and expertise continues the 20th century predominance of classical economy in the handling of the notion of crisis (Masur, 1978: 590).
international data, statistics, classifications and comparisons, these organizations dramatise the dysfunctions of existent public health care systems by diagnosing them with an efficiency crisis having its cause in their bureaucratic organization45 (Serr and Pierru, 2001). This global discourse on crisis provided, to a wide range of actors, a ready repertoire for talking about problems in the health care sector. Evans noticed, for example, that the decline in hospital use, that followed, in Quebec, the Rochon reforms, has lead to increasing claims, particularly from hospital workers, that the system is falling apart. For him, the declining position of hospital workers drove them, once the strongest supporters of Medicare,46 into an inadvertent alliance with its traditional enemies (Evans, 2000: 894). These enemies are powerful interest groups that include providers of care (physicians, private insurers and corporate providers), higher-income Canadians, as well as ideological entrepreneurs that champion the interests of the wealthy, cheerleading for the private marketplace (Evans, 2000: 894-896; also, Evans, 2008). Additionally, according to Hutchinson and his colleagues, crisis statements can also be fostered by less ferocious foes of the public system. For example, policy makers keen on effecting change in the atomised primary care sector often have recourse to propositions for radical change. For them, crisis statements serve to secure public and political support to big bang approaches (Hutchinson et al., 2001). These diverse statements, claims, and interests have collided with media campaigns that have made the Canadian health care crisis their battle horse. Some analysts saw thus the crisis discourse as mounted in explicit disinformation campaigns of a policy warfare originating in the neighbouring United States (Evans, 2000: 894, 895, Marmor, 1999). The campaigns developed at the beginning of the nineties as a
45 The more so, as some analysts point out, when media's search for sensational revelations weigh the balance towards the darkest scenario. Thus, for example, when Canadian media made their selective reading of the 2000 WHO report, and chose to downplay a still respectable 7th place ranking in terms of goal attainment occupied by the Canadian health care system, for its 30th rating in terms of achievement relative to potential. For some analysts, this choice has contributed to further "promoting an air of crisis" (Lewis et al., 2001: 926). 46 In English Canada, Medicare is used in reference to what Quebec terms as le rgime dassurance maladie and sometimes as a synonym for the health care system. It would be interesting to analyse, in a comparative perspective, the English media use of the system in its discourse on the health care sector.
27
side effect to achieve health care reform in the United States and inevitably spilled over into Canadian media and health services academic and policy literature. But why, for all matters, did the crisis discourse only enter the Quebec health care arena only at the end of the nineties, and why it has taken this particular form? Of course, the turbulent changes effected during 90s led the Canadian health care system to an apparent state of crisis marked by contradictory measures, services slashing and disorganising restructurings (Lewis et al., 2001: 926). Still, reading the appearance of chaos as a crisis of the health care system was not the only reading available. Elements of the chaos could still have been read as separate ones, and not necessarily as taking part in a more total, encompassing crisis of the system. For example, one event with important chaotic consequences for the system, hospital closings (fermeture dhpitaux), saw its media notoriety reach a peak in 1995,47 but faded away before the take off of the crisis discourse in 1998. By comparison, the more visual events of emergency room crises (crises des urgences) had a media evolution that closely preceded the crisis discourse (as it took off in 1998 and reached its peak in 199948). It seems that, as media coverage of emergency room crises intensified, it fuelled a more encompassing systemic discourse on the crisis. How did it happen, and why did the crisis have to be systemic? The particular meaning of the crisis discourse stems from larger ideological transformations (i.e. the turn from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism), but also from the conjectural internal struggles of the social field in which they are produced (Chalaby, 1996: 691, 694), namely in this case the francophone journalistic field. In Canada and Quebec, the end of the nineties saw internal competition inside the field mount in intensity, as francophone and Anglophone media alike went through a process of renewed concentration.49 Moreover, the continuous trend of
47 The 1995 peak registered more than 160 mentions of the phenomenon in the three dailies considered here.
tioning the emergency room crisis (la crise des urgences).
the diminishing importance of the written press vis--vis other media (television and internet) put further pressure on editors and journalists inside the written media field. The medias propensity to offer a more schematic and dramatic presentation of issues was compounded with an appearance of chaos in the health care sector, a strengthening of right wing positions in the Canadian media (Hackett and Gruneau, 2000: 204) and intensified internal competition in the journalistic field, to produce discussion of on an encompassing, systemic crisis. By claiming expertise on the health care domain (through powerful statements on the systemic crisis affecting it), media executives and journalists not only gave voice to marketising interests, but also enhanced their own positions and established a new symbolic territory (the health care system) inside a shrinking journalistic field. Of course, media discourses are not only the domain of journalists and editorial boards. One, they are overlapping with and are participating in larger discourses, such as those developed by governments, experts, or other media. Two, media discourses are not produced solely by the media, as discourse producers are always multiple (Chalaby, 1996: 695). In fact, most of the articles analysed here include (cited or authored) utterances not only of journalists, but also of other social actors, such as politicians, officials, experts, representatives or members of different professional and labour groupings. Journalists are part of a bigger chorus of voices, as they give form to concerns and problems of other social worlds, in particular the political and the administrative ones (Pierru, 2004: 2). Therefore, we can say that the discourse on the crisis of the health care system in Quebec is produced by a variety of actors and forces: the global neo-liberal ideology of welfare state bashing, essays by health care policy makers on advancing more radical reforms of the health care sector, the intensification of struggles inside the francophone journalistic field, as well as contestations by actors inside the health care field triggered by health care reforms.
of press concentration" (Fleras, 2003: 110). Even if this concentration affected less the written Quebec francophone media, it certainly affected the manner in which Quebec journalists perceived their field.
48 In 1999 there was a peak of 60 articles men-
49 The dailies analysed here were subject to earlier processes of concentration. While Le Devoir always remained an independent journal, La Presse was bought by Quebec media mogul Paul Desmarais in 1967, and Le Soleil was purchased by the Hollinger group of Conrad Black in 1987 (Gingras, 1999:115, 118). But at the end of the 90s, Canadian media underwent a series of important mergers and buy-outs, leading to "one of the world's highest degrees
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8. Effects of the Crisis Discourse The crisis metaphor not only gives full vent to feelings as to the intolerability of the present (Holton, 1987: 504), but also contributes to the cultural construction of this feeling. Moreover, the crisis discourse is not necessarily suggestive of [] a critical standpoint (Holton, 1987: 505), but rather, as the case analysed here showed, a sign of utopian politics calling for a radical dissolution of the public realm (Clarke, 2004) through the thorough institution of the idea of the Market (Carrier, 1997; Newman and Clarke, 2009). Appealing to a crisis discourse to qualify the system is also a powerful manner to claim knowledge and truth. While any discourse embodies claims to knowledge (Torfing, 1999, Foucault, 1971), the notion of crisis always potentially evokes its older meanings of moment of truth, of revelation of the deeper essence of a phenomenon (Starn, 1971: 16). The crisis of the health care system offers, in this perspective, the revelation of the true nature of the system, construed in this case as being in the same time evil and bureaucratic (i.e. public). The discourse on the crisis of the health care system contributes to the adoption of policies with very concrete effects. In Quebec, the crisis discourse succeeded in radicalising and limiting policy horizons, by making marketisation seem not only justifiable but also an inevitable component of health care reforms. The ideological effects of the crisis discourse can thus be seen as advancing a more or less hidden marketisation agenda of powerful interests. While witnessing a real privatisation of health care through the private provision of services not covered by public funds (Lewis et al., 2001: 927) and discontinuing the historically feeble overt political support for privatisation, the end of the 90s saw a powerful current in official, academic and media discourse in Quebec and Canada to giving more and more prominence to private sector delivery of health care (Bernier and Dallaire, 2001: 130; Armstrong and Armstrong, 2008). Thus, when the Parti libral took power in Quebec in April 2003, it committed itself to a marketising and privatising reform the public acceptance of which was prepared by previous years of media crisis discourse. Both the Parti libral commitment to a privatising stance towards the health care sector and the public acceptance of this stance were fully revealed by the July 2005 Chaoulli ruling (Crawford, 2006). On this occasion, the
Supreme Court of Canada overthrew Quebec laws banning the purchase of private insurance for medically necessary services. Seizing the occasion, the Parti libral ignored possibilities of blocking the ruling and further expanded its effects by announcing only months later that it will consider shortly what part the private sector should play in health care. At the same time, public reactions to the ruling and to the governments position vis--vis the ruling have not yet managed to consolidate in a powerful movement against privatisation. Thus, the crisis discourse might have realised just this: to trigger maybe not so much deep adhesion to privatisation as indifference and a wait-and-see attitude to the policies of a government determined to transform along market lines the health care sector. Following Mintz, we can distinguish two meanings of the crisis. On the one hand, the outside meaning (Mintz, 1985) of the crisis pertains to the meanings the crisis has for different power holders. Thus, if for government officials, the crisis might constitute a means for legitimising reform, for private companies, the crisis is a means for legitimising health care privatization, and, tacitly, profits derived from health care provision. On the other hand, the crisis has also an inside meaning (Mintz, 1985), one that points towards its meanings for health care workers and patients. In this article I concentrated on the crisis outside meaning, the one related to power and to powerful actors, to policy shifts and to envisioned gains. Its inside meanings remain yet to be studied and constitute an interesting angle through which to approach contemporary health care transformations. In fact, the inside meaning of the crisis of the health care system points to the novel temporality of the flexible phase of capitalism, particularly, in health care, to shifts in patterns of care away from the hospital and to shorter stays inside the system. Documenting this temporality of accelerated people-processing inside the system and its consequence for the manner in which the system is lived by those who are inside it or who are just passing through it, constitutes a fruitful agenda for future research.
29
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Diskurs o krizi zdravstvenog sustava i novi model upravljanja zdravstvenom zatitom u Qubecu
SABINA STAN Gradsko sveuilite u Dublinu, Irska
Tijekom prolog desetljea, javni diskurs o krizi zdravstvenog sustava u Qubecu i Kanadi narastao je do takvih razmjera da je u oima mnogih Kvebeana i Kanaana kriza postala trajna znaajka sektora zdravstvene zatite. Na temelju analize lanaka iz kvebekog tiska, lanak pokazuje kako diskurs o krizi pridonosi promicanju trino orijentiranog modela upravljanja zdravstvenom zatitom te potie prihvaanje trino orijentiranih politika u zdravstvu. Kljune rijei: zdravstvena zatita, upravljanje, diskurs, kriza, neoliberalizam
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Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societies
UDK: 32.019.5(497.2+470) Pregledni rad Primljeno: 17. 8. 2009.
The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societies: The Case of Bulgaria and Russia
PLAMENA PEHLIVANOVA University of Chicago, USA
After the fall of communism in Bulgaria and Russia, the form of underground communities still remained in the collective consciousness, as people became even more secluded around their tight circles of family and friends. The family bonds became the new cradle of trust that might have resulted in the low levels of bridging and out-group trust. Trust toward government institutions and formal organisations have dramatically declined in accord with the decline in social and political participation. From observations of the Bulgarian society from 2000 to present, I propose that informal personal contacts on the micro-level rather than formal institutional participation on the macro-level tend to generate social trust and thus hamper institutional legitimacy. The family substitutes the role of the institution as it provides for value priorities and moral resources for ones realisation. Contrary to the Tocqueville and Putnam model, I propose that in Bulgaria and Russia such interpersonal relations generate trust and intermediary organisations do not. Furthermore, the paper will study: 1) the levels of trust in comparison to the levels of social participation, 2) the level of economic development and 3) the development of the family structure as an influential factor of trust and social/political participation. The study will focus on the social development of post-communist Bulgaria and Russia (from 1999 to present), with the Chinese and Dutch societal model as comparison. Key words: trust, social capital, confidence, fatalism, social and political participation, intermediary organisations, legitimacy organisations
1. Background: After the death of Stalin in 1953 the Soviet Union experienced the melt-down period, referred to as The Thaw. The Khrushchev era gave rise to multiple underground associations that were the building blocks of the future democracy. They were non-conformist groups like the Lianozovo School of Oscar Rabin and musicians such as Visotsky and Akudjava that gradually destabilized the regime from within and consequently became the catalysts for the break of the Soviet Union. This was the period in which
underground, non-conformist art groups formed to share their independent views on society and culture; it was the common goal that united them and created a rich social capital throughout. Breaking away from the government influence and commands, radical young individuals formed social groups that were built around a common scepticism toward the government and the goal to radically break away the order. People formed tight circles based around their family and friends, as they shared common views and ideas about life. However, after the fall of communism in Bulgaria and in Russia, the form of
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underground communities still remained in the collective consciousness, as people became even more secluded around their tight circles of family and friends. The family bonds became the new cradle of trust that might have resulted in the low levels of bridging and out-group trust. Trust toward government institutions and formal organisations have dramatically declined in accord with the decline in social and political participation. Through my observations of the Bulgarian society from 2000 to present, I propose that the informal personal contacts, rather than formal institutional participation, tend to generate social trust and hamper institutional legitimacy. The family substitutes the role of the institution as it provides for value priorities and moral resources for ones realisation. Contrary to the Tocqueville1 and Putnam model, I propose that in Bulgaria and Russia, such personal relations generate trust and intermediary organisations do not. Furthermore, the paper will study the levels of trust in comparison to the levels of participation; to the level of economic development, and the development of the family structure as an influential factor of trust and social/political participation. The study will focus on the development of post-communist Bulgaria and Russia (from 1999 to the present) and it uses the Chinese and Dutch societal model for comparison. 2. Introduction With the fall of communism in both postcommunist countries (Bulgaria and Russia) the formal public participation declined in accord with the decrease in social and political trust. However, the interwoven structure of the family functions as the epicentre for the continuation of social traditions. From the World Value Survey we learn that people in both countries trust most their families and close friends, and distrust any kind of social and political structures (esp. government). We also see that most participation takes place in activities involving tight social circles and less in any kind of formal (sport, church, work) organisations, and least in any kind of political or governmental institutions. For example, the World Value Survey shows us that - in Russia 38.5% and in Bulgaria 24% of society does not trust the Parliament at all, in contrast to the Neth1 Civic and political organisations educate individuals about
being citizens in a free society. Such groups may also form alliances with like-minded organisations in order to lobby or coordinate their advocacy messages. Most importantly, these organisations become reservoirs of social capital and trust.
erlands with 4.8%. Furthermore, from the survey sections Frequency of spent time, we notice that Bulgaria and Russia prevail in spending time with family and friends and minimal with formal organisations (like church, sports and communal organisation). It is shocking to note that 79.6% of the Bulgarian and 67.8% of the Russian population claims not involved in any voluntary organisations. Whereas in the US and the Netherlands the cultural participation has dramatically risen, Bulgaria and Russia report almost 90% of their population as no member of any organisation.2 According to the results from the Eurobarometer survey for 2004, the Bulgarian institutions were facing a crisis of confidence. Low levels of trust have remained the same (since the fall of the regime) for most of the national political institutions, while some dont knows have been transformed into negative opinions. Plamen Georgiev claims that, the result is 10 points decrease in trust in the National Parliament (81%), 6 point decrease in political parties (83%), a 7 point decrease in national government (70%) and 5 point higher mistrust in the Bulgarian justice system (70%). (Plamen, 2007: 138). Out of all countries surveyed by the Euro barometer, Bulgarians tend to mistrust the most their national legal system. The survey also shows that, out of all countries polled, Bulgarians and Romanians are the most dissatisfied with their quality of life. While pessimistic about the political institutions and their quality of life, Bulgarians have shown high expectations towards the European Union. Particular support and optimism has been reflected by young people between 15 and 24 years of age. In general, the Euro-barometer reports show that Bulgarians have become less pessimistic in national terms and more realistic in their Euro-optimism and the role of Europe in the future of their country. However, what is the reason for the decline of trust and participation after the fall of the regime? How can we compare the Bulgarian case with the Chinese sociopolitical model? How do we fight antagonism and growing pessimism in the Balkans?
2 The survey results have been extracted from the World

Value Survey Bulgaria (1999) and Russia (1999)
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Table 1 Confidence in Institutions President Army Police Local Government Banking System Cabinet Prosecution Courts of Law Parliament 71% 55% 51% 40% 37% 30% 18% 18% 15%
* Survey conducted by Gallup, July 2005
3. History and Old Age The political and social behavior of the Balkans can be explained by the inherited culture of traditional antagonism that relates not only to their communist past. Nikolay Valkov describes this behavior as formed around culture, history and the political model of the country. (Valkov, 2009) Furthermore, his study closely compares the resemblance between Latin European countries to post-communist countries in their democratic political model and low voluntary organisational membership. It could be argued that the interpersonal relations on the micro-level influence the social and political structure of the state. Nevertheless, through his analysis, Valkov opposes this theory and concludes that the low associational life model in post-communist societies is not necessary correlated with their democratic performance. Instead, he believes that the low membership rates should be understood as something which has its own internal logic and
explanation. The origins lie in the nature of the societal transformation in the region. (Valkov, 2009: 14). Bulgarians in this way are less bound to the values of individual worthiness. Their social solidarity is a hybrid of the old structured collectivism that emerged as structures during the transition, believes Plamen Georgiev. Eastern and Central Europe have good reason to distrust the government, since they have lived in authoritarian regimes, some more totalitarian than others, forced to subjugate individual interest to those of the Communist Party. Social participation in volunteer and political organisations was advocated (if not enforced), which led to drastic decline in any kind of political or civic organisations after the fall of communism. With the fall of the regime, the reaction was a massive alienation and distrust toward the communist regime and lingering cynicism toward political and civil institutions (Georgiev, 2007:138). One may speculate that with the fall of the regime, there would have been an
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Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societies
increase in social participation and enthusiasm for independent civic and cultural organisations. As Nikolay Valkov states in his study of postcommunist countries, there is an expectation that vigorous civic engagement precedes, triggers, or follows democratization of an authoritarian political regime. (Valkov, 2009: 2). However, with the development of democracy in Bulgaria and Russia (1990-1999) the World Value Survey shows a decline in civic and political activism. The reappearance of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe coincided with the decline in associational activity. In relation to decline in social participation, we also witness a decline in political and civic trust. Contrary to the Tocquevillian model, which infers that democratic systems increase participation, it seems that post-communist societies such as Russia and Bulgaria do not necessary manifest the inferred high voluntary activism. To the question: Can most people be trusted?- Bulgaria (1997-1999) witnessed 8% decline, while Russia (1990-1999) witnessed a 15.7% decline. Confidence in Parliament declined: in Bulgaria (1990-1999) with 24% and in Russia (1990-1999) with 22%. The New Democracies Barometer (2001) exhibits Bulgaria and Romania as the countries with the highest level of distrust among the new democracies. The results here reflect the difference in experience of each country under communism. Furthermore, William Mishler and Robert Rose speculate that most citizens dont distinguish between institutions of state and society but they judge them holistically and evaluate them sceptically. (Mishler, Rose, 1997: 420). This argument resembles the one put forward by Thompson in Cultural Theory (Ellis,Thompson, Wildavski, 1990), and is ambitious enough to involve future studies on how fatalism affects participation. Why did trust decline and continues to decline in Bulgaria? On the other hand, how can we compare the Chinese social model to Bulgaria and Russia? Trust is to be consequentially developed by the society and it needs to come from the positive performance of political and civil institutions that, as Hirschman says, is measured by reasonable measure of individual and collective good (Hirschman, 1970: 58). Trust is initially very important for the development of democracy in post-communist countries like Bulgaria and Russia. Trust in civil institution doesnt diminish democracy but completes it, enhancing the effectiveness of political institutions (Mishler, Rose, 1997: 420). In the case of Bulgaria and Russia, one can speculate that the fall of the
regime witnessed an increase in social activism, which adopted the fight for democracy as their slogan. However, the legitimacy of institutions was no longer judged by ideology but by performance. Thus, the economic downfall resulted in decreased political trust and participation, and increased social dissatisfaction. The Standard Eurobarometer Analysis of 2008 states the following: Bulgarians continue to be least satisfied with their way of life of the entire Eurobarometer poll (59%). However, while, in the spring (2008), they felt strongly the positive effects of EU membership and their life satisfaction was on the rise, reaching its highest scores (40%), now under the influence of the crisis, it has decreased (by 2 points). This strong dissatisfaction with life may be explained by the unanimous opinion of citizens that compared to the average in the European countries, the situation in Bulgaria is worse in all areas: 88% give a negative assessment regarding the situation of the national economy, 77% - regarding the employment situation, 84% - regarding energy prices, and at least nine out of ten interviewed regarding the cost of living (92%) and the quality of life (93%). (Standard Eurobarometer 70, 2008) The growing income gap between the people and the insufficient pensions also furthered the antagonism in Bulgaria. When asked: How would you rate the current retirement funds in Bulgaria?, 82% of the Bulgarians answer as Bad + Very Bad, while only 52% of the European Union population reports the same. Bulgaria and Hungary are presented as the European States with the highest dissatisfaction rate in their retirement funds. At the same time, 25% of Bulgarian households report in WVS to have the minimum salary income, in comparison to the only 9% of Russian, and 2% of Chinese and Dutch households. While we see highly skewed data for Russia and Bulgaria, Chinese and Dutch data have a rather uniform bell-shaped distribution. Do income and retirement funds affect participation? The data show that Bulgarians with lowest income levels tend not to participate in voluntary organisations. However, income is not the only cause for decline in participation; age proves to be another important factor that we have to control for.
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4. Age In order to dig deeper into the causality of the decline in trust and participation of the Bulgarian, Russian and Chinese society, we must look at the age distribution in these countries (Table 2). It is striking to see that 23.3% of the Bulgarian society consists of people over 65 years old, while in the Chinese they comprise only 6% of the population. There is a big difference in Bulgarian and Chinese demographics, where the Bulgarian population growth rate is -0.813% (2008 est.), the Chinese is 0.629% (2008 Est.). How does this affect the reports on trust and participation of the two populations? The older generation in Bulgaria reports to participate least in voluntary organisations and expresses the highest dissatisfaction with life. For example, to the question in the World Value Survey: Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say...which, if any, you belong to? 79% of the Bulgarians answered Belong to none. Here we see that only 20% of Bulgarians and 32% of Russians belong to any voluntary organisations, in contrast to 92% of Dutch. In order to explain this phenomenon of decline in associational life we must look at two factors: age and income of the population. As previously noted, 43% of the interviewed Bulgarians is above 50 years of age; while in China it is only 25%. In other words, the dominant population of Bulgaria consists of elderly (born after 1951) while China consists of predominantly 33-49 year olds. Therefore, the analysis has to control for the variable of age and Table 2:
income to see whether their effect on participation. When controlling for age, the World Value Survey presents that 46% (BG) of the Belong to None section is made up of people above 50 years old (Table 3). Interestingly enough, the Chinese model shows that 43% of the Belong to None section is composed of 15-29 year olds. Therefore, the Bulgarian and Chinese model seems to differ in the level of participation between their age groups. What does this tell us about the younger generation in China and the older generation in Bulgaria? Since the Bulgarian population is dominated by the older generation, we see that this survey on participation is also influenced by the opinions of the elderly. The outcomes also support observations made by Terry Clark in his The New Political Culture that younger people participate more than the elderly (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998:126). In support of the New Political Model, we see that in Bulgaria there is a decline in associational life with the increase of the age factor. Similarly, the table below shows a decrease in cultural activism with the increase of age. 5. Social and Cultural Participation James Coleman and Robert Putnam both emphasize trust as an important factor for the establishment of civil society, the sense of community and connection between citizens in institutions that connect them with government. Political activism is an example where the social trust is measured in participation. In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam chooses bowling as
Participation declines with Age
Age vs. Mean of Belonging to Cultural Organisations 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-64 65 0,175 0,123 0,11 0,1 0,085
Survey conducted by Terry Clark, University of Chicago * This table controls for the Age vs. Mean of people belonging to Cultural Activities
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an example of civic participation, which provides for bonding and establishment of social trust. He further argues that social trust is strongly associated with forms of civic engagement and social capital. Putnam implies that people, who trust their fellow citizens, volunteer more often, participate more often in politics and community organisations. (Putnam, 2000: 136-137). It is discouraging to see the statistic on Bulgaria and Russia, which show a decline in participation and relevantly the decline in trust. In her article Socialization for Participation, Natalia Letki discusses that the low level of citizen involvement in politics, in East-Central Europe, is linked to low levels of social capital. Letki mentions the prevailing apathy, lack of interest and low participation in politics. (Letki, 2004: 669). Accordingly, the author cites leading sociologists such as Inglehart and Catterberg, who argue that the weakness of political involvement are blamed on the weakness of civil society and low levels of interpersonal trust.
The World Value Survey and the New Democracies Barometer present very little positive trust in civil and political institutions (for Bulgaria) with most distrust directed toward the Judiciary System and the Parliament. Participation in political parties, trade unions and other government organisations is witnessing a decline. From Putnams point of view, Bulgaria and Russia are witnessing a great decline in participation in relation to trust. However, one might argue that this evaluation is based only on the analysis of formal civic and political organisations. As argued by Clark, Achterberg and Navarro, Putnam doesnt take an account for scenes3 and thus excludes the unofficial types of social participation, which also generate social
3 Scenes are the concept introduced in Clark, Achterberg,
and Navarro conference paper Culture is on the Rise - Why? Theories of Cultural Participation and Empirical Evidence. Scenes are constructed by physical structures, people and neighborhoods. Peoples interaction with these structures creates the dynamic of scenes. The three aspects of scenes (values on which they are judged) are: legitimacy, authenticity and theatricality.
Table 3 Rising Membership of Cultural Activity Groups Country Netherlands USA Bulgaria Portugal Brazil Latvia Russia Lithuania China 1981 12,5 13,9 1990 34,6 19,7 4,3 6,2 5,4 6,8 4,9 7,3 7,3 2000 45,2 36,9 4 3,7 2,4 3,7 1,2 2,9 2,2 Delta 32,7 23 -0,3 -2,5 -3 -3,1 -3,7 -4,4 -5,1
* Survey conducted by Terry Clark, University of Chicago
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capital. For example, Clark studies the rising membership of cultural activity groups in order to emphasize the role of scenes in the post-materialist countries. (Clark, Achterberg, Navarro 2007: 11). The Netherlands witness the highest rise of membership, while Bulgaria, Russia and China present a negative delta growth. Why does membership decline in Bulgaria and Russia, and how can we compare their outcomes to the Chinese model? The studies and analysis of Clark, Achterberg and Navarro show that cultural participation in post-communist or communist countries is decreasing (Table 3). They explain this phenomenon as - participation in the post-communist countries doesnt lead to legitimacy. On the other hand, we should consider the idea that social structures have lost their legitimacy on the grounds of historical ineffectiveness and forceful authoritarian model. Furthermore, how does China compare to this model? We see in the table above that Chinese participation in cultural organisations is even lower than Bulgaria and Russia. In regards to the state economy, Bulgaria reports the lowest economic growth between the three countries, which could be correlated with the negative participation levels. On the other hand, China reports a GDP of $3.251 trillion (2007 est.) and at the same time witnesses the lowest social association. What does this say about the Chinese model? The Chinese society reports to be most concerned with materialistic, not post-materialistic values. Since the change of the regime from legitimacy based on ideology to legitimacy based on performance, the Chinese society has witnessed increase in trust toward the economic performance of the country, rather than the cultural/voluntary institutions. Students place a great deal of faith in the capacity of economic growth to solve their problems. While students agree that the environment is a serious problem, they place economic development before environmental protection in terms of domestic goals. (Stalley, Yang, 2006: 13). Another example becomes the environmental NGOs, which maintain only about 100 volunteers, of which only 20 are considered regular contributors. Many Chinese environmental organisations posses a degree of freedom, say Phillip Stalley and Dongning Yang. Nevertheless, these philanthropic and environmental organisations remain closely tied to the state and perform functions in line with the central government policies. The governments restrictions on NGOs and social organisations are argued by Peter Ho to have this negative effect on participation (Ho, 2001).
In general, the Chinese society remains restricted because of limitations in its political opportunity structure the lack of elections, the restrictions on social organisations and the lack of civil society. In addition, the Chinese society has been focusing on the two most important domestic development goals 1) promoting scientific advancement and 2) controlling the population. So, environmental protection has been viewed as post-materialist issue and has been ranked below the governments materialist goals. The belief in the ideology of economic development has hampered the likelihood of anti-pollution movement and the support in post-materialist issues. Therefore, the Chinese society can be defined as materialistic and not yet issue-based, which partially explains its negative cultural participation levels. Here, the Chinese model is similar to outcomes of Bulgaria and Russia; however the mechanism, which explains it turns out to be very different. While the Bulgarian society shows a decrease in cultural participation because of distrust and antagonistic behavioral patterns, Chinas negative delta membership comes from the governments emphasis on the economic, rather than cultural, development. Another explanation to why there is a decline in voluntary and cultural organisations on the Balkans and Russia, given by Plamen Georgiev in The Bulgarian Political Culture, is that their society is less aware of the instruments of genuine democratic government; their mentality is still set on the centralist model, like China (Georgiev, 2007:111). As previously noted by Gallup International (2005), the President earns 71% of the Bulgarians trust and the Army 55%, while the Parliament earns only 15%. Cross compared internationally, the survey by the AllRussian Public Opinion Research Center (2009) found that trust levels for President Medvedev (Russia) have grown to 73 percent in the past three years. It is striking to see that both Bulgarian and Russian presidents have earned more than 70 percent of their citizens trust, when at the same time 22 percent of them express that the previous political regime was Bad (1999). However, the Gallup International presents a dualistic concept. Does the survey actually test the Trust in the President or the Trust in the Presidency? Plamen Goergiev infers that the survey defined rather dualistically by the concepts of President and The Presidency seems to be not less consistent (Georgiev, 2007: 112). He presents data for the levels of trust in different presidents: (1992) saw an 88% of the blue
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cohort strongly supporting the President, while 1993 reported less than 50% support. The turning point was the reign of Z. Zhelevs appeal for a national agreement and the restructuring of the political space. The results proved a drop in shared trust toward his personality and at the end of 1995 Bulgarian voters reported less than 50% support. It is interesting to note that Georgiev also argues that the attitudes toward the Presidency are not influenced by the hypothetic models of imperial, corporative or symbolically week. Instead of evaluating on the ideal type model, the Bulgarians prove to be influenced more by the personality of the individual. Personal legitimacy has clearly become more important than the institutional legitimacy model of the Soviet past. Here charisma dominates the regime. President of all Bulgarians has been the most acceptable mantra of latest voting campaigns, whereby a non-militant (even though paternalist) role of the President is given merit. (Georgiev, 2007: 112). The Alpha Research4 done in October 2000 further discusses the trust toward the President: In general, the Bulgarians are more likely to trust institutions as the President and the mayor, which are directly elected and are embodied by a certain personality. This to large extent is due to the strict reticence towards the people around - 77% of the respondents stand to the position that one has to be very cautious with the people (Alpha Research, 2000: 4). Unfortunately, the World Value Survey doesnt study the confidence level for the role of the president in the Bulgarian society. Nevertheless, WVS shows Confidence in the Armed Forces as being 60%. The Bulgarian army enjoys higher trust than any other institution since 1989. This is because the army has been traditionally and rather sentimentally bound institution in the nations political culture. Georgiev further defines the army as a contributor toward the territorial integrity and has played a role of significant socializing institution (Georgiev, 2007:112). Just as Tocqueville defines the intermediary organisations as socialization structures, the Bulgarian army is seen as a melting pot for ethnic, educational and cultural differences in the country.
4 Alpha Research is a private, independent full-service research agency, established in 1997. It is a member of ESOMAR (The European Society for Opinion and Market Research) and of the Bulgarian Sociological Association.
Therefore, the army counts as a reliable factor of stability in Southeastern Europe. Since societal expectations remained unmet after the fall of the regime, the social distress and antagonism grew constantly. Negativism toward the previous political system is mostly observed in the younger generation (15-29 year olds). The elderly, however, show more trust and more optimism toward the old political regime and towards the armed forces. Instead, the people over 50 years of age report the most dissatisfaction with life; they tend to have the lowest income levels and to be mistreated by the state as they receive miserable pensions. A 45% of the people over 50 years of age (the sociodemographics given by the WVS) witness total butchering of their expectations by the mistreatment of the state. Thus, the growth of antagonism and nostalgia within the circles of the older population seem inevitable. The need for a strong leader is expressed by the Bulgarian society in the WVS, which reports 48% being in favor of having a strong leader. Contrastingly, only 13% of the interviewed Chinese reported as being in favor of such model. Even after the fall of communism and the fight for democracy, the Bulgarian mentality remains most trustful in the paternalistic-authoritarian model. Not very different from the Chinese case, the Eurobarometer for 2008 reports Bulgaria as definitely in favor of more economic development and interested in materialist values, rather than post-materialist issues. For example, What expenditure, do you think, has the largest share of the European Union budget? (2008), 38% of Bulgarians report as dont knows. 35% think that they go for economic growth and only 1% think that they go for culture and media. However, when asked For what sector would you like most of the EU budget to be used? Bulgarians place first the economic growth (like the Chinese) and least the culture/media (Table 6). This opinion study of the European Barometer (2008) shows that the society is in need of economic betterment; it focuses mostly on the materialist values, rather than post-materialist issues. 6. The Family The analysis up to here aimed to explain the reasons and effects of decline in trust in the Bulgarian and Russian society. We looked at how income and economic levels affect participation, how materialist state goals hamper the rise of post-materialist values and movements.
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On the other hand, we observed the increase in social antagonism as a result of growing inequality and dissatisfaction with life in society. This section will try to further focus on the levels of trust that society reports and how does inside and outside group trust affect participation and the development of society. Who do Bulgarians trust? Why? And where do they spend most of their leisure time? Our Circle became a common phrase used during the Thaw period in Russia and in Bulgaria, where tight circle of family and friends would meet and discuss shared ideology and opinions. The family structure, which was predominantly nuclear, helped in the establishment of tight bonds and facilitated the creation of strong social capital among its members. In a way, the circle generated the micro-level trust which has declined towards the state in the last years of the regime. Through tough political and economic transitions, the Bulgarian society witnessed a decline of the social ties that existed during communism. The social inequality and the later emergence of dirty money and corruption triggered the disintegration of society, which led to social alienation and loss of institutional legitimacy. The older generation in particular tends to express suspicion and negativism toward the newly rich. Inequality and miserable financial status of most elderly in Bulgaria has proven to affect their social and political trust levels. From my personal observations of the older generation in Bulgaria, it seems that the elderly have isolated themselves within a very limited circle of family and friends who have earned their trust.
It can be argued that the family substitutes the role of the institutions as it provides for value priorities and moral resources for ones realization. Contrary to the Tocqueville and Putnam model, I propose that in Bulgaria and Russia, such personal relations generate trust and intermediary organisations do not. Relevant to the WVS study of Participation in Voluntary organisations, (Table 4), the survey based on Spending of leisure time analyses where and how people spend their time. According to Terry Clark, unofficial social interactions, such as consumption, generate a strong social capital (Clark, Achterberg, Navarro 2007: 11). In this sense, based on the survey on spending leisure time we could analyse where and how people interact and hypothesize how social capital is constructed in the different countries. From this table presented by the WVS, we can see that in contrast to the United States, more than 70% of the interviewed from China, Russia and Bulgaria report to not at all spend their time in sports, cultural or communal organisations. When we add the variable of age to the table, we see that in Bulgaria (1999) 55% of the people over 50 years of age dont spend any time, while 45% of the younger spend their time weekly in such organisations,. On the other hand, in Russia (1999) - 60% of the 30-49 year olds dont spend any time, but 65% of the younger interviewees spend their time weekly in communal organisations. Why is there such a generational gap? What makes the older population
Table 4 Spending of leisure time: How often do you spend time with people at sports, culture, communal organisations? Country Bulgaria China Russian Federation United States Not at all 70% 85% 75% 25% Only a few times 7% 9% 10% 26% Once a month 11% 2% 5% 24% Weekly 10% 2% 6% 20%
* World Value Survey (1999)
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more isolated, less trustful and not participating? When we test the WVS section of Spend leisure time, the data shows that Russians and Bulgarians hardly spend any time in formal clubs, organisations or cultural gatherings. An influential factor for these negative results are the opinions reported by the older generation. Nevertheless, we should a question: why is this so? The marginals table shows very intriguing results under the section Not applicable. It is interesting to note that only Bulgaria and Russia show percentage outcome in this section. The result for
Bulgaria (46%) and the Russia (23%) shows a very high percentage that shouldnt be ignored in this analysis. What does Not applicable mean? Does it mean that such organisations are a nonexisting concept for 46% of the Bulgarians and 23% of the Russians? During the communistic regime, the Bulgarian and Russian society were required to become members of organisations such as sports clubs, youth clubs, party organisations, and various professional unions which were controlled by the state. However, with the fall of the regime, these organisations vanished
Taking note of the marginals section under this study, the following is observed: Table 5 Marginals for question: How often do you spend time with people at sport, culture, communal organisations? Country Bulgaria China Russian Federation United States Not applicable % 46 0,0 23,3 0,0 n 460 0 583 0
World Value Survey (1999) *The marginals section pays attention to the section Not Applicable and the results that follow under the countries of Bulgarian (1999) and Russia (1999).
or were modified and altered into new forms adaptable to the new democratic society. It is reasonable to infer that with the disintegration of these formal clubs and organisations, the older generation couldnt adapt with the new forms or was not well-informed about the emergence of new ones. In general, the older generation experienced inequality from the state (in terms of income and pension) and was left in isolation from the rapidly emerging new forms of civil life. This neglect and seclusion left the elderly with the inability to adapt to the tempo of the social modernizations. In these terms, older people in both countries might show inadequate responses to surveys like the one shown above. Not applicable, thus proves to be a very important field for further examinations and speculations. Nevertheless, the WVS from 1999 observes a decline of social participation in formal
organisations in Bulgaria, Russia and China. A more recent study under the European Barometer examines the changes in the Bulgarian society after 2007 and it reports pessimistic outcomes not very different from the observations in 1999. Citizens mistrust towards national governments, parliaments and the judiciary has registered again, as in previous surveys, its highest levels, and trust the lowest scores, in the whole Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer, 2008: 5). On the other hand, the above mentioned economic inequality and the general influence of the economic downfall coincides with growing outgroup distrust in the Bulgarian and Russian society. WVS (1999) asks: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? The answers are:
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(1) Most people can be trusted (2) Cant be too careful A 67.5% of Bulgarians and 73.7% Russians show increasing distrust toward the rest of the society. In contrast to China (43.8%) and the Netherlands (40%), the two post-communist countries report that most people cannot be trusted. In his article on the E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first
Century, Robert Putnam proposed two theories that reflect the effect of growing diversity - Theory 1: Diversity enhances bridging and out-group solidarity and Theory 2: Diversity enhances bonding and in-group solidarity (Putnam, 2007: 115). Contrary to these theories, Bulgaria reports to be one of the Balkan countries with the highest diversity, and at the same time with steady ethnic tolerance. Thus, the increase in social distrust cannot be fully explained on the
Table 6 Most people can be trusted? Country Bulgaria China Netherlands Russian Federation Most can be trusted 24,9 52,5 59,4 22,9 Cant be trusted 67,5 43,8 39,9 73,7
* World Value Survey (1999)
terms of diversity. The growing distrust in the two countries might be a result of economic shifts, diversity growth or cultural value shifts in the different generations. These three factors should be a theme for further research on the decline of trust in these two communities. However, we will focus on another important factor that might have an influence on these social and cultural developments the structure of the family. The structure of the Bulgarian and Russian family plays an important role throughout history and has contributed toward the formation of very particular communal social structures and folklore culture. The family has always been an epicenter of folklore and religious rituals and so it has generated strong interpersonal trust within its members. We can further note that during the Soviet years, society turned pessimistic toward the role of institutions and their ineffectiveness; it further obtained trust toward the role of interpersonal contacts as essential instruments to exchange and attain goods. Accordingly, the Alpha Research (October 2000) surveying the political participation in the Bulgarian society:
Family and political institutions are positioned in the two poles of the public trust. Strongest is the confidence in kinship. According to a decimal grade scale (where 1 means absence of trust, and 10 marks full trust), only family and relatives receive grades close to the maximum - family takes 9.6, and relatives are assessed with 7.9. Next in place are neighbors (5.9) and Bulgarian nationals, i.e., those with whom people communicate directly. (Alpha Research, Oct. 2000) Likewise, the WVS studies how these countries spend their leisure time. The questions that deal with a participation or spending time in formal or communal organisations show negative results, while the ones that deal with family and friends show strong positive outcomes. It is interesting to note that the Chinese spend most time with family, which is also observed in Bulgaria and Russia. We note further that Bulgaria and Russia show strong distrust toward their own societies, which indicates the outgroup
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distrust of these societies. Nevertheless, we observe more ingroup trust, more bonding rather than bridging and more time spent with family and close friends rather than at any civic associations. In The New Political Culture, a following model is proposed (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998: 27): Having a slimmer family and more education contributes towards the increase in individual and group tolerance. These factors also facilitate the rise of the New Political Culture.
However, having a slimmer family and the possession of individualistic values is not embedded in the Bulgarian and Russian history. Instead the cultural forms of the two countries have developed around the nuclear and extended family structures, which Maria Todorova has studied as far as during the Ottoman rule of Bulgaria. The cult of the family can be explained through the evolution of the family model in the Balkan history. In her Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern: Demographic Developments in Ottoman Bulgaria, Maria Todorova emphasizes the Balkan tendency to predominate in nuclear
Slimmer Family: decline in extended family; weakening of family links More tolerance of individual and group tolerance More Education: more media access
family households since 1863 (Todorova, 2006: 25). Changes within the family structure have occurred due to variety of factors social structure and social values, economy and environmental constraints. Nuclear family dominated during the Ottoman rule and the extended family expanded during the Soviet period. Following the Soviet era, observations show an increase of extended households during the 1990s. Second, it appears likely that some reversal occurred over the first quarter of the 20th century due to the substantial increase in the share of solitaries. For the long Soviet period, however, the relative order of the categories remains roughly the same. The largest group is simple family households, accounting for 41% and 55%. The second and third largest categories are solitaries and extended/ multiple households with 1822 and 1524%. Finally, there is a more or less stable 1015% one-parent households. During pre-soviet and Soviet period, it was the norm for newly married couples to co-reside with the parents of one of the two spouses. For the years up to 1970 they yield an expected bandwidth variation of extended households of between 30 and 45%, i.e. well above the actual percentage of extension found in the population census data for these years. (Afontsev et al., 2008: 177). According to the logic of the model, Afontsev argues that this would mean that not even all available widows joined their married childrens household at
old age, and she strongly suggest that nuclear family formation was the norm. Starting from the 1970s, however, the calculations yield an expected share of extended households of around 20%, which approaches the real values enough to hint at the possible existence of an extended family system during the later Soviet period. Similar to the Bulgarian model, the Russian family structure also portrays a traditional pattern of nuclear and extended family structures. In looking at the history of the family structure, we must also take under consideration the structure and availability of housing as a factor that influences patterns of household formation. As Sergey Afontsev et al. mention in their study urban housing in Russia was in very short supply throughout most of the 20th century, with the exception of the years of actual de-urbanization during the Civil War. (Afontsev et al., 2008: 190). In the table above, it is seen that the share of solitaries among urban households was lowest during the 1930s to 1950s, when housing was most scarce due to the combination of high rates of ruralurban migration and low investment in civil construction. The shortage of housing thus obviously became an important factor behind the formation of extended and multiple households, and influenced the cultural preferences that favored such households. Newly married couples often could not obtain separate apartments until their 30s and so, like the Bulgarian families,
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had not much of a choice but to reside with their parents. Important is to consider the ecologydependent mechanism, which the communal apartments (komunalki) introduced towards the pattern of family life. From the Communal Living in Russia Project we are able to grasp the atmosphere of the interior structure of the komunalki, and to also read primary documents written by members of these social/family structures. There are many reasons why people lived in communal apartments in the Soviet period, and why many continued to live in them after the collapse. From a simple historical view, the severe shortages of housing explain the existence in these komunalki (in Bulgaria and Russia) during the entire USSR. The ideology behind this mass phenomenon came from the states communist philosophy of communal lifestyle. After the collapse, many unmarried, divorced or widowed women remained living in them, because of the inability to improve their standard of living and the decline in their pensions/incomes. Unless they have cash income apart from their primary salaries, personnel in education, health care, the sciences, civil administration, and other public sectors earn less than the average monthly salary (as of 2006, 9900 rubles per month or approximately $343, according to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service) (Buckley, Gurenko, 1997: 1). In Bulgaria (1990), the Country Studies Series by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress reports: 65% of the population averaged only half a room per family member. Only 36% of families with children under eighteen had a separate childrens room; 65% used the living room as a bedroom; and 57 % used the kitchen as a bedroom. By 1990 communal apartments were becoming rarer, however; at that time, 12 percent of families shared a kitchen with another family (Nations Encyclopedia, 1992). The Country Studies also report that 60 % of the younger generation was forced to stay in their parents homes after marriage. In 1990 over 40 % of homes included two or more families or other relatives of one family. Members of three or even four generations often lived together. Traditional acceptance of the extended family contributed to this situation, but long waits for separate housing also played a critical role. In 1979 the government established a special Young Newlywed Families Fund that ensured that new families would receive at least 25 % of new government housing. This program delivered more housing to young families in the 1980s, but waiting lists also grew longer during
that period. The relationship between housing and patterns of household formation proves to be much emphasized in the 1990s because of construction standstill in both countries. The 2002 census outcomes also reflect the emergence of a phenomenon relatively new to the Russian and Bulgaria society young urban professionals leaving the parental home before marriage and setting up one-person households in rented or purchased apartments (Afontsev, 2008: 178). The modernization tendencies enforce of the emergence of a contingent of young urban professionals who set up a separate household before marriage. Nevertheless, social and economic instability in these two countries continues to strengthen the institute of family as an income-pooling unit, including the traditional extended family household. Because of the economic instability and the transitional processes that are still underway, it cannot yet be predicted, which of these trends will eventually prevail. In these terms, the family remains a strong institution which has traditionally formed the moral values and cultural patterns in both Bulgaria and Russia. As Inglehart has noted, some post materialistic values have had an impact on the younger Bulgarian generation autonomy, postponing marriage and increased mobility (Inglehart, 1997: 132). However, he also claims that empirical evidence is still limited and not representative to predict the development of the activist role of the family in relation to affirmation of the democratic values (Georgiev, 2007: 121). In addition, the Bulgarian and Russian family structure cannot yet be defined as slim, as mentioned by Clarks model in The New Political Culture (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998). Even though not slim, the contemporary Bulgarian family is to be characterized with high educational homogeneity, says Plamen Georgiev. (Georgiev, 2007: 120). As previously noted, Terry Clarks model suggests that higher education and slimmer family lead to the increase in individual and group tolerance (Clark, HoffmannMartinot, 1998). However, the two influential factors are not fully expressed in the Bulgarian case. The educational level seems relatively high but the family has not evolved to answer the category of slim. As a result, though, Georgiev further notes that the Bulgarian society reports a steady ethnic tolerance, especially concerning religion. The Ottoman occupation and the WWII Jewish immigrant population in Bulgaria have resulted in gradual increase in ethnic tolerance. Therefore, the Bulgarian social mechanism doesnt
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seem to fit the NPC model proposed by Clark. In the Bulgarian and Russian case studies, the family has become the basic factor for political socialization and milestone for shaping the new civic culture. The economic instability in the two countries has enforced the strength of the family unit, while it has also increased the distrust toward local institutions and authorities. The social capital cannot be sought as a product of intermediary organisations, as De Tocqueville argues, but has allocated itself in the isolated family unit structures and the informal social folklore practices. Wedding processions, socializing over coffee, sitting parties and unofficial folklore dance collectives are types of these unofficial socio-cultural scenes in Bulgaria that encourage social participation in contrast to the institutionalized organisations. To relate it internationally, this unofficial cultural model of Bulgaria and Russia is similar to Spains informal social scene of Pandillas and Movidas. Furthermore, these social practices reveal a continuation of folklore culture that is built around the family structure and inspired by an oral tradition. Folklore practices in general have been formed in a more intimate scale and have become situated around the circle of family and relatives. Even though personal relations seem to generate trust and intermediary organisations do not, we should consider the social trust that is directed toward the national institutions. If the personal relations and family circle provide trust and other organisations do not, then how do we explain the trust in EU institutions that Eurobarmeter (2008) reports? Trust in the European Union among Bulgarians is higher than the trust in other international organisations, such as NATO and UN. The high level of trust in the EU and its institutions is in sharp contrast with the new wave of mistrust in the Bulgarian institutions. (Standard Eurobarometer 70, 2008) Unlike the average EU citizen, but similar to the new member states, Bulgarians trust only the European Union, its institutions and international organisations. Also, at least every second Bulgarian trusts the European Commission (BG - 51%, EU27 - 47%) and the European Parliament (BG - 57%, EU27 - 51%), and almost half of those polled trust the European Central Bank (BG - 49%, EU27 - 48%) and the Council of the EU (BG - 46%, EU27 - 42%). On the contrary, mistrust in the Community institutions is on the
rise in the EU27, but in Bulgaria it has dropped and is now half the EU average for each and every EU institution. The Bulgarians show highest mistrust in the countrys political and executive power. In contrast to the Bulgarians, the regional and local authorities gain the highest level of trust among citizens in the EU (50%). However, Bulgarians reports of mistrust towards national governments, parliaments and the judiciary prove to have the highest levels and the lowest trust scores in the whole Eurobarometer survey. 7. Conclusion Albeit enthusiastic about their future at the beginning of the twenty first century, the citizens of Bulgaria and Russia display more apathy. Observing the development of post-communist societies has further proven that democratic conditions do not always co-exist with the vigorous political activism and civic associations. Instead, as stated by Nikolay Valkov, low associational activity rates in these countries should be understood as something, which has its own internal logic and explanation (Valkov, 2009: 14). These social patterns can be explained by the influence of cultural folklore on the social mentality, or through the institutional structures and political actors that are seen as responsible for the social welfare. While the social and economic levels in Bulgaria and Russia remain unstable, the cultural significance of the family structure will remain a stronger institution for the provision of social capital and trust than the intermediary and government organisations. Even with the progression of post-materialist values in these societies, the family will remain a traditional enforcer of moral values and cultural patterns. Thus, we have witnessed that both post-communist societies portray an ecology-dependent structures that establish cultural and social patterns. The unsatisfactory financial status of individuals and the generational differences in the two societies also influence the levels of distrust and political and civic participation. While pessimistic about the political institutions and their quality of life, Bulgarians have shown high expectations towards the European Union. Particular support and optimism has been reflected by young people between 15 and 24 years of age. In general, the Eurobarometer (2008) reports show that Bulgarians have become less pessimistic in national terms and more realistic in their Euro-optimism and the role of Europe in the future of their country. According to these results,
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the Bulgarians express some kind of institutional trust, however not toward any of their local ones. Hope seems to exist for the increase in national trust with the enhancement in economic prosperity and the effectiveness of local institutions. References Afontsev, S. (et al.) (2008): The urban household in Russia and the Soviet Union, 19002000: Patterns of family formation in a turbulent century, The History of the Family, 13 (2): 178-194 Alpha Research: Political Participation in Bulgaria - October 2000 Key Findings, http://www.democ.uci. edu/resources/virtuallibrary/bulgaria2000.report.pdf (March 15, 2009) Buckley, R. M., Gurenko, E. N. (1997): Housing and Income Distribution in Russia: Zhivagos Legacy. The World Bank Research Observer, 12: 19-32 Clark, T. N., Hoffmann-Martinot, V. (ed.) (1998): The New Political Culture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Clark, T. N., Achterberg, P., Navarro, C. (2007): Culture is on the Rise - Why? Theories of Cultural Participation and Empirical Evidence, Conference paper, Glasgow Coleman, J. S.: Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, American Journal of Sociology, 94: 95-120 Curtis, G. E. (ed.) (1992): Bulgaria: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress Ellis, R.,Thompson, M., Wildavsky, A. (1990): Cultural Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview Press Eurobarometer 70, National Report: Executive Summary Bulgaria, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb70/eb70_bg_exec.pdf (March 10, 2009) Fukuyama, F. (1995): Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press Hirschman, A. O. (1970): Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Ho, P. (2001): Greening without Conflict: Environmentalism? NGOs, and Civil Society in China, Development and Change, 32 (5): 893-921 Inglehart, R. (1997): Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press Koford, K., Miller, J. B. (1995): Contracts in Bulgaria: How Firms Cope when Property Rights are Incomplete, University of Delaware Working Paper, 95-04 Letki, N. (2004): Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership and Democratization in East-Central Europe, Political Research Quarterly, 57(4): 665-679 Mishler, W., Rose, R. (1997): Trust, Distrust and Scepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies, The Journal of Politics, 59 (2): 418-451 Nations Encyclopedia, Country Listings: Bulgaria, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-1928. html (April 13, 2009) Newton, K. (2001): Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy, International Political Science Review, 22 (2):201-214 Putnam, R. D. (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon & Schuster Putnam, R. D. (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press Putnam, R. D. (2007): E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century, Scandinavian Political Studies, 30 (2): 137-174 Stalley, P., Yang, D. (2006): An Emerging Environmental Movement in China, The China Quarterly, 186: 333-356 Todorova, M. (2006): Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern: Demographic Developments in Ottoman Bulgaria, Budapest: Central European University Press Valkov, N. (2009): Membership in voluntary organisations and democratic performance: European and Post-Communist countries in comparative perspective, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42 (1): 1-21 World Value Survey, Online Data Analysis, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (January 15, 2009)
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Pad povjerenja u postkomunistikim drutvima: Sluaj Bugarske i Rusije

PLAMENA PEHLIVANOVA Sveuilite u Chicagu, SAD
Nakon pada komunizma u Bugarskoj i Rusiji, oblici podzemnih zajednica su ostali u kolektivnoj svijesti, a ljudi su se jo vie povukli u uski krug obitelji i prijatelja. Obiteljske spone postale su novi izvor pojverenja to za moguu posljedicu ima nisku razinu povjerenja prema vani. Povjerenje prema dravnim institucijama i formalnim organizacijama dramatino je opalo, sukladno s padom drutvene i politike participacije. Na temelju opaanja u bugarskom drutvo od 2000. godine naovamo, smatram kako osobni kontakti, naspram formalnih organizacija, stvaraju povjerenje te sprjeavaju izvanjsku participaciju. Obitelj substituira ulogu institucija, budui da prua vrijednosne prioritete i moralne resurse za osobno samoostvarenje. Suprotno Tocquevilleovom i Putnamovom modelu, smatram kako u Bugarskoj i Rusiji osobni odnosi stvaraju povjerenje, dok posrednike institucije to ne ine. Nadalje, lanak prouava razine povjerenja u usporedbi s razinama participacije, kao i gospodarskog razvoja i obiteljske strukture kao utjecajnim faktorima povjerenja i drutvene/politike participacije. Studija se fokusira na razvoj postkomunistike Bugarske i Rusije (od 1999. naovamo) te koristi kineski i nizozemski model za usporedbu. Kljune rijei: povjerenje, socijalni kapital, pouzdanje, fatalizam, drutvena i politika participacija, posrednike institucije
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Saa Mrdulja: Oblik dravnog ureenja BiH po Cutileirovom planu
UDK: 323.1(497.6) Pregledni rad Primljeno: 11. 5. 2009.
Oblik dravnog ureenja Bosne i Hercegovine po Cutileirovom planu (18. oujka 1992.) meunarodne zajednice1
SAA MRDULJA Institut drutvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar - Centar Split
Tijekom zavrne faze raspada Jugoslavije, u okolnostima koje vode dravnom osamostaljenju njenih republika i koje u bitnome oznaava srpska velikodravna agresija na Hrvatsku, dolazi i do konane kristalizacije politikih ciljeva triju bosansko-hercegovakih naroda. Tako krajem 1991. Srbi pristaju uz opciju stvaranja srpske dravne tvorevine na dvije treine bosansko-hercegovakog teritorija s perspektivom njenog prikljuenja Srbiji. Nasuprot tome, druga se dva naroda zalau za neovisnost BiH. No, dok je Hrvati vide kao sloenu (kon)federativnu dravu triju nacionalno-teritorijalnih jedinica, pri emu bi hrvatska jedinica zauzimala oko treine njena teritorija, Muslimani/Bonjaci tee transformaciji BiH u unitarnu tvorevinu. Takvu koja bi u uvjetima, skoro oekivane muslimanske/ bonjake apsolutne brojane nadmoi faktino funkcionirala kao muslimanska/bonjaka nacionalna drava. S ciljem usuglaavanja politikih ciljeva triju bosansko-hercegovakih naroda i harmonizacije njihovih meusobnih odnosa meunarodna je zajednica poetkom 1992. otpoela svoj direktan angaman u BiH u sklopu kojeg je oblikovan i meunarodni/Cutileirov plan njenog unutranjeg ureenja. Rije je bila o jedinom planu meunarodne zajednice koji je kreiran u ozraju koje nije bilo odreeno ratnim prilikama (travanj 1992 studeni 1995.) te traumatinim iskustvima koja determiniraju bosansko-hercegovaku postratnu politiku zbilju. Stoga je meunarodna zajednica prilikom kreacije Cutileirovog plana bila u mogunosti u znatno veoj mjeri uvaiti i ustavno odreenje (Socijalistike Republike) BiH, po kojem je ista imala biti dravom triju konstitutivnih, suverenih i jednakopravnih naroda (Hrvata, Srba, Muslimana/ Bonjaka) i djelovati na rjeenju koje bi se temeljilo na etiki opravdanom principu podjednakog uvaavanja i zakidanja triju bosansko-hercegovakih naroda. Sve u svemu, djelovanje u takvim okolnostima dovelo je meunarodnu zajednicu na pozicije da kreira i podri plan po kojem je u interesu harmonizacije meunacionalnih odnosa BiH imala funkcionirati, kako iz analize sadraja samog plana proizlazi kao izrazito integrirana konfederativna tvorevina. Kljune rijei: Bosna i Hercegovina, Hrvati, Srbi, Muslimani/Bonjaci, meunarodna zajednica, Cutileirov plan, konfederacija
1 Ovaj lanak izraen je u okviru znanstveno-istraivakog projekta Hrvatski identitet i multikulturalnost Mediterana u doba globalizacije ifra: 194-1941560-1546
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1. Uvod: Okolnosti raspada Socijalistike Federativne Republike Jugoslavije Tijekom osamdesetih godina prolog stoljea glavno politiko pitanje unutar Socijalistike Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) bilo je pitanje (redefinicije) oblika njenog dravnog ureenja. Dok je srbijansko partijsko rukovodstvo teilo prema unitarizaciji i centralizaciji Jugoslavije, politika vodstva nesrpskih republika/ naroda inzistirala su na ouvanju postojeeg stanja ili na dodatnom jaanju (kon)federalistikih znaajki zajednike drave. Nakon to se u uoj Srbiji 1987. etablira nova vladajua garnitura sa Slobodanom Miloeviem na elu, koja otpoinje sa izvaninstitucionalnim, manipulativnim i nasilnim nametanjem vlastitih htijenja te koja uspijeva podrediti Vojvodinu, Kosovo i Crnu Goru, problematika dravnog ureenja Jugoslavije otpoinje usmjeravati jugoslavensko drutvo u pravcu krajnje zaotrenih politikih odnosa. Taj e se razvoj osobito snano oitovati poslije raspada Saveza komunista Jugoslavije u sijenju 1990., izazvanog pokuajem srbijanskog rukovodstva za stjecanjem kontrole nad tom institucijom posredstvom koje je htjelo olakati realizaciju vlastitih ciljeva, odnosno nakon to tijekom iste godine u nesrpskim republikama, poslije demokratski provedenih izbora, vlast preuzmu nove politike strukture. Za razliku od prethodnih, one su, naroito u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj zauzele otvorene konfederalistike pozicije otro se suprotstavljajui srbijanskim zahtjevima. U okolnostima odreenim radikalnom politikom podvojenou, neravnoteom snaga oitovanom u injenici da je uz srbijansko rukovodstvo pristajala srbizirana Jugoslavenska narodna armija (JNA) kao i spremnosti srbijanskog i armijskog vrha da nasilno ostvare vlastite ciljeve mogunosti za kompromisno rjeenje temeljne problematike jugoslavenskog drutva gotovo i nije bilo. S tim u vezi, nakon procjene kako vlastite ciljeve nee moi ostvariti na miran nain, srbijansko i armijsko rukovodstvo otpoinju pripreme za njihovu oruanu realizaciju. Uz ostalo, one su ukljuivale oduzimanje oruja teritorijalnim obranama nesrpskih republika te temeljito naoruavanje srpskog stanovnitva izvan Srbije. Pored toga, od same uspostave demokratski izabrane vlasti u Hrvatskoj, konstituirane od strane Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ), poticano je teritorijalno izdvajanje dijela srpskog stanovnitva unutar te republike, predvoenog Srpskom demokratskom strankom (SDS). Pri
tome se srpskom ivlju pruala podrka u lokalnim sukobima s hrvatskom vlau. Otvorena agresija na Sloveniju, a zatim i na Hrvatsku uslijedit e nakon to poetkom ljeta 1991. spomenute republike proglase svoju neovisnost. No, dok je napad na Sloveniju neuspjeno okonan ve kroz nekoliko dana, nakon ega pred tom republikom vie nije bilo ozbiljnijih prepreka na putu k potpunoj dravnoj samostalnosti, agresija na Hrvatsku dovodi do izbijanja izrazito snanog ratnog sukoba. Izbijanje agresije dolazi i do intenzivnog ukljuivanja meunarodne zajednice u jugoslavenska politika zbivanja, usmjerenog na obustavljanje ratnih sukoba i na iznalazak politikih rjeenja putem kojih bi se uspostavljeni mir odrao. U interesu ostvarenju tih ciljeva, meunarodna je zajednica poetkom rujna 1991. utemeljila i Meunarodnu konferenciju o (bivoj) Jugoslaviji. Unutar njenih okvira kreirala je te od poetka listopada do poetka studenog nudila na prihvaanje vlastiti model njenog unutranjeg preureenja po kojem se trebala transformirati u svojevrsnu junoslavensku zajednicu neovisnih drava (Nacrt Konvencije Konferencije o miru u Jugoslaviji / Carringtonov plan). No, nakon to u studenom Srbija i Crna Gora definitivno odbiju takvu mogunost te nakon to krajem istog mjeseca Arbitrana komisija Konferencije o Jugoslaviji zakljui da se Jugoslavija nalazi u procesu raspada meunarodna zajednica krajem prosinca iskazuje spremnost za priznanjem pune dravne neovisnosti onih jugoslavenskih republika koje ga zatrae. Time su stvoreni uvjeti za meunarodno priznanje samostalnosti Slovenije, Hrvatske i BiH, do ega dolazi poetkom 1992. te naknadno i Makedonije. S druge pak strane, meunarodno je posredovanje imalo svog znaaja i za obustavu ratnih djelovanja. Prvo u Sloveniji a naknadno i u Hrvatskoj. Naime, uz meunarodnu asistenciju poetkom su sijenja 1992., potpisivanjem, kako e se pokazati relativno stabilnog primirja privremeno okonani ratni sukobi u toj republici. No, do tada su agresorske snage uspjele okupirati etvrtinu hrvatskog teritorija na kojem je formirana tzv. Republika Srpska Krajina. Taj e prostor Hrvatska uspjeti povratiti tek tijekom 1995. i 1997. (istona Slavonija).2
2 v. vie kod: Bilandi, 1999; Javorovi, 1995; Jovi, 2003.
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2. Bosna i Hercegovina izmeu demokratskih izbora (studeni 1990.) i meunarodnog priznanja (travanj 1992.) Polarizacija politikih odnosa unutar Jugoslavije nije mogla zaobii niti BiH. Tim vie to je u sredinjoj jugoslavenskoj republici, od sveukupno 4.377.033 stanovnika (popis 1991.), pored 1.902.956 ili 43,5% Muslimana/Bonjaka, 242.682 ili 5,5% Jugoslavena te 104.439 ili 2,4% ostalih, ivjelo 760.852 ili 17,4% Hrvata i 1.366.104 ili 31,2% Srba (Gelo i dr. (ur.), 1995: 9). Dakle, u BiH su pripadnici dvaju najbrojnijih, u osnovi politiki konfrontiranih jugoslavenskih naroda zajedno predstavljali 48,6% njenog stanovnitva. Do otvorenih, jo uvijek politikih konfrontacija u BiH doi e nakon demokratski izbora krajem 1990. kada vlast u njoj preuzmu nacionalno-afirmativne stranke tj. muslimanska/bonjaka Stranka demokratske akcije (SDA) te bosansko-hercegovaki HDZ i SDS (Herceg, Tomi, 1998). U vrijeme ve odmakle nacionalne homogenizacije na razini cjelokupne Jugoslavije, bosansko-hercegovaki SDS i HDZ postaju promicatelji onog vida unutranjeg ureenja zajednike drave koji je ve formuliran u nacionalnim centrima srpskog i hrvatskog naroda. Za razliku od susjedne Hrvatske, unutar koje je politika suprotstavljenost izmeu vladajueg HDZ-a i SDS-a gotovo odmah dovela do beskompromisnog zauzimanja otrih protivnikih pozicija pa i do oruanih sukoba, u BiH je put do takvog razvoja dogaaja bio usporeniji. Prvenstveno stoga to su hrvatsko-srpski odnosi u toj zemlji uvelike bili determinirani politikim pozicijama Muslimana/Bonjaka te odnosima s njima. Jer i za Hrvate i za Srbe bilo je izuzetno bitno imati Muslimane/Bonjake u vlastitom konfederalistikom ili unitaristiko- centralistikom bloku. Time bi u BiH jedna od opcija ureenja Jugoslavije stekla dominantne pozicije to bi znaajno utjecalo na karakter samih unutarjugoslavenskih odnosa. No, u danom vremenu sami Muslimani/ Bonjaci nisu bili voljni, izuzev u nedostatku druge mogunosti, odluno se prikloniti kojem od postojeih blokova. Iako su predstavljali gotovo apsolutnu veinu stanovnitva unutar BiH, ivjeli su u okruju, openito gledano, brojnijih Hrvata i Srba. Pored toga, po Ustavu Socijalistike Republike (SR) BiH sva su tri bosansko-hercegovaka naroda, unato razlikama u brojanoj veliini imala statuse konstitutivnih, suverenih i meusobno jednakopravnih naroda.3 U
3 v. uvodni dio Ustava SR BiH (1974.) te lanke 1., 2. i 282.
kao i amandmane na reeni Ustav iz 1990. kod: Ustavi,
takvim se okolnostima niti muslimanska/bonjaka brojana nadmonost unutar BiH nije mogla adekvatno politiki kapitalizirati. Svjesni kako bi ih priklanjanje pojedinoj od otro suprotstavljenih opcija izloilo konfrontaciji s kojim od susjednih naroda, konfrontaciji koja bi po Muslimane/ Bonjake mogla biti izrazito tetna, oni su svoje politiko djelovanje primarno usmjerili u pravcu jaanja vlastitih pozicija unutar BiH. Konkretno, inzistirajui na ouvanju i jaanju njene dravne samobitnosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti djelovali su u pravcu njenog ureenja kao unitarne tvorevine (Filandra, 1998; Kasapovi, 2005; Valenta, 1991). Uspjenom realizacijom tih ciljeva, Muslimanima/ Bonjacima bi se otvorio daleko iri manevarski prostor. Jer unitarna BiH, naroito nakon postizanja iekivane muslimanske/bonjake apsolutne brojane nadmoi, faktino bi predstavljala nacionalnu dravu tog naroda na cjelokupnoj bosanskohercegovakoj prostornosti. U takvoj dravi, unutar koje bi u bitnome bila umanjena sposobnost bosansko-hercegovakih Srba i Hrvata utjecanja na muslimanske/bonjake pozicije, stvorile bi se i odgovarajue pretpostavke za odlunije muslimansko/bonjako istupanje na jugoslavenskoj razini. U skladu s navedenim zanimljivo je navesti sljedeu izjavu akademika Muhameda Filipovia (u predizbornom razdoblju jednog od elnika SDA): Mi smo imali elemente (Muslimani/Bonjaci, S.M.) da izaemo iz cijele te drame balkanskog prostora izbjegavajui rat. Mi smo imali demografsku, kulturnu, intelektualnu i ekonomsku propulziju, mi smo postali ne samo najbrojnija nego i dominirajua grupacija u BiH i vrlo znaajan faktor u cijelom kontekstu regionalne politike, a to su sve elementi koji su u varijanti mirnog razvoja, bez obzira pod kakvim se okolnostima taj razvoj odvijao, bili za nas i radili za nas. Ja sam izraunao da bismo mi do 2001. godine, dakle do danas, bili u BiH 62% ukupnog broja stanovnitva, bili bismo ekonomski jaki, pogotovo ako bi drava donijela neke mjere restitucije imovine (Dani, 1.3.2002). U konanici, naroito svojim izriitim zahtjevom za ouvanjem i jaanjem dravnosti BiH, Muslimani/Bonjaci su morali doi do konfederalistikih pozicija. No, do njih su, barem po svojoj tadanjoj politikoj percepciji mogli doi i bez konfrontiranja sa Srbima. ak i posredstvom eventualne, kratkorone i taktike suradnje s njima.4
1974.; Amandmani, 1990.
4 o pokuaju stvaranja srpsko-muslimanskog/bonjakog
politikog dogovora vidjeti: Filipovi, 2000; Izetbegovi, 2001
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Iz prikazane se muslimanske/bonjake otvorenosti za oba meusobno suprotstavljena bloka u BiH vidi kako se dugo vodilo svojevrsno politiko nadmetanje izmeu Srba i Hrvata za pridobivanja Muslimana/Bonjaka to je usporavalo izbijanje otrih meunacionalnih konfrontacija. Meutim, tijek dogaaja u ostatku Jugoslavije ubrzao je kristalizacije pozicija i u samoj BiH. Nakon to su poetkom ljeta 1991. Hrvatska i Slovenija proglasile neovisnost, nakon otvorene velikosrpske agresije na te dvije republike te direktnog ukljuivanja meunarodne zajednice u jugoslavenska zbivanja, koje je bilo afirmativno za usmjeravanje BiH prema dravnoj neovisnosti Muslimani/Bonjaci su dovedeni u poziciju da se jasno i trenutano opredijele. Konkretno, ele li svoje djelovanje usmjeriti k dravnoj neovisnosti BiH ili u pravcu uklapanju te zemlje u okvir krnje Jugoslavije/Velike Srbije. U takvom ozraju oni se opredjeljuju za prvu opciju. Reeno je opredjeljenje omoguilo nastanak neformalne hrvatsko-muslimanske/ bonjake koalicije koja e do poetka travnja 1992., kad je uslijedilo meunarodno priznanje dravne neovisnosti BiH, uspjeno realizirati cilj zbog kojeg je nastala. Mada je sve do kraja ljeta 1991. glavno politiko pitanje u BiH bilo pitanje njenog dravnopravnog statusa, prvenstveno u odnosu na (pre) oblikovanje dravnog ureenja Jugoslavije, ono je zarana, jo poetkom iste godine, potaklo i kalkulacije vezane uz mogunost (unutranje) podjele te zemlje. I kod Srba i kod Hrvata te se kalkulacije prvo pojavljuju kao alternativa mogunosti da pri odreivanju dravno-pravnog statusa BiH njihova opcija doivi poraz. Tako se kod Srba razvija spremnost za stjecanjem samo onog dijela BiH koji doivljavaju kao ekskluzivno srpski i koji je po njihovim vienjima zauzimao 64% teritorija te republike (Vudvord, 1997: 210). Nakon propasti mogunosti pridobivanja Muslimana/Bonjaka za vlastitu opciju, odnosno nakon to u listopadu 1991. hrvatsko-muslimanska/bonjaka koalicija usmjeri BiH u pravcu dravne neovisnosti, ideja o izdvajanju gotovo dvije treine bosansko-hercegovakog prostora i njegovom pripajanju Srbiji postaje stratekim srpskim ciljem. Krajem 1991. ubrzano se osnivaju samoproglaene srpske autonomne oblasti u BiH, koje e u konanici prerasti u Republiku Srpsku (RS) te dravna tijela budue srpske jedinice (Begi, 1997). Ujedno, uz intenzivne pripreme za oruani sukob, sa srpske se strane najavljuje i agresija na susjedne hrvatske i muslimanske/ bonjake prostore, koje se jednostrano proglaava srpskima u sluaju priznanja BiH kao unitarne dravne tvorevine.
Prve naznake hrvatskog kalkuliranja s eventualnom (unutranjom) podjelom BiH pojavljuju se u proljee 1991. Inicijalno su vezane uz nastanak uvjerenja da se Srbe, prvenstveno zbog njihove vojne i demografske snage, nee moi dovesti u poziciju da ive u BiH kojoj bi dravno-pravni status i unutranje ureenje odredila druga dva naroda te iz bojazni da posredstvom eventualnog srpsko-muslimanskog/bonjakog dogovora bosansko-hercegovaki Hrvati ne zavre u krnjoj Jugoslaviji. Nakon nastanka hrvatsko-muslimanske/ bonjake koalicije konano se kristalizira hrvatska pozicija naspram i unutar BiH. Sa hrvatske se strane daje podrka samostalnosti BiH i nepovredivosti njenih dravnih granica no ujedno se insistira na (kon) federativnom ureenju tj. na unutranjoj podjeli bosansko-hercegovakog teritorija na etnikom principu i uspostavi, uvjetno reeno triju nacionalnih jedinica. Pri tome se, po inicijalnim zahtjevima, za hrvatsku jedinicu trai gotovo treina teritorija BiH.5 O navedenom politikom opredjeljenju bosansko-hercegovakog HDZ-a naknadno e vrlo upeatljivo posvjedoiti prijedlog referendumskog pitanja o dravnoj neovisnosti BiH formuliran na sjednici sredinjeg odbora te stranke u Livnu 9. veljae 1992.: Jeste li za suverenu i nezavisnu Bosnu i Hercegovinu, dravnu zajednicu konstitutivnih i suverenih naroda hrvatskog, muslimanskog i srpskog u njihovim nacionalnim podrujima (kantonima)? (prema: eki, 1994: 312). U skladu sa svojim temeljnim opredjeljenjem, koje je uz ostalo ukljuivalo i zalaganje za cjelovitost BiH, Muslimani/Bonjaci su snano i dugotrajno odbacivali svaku ideju njene podjele. U tom su smislu bili i protiv unutranje podjele na etnikom principu drei da bi takvo to predstavljalo tek etapu na putu razbijanja BiH. Mjesto toga predlagali su decentralizaciju na temelju neetnikih pretpostavki. Ipak, iz suoenosti sa ve postojeim parcelizirajuim alternativama bosansko-hercegovakih Srba i Hrvata te u prilikama koje im, barem u datom vremenu nisu omoguavale ostvarenje stratekih ciljeva i kod Muslimana/Bonjaka se do ljeta 1991. (Bosanski pogledi, 29.8.1991.; Filipovi, 2000: 57; NIN, veljaa 2003.; Slobodna Bosna, 18.3.2004.) razvija alternativna opcija po kojoj bi u sluaju (unutranje) podjele BiH muslimanska/ bonjaka jedinica trebala zauzimati oko 4550% njenog teritorija.6
5 autorov proraun prema karti kod: Ivanovi, 2000, prilozi 6 autorov proraun prema kartama kod: Valenta, 2000: 4647; Krmpoti i sur., 1998: 296
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Slika 1.:
Etniki zemljovid Bosne i Hercegovine (1991.)7
7 linije vanjske granice BiH i granice bosansko-hercegovakih opina; toke naselja BiH; uto hrvatski etniki prostori;
naranasto srpski etniki prostori; zeleno bonjaki etniki prostori. Zemljovid izradio dr.sc. Saa Mrdulja prema podacima: Gelo i sur., 1995.
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Pristup koji je meunarodna zajednica zauzela krajem 1991. godine prema rjeenju meunacionalnih relacija na prostoru (bive) Jugoslavije nije omoguavao nadilaenje dubokih suprotnosti izmeu triju bosansko-hercegovakih naroda u odnosu na dravno-pravni status i unutranje ureenje BiH. tovie, u postojeim je okolnostima (indirektni) meunarodni poticaj procesu dravnog osamostaljenja BiH dodatno pogoravao meunacionalne odnose u toj zemlji. U prvom redu izmeu Srba s jedne te Bonjaka i Hrvata s druge strane. No, utjecao je i na pogoravanje odnosa izmeu ta dva, oko dravne neovisnosti povezana naroda. Naime, intenziviranjem procesa koji je vodio prema osamostaljenju BiH intenziviralo se i hrvatsko djelovanje na njenom ureenju kao sloene drave. Ono se pak najsnanije, time i za Bonjake najiritantnije, manifestiralo posredstvom samoinicijativnog osnivanja hrvatskih zajednica tj. hrvatskih teritorijalno-samoupravnih jedinica. U svakom sluaju, suoivi se sa krajnje zaotrenim meunacionalnim odnosima u BiH, meunarodna se zajednica poetkom veljae 1992. direktno ukljuuje u bosansko-hercegovaka zbivanja, s ciljem harmoniziranja meuetnikih relacija posredstvom adekvatnog razrjeenja nacionalnih statusa i odnosa te otklanjanja mogunost izbijanja oruanih sukoba u BiH. Ukratko, djelujui i dalje afirmativno na proces njenog osamostaljenja, uz inzistiranje na nepovredivosti bosanskohercegovakih dravnih granica, meunarodna je zajednica usredotoila svoje napore na kreaciju takvog unutranjeg ureenja BiH koje bi istodobno osiguravalo i njenu dravnu opstojnost i vitalne nacionalne interese svakog od triju bosansko-hercegovakih naroda. Angaman meunarodne zajednice u kontekstu BiH, koji se bio odvijao pod vodstvom portugalskog diplomata Josa Cutileira relativno je brzo doveo do rezultata. Konkretno, u okviru svog djelovanja, meunarodna je zajednica kreirala nacrt politiko-pravnog modela unutranjeg ureenja BiH, odnosno Izjavu o principima za novo ustavno ureenje BiH. Spomenuti dokument, kolokvijalno poznat kao Cutileirov plan, ve su 18. oujka 1992. neformalno prihvatili predstavnici svih triju bosansko-hercegovakih naroda. Trostranim prihvaanjem Cutileirovog plana8 izgledalo je da je stvorena osnova za stabilizaciju meunacionalnih odnosa u BiH te izbjegnuta mogunost izbijanja rata u toj zemlji. Meutim, zbog nezadovoljstva pojedinim njegovim rjeenjima te drei da e nakon najavljivanog, skorog priznanja neovisnosti BiH imati daleko
8 o fazama njegova nastanka v. vie kod: Begi, 1997:
83-100; Ivanovi, 2000: 211-221, 282-288; Markei, 2004: 59-61; Tuman, 2005: 134-163
iri manevarski prostor za realizaciju autentinih nacionalnih ciljeva. Bonjaci faktiki odbijaju Cutileirov plan ve krajem istog mjeseca (Osloboenje, 26.3.1992.: 5; Slobodna Dalmacija, 26.3.1992.: 4). Bonjako odbijanje plana te meunarodno priznanje BiH bez da su u njoj prethodno regulirani nacionalni statusi i odnosi, Srbi su iskoristili kao povod za otpoinjanje otvorene agresije na bosansko-hercegovake Hrvate i Bonjake te na etnike prostore tih dvaju naroda. Time otpoinje etvorogodinji, izuzetno razorni rat u BiH. 3. Cutileirov plan Meunarodna je zajednica i nakon izbijanja rata nastavila djelovanje na iznalasku odgovarajueg, za povratak mira afirmativnog modela unutranjeg ureenja BiH. No, ratni sukobi te dogaaji izazvani tim sukobima izuzetno su usloili meunarodno djelovanje. Naime, u novim okolnostima meunarodna je zajednica pri kreaciji ustrojstvenih modela za BiH morala uzimati u obzir vojno-politiko-teritorijalne odnose snaga u BiH; humanitarnu situaciju u toj zemlji; zatim, uvjetno reeno globalno javno mnijenje; nacionalne interese vodeih svjetskih drava involviranih u rjeavanje bosansko-hercegovake problematike, itd. Uvelike zbog navedenih razloga, meunarodni planovi za BiH koji su nastajali tijekom rata nerijetko su se izrazito razlikovali po svojim ustrojstveno-kartografskim rjeenjima.9 Napokon, prilikom kreacije aktualnog washingtonsko-daytonskog modela unutranjeg ustrojstva BiH, meunarodna je zajednica, kao to je navedeno, takoer u bitnome morala uvaiti realitete na iju su pojavu utjecale ratne prilike. Sukladno okolnostima u kojima je spomenuti model oblikovan, razumljivo je da njegova rjeenja uvelike nisu funkcionalna te ih se u postratnom vremenu pokuava modificirati. No, i taj, modifikacijski vid djelovanja, snano je determiniran iskustvima i pozicijama koja su unutar BiH i kod relevantnih imbenika meunarodne zajednice stvorena tijekom ratnih zbivanja. S obzirom na reeno, moe se zakljuiti da pristup meunarodne zajednice rjeenju bosansko-hercegovake problematike, od trenutka kad se njom poela direktno baviti poetkom veljae 1992. pa do danas, jedino tijekom prva dva mjeseca meunarodnog djelovanja nije bio de9 Vance-Owenov plan, Owen-Stoltenbergov plan, Akcijski
plan EU, Washingtonski sporazumi (uspostava hrvatskobonjake Federacije BiH), Plan kontaktne skupine, Daytonski sporazumi (uspostava ''daytonske'' BiH koja se sastoji od Republike Srpske i Federacije BiH).
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terminiran ratom i posljedicama ratnih djelovanja. U tom smislu valja istaknuti poseban znaaj Cutileirovog plana u odnosu na sve ratne planove i postratne prijedloge unutranjeg ureenja BiH. Jedino je taj plan meunarodne zajednice, ije je prihvaanje predstavljalo svojevrsni preduvjet meunarodnom priznanju BiH (Slobodna Dalmacija, 19.3.1992.: 4; 30.3.1992.: 11; 7.4.1992.: 13) nastao u relativno mirnom ozraju, u vremenu u kojem je jo uvijek bila u poziciji da pri kreaciji modela unutranjeg ureenja BiH prvenstveno polazi od potrebe podjednakog uvaavanja i zakidanja interesa sva tri bosansko-hercegovaka 3.1. Cjeloviti sadraj Cutleirovog plana
naroda. U svezi s istaknutim znaajem Cutileirovog plana u nastavku emo rada, nakon njegove cjelovite prezentacije, pokuati utvrditi kakav je uope oblik unutranjeg ureenja predviao za BiH.
IZJAVA O PRINCIPIMA ZA NOVO USTAVNO UREENJE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE10 A) NEZAVISNOST 1. Bosna i Hercegovina biti e drava sastavljena od tri konstitutivne jedinice zasnovane na nacionalnom principu i uz uvaavanje ekonomskih, zemljopisnih i drugih kriterija. 2. Bosna i Hercegovina ostaje u postojeim granicama, a Vlada BiH kao ni vlade konstitutivnih jedinica nee ohrabrivati bilo kakav zahtjev za prikljuenjem dijela njene teritorije nekoj od susjednih drava. 3. Suverenitet poiva na graanima muslimanske, srpske i hrvatske nacionalnosti, kao i drugih nacija i nacionalnosti koje to svoje pravo ostvaruju kroz graansku participaciju u konstitutivnim jedinicama i centralnim organima republike.
B) GENERALNI PRINCIPI 1. Bosna i Hercegovina i njene konstitutivne jedinice poivati e na sljedeim ustavnim principima kako su oni shvaeni i primijenjeni u demokratskim dravama zapadne Europe i kako su postavljeni u nacrtu Konvencije o kojoj se raspravlja na Konferenciji: a) potivanje ljudskih prava u najviim standardima, kako je to predvieno u nacrtu Konvencije, potivanje privatnog vlasnitva, trine ekonomije i slobode ulaganja kapitala; b) ope i jednako pravo glasa, slobodni izbori i tajno glasovanje; c) sloboda politikog i sindikalnog djelovanja; d) sekularni sistem sa punim vjerskim slobodama, uz odvojenost crkve od drave, razgranienjem resora u Vladi, vladavina zakona, uz demokratski i efikasan sistem kontrole i zatite ustavnosti i zakonitosti; e) meunarodna kontrola i jurisdikcija za zatitu ljudskih prava i sloboda. 10 Cutileirov plan, odnosno njegovu zadnju, trostrano prihvaenu i politiki-pravno najrelevantniju verziju, uz prilagodbu hrvatskom jeziku, prenosimo prema: Osloboenje, 19.3.1992.: 1
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C) PARLAMENT I VLADA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE 1. Parlament Bosne i Hercegovine sastoji se od Vijea graana, koje e biti direktno birano i Vijea konstitutivnih jedinica, u kome e svaka konstitutivna jedinica imati jednak broj predstavnika. 2. Parlament koji e djelovati preko Vijea graana, Vijea konstitutivnih jedinica i Vlade imati e kompetencije da, u svojstvu zakonodavca, razmatra i usklauje prijedloge konstitutivnih jedinica u sljedeim oblastima: centralna banka i monetarna politika, vanjski poslovi, obrana, ekonomska politika, ekonomski odnosi ukljuujui sva pitanja koja se tiu vie od jedne konstitutivne jedinice, transport, energetika, plinovodi i vodoprivreda kao i druga pitanja. Odluke koje se tiu zastave, grba, visokog obrazovanja, religije kao i one koje se odnose na obranu, makroekonomsku politiku, opa pitanja ekonomske politike, zatim odluke koje se tiu odnosa BiH i susjednih drava bie u nadlenosti Vijea konstitutivnih jedinica, a donositi e se veinom od etiri petine ukupnog broja predstavnika. BILJEKA: pitanja koja se tiu budunosti oruanih snaga BiH biti e definirana u nastavku pregovora. Ovo se ne odnosi na sadanje vojne formacije, jer e se to pitanje rjeavati odvojeno. 3. Sastav javne uprave i pravosua BiH treba proporcionalno izraavati nacionalni sastav stanovnitva BIH. 4. S ciljem razrjeavanja ustavnih pitanja, vezanih za nadlenost BiH i konstitutivnih jedinica, biti e ustanovljen poseban sud, koji e u periodu ne kraem od pet godina ukljuivati osobe izvan BiH i izvan njoj susjednih drava. Ovaj sud imati e po jednog lana iz svake konstitutivne jedinice i isti broj vanjskih lanova, uvean za jedan. On e donositi odluke obinom veinom. D) KONSTITUTIVNE JEDINICE 1. U Bosni i Hercegovini ustanoviti e se konstitutivne jedinice definirane u E odjeljku. 2. Parlament i Vlada konstitutivnih jedinica imati e nadlenosti usklaene sa zakonodavstvom Bosne i Hercegovine u oblastima koje su ve navedene i u skladu sa navedenom procedurom, te shodno tome zakonsku i administrativnu nadlenost oko pitanja koja se tiu konstitutivne jedinice, po imenice u upravi i organima konstitutivne jedinice, eksproprijaciju imovine za javne potrebe, katastar, vatrogasne slube, gospodarske komore, nadzor kooperacijskih trgovakih organizacija, tednih i kreditnih banaka, nadzor dobrotvornih ustanova, socijalnog i zdravstvenog osiguranja, ouvanje kulturno-povijesnog nasljea, zatim biblioteke, instituti i muzeji, koritenje zemlje, briga o ovjekovoj okolini, stambena pitanja, trita, putovi, servisi za hitne usluge, rudarstvo, lov i ribolov, nacionalni parkovi, vodoprivreda, plinovodni transport unutar konstitutivne jedinice, turizam, poljoprivreda i umarstvo, socijalna pomo, obrazovanje, kolstvo, policija, trgovina i drugi aspekti ekonomske politike, sigurnost javnih skupova, javno zdravstvo, sport i rekreacija i druga pitanja. Svaka konstitutivna jedinica e organizirati svoje vlastite institucije. Konstitutivna jedinica moe ostvarivati veze sa drugim republikama i organizacijama u tim republikama, pod uvjetom da su te veze i odnosi u skladu sa nezavisnou i integritetom BiH. 3. Sve institucije (organi, uprave, pravosue itd.) unutar jedne konstitutivne jedinice trebaju proporcionalno izraavati nacionalni sastav konstitutivne jedinice. 4. Pripadnici nacionalnosti koja e biti u manjini u nekoj konstitutivnoj jedinici uivati e prava slina onim iz lanka 2 (3) nacrta Konvencije. E) DEFINICIJA KONSTITUTIVNIH JEDINICA 1. Biti e formirana radna grupa, s ciljem da definira teritorije konstitutivnih jedinica, zasnovanih na nacionalnom principu i uzimajui u obzir ekonomske, geografske i druge kriterije. Karta
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zasnovana na apsolutnoj ili relativnoj nacionalnoj veini u svakoj opini biti e osnova za rad radne grupe i biti e predmet modifikacija koje se mogu verificirati gore pomenutim kriterijima. Kopija karte je prikljuena Izjavi o principima. F) PRELAZNE ODREDBE 1. U cilju definiranja konstitutivnih jedinica u skladu sa buduim ureenjem prema odjeljku E ove Izjave o principima biti e donesen ustavni zakon, u koji e biti ugraeni navedeni principi i prezentirani Skuptini to je mogue prije, o emu e se graani izjasniti na referendumu pod meunarodnom kontrolom. OVAJ JE TEKST OSNOVA BUDUIH PREGOVORA Sarajevo, 18. oujak 1992. Dogovoreno s elnicima SDA, SDS i HDZ u petoj rundi razgovora o buduem ustavnom ureenju za Bosnu i Hercegovinu u okviru mirovne Konferencije EZ-a. 3.2. Oblik dravnog ureenja Bosne i Hercegovine po Cutileirovom planu U Cutileirovom planu nigdje nije bilo izriito navedeno koji oblik dravnog ureenja predvia za BiH. Do saznanja o tome moglo se doi tek posredno, analizom njegovog sadraja. U tom je smislu trea toka prvog odjeljka (NEZAVISNOST), u kojoj se govorilo o nositeljima suverenosti (najvie vlasti) unutar BiH trebala biti mjerodavni, posredni pokazatelj predvianog oblika bosanskohercegovakog unutranjeg ureenja.11 Da ponovimo, u njoj je stajalo sljedee: Suverenitet poiva na graanima muslimanske, srpske i hrvatske nacionalnosti, kao i drugih nacija i nacionalnosti koje to svoje pravo ostvaruju kroz graansku participaciju u konstitutivnim jedinicama i centralnim organima republike. Naalost, svojom nedoreenom, dvosmislenom kombinatorikom graanskog i nacionalnog odreenja nositelja suverenosti spomenuta toka, izdvojeno promatrana, nije doputala donoenje jasnijih zakljuaka o obliku unutranjeg ureenja BiH. Oigledno da je njena nedoreenost proizlazila iz potrebe usklaivanja, nerijetko krajnje suprotstavljenih politikih realiteta. Primjerice, injenice da je BiH po svom Ustavu imala biti dravom triju suverenih i jednakopravnih naroda tj. Hrvata, Srba i Muslimana/Bonjaka, ali i da je praktino funkcionirala kao unitarna tvorevina; potrebe usklaivanja hrvatskih i srpskih zahtjeva za ureenjem BiH kao (kon)federativne tvorevine te bonjakih za njenom ustavnom transformacijom u unitarnu dravu; opredjeljenja meunarodne za11 o pojmu suverenosti v. kod: Jovanovi, 1990; Peri,
1992; Stres, 2001; Trnka, 2000
jednice da ouva dravni integritet BiH i da je istodobno uini dravom prihvatljivom svim njenim narodima, itd. U svakom sluaju, do preciznijeg uvida u predviani oblik unutranjeg ureenja BiH, takvog koji bi u konanici pojasnio i znaenje tree toke prvog odjeljka vodili su drugi, relevantni dijelovi Cutileirova plana. Iz analize njihova sadraja lako se dalo zakljuiti da po njemu BiH nije zamiljana kao unitarna, centralizirana ili decentralizirana drava. S druge strane, istom se lakoom nije moglo ustvrditi je li isti plan predviao BiH kao konfederativnu tvorevinu ili kao federativnu dravu. Zapravo u planu su pojedine toke ile u prilog jednom, a pojedine drugom odreenju BiH. Elementi Cutileirovog plana iz kojih je proizlazilo da bi BiH imala biti svojevrsnom konfederacijom snano su se oitovali u prvoj toki prvog odjeljka u kojoj je stajalo: Bosna i Hercegovina biti e drava sastavljena od tri konstitutivne jedinice zasnovane na nacionalnom principu i uz uvaavanje ekonomskih, zemljopisnih i drugih kriterija. Dakle, navedena je toka govorila o BiH kao sastavljenoj dravi, odnosno o dravi, podesnije bi bilo rei politiko-teritorijalnom entitetu, koju formiraju tri konstitutivne jedinice. Takve koje nisu trebale biti stvorene od strane sredinje vlasti (sluaj federativne drave) ve koje su udruene trebale stvarati entitet koji se naziva dravom BiH (sluaj konfederativne drave). O tome da je BiH po Cutileirovom planu imala biti svojevrsnom konfederativnom tvorevinom govorila je, pored navedene, i druga toka treeg odjeljka (VLADA I PARLAMENT BIH). U njoj je, pored ostalog, stajalo da e sredinje institucije vlasti unutar BiH imati kompetencije da, u svojstvu
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zakonodavca, razmatra(ju) i usklauje(ju) prijedloge konstitutivnih jedinica Drugim rijeima, iz ove je toke proizlazilo da bi tek ono to predloe konstitutivne jedinice moglo postati predmetom zakonodavnog razmatranja i usklaivanja sredinjih tijela BiH. Pri tome je u istoj toki dana naznaka da bi se vitalna pitanja imala rjeavati kvalificiranom veinom (4/5 zastupnika) i to u Vijeu naroda BiH. U osnovi, da bi se rjeavala konsenzusom postignutim izmeu predstavnika triju konstitutivnih jedinica. Iz priloenog, jezgrovitog uvida moe se zakljuiti da je po Cutileirovom planu bosansko-hercegovaka sredinja vlast imala biti izvedena iz vlasti konstitutivnih jedinica koju bi one svojevoljno prenijele na BiH. S druge pak strane, odgovor na pitanje o nositeljima suverenosti unutar konstitutivnih jedinica indirektno je pruala etvrta toka etvrtog odjeljka (KONSTITUTIVNE JEDINICE) u kojoj je stajalo: Pripadnici nacionalnosti koja e biti u manjini u nekoj konstitutivnoj jedinici uivati e prava slina onim iz lanka 2 (3) nacrta Konvencije. Iz navedene je toke proizlazilo da bi unutar konstitutivnih jedinica, formiranih na temelju politike odluke po kojoj unutar svake od njih pojedini bosansko-hercegovaki narod ima biti brojanom veinom pripadnici brojano manjinskih etnikih skupina trebali imati zatiena manjinska prava. Naime, lanak 2 (3) ve spomenutog nacrta Konvencije govorio je o nainu zatite takvih zajednica u republikama (bive) Jugoslavije.12 Sukladno reenom, iz citirane toke Cutileirovog plana slijedi da su brojano manjinske etnike skupine unutar konstitutivnih jedinica de facto trebale imati statuse nacionalnih manjina, odnosno da su same jedinice zamiljane kao unitarne tvorevine zasnovane na suverenosti svojih graana. Sve u svemu, BiH se moglo zvati dravom, uvelike je mogla funkcionirati i djelovati kao takva, no esencijalno je imala biti savezom triju drava. Sukladno tome, odreeni vid suverenosti dravnog saveza BiH nije niti mogao biti (direktno) izveden iz graanske suverenosti. Zapravo, nje na bosansko-hercegovakoj razini ne bi niti bilo u okolnostima unutar kojih suverenost BiH proizlazi iz one koju su na nju prenijele konstitutitivne jedinice. No, formalno gledano, po Cutileirovom planu, niti nacionalna suverenost nije mogla odreivati karakter politiko-pravnog identiteta BiH i konstitutivnih jedinica. Jer dok je bosansko-hercegovaka suverenost imala proizlaziti iz suverenosti konstitutivnih jedinica njihova se
12 v. sadraj nacrta Konvencije kod: Degan, 2002: 319-329
suverenost, kao to je navedeno, imala temeljiti na suverenosti graana tih jedinica. Unutar njihovih okvira nikakva etnika grupa, pa niti najbrojnija, nije imala biti formalno odreenim nositeljem suverenosti. Ipak, time to je unutar svake jedinice pojedina etnika skupina imala biti brojanom veinom, time to je unitarno ureenje konstitutivnih jedinica trebalo omoguiti veinskim skupinama apsolutnu vlast unutar njih one su faktino imale biti nacionalnim tvorevinama svojih najbrojnijih nacionalnih zajednica. Uzme li se to u obzir, zatim injenica da se dravnost BiH imala zasnivati na dravnosti konstitutivnih jedinica koje bi konsenzualno oblikovale bosansko-hercegovaki politiko-pravni identitet moe se rei da je BiH, mada ne formalno, faktino ipak imala biti tvorevinom zasnovanom na nacionalnoj suverenosti triju nacija. Unato tome to je po Cutileirovom planu BiH u esencijalnom smislu trebala biti konfederacijom, njene su znaajke uvelike imale odstupati od znaajki kakve bi po definiciji konfederacija trebala imati. Ukratko, po ustaljenoj percepciji konfederacija bi bila savez suverenih drava na koji je prenesen uzak broj ovlasti te kojim na temelju suglasnosti njenih lanica rukovodi odreeno, zajedniki formirano tijelo. Upravo po navedenom, stalnom sredinjem tijelu konfederacije se razlikuju od obinih saveza kakvi su nastajali ili koji nastaju meu dravama (Peri, 1992: 125). Nasuprot tome, po Cutileirovom planu BiH je ne samo izriito nazivana dravom i republikom ve je po svojim sredinjim organima (vlada, dvodomni parlament) te po irokom opsegu pitanja koja bi posredstvom njih konstitutivne jedinice zajedniki rjeavale (centralna banka i monetarna politika, vanjski poslovi, obrana, ekonomska politika i odnosi, transport, energetika, plinovodi i vodoprivreda, zastava, grb, visoko obrazovanje, religijska pitanja, odnosi BiH i susjednih drava bie,...) uvelike pribliavala karakteristikama federativne drave. Napokon, uzimajui u obzir da je po svojim bitnim karakteristikama trebala biti savezom drava te da je u funkcionalnom smislu imala djelovati gotovo kao savezna drava moglo bi se konstatirati da je po Cutileirovom planu BiH zamiljana kao izrazito integrirana konfederacija. Svakako, reeni je plan predstavljao tek osnovu za kreaciju konkretnog, daleko opsenijeg modela unutranjeg ureenja BiH. Taj, finalizirani model, zasigurno bi se po regulaciji pojedinih pitanja znaajno razlikovao od te osnove. tovie, do bitnih udaljavanja od inicijalnih rjeenja Cutileirovog plana dolo je ve krajem
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oujka 1992. Tada je primjerice odlueno da se pri definiciji teritorija svake od triju konstitutivnih jedinica, ne daje, kako je prvotno zamiljeno prevladavajui znaaj samo relativnim ili apsolutnim veinama pojedinih naroda po opinama BiH (1991.) ve da se podjednaka vanost da, kako je izjavljivao predsjednik HDZ-a BiH dr. Milenko Brki, gospodarskim, demografskim, prirodnim, kulturnim, sakralnim, prometnim i ostalim naelima (Slobodna Dalmacija, 2.4.1992.: 13; 23.8.1992.: 8-9). U skladu s prikazanim, moglo se oekivati daljnje, bitne promjene na Cutileirevom planu. Zbog protivljenja brojano manjinskih naroda te promjene vjerojatno ne bi dovele u pitanje odreenje BiH kao konfederacije triju konstitutivnih jedinica. No, sukladno vrstom meunarodnom opredjeljenju za opstojnost i funkcionalnost BiH vie je nego izvjesno da bi bile afirmativne za daljnje jaanje federativnih znaajki njenog ustrojstva. 4. Zakljuno razmatranje Nesumnjivo je kako su politike prilike koje su tijekom veljae i oujka 1992. vladale u BiH i njenom neposrednom susjedstvu imale utjecaja na meunarodni pristup rjeenju bosansko-hercegovake problematike i unutranjem ureenju BiH. S time u vezi, na nastanak i karakter Cutileirovog plana svakako treba gledati i u kontekstu injenice da su tadanji meunacionalni odnosi u BiH bili izrazito naelektrizirani; da je srpska vojno-tehnika nadmo, uzrokovana srbizacijom JNA, u okolnostima nepostojanja ravnotee snaga, lako mogla dovesti do otpoinjanja velikosrpske agresije i u toj zemlji; da je u Hrvatskoj intenzivna velikosrpska oruana agresija zaustavljena poetkom 1992. (Sarajevsko primirje); da je za rezultat imala okupaciju etvrtine njenog teritorija, itd. Meutim, uzimajui u obzir sve dimenzije politikih pritisaka s kojima se praktiki svi pokuaji iznalaska rjeenja za BiH suoavaju nakon izbijanja, trajanja i okonanja rata u njoj moe se rei da se upravo poetkom 1992. meunarodno djelovanje na apsolviranju bosansko-hercegovake problematike odvijalo u najpovoljnijem ozraju. Primjerice, to to je meunarodna zajednica posredstvom kreacije i ponude Cutileirovog plana dala podrku formiranju BiH kao izrazito integrirane konfederativne tvorevine nije izazivalo niti znaajnije odobravanje niti znaajnije negodovanje na meunarodnoj sceni. Nasuprot tome, svi kasniji meunarodni planovi i pristupi bili su ekstremno optereeni
kritikim, najee politiko-interesnim ili idejno-trendovskim determiniranim stavovima (pojedinih segmenata) meunarodne zajednice i uvjetno reeno meunarodne javnosti. injenica da takvog eg prilikom nastanka Cutileirovog plana u osnovi nije bilo uvelike je omoguila da taj plan, za razliku od drugih u daleko veoj mjeri bude zasnovan na ustavnom odreenju BiH kao drave triju konstitutivnih, suverenih i jednakopravnih naroda te na balansiranom, etiki utemeljenom pristupu. Onom koji je pri kreaciji rjeenja za bosanskohercegovaku problematiku polazio od podjednakog uvaavanja i zakidanja pozicija svih triju bosansko-hercegovakih naroda. Ujedno, uzimajui u obzir tadanje okolnosti te naela kojima se rukovodila prilikom kreacije Cutileirovog plana moe se rei da je meunarodna zajednica tijekom svog djelovanja u relativno normalnom, predratnom ozraju, drala da bi ureenje BiH kao izrazito integrirane konfederativne tvorevine najadekvatnije utjecalo na harmonizaciju meunacionalnih odnosa u BiH, a time i na ouvanje multietnikog karaktera bosansko-hercegovakog drutva.
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Literatura Amandmani LIX LXXX na Ustav Socijalistike Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (1990.), Sarajevo: Novinsko-izdavaka organizacija Slubeni list Socijalistike Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Begi, K.I. (1997.): Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do Daytonskog sporazuma 1991.-1996., Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga Bilandi, D. (1999.): Hrvatska moderna povijest, Zagreb: Golden marketing eki, S. (1994.): Agresija na Bosnu i Hercegovinu i genocid nad Bonjacima 1991-1993., Sarajevo: Ljiljan Degan, V. . (2002.): Hrvatska drava u meunarodnoj zajednici, Zagreb: Globus. Filandra, . (1998.): Bonjaka politika u XX. Stoljeu, Sarajevo: Sejtarija Filipovi, M. (2000.): Bio sam Alijin diplomata, knjiga 1., Biha: Delta Gelo, J.,Grizelj, M., Akrap, A. (priredili) (1995.): Stanovnitvo Bosne i Hercegovine narodnosni sastav po naseljima, Zagreb: Republika Hrvatska Dravni zavod za statistiku Herceg, N., Tomi, Z. (1998.): Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini, Mostar: Sveuilite u Mostaru, Centar za studije novinarstva Ivanovi, V. (2000.): Raspad Jugoslavije i stvaranje BiH 1990. 1995. (doktorska disertacija), Zagreb: Fakultet politikih znanosti Izetbegovi, A. (2001.): Sjeanja, Sarajevo: TDK ahinpai Javorovi, B. (1995.): Velikosrpska najezda i obrana Hrvatske, Zagreb: DEFIMI Jovanovi, S. (1990.): Drava, knjiga 1., Beograd: Beogradski izdavako-grafiki zavod Jovi, D. (2003.): Jugoslavija drava koja je odumrla, Zagreb: Prometej Kasapovi, M. (2005.): Bosna i Hercegovina: podijeljeno drutvo i nestabilna drava, Zagreb: Politika kultura Krmpoti, M., Tomljanovi, I., Makovika, E. (istraili i pripremili) (1998.): Kronologija rata Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovina 1989.-1998., Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar Markei, I. (2004.): Kako smo sauvali Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Zagreb, Sarajevo: Hrvatsko narodno vijee Peri, B. (1992.): Drava i pravni sustav, Zagreb: Narodne novine Stres, A. (2001.): Sloboda i pravednost, Zagreb: Kranska sadanjost Trnka, K. (2000.): Konstitutivnost naroda, Sarajevo: Vijee Kongresa bonjakih intelektualaca Tuman, M. (priredio) (2005.): Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini (dokumenti), Zagreb: Slovo M Ustavi i ustavni zakoni (1974.): Zagreb: Informator Valenta, A. (1991.): Podjela Bosne i borba za cjelovitost, Vitez: HKD Napredak Vudvord, S. (1997.): Balkanska tragedija, Beograd: Filip Vinji Dnevne novine i tjednici: Bosanski pogledi (Sarajevo) NIN (Beograd) Osloboenje (Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo) Slobodna Dalmacija (Split)
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International Community Polity Proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina according to Cutileiros Plan (March 18, 1992)13
SAA MRDULJA Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar - Centre Split
During the final phase of the breakup of Yugoslavia, in circumstances which have led to independence of its republics and were largely characterised by Serbian hegemonic aggression towards Croatia, a final chrystallisation of political goals of the three Bosnian-Herzegovinian ethnicites. By the end of 1991, Serbs agree to the creation of a Serbian political entity on two thirds of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory with a possibility of merging with Serbia. On the contrary, the two other ethnicities opted fo an independent BaH. However, while the Croats saw the future state as a complex (con)federal republic of three national-territorial entities, with the Croatian entity comprising one third of state territory, Bosnian Muslims/ Bosniaks seeked a unitary state, which would, considering the conditions of the soon-to-be-reached Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak absolute demographic dominance, function as a de facto Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak national state. In order to coordinate the political goals of the three Bosnian-Herzegovinian ethnicites and to harmonise their mutual relations, the international community started its direct involvement in BaH beginning of 1992, part of which was the drafting of the international/Cutileiros plan for Bosnian-Herzegovinian polity. This is the only plan of the international community which was not created in an atmosphere determined by the state of war (April 1992 November 1995) and the traumatic experiences which impact the post-war political reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to this fact, the international community and Cutileiros plan could take into account the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of BaH which defined the state as a polity governed by three constituent, sovereign and equal ethnicites (Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks) to a much greater extent. In doing so, the international community could pay equal respect to the needs and whishes of all three ethnicities. The analysis of this plan shows that the international community, wishing to harmonise and stabilise interethnic relations in BaH envisaged a highly integrated confederal state. Key words: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks, international community, Cutileiros Plan, confederation
13 This paper was written as part of the research project "Croatian Identity and Mediterranean multiculturalism in the Age of Globalisation - code: 194-1941560-1546
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Maja Sahadi: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina
UDK: 342.84:324(497.6) 327.56($+73:497.6) Pregledni rad Primljeno: 27. 8. 2009.
The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Short Review of Political Matter and/or Technical Perplexion
MAJA SAHADI Faculty of Law, University of Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Dayton Proximity Talks were held in the Wright - Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, USA from 1-21 November 1995. They resulted with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g. Dayton Peace Accords, Dayton Peace Agreement) that was signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and witnessed by USA, UK, Germany, France, Russia and an EU special negotiator. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and shaped a basis for peace. But, the most important issues for democratic functioning of the state have not become conciliated with international legal standards; such as elections and the electoral system. The Dayton Peace Accords arose from compromises and different trade-offs which account for many open questions regarding the Bosnian electoral system. Key words: electoral system, Bosnia and Herzegovina, political and technical issues, elections, Dayton Peace Agreement
1. Introduction From a scientific view, elections are exceptionally interesting, since they constitute a very important decision that, once brought, in next several years, depending on a concrete Electoral Law in an individual country, determines the repository of political power. In that act of electoral commitment, the whole national history, certain regions, political traditions of family
and reference groups, the actual political situation, effects of concrete life conditions, political socialisation of an individual, activity of electoral campaign so as interested political parties and candidates, the role of mass media and many more unpredictable effects that compress in, at the fist look, simple decision of choosing a certain list, party or candidate are reflected (iber, 2003: 88-103).
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An electoral system is a unity of electoral principles and mechanisms of their achievement which is conducted as a part of the overall political and constitutional system of a certain state (orevi, 1975: 697). For the purposes of this analysis, we will mention only the differences between the proportional and the plurality electoral system and their influence on political participation. Proportional electoral systems are considerably more responsive to different political programmes; they enable representation of smaller political parties in representative bodies, which means taking a variety of interests of the electorate into consideration. Majority systems aspire to decrease the number of political parties, especially in the plurality systems. From the perspective of voters motivation, proportional systems are considered more motivating, because they make it possible for even some minor interests to be represented, based on a certain number of votes (iber, 2004: 3-27). In the framework of proportional election systems, the meaning of the electoral threshold is also worth noting, i.e. the percentage of votes that is required for the participation in the distribution of mandates. Logically, a high electoral threshold is explicitly discouraging, while a low one gives the smaller parties and their potential voters the chance to participate in sharing the electoral cake (iber, 2004: 8). Generally speaking, all institutions, as well as electoral systems, are designed and governed by laws and regulations, which are drafted by national or international actors. Nevertheless, this design can derive from different origins of social and political change, being driven by accident, evolution or intention (Goodin, 1998: 2430). Finally, previous experiences acknowledge that effects of electoral systems are contingently conditioned and that they can be apprehended only by a historical-empirical analytic approach (Kasapovi, 2002: 3-19). 2. Historic Background Not to be prejudiced and spacious, this is how authors Belloni and Deane describe ending war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Bosnian War lasted from April 1992 until November 1995, when a peace agreement was reached at Dayton, Ohio, after three weeks of intense negotiations conducted under the aegis of the United States. The end of the war came about as a result of three interrelated episodes. First, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted the Operation Deliberate Force in September 1995, effectively undermining the Bos-
nian Serb war machine. Second, ethnic cleansing was practically completed. With most (but not all) Bosnians living in ethnically defined areas, nationalists had achieved their goal of securing control of territory by destroying the ethnic mix characterising Bosnia prior to the outbreak of the conflict. Third, Serbia and Croatia were ready to terminate their support for their ethnic cousins in Bosnia. Serbia was desperate to obtain the lifting of the United Nations sanctions imposed earlier on. Croatia wanted to regain control of its eastern region of Slavonia taken by the Serbs in 1991, and gain international legitimacy for its newly acquired independent state. Both Serbian and Croatian leaders negotiated and signed the peace at Dayton on behalf of their Bosnian counterparts. A massive international peace operation was deployed in early 1996 to help the parties implement the agreement. Implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement has been very difficult, and no clear exit strategy has yet emerged for international organisations and humanitarian agencies in the country. The primary reason for this is that the Dayton Peace Agreement was negotiated with the same ethnic leaders likely to boycott its full implementation (Belloni and Deane, 2005: 219-243). Elections played a particularly important role in attempts to manage ethnic tensions in plural societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Debates about electoral systems have traditionally revolved around the desirability of the major ideal types. Majoritarian electoral systems are designed to promote accountable single-party government, by awarding the greatest representation to the two leading parties with the most votes. Proportional electoral systems aim to generate inclusive and consensual powersharing, by producing parliaments that reflect the vote shares of multiple parties. During the 1990s debates turned increasingly towards the pros and cons of combined (or mixed) electoral systems, incorporating features of each of the major ideal types (Sberg Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: chap 5). The Law for Protection of the Rights of National Minorities was adopted in 2003; however, its implementation still has not commenced. According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the economic and social rights of the members of minority
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groups are more frequently violated then those of constituent peoples. Procedural obstacles made it impossible for national minorities to elect their representatives to local assemblies in 2004 local elections; subsequently this group remains deprived of opportunities to influence political developments (Bieber, 2006: 46). Minorities and ethnic groups, unless geographically concentrated, tend to be better represented in proportional systems, while majoritarian systems tend to permanently exclude dispersed minorities from representation (Harris and Reilly, 1998: 193-199). The formal dominance of religious institutions has decreased in recent years; for example, the emphasis of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Republic of Srpska, mentioned in the constitution of this entity, has promoted the exclusion of Croats and Bosniaks in the past. Constitutional amendments and changes to legislation eliminated this form of discrimination in 2002. Informally, however, religious institutions continue to significantly influence Bosnian politics. Religious leaders extensive involvement in politics was exposed during the pre-election campaign for general elections in 2002 and municipal elections in 2004. In both cases, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina reported on the significant influence of religious leaders on election outcomes, exercised by directing the electorate toward three national parties: Srpska demokratska stranka (Serbian Democratic Party), Stranka demokratske akcije (Democratic Action Party) and Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union). The interference of religion in politics produces a twofold effect: the ethnic religious elites have grown into influential interest groups in Bosnia and Herzegovinas political discourse, often impacting policy outcomes; and the fragmentation of the political agenda along ethnic nationalist lines, and subsequently the process of ethnic homogenisation are being perpetuated (Bieber, 2006: 46). There is a democratic system in the sense that there are democratic elections, but the result of the elections is that they give the advantage to one ethnic group over another. This is only a continuation of the war with other means (Chandler, 2000: 111-112). Due to the ethnic electorates of the parties, they do not compete with each other, but with the opposition parties, and all three nationalist parties possess strong authoritarian and paternalistic instincts toward their respective constituency (Bieber, 2006: 57). Framing elections around the promise of European Union accession, however, will be a
challenge given the proven power of ethnic fear and zero-sum ethnic polarisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country still faces significant challenges, but the next ten years are likely to be much more progressive and dynamic for the country than the past decade because of the European Union accession process. With European Union membership possible on the twentieth anniversary of Dayton, there may eventually be something to celebrate on November 21 for all of Bosnia and Herzegovinas citizens ( Tuathail, OLoughlin and Djipa, 2006: 61-75). 3. Electoral Legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina1 The grounds for elections and the electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been arranged by the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. a) Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina about elections and electoral system Considering the meaning of the Dayton Peace Accords, much attention has been dedicated to the regulation of the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, many compromises influencing the electoral system have been made. These compromises are based on the combination of two principles: the constituent2 peoples principle and the national sovereignty principle. International democratic standards related to electoral systems (universal suffrage, right to stand for elections, equal right to vote, direct ballot, secret ballot, etc.) have been incorporated in the Dayton Peace Accords. Initially, the Dayton Peace Accords specified elections pursuit in shorter periods of time. This was later prolonged until 2002; even it was anticipated to last only for elections that were held in 1996 and 1998. The Dayton Peace Accords address elections and the electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina in several instances.
1 On constitutional foundations related to elections see more
in: Dmii, M. (2003): Ustavnopravni osnov funkcionisanja Bosne i Hercegovine na osnovu slobodnih i demokratskih izbora, http://www.soros.org.ba/docs_pravo/ustav_txt/dr_ mile_dmicic.doc
2 Various authors differentiate between the terms constituent
and constitutive. On this difference see: Sahadi, M. (2009): Priroda politikog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini, in: Uvod u politiki sistem Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo: Sarajevski otvoreni centar and Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, 37-39
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Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords (Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina) is directly related to the electoral system and elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska have agreed to establish elections in accordance with the relevant documents of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords explicitly and specifically assesses requirements to promote free, fair, and democratic elections and to lay the foundations for a representative government and to ensure the progressive achievement of democratic goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Article 1 (1) of Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords3. These are also premises for the establishment of an effective electoral system. But, the electoral system that was created by this Annex was merely temporary. It was supposed to last for a short time after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the support of OSCE, yet it was prolonged until 2002. Annex IV of Dayton Peace Accords (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina) dedicated much attention to elections and the electoral system Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article I (2) states that Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections. In Article II (1) related to human rights and fundamental freedoms it is stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina and both Entities shall ensure the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. In Article II (2) related to international standards it is stated that the rights and freedoms set forth in the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law. In particular, a separate point has been made on rights related directly or indirectly to elections in Article II (3)4. Also, in Article II (7) related to international agreements it is stated that: Bosnia
3 The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organisation of free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press; shall allow and encourage freedom of association (including of political parties); and shall ensure freedom of movement (Annex III, Article 1(1), Dayton Peace Accords).
and Herzegovina shall remain or become party to the international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution.5 By including a large number of international documents on human rights and fundamental freedoms in Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it can be noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted the international standards related to electoral legislation. Annex VI of Dayton Peace Accords (Agreement on Human Rights) is considerably dedicated to elections and the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides human rights and fundamental freedoms mentioned in Annex I of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV of Dayton Peace Accords), Annex VI is also related to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms which affects elections and the electoral system legislation. b) The Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina about Elections and Electoral Legislation On the other hand, we have the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina6 that was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the House of Representatives session held on August 21, 2001 and the House of Peoples session held on August 23, 2001. By adopting the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all criteria and requirements needed have been met to ensure the holding future elections according to international and domestic legal regulations. But, the adoption of this law was accompanied by different compromises and compensations of political parties which participated in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It should be mentioned that the adoption of this law was followed with credentials that the passing of this legislature is a prerequisite for admission to Council of Europe. In the end, the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not offer significant changes to the temporary electoral system based on
5 Annex I of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina correspond to fifteen human rights agreements to be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina where some are directly or indirectly related to elections and electoral systems: 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto, 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto, 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, etc.
4 The rights to liberty and security of person, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others etc (Annex III, Article II (3), Dayton Peace Accords).
6 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23/01,
23/01, 7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 25/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05, 65/05, 77/05, 11/06, 24/06, 32/07, 33/08 and 37/08.
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the Dayton Peace Accords. But, in order to see the differences, we have to give an overview of the temporary electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 4. The Temporary Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina The temporary electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords (Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina). In compliance with this Annex, Article II (1) defines the role of the OSCE in elections. This role requested the parties of agreement to adopt and put in place an elections programme for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to supervise the preparation and conduction of elections for legislative and executive government bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (state, entity, cantonal and municipal level). Article V of Dayton Peace Accords defined the agreement of Parties to create a permanent Election Commission with responsibilities to conduct future elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Article II (3), the OSCE was to establish a Provisional Election Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In accordance with Article III (1) the Provisional Election Commission adopted a large number of rules and regulations related to the registration of political parties and independent candidates; the eligibility of candidates and voters; the role of domestic and international election observers; the ensuring of an open and fair electoral campaign; as well as the establishment, publication and certification of final election results. Those rules and regulations had priority over domestic rules and regulations. The Provisional Election Commission had wide responsibilities.7 According to Article III (3), the Provisional Election Commission consisted of the Head of the OSCE Mission, the High Representative or his or her designee, representatives of the Parties, and other persons as the Head of the OSCE Mission, in consultation with the Parties, may have decided. The Head of the OSCE Mission was also Chairman of the Commission. In the event of disputes within the Commission, the decision of the Chairman was final.
7 Those responsibilities can be described as supervision of
the electoral process in order to obtain free and fair elections, determine provisions for voter registration, ensure compliance with the electoral rules and regulations established pursuant Dayton Peace Accords, accredit observers from international organisations and foreign and domestic nongovernmental organisations, etc. (Annex III, Article III(2), Dayton Peace Accords).
According to Annex III of the Dayton Peace Accords, the Provisional Election Commission adopted the Electoral Rules and Regulations for the Elections on Local and Higher Level in Bosnia and Herzegovina8 in 1996 and the Electoral Rules and Regulations for Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina9 in 1997. Those rules regulated the process of registration and voting of displaced persons and refugees. It has to be mentioned that the Provisional Election Commission also adopted the Electoral Rules and Regulations10 in 2000 that were used to hold elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina was introduced. General electoral principles have been settled in the Attachment to Annex III on Elections by the Document of the Second Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Copenhagen, 1990 (called the Copenhagen regulations) in Paragraph 7.11 Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords and Rules and regulations of the Provisional Election Commission have been applied to the elections for: the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska12,
8 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22/96,
25/96, 29/96, 21/96 15/97
9 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10/97, 10 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1/00 11 By Copenhagen regulations elections are free held at reasonable intervals, as established by law; regulations permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested in a popular vote; guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens; ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public; respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organisations, without discrimination; full freedom of political parties or other political organisation; ensure conducting political campaigning in a fair and free atmosphere; ensure equal access to the media on a non discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process; ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures.
12 Additional intervening but independent house named Council of Peoples of the Republic of Srpska has been established by High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina
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the President and Vice-president of Republic of Srpska13, as well as cantonal and municipal assemblies (Pobri, 2000: 201). The rules and regulations related to parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced a system of proportional representation, the so-called DHondt system. However, an exception to the rule of proportional representation was introduced as well. This was in a situation where the formula for proportional representation could not be applied. In that case, the Chairman of the Provisional Election Commission had to determine which kind of formula was to be applied and then forwarded his conclusion to the Commission for adoption (Pobri, 2000: 203). The supervision of the electoral process has been done through submitting a Complaint or Appeal to the Election Appeals Sub-commission that was formed in 1996 by the Provisional Election Commission. Its task was interpreting, strengthening and improving of the above mentioned Rules and Regulations. The first post-war elections were held on 14 September 1996, including presidential and parliamentary elections on national level, as well as entity level. The first local elections were postponed a year (Trnka, 2006: 200). In the next two years, the implementation of Dayton Peace Accords has seen some progress. However, the international community found that the conditions for permanent electorate system condition were not yet met, so that the next elections (against Dayton Peace Accords provisions) were held on 12 and 13 September 1998, according to Rules and Regulations of Provisional Election Commission, respectively organized by OSCE. This routine was continued until presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2002 (Trnka, 2000: 200). The first round of post-war elections (from 1996 to 1998) helped to consolidate ethnic exclusivism with little impact on the promotion of peace building and democratization. As the local elections of 1996 demonstrated, in conditions of group insecurity and mutual distrust, with no incentive for politicians to appeal beyond their own ethnic constituencies, elections predictably turned into an ethnic census. By granting constitutional guarantees to protect the safety and survival of all three national groups and ensure their representation at all levels of governance, the DPA [Dayton Peace Accords] played into the
intervention in 2000.
hands of the ethno-nationalist parties who conducted the war. These parties were quick to take advantage of the post war electoral process to legitimize them and occupy the newly established institutions by democratic means (Belloni, 2004: 337). The 2000 elections differed from the previous elections in three important aspects. First, open lists and multi member constituencies were introduced. Second, a preferential voting system was adopted for the election of the RS (Republic of Srpska) Presidency. Third, new rules for the election of members of the House of Peoples in the Federation were introduced. Of the three innovations, the first did not specifically foster inter ethnic accommodation but rather disadvantaged multi ethnic and civic parties; the second and the third, both inspired by an integrationist approach, backfired because of the timing and method of their adoption. As the experience of the 2000 elections shows, there is a narrow line between fine tuning election rules and manipulating them. The international communitys approach, leaning more towards manipulation, backfired (Belloni, 2004: 340)14. The 2000 elections differed from the previous elections in three important aspects. First, open lists and multi member constituencies were introduced. Second, a preferential voting system was adopted for the election of the RS (Republic of Srpska) Presidency. Third, new rules for the election of members of the House of Peoples in the Federation were introduced. Of the three innovations, the first did not specifically foster inter ethnic accommodation but rather disadvantaged multi ethnic and civic parties; the second and the third, both inspired by an integrationist approach, backfired because of the timing and method of their adoption. As the experience of the 2000 elections shows, there is a narrow line between fine tuning election rules and manipulating them. The international communitys approach, leaning more towards manipulation, backfired (Belloni, 2004: 340)15. Open lists at 2000 elections implied that up to that point citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina could only vote for a party, not for candidates so lists were based on closed list system. In 2000 Electoral Rules and Regulations delivered open list system so voters were able to vote for
14 On this topic see: Belloni, R. (2004): Peacebuilding and
Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina, International Peacekeeping, 11 (2): 334-353
13 By later amendments of Constitution of Republic of Srpska this has changed to President and two Vice Presidents of Republic of Srpska, each from different constituent peoples members.
15 On this topic see: Belloni, R. (2004): Peacebuilding and
Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina, International Peacekeeping, 11 (2): 334-353
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a party, but also for a candidate on that specific party list which became a norm in latter Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this system does not take into account the uniqueness of a society divided along ethnic lines. Open lists might increase accountability but do not necessarily favour moderation. Nor do they promote multiethnicity and multi ethnic parties both explicit goals that the Electoral Law was supposed to achieve (Belloni, 2004: 340). On the other side multi member constituencies at 2000 elections were effectuated for the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska elections. But, there were some flaws. While sensible in theory, to improve accountability, in practice its impact on fostering interethnic moderation is small. Indeed, the way the MMCs [multimember constituencies] were drawn up (preserving a clear ethnic majority within each constituency) made it unlikely that candidates would seek support across ethnic lines. Furthermore, the sheer complexity of the system was likely to be difficult for voters to understand, and thus discourage electoral participation. Finally, compensatory mandates increase the number of parties represented in parliament, encouraging political fragmentation at the expense of stable government () (Belloni, 2004: 340-341). In the Republic of Srpska preferential voting was accepted for the election of the President and Vice President of the Republic of Srpska. Nevertheless, preferential voting for the RS Presidency was unlikely to be a reliable test for at least for two reasons. First, this system is unlikely to produce conciliatory behavior where ethnic groups are concentrated in particular geographic regions. In these instances, the politicians incentive to seek support from various groups depends on the presence and size of minority groups. Because the RS electorate was not ethnically heterogeneous, only under the most unusual circumstances could AV [alternative votes/voting] have influenced the results (Belloni, 2004: 342). House of Peoples of the Parliament of Federation was about to be elected through Cantonal Assemblies in a manner that member of different community can vote for each other and not by the same community elected members. This rule was known as a Barry Rule16. The main Croat nationalist party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) objected vigorously. It argued that when all members of the
16 US Ambassador Robert Barry, who imposed this rule,
was appointed Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1998-2001
Canton Assembly elected the delegates in one election, there would be an influence of the majority group the Bosniaks on the selection of the delegates from the smaller groups. The HDZ began its 2001 rebellion against international policy as a protest against the Barry Rule, leading to a major confrontation between the party and international peacebuilders (Belloni, 2004: 343). This does not downgrade the fact that by this very Rule Bosniaks intrinsically influenced Croat members conformation in the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereby political and legal dimensions of Bosniak-Croat relation concernment in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2002, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian electoral commission, rather than the OSCE, organized general elections for the first time autonomously without major problems. Elections for municipal councils, mayors and the District of Brko were held without significant incidents in October 2004. For the first time, mayors were directly elected in the country, as was a unified city council in previously divided Mostar. Some incidents of fraud, nevertheless, have occurred. As the OSCE notes, the electoral system is very complex and often not understood by voters. The government has the power to govern in principle, but its ability to govern is constrained by the continued intervention of the Office of High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), the fragmentation of public authority in the entities and regions, as well as the extensive veto rights at state and entity level (Bieber, 2006: 43-64). 5. Permanent Electoral System in Bosnia and Herzegovina In 2001 Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The draft Electoral Law was prepared by international OSCE staff and legitimized firstly as national project through the involvement of the seven-strong Independent Experts Commission appointed by the HR (High Representative) and, secondly, as an internationally sanctioned document through the approving comments of the Council of Europes Venice Commission. The EL (Electoral Law) took long time to pass through Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the main reasons was that the OSCE meant for it to clearly favor in the electoral competition non nationalist parties that have multiethnic leadership and membership, that respect the GFAP
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[General Framework Agreement for Peace] provisions that stand for issue politics and reconciliation and reject separatism and politics of exclusion. The final version was considerably toned down from this ambitious intention, containing only the uncontested provision banning ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] indicted war criminals to hold any functional position in the candidate parties (Article 1.6), and nothing in its Chapter 4 (Certification and Candidacy for Elections) requiring parties to present reconciliatory platforms or to have multiethnic membership. With regard to this the outcome of the last general elections is a hardly surprising indication of both the strength of the exclusive nationalist appeal within the country and the lack of potential for attracting politicians capable of mustering voters support under the banner of reconciliation and civic nationalism (Bojkov, 2003:57). We emphasized earlier that this law did not make any significant changes by comparison to temporary electoral system based on Dayton Peace Accords. But, even if it did not provide considerable and distinctive transformation, Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina remained within framework of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV, Dayton Peace Accords). Certain authors refer to basic characteristics of permanent electoral system (Trnka, 2006: 201-203) in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a) election of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been regulated; b) 2/3 of members of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly and members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the line of Bosniak and Croat peoples are being elected on territory of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1/3 of members of this house of parliament and member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the line of Serb peoples are being elected on territory of Republic of Srpska; c) conditions for acquirement of right to vote has been also regulated; d) voters have right to vote in person or in absence in municipality where they had residence according to 1991 population census; e) a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who has dual citizenship have right to
vote only if Bosnia and Herzegovina is the country his or her permanent residence; f) person that was accused or sentenced by International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia for serious violations of humanitarian law cannot be elected for any function on territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; g) principle of incompatibility is regulated; h) cumulating of functions is disabled; i) mandate belongs to candidate not to party or coalition on which list candidate was; j) permanent terms for conduction of elections were stipulated. If we take closer look at the list of basic characteristics we can make a short analysis of permanent electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Point (a) is referring to Article 1.1 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina which defines that this law shall regulate the election of members and delegates of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and shall stipulate the principles governing the elections at all levels of authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On one side, it has to be noted that precise regulations on this have been provided by entities. On the other side, Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina used broad approach in regulating principles which narrows range of entities regulation. Point (b) is referring to Article IV(2) and Article V(1) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV, Dayton Peace Accords) which are regulating election of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequence of this constitutional regulation is that all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot elect all members of those two. For disproportional number of voters, equal right to vote is doubtful. On the other side, this is not in accordance with 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols that shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Article II(2) of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV of Dayton Peace Accords) and Article 1.3 of Electoral Law which defined that election of members of all bodies of government is based on free elections and universal suffrage and equal right to
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vote and by secret balloting. Point (c) is referring to Articles 1.4 and 1.5 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who has attained eighteen years of age shall have the right to vote and to be elected pursuant to this law. To exercise his or her right to vote, a citizen must be enlisted in Central Voters Register. Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined conditions for acquirement of right to vote: citizenship, eighteen years of age and enlistment in Central Voters Register. Until 2006 there was a model of active registration applied which implied obligation of voters to register. In 2006 model of passive registration applied which means that state bodies manage Central Voters Register ex officio by using official record of place of residence. Every citizen who applied for the ID before August 17 was registered in a Central Voters Register. However, the system did not apply to certain/special categories of voters. Refugees and voters living temporarily abroad who wished to vote out of country had to submit an application to the Central Election Commission before July 18, but voters registered to vote out of country were allowed to vote in Bosnia and Herzegovina on election day with tendered ballots in the municipality of their permanent residence.17 Point (d) refers to Article 1.5 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina which defines that all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who have the right to vote, pursuant to this law, shall have the right to vote in person in the municipality of their permanent residence. A citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who is temporarily residing abroad and has the right to vote, is entitled to vote in person (by appearing at an appropriate polling station in Bosnia and Herzegovina or at a diplomatic and consular representation office of Bosnia and Herzegovina abroad) or by mail (by sending the voting ballot by mail) for the municipality where the person had the permanent place of residence prior to his or her departure abroad. Displaced persons, according to Article III of Dayton Peace Accords can vote in municipality where they reside at present time under condition that they have permanent residence in that municipality for at least six months. Point (e) also refers to Article 1.5 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina that is related to citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who has dual citizenship pursuant to Article I(7)
17 For more information refer to: OSCE (2007), General
Elections 1 October 2006, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw 6 February 2007.
(d) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This citizen does not have right to active and/ or passive election right if he or she resides in other state. Point (f) refers to Articles 1.6 and 1.7 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. No person who is serving a sentence delivered by the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may be recorded in the Central Voters Register or stand as a candidate (the candidate for the purpose of this Law refers to persons of both genders) or hold any appointive, elective or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, no person who is serving a sentence delivered by a Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, courts of the Republic of Srpska, courts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and court of the District of Brko or has failed to comply with an order to appear before a Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, courts of the Republic of Srpska, courts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and courts of the District of Brko for serious violations of humanitarian law where the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has reviewed the file prior to arrest and found that it meets international legal standards may not be recorded in the Central Voters Register or stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Point (g) refers to Article 1.8 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it relates to principle of incompatibility. Members of legislative, executive, judicial branch, members of police, military forces, diplomatic and consular representatives cannot hold two public functions. Point (h) also refers to Article 1.8 Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it relates to cumulating of functions disability. This means that nobody can hold more than one elected function. Point (i) refers to Article 1.9 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A mandate belongs to the elected holder and not the political party, coalition or list of independent candidates, which nominated him or her on the candidates list. The mandate cannot be terminated except where prescribed by law. Should an elected holder, during his/her term of office, withdraw from a political party, coalition or list of independent candidates that participated in the elections or nominated him/her on its candidates list, the elected holder shall become an independent
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representative. Point (j) refers to Article 1.14 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The elections at all levels of authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be held on the first Sunday in October unless that date conflicts with observance of a religious holiday of one of the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any election that cannot be held on the first Sunday in October because of a conflict with a religious holiday shall be scheduled by the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Sunday closest to the first Sunday in October, which does not conflict with a religious holiday. The Authorities responsible for the conduct of elections in permanent electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina are Central Election Commission, Municipal Election Commissions and the Polling Station Committees. The composition of those authorities should be multiethnic, reflecting population of constituent peoples and others in accordance the most recent population census. 1. The Central Election Commission is consisted of seven members: two Croats, two Bosniaks, two Serbs, and one Other18 member (Article 2.5). The election commission member is appointed for a period of seven years (Article 2.4). The President of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina is elected from amongst its members. One Croat, one Bosniak, one Serb and Other member of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina serve as the President for one fifteen month rotation in a five year period (Article 2.6). The Central Election Commission is independent body, which derives its authority from and reports directly to, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has its tasks regulated in Article 2.919;
18 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Others are refering to national minorities and nationally indeterminated people.
2. A Municipal Election Commission shall consist of three, five or seven members. The member of the Municipal Election Commission can be: president or judge of a regular court, the Secretary of the Municipal Council/Municipal Assembly and City Council, persons professionally employed in Municipal administration (Article 2.12). This Commission is appointed for a period of seven years (Article 2.4). The Municipal Election Commission shall have it tasks regulated in Article 2.1320; 3. The Polling Station Committee shall consist of three or five members of whom one shall be appointed as President. The President and members of the Polling Station Committee shall have deputies. The appointment of the President and members of the Polling Station Committee and their deputies shall be made by the Municipal Election Commission no later than thirty days prior to the date of the election (Article 2.19).Certification and Candidacy for the Elections is also defined in Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to participate in the elections political parties, independent candidates, coalitions and lists of independent candidates shall certify their eligibility with the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 4.1). In order to be certified for the elections for all bodies of authority at all levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an independent candidate or a candidate on a political party, list of independent candidates or a coalitions candidates list shall meet reresponsible for the timely printing, distribution and security of ballots and forms for all levels of direct elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina; defines the contents and the form of the ballot for all levels of direct elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina; determines and verify election results for all direct and indirect elections covered by this Law, certify that elections were conducted in accordance with this Law and publish results of all direct and indirect elections covered by this Law; and perform all other duties as authorized by law.
20 By this article Municipal Election Commission tasks in-
19 By this article Central Commission tasks are following:
coordinate, oversee and regulate the lawful operation of all election commissions and Polling Station Committees in accordance with this law; issues administrative Regulations for the implementation of this law; is responsible for accuracy, update and overall integrity of the Central Voters Register for the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; certifies the participation of political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidates and independent candidates for all levels of direct elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina; verifies and certify the lists of candidates for all levels of direct and indirect elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina covered by this law; is
clude following: monitor and supervise (control) the work of the Voters Register Center; designate Polling Stations in the territory of the municipality for voting on all levels of authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina; conduct the appointment procedure, appoint and train the members of the Polling Station Committee; be responsible for the proper conduct of the counting of ballots at Polling Stations and municipal counting centers; compile the results of elections from all Polling Stations in the municipality, separately for each body for which elections were administered and forward the results to the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and perform all other tasks as authorized by law and by the Regulations of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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quirements numerated in Article 4.221. In order to participate in the elections, a political party must be registered with the competent authority in accordance with the law as regulated in Article 4.322. Rules of Conduct in the Election Campaign are regulated in Article 7.123. The Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina specified elections for different levels of executive and legislative branches of government:
21 The candidate must be recorded in the Central Voters
Register in the municipality in which he or she is standing for office or in the municipality found within the boundaries of the electoral unit if he or she is standing for office at the higher levels of authority, no later than by the day when the elections are announced; and the candidate may only run for office in one electoral unit at any level of authority and may appear only on one political party, coalition or list of independent candidates.
22 Three thousand (3,000) signatures of voters recorded in
the Central Voters Register for the elections for the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; three thousand (3,000) signatures of voters recorded in the Central Voters Register for the elections for the members of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina; two thousand (2,000) signatures of voters recorded in the Central Voters Register for the elections for the members of the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or for the members of the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska or for the elections for the President and Vice Presidents of Republic of Srpska; five hundred (500) signatures of voters recorded in the Central Voters Register for elections for the delegates of the Cantonal Assemblies of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; one hundred (100) signatures of voters recorded in the Central Voters Register for the elections for the Municipal Council/Municipal Assembly and for the Head of Municipality in a municipality where the number of voters recorded in the Central Voters Register on the day when the elections are announced did not exceed ten thousand (10,000) voters, or two hundred (200) signatures for the election in the municipality in which this number exceeded ten thousand (10,000) voters recorded in the Central Voters Register; (5)% of signatures of voters recorded in the Central Voters Register for the election of Municipal Council or Municipal Assembly and for the Head of Municipality, in a municipality where the number of voters recorded in the Central Voters Register on the day when the elections are announced did not exceed a thousand (1000) voters recorded in the Central Voters Register; supporting signatures submitted for the higher level of authority shall also be applicable to the lower levels of authority included in the higher level of authority.
1. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a collective head of state which is constituted of three members of each constituent people: one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb. Preferential voting system is applied with plurality principle in mandates distribution. Still, with regard to way of their election, expression of constituent peoples will is mediated trough entities, and by that significantly damaged (Trnka, 2006: 207). Annex 4 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina prescribes a split of citizens in terms of voting rights. Article V of the Constitution reads: the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniak and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska (Scholdan, 2000: 35). Many citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have opportunity to elect members of Presidency from national group they belong. In this way, Bosniaks and Croats with permanent residence in Republic of Srpska cannot cast a vote for election of Bosniak or Croat Presidency member. On the other side, Serbs with permanent residence in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot cast a vote for Serb member of Presidency. This is conditioned by a fact that this constitutional solution is not consistent with constitutional principles but also international democratic standards related to elections and electoral systems24; and this is not contributing to integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, certain repercussions on election of Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred in 2006 elections. Electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina facilitated that Bosniaks, on a basis of their most part
24 According to Article 8.1 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina directly elected from the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina one Bosniak and one Croat shall be elected by voters recorded in the Central Voters Register to vote for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A voter recorded in the Central Voters Register to vote in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina may vote for either the Bosniak or Croat Member of the Presidency, not for both. The Bosniak and Croat member that gets the highest number of votes among candidates from the same constituent people shall be elected. The member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina that shall be directly elected from the territory of RS one Serb shall be elected by voters recorded in the Central Voters Register to vote in the Republic of Srpska. Candidate who gets the highest number of votes shall be elected. The mandate for the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be four (4) years.
23 Political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidates and independent candidates have the right to: conduct the election campaign in a peaceful environment; organise and hold public meetings in which they can freely express their positions in order to gain support from the voters; and publish and distribute placards, posters and other materials related to the election campaign. For the purposes of public meetings permits from the competent body shall not be required, but the organiser shall notify the competent body responsible for public order and peace twenty four (24) hours prior to holding such an event.
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had significant and essential leverage on Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (eljko Komi). Political parties as representatives of their people reacted bitterly stating that Croats did not choose eljko Komi as a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In counterpart Croats hold minor influence upon Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina election. In the end, changes in electoral system should enable similar way and conditions of elections in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska. Yet, in present and momentarily state of affairs, constitutional reform is under way of attempt and if it happens, members of political parties as representatives of their people will surely reflect on electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2. The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina is constituted of House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina is consisted of 42 members that are being directly elected by citizens.25 Each entity is one electoral unit/constituency where candidates are being elected on a basis of compensatory list which gives compensatory mandates. Entities are being divided to smaller electoral
25 By Article 9.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of forty -two (42) members, twenty-eight (28) of whom shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote for the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and fourteen (14) of whom shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote for the territory of the Republic of Srpska. The mandate of members of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be four (4) years. Of the twenty eight (28) members who shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote for the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, twenty one (21) shall be elected from multi-member constituencies under the proportional representation formula set forth in Article 9.5 of this law, and seven (7) shall be compensatory mandates elected from the territory of the Federation as a whole according to Article 9.6 of this law. Of the fourteen (14) members who shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote for the territory of the Republic of Srpska, nine (9) shall be elected from multi-member constituencies under the proportional representation formula set forth in Article 9.5 of this law, and five (5) shall be compensatory mandates elected from the territory of the Republic of Srpska as a whole according to Article 9.6 of this law. A voter shall have one ballot for the proportional representation mandates in the multi-member constituency for which the voter is registered.
units/constituencies which give the rest of 2/3 of mandates. Electoral Law adopted half-open list system which is more democratic but connected with difficulties of votes counting. When it comes to mandates distribution, proportional representation formula has been adopted according to the SaintLagu method of the highest average.26 Also, as a correction there is compensatory mandate system applied.27 This house should express interests of all citizens on whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, this kind of election of members is disabling expression of will of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina is consisted of 15 delegates of whom 2/3 from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (five Croats and five Bosniaks) and 1/3 from the Republic of Srpska (five Serbs) that are indirectly delegated by entity
26 By Article 9.5 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herze-
govina mandates are allocated in each constituency in the following manner: for each political party and coalition, the total number of valid votes received by that political party or coalition shall be divided by 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, et seq., as long as necessary for the allocation in question. The numbers resulting from this series of divisions shall be the quotients. The number of votes for independent candidates is the quotient for that candidate. The quotients shall be arranged in order from the highest quotient to the lowest quotient. Mandates shall be distributed, in order, to the highest quotient until all the constituency mandates for the body have been distributed. Political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidates and independent candidates cannot participate in the allocation of mandates if they do not win more than 3% of the total number of valid ballots in an electoral unit.
27 By Article 9.6 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina compensatory mandates shall be allocated in the following manner: only political parties and coalitions, which won more than 3% of the total number of valid ballots for the territory of the entity for which the compensatory list is made193 may take part in the distribution of compensatory mandates. First, the total number of mandates for the legislative body to be allocated for the territory of the respective Entity, reduced by the number of mandates won by independent candidates, is distributed according to the formula set forth in Article 9.5 of this law. From the number of mandates a list of a political party or coalition has won according to this procedure, the number of mandates won by the same party or coalition, according to the procedure set forth in Article 9.5 of this law, is deducted. The remaining number is the number of compensatory mandates the list wins. If a political party or coalition receives a negative number of mandates according to the procedure in the previous paragraph, the political party or coalition keeps the mandates won in the constituencies, but does not receive any compensatory mandates. In case one or more lists get a negative number of mandates, the mandates to be distributed according to the procedure of this article is decreased correspondingly to preserve the correct number of mandates in the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina elected from the territory of the respective Entity.
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parliaments.28 Mandate distribution is being done trough proportional representation formula so as in House of Representatives. Usually, (in federal states) upper house of parliament is consisted of member that represents federal units. But, that is not case in Bosnia and Herzegovina where constituent people (along with entities) are being represented to be able to maintain equality of three constituent peoples. 3. The President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is head of executive government and is accompanied with two Vice Presidents. They are being elected indirectly by the Parliament of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina29, and each has to be from
28 By Article 9.12a of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina Croat and Bosniak Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Federation shall be elected by the Croat and Bosniak Caucus of Delegates as appropriate to the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croat and Bosniak Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall elect delegates from their respective constitutive people. Serb Delegates and Delegates of the Others to the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall not participate in the process of electing Bosniak and Croat Delegates for the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Delegates from the Republic of Srpska (5 Serbs) to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be elected by the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska.
different constituent people. National consensus had to be reached in order to gain place. 4. The Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is constituted of House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is constituted of 98 members that are being elected directly by citizens of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.30 Mandates distribution is done in the same way as in House of Representatives of Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is important is that Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulates that at least four members of each constituent people has to be represented in this house. But, this is also non-consistent to nature of this house that has to represent interests of citizens of whole territory of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina although, theoretically it is justified by present conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is consisted of 58 delegates that are being indirectly delegated by cantonal assemblies.31
cuses of the constituent peoples. By Article 9.17 mandate of the President and Vice-president shall be for four (4) years provided that the mandate does not expire earlier.
zegovina in election of the President and Vice-presidents of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least one third of the delegates of the constituent peoples caucuses to the House of Peoples of the Federation shall nominate delegates for the office of the President and Vice-presidents. By Article 9.14 the joint slates for the office of President and Vice-presidents of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be formed from among the candidates referred to in Article 9.13. The House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall vote on one or several joint slates composed of three candidates including one candidate from among each constituent peoples. The slate which receives the majority of votes in the House of Representatives of the Parliament of 72 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be elected if it gets majority of votes cast in the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina including majority of votes of each constituent peoples caucuses. By Article 9.15 if the joint slate presented by the House of Representatives does not receive the necessary majority in the House of Peoples, this procedure will be repeated. If in the repeated procedure the joint slate which receives majority of votes in the House of Representatives is rejected again in the House of Peoples that joint slate shall be considered to be elected. By Article 9.16 delegates to the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the rank of Others may participate in the election of candidates for the President and Vice-president. However, on this occasion, no caucus of Others shall be formed and their vote shall not be counted in calculating the specific majority in the cau-
30 By Article 10.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herze-
govina the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of ninety eight (98) members, directly elected by voters registered to vote for the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mandate of members of the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be four (4) years. A certain number of members shall be elected from multi-member constituencies under the proportional representation formula set forth in Article 9.6 of this law. There shall be compensatory mandates from the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole according to Article 9.7 of this law. The House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall determine, based solely on the guidelines set forth in Article 10.2 of this law, what shall be the number of mandates and boundaries for multi-member constituencies and the number of compensatory mandates. A minimum number of four (4) members of each constituent people shall be represented in the Federation House of Representatives. A voter shall have one ballot for the proportional representation mandates in the multi-member constituency for which the voter is registered. This ballot shall also count for the allocation of compensatory mandates under Article 10.5 of this law.
31 By Article 10.10 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Cantonal Legislature shall elect fifty-eight (58) delegates to the House of Peoples, seventeen (17) from
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Mandate distribution is being done by proportional representation formula. Number of delegates from each canton is proportional to the number of voters and national structure of each canton is determined by population census from 1991. It has to be bared in mind that demographic and national structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is severely changed during war and ethnic cleansing 1992 1995. In this manner, there has to be done new population census to be able to determine real national structure of each canton. 5. The President of and two Vice-presidents of Republic of Srpska are being elected directly by citizens registered to vote in Republic of Srpska.32 Mandate distribution is being done by plurality principle applying preferential voting, so as in election of Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, Sumantra Bose suggests that the Alternative Vote system used for the Republic of Srpska presidential elections poses considerable problems that it is probably fortunate that the designers of Bosnias Electoral Law eventually decided not to make the elections to the tripartite Bosnia and Herzegovina state presidency dependent on an AV [alternative voting] type multiple/preferential voting system (Bose: 2002: 238). 6. The National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska consists of 83 members, who are
among Bosniaks, seventeen (17) from among Serbs, seventeen (17) from among Croats and seven (7) delegates from the rank of Others. By Article 10.11 the representatives from among Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others in each Cantons Assembly shall elect delegates of their respective constituent peoples in that Canton. Each party represented in the respective caucuses of the constituent peoples and Others or each member of one of these caucuses shall be entitled to nominate one or more candidates on a list for election of delegates of that particular caucus from that Canton. Each list can include a larger number of candidates than is the number of delegates to be elected on the condition that the legislature of the Canton has a larger number of delegates from among Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others than is the number of delegates from amongst Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others that ought to be elected to the House of Peoples.
being directly elected by voters registered to vote for the Republic of Srpska. Proportional representation formula of mandate distribution is applied along with distribution of compensatory mandates.33 7. The Council of Peoples of Republic of Srpska is consisted of 28 delegates, 8 from among Bosniaks, 8 from among Serbs, 8 from among Croats and 4 representatives of Others elected by their caucuses in the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska. This council is parity-based so that each constituent people can have the same number of delegates.34 This house was es33 By Article 11.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska shall consist of eighty-three (83) members, who shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote for the Republic of Srpska. A certain number of members shall be elected from multi member constituencies under the proportional representation formula set forth in Article 9.5 of this law. There shall be compensatory mandates from the Republic of Srpska as a whole according to Article 9.6 of this law. The National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska shall determine, based solely on the guidelines set forth in Article 11.2 of this law, what shall be the number of mandates and boundaries for multi-member constituencies and the number of compensatory mandates. A minimum number of four (4) members of each constituent people shall be represented in the National Assembly of Republic of Srpska. A voter shall have one ballot for the proportional representation mandates in the multi-member constituency for which the voter is registered. The mandate of members of the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska shall be four (4) years. By Article 11.2 the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska shall determine, based solely on the guidelines set forth in this article, the number of mandates and boundaries for multi-member constituencies and the number of compensatory mandates. Of the eighty-three (83) mandates for the National Assembly, between twenty-three percent (23%) and twenty-seven percent (27%) shall be compensatory mandates. The remaining mandates shall be allocated in multi-member constituencies. There shall be a minimum of six (6) multi-member constituencies. A multi-member constituency shall have a minimum of four (4) members and a maximum of fifteen (15) members. The Brko District shall be included in one of the multi-member constituencies. The number of mandates for a constituency shall be determined as follows: the number of registered voters for the Republic of Srpska, as determined by the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall be divided by the total number of constituency mandates to be allocated. The number of registered voters for a constituency shall be divided by the quotient resulting from the previous division to determine the number of mandates to which the constituency is entitled. Mandates which cannot be allocated based on whole numbers shall be allocated to constituencies on the basis of the highest remainders.
32 By Article 12.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina the President and two (2) Vice-presidents of Republic of Srpska shall be directly elected from the territory of Republic of Srpska by voters registered to vote for Republic of Srpska. By Article 12.2 voters registered to vote for the President of the Republic of Srpska may vote for one candidate only. By Article 12.3 candidates from each constituent people receiving the highest number of votes shall be elected. Among these three (3) candidates, one from each constituent people, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes shall be elected President and the two candidates receiving the second and third highest number of votes shall be elected Vice-presidents.
zegovina, the members of the Council of Peoples shall be elected by their respective caucus in the National Assembly. In the event that the number of members elected to one caucus of the Council of Peoples exceeds the number of the representatives of the respective caucus of the National Assembly, an additional number of members shall be elected by a caucus to be established for that purpose from
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tablished by High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina intervention in 2002, but solution that was imposed is not symmetrical to Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This house can be apprehended as intervening house, but National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska still makes decisions as unicameral body while House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina acts as equal to House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 8. We have to be aware that there are also elections for Cantonal Assemblies, Municipal Councils/Assemblies, and City Councils/ Assemblies so as elections for Brko District and City of Mostar that will not be discussed here for the limited length of paper. Bosnias peculiar constitutional structure has the effect of segmenting the electoral marketplace along ethnic lines. At the same time, it creates a patchwork quilt of political arenas, each with varying degrees of ethnic integration and each with different rules for promoting ethnic integration. In all of Bosnias elections, however, parties tend to compete for the votes of a single ethnic community. No politician needs the support of anyone from another ethnic group in order to get elected. There are certain offices for which the system is structured to ensure that members of a given ethnic group vote only for their own representatives (Manning, 2004: 71). 6. Conclusion The fundaments of the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex
among all members of the appropriate constituent peoples in the Municipal Assemblies in Republic of Srpska. By Article 11.12 any political party represented in the caucuses of the their respective constituent peoples and the Others or any member of one of these caucuses, including ad hoc members elected in accordance with Article 11.11, Paragraph 2, shall have the right to propose one or more candidates on the list for election of members of that relevant caucus. Any list may contain a number of candidates that is larger than the number of members to be elected. No delegate in the National Assembly or councilor of the Municipal Assembly may be a candidate. Each delegate in the National Assembly shall cast one vote for a list within his or her caucus. The vote shall be cast as a secret ballot. By Article 11.13 the results of the votes shall be communicated to the Election Commission for the final allocation of seats. Mandates shall be distributed, one by one, to the lists or candidate with the highest quotients resulting from the proportional allocation formula provided for in Article 9.5. of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When a list wins a mandate, the mandate shall be allocated from the top of the list.
IV, Dayton Peace Accords) and the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We can percieve that there are two normative frames of regulating an electoral system. Constitutional provisions on elections are very brief and short which leads us to the point that we can determine worthiness and effects of the electoral system only on grounds of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a specific legal document related to elections and the electoral system. During the temporary electoral system in Bosnia and Herezgovina, electoral legislation was not adopted by authorised bodies but by the Provisional Election Commission, with support of the OSCE. Rules and regulations were often changed which affected voters and political parties and candidates. It is not common that the Electoral Law and related terms are at least in principles distincted and specified in an constitution. Also, concerning the legal nature of Dayton Peace Accords, it is not strange that provisions of this kind are not explicitly and/or specifically part of Article II (Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV, Dayton Peace Accords). Concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, it has to be said that there is no integrative and consistant approach in application of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herezgovina in respect to international human rights standards named especially in the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto that form an integral part of the legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina through Annex I (Additional Human Rights Agreements to be Applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina) of Constitution of Bosnia and Herezgovina (Annex IV, Dayton Peace Accords). The electoral procedure for election of members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herezgovina is not in accordance with the documents mentioned. Bosniaks and Croats on Republic of Srpska territory cannot elect their representatives and Serbs in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot elect their representatives in those institutions. On the other side, the electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows national and ethnic representation. The representation of Others is not defined, especially when it comes to elections for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary As-
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sembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Others are disqualified and neutralised in their representation by the Constitution and the Electoral Law. Further analysis shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina still does not have a complete and integral and yet democratic electoral system. This system is based on different categories of electoral rights titulars that do not for different status materialise their rights in equal way (e.g. refugees, displaced persons, migrants, citizens of entities that can not elect all members of the government, etc.). In the present electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems that there are no available instruments and mechanisms that would give citizens the opportunity to influence elections. Citizens are not able to decide and determine the lists of candidates. This is done through political parties. Also, citizens vote for candidates that are elected by a political party an placed on list of candidates which means that citizens do not have the opportunity to elect candidates outside of the list of candidates presented by political party. In this way, citizens do not have power to decide to elect the most competent persons. Elected candidates are not resposible to citizens because citizens do not have power to revoke them. Elected candidates are responsible to the political party they belong to and to other elected candidates. The electoral system of Bosnia and Herezgovina uses different models and principles of mandate distribution. There are elements of both direct and indirect elections applied; plurality and proportional system tampered in electorates; proportional representation formula, compensatory mandates etc. Some authors are convinced of the soundness of this and believe that the current electoral system of proportional representation through party/coalition lists (list PR) is the appropriate choice for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that elements of the integration through electoral engineering approach, based on multiple preferential voting and/or ethnic vote distribution requirements for certain executive posts at various levels of government, can be introduced with some success, albeit in a very limited way, in the foreseeable future. This should not be ruled out as permanently infeasible times change and conditions can change with time (Bose, 2005: 328). The electoral system of Bosnia and Herezgovina insufficiently and poorly mirrors the constitutional, legal, national, political and ethnic structure of Bosnia and Herezgovina. The elec-
toral system change, in line with premises and standpoints presented in this paper, should be anticipated and expected as well as implied and inherent. The legal system of both state and the two entities has to be transformed and modified to comply with democratic electoral procedures. As a brakedown, we should state that the goal should be such that would encompass solid and full citizen equality, without any form of discrimination in the electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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References Bieber, F. (2006): Bosnia-Herzegovina: Slow Progress towards a Functional State, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 6 (1): 43-64 Belloni, R. (2004): Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina, International Peacekeeping, 11 (2): 334-353 Belloni, R., Deane, S. (2005): From Belfast to Bosnia: Piecemeal Peacemaking and the Role of Institutional Learning, Civil Wars, 7 (3): 219-243 Bojkov, V.D. (2003): Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political System and its Functioning, Southeast European Politics, 4 (1): 41-67 Bose, S. (2002): Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, London: Hurst Chandler, D. (2000): Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, London: Pluto Press Dmii, M. (2003): Ustavnopravni osnov funkcionisanja Bosne i Hercegovine na osnovu slobodnih i demokratskih izbora, http://www.soros.org.ba/docs_pravo/ustav_txt/dr_mile_dmicic.doc orevi, J. (1975): Ustavno pravo. Beograd Goodin, R.E. (1998): The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Harris, P. and Reilly, B. (1998): Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. Stockholm: International IDEA Kasapovi, M. (2002): Obrasci izbornih reformi u stabilnim demokracijama: Novi Zeland, Italija i Japan, Politika misao, 39 (3): 3-19 Manning, C. (2004): Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratization, 11 (2): 60-86 OSCE (2007): General Elections Oct. 1, 2006, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 6 February 2007 Tuathail, G., OLoughlin, J., Djipa, D. (2006): Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Change and Public Opinion, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47 (1): 61-75 Pobri, N. (2000): Ustavno pravo, Mostar: Slovo Sahadi, M. (2009): Priroda politikog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini, in: Uvod u politiki sistem Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo: Sarajevski otvoreni centar, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer Scholdan, B. (2000): Democratization and electoral engineering in post-ethnic conflict societies, The Public, 7 (1): 25-40 iber, I. (2003): Tri klasina pristupa istraivanju ponaanja biraa, Politika misao, 40 (2): 88-103 iber, I. (2004): Interest in Elections and Electoral Participation, Politika misao, 41 (5): 3-27 Sberg Shugart, M., Wattenberg, M.P. (eds) (2001): Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?, New York: Oxford University Press Trnka, K. (2006): Ustavno pravo. Sarajevo: Fakultet za javnu upravu Documents Dayton Peace Accords, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html (26.08.2009) Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23/01, 23/01, 7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 25/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05, 65/05, 77/05, 11/06, 24/06, 32/07, 33/08, 37/08 Electoral Rules and Regulations for Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10/97, 15/97 Electoral Rules and Regulations for the Elections on Local and Higher Level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 22/96, 25/96, 29/96, 21/96 Electoral Rules and Regulations, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1/00
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Izborni sustav Bosne i Hercegovine: Kratki prikaz politikog pitanja i/ili tehnikog nesuglasja
MAJA SAHADI Pravni fakultet, Sveuilite u Zenici, Bosna i Hercegovina
Daytonski mirovni pregovori odrani su u zranoj bazi Wright-Patterson u Ohiju, SAD, od 1.-21. studenog 1995. godine. Rezultirali su Opim okvirnim sporazumom za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini (Daytonski mirovni sporazum) koji su potpisali predstavnici Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Republike Hrvatske, Federalne Republike Jugoslavije, a svjedoili su predstavnici Sjedinjenih Amerikih Drava, Velike Britanije, Njemake, Francuske, Rusije i posebnog izaslanika Europske unije. Daytonski mirovni pregovori okonali su sukob u Bosni i Hercegovini i postavili osnove za ponovno uspostavljanje mira. Meutim, najvanija pitanja demokratskog funkcioniranja drave nisu se usuglasila s meunarodnopravnim standardima, poput izbora i izbornog sistema. Daytonski mirovni sporazum nastao je kao kompromis razliitih ustupaka to se odraava posebno kada se govori o izborima i izbornom sustavu Bosne i Hercegovine. Kljune rijei: izborni sustav, Bosna i Hercegovina, politiki i tehniki problemi, izbori, Daytonski sporazum
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Ivana Grubei: Usklaenost pravnih propisa o dionikim drutvima u BiH
UDK: 347.721(497.6: 4 EU) Pregledni rad Primljeno: 1. 9. 2009.
Usklaenost pravnih propisa o dionikim drutvima u Bosni i Hercegovini s Uredbom o statutu europskog drutva1 u svjetlu izmjena nacionalnog zakonodavstva o trgovakim drutvima
IVANA GRUBEI Pravni fakultet, Sveuilite u Zenici, Bosna i Hercegovina
S ciljem uspjene integracije u unutranje trite Europske unije, Bosna i Hercegovina se 16.6.2009., potpisujui Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruivanju, obvezala poduzeti propisane mjere koje e omoguiti uspostavljanje funkcionalnog trinog gospodarstva putem osnivanja jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora temeljenog na etirima slobodama kretanja. Stoga e intenziviranje dosadanjih napora koji su uinjeni na polju harmonizacije domaih propisa s komunitarnim biti usmjereno prema usklaivanju propisa statusnog poslovnog prava, ostvarujui jednu od sloboda kretanja slobodu poslovnog nastana. Samo na taj nain priznat e se trgovaka drutva osnovana na jedinstvenom ekonomskom prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine, stvarajui konkurentniji poloaj na unutranjem tritu EU. Osnovano je pretpostaviti da e osnivanje i poslovanje europskih drutava na jedinstvenom ekonomskom prostoru BiH biti odluujui korak u ostvarenju potpune integracije bosanskohercegovakog trita u unutranje trite nakon to BiH postane drava lanica. Europsko drutvo kao prvi nadnacionalni oblik trgovakog drutva na unutranjem tritu ve je pokazalo zavidne komparativne prednosti spram drutava reguliranih nacionalnim propisima. U tu svrhu potrebno je utvrditi koje su promjene ve izvrene u zakonodavstvu BiH i koliko su uinkovito provedene, te koje korake e biti potrebno uiniti kako bi dioniko drutvo u BiH moglo biti osnovano kao europsko drutvo koje e uspjeno poslovati kako na teritoriju BiH, tako i na teritoriju cijele Europske unije. Kljune rijei: usklaivanje, europsko pravo trgovakih drutava, unutranje trite, europsko drutvo (SE), Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruivanju, jedinstveni ekonomski prostor
1 SE Societas Europaea
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1. Uvod U posljednjih petnaest godina dolo je do presudnih promjena u zakonodavstvu Bosne i Hercegovine radi ostvarenja lanstva u Europskoj uniji. Unutranje trite Europske unije razvija se ve 50 godina te su mnoga pitanja jo uvijek nedovoljno regulirana. Stoga je usklaivanje nacionalnog zakonodavstva s postojeim komunitarnim propisima kompleksan proces u kojem se mora uzeti u obzir potpuno drugaiji gospodarski sustav koji je postojao sve do devedesetih godina u Bosni i Hercegovini, ali i tendencije modernog trita. Stvaranje i razvijanje unutranjeg trita EU zasniva se na harmonizaciji propisa drava lanica, a najvie se postie uredbama i smjernicama. Pravo treih drava je da mogu takoer provoditi usklaivanje nacionalnih propisa s komunitarnim iako jo nisu pristupile EU, ili uope nemaju to za svoj cilj. Ovakva harmonizacija propisa zove se jo i dobrovoljna harmonizacija, a moe se javiti u tri oblika, zakonodavnom, upravnom i sudskom (Bodiroga-Vukobrat, 1999: 45). Da bi se postigla odgovarajua razina harmonizacije u konkretnoj dravi nelanici, potrebno je stvoriti odgovarajui pravni okvir, koji e omoguiti provoenje etiriju osnovnih sloboda trita EU: slobode kretanja ljudi, kapitala, roba i usluga, a koji se prvenstveno odnosi na pravo vlasnitva, ugovorno pravo, pravo trinog natjecanja i pravo drutava (Bodiroga-Vukobrat, 1999: 40). Jo je Bijelom knjigom iz 1995. godine2 utvren jedan od osnovnih ciljeva - modernizacija i ujedinjenje trita drava istone i sredinje Europe - gdje se posebno naglasila i potreba za modernizacijom prava trgovakih drutava, predlaui nove zakone o trgovakim drutvima koji e biti u skladu sa smjernicama iz podruja statusnog poslovnog prava. Na jednakim principima donesena je i Bijela knjiga iz 2000. godine. Znaaj Bijele knjige iz 2000. godine ogleda se u tome to se njome definie program za udovoljavanje obavezama koje namee unutranje tritekoji identificira kljune mjere u svakom sektoru i predlae redosljed aktivnosti u procesu pribliavanja3. Njome se predvia os2 U radu je koriten prijevod u izdanju Ministarstva vanjskih poslova Bosne i Hercegovine: Bijela knjiga pripreme pridruenih zemalja centralne i istone Evrope za integraciju u unutranje trite Unije, Komisija Europske zajednice, COM (95) 163 final, 3.5.1995, Bruxelles
nivanje jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora4 u BiH, koji e se postii ostvarenjem tzv. kljunih mjera, podijeljenih u dvije faze, gdje se u prvoj fazi sprovode one mjere iji je cilj stvaranje ireg okvira za detaljnu legislativu, a vezane su za fundamentalne principe ili one koje reguliu osnovne procedure, a koje su preduslov za djelotvorno funkcionisanje unutranjeg trita u odgovarajuem sektoru5. Ostvarivanje jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora u BiH, kako je i predvieno Procesom stabilizacije i pridruivanja, omoguit e lake prikljuivanje unutranjem tritu EU nakon to BiH postane lanica EU, te zadovoljavanje minimalnih standarda koje ono namee. Iako je odredbom lanka 1. stavka 4. Ustava BiH predvieno postojanje etiriju sloboda kao i komunitarnim propisima o unutranjem tritu EU, ipak je potrebno usuglasiti zakonodavstvo s postojeim komunitarnim pravom u podruju poslovnih odnosa. Tako neki autori navode pojedina podruja koje je potrebno usuglasiti na prvom mjestu kako bi se zadovoljili minimalni standardi (Ceni, 2008: 43), a za pravo trgovakih drutava na prvom mjestu je, pored usuglaavanja zakona na entitetskoj razini, moderniziranje upravljanja trgovakih drutvima i vea transparentnost u pogledu poslovanja. Potpisivanjem Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruivanju 16.6.2008. godine (u nastavku: SSP), Bosna i Hercegovina se obvezala poduzeti korake kojima e se okonati uspostavljanje jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora. Vodei se ovim promjenama koje moraju uslijediti u BiH, pored transformacije vlasnitva, potrebno je na prvom mjestu izvriti i promjene u pogledu korporativnog upravljanja, ime e se omoguiti konkurentnost bosanskohercegovakih tvrtki na unutranjem europskom tritu. Stoga su izmjene zakona o trgovakim drutvima u posljednjih nekoliko godina bile neminovne. S obzirom da na dravnoj razini ne postoji jedinstveni zakon o trgovakim drutvima, izvrene su izmjene i dopune entitetskih zakona o trgovakim drutvima. Dok je u Republici Srpskoj stupio na snagu novi Zakon o privrednim drutvima6, u
ba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_eu/?id=1230 (22.04.2009.), str. 3
4 Prijevod sintagme single economic space preuzet je od

Ajanovia i ostalih (2006: 86)
5 Europska komisija, Bijela knjiga Evropske Unije jedinstveni ekonomski prostor, preuzeto s: http://www.dei.gov. ba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_eu/?id=1230 (22.04.2009.), str. 3 br.128/08) (u daljnjem tekstu: ZPD RS).
3 Europska komisija, Bijela knjiga Evropske Unije jedin-
stveni ekonomski prostor, preuzeto s: http://www.dei.gov.
6 Zakon o privrednim drutvima, (Slubeni glasnik RS
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Federaciji BiH je stupilo na snagu nekoliko izmjena i dopuna Zakona o privrednim drutvima u FBiH7. Cilj novih izmjena i dopuna zakona o trgovakim drutvima, kako u RS, tako i u FBiH, je usklaivanje sa smjernicama komunitarnog prava iz podruja prava trgovakih drutava. 2. Znaaj usklaivanja nacionalnih pravnih propisa o dionikim drutvima s Uredbom br. 2157/2001 i Smjernicom br. 2001/86/EC Provoenje svih mjera predvienih SSPom treba biti okonano najvie est godina od potpisivanja SSP-a 2008. godine (l. 8. SSP-a), gdje e se primarno provoditi mjere kojima e se usklaivati nacionalni pravni propisi s pravnom teevinom koja regulira unutranje trite EU (l. 70. st. 3. SSP-a). Na ovaj nain provest e se primarni cilj, jedinstveni ekonomski prostor na tlu BiH, ime e biti ostvarena bitna pretpostavka lanstva za EU. U tom cilju izvrene su izmjene i dopune zakona o trgovakim drutvima, odnosno, njihovo usklaivanje sa smjernicama prava trgovakih drutava EU. Ukoliko se ovaj postupak okona uspjeno, po ostvarenju lanstva BiH u EU, izbjei e se sukobi prilikom primjene smjernica, uredbi i drugih pravnih akata kao sekundarnih pravnih izvora acquis communitaire i nacionalnih pravnih propisa. Ostvarenjem ovog cilja omoguit e se bosanskohercegovakim tvrtkama konkurentan poloaj na unutranjem europskom tritu po ostvarenju lanstva BiH u EU. Nove poslovne mogunosti za tvrtke otvorit e se i njihovim osnivanjem u posebnim gospodarskim oblicima predvienim uredbama i smjernicama europskog prava trgovakih drutava, koje do sada nisu bile predmet regulacije nacionalnog zakonodavstva, a koje e omoguiti tvrtkama stjecanje istinskog europskog karaktera. Rije je o europskoj ekonomskoj interesnoj grupaciji (Uredba br. 2137/85), europskom drutvu (Uredba br. 2157/2001 i Smjernica 2001/86/EC), europskom uzajamnom udruenju (Uredba br. 1435/2003 i Smjernica 2003/72/EC) te europskom privatnom drutvu (prijedlog statuta europskog privatnog drutva jo nije usvojen). Od posebnog znaaja za razvijanje unutranjeg trita pokazalo se europsko drutvo, jer je u samo pet godina primjene Uredbe br. 2157/2001 o statutu europskog drutva osnovano nekoliko stotina tvrtki u ovom gospodarskom obliku.
7 Zakon o privrednim drutvima, (Slubene novine FBiH,
br. 23/99, 45/00, 2/02, 6/02, 29/03, 68/05, 91/07, 85/08) (u daljnjem tekstu: ZPD FBiH).
S obzirom da je pravni status europskog drutva reguliran putem dvaju pravnih akata, uredbom i smjernicom, posljedice po nacionalna zakonodavstva u kojima e se one primjenjivati su razliite. Uredba ima direktnu primjenu u nacionalnim zakonodavstvima, te pravni akt koji se u tom sluaju donese od strane drave lanice ima uglavnom deklarativni karakter u pogledu odnosa uredbe i nacionalnih pravnih akata, kojim se utvruje koje nacionalne propise koristiti u pogledu pitanja koja nisu detaljno ureena uredbom. To znai da e se po ostvarenju lanstva BiH u EU Uredba o statutu europskog drutva direktno primjenjivati, dok e nacionalni propisi koji su u suprotnosti sa Uredbom biti izvan pravne snage. Da bi se preduhitrila ovakva situacija, potrebno je poduzeti mjere kojima e se uskladiti, u ovom sluaju, odredbe o dionikim drutvima (s obzirom na injenicu da je europsko drutvo dioniko drutvo lanak 1. Uredbe). Olakavajua okolnost u ovoj situaciji je ta da su Uredbom u velikoj mjeri openito regulirana pitanja u pogledu europskog drutva, te se u mnogim pitanjima upuuje na primjenu nacionalnih propisa o dionikim drutvima, usklaenih smjernicama trgovakih drutava. S druge strane, u pogledu primjene Smjernice br. 2001/86/EC, potrebno je donijeti odgovarajue pravne propise kojima e se implementirati ista u nacionalno zakonodavstvo. Dakle, uspjenim ostvarenjem postupka usklaivanja propisa kojima je reguliran pravni status dionikih drutava s odgovarajuim smjernicama trgovakih drutava omoguit e se potpuno ostvarenje jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora Bosne i Hercegovine, ime e se ostvariti i pretpostavka za stjecanje lanstva u EU. Nakon to BiH postane drava lanica, primjena Uredbe i Smjernice kojima se regulira status europskog drutva moi e se uspjeno ostvariti i na jedinstvenom ekonomskom prostoru BiH, ime e se intenzivirati prikljuivanje unutranjem tritu EU. Stoga je ovaj rad posveen razmatranju u kojoj mjeri je pozitivno zakonodavstvo BiH do sada usklaeno s pravnim propisima kojima se regulira osnivanje i poslovanje europskog drutva te koje mogunosti osnivanje europskog drutva na jedinstvenom ekonomskom prostoru BiH moe pruiti, nakon to BiH postane lanica EU.
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3. Prednosti primjene Uredbe br. 2157/2001 i Smjernice br. 2001/86/EC Osnovni razlog za donoenje Uredbe o statutu europskog drutva (SE) i Smjernice koja dopunjava statut europskog drutva u pogledu participacije zaposlenika usvojene u listopadu 2001. godine u Nici8 je ekonomskog karaktera. Kao to se navodi u toki 7. preambule Uredbe, primarni cilj je bio omoguiti osnivanje nadnacionalnog trgovakog drutva kroz jedan organizacijski oblik, a ne kao u dotadanjoj praksi, osnivanjem podrunica, koncerna, holdinga i sl. Time su se u velikoj mjeri smanjili trokovi osnivanja9 te omoguila jednostavnija organizacija i efikasnije poslovanje. S druge strane, donoenje Statuta predstavlja korak naprijed u harmonizaciji prava trgovakih drutava u Europskoj uniji, ija je zadaa bila ujednaiti razliite prakse nacionalnih poslovnih prava te stvoriti jedinstvene principe poslovanja i time omoguiti stvaranje jedinstvenog europskog trita, iji e poslovni subjekti biti konkurentni onima na amerikom i japanskom tritu, vodeima u svjetskoj ekonomiji. Broj SE tvrtki na samom poetku bio je veoma mali, ali prouavanje prednosti ovog oblika dionikog drutva te upoznavanje trgovakopravnih subjekata na tritu s komparativnim prednostima europskog drutva poluilo je pozitivne rezultate. Danas postoji nekoliko stotina SE tvrtki (Stollt, 2009: par.1), a njihov broj se iz godine u godinu sve vie poveava. Stoga je opravdano postaviti pitanje: emu SE tvrtka duguje ovoliku pozornost i primjenu?Analiza pravnog statusa europskog drutva pokazuje je da SE ima etiri prednosti koje za nacionalne kompanije nisu predviene propisima, a takoer nisu svojstvene ni drugim nadnacionalnim oblicima trgovakih drutava:
1. 2. 3. 4.
promjena registriranog sjedita nadnacionalna fuzija sloboda izbora sustava uprave trgovakog drutva te sloboda pregovora sa zaposlenicima.
Klju uspjeha europskog drutva krije se zapravo u njenoj nadnacionalnoj prirodi, koja se ogleda kako u pravnoj regulaciji, svakodnevnom poslovanju, tako i u etirima navedenima prednostima. Iako su joj mnogi uskraivali priznanje o nadnacionalnoj prirodi (Marychurch, 2002: 8), navodei da pravna regulacija nije isto nadnacionalnog karaktera, ova tvrdnja je nesumnjivo opovrgnuta injenicom da je europsko drutvo regulirano Uredbom kao pravnim sredstvom koje se direktno primjenjuje u dravama lanicama, te Smjernicom, koja je svojevrsni kompromis izmeu postojeih razliitosti koje postoje u sluaju reguliranja pravnog poloaja zaposlenika u trgovakim drutvima, a koji predstavlja prvi korak k usklaivanju divergentnosti zakonodavstava drava lanica po ovom pitanju10. Ni primjena nacionalnih propisa u pogledu pitanja koja nisu regulirana Uredbom ili Smjernicom nije u suprotnosti s tvrdnjom da je pravna regulacija europskog, a ne nacionalnog karaktera, jer nacionalni propisi koji se primjenjuju u konkretnim situacijama su ve usklaeni sa smjernicama trgovakih drutava te se tada moe govoriti samo o usklaenim nacionalnim propisima, a ne o nacionalnim propisima. Ovako utvrenim pravnim okvirom omoguilo se i nadnacionalno poslovanje europskog drutva bez uobiajenih nacionalnih ogranienja fizike, pravne, ili ekonomske prirode. Iako je predviena svjetla budunost SE, ekonomski tokovi europskog i svjetskog trita, te legislativa kojom se regulira pravo trgovakih drutava nakon donoenja Uredbe u velikoj mjeri e utjecati na primjenu ove Uredbe prilikom osnivanja trgovakih drutava u budunosti. Stoga je opravdano i prednosti SE
10 Najvea konica u donoenju pravnih propisa bila je participacija radnika u upravljanju. S obzirom na injenicu da u europskim zemljama postoji nekoliko sustava sudjelovanja radnika u upravljanju, od onih u kojima je ve uspostavljena tradicija sudjelovanja radnika, do onih gdje uope nije predvieno sudjelovanje, bilo je jako teko utvrditi model koji e se primjenjivati u svim zemljama Europske unije. Nakon trideset godina truda, ostvaren je kompromis u vidu smjernice koja, s jedne strane utvruje obavezne odredbe zajednike za sve drave lanice, kao to je pregovaranje s radnicima i prije osnivanja europskog drutva, a s druge strane, ostavlja mogunost dravama da same reguliraju to podruje nacionalnim propisima, koji, takoer moraju biti u skladu sa Smjernicom.
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of October 2001
on the Statute for a European company (SE), Official Journal L294, 10/11/2001 p. 0001-0021 (u nastavku: Uredba); Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October supplementing the Statute for a Europan company with regard to the involvement of employees, Official Journal L294, 10/11/2001 p. 0022-0032 (u nastavku: Smjernica).
9 Prije donoenja Uredbe morali su se plaati posebno
trokovi prestanka postojanja i brisanja tvrtke iz nacionalnog registra te trokovi osnivanja nove tvrtke u drugoj dravi lanici ( o tome e biti rije u nastavku teksta).
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promatrati kroz prizmu vjerojatnih promjena koje e uslijediti pod utjecajem dvaju faktora: 1. Izvjee o primjeni Uredbe te mogui izmjene i dopune iste, koje e Komisija uputiti Vijeu u Parlamentu, pet godina nakon to Uredba stupi na snagu (do kraja 2009. godine) - Izvjeem e Komisija utvrditi u kojoj mjeri je SE prihvaena na europskom i nacionalnom tritu, koje su negativne strane statuta SE, a takoer je predvieno i predlaganje izmjena i dopuna statuta SE, po odreenim pitanjima (l.69. Uredbe). 2. Legislativa u podruju europskog prava trgovakih drutava donesena nakon stupanja Uredbe na snagu. Usvajanjem Uredbe SE po prvi put u povijesti omoguilo se tvrtkama premjetanje registriranog sjedita iz jedne drave u drugu bez prestanka njihovog pravnog postojanja (l.8. st.1. Uredbe). Nesumnjiva komparativna predost se ogleda u injenici da tvrtke u ovom sluaju imaju pravni kontinuitet iako su registrirano sjedite premjestile iz jedne drave lanice u drugu, uz nesrazmjerno manje trokove u odnosu na one koje bi imale da premjetaju registrirano sjedite primjenjujui nacionalne propise11, ime se poveava i pravna sigurnost slobode kretanja trgovakih drutava12. Oteavajua okolnost u pogledu slobodnog premjetanja registriranog sjedita je obaveza da i stvarno i registrirano sjedite mora biti smjeteno u istoj dravi lanici, s ciljem sprjeavanja moguih tzv. pseudo-tvrtki (McCahery i dr., 2005: 788). Ovakvo ureenje je protivno pravu nastana trgovakih drutava, a s druge strane, smatra se da kao takvo smanjuje konkurentnost SE postavljanjem ovako strogog uvjeta. To je prvo, a ujedno i najkontroverznije pitanje o kojem e Komisija podnijeti izvjee, u smislu ponovnog razmatranja te mogue promjene, s ciljem da se omogui europskim drutvima da imaju stvarno i registrirano sjedite u razliitim dravama lanicama. Iako bi se time poveala konkurentnost europskog drutva, u smislu veeg broja osnovanih tvrtki u ovom obliku, a s druge strane,
11 Trokovi prestanka postojanja i brisanja trgovakog
drave lanice bi nastojale privui nadnacionalne tvrtke da se osnuju na njihovom teritoriju, ipak je malo vjerojatno da e to dovesti do Delawareovog efekta u EU, utrke prema dnu odnosno, kontinuiranog ograniavanja strogih uvjeta predvienih za osnivanje i poslovanje tvrtki s ciljem privlaenja veeg broja investitora koji e na posve jednostavan nain osnovati tvrtku, zbog injenice da je pravo trgovakih drutava ve u velikom segmentu harmonizirano.13 S obzirom da je prijedlog 14. Smjernice o nadnacionalnom prijenosu registriranog sjedita odbijen, europsko drutvo e (za sad) i dalje ostati jedini oblik trgovakog drutva (dionikog) koji ima mogunost transfera registriranog sjedita.14 injenica da je najvei broj SE tvrtki osnovan putem fuzije dovoljan je pokazatelj da je jedna od najveih prednosti ovog oblika dionikog drutva upravo meunarodna fuzija15. Regulirana po prvi put Uredbom16, meunarodna fuzija predstavlja mogunost jednostavnijeg nadnacionalnog povezivanja i organiziranja tvrtki te smanjenja trokova poslovanja kako u Europi tako i u svijetu (ovdje se prvenstveno misli na porezne obaveze). Stoga se opravdanim smatra da se pitanje meunarodne fuzije razmotri u izvjeu Komisije, te proiri koncept fuzije. lanak 17. stavak 2. Uredbe poziva se na dva postojea naina ostvarivanja fuzije, odnosno, na dvije vrste fuzije: fuzija pripajanjem i fuzija spajanjem, kako je i regulirano 3. Smjernicom. Takoer Uredba predvia jo jedan oblik fuzije, koji nije previen 3. Smjernicom17, a radi se o fuziji od strane holdinga, gdje tvrtka koja prestaje postojati, bez vrenja likvidaci13 pogledati vie o tome u: McCahery et al., 2005 14 Pored SE, mogunost transfera registriranog sjedita
postoji i u sluaju europskog uzajamnog drutva, l. 7. Uredbe br. 1435/2003 (europsko uzajamno drutvo, za razliku od SE, moe u statutu propisati i neogranienu odgovornost dioniara, pa prema tome nije klasino dioniko drutvo kao SE (l. 2. st. 2. Uredbe br. 1435/2003) (Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE), Official Journal L 207, 18/08/2003, p. 1-24)
15 Pored meunarodne fuzije kao naina osnivanja europskog drutva, uredbom su predviena jo tri naina: osnivanje SE u vidu holdinga, u obliku supsidijarne tvrtke drugog dionikog drutva, te transformacijom dionikog drutva u SE (l. 2. Uredbe).
drutva iz nacionalnog registra, te trokovi osnivanja novog trgovakog drutva u drugoj dravi lanici.
12 Vea pravna sigurnost ogleda se u injenici da ukoliko

bi se premjetanje registriranog sjedita vrilo primjenom nacionalnih propisa, tada bi drava lanica u kojoj se eli ponovno osnovati kompanija mogla odbiti registraciju iste, ili postaviti stroije uvjete osnivanja.
16 l. 17.-31. Uredbe reguliraju nadnacionalnu fuziju. 17 Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978
based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, Official Journal L 295, 20.10.1978., l. 3-4
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je, svu svoju aktivu i pasivu prenosi na drugu tvrtku, koja ve dri sve vrijednosne papire, odnosno dionice osnivakog kapitala te tvrtke. Ovaj vid fuzije je predvien kasnije i Smjernicom o meunarodnoj fuziji, u l. 2. st. 2. toka c). Meutim, Uredbom se predvia razmatranje i drugih moguih naina izvrenja fuzije, osim gore navedenih. U tu svrhu potrebno je uzeti u obzir mogue novine koje budu predviene u drugim direktivama, usvojenim nakon Uredbe, meutim, za sada nije predloen drugaiji nain fuzije, osim tri navedena, pa ni u Smjernici o meunarodnim fuzijama.
Mogunost slobodnog odabira izmeu jednoslojnog i dvoslojnog sustava uprave (to do sada nije bio sluaj u dravama lanicama, osim u nekoliko njih18) jedan je od razloga osnivanja velikog broja SE tvrtki (lanak 38. Uredbe). Time je omoguena vea konkurentnost naspram drugih oblika trgovakih drutava, to se posebno moe primijetiti u dravama gdje je osnovan veliki broj europskih drutava sa sustavom uprave koji je drugaiji od onog koji je dominantan u toj dravi lanici19. Nesumnjivo je da e ovakva uprava tvrtke dovesti i do konvergencije razliitih sustave uprave koji postoje u EU na nain to e se tvrtke uvijek priklanjati onom nainu upravljanja koji je podobniji za poslovanje i na jedinstvenom europskom i na svjetskom tritu. Ovdje se ne smije zanemariti injenica da je do velikih promjena u pogledu upravljanja kompanijama dolo kako u svijetu, tako i u EU. Posljednje desetljee je desetljee korporativnog upravljanja, pa su se na podruju europskog prava trgovakih drutava izvrile velike promjene po pitanju korporativnog upravljanja. Uzimajui u obzir dva postojea sustava uprave koja postoje u EU, jednoslojni i dvoslojni sustav uprave, te odnose dioniara, nadzornog i upravnog odbora, odlueno je da je potrebno izvriti usuglaavanje ovih propisa. Do prve promjene je dolo nakon to je odlueno da se pri izvrenju promjena koristi tzv. otvorena metoda koordinacije,20 a nakon toga je formi18 Italija i Francuska, preuzeto iz: Horak, Dumani, 2007:
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rana grupa strunjaka pod nazivom Winter Group (Baums, 2007: 2), koja je imala za cilj razviti akcijski plan za pravo trgovakih drutava koji je ukljuivao i niz mjera o promjenama korporativnog upravljanja. Na osnovi izvjea ove grupe stvoren je akcijski plan Moderniziranje prava trgovakih drutava i jaanje korporativnog upravljanja u Europskoj uniji plan za napredovanje, kojim su predviene dvadeset i etiri mjere koje su se trebale implementirati u kraim i duim rokovima u sljedeih nekoliko godina (Baums, 2007: 3). Ovim akcijskim planom nastoji se izvriti i simplifikacija prava trgovakih drutava jer je grupa strunjaka utvrdila da nema potrebe za opsenom legislativom koja e samo stvarati nove trokove, nego je potrebno dopuniti ve postojeu legislativu te primjenjivati one mjere koje nee uzrokovati velike trokove drava lanica prilikom procesa modernizacije21 (to je od velikog znaaja za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, koja, pored usklaivanja s ve postojeom komunitarnom legislativom, mora uzimati u obzir i tekue promjene kao i mogunost buduih promjena na polju korporativnog upravljanja). Ono to je zakljueno, nakon analize trenutnog stanja i ciljeva postavljenih akcijskim planom, je to da nije potreban jedinstveni europski zakon koji e regulirati podruje korporatvnog upravljanja22, jer time se ne bi postigao osnovni cilj efikasnost i konkurentnost poslovanja, te jaanje prava dioniara i treih osoba23. Smatra se da nacionalna zakonodavstva i dalje imaju veliki utjecaj na kompanijsko upravljanje, te da je divergentnost u sustavu korporativnog upravljanja potrebna izmeu drava lanica jer se tako samo potie konkurentnost te e budunost pokazati koji model upravljanja je i najprivlaniji potencijalnim investitorima i osnivaima. Analizom predvienih mjera, moe se primijetiti da je na
21 tzv. The SLIM-plus Simpler Legislation for the Internal
Market (vie o tome pogledati u: Saenger, 2005: 316
22 Do identinog zakljuka dole su i meunarodne orga-
nizacije OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) i ICGN (International Cocrporate Governance network) donoenjem meunarodnih standarda o korporativnom upravljanju, zakljuivi da je nemogue utvrditi sistem uprave kompanije koji e odgovarati svim kompanijama na globalnom tritu (vie o tome pogledati u: Monks et.al., 2004: 298.)
19 Od ukupnog broja tvrtki koje su se odluile za jednoslojni
23 Commission of the European Communities (2003): Com-
sustav uprave, oko 50% ih je prelo s dotadanjeg dvoslojnog sustava koji je dominantan u dravi u kojoj su registrirane na jednoslojni sustav uprave (najvie u Njemakoj), dok se svega nekoliko tvrtki odluilo za dvoslojni sustav uprave umjesto jednoslojnog sustava koji dominira u dravi njene registracije (Austrija) (podaci preuzeti iz: Schwimbersky, 2007).
20 vie o tome kod: Mavrommati i Papathanassiou, 2006
munication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union A plan to Move Forward, COM(2003)284 (final), Brussels, URL= http://www.gurn.info/en/topics/corporate-governance/ industrialised-countries/industrialized-countries/the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governance-in-the-european-union-a-plan-to-moveforward-may-2003 (13.04.2009.)
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podruju korporativnog upravljanja predvieno provoenje korporativnih ciljeva akcijskog plana putem smjernica24 i preporuka25. Evidentno je da e upravljanje europskim drutvom, usprkos svojoj inovativnosti i prihvaenosti na europskom tritu, doivjeti odreene promjene, slijedei postojee moderne tokove trita, s ciljem ostvarenja vee konkurentnosti naspram drugih nadnacionalnih oblika trgovakih drutava. Posljednja, ali ne i manje bitna, prednost SE je sloboda pregovaranja sa zaposlenicima. S obzirom na postojee razliitosti u dravama lanicama u pogledu pravnog poloaja zaposlenika u tvrtkama26, ureenje statusa zaposlenika smjernicom u sluaju SE tvrtki je bilo od presudnog znaaja, jer se nije nametnuo jedinstveni sustav regulacije njihovog poloaja, nego je svakoj dravi lanici omogueno da donese odgovarajua rjeenja uzimajui u obzir postojei sustav sudjelovanja zaposlenika u upravljanju. Stoga nee u svakoj SE tvrtki postojati uvijek participacija zaposlenika, kao jedan od tri oblika sudjelovanja koje regulira Smjernica (informiranje, konzultiranje i participacija)27, ali informiranje
24 Predvieno je da smjernicama a budu regulirana sljedea
pitanja iz podruja korporativnog upravljanja: jaanje naela javnosti u radu uprave, jaanje poloaja dioniara, odgovornost lanova uprave za financijski obraun, jaanje naela javnosti u pogledu ulaganja investitora, mogunost slobodnog izbora izmeu jednoslojnog i dvoslojnog sustava uprave, jaanje odgovornosti lanova uprave, Commission of the European Communities (2003): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union A plan to Move Forward, COM(2003)284 (final), Brussels, URL= http://www.gurn.info/ en/topics/corporate-governance/industrialised-countries/ industrialized-countries/the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governancein-the-european-union-a-plan-to-move-forward-may-2003 (13.04.2009.)
25 Predvieno je da sljedea pitanja budu regulirana pre-
porukama: jaanje uloge neovisnih neizvrnih direktora, razvoj odgovarajueg sustava plaanja direktora, Commission of the European Communities (2003): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union A plan to Move Forward, COM(2003)284 (final), Brussels, URL= http://www.gurn.info/ en/topics/corporate-governance/industrialised-countries/ industrialized-countries/the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governancein-the-european-union-a-plan-to-move-forward-may-2003 (13.04.2009.)
26 Prije donoenja Smjernice osamnaest drava lanica je
nacionalnim propisima reguliralo direktnu ili indirektnu participaciju zaposlenika u odluivanju, devet drava lanica nije propisima reguliralo participaciju zaposlenika, iako je u nekima od njih (Italija i Belgija) postojala praksa da predstavnici zaposlenika sudjeluju u radu upravnog odbora tvrtke (podaci preuzeti iz: Kluge, Stollt, 2004: 4.).
i konzultiranje su obavezujui. Iako ovakav nain ureenja poloaja zaposlenika ostavlja dojam da prava zaposlenika nisu dovoljno zatiena, Smjernicom je ipak utvrena donja granica u pogledu prava koju ne smiju prei drave lanice prilikom implementacije Smjernice u svoja zakonodavstva, u obliku standardnih pravila (l. 7. Smjernice). Njima je utvren minimalan sadraj prava na informiranje, konzultacije te participaciju zaposlenika, kojima se u znatnoj mjeri titi i jaa poloaj zaposlenika. Rjeenja o pitanju poloaja zaposlenika moda nisu dobila svoj konaan oblik u Smjernici, stoga je potrebno naglasiti da su po prvi put Smjernicom regulirana sva tri prava zaposlenika (za razliku od dosadanjih rjeenja, gdje je npr. Smjernicom o europskim radnikim vijeima regulirana samo prava na informiranje i konzultiranje) te je i na ovaj nain uinjen veliki korak u pogledu pribliavanja razliitih sustava reguliranja poloaja zaposlenika. Svjestan nesavrenosti Uredbe, zakonodavac je predvidio i razmatranje te mogue izmjene u cilju poboljanja pravnog poloaja europskog drutva l. 8. st. 16. Uredbe, koji predvia nadlenost drave lanice u kojoj je bilo smjeteno registirano sjedite prije premjetanja registriranog sjedita SE u drugu dravu lanicu, u sluaju dizanja tube prema SE prije premjetanja sjedita. lankom 69. st. 1. toka (c) predvieno je da se ova odredba treba promijeniti u sluaju bilo kakvi promjena, odnosno umetanja novih odredbi u Briselsku konvenciju iz 1968. godine, odnosno, ukoliko se donese drugi pravni akt kojim e se zamijeniti ova konvencija. U svjetlu ovih promjena, smatra se za shodno razmotriti i mogunost doputanja odredbi u statutima SE, prihvaenih od strane drava lanica o izvrenju njihovih nadlenosti, bilo od strane Uredbe ili drugog zakona koji su doneseni radi lake primjene Uredbe, bez obzira jesu li te odredbe u skladu s ovim zakonima, ak i ukoliko takve odredbe nisu doputene u statutima drutava s ogranienom odgovornou u tim dravama lanicama (l. 69. st. 1. toka (d) Uredbe). Time bi se omoguilo da statut SE sadri i odredbe koje su u skladu sa najnovijim kretanjima trita, bez obzira to kao takve nisu doputene u statutima domaih tvrtki, ime bi i atraktivnost ovog oblika trgovakog drutva porasla te omoguila iru primjenu na svjetskom tritu.
27 Navedeni pojmovi su definirani odredbama lanka 2.
Smjernice
85
4. Usklaenost nacionalnih pravnih propisa o dionikim drutvima s Uredbom br. 2157/2001 o statutu europskog drutva Na osnovi dosadanje analize pravnog statusa europskog drutva te injenice da SE ima oblik dionikog drutva, jednostavno je zakljuiti da je jedini usporedivi oblik od etiriju predvienih Zakonom o privrednim drutvima u FBiH, odnosno po Zakonu o privrednim drutvima u RS-u28, dioniko drutvo. Iako je izvren veliki pomak u usklaivanju propisa u pogledu pravnog statusa dionikih drutava u posljednjih godinu dana, jo uvijek se nije razmatralo pravno sredstvo putem kojeg e se implementirati Smjernica 2001/86/EC, odnosno omoguiti primjena Uredbe 2157/2001 nakon to BiH postane drava lanica. Uobiajena praksa drava lanica je donoenje dvaju zakona29, gdje se jednim vri implementacija Smjernice 2001/86/EC, dok se drugim ureuje primjena Uredbe. U ovakvom sluaju zakon kojim se regulira primjena Uredbe iskljuuje primjenu bilo kakvih nacionalnih propisa koji su mu u suprotnosti, te djeluje kao lex specialis naspram propisa kojim se regulira poloaj nacionalnih trgovakih drutava, kao lex generali propisa. S obzirom da u BiH jo nije donesen odgovarajui propis o primjeni Uredbe i Smjernice, potrebno je utvrditi u kojoj mjeri su usklaeni entitetski zakoni i propisi kojima se regulira pravni status europskog drutva. 5. Odnos europske kompanije i dionikog drutva u pozitivnom zakonodavstvu Bosne i Hercegovine Kao i u sluaju europskog drutva, dioniko drutvo u BiH ima osnivaki kapital podijeljen na dionice, gdje su dioniari odgovorni za obaveze drutva samo do visine vrijednosti svojih dionica (l.107. ZPD FBiH, odnosno, l.179. ZPD RS). Na osnivanje SE primjenjuju se nacionalni propisi koji se odnose na dionika
28 U odredbi lanka 3. Zakona o privrednim drutvima
u FBiH, predviena su etiri oblika trgovakih drutava (drutvo s neogranienom solidarnom odgovornou, komanditno drutvo, dioniko drutvo i drutvo s ogranienom odgovornou), a jednak broj trgovakih oblika predvien je i u odredbi lanka 2. Zakona o privrednim drutvima u RS-u (ortako drutvo, komanditno drutvo, drutvo s ogranienom odgovornou i dioniko drutvo).
drutva te drave, te je nuno u ovom segmentu uskladiti nacionalno zakonodavstvo s 1. Smjernicom,30 ime e se zadovoljiti zahtjev u pogledu transparentnosti osnivanja i poslovanja privrednih drutava u BiH. Ali, najvei problem koji se postavlja u ovoj situaciji nije taj jesu li zakoni u BiH usklaeni s 1. Smjernicom, nego je li pitanje registriranja trgovakih drutava regulirano na entitetskoj razini, a ne na dravnom (to je posljedica injenice da su i zakoni o trgovakim drutvima na entitetskoj razini). Iz ovog razloga dioniko drutvo osnovano u jednom entitetu, ukoliko eli poslovati u drugom entitetu, obavezno je osnovati podrunicu, to je istaknuto kao jedan od vodeih problema u podruju prava trgovakih drutava u Izvjeu o napretku Bosne i Hercegovine u 2009. godini, koje je Komisija Europskih zajednica dostavila Europskom parlamentu i vijeu (Komisija Europskih zajednica 2009: 38) (dvostruki trokovi osnivanja jednog dionikog drutva koje eli poslovati u oba entiteta). Osnivanje i SE i dionikih drutava u BiH provodi se upisom u registar trgovakih drutava31, ime drutvo stjee pravnu sposobnost, te odgovara za svoje obaveze od tog trenutka (l.5. ZPD FBiH, l.8. ZPD RS). Jednako rjeenje problema predvia se kako Uredbom tako i naim nacionalnim propisima, ukoliko neka osoba preuzme obaveze u ime drutva prije njegovog osnivanja. Tada ta osoba, odnosno osobe, odgovaraju za preuzete obaveze, a ne drutvo koje kasnije budu registrirali (l.12. ZPD RS kao i l.5. ZPD FBiH u usporedbi s l.16.st.2. Uredbe). Osnovni elementi osnivakog akta, odnosno statuta dionikog drutva, te podatci koji se upisuju u registar drutava predvieni u BiH, usklaeni su takoer s 1. Smjernicom koja se u ovom sluaju primjenjuje na europsko drutvo. Kao to se u BiH prilikom registracije dionikog drutva u nazivu mora navesti skraenica d.d., tako se i prilikom osnivanja europskog drutva, u nazivu mora navesti skraenica SE ime se daje na znanje treim osobama da se radi o dionikom drutvu jer se SE moe osnovati
30 vie o tome: Kasagi, 2007. 31 Za europska drutva nije predvien poseban registar,
nego se vri upis u registar trgovakih drutava na nacionalnoj razini, ali se u isto vrijeme objavljuju podaci o registraciji SE u Slubenom listu Europske unije. Takoer je potrebno napomenuti da je 1992. godine zapoet projekt o jedinstvenom Europskom trgovakom registru, koji danas uvezuje registre 21 drave iz Europe, te na taj nain olakava informiranje o pojedinim trgovakim drutvima, uz omoguavanje pristupa bitnim dokumentima koji se nalaze u evidenciji (Meki, Reichelt, 2008: 172).
29 pogledati vie o tome na: URL= http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/Countries-Transposition (08.10.2009.)
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samo u obliku dionikog drutva (l.13. st.4. ZPD FBiH i l.18. st.4. ZPD RS u usporedbi s l.11. st.1. Uredbe). Zajednika karakteristika SE i dionikih drutava u BiH je injenica da postoji minimalan iznos osnivakog kapitala. Dok je za SE predvien u vrijednosti od 120 000 eura, u FBiH je predvieno za zatvorena dionika drutva osnivaki kapital u vrijednosti od 50 000 KM (l.127. ZPD FBiH), a za otvorena dionika drutva 4 000 000 KM (l.6. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednim drutvima) , dok je u RS-u predvieni osnivaki kapital za zatvoreno dioniko drutvo 20 000 KM, a za otvoreno u vrijednosti od 50 000 KM (l.228. ZPD RS). S obzirom na injenicu da se posljednjim izmjenama i dopunama zakona u BiH predviene dvije vrste dionikih drutava, otvorena i zatvorena, europsko drutvo po svom karakteru odgovaralo bi otvorenim dionikim drutvima, ali ne na temelju kriterija broja dioniara ili visine osnivakog kapitala, nego na temelju injenice da se SE kao dioniko drutvo uvrtava na burzu te se dionice nude putem javne ponude. U pogledu osnivakog kapitala, njegovog poveanja, smanjenja, potrebno je uzeti u obzir 2. Smjernicu kojom su regulirana ova pitanja, a na koju se Uredba poziva (l.5. Uredbe). Kao i u sluaju SE, i u BiH se predvia postojanje vie razliitih klasa dionica, koje nose sa sobom odreena prava dioniarima (l.199. ZPD RS, odnosno l.195. ZPD FBiH u usporedbi sa l.60. Uredbe). Prilikom osnivanja europskog drutva, ali i dionikih drutava u BiH, ulog dioniara moe biti u novcu, ili u stvarima ija vrijednost je jednaka vrijednosti dionica iji oni postaju vlasnici, ali nikada u obliku obaveza ili usluga (l. 187. ZPD RS, odnosno l. 128. ZPD FBiH). Uredbom SE predvieni su skuptina dioniara i organ ili organi uprave kao organi tvrtke. U tom smislu, Uredba predvia, kao to je prije spomenuto i jednoslojni i dvoslojni sustav uprave u SE, tako da se tvrtke u dravama lanicama mogu osnovati i s onim oblikom uprave koji nije predvien nacionalnim zakonodavstvom. U BiH je predvien dvoslojni sustav uprave kao dominantan. Dakle, u ovom segmentu zakoni o trgovakim drutvima u entitetima nisu usklaeni s Uredbom, to je potrebno dodatno uskladiti donoenjem posebnog zakona o primjeni Uredbe o europskom drutvu. Kao osnovni organ drutva u BiH je predviena skuptina dioniara. Nadlenosti skuptine, tj. odluke koje ona donosi regulirane su l. 246. ZPD FBiH, odnosno, l. 281. ZPD RS, a koje ne odstupaju u pogledu ovlatenja
koje ima skuptina SE. Ovo pitanje je u jednom dijelu regulirano i nacionalnim propisima, kako je utvreno Uredbom, tako da e se pitanja regulirana entitetskim zakonima o trgovakim drutvima primjenjivati ukoliko se europsko drutvo osnuje na teritoriju BiH (nakon to BiH postane lanica EU) u situaciji kada to pitanje ve izriito nije stavljeno pod nadlenost skuptine samom Uredbom. I Uredbom i zakonima je predvieno najmanje jednom godinje sastajanje skuptine, uz mogunost i izvanrednih sjednica. Na jednak nain je rijeeno i pitanje kvoruma te donoenja odluka: kvorum ine dioniari koji posjeduju vie od 50% dionica s pravom glasa (l. 57. Uredbe, odnosno l. 248. ZPD FBiH i l. 283. ZPD RS), a odluke se donose obinom veinom, osim u iznimnim situacijama kada je potrebna dvotreinska veina (l. 284. ZPD RS i l. 248. ZPD FBiH, dok se u Uredbi navodi konkretna situacija u kojoj je potrebna dvotreinska veina prisutnih dioniara, a to je donoenje izmjena i dopuna statuta SE, mada se lankom 57. Uredbe navodi da e se postupiti prema nacionalnim propisima ukoliko oni predviaju i veu veinu za izglasavanje odreene odluke). Pored osnovnih imovinskih prava predvienih Uredbom i zakonima u BiH32, predviaju se i upravna prava koja su ujedno i instrumenti zatite dioniara u tvrtki33 Sudjelovanjem u radu skuptine, u smislu donoenja odluka, sazivanja skuptine, predlaganje dnevnog reda, predlaganja izmjena dnevnog reda, informiranjem o radu dionikog drutva, predlaganjem i imenovanjem lanova nadzornog odbora i odbora za reviziju (Dautbai, 2004: 24), dioniari omoguavaju uspjenije poslovanje tvrtke te vei profit, kao i dividende, a jednaka prava predviena su i Uredbom o SE, lancima 54-59. Zakonom o privrednim drutvima FBiH predvien je dvoslojni sustav uprave, odnosno, postojanje nadzornog i upravnog odbora, dok se u RS predvia jednak sustav uprave, s neto drugaijim nazivima: upravni odbor (koji ima nadzornu funkciju) i izvrni odbor. Kao to je predvieno i l. 40. st. 2. Uredbe, lanovi nadzornog odbora su imenovani od strane skuptine dioniara, a na jednak nain je ovo pitanje rijeeno i u BiH (l. 246. st. 1. toka 12. ZPD FBiH, odnosno, l. 300. ZPD RS). Intere32 O imovinskim pravima predvienim gospodarskim zakonima u BiH, u koje ubrajamo pravo na dividendu, pravo prvenstva pri kupovini dionica, pravo na dio likvidacijske ili steajne mase pogledati vie u: Duki, 2004.; Dautbai, 2004.
33 vie o tome kod: Muhadi, 2001.
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santno je napomenuti i to da se novim Zakonom o privrednim drutvima RS predvia i obaveza upravnog odbora da formira dvije komisije koje e pomoi u izvravanju obaveza upravnog odbora, dok isto nije predvieno Zakonom o privrednim drutvima FBiH. To su komisija za imenovanje i komisija za naknade (l. 308. ZPD RS), to je danas uobiajena praksa u poslovanju trgovakih drutava u EU da putem osnivanja posebnih komisija olakaju rad lanova uprave koji vre nadzor nad poslovanjem tvrtke. Dakle, po ovom pitanju nije izvreno usklaivanje entitetskih zakona o trgovakim drutvima, kao niti potpuno usklaivanje s komunitarnim propisima. Kao to je regulirano Uredbom, lanove upravnog odbora u FBiH, odnosno lanove izvrnog odbora u RS, imenuju i razrjeavaju funkcije nadzorni odbor u FBiH (l. 269. st.1. toka 5. ZPD FBiH), odnosno upravni odbor u RS (l. 304. st. 1. toka 2. ZPD RS). Osnovna obveza upravnog odbora u FBiH, odnosno izvrnog odbora u RS, svakodnevno je poslovanje tvrtke, odnosno donoenje odluka o svakodnevnom poslovanju tvrtke, to je takoer predvieno kao osnovna obveza upravnog odbora SE. Posebno je od znaaja naglasiti da je predviena solidarna odgovornost i Uredbom i zakonima o trgovakim drutvima u BiH lanova uprave u sluaju nanoenja trgovakom drutvu uslijed neizvravanja ili neurednog izvravanja svojih obveza (l. 51. Uredbe u usporedbi sa l. 271. i 272. ZPD FBiH i l. 319. ZPD RS). Takoer postoji i obveza uvanja podataka u tajnosti na odreeni vremenski rok i nakon to osoba bude razrijeena funkcije u upravi (l. 49. Uredbe u usporedbi sa l. 32. i l. 33. ZPD FBiH i l. 38. ZPD RS). Kao to je za poslovanje trgovakih drutava, a samim time i SE od velikog znaaja Preporuka u pogledu uloge neovisnih lanova uprave te ostale preporuke koje se odnose na korporativno upravljanje34, u BiH su takoer doneseni standardi o organima dionikih drutava, kojima se nastoji olakati i poboljati izvravanje njihovih obveza. 2002. godine u FBiH35 kao i u
34 Commision recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board, Official Journal L 52, 25.02.2005., p. 51-63.; Commission recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, Official Journal L 385, 14.12.2004., p. 55-59.
RS36, Komisija za vrijednosne papire dobila je ovlatenje za utvrivanje standarda upravljanja dionikim drutvima, iji je cilj unaprjeenje korporativnog upravljanja, u smislu jaanja prava dioniara, prava i obveza lanova uprave. Potrebno je napomenuti i to da su ovi standardi doneseni od strane neprivatnopravnog tijela i da su nepravnog karaktera (Rajevi, 2007: 446), ali iako u najveoj mjeri sadre preporuke, ipak imaju i odredbe koje su obvezujueg karaktera, a koje imaju osnovu u zakonima te time ispunjavaju svoj cilj dopunu postojeih obveznih zakonskih propisa. Dionika drutva nisu obvezna prihvatiti ih i primjenjivati, ali u tom sluaju moraju dati obvezno obrazloenje o neprihvaanju standarda. Ovo je inae uobiajena praksa u EU u pogledu pravno neobvezujuih akata kao to su preporuke, a kojima se nastoji uskladiti praksa u razliitim dravama lanicama. I u ovom pogledu BiH je otila jo jedan korak blie EU, uspostavljajui jednake standarde korporativnog upravljanja na unutranjem tritu. S obzirom na injenicu da je Uredbom dosta oskudno regulirano i pitanje prestanka postojanja SE, gdje se upuuje na primjenu nacionalnih zakonodavstava, odredbe o prestanku postojanja dionikih drutava primjenjivat e se i u ovoj situaciji na SE (l. 71. ZPD FBiH i l. 336. ZPD RS). 6. Naini osnivanja europskog drutva i njihov odnos sa statusnim promjenama trgovakih drutava u BiH Od etiriju naina osnivanja europskog drutva, dva naina predstavljaju statusne promjene. Radi se o osnivanju SE fuzijom i osnivanje SE transformacijom dionikog drutva u SE (l. 2. st. 1. i st. 4. Uredbe). Zakonima o trgovakim drutvima u BiH predviena je fuzija kao jedna od statusnih promjena37, a ijom primjenom bi se mogla osnovati SE na teritoriju BiH (nakon to BiH postane drava lanica EU)38. Kao i u Uredbi, i ZPD FBiH i ZPD RS predviaju dva oblika fuzije, odnosno spajanja: spajanje uz pripajanje i spajanje uz osnivanje (l. 18. Zakona
36 Standardi upravljanja akcionarskim drutvima (Slubeni
glasnik RS, br.3/06.)
37 Statusne promjene privrednog subjekta podrazumijevaju
35 Standardi upravljanja dionikim drutvima (Slubene

novine FBiH, br.32/01, 17/02.), te kasnije donesena Pravila upravljanja dionikim drutvima (Slubene novine FBiH, 24/06, 30/07.)
provoenje niza faktikih i pravnih radnji koje, u skladu sa zakonom, imaju dejstvo na izmjenu pravnog i ekonomskog identiteta drutva i univerzalnu sukcesiju imovine drutva.(definicija preuzeta iz: ovi, 2003: 112).
38 Da bi se osnovalo SE putem fuzije u BiH, potrebno je
razmotriti i dodatne uvjete predviene 3. Smjernicom o fuziji dionikih drutava i 10. Smjernicom o meunarodnoj fuziji.
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o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednim drutvima, l. 372. ZPD RS), gdje su definicije i jednog i drugog sadrajno identine onoj navedenoj u l. 17. Uredbe. Postupak osnivanja dionikog drutva putem nekog od dvaju navedenih naina spajanja odvija se na isti nain kao to je predvieno Uredbom u pogledu osnivanja SE putem fuzije, gdje skuptina dioniara svakog drutva donosi odluku o fuziji na temelju predloenog nacrta ugovora o spajanju uz obvezno izvjee neovisnog revizora. Dioniari imaju pravo izvriti uvid u sve relevantne dokumente u pogledu spajanja prije donoenja odluke, dok vjerovnici dionikog drutva imaju pravo na obeteenje i namirenje. Pravne posljedice spajanja stupit e na snagu od dana upisa u registar drutava39. Ono to nije predvieno ZPD FBiH, a postoji po zakonodavstvu RS, je postojanje jo jednog oblika fuzije, tzv. spajanja uz pripajanje dionikog drutva u pojednostavljenom postupku, koje sadrajno odgovara tzv. fuziji u holding, reguliranoj l. 25. st.3. Uredbe. Zakonima o trgovakim drutvima u BiH predviaju se i promjena oblika trgovakih drutava, tako da svaki od predvienih oblika trgovakih drutava, osim drutva s neogranienom solidarnom odgovornou, mogu izvriti promjenu statusa u dioniko drutvo drutvo (l. 427.-429. i l. 431. ZPD RS, l. 62. ZPD FBiH). Uredbom je predvien kao jedan od naina osnivanja SE transformacija dionikog drutva osnovanog po nacionalnom pravu u europsko drutvo, gdje postoje odreene slinosti izmeu ovog postupka i onih predvienih zakonima u BiH u pogledu promjene statusnog oblika, ali, s tom razlikom da kod transformacije dionikog drutva u SE ne dolazi zapravo do promjene pravnog statusa, budui da je i SE dioniko drutvo, nego dolazi do promjene u poslovanju te injenici da je europsko drutvo regulirano na prvom mjestu Uredbom i Smjernicom, kao i drugim pravnim propisima komunitarnog karaktera.
7. Odnos europskog drutva i povezanih drutava u bosanskohercegovakom zakonodavstvu Pored osnivanja SE putem fuzije i transformacije u SE, Uredbom je predvieno osnivanje europskog drutva u obliku holdinga40 i supsidijarnog drutva, koji omoguavaju prednosti u meunarodnom poslovanju u vidu jednostavnijeg osnivanja, poreznih olakica i sl. Stoga je od velikog znaaja nacionalnim zakonodavstvom regulirati pravni poloaj povezanih drutava. Posljednjim izmjenama i dopunama zakona o trgovakim drutvima u BiH reguliran je pojam povezanih drutava, naini povezivanja, odgovornost vladajueg drutva kao i ovisnog (l. 2.11. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednim drutvima, l. 357.-367. ZPD RS). U FBiH nije podrobno reguliran pojam povezanih drutava, nego se samo navode koja su drutva obuhvaena tim pojmom, navodei definicije svakog od njih, dok se u RS navodi da su to dva ili vie drutava koja su povezana kapitalom, ugovorom ili na oba naina istovremeno (l. 357. ZPD RS). U pogledu pojma vladajuih i ovisnih drutava, u RS i FBiH navedeni su jednaki uvjeti pod kojima e se neko drutvo smatrati vladajuim, odnosno ovisnim41. Ovako definiran pojam vladajueg ili kontrolnog drutva odgovara pojmu istog definiranog l. 3. st. 2.-7. Smjernice 94/45/EC, a na koju navodi l. 2. st. 1. toka (c) Smjernice, jer pojam kontrolnog/vladajueg drutva i supsidijarnog/ovisnog nisu regulirani Uredbom. Prema definiciji navedenoj u Zakonu o privrednim drutvima u FBiH (l.6. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednim drutvima), odnosno u RS (l. 357. st. 5. ZPD RS), holding je vladajue drutvo koje, na osnovi zakljuenog ugovora o voenju poslova, obavlja djelatnost upravljanja i financiranja ovisnih drutava. U Uredbi nije navedena izriito
40 Hrvatski Zakon o trgovakim drutvima (l. 476.) umjesto 41Pod pojmom vladajueg drutva smatra se drutvo koje,
termina holding, predvienog bosanskohercegovakim entitetskim zakonima, koristi naziv koncern. posredno ili neposredno, u drugom poduzeu ima 50% osnivakog kapitala, i 50% glasova u skuptini dioniara (l. 6. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednim drutvima). Pored pojma veinskog udjela u ovisnom drutvu, u literaturi se navodi i pojam znaajnog udjela u ovisnom drutvu (vie o tome kod: Kostadinovi, 2004: 177). Ovaj pojam se spominje i u Zakonu o privrednim drutvima u RS, u l. 358. gdje se navodi da znaajan udjel u kapitalu ovisnog drutva ima ono drutvo koje ima vie od 20% glasova u skuptini.
39 Postupak spajanja je reguliran u FBiH l. 63.-69. i l.

291.-296. ZPD FBiH, te l. 19.-22. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednim drutvima (Slubene novine FBiH, br. 29/03), a u RS l. 375.-393. i l. 399. ZPD RS.
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definicija holdinga te se u tom sluaju europsko drutvo prilagoava znaenju ovog pojma prema nacionalnim propisima42. Bilo da se radi o holdingu ili o ovisnom drutvu, entitetski su zakoni predvidjeli odgovornost za uinjenu tetu ovisnom drutvu (l. 9. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednim drutvima, odnosno, l. 32.-34. i l. 36.-37. ZPD RS). Takoer, vladajue drutvo odgovorno je za obveze ovisnog drutva njegovim vjerovnicima u sluaju insolventnosti ovisnog drutva (ovi, 2003: 13). Potrebno je napomenuti i injenicu da je zakon u RS detaljnije propisao obavezu pisanja konsolidiranih izvjea od strane vladajueg drutva (l. 363. te situaciju kada jedno drutvo putem poslovnog ugovora prenosi dio dobiti na drugo drutvo (l. 364.-367.). Predvianjem povezanih drutava entitetskim zakonima, otvara se mogunost osnivanja tvrtke u obliku SE, primjenjujui propise koje se odnose na dionika drutva, a koji su usklaeni sa smjernicama prava o trgovakim drutvima EU.
Meutim, jo uvijek nisu usvojeni propisi kojima bi se uskladilo zakonodavstvo sa Smjernicom koja dopunjava statut o europskom drutvu u pogledu sudjelovanja zaposlenika u upravljanju tvrtkom, niti se usvojio propis, kao u susjednoj Hrvatskoj, o primjeni europskih drutava na domaem tritu, koji e stupiti na snagu onog dana kada se ostvari lanstvo u EU. Dodatni problem koji se namee u primjeni Uredbe i Smjernice kojima se regulira pravni poloaj europskog drutva je i postojanje razliitih zakona o trgovakim drutvima i drugih propisa kojima kojima se reguliraju ostala pitanja trgovakih drutava na entitetskoj razini u BiH. Kao logino rjeenje namee se donoenje jednog, tzv. krovnog zakona o trgovakim drutvima na razini Bosne i Hercegovine, kojim e se potpuno uskladiti postojei entitetski zakoni, te potpomoi uspjeno uspostavljanje jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora u BiH. To bi u isto vrijeme olakalo i donoenje zakona o primjeni Uredbe i implementiranje Smjernice o europskom drutvu na dravnoj razini, ime bi se omoguilo i maksimalno iskoritavanje komparativnih prednosti koje prua europsko drutvo.
8. Zakljuak Opravdano je zakljuiti na osnovi prikazanih prednosti i buduih promjena, da je europsko drutvo efikasan instrument razvoja jedinstvenosti europskog trita te kao takvo potie poveanje konkurentnosti nadnacionalnih tvrtki iz Europske Unije na svjetskom tritu. Stoga je usklaivanje propisa u Bosni i Hercegovini kojima se regulira pravo trgovakih drutava prvi korak prema stvaranju odgovarajuih uvjeta za osnivanje i poslovanje europskih drutava i na bosanskohercegovakom tritu nakon to BiH postane drava lanica, to e rezultirati kako povoljnijim poloajem domaih tvrtki na unutranjem tritu EU, tako i poveanjem investicijskog kapitala od strane inozemnih kompanija. Donoenjem novog Zakona o privrednim drutvima u RS-u, te izmjenama i dopunama postojeeg Zakona o privrednim drutvima u FBiH, u jednom dijelu se uspjeno se uskladilo BH-zakonodavstvo sa smjernicama o pravu trgovakih drutava komunitarnog prava.
42 Prema naem zakonodavstvu, holding moe obavljati samo istu holding djelatnost. tj. moe osnivati nova drutva, financirati ovisna drutva te upravljati ovisnim drutvima. Pored ove djelatnosti, postoji i tzv. mjeovita djelatnost holdinga, gdje holding moe obavljati i druge samostalne djelatnosti (vie o tome kod: Mili, Trifkovi, 1999: 246).
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Literatura Ajanovi J., Alkalaj, A., Drakovi N. i dr. (ur.) (2006.): Strategija integriranja Bosne i Hercegovine u Evropsku Uniju, Vijee ministara Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo: Direkcija za evropske integracije Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N. (1999.): Harmonizacija prava tranzicijskih zemalja sa europskim pravom, Pravna misao, 11-12: 39-47 Ceni, S. (2008.): Bosanskohercegovaka privreda mogui pokreta ili faktor blokade u procesu evropskih integracija, u: Bosna i Hercegovina i proturjenosti procesa EU, Sarajevo: Fondacija Heinrich Bll, Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu ovi, . (2003.): Poslovno pravo statusno pravo i pravo privrednih drutava, Sarajevo: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Sarajevu ovi, . (2003.): Povezana privredna drutva, Pravna misao, 11-12: 8-17 Dautbai, S. (2004.): Funkcionisanje i organi dionikog drutva, Pravna misao, 9-10: 41-54 Duki, V. (2004.): Prava i obaveze akcionara, Pravni savjetnik, 6: 72-78 Horak H., Dumani, K. (2007.): Europsko drutvo - societas europea: novota u hrvatskom pravu, Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, godina 5: 128-152 Kasagi, R. (2007.): Unifikacija meunarodnog trgovinskog zakonodavstva sa posebnim osvrtom na trgovinsko zakonodavstvo Republike Srpske, Godinjak Pravnog fakulteta u Banjoj Luci, 30: 247264 Kostadinovi, D. (2004.): Osnove privrednog prava, Beograd: Fakultet za trgovinu i bankarstvo Janiije i Danica Kari Mavrommati S., Papathanassiou C. (2006): A modified open method of coordination in corporate governance, European Business Law Review, 17 (6): 1637-1649 McCahery A. J., Vermeulen, P. M. E. (2005): Does the european company prevent the Delaware effect?, European law journal, 11(6): 785-801 Meki Z., Reichelt G. (2008.): Evropsko privatno pravo, Zenica, Be: Univerzitet u Zenici, Sveuilite u Beu Monks A. G. R., Minow, N. (2004): Corporate governance (third edition), Oxford: Blackwell Muhadi, E. (2001): Zatita dioniara prema propisima u Federaciji BiH, Pravni savjetnik, 4: 5-14 Rajevi, M. (2007.): Pojam i priroda korporativnog upravljanja, Pravna rije, 10: 435-447 Saenger, I. (2005): Recent developments in european company and business law, Deakin Law Review, 10 (1): 297-318 Simi, M., Trifkovi, M. (1999.): Poslovno pravo: osnovi prava i obligacija, privredna/trgovaka drutva, Sarajevo: Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Sarajevu Izvori Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October supplementing the Statute for a Europan company with regard to the involvement of employees, Official Journal L294, 10/11/2001: 22-32 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of October 2001 on the Statute for European company (SE), Official Journal L294, 10/11/2001: 1-21 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE), Official Journal L 207, 18/08/2003: 1-24 Pravila upravljanja dionikim drutvima, Slubene novine FBiH, 24/06, 30/07 Standardi upravljanja dionikim drutvima, Slubene novine FBiH, 32/01, 17/02 Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, Official Journal L 295, 20.10.1978 Zakon o privrednim drutvima, Slubene novine FBiH, 23/99, 45/00, 2/02, 6/02, 29/03, 68/05, 91/07, 85/08 Zakon o privrednim drutvima, Slubeni glasnik RS, 128/08
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Mreni izvori: Akcijski plan provoenja Privremenog sporazuma i Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruivanju, Baums, T. (2007): European company law beyond the 2003 Action Plan - ECGI Law Working Paper No. 81/2007., URL= SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=973456 (22.06.2009) Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union A plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final, Brussels, 2003., URL= http:// www.gurn.info/en/topics/corporate-governance/industrialised-countries/industrialized-countries/ the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governance-in-theeuropean-union-a-plan-to-move-forward-may-2003 (13.04.2009.) Europska komisija: Bijela knjiga Evropske Unije jedinstveni ekonomski prostor, URL= http://www.dei. gov.ba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_eu/?id=1230 (22.04.2009.) Kluge, N., Stollt, M. (2004): Workers participation in the European Company an aditional reference in european industrial relations, European Trade Union Institute, URL=http://www.seeuropenetwork.org/homepages/seeurope/file_uploads/benchmarking_text_en.pdf2004. (06.09.2008) Privremeni sporazum o trgovini i trgovinskim pitanjima izmeu Evropske Zajednice, s jedne strane i BosneHercegovine, s druge strane, URL= http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/ssp/doc/Default. aspx?id=766&template_id=14&pageIndex=1, (30.05.2009.) Komisija Europske zajednice: Radni dokument Komisije: Izvjetaj o napretku Bosne i Hercegovine u 2009. godini prilog uz saoptenje Evropskom parlamentu i savjetu/vijeu, SEC (2009) 1338, 14.10.2009., Bruxelles, URL- http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_ eu/?id=2459 Komisija Europske zajednice: Bijela knjiga pripreme pridruenih zemalja centralne i istone Evrope za integraciju u unutranje trite Unije, COM (95) 163 final, 3.5.1995, Sarajevo: Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova Bosne i Hercegovine Marychurch, J. (2002): Societas Europaea harmonization or proliferation of corporations law in the European Union, Faculty of faw Papers, Faculty of law, University of Wollongong, URL= http:// ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=lawpapers (13.07.2009) Schwimbersky, S.: SEs in Europe - etablished, in preparation, announced interest, sold shelfs, transformed, liquidated and failed, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI-REHS) co-funded by Hans Bockler Foundation, last update 27.04.2007, URL=http:www.seeuropenetwork. orghomepagesseeuropefile_uploadssefactsheets052007.pdf, (30.01.2009) Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruivanju izmeu Evropskih zajednica i njihovih drava lanica, s jedne strane i Bosne i Hercegovine, s druge strane, URL= http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/ssp/doc/ Default.aspx?id=743&template_id=14&pageIndex=1, (11.03.2009.) Stollt, M. (2009): European Companies (SE) News from the SE Factsheet Database (March 2009), URL=http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/se-companies-news/europeancompanies-se-news-from-the-se-factsheet-database-march-2009. (27.06.2009) URL= http://www.dei.gov.ba/Default.aspx?template_id=37&pageIndex=1, (30.05.2009.) URL=http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/Countries-Transposition (8.10.2009)
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Coordination between the regulation of public limited liability companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council Regulation on the Statute for an European company43 in the light of amendments of national legislation on companies
IVANA GRUBEI Faculty of Law, University of Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina
With the goal of successfully integrating into the internal EU market in mind, by becoming a signatory of Stabilisation and Association Agreement on June 16, 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina took on the responsibility of undertaking prescribed measures to enable a functional market economy to take roots by establishing a single economic space based on four freedoms of movement. Hence, current efforts to harmonise the local regulations with acquis communautaire will be intensified and attention given to the harmonisation of company law regulations, thus ensuring one of the four mentioned freedoms the freedom of establishment. This is the only manner in which companies established in the single economic space in BiH can endeavour to be recognised, gaining a more competitive status in the internal EU market. It is reasonable to maintain that establishing European companies and their conducting of business in the single economic space of BaH will prove to be a decisive step towards complete integration of Bosnian market into the internal EU market after BaH becoming a Member State. The first supranational form of company in the internal market, witnessed in the ascent of European company (SE), has already yielded many advantages in comparison to companies governed by national regulations. Acting towards these ends, it is a prerequisite to ascertain what changes have already been done to the national legislation and just how efficiently they have been implemented, followed by determining the next course of action in making it possible for the joint-stock company to be established as a SE capable of successful business activities in BaH, as well as on EU territory. Key words: harmonisation; European company law, Internal market, European company (SE), Stabilisation and Association Agreement, single economic space
43 SE Societas Europaea
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Anelko Milardovi: Future Scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina
The International Community and Future Scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina
ANELKO MILARDOVI Political Science Research Centre, Zagreb Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, Zagreb
This conference paper, presented at Panel 3 The future role of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the international conference Bosnia & Herzegovina - a Road towards Stabilization, Prosperity and European Integration organised by the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and held on November 5-6, 2009 in Budapest, Hungary, deals with possible future scenarios of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the role of key international actors will play in each of these cases.
1. Status Quo This scenario would effectively mean the continuance of internal political conflicts between Sarajevo and Banja Luka, as well as asymmetrical relations between the Croat and Bosniak parts of the Federation. A status quo scenario would see a prolongation of the Dayton political system, without options for its improvement or reconstitution. Such a situation would mean further socioeconomic stagnation and degradation of mutual trust and respect among major political forces in the country and would provide fertile ground for escalation of ethnic strives. With Prud and Butmir negotiations proving unsuccessful, this scenario is highly probable. 2. Federalisation As the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political architecture already features the division into two separate, self-governing entities, the Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (further divided into ten cantons/counties) and the Republic of Srpska, with Brko District being governed by both entities, further federalisation remains an open political issue. The present political system does not provide stability and unity, nor does it represent a stable basis for economic progress, as the multiple divisions of the Bosnian state create a heavy administrative burden that hampers development initiatives. While the dominant politics of Republic of Srpska show the tendency to further federalisation and relativisation of the common Bosnian state, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is destabilized by a strong unitarist approach of the Bosniak political elite in Sarajevo, which in turn fuels aspirations for further federalisation and creation of a third entity in Croat majority areas. The current model of Bosnian-Herzegovinian federalism has so far proven not viable, as it is a result of a temporary solution created by the Dayton Peace Treaty which has over time become a permanent state of affairs. There remains a question whether different models of federalism might prove applicable in the Bosnian case.
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2. a) The Belgian Case The Belgian example of federalism, based on ethnolinguistic political and administrative communities, itself shows deep internal problems and cannot effectively be transposed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This model would mean the division of Bosnia into three autonomous entities (Serb, Croat and Bosniak), along ethnic lines. 2. b) The Swiss Model The stability of the Swiss federal system which is based on a long tradition of direct democracy, subdivision into small, self-governing cantons and coalition governments, is highly unlikely to be achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Swiss model predates the existence of modern nations and nationalism which play a dominant role in Bosnian society and politics. This model would mean the dissolution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Republic of Srpska and the creation of self-governing cantons on the whole Bosnian territory. 3. Modernisation and EU Accession Political modernisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although from todays standpoint not very likely, should include strengthening of capacities of institutions of the Bosnian central state. While this process is, with limited extent and success, already under way, it is met with significant opposition from the Serb side as Prime Minister of Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik strives to maintain and further increase the autonomous and almost sovereign position of the Serb-dominated entity. Political modernisation is not necessarily synonymous with centralisation and unitarism, as it federalist solutions could also be combined with political reforms that would strengthen the state as a whole and bring Bosnia closer to European political standards. The Croat side shows voices that both support the creation of a third entity (which would further federalize the country), but could also favor the disolution of entities and the creation of a decentralized state with regions not necessarily based on ethnic divisions which could provide a certain level of autonomy for all three parties. There is no clear way to modernisation (and thus to bringing Bosnia closer to the EU) that would be acceptable to the political elites of all three Bosnian national groups. As nation-formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is already a vastly finished process it is highly unlikely that a pan-Bosnian national identity and a political culture stemming from it could be created (at least not one that would not be seen by Serbs and Croats as Bosniak nationalism masked as pan-Bosnianism). A civic culture that would accept the multinational character of Bosnia and Herzegovina (this means adopting some elements of Belgian political culture, while seeing the adoption of Swiss solutions as impossible) could provide a stable option for modernization efforts. 4. Renewed Armed Conflict Although the levels of sports violence with ethnic and political backgrounds (Croat-Bosniak conflicts) do show some potential for low-intensity armed struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina and dubious military and police cooperation arrangements between Banja Luka and Belgrade leave a lot of questions to be answered, a renewed escalation of armed conflict in Bosnia is not very likely. Taking in account that Serbia is economically too exhausted to launch a war campaign and Croatia, being a NATO member and a EU accession candidate, would not engage in armed conflict without consent from Western partners and allies, external factors are not strong enough to transform internal Bosnian contradictions into armed conflict.
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5. Dissolution of the Bosnian State Republic of Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, uses threats of separation of his entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina for purposes of daily politics, but, without sufficient support from Belgrade (which is not likely to be shown in near future), the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a very likely scenario. Separatist tendencies remain high both among Bosnian Serbs and many Bosnian Croats, yet the political strength to turn such ideas into reality is not present. 6. The Role of the United States The US foreign policy has since the War on Terror and the Invasion of Iraq lost interest in the Balkans region. Despite American military presence in Kosovo, as well as Bosnia and Macedonia, US diplomats have delegated the ongoing political problem-solving to the European Union. The US generally support the modernisation of Bosnia and its Europeanisation and would thus object to dissolution of the Bosnian state. Its military presence should prevent any possibility of renewed military conflict. The US do not show a clear preference for any type of political system in Bosnia. 7. The Role of the European Union The European Union, while offically supporting further modernisation and Bosnias EU aspirations, does not have political capacity and will to actually fullfil this mission. While the EU Copenhagen criteria do represent a clear framework for political reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, internal disagreements and particularist interests in EU members states do not allow a single position the future of Bosnia which would prove fruitful. The EU, however strongly opposes the dissolution of the Bosnian state and is thus suspicious of further decentralisation and federalisation of the country. 8. The Role of Russia Regarding Bosnia, Russia clearly supports the Serb side, due both to Belgrades ties with Moscow, as well as to Russian economic interests in privatisation and investment opportunities, especially in the energy sector in the Republic of Srpska. Russia provides support to Milorad Dodiks opposition to centralisation and the abolition of Bosnian federal entities and could even back up the Serb side in the case of dissolution of the Bosnian state, in order to counterbalance the changes in EuroAtlantic international relations that have been created by the declaration of independence of Kosovo. 9. The Role of Turkey Turkey has interest in the stabilisation of the Bosnian state and has interests in strengthening of the Bosniak position in Bosnian politics. It also sees Bosnia as political and economic ground for furthering Turkish influence on European politics. 10. The Role of Arab Countries Arab countries, especially the oil-wealthy Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have shown great support for the Bosniak cause during the War in Bosnia and are trying to maintain their economic, political and religious influence in the country. They would vehemently oppose the dissolution of the Bosnian state and favor further centralisation and stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Meunarodna zajednica i scenariji budunosti za Bosnu i Hercegovinu

ANELKO MILARDOVI Centar za politoloka istraivanja, Zagreb Institut za migracije i narodnosti, Zagreb
Ovo izlaganje sa skupa predstavljeno je na Panelu 3 The future role of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina na meunarodnom skupu Bosnia & Herzegovina - a Road towards Stabilization, Prosperity and European Integrationkoji je 5. i 6. studenog 2009. organizirao Maarski institut za meunarodne odnose u Budimpeti. Izlaganje se bavi moguim scenarijima budunosti za Bosnu i Hercegovinu te ulogom koju e u njima imati kljuni meunarodni akteri.
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godite II broj 1 2009. | volume II number 1 2009

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centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

UDK: 316.66-055.2(549.1) Izvorni znanstveni lanak Primljeno: 1. 6. 2009.

Understanding Female College Students Mind-set towards Television Advertising in Pakistan

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

Female students general attitude towards television advertising

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

Demographics comparision of respondents

Percent 18.4 12.7 17.4 32.1 19.4 100.0

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

Correlation matrix of variables Regulatory

General attitude Ethical Economic impact Social Regulatory

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

Table 6 Model R R square

Model summary Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate .57316

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

t 7.369 2.498 6.075 .498 .324

.000 .013 .000 .619 .747

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Students

Razumijevanje stavova studentica prema televizijskom oglaavanju u Pakistanu

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

UDK: 349:614.2>(71)=111 Izvorni znanstveni lanak Primljeno: 14. 5. 2009.

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

20 La Presse, May 23, 2001: A16 21 La Presse, June 5, 2000: B2

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

41 The only time after 1998 when marketisation was

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

48 In 1999 there was a peak of 60 articles men-

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societies

UDK: 32.019.5(497.2+470) Pregledni rad Primljeno: 17. 8. 2009.

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societies

2 The survey results have been extracted from the World

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societies

* Survey conducted by Gallup, July 2005

centar za politoloka istraivanja the political science research centre www.cpi.hr