MARTIN

KUSCH

HUSSERL

AND HEIDEGGER

ON MEANING

1. INTRODUCT1ON: AND

LANGUAGE LANGUAGE

AS THE

UNIVERSAL

MEDIUM

AS CALCULUS

In this paper I want to outline a new interpretation of the central tenets of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, of Heidegger's ontology and of the differences between the two. A fresh attempt to interpret Husserl's and Heidegger's conceptions of meaning and language seems to be possible due to recent developments in Frege- and Wittgenstein-scholarship, especially to Merrill B. and Jaakko Hintikka's book Investigating WittgensteinJ The cornerstone of the Hintikkas' interpretation is a conception of meaning that the authors call "language as the universal medium". 2 The core of this conception is the claim that semantical relations between language and the world are inexpressible. As the Hintikkas' put the central point:
. . . one cannot as it were look at one's language from outside and describe it . . . . T h e reason for this alleged impossibility is that orte can use language to talk about s o m e t h i n g only if one can rely on a given definite interpretation, a given network of m e a n i n g relations obtaining between language and the wortd. H e n c e one cannot rneaningfully and significantly say in language what these m e a n i n g relations are, for in any attempt to do so o n e taust already presuppose them. 3

The corollaries of this general point can be summarized in the following argument - here I follow more the spirit than the letter of

Investigating Wittgenstein :
(UM-l) Semantical relations are inaccessible; therefore (UM-2) we cannot imagine different semantical relations; therefore (UM-3) model theory (and talk of possible worlds) is impossible (since model theory is based on the systematical variation of meaning relations); and (due to 1) (UM-4) linguistic relativism is inevitable (we are trapped in our language); for (due to 1 & 2) (UM-5) we cannot grasp reality without linguistic (distorting) interference; and (due to 1) (UM-6) the construction of a metalanguage is impossible; therefore
Synthese 77 (1988) 9 9 - 1 2 7 . 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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(UM-7) truth as correspondence is inexpressible, therefore (and due to 1) (UM-8) we have to limit ourselves to syntax, i.e., formalism. This argument, let us call it the U M - a r g u m e n t for brevity, can be identified not only in Wittgenstein, but also in Frege, as earlier work by Jaakko Hintikka, 4 Jean van Heijenoort 5 and recent studies by Leila Haaparanta 6 have shown. One of my aims in this paper is to make plausible the claim that central elements of the U M - a r g u m e n t can also be found in Heidegger. 7 In the case of Husserl, the U M - a r g u m e n t is present only via negationis, that is to say, in his writings we can identify a position that is directly opposed to at least the first seven theses of the argument. Thus we can interpret Husserl's theory of meaning as a variant of what the Hintikkas call "language as calculus", a stand which they construct as negating the centra| points of "language as the universal medium". (Hintikka has suggested already some time ago that in Husserl we can find this calculus conception. 8)

2.

HUSSERL'S

REDUCTIONS

H e r e I can only discuss some central tenets of Husserl's theory of meaning and language. Let us start with the phenomonological method as he employs it in almost all of his works after 1905, the "phenomenological reductions". This method is meant to help clarify the so-called "natural attitude", i.e., the attitude through which we are related towards the world in prescientific and most of scientific experience. In this attitude we assume that there exists a world of physical, psychological and cultural states of affairs, i.e., a world that is for the most part independent from out consciousness. From a language-perspective, a perspective that makes an occasional appearance in Husserl, too, we can say that the natural attitude corresponds to ordinary language with all its ontological commitments. However, already in everyday life we sometimes leave this attitude behind, and psychology has made this step its special mark. T h a t is to say, sometimes we are not directed towards objects and events in the world but rather towards our own directedness, e.g., instead of (just) seeing a tree, we can reflect on our seeing (the tree). In Husserl's terminology this turn towards our doing is a "'reduction" of our

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attention towards the world, a reduction that limits our attention to out psychological consciousness, our "soul". Thus Husserl speaks of a psychological reduction" here. 9 In moving from the natural attitude to the psychological attitude we have reduced the ontological commitments of prescientific and non-psychological scientific language, i.e., we have re-interpreted ordinary language. We drop expressions that commit us to the existence of an "outer world", or we re-interpret these expressions in a way that gets rid of these commitments. However, Husserl goes on to claim that this psychologicalphenomenalistic language is still only partly capable of fulfilling its task, i.e., to clarify the natural attitude. 1 Husserl exp~ains that the psychological reduction is insufficient since it does not ~eally break with all of the ontological commitments of the natural attitude. Thus the psychological reductions can give us only a circular explanation of the natural attitude's commitments. In order to avoid this circularity, Husserl tells us that we have to employ a further reduction, a reduction that he calls "transcendental"; The transcendental reduction does not only bracket the physical world, but also the psychic 'world' in so rar as it is the sphere of a specific, publicly identifiable person. The "soul" must thus be analyzed with the help of a language that is free from any commitment to soul-like entities. Again language must thus be re-interpreted:
Breaking with the native by employing the transcendental-phenomenological turn leads to an important c h a n g e . . . All these new appereeptions.., lead to a new language (i.e., a new language despite the fact that I have to employ ordinary language, for the meanings of ordinary language had to ehange) . . . . 11

Already at this point it seems safe to claim that Husserl commits himself to the opposite of UM-6, namely, (C-6) The construction of metalanguages is possible. This is so since the transcendental-phenomenological language is intended by Husserl to serve as a metalanguage of the ordinary language. To a lesser degree the same goes for the psychologicalphenomenalistic language (Figure 1). Furthermore, Husserl's claim that we can re-interpret our language also points towards the calculus-conception. Yet even stronger evidence on this point is forthcoming once we take a further reduction into account, a reduction that Husserl calls "eidetic". Eidetic reduc-

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levels of the Ego Ego of the natural attitude
L

MARTIN

KUSCH

levels of language physicalistic, naturalistic (object-)language psychological-phenomenalisfic (meta-)language transcendental-phenomenalistic (meta-)language

Fig. 1.

psycliologicalEgo, "soul" transcendental Ego

tion does not reduce facts to phenomena, but rather facts (and phenomena) to essences, az The basis of this method is variation and imagination. In order to find the essence of some fact or phenomenon, Husserl asks us to imaginatively vary its attributes. Those attributes that we cannot imaginatively take away from the fact or phenomenon without its losing its character of being this fact or phenomenon belong to its essence. Husserl concedes that we cannot ever tun through all possible variations but deems it sufficient that the choice of variations is arbitrary. 13 Above we have presented Husserl's reduction in the same order that is usually given in textboo.ks. However, let it be noted in passing that Husserl orders the different reductions differently in different works and stages of his development. (In Die Idee der Phnomenologie TM Husserl does not yet speak of eidetic reductions but less specifically of "ideierender Abstraktion". In Die Krisis der europischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phnomenolgie, 15 he first reduces the scientific attitude to the natural one.) Figure 2 graphs the main models: 'N' stands for 'natural attitude', 'P' for 'psychological attitude', 'T' for 'transcendental attitude', 'S' for 'scientific attitude', 'E' for 'eidos on a given level', 'A' for 'abstraction', horizontal arrows for eidetic reductive steps, vertical arrows for non-eidetic reductive steps. 16 In our context it seems especially interesting to take notice of the case where eidetic reduction is used on the transcendental level. Here the subject matter of variation is not just any object, but the world as a phenomenon. This world is studied with the method of variation in

HUSSERL

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Krisis 2

Die Idee

Ideen I 1 Ideen I 21Ph.Psych Cart.Med, Erf.&Urt.

Krisis 1

Fig. 2.

order to find its invariant, necessary structures, i.e., structures that are to be found in every "possible world". It should be noted hefe that it is a peculiarity of Husserl's version of possible worlds that different possible worlds are constituted by different transcendental Egos that belong under a common essence or "Eidos". That is to say, to every possible world there corresponds one transcendental Ego whose acts of meaning-constitution build up the respective world. It is in this context, I think, that we can see clearly how deeply Husserl is committed to the calculus conception. T h e theses, (C-l) (C-2) (C-3) Semantical relations are accessible, We can say what would be to have different ones, Model theory is possible,

obviously result directly from Husserl's contention according to which the phenomenologist is able to study systematically how different transcendental consciousnesses build up different possible worlds via different meaning structures. The phenomenologist is not caught in a fac~ual system of language-world relations, by way of a transcendental reduction he can turn factuality into a mere phenomenon that by way of eideitic reduction turns into a reinterpretable calculus. From this position it also follows that Husserl can accept C-4: (C-4) Linguistic relativism is not a tenable doctrine.

Husserl makes this point especially in bis late work, Die Krisis der europischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phnomenologie: 17 linguistic and cultural differences can always be won over by

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MARTIN KUSCH

way of reductions. We 'only' need to go back to the level of transcendental Egos and ask how we wonld have to rearrange the meaning, structuring acts of 'our' transcendental Ego in order to build up the world or "life-world" in question. TM In the same way Husserl also disposes of the Ding-an-sich which at least in some sense - still flourished for example in Wittgenstein's semantical Kantianism". 19 However, in the case of Husserl we can write: (C-5) We can reach reality as such for we can always subtract the influence of language

Since there is a strict correspondence between possible worlds and possible transcendental consciousnesses, and since there is complete transparence on the level of the transcendental, a world or a cause that is in principle inaccessible to any consciousness makes no sense for Husserl. Whatever there is in some world or other, it is as such posited by some consciousness or other. This, together with the further premiss:
. w h a t e v e r is a c c e s s i b l e for my 'I' m u s t b e principally a c c e s s i b l e for any other I, too, if I a m to s p e a k a b o u t it at all . . . . 20

amounts to the accessibility of every possible world. Husserl also attacks Kant directly, calling the Ding-an-sich a "Widersinn", 21 and writing that
. . I r e a l l y ger to k n o w b e t t e r a n d b e t t e r real t h i n g s a n d a w h o l e w o r l d , a n d I l e a r n to e x c l u d e illusion a n d s e m b l e n c e as m e r e l y s u b j e c t i v e . . . . In so far as I c a n i n t e r v e n e into the c o u r s e of m y e x p e r i e n c e s . . . I c a n also d i r e c t it t o w a r d s l e a r n i n g m o r e a n d m o r e of the t h i n g s a n d the w o r l d . . . . 22

NOEMA

AND

SINN

Before identifying theses C-7 and C-8 in Husserl's thought I would like to draw attention to two points where the dichotomy 'language as the universal medium' and 'language as calculus' can throw some interesting new light on differences between Husserl and Frege. Dagfinn F~llesdal has put forward the much-discussed proposal according to which Frege's Sinne and Husserl's noemata show important similaritiesY On F~llesdal's interpretation, noemata are intentional correlates of intentional experiences (Erlebnisse), i.e., of aets. Noe-

HUSSERL act (noesis)

AND HEIDEGGER noema (Sinn)

ON MEANING /object/

105

entertains intends Fig. 3.

prescribes
J

mata are placed as ideal "mediators" between the real temporal content of consciousness (i.e., the noesis), and the reducible object; FOllesdal's students Smith and McIntyre sum up the idea in Figure 3. 24 As mentioned earlier, some scholars hold that Frege's whole philosophy of language and logic, and thus also his famous distinction between "Sinn" and "Bedeutung", 25 is essentially based on his conception of 'language as the universal medium'. 26 This presupposition forces hirn to exclude model theory and metalanguage, and motivates his attempts to get by with an extensional first-order language. The Sinn~Bedeutung distinction then comes into play where Frege's logical language runs into problems, e.g., in the case of propositional attitudes. Yet if the difference between Husserl's and Frege's conception of meaning is as radical as the difference between 'language as calculus' and 'language as the universal medium', then we might also expect that this difference shows up with respect to Noema and Sinn. Indeed, this expectation is not vain: whereas Husserl can systematically study and vary his Noemata, and can develop a method through which we can isolate those meanings in terms of which we relate to the actual or possible worlds, Frege taust exclude all this from the domain of sober research. As Leila Haaparanta has shown in her dissertation Frege's Doctrine of Being, 27 Frege on his own premisses cannot even allow for the naming of senses:
Frege's examples suggest that when we name a sense of an objeet, we do not name any new object whieh would be a complex of individual properties of that objeet, but we name the original object in a new way. Hence, it follows .... that we do not suceeed in naming a sense of an object . . . . z8 4. HUSSERL ON POSSIBLE WORLDS

A second point that deserves some stressing is that fact that as regards the analysis of modal notions Husserl turns out to be a more modern

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KUSCH

thinker than Frege. 29 Frege is bound here by his view of language as the universal medium since this Conception does not allow for alternative, possible worlds. As Haaparanta has shown, Frege is thus forced to exclude modal notions from the area of logic, to treat them occasionally as psychological concepts, and to give them in some contexts a temporal interpretation that leads to accepting the famous principle of plenitude according to which every true possibility has been or will be actualised sometimes. Whereas Frege, that stout admirer of Leibniz, was thus unable to make use of Leibniz's possible worlds, Husserl employs them systematically. For example, Husserl writes:
Of course Leibniz is right in saying that infinitely many monads and groups of monads are conceivable, but that not all of these possibilities are compossible, and that infinitely many worlds could have been created, but not several of them at the same time since they are incompossible2

As mentioned earlier the correspondence and correlativity of possible worlds and variations of the eidos 'transcendental consciousness' are the special mark of Husserl's modal thought. In accordance with this idea he demands compossibility for both worlds and consciousnesses. Since transcendental consciousnesses are always accessible to each other, Husserl does not accept any "alien" worlds in the sense David Lewis speaks of them; 31 in other words, there are no possible worlds that are not built up by a simple rearranging of the world-constituting meanings of some transcendental ego. 32

5. TRUTH

AS CORRESPONDENCE

There is also an interesting ditIerence between Frege and Husserl concerning the question of whether truth as correspondence makes sense. While Frege, in accordance with the universal medium conception, claims that truth as correspondence is unintelligible,33 Husserl takes the opposite stand: (C-7) Truth as correspondence is expressible.

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HEIDEGGER

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107

Husserl's theory of truth and evidence as it appears in the Logische Untersuchungen, 34 is especially difficult and highly complex and thus it cannot be dealt with here in detail. Its basic idea can be expressed by saying that truth is the complete filling of a meaning intention. Here meaning-filling is a perception, and meaning-intention is (in general) a linguistic-significative intention, the intending of some linguistic meaning. For example, if I think of (and intend) the name 'Mauno Koivisto', and if I have a complete and clear perception of Koivisto at the same time, then my thought is true. This truth is not experienced on the level of meaning-filling and meaning-intention, rather the identity of meaning-intention and meaning-filling is the object of a metalevel act of evidence. Perhaps the intriguing point of Husserl's theory of truth becomes clear once we remind ourselves of Frege's central counterargument against the correspondence theory:
It would only be possible to c o m p a r e an idea with a thing if the thing were an idea, too. A n d then, if the first did correspond perfectly with the second, they would coincide. But this is not at all what is wanted . . . . For it is absolutely essential that the reality be distinct from the idea. 3

Husserl's version of the correspondence theory seems to be able to avoid this Fregian dilemma. On the one hand, Husserl can conceive of both arguments of the adaequao-relation as non-real, since the thing enters into this relation only as a percept. On the other hand, the phenomenological jargon still allows Husserl to speak of a correspondence between thing and meaning, to speak of "adequatio rei et intellectus", 36 since Husserl stresses in many places that in complete perceptive filling the thing is "selbstgegeben". However, Husserl does not only speak of truth as correspondence simpliciter. Rather he draws a distinction between four conceptions of truth that are, nevertheless, all connected to the correspondence theory. The first meaning of truth is the identity of a factual meaningintention and a factual meaning-filling; the second meaning of truth is ideal identity, i.e., "the idea of absolute adaequatio a s s u c h " . 37 The third sense of truth is the meaning-intention that is completely filled: it is true or "richtig" since it corresponds to reality. Finally, the selfgiven thing is true, since it makes the meaning-intention true. 38

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MARTIN KUSCH truth2

meaning intention/ meaning truth3 identifying act/ factual identity

meaning-fulfilling act/ perception truth4

truthl Fig. 4.

6. H U S S E R L ' S L O G I C

Husserl's work on the philosophy of logic, with the exception of his criticism of psychologism, has not met with much interest. Only recently, since those researching Frege have become interested in Frege's contemporaries, have Husserl's ideas on logic been occasionally dealt with. As Jean van Heijenoort, Jaakko Hintikka and Leila Haaparanta have shown, 39 the special mark of Frege's logic is that it is intended to be a calculus ratiocinator and a lingua characterica at the same time. van Heijenoort has demonstrated in his seminal paper 'Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language' (1967) that it is the lingua conception that forces Frege not to allow for changes in the universe of discourse, to ignore metasystematical questions concerning consistency and completeness, and to bring his semantical ideas across by hints and unsystematic suggestions.4 Again, Husserl's abiding to the calculus conception can be used to

HUSSERL

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explain why he is able to take a different stand on all of these points. To see that Husserl indeed proceeds differently, a brief mention of his three large and yet incomplete projects on logic has to suffice here: (1) The first project is concerned with a systematic construction of logic in three steps. The first level is a "pure theory of forms of meanings (or a pure logical grammar) ''41 that is supposed to give us a systematization of all judgements in their logical form. In Logical Investigations Husserl holds that this grammar gives us the ideal "fra me " (Gerust) of . all languages; thls .agaln . . . . shb~ws .that hngmstlc relativism has no justification on phenomenologic~l grounds. The second level is a "logic of consequence", a logic tha~ is c0nceived of as working only with concepts of consequence and inconsequence, "without asking the least about truth and falsity....42 Only after we have interpreted our judgments over the real or some possible world do we pass on to a third level, the "logic of truth". Husserl tries to show that the whole area of Logistik can be reformulated without, the concept of truth. The most central point for us is that Husserl wants to construct a level of logic that is not concerned with interpretations over a domain. Where Frege's logic is inseparable from the one real world and the reference of judgments to the True and the False is the starting point, Husserl chooses an opposite point of departure: logic can abstract from reference and can confine itself to senses:
A pure systematic theory of the region of s e n s e s . . , all questions concerning truth are excluded, for by using the predicate "true" (and all its deviates) we go beyond the pure a priori of the sphere of senses . . . . 3

(2) In Logische Untersuchungen Husserl already formulates the task of a universal t h e o r y " a priori of the essential types (forms) of theories and the laws of relation that pertain to them". 44 We cannot go into the details of this undertaking here. Nevertheless, two details are worth stressing: on the one hand, Husserl strives for a highest theory, a set of axioms that can be re-interpreted like a calculus in order to arrive at different theories. 45 On the other hand, Husserl demands that this highest theory should be complete and consistent, thus making metasystematical demands that Frege cannot pose for his system.46 (3) The third Husserlian project, the project of a geneology of logic, i.e., the project of a transcendental-phenomenological grounding of logic, is also in opposition to Fregian principles. The justification

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KUSCH

Iogic/language as calculus, semantical relatioos are ] accessible, we are not trapped in our Iogic/language |

,We can take

axioms of logic are re-interpretable like a calculus

truth as corresnondence is exeidetic reduction as systematic variation of meaningrelations

model theory,

Iogic can be justified by pre-logical, prepredicatiw ordered evidences :

metasystematical questions in Iogic concerning consistency and completeness can be raised F i g . 5.

HUSSERL AND HE|DEGGER

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of logic from an area outside of logic itself, e.g., in phenomena of pre-linguistic experience, is something only a calculus conception of logic can strive for. 7.
HUSSERL'S CALCULUS CONCEPTION: A SUMMARY

Despite these differences in the Fregean and Husserlian conceptions of logic, the fact that both the calculus conception and the language as the universal medium conception can end up in formalism, deserves attention. This twist has led Jaakko Hintikka to speak of a "paradox of formalization": 47 language as the universal medium leads into formalism since after the exclusion of semantics we are left only with syntax; also language as calculus leads to formalism since one is likely to mark those elements of language that can be re-interpreted. These remarks on Husserl's calculus conception have to sultice here. Figure 5 sums up some of the connections of the Husserlian tenets mentioned above.
8. HEIDEGGER'S E A R L Y C R I T I C I S M OF H U S S E R L

In the case of Heidegger I again discuss only those tenets that are of importance for his theory of meaning. Mst of all I want to show that Heidegger's late philosophy, generally regarded as especially diflicult if not obscure, can be partially explaineO by using the conception of language as the universal medium. Unfortunately I must confine myself to only a few indications as to where the interesting questions lie in Heidegger's early critique of Husserl as weil as in Sein und Zeit. The way Heidegger's own philosophica! position emerges from his criticism of Husserl's phenomenology can most clearly be seen from a recently published lecture held by Heidegger in 1925, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. 48 It seems to me that this criticism can be related to the medium/calculus distinction. Heidegger claims that Husserl's project of phenomenology as a strict science is a circular enterprise, i.e., phenomenology as a strict science is possible only in so far as one couches the subject matter of its research in concepts that already presuppose eentral phenomenological tenets. In Heidegger's words:
Husserl's primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: how can consciousness

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become the possible ob]ect of an absolute sc&nce? T h e primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science.., consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science . . . . 49

Husserl's methodological ideal calls for an objective science, a science that can clearly distinguish between subject and object. In accordance with this demand Husserl p o s t u l a t e s - not reveals - the subject/object distinction: the natural attitude (as the subject) posits a world (as the object) and the transcendental consciousness (as the subject) disentangles itself from the natural attitude and turns the latter - together with the posited world - into a pure phenomenon (i.e., an object). Furthermore, the natural attitude can be bracketed since it is thought of as positing itself as a part of the real world; once it is thus conceived the transcendental consciousness can turn it into an object. The key to the whole phenomenological enterprise is thus a certain interpretation of the natural attitude, an interpretation that remains implicit. It is only because the relation between the natural attitude and the world is conceptualized as 'positing a world as real' that Husserl's project succeeds. However, Heidegger claims that this characterization of the natural attitude is unjustifiable: neither does the natural attitude posit a world of physical and psychological entities, nor does it posit itself as a part of this world:
Is this attitude a natural attimde or is it not? It is an experience which is totally unnatural. For it includes a well-defined~ theoretical position in which every entity is taken a priori as a lawfully regulated flow of ocCurrences in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world . . . . Man's natural manner of experience, by contrast, cannot be called an attude.

To make use of the interpretational framework of this study, we can perhaps reconstruct Heidegger's point in the following way: an absolute science as envisaged by Husserl demands that we can take a stand outside of those meaning-relations that we usually live in. An absolute science does not allow for circularity that results from situations where we have to make use of those very networks of meaning which we are trying to describe and explain. In other words, Husserlian phenomenology must accept the calculus-conception of meaning in order to arrive at its goal. Yet the price of the implicit acceptance of the calculus-conception is severe: it amounts to a distortion of the natural attitude and of the Being of humans. Further, the natural attitude must be conceptualized as positing the world as an objeet -

HUSSERL

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i.e., as a calculus - and the relation of human beings toward themselves must be one of primarily positing oneself as a physical entity, alongside bricks and stones. The distortion caused by the calculus-conception reaches its peak once transcendental reduction is implemented alongside eidetic reduction. The latter reduction, in aiming for the essence of objects, events, and worlds, rules out the Being and existence of objects and events, i.e., it rules out the actual world:
Likewise, in the consideration and elaboration of pure consciousncss, merely the what-content is brought to the fore, without any inquiry into the being of the acts in the sense of their existence. Not only is this question not raised in the reductions, the transcendental as weU as the eideitic; it gets lost precisely through them. 51

Heidegger's point here seems to be that an ontological clarification of the Being of the natural attitude cannot be based on a systematic variation and a comparison between different (possible) worlds, since the nature of original experience of a human being is the experience of being bound to just one world:
But if there were an entity whose what is precisely to be and nothing hut to be, then this ideative regard of such an entity would be the most fundamental of misunderstandings. 52

To clarify the Being of the natural attitude and to clarify the way it understands Being, the phenomenologist must analyze Being as "inder-Welt-sein", where 'Welt' appears in the singular and is preceeded by the definite article. Once we give up the calculus conception, we g i v e up the thesis of a manifold of possible worlds, and restrict ourselves to one world, to the actual world.
9. S O M E R E M A R K S
ON SEIN UND ZEIT

Due to limitations of space, I cannot deal with Sein und Zeit here in detail, but a closer inspection o f this modern classic would detect elements that stem from the conception of language as the universal medium as well as other tenets that rather fit the conception of language as calculus. Especially noteworthy in Sein und Zeit is the fact that Heidegger is much less disturbed by a circular investigation into meaning relations than Frege or Wittgenstein. Once logical minds are confronted with the circularity involved in studying semantics of a language regarded

114

MARTIN KUSCH TheBeing-in-the-wrld of ~the attitude natural is beconceived as of ", withina universalbeing medium ofmeaning onlyof (not
to

1 I [ ] ]

..... IsLog,sche !It Untersuchungen rather thanhisIdeen can serveasa starting point

redutions

untology

| reclenned ! as

\ "~ \~

I:'~'"ngiee t

~ m I"e~en,og,asI

~ thehermeneutica! | circlerehabilii disclos actualizesaS d,possibiltyones0metimesthat imetalanguage B ...... B Djs conceivable a~uu njversall mediu~ thecircularity involved the in ,investigation of isnotvicious '] I

[ ~ ....~ets

partswithin theuniversal medium be eau analyzed as ealculi Fig. 6.

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as a universal medium, they are quickly ready to put a ban on any such attempt. This is so because for them a circle is almost inevitably a vicious circle. But this was not so for Heidegger, a philosopher fmiliar with the hermeneutical tradition, an admirer of Dilthey and a former student of theology:
But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, eren if we just 'sense' it as an ineoitable imper[ection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood [rom the ground up . . . . What is decisive is not to ger out of the circle but to corne
into it in the right way . . . . The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning . . . . 53

These central ideas of Sein und Zeit nonwithstanding, there still remain important tenets of the book that can be adequately understood only when read against the background of the universal medium view. I want to mention at least three of them here: (1) Heidegger sharply criticizes the correspondence theory of truth 54 (in a way that is sometimes reminiscent of Frege's critique). Heidegger replaces truth as correspondence by truth as "disclosedness". In our terminology, the meanings that open up a world (as a universal medium) for us are the primordial phenomena of truth. (2) The distinction between Being as Vorhandenheit and Being as Zuhandenheit can also be reformulated with the calculus/medium distinction. Heidegger's claim that Zuhandenheit is primary compared with Vorhandenheit can then be interpreted as saying that the meaning totality allows the controlled and manipulative usage of different parts of it. (3) So far Heidegger's modal notions in Sein und Zeit and in his latter works have not been studied. 55 According to Sein und Zeit possibility is not a logical concept but rather a concept that characterizes the human being itself. The possibility Heidegger is mostly concerned with, the possibility of death, most certainly falls within the range of the principle of plenitude. Even though we cannot further discuss here interesting points in Sein und Zeit, I would like to present its central claims concerning meaning in Figure 6.
10. HEIDEGGER ON ART

Heidegger's later philosophy seems to be an area where the notion of language as the universal medium can be fruitfully applied. I shall try

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to show in the following section that this holds not only for Heidegger's philosophy of language but also for his philosophy of art. The central tenets of 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks' can be summarized in seven theses. I shall explain each in turn: (A-I) We cannot analyze a work of art with the categories of "thing" or "equipment" (Zeug), since both categories only appear in the work of art. 56

Heidegger arrives at this claim by criticizing the traditional concept of "thing" and by studying the attributes of "equipment" via a painfing by van Gogh that depicts a pair of peasant-shoes. "Thing" can be defined neither as a carrier of attributes, nor as a bundle of sense data, nor as formed marter: the first definition makes the thing itself ineffable, the second cannot account for the specific independence of a thing, and the third commits a category mistake, i.e., it analyzes a thing with concepts whose original place is a different region of being, namely the region of equipment. But equipment is not a category that can help us to conceptualize the essence of art. Heidegger makes this point in a surprising way - he analyzes equipment by starting from a concrete example, a pair of peasant-shoes, and this pair is not just any pair but one that is depicted in a painting by van Gogh. Now, since the attributes of equipment "have to be" read from the painting, Heidegger concludes that it would be circular if we were to try to analyze art through the category of equipment. At first sight it might seem that we have only negative results so far. But Heidegger teils us that this impression is wrong: the fact that we could read the attributes of equipment from the painting can teach us something important about art itself: (A-2) The work of art shows us what a being truly is. 7

The second paragraph of Heidegger's study58 is devoted to the further explication of this claim. A first step is the introduction of the concepts "happening", "strife", "earth", and "world": 59 (A-3) The work of art is a happening, a strife between world and earth.

Again Heidegger uses a concrete example, this time a Greek temple. The temple's nature of a happening is described as the 'opening of a world' on the one hand, and as the 'leaving of the earth in its rights' on

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the other. It is worth stressing that world is here not to be conceived of as an object, but rather as the horizon of meaning that cannot be transcended. Ear4h is a metaphor for homeland as well as for the material, the strange, the dangerous, and the closed. 'World' and 'earth' both name essential albeit opposite aspects in a work of art; art happens" only in their strife. Heidegger argues that this happening is an instantiation of the happening of truth in general: (A-4) Art is a happening of truth, truth is a strife between lighting and concealment. 6

According to Heidegger, truth is thus a happening, too: it is a strife, and the strife within the work of art is but an exemplification of truth. As in Sein und Zeit Heidegger again criticizes the correspondenee theory of truth; for him truth is neither the adequatio of an assertion to a state of affairs, not is it the accessibility of the state of affairs itself, but rather the original openness that makes it possible for the humar~ being to distinguish facts, objects, himself, and language from each other. Since that openness is not under our control, truth as well as falsehood figure as independent events in Heidegger's language: truth is the strife between lighting (openness) and concealment (falsehood). The third and last paragraph 61 turns to the production of art, and to the relations between art, history, and language. The first claim concerns the production of art: (A-5) The production of works of art corresponds structurally to their preservation, both are rather a receiving than an active doing. 62

This thesis is a natural corollary of the conception of art as a happening of truth and of an independent subject. The same thought also motivates the following thesis which stresses the national, historical and even deterministic nature of art: (A-6) Art is bound to nations and determines their essence and history. 63

Art for Heidegger is not a means by which human beings work toward consciousness of their history, but rather something that determines this history and calls us into a historical task. As we shall see below, in this respect art resembles language.

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However, there is also an even closer link between art and language: 64 (A-7) Poetry is the essence of art.

With this statement Heidegger does not deny that painting or music are art, yet he claims that they only develop an area of truth that has originally been opened by language, i.e., poetry. 1 1. HEIDEGGER ON LANGUAGE The key to a proper appreciation of Heidegger's philosophy of art is to see that for each of the seven theses on art we can formulate a Heideggerian thesis on language: (L-l) We cannot analyze language with the help of any other category, since all categories only appear in language.

Evidence for Heidegger's acceptance of L-1 is easy to find. For example, in the lecture "Die Sprache ''65 Heidegger claims that the analysis of the essence of language has to happen along the lines of tautologies such as "Die Sprache ist: Sprache" or "Die Sprache spricht": 66 any other starting point would either be circular or destroy the essence of language. It is interesting to note that this turning towards tautologies in Order to avoid false reductions is a very popular move with Heidegger: just think of the famous "the world worlds", 67 or "time times" (die Zeit zeitig,t), "space spaces" (der Raum rumt) and "thing things" (das Ding, dingt). 68 Below we shall see that this method is interestingly linked to the universal medium conception. L-1 is also apparent in Heidegger's repeated claim that there is no speaking about language and that only the word leads us to the thing. Language is a totality that we cannot speak about, we can only speak out of it. 69 Since everything appears within language, language as a whole cannot thus appear: "Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object. And then its essence vanishes". 7 According to Heidegger the main shortcoming of analytical philosophy is that it strives to speak about language. 71 Heidegger's interpretation of Stefan George's lines is also noteworthy:
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht: Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht. (So I r e n o u n e e d and sadly see: W h e r e word breaks oft no thing m a y be.) 72

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Heidegger derives two central tenets of his thought about language from these lines. The one that is of immediate importance concerning L-1 is that the being of the thing is dependent on the word: "Only where the word for the thing has been found is the thing a thing. Only thus is it. Accordingly we must stress as follows: no thing is where the word, that is, the name, is lacking. The word alone gives being to the thing". 73 It is crucial from the point of view of our investigation that Heidegger, in all contexts where he interprets these lines, goes further and adds another interpretation to the one given. This further interpretation claims that the subject matter of the poet's renunciation is the (semantical) relation between word and thing:
The poet's renunciation does not touch the word, but rather the relation of word to thing, more precisely, the mysteriousness of that relation . . . . 74

The counterparts of A-2, A-3 and A-4 in the realm of the philosophy of language, namely (L-2) (L-3) (L-4) Language discloses to us what a being truly is, Language is a happening, strife, Language as happening of truth i~ a strife between lighting and concealment,

can also be easily detected in Heidegger's oeuvre. Thus already in "der Ursprung des Kunstwerks" Heidegger stresses that it is language that brings the thing into the lighting.7JAnd in the lecture "Die Sprache" we are told that we encounter the world as a horizon of meaning and the thing as appearing in this horizon only through our language. The relation between world and thing Heidegger couches in almost Hegelian terms as an identity of identity and difference adding that it is again language that is the condition of the possibility of this dialectic. 76 The happening character of language also comes out neatly in the foUowing passage:
To say, related to the Old Norese, "saga", means to show: to make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call World, lighting and concealing it. This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential being of Saying. 77

The language-counterpart of A-5 (L-5) The speaking of a language is more a receiving than an active doing.

appears especially impressive in the following, almost poetic, lines:

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"Der Mensch spricht nur, indem er der Sprache entspricht. Die Sprache spricht. Ihr Sprechen spricht fr uns im Gesprochenen". (The human
being only speaks by conforming to language. Language speaks. Its speaking speaks for us in what is spoken.) 78 With less alliteration Heidegger makes the same point by stressing that speaking a language is first and foremost a hearing of that language: "Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which we speak . . . . What do we hear there? We hear language speaking". 79 Thus in the case of language, too, Heidegger makes clear that we are dealing more with something of an independent entity or agent than with a means that is in our hands. As we saw above, this view leads Heidegger in the case of art to stress art's historical and national role. Support for the corresponding point concerning language (L-6) Language is relative with respect to different communities and deter.mines their essence and history,

- finds an early expression in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks" where Heidegger stresses that language opens up the world for a people, and that in the speaking of a language "the concepts of a historical people's essence, i.e., their belonging to world history, are performed for that people". 8 The cultural and linguistic relativism that raises its head in these lines comes out more clearly in the following passage from the already mentioned discussion on language:
Some time ago I called language, clumsily enough, the house of Being. If man by virtue of his language dwells within the claim and call of Being, then we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than the man of the Far East. 81

The connection between art and language is created in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks" by thesis A-7, according to which the essence of art is poetry. The corresponding thesis(L-7) Poetry is the essence of language,

expresses the very core of Heidegger's thinking about language. It is the speclal mark of Heidegger's later thought that he sees a fundamental difference between ordinary and scientific language on the one hand, and poetic language on the other. It is only in poetry that we are really listening to language, thus it is only in poetry that language can reveal truth to us. Once we start looking at language as a mere carrier of information - as is for Heidegger the inevitable

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outcome of the development of western technology - we distort its essence and make ourselves blind to its truth. However, since Heidegger sees language as the true agent in history, he has to go still further: because the disclosure of truth is the work of language, and because we are thus inevitably limited and bound by language, our present way of looking at language is at least as much the doing of language itself as it is of our own doing. 82
12.
LANGUAGE AND ART AS UNIVERSAL MEDIA

Most of Heidegger's ideas on language and art will appear strange - to say the least - to anyone within the analytical tradition. Still it is possible to detect something of a rational, understandable, core in Heidegger's claims by relating them to the conception of language as the universal medium the Hintikkas suggest and use in their interpretation of Wittgenstein. It should not be difficult at this stage to see that with the exception of (8) we can find all the central ingredients of the universal medium conception in Heidegger's philosophy of language. The thesis of the inexpressibility of semantics is not formulated by Heidegger in a straightforward fashion. However, his interpretation of the lines by George that declare the relation between word and thing to be unexplainable and mysterious comes very close to a formu!ation of this thesis; Wittgenstein and Gadamer, two other proponents of language as the universal medium, even use the same word "mysterious" to characterize the relation between language and world. 83 Furthermore, it is important to stress here that a supporter of the universal medium conception cannot really put it bluntly that he subscribes to this view, for any such attempt would be self-refuting. Thus Frege has to let it be known through hints what his semantical ideas are; and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus has to call on his reader to throw away that ladder of arguments that convinced hirn of the inexpressibility of logical form. Heidegger, as a thinker not bound by demands for a scientific language, can help himself otherwise: semantical ideas can be put forward via metaphors or interpretations of poems. As concerns the theses (UM-2) and (UM-3) we do not find explicit formulations of them in Heidegger's text. Again, however, this does not refute our general claim that the position of Unterwegs zur Sprache

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can indeed be characterized as the universal medium view. The complete absence of even a brief consideration of the potential value of model theory, or of alternative possible worlds, as a means to study modal concepts, for example, is as good a proof of Heidegger's stand as if he had put it to us in so many words. On the other hand, evidence for linguistic relativism (4) in Heidegger turns up in many places explicitly, as we have seen. The same can obviously also be said for the unacceptability of metalanguages (6) and the correspondence theory of truth (7). A positive formulation of (6), say, 'only language gives us reality', formulates Heidegger's own concept of truth as happening. Finally, Heidegger's repeated tautologies, according to which language speaks (die Sprache spricht), world worlds, time times, space spaces, and thing things, can also be given a rational explanation against the background of language as the universal medium. For as Eugene Kaelin has pointed out, 84 tautologies of this kind are as clear an indication of the universal medium conception as we can ever hope to find: time, world, space and language, at least, are universal media that we cannot escape from. They are the conditions of the possibility that there is something (for us) at all. Thus they lie behind everything of whose Being we can meaningfully speak at all, and they cannot be reduced to any other categories. It is only against this background of Heidegger's philosophy of language and its interpretation via the universal medium conception that one can get a proper grasp of Heidegger's philosophy of art. Since Heidegger constructs art analogously to language, and since his view on language becomes intelligible once read through our interpretation, our interpretation should also be able to throw some light on art, too. Perhaps the obvious way to start is to ask what a conception of art would look like if it were constructed isomorphically with language as the universal medium. The following formulation seems natural:

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Ways of representation cannot be expressed. We cannot speak of different ways of representation. A systematical variation of modes of representation is impossible. Art is bound to communities, nations. We cannot grasp reality without art./Language is the condition of the possibility of art.

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(6) (7)

Art cannot be self-reftective./Metalanguage with respect to art is impossible. T h e truth of art cannot be in its adaequatio to reality.

It is hardly necessary to run through these claims one by one to show that Heidegger's A-1 to A-7 can indeed be related to this model, since A-1 to A-7 correspond to L-1 to L-7. However, we should pay particular attention to the fact that the conception of 'art as the universal medium' cannot speak about different ways of representating reality, i.e., it cannot speak about what Nelson G o o d m a n calls the "languages of art". 8s In the case of Heidegger it is just as predicted hefe: a discussion of the different sign-systems of art is not only missing from " D e r Ursprung des Kunstwerks" but - as far as I can see - it is also missing from all of his studies of art and poetry. Thus even though art is regarded as a language by Heidegger, art is language only in the singular. For hirn there is just orte mode of representation that might of course change historically, but that cannot be studied or consciously invented. T h e fact that Heidegger's most central example in " D e r Ursprung des Kunstwerks" is a Greek temple, i.e., a case of classical art for which alternative modes of representation did not pose a problem, fits neatly into our interpretation. This observation concerning Heidegger's philosophy of art can also serve as a link to come back to Husserl. In his paper 'Concept as Vision: On the Problems of Representation in Modern Art and in Modern Philosophy', 86 Jaakko Hintikka points out fascinating features that are shared by the cubist revolution, Husserl's phenomenology, and possible worlds semantics: neither of these three views accepts a preferred method to represent reality. According to cubist premises, the artist is free to choose his own system of signs; according to Husserl, the transcendental consciousness is free to constitute its own world; and possible worlds semantics is built on model theory, i.e., the systematic variation of meaning-relations. In other words, all three views accept the calculus-conception of meaning. T h e case studied by Hintikka is interesting since it draws attention to the fact that very different movements such as phenomenology and cubism can share c o m m o n presuppositions. Orte can say, slightly exaggerating, that cubism represents the program of a 'phenomenological' esthetics missing in Husserl's o e u v r e . In the case of Heidegger - and incidentally also in the case of Gadamer - we are dealing with a philosophy that relates philosophy of language and

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philosophy of art to each other via the idea that art as a language taust be a universal medium. The common presupposition in Husserl and cubism on the one hand, and the difference with respect to the calculus]universal medium dichotomy between Husserl and Heidegger on the other hand thus allows us finally to put forward the following claim: Heidegger's lack of interest in modern pictorial art is hut an indirect result of his criticisrn of Husserl.
NOTES t Merrill B. and Jaakko Hintikka: 1986, Investigating Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Professor Hintikka suggested the research reported here and he also made numerous suggestions eoncerning details. 2 Ibid., p. 1. 3 Ibid. 4 See e.g., Hintikka: 1981, 'Semantics. A Revolt Against Frege', in Guttorm Fl~istad (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 1, Philosophy of Language, Nijhoff, The Hague, pp. 57-82. 5 See Hintikka: 1967, 'Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language', Synthese 17, 324-30. 6 L. Haaparanta: 1985, 'Frege's Doctrine of Being', Acta Philosophica Fennica 39, Helsinki. 7 I have argued in another place that it is central in Gadamer too. See M. Kuseh: 1987, ' . . . Language is the Universal Medium', - Gadarner's Philosophy of Language, Oulun yliopiston historian laitoksen julkaisuja, No. 1. s j. Hintikk: 1975, 'Concept as Vision: On the Problem of Representation in Modern Art and in Modern Philosophy', in The Intentions of Intentionality and other New Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, p. 223. 9 It should be noted here that Husserl is not consistent in his terminology. I hefe follow the usage of Cartesianische Meditationen, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrge, Husserliana Band I, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von S. Strasser, Nijhoff, den Haag 1950.

1o Die Krisis der europischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phnomenologie,

Husserliana Band VI, herausgegeben von Walter Biemel, Nijhoff, den Haag 1962, p. 213. Jl Krisis, p. 214. 12 See Elisabeth Strker: 1983, 'Phnomenologie und Psychologie. Die Frage ihrer Beziehung bei Husserl', Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 37, 3-19 (esp. p. 10). 13 1973, Experience and Judgment. Investigations in a Geneology of Logic, revised and edited by Ludwig Landgrebe, translated by James S. Churehill and Karl Ameriks, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, p. 341. 14 1958, Die Idee der Phnomenologie. Fnf Vorlesangen, Husserliana Band II, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Walter Biemel, Nijhoff, den Haag. 15 See note 10 above.

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16 "Die Idee" cf. note 14. "Ideen I " = Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfhrung in die reine Phnomenologie, Neue~ auf Grund der handschriftlichen Zustze des Verfassers erweiterte Auflage, Husserliana Band III, herausgegeben von Walter Biemel, Nijhott, Den Haag 1950. "Ph.Psych.'=Phnomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana Band IX, herausgegeben von Walter Biemel, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1962. "Cart. Med." cf. Note 9 above. "Erf. & Urt." cf. Note 13 above. "Krisis" cf. Note 10 above. 17 See Note 10 above. la Krisis, p. 156. ~9 See Hintikka's paper 'Wittgenstein's Semantical Kantianism', in Elisabeth Leinfeltner et al. (eds.), Ethics, Foundations, Problems, and Applications, Proceedings of the 5th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Hlder Pichler Tempsky, Vienna, pp. 375-90. 2(1 Ideen I, p. 113. 2~ 1956, Erste Philosophie. Kritische Ideengeschichte, Husserliana Band VII, herausgegeben von Rudopf Boehm, NijholI, Den Haag, p. 223. 22 Ibid., p. 361. 23 Dagfinn F~llesdal: 1958, Husserl and Frege, Asehehoug, Oslo. 24 David Smith and Ronald Mclntyre: 1982, Husserl and Intentionality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, p. 143. 2 1962, 'ber Sinn und Bedeutung', in Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung, herausgegeben von G. Patzig, Vandenhoeck, Gttingen, pp. 40-65. 26 See the studies by Haaparanta, Hintikka and van Heijenoort cited above. 27 See Note 6 above. 2s Ibid., p. 66. 29 Leila Haaparanta also stresses this point in her forthcoming, 'How is Logic as Science Possible? An Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology'. On Frege's modal notations see L. Haaparanta: 1988, 'Frege and his German Contemporaries on Alethic Modalities', in Simo Knuuttila (ed.), Modern Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 239-274. 30 Cartesianische Meditationen, p. 167. 3~ David Lewis: 1986, On the Plurality o[ Worlds, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 91. 32 Like Lewis Husserl denies crossworld identity, however. See Experience and Judgment, p. 356. 33 1967, 'The Thought: A Logical Inquiry', in P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. !7-38. 34 1913, Logische Untersuchungen, Zweite, umgearbeitete Auflage, Max Niemeyer, Halle a.d.S. 35 Frege, 'The T h o u g h t . . . ' , p. 19. 36 Logische Untersuchungen, II, 2, p. 118. 37 Ibid., p. 123, emphasis added. 38 Ibid. 39 See their papers cited above. 40 'Logic as Calculus...', p. 327. 41 1974, Formale und transzendentale Logik, Husserliana Band XVII, herausgegeben von Paul Janssen, Nijhott, Den Haag, p. 55. 42 Ibid., p. 59. 43 Ibid., p. 143. 44 Logische Untersuchungen, I, p. 247.

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45 Formale und transzendentale Logik, p. 102. 46 'Logic as Calculus...', p. 326. 47 Investigating Wittgenstein, p. 9. 48 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (=PGZ) (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925), herausgegeben von Petra Jaeger, Gesamtausgabe Band 20, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1979; English translation by Theodore Kisiel: 1985, History of the Concept of Time (=HCT), Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 49 PGZ; p. 147; HCT, p. 107. 5o PGZ, p. 155-; HCT, p. 113. 51 PGZ, p. 151-; HCT, p. I10. 52 PGZ, p. 152; HCT, p. 110. s3 Sein und Zeit (=SZ), 15. Auflage, Niemeyer, Tbingen 1979; Being and Time (=BT), Harper & Row, New York and Evanston 1962; hefe SZ, p. 153; BT, p. 194-95. 54 SZ/BT, Section 44. 5.~ SZ/BT, Section 32. 56 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks' (=UK), in Holzwege, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 4. Auflage 1963, p. 7. English (partial) translation by David Farrell Krell, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (=OA), in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978, pp. 143-88; here UK, p. 11-; OA, p. 149-. _~7 UK, p. 25; OA, p. 158. 58 Ibid., p. 29-. .~9 Ibid., p. 30-. 6o UK, p. 41-; OA, p. 173-. 6i Ibid., p. 46-. ~2 UK, p. 47--; OA, p. 178~3 UK, p. 62-; OA, p. 186. 64 U K , p. 64--; OA, p. 187. 65 In Unterwegs zur Sprache (=US), siebte Auflage, Neske, Pfullingen 1982, English translation by Peter Hertz: On the Way to Language (=OL), Harper & Row, New York and Evanston 1971; US, pp. 934; not in the English edition. 66 US, p. 13. 67 UK, p. 30; Qm, p. 170. 68 US, p. 19; US, p. 213; OL, p. 106. 69 US, p. 191; OL, p. 85. 70 'Aus einem Gesprch von der Sprache', in US, pp. 83-156; 'A Dialogue on Language', in OL, pp. 1-56; here US, p. 149; OL, p. 50. 71 US, p. 160; OL, p. 58. 72 US, p. From George's poem 'Das Wort' (1919). 73 US, p. 164; OL, p. 62. 74 US, p. 183; OL, p. 78/79. 75 UK,p. 41; OA, p. 175. 76 US, p. 28-. Not in OL. 77 US, p. 200; OL, p. 93. 78 US, p. 33. Not in OL. 79 U S , p. 254; OL, p. 123-24. 8o UK, p. 61; OA, p. 185.

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8~ US, p. 90; OL, p. 5. 82 'Brief ber den Humanismus', in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, 1 Abt. Band 9, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1976, pp. 313-364. English translation: 'Letter on Humanism', in Basic Writings, pp. 189-242, here p. 317; p. 197. 83 See my 'Language in the Universal Medium', Note 68, p. 84. 84 ~rl his forthcoming book on Heidegger. 8~ Nelson Goodman: 1968, 'An Approach to a Theory of Symbols', Languages of Art, Bobbs-Merrill, New York. 86 See Note 8 above. Koivumentie, 18 C 79 SF-01230 Vantaa Finland