PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Concepcion v. CA SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy Facts On 29 December 1989, Ma. Theresa and Gerardo got married. On 8 December 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Their relationship turned sour which caused Gerardo to file a petition for annulment on the ground of bigamy. He contended that prior to their marriage, Ma. Theresa had an annulled marriage with Mario Gopiao (married December 10, 1980) and petitioner also found that Mario was still alive. Maria did not deny this prior marriage but claimed that she never lived with Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting marriage with Gerardo is a bigamous one. The custody of the child was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted with visitation rights. Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which granted to the petitioner visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Hose Gerardos surname should be changed form Conception to Almonte following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname. However, the law applied the best interest of the child principle hence dismissing her motion. Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of appeals assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo and Jose Gerardos surname must be Almonte but it was also denied. The Court of Appeals further held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers surname motu propio and that she should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under the Rules of Court to effect corrections. However, after further investigation, the Court of Appeals found out that appellant was married to Mario Gopiao and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee Gerardo since their marriage was void ab initio for being bigamous. Therefore, the child, under the law, is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void marriage. Moreover, Gerardo can claim neither custody nor visitation rights over the child and he cannot impose his surname upon the child. Hence this appeal.

Issue Whether or not Gerardo was entitled of the visitation rights over Jose Gerardo and whether or not his name shall be carried by the child. Held The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised. Under Article 64 of the Family Code of the Philippines, a child who was conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. Under Article 167 of same Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulterous. Hence, Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario. Since the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo was void form the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. Thus, there is no legal reason for Gerardo to claim visitation rights over the child because it was ruled that the child is a legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and her legal husband Mario. Wherefore, petition denied and the Court of Appeals decision and resolution was affirmed. Angeles v. Maglaya SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy Facts On March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. Francisco died intestate on January 21, 1998 Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties ad that there is a need to appoint an administrator of Franciscos estate. She alleged that she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator. Petitioner opposed the petition and claimed to be made as the administratrix of Franciscos estate. Petitioner alleged

having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 and Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondents claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate. On 12 July 1999, the trial court found that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco hence dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco. Issue Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercad. Held A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion as well as the appellate courts conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already spouses. Now, then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genovevas death, would

necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a surviving spouse of the decedent. WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED. Jao vs. Court of Appeals SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy Facts On October 18, 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian-adlitem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held January 21, 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado. Issue Whether or not blood grouping test are conclusive as to non-paternity. Held A universal scientific agreement that blood grouping are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternitythat is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Babiera vs. Catotal SUBJECT MATTER: Action to impugn legitimacy

Facts: Presentacion B. Catotal (private respondent) filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera. From that petition, private respondent asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Carinosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a bay girl was delivered by hilot in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouse, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of the said spouses, caused the registration/ recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made the latter to appear as the mother by forging her signature; that petitioner, then 15 years old saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto gave birth to Teofista Guinto. Issue:

notarized document. They filed for partition with Inventory and Accounting after Juan Dizon died intestate. Issue Whether petitioners are illegitimate offspring of the decedent Held The issue at hand cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Carolina and Danilo de Jesus in a lawful wedlock. Declaration of legitimacy cannot be collaterally attacked. Moreover, there is a presumption that children born on wedlock are legitimate. However, this becomes conclusive when evidence shows proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the 1st 120 days of the 300 days, which immediately precedes the birth of the child. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN the acknowledged

Whether or not Article 170 of the Family Code is applicable. CABATANIA v. REGODOS Held: Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close readings of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the another. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not gave birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latters child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon vs. Court of Appeals SUBJECT MATTER: Who may file, within what period Facts Petitioners were born as a result of the marriage between Carolina de Jesus and Danilo de Jesus. The latter acknowledged petitioners as his illegitimate children in a SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary Recognition of Illegitimate Children, How Made Facts: This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant. On the other hand, Camelo Babatania denied all allegations and provided for a different version. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in its application of article 283 of the civil code on the compulsory recognition and award of support in favor of respondentappellee Camelo Regodos. Held: The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. In the case at bar, private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. In the same vein while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Also, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. Wherefore the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial is reversed and set aside. Private respondents petition for recognition and support is dismissed.

ECET v. ECETA SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary Recognition of Illegitimate Children, How Made Facts: In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter.Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, for Partition and Accounting with Damages[2] against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her fathers death, she became Rosalinas coheir and co-owner of the Cubao property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the herein respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courts ruling. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether the certified xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an illegitimate daughter of her alleged father Vicente Eceta. Held: Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

Wherefore the petition for review on certiorari is denied. The decision of the court of appeals which affirmed with modification the decision of the regional trial is affirmed in toto. De jesus vs. Estate of decedent juan gamboa dizon SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary recognition of illegitimate children Facts Juan G. Dizon a well founded man, acknowledged through an affidavit; Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus sometime in 1991. On March 12, 1992 Juan G. Dizon died leaving his assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and other properties. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporation of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case alleging a call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and the deceased Juan Dizon but it was dismissed. Issue Whether or not the Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus can claim to be illegitimate children of Dizon. Held Only the father can impugn the legitimacy of the child while he is still alive, if not , then his heirs. But the question in this case is can both Petitioners claim being an illegitimate child at the same time a legitimate of other parent. The answer would be in the negative. It is unlikely that the law recognize such relationship. And taking into consideration the evidence presented is only an affidavit which cannot be fully given credence in the absence of any other evidences. Thus this petition is dismiss CABATANIA v. CA SUBJECT MATTER: Voluntary Recognition of Illegitimate Children, How Made

Facts: This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant. On the other hand, Camelo Babatania denied all allegations and provided for a different version. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in its application of article 283 of the civil code on the compulsory recognition and award of support in favor of respondentappellee Camelo Regodos. Held: The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

In the case at bar, private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. In the same vein while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Also, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. Wherefore the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial is reversed and set aside. Private respondents petition for recognition and support is dismissed. Verceles v. Posadas SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of Illegitimate Children Facts: Clarissa met Teofisto (mayor of Pandan) and the latter offered job to the former. On November 10-15, they went to a seminar together with other companion. Teofisto fetched Clarissa in My Bros Hotel and went to Mayon Hotel to have lunch. Clarissa was surprised when her companions were not there. And at that moment, Teofisto was making amorous advances on her and she run towards the comfort room and closeted herself there. Clarissa being afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident. Clarissa went to Virac to follow-up the funds for barangay funds. She met with Teofisto on a hotel to update the latter with the matter. Teofisto led her to the upper floor of the hotel and there she suddenly embraced her and said some promises to Clarissa and eventually Clarissa succumbed. From there, Clarissa became pregnant. Clarissa presented three letters ( two of which are with the letterhead of Mayor of Pandan), pictures. On March 1987, she received a letter and php 2,000 from Teofisto. On June 1987, Teofisto went to see her and gave her php 2,000 for her delivery. She gave birth to Verna Aiza Posada on September 23, 1987. Clarissas statement was corroborated by her mother. Clarissa filed a complaint for damages and coupled with support pendent lite which was granted by the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada was proven Held: A perusal of the complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption stats Damages coupled with support pendent lite. Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with the petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court record, or in any authentic writing is in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for recognition, it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
De Santos vs. Angeles SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona with which they were blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner, Maria Rosario de Santos. Thereafter, the relationship of the spouses became stained to the breaking point. Dr. de Santos fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag. Antonio sought the dissolution of his previous marriage by obtaining a decree of divorce in Nevada. Antonio and Conchita then proceeded to Tokyo in 1951 to wed. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, Antonio and Conchita contracted a marriage in Tagaytay celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate. On May 15, 1981, Conchita, herein private respondent, went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br.121, asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor over the settlement of her late husbands estate. Petition was granted. After six years of intestate proceedings, herein petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in her motion of November 1987, she argued that private respondents children were

illegitimate on November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondents accent of her administration, the court denied petitioners motion. A motion for reconsideration was also denied on January 9, 1992. Hence this petition ISSUE Whether or not the children of respondents are natural children by legal fiction? HELD private

1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as single" in the marriage contract and dispensed with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate," his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan , respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. Issue

Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus the Civil Code provides under Art. 17 7, [o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia , Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner. SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children Facts On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among others, that Stephanie was born on june 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Gar cia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle nameand surname, and that vhe is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her mothers surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his Surname. The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial Court did not allow the use of her mothers surname as her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. Issue Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her middle name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural father. Held As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The Court ruled that since no law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to use as middle name the mothers surname, the Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her middle name. Wherefore, the petition was granted.

While a legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as hereditary rights are concerned. It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioners half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the requisite of legitimation that they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot be demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of those rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children. Abadilla vs. Tabiliran SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of illegitimate children Facts The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23,

Whether or not the children are legitimated?

Held The Civil Code on ratification on contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art 34 of the Family Code was intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in a state of concubinage for more than five years. However, it also requires that parties in the cohabitation do not suffer from any impediment. In the case at bar, Judge Tabiliran was still validly married when he cohabited. For purposes of remarriage, he has to wait for seven years from 1966, at the time of claimed abandonment but in 1970, he already had a child with Priscilla. Thereby, the ratification of their cohabitation was not valid. It is important to note that these children were born prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents, who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

DSWD v. Belen SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children FACTS Respondent Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12 of this Court in connection with the aforementioned special proceeding. As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own. Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent judge based his decree primarily on the findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a Home and Child Study Report in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minors adoption. ISSUE Whether or not respondents committed an error concerning the adoption in question. HELD

The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law. Teotico vs. Del Val

allegation saying that the will is inoperative with respect to the share of Rene A. Teotico. On November 10, 1960, the probate court admitted the will to probate but declaring the portion made in favor of Rene A. Teotico void and should be passed to the testatrixs heirs be way of intestate succession. Petitioner Teotico fled a motion for reconsideration. Also, oppositor filed her motion for reconsideration on the portion of the judgment that decreed the probate of the will. Both motions were denied. Hence this appeal. ISSUE Whether or not oppositor has the right to intervene in the proceedings? HELD

SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children FACTS On July 14, 1955, Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. De Aguirre died leaving properties worth P600, 000.00. She left a will written in Spanish whish had her signature signed in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures. Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton acknowledged the said will. Among the many legacies and devices made in the will was one made of P20, 000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrixs niece Josefina Mortera. The testatrix also instituted Josefina as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955. A day before the said hearing however, Ana Del Val Chan, herein oppositor-appellant, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, deceased brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will. Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition saying that oppositor has no legal personality. Oppositor was not allowed to intervene. Oppositor however added an It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as an executor or as a claimant in the estate. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, petitioner, versus, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children Facts On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody. Issue Whether or not petitioner Held The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Herbert Cang vs.Court of Appeals SUBJECT MATTER: Adopten children Facts Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children,

namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband's consent as the parties are by this agreement legally separated; Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) jobseeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children for the following reasons:The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract without the written consent of her husband; Issue Whether or not minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them.

Held Petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses. While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them. The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record. Republic vs. Hughes FACTS James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of United States married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino citizen, who was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On June 29, 1990 the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Ma. Cecilia. Neil and Mario, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The petition was granted in the Regional Trial Court and was affirmed in the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE Whether or not spouses Hughes could legally adopt under Philippine Law. HELD Art 184 of the Family Code provides that aliens are not qualified to adopt except (a) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, (b) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, and (c) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. It is clear that James is not qualified to adopt while Lenita seems to appear to be qualified, unfortunately, Art 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition which must be read along with Art 184. The court is not unmindful of the possible benefits that an adoption can bring for the adopting parents and adopted children. It also realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however, the law is clear and .no other choice is given, the court must obey its full mandate. The decision is reversed and set aside.

United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption. The trial court granted the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse and decreed that the said minor be considered as their child by adoption. The Solicitor General, however, interposed contending that Spouses Clouse are not qualified to adopt minor Solomon under the law. ISSUE Whether or not the Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt under the law. HELD

G.R. No. 117209

February 9, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents. FACTS Private respondents, spouses Munson on March 10, 1994, filed a petition to adopt the minor Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by rule of the Rules of Court for adoption of the minor. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 1993 when he arrived at the private respondents residence. On April 18, 1994 hearing, petitioner, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption, citing it would be a violation of the Rule 103 of the Rules of Court . In its formal opposition, dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption, and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. ISSUE Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the change in name of minor as embodied in the petition for adoption of the said minor. HELD Yes. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.

TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents. FACTS On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks. The principal evidence discloses that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the

No. There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala. Thus, the petition was granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law. Thus, the Court granted the petition of the Republic and modified the order of the trial court; the name of the adopted child shall remain as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade until a proper proceeding for the change of name shall have been effected. G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents. FACTS The petition at bar was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the

Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Private respondents were required to comment. ISSUE Whether or not a change of name of an adoptee could be effected simultaneously with the adoption proceeding. HELD Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case. The Court held, however, that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name.", Article 412 of the Civil Code to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of

Court in 1964 covers "those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, it was held that "the change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate." While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that, notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals was modified that the decision of the Regional Trial Court to order to the local civil registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child, was deleted. In other respects relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from was affirmed. March 20, 1997 REPUBLIC vs. VERGARA

FACTS Respondent spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina on June 25, 1990. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of the United States Air Force is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adopion. On September 10, 1990, after trial, the lower court rendered its decision on granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the (16) year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being

only (15) years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability, love, and affection for the intended adoptees. ISSUE Whether or not spouses Dye are qualified to adopt under the law. HELD No. Samuel Dye is an American and therefore, an alien, is disqualified from adopting the minor Maricel and Alvin Due. Because he does not fall under any of the three aforeqouted exception laid down by the law. Also, the law does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt. The Supreme Court is not in the position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. It cannot sustain the respondent spouses petition for adoption. ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent. FACTS In 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption of herein respondent. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred that the herein respondent had continued to used his surname, Sibulo, to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and

activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo. Petitioner alleged further that respondent had been jealous of her nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner. Furthermore, in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband. However RA 8552, a new statute, deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Nonetheless, the trial court respected petitioners right to rescind the decree of adoption under the Family Code but likewise denied her petition citing grounds of prescription. ISSUE Whether or not the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552. HELD No. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,

absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that herein respondent is still the legal child of petitione