174999

Campesino Movements and Class Conflict in Latin America: The Functions of Exchange and Power Author(s): Peter Singelmann
Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1974), pp. 39-72 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174999 . Accessed: 23/05/2011 17:23
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PETER SINGELMANN
Departmentof Sociology University Missouri of on leaveto LatinAmerican Teaching Fellowships,Mexico
CAMPESINOMOVEMENTSAND CLASS CONFLICTIN LATIN AMERICA: The Functions of Exchange and Power
This paper will attempt to evaluate the utility of exchange

theory for analyzing and interpreting the currently available evidence about emerging campesino movements in Latin America. The focus will be on the transactions and exchanges campesinos engage in both horizontally (with their peers) and vertically (with the landlord and other patrons). My principal thesis is that in the past the gains campesinos could accrue from vertical exchanges have outweighed the actual and potential gains derived from horizontal solidarities within their own community; furthermore, the vertical solidarities between campesinos and landholders served to undermine the precarious horizontal relationships in the campesino community which did exist. As a result, the development of campesino movements, organized or spontaneous, has been directly related to changes in the relative outcomes campesinos obtain in exchanges with one another, with their landlord, or with alternative patrons. One of the principal factors in the dynamics of campesino movements is seen in the macro-structural framework within
AUTHOR'S NOTE:Thispapersummarizes partsof my Ph.D. dissertation (University of Texas at Austin, 1972). An earlier versionwaspresentedat the annualmeetingsof the Southwestern SociologicalAssociation,San Antonio, Texas,March1972.
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 16 No. 1, February 1974 ? 1974 Sage Publications, Inc.
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which exchanges between campesinos and landlords take place. Changes in this larger social structure differentially affect the outcomes and bargaining positions of campesinos and landholders, thereby giving rise to imbalances in existing exchange and power relations to which the interactants have to respond actively or cognitively.
Analy tical Dimensions of Exchange Exchange theory, as formulated by Homans (1961, 1958), Blau (1964a, 1964b), J. S. Adams (1965), and Thibaut and Kelley (1967) rests on the assumptions that (a) human behavior is motivated by the experience of past or anticipation of future rewards associated with given courses of action under specified circumstances; and (b) in social interaction the rewards motivating the behaviors of each interactant are provided by others; the delivery of these rewards by others is contingent on the benefits they receive themselves in return for their services. The analysis in this paper will take two basic dimensions of exchange as a point of departure. The first includes the objective factors, defined as physicostructural referents which are the objects of the actors' definitions. They include such matters as the objects and services each interactant can offer to the other(s), as well as the environmental opportunities and constraints within which actors make their choices. These constraints are reflected in various institutional and noninstitutional resources (e.g., force, finance, legitimation, votes) to which interactants have equal or differential access and which determine the relative accessibility, outcome levels and success chances of alternative courses of action. The totality of these objective factors make up the actors' respective "bargaining positions." The second basic dimension includes subjective factors. These are akin to what W. I. Thomas called the "definition of the situation" and consist of more or less constructed conceptions in terms of which the objective environment is cognitively organized by actors. Definitions can be further subdivided into "perceptions" (existential defini-
Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASSCONFLICT / [411
tions, indicating what "is") and "evaluations" (normative definitions, indicating what "ought to be"). The most salient definitions entering exchange relationships are (a) values and norms which stipulate which goods and behaviors are desirable, (b) exchange-values, stipulating what is a "fair" or "just" price for given benefits received, and (c) perceptions of the objective environment in terms of available alternatives and future expectations. As Blau has pointed out, exchanges can be "bilateral" (where the benefits exchanged have equivalent values) or "unilateral" (where the benefits received by some actors are more valuable than those received by others). "Dependence" develops when in a social relationship one actor needs the services of others more than others need his, and when one actor has fewer alternatives available to satisfy his needs than others. Under such conditions, the actor in the inferior bargaining position may become obligated to those who provide needed benefits to him. The only way to discharge these obligations is to act according to the others' wishes when demanded to do so. The dependence of a person upon others thus gives the others "power" over him. While the ultimate source of power in social relations is physical force, it can be institutionaliz'ed when superior services are provided to the subordinates by the power holders which legitimate their demands (see Blau, 1964a: chs. 4, 5, 8). "Justice" is a condition in which each interactant perceives his outcomes to be equivalent to the outcomes of all others, if differential "investments" in the form of ascribed and achieved status characteristics are taken into account (Blau, 1964b: J. S. Adams, 1965). Justice prevails also in unilateral exchanges where the domination of some over others is legitimized in terms of their superior services provided to the subordinates. Therefore, the dynamics of social interaction does not result from objective imbalances per se, but from cognitive inconsistencies (a) in response to objective changes in bargaining positions and (b) due to autonomous changes in perceptions or evaluations. Solidarity in social relations is a function of the values actors
place upon the rewards received from one another and is manifested in the tendency of actors to seek interaction with "attractive" others. In triadic interactions, persons will exhibit the greatest solidarity with the participant who provides the highest benefits in relation to the persons' own investments. When two actors (C-1, C-2) are both unilaterally dependent upon a third (P), then the exchanges of each subordinate with P will take precedence over their exchanges with one another. The greater the degree to which P controls most vital rewards of both C-1 and C-2, and the more scarce P keeps these rewards, the greater the competition between C-1 and C-2 for these rewards, and the greater their overt manifestations of solidarity with P. Imbalances in exchange and power relations emerge out of endogenous dialectic contradictions and paradoxes (see Blau, 1964a: ch. 12) as well as from changes in the larger social structure which differentially affect the interactants' bargaining positions and definitions (see Blau, 1964a: 19-31). Actors respond to the ensuing cognitive inconsistencies by actively changing inconsistent parts of the environment (which includes other actors) or by (re)definitions which restore consistency in the organization of cognitions (see J. S. Adams, 1965: 283-288).1 Which one among several functionally equivalent modes of consistency restoration will be chosen by an actor may not be easily predicted a priori. But in general it can be expected that some alternatives are more accessible than others and thus entail lower costs for the individual. Such alternatives are then more likely to be chosen. For the purpose of this analysis, it is proposed that the relative power and dependence of an individual in a social relationship will differentially influence the costs of various alternative adaptations. The greater the control over his (human and nonhuman) environment is, the greater the number of alternatives available to him and the greater the probability that an active response will be successful. On the other hand, if an individual has relatively low control over his outcomes in a social relationship, an active response to imbalance will be more costly to him, and the
Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT (431
probability that such a response will yield the desired results will be lower. Thus, it is proposed that cognitive responses to imbalance become increasingly likely as an individuals control over his outcomes declines (see Thibaut and Kelley, 1967: 180-181). Within this theoretical framework, some traditional paraLatin America meters of patron-campesino relationships in ruralmay be outlined ideal-typically.2 Patterns of Exchange and Solidarity in Rural Latin America: Some TraditionalParameters3 One of the most salient parameters of traditional patroncampesino relations in Latin America is the historical increase of land concentration in the hands of a few large corporate or individual landholders. In most countries this process has continued into the present time with the result that the large majority of the campesinos of the continent own and control only a minute fraction of the land, wealth, and power resources existing in their countries (see Barraclough and Domike, 1970: 48; Feder, 1971: 3-106). Thus, the vast majority of the rural population in Latin America depended on a relatively small elite which monopolized their means of subsistence. The need of campesinos to secure their means of subsistence under conditions of scarcity and powerlessness left them in a weak bargaining position vis-a-vis the landholders, who could arbitrarily impose almost any kind of obligation on their peons with minimal remuneration. The landlords could change labortenancy arrangements and dismiss worker-tenants at will, usually knowing that cheap and willing labor was abundantly available. As a result, landlord-campesino relations in Latin America have involved extremely unilateral exchanges in which the worker-tenants and their families would live and work on the estate or townhouse of the patron in various capacities, in return for the right to use a small polot of land and to receive a variety of token remunerations. This colono pattern differed from straight wage labor and sharecropping arrangements, but the labor and tenancy conditions in these latter patterns tended
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to be no less arbitrary and restrictive.4 Some of the structural parameters surrounding traditional labor and tenancy patterns in rural Latin America may be outlined briefly in the following paragraphs.
ECONOMICPARAMETERS
Apart from being exposed to ecological pressures (population increases, diminishing land base, unemployment and underemployment-see Barraclough and Domike, 1970: 44, 55-63; Feder, 1969: 416-423), campesinos historically have had to cope with conscious economic strategies on the part of the landholders which were designed to keep the returns of the tenant-workers at the subsistence level (see Centro Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola, 1966a: 237, 266, 283, 566, 572-574; 1965: 144; Feder, 1969), placing maximum emphasis on remuneration in kind and thereby underwriting the particularistic nexus of dependence between landlord and campesino (see CIDA, 1966a: 250). The marginal status and fundamental insecurity of campesinos has been reinforced by a variety of monopolies enjoyed by the landholders. These monopolies rendered campesinos dependent on the patron not only for obtaining land and work, but also for marketing their produce and obtaining tools, seeds, or credit. These monopolies also restricted the rights of campesinos to plant the type and quantity of crop they desired. The most blatant manifestation of the landholders' traditional economic monopolies was debt peonage. Even today in some parts of the continent workers are remunerated in token currency that can be exchanged only at the property-owned store where exorbitant prices are charged. In Northeast Brazil, the landholders' control over credit, investments, marketing, and consumption of their tenantworkers still makes it possible to tie the latter to the estate unless they are "bought" by another landholder who then becomes their new "owner"9 (Corfeia de Andrade, 1963: 116-117).-
Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [451
SOCIAL PARAMETERS
Campesino communities within the realm of large haciendas have traditionally been isolated from the larger society and totally subjected to the domination of the landholders (see Tannenbaum, 1960: 77-86). Internally, the hacienda has been hierarchically organized under the absolute command of patriarchal hacendado, the patron who ruled the estate like the father of a family. Below him there were several ranks of administrators, supervisors, foremen, and common tenantlaborers (for examples of the internal organization of the large estates, see Feder, 1971: 120-124, 1969: 404-405; Hutchinson, 1957: 49, 70; CIDA, 1965: 183-326; Vasquez, 1963; Heath et al., 1969: 101-102). As the administrators and foremen were usually the ones who dealt directly with the colonos, especially under absentee landlords, it has been suggested that they were the objects toward which the resentment of disgruntled subordinates would be directed first; they thereby served as cushions which deflected potential class hostilities by the colonos from the actual ruling groups and individuals (Feder, 1971: 125-128, 1969: 406-408). Administrators and foremen still today are frequently chosen by the patron from colonos who have distinguished themselves by their loyalty, obedience, and informant services. Special favors serve as an incentive for the colonos to place a premium upon loyalty to the patron in order to stabilize their precarious life chances (see Feder, 1969: 415; Heath et al., 1969: 100-101; Tullis, 1970: 93, 113). The immediate self-interest of the individual campesino thus becomes incompatible with his class interest. The relationship between patron and campesinos has frequently been described as paternalistic. Paternalism implies, first of all, that there is a fundamental power imbalance so that the subordinates have only (unenforceable) privileges against the patron whereas the latter has (enforceable) rights against the campesinos (see R. N. Adams, 1964: 68-69). Moreover, paternalism implies certain affective bonds between a benevolently caring patron who renders favors and assistance on the one hand, and the loyally obedient campesinos on the other (see
Wagley, 1960: 83-86; Gillin, 1960: 36; H. W. Hutchinson, 1957: 7-8, 61-62). Such bonds were often reinforced by ritual kinship. Observers generally agree that godparenthood (compadrazgo) has had utilitarian functions and that those tended to be selected as godfathers and compadres who had to offer material benefits and social security. Thus, there has been a marked tendency among campesinos to select compadres and padrinos from persons with higher social status (see Harris, 1956: 131-155; Martlnez, 1963b; Tumin, 1952: 26; Mintz and Wolf, 1967). Such manifestations of vertical solidarities can undermine horizontal bonds among the campesinos when, as B. Hutchinson (1966: 14, italics added) observed in Brazil, the search for upper-class godfather implies "an expectation of exceptional advantage for the godchild, who will be provided benefits promoting his interests at the expense of others" (see also Cotler, 1970b: 416). The extreme dependence of campesinos has often led them to look at their patrones as protectors whose good graces had to be maintained. Their welfare depended on the discretionary favors from the patron. This has particularized patroncampesino relations, so that individual campesinos were able to "explain" the actions of one harsh landlord by noting that he was a "bad" rather than a "good" landlord (see Heath, 1969: 183; Pearse, 1970: 27); self-interest demanded from the campesinos, then, to look for a "good" patron rather than questioning the legitimacy of a social structure which granted a landowner the discretion to be either "good" or "bad" (see Feder, 1969: 401; Petras and Zemelman, 1972: chs. 6 and 7).
POLITICAL PARAMETERS
After the independence wars, the political structures of Latin American nations have been characterized by regional fragmentation and the relatively autonomous rule of regional strongmen (caudillos, caciques) who competed at the national level for control over the spoils of the central government and at the local level for control over municipal politics and
administration.6 With the emergence of the central government as a new power factor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see R. N. Adams, 1967b), national political organizations formed which extended down to the local level in a mutual give-and-take of spoils, votes, and legislation. These organizations had the objective to attain power for their members at the expense of rival groups at all political and socioeconomic levels, rather than promoting particular class goals and ideologies. Characteristically, there have been two major parties in most Latin American countries which resembled each other in socioeconomic composition, and whose labels had little if any ideological implication, be they "Liberal" versus "Conservative," "Red" versus "Green," or "White" versus "Colored." What distinguished these groups was that one was in power and the other was out. Those who were "in" could dispense over patronage, armed force, and funds of the government for their own benefit in the perpetuous rivalry for power and control at the national, regional, and local levels. They could dispense overall institutional resources to deprive their rivals of land, office, and even life. In view of the mobilization of governmental institutions for partisan ends, it was vital for each faction to be "in." The political stakes of elections and appointments were "all or nothing." It was therefore necessary for any political chief to use all means, including violence and fraud, to secure control over local electorates and armed militias in order to provide inducements to the state and national governments for the spoils and patronage that allowed the submission of local rivals.7 Within the context of such conflicts, campesinos have traditionally had very few resources to defend themselves against encroaching landholders and their retainers except to seek the protection of a powerful political boss in return for loyal following. They gained a measure of security if their patron fared well politically and could thus offer protection from the attacks by other landholders. As a result, campesinos have traditionally constituted the bottom of the divided political hierarchy as camp followers of one or the other
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faction. This has been most pronounced among the jagun_os (armed strongmen) following political chiefs in Brazil and in the battles between "Liberal" and Conservative" campesinos during the Colombian violencia, but similar situations have prevailed in most other countries. The attainment of voting rights by campesinos has not liberated them from traditional domination as long as landholders could still forcibly control the votes of the campesinos. In order to survive and attain a measure of security, campesinos traditionally had to provide armed and electoral support as well as general loyalty to their patron and participate in his struggles. This situation pitted peasant against peasant, hacendado against hacendado, caudillo against caudillo and party leader against party leader. Again, the self-interest of individual campesinos commanded that they pursued vertical solidarities with the landed elite rather than their proper class interests.
PSYCHOCULTURAL PARAMETERS
Rogers (1969) has suggested a number of traits belonging to a universal "subculture of peasantry" which tend to reinforce submission to authority and attachments to the status quo.8 It may be questioned, however, whether such traits actually reflect the existence of a subculture or whether they are only habitual and reinforced adaptations to scarcity and powerlessness and as such may disappear readily once there is a decline in the prevailing objective constraints which limit the campesino's choices (see Huizer, 1972). Low cognitive capacity (the capacity to handle complex information and differentiated categories) has traditionally been a factor constraining the campesinos' choices for adaptation-a factor reflected in high rates of illiteracy, lack of formal schooling, lack of ability to communicate in the dominant language (Spanish) without the help of interpreters and other "cultural brokers" (Wolf, 1965: 97), and restriction to the reference sources of the isolated rural community (for some data on literacy, language barriers, and cultural isolation among campesinos, see Cotler, 1970a: 553, 1970b: 418, 420-421; Patch, 1960: 138; Heath, 1969: 183;
Fromm and Maccoby, 1970: 45-48). A number of character traits have been identified for Latin American rural dwellers which reinforce accommodation to existing social structures and particularly the campesinos' attachment to a protective patron. Among them are "speculativeness," the tendency to improve one's position in respect to luck and other "favors" from the outside (Leeds, 1957: 468-472; Foster, 1967a, 1967b, 1964) and fatalism (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970: ch. 10; Foster, 1967c: 118-120; Cotler, 1970a: 555). In this connection, significant findings of Fromm and Maccoby in a Mexican village indicate that the predominant character traits ("receptive" and "hoarding") directly reinforce conservatism and submission to an outside "benefactor,"9 while submissiveness and acceptance of traditional authority are the most significant modes of sociopolitical relatedness.' 0 These characteristics are associated with low self-confidence and self-respect, expectations of personal failure, and internalization of low-status self images (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970: ch. 10; see also White, 1969: 131; Cotler, 1970b: 417; Tumin, 1953: 234-250; Hirschman, 1965: 220; Lewis, 1959: 57).
HORIZONTAL IN RELATIONS THECAMPESINO COMMUNITY
Ever since Lewis (1953) had challenged Redfield's (1930) analysis of Tepoztlan, Mexico, as a homogeneous, isolated, and integrated folk-community with much contentment and little conflict, observers have noted the importance of conflict, disruption, individualism, and lack of cooperation in Latin American rural communities. The psychological dimensions of such conflicts are manifested in pervasive fear of aggression, distrust, and envy (for accounts of fear, distrust, and envy underlying social relations in campesino communities, see Nash, 1967: 100-103; Fromm and Maccoby,- 1970: 37-39; Gillin, 1951: 114-119; Foster, 1967c: 91-96, 103-108, 153-160; Wolf, 1955: 460; Lewis, 1959: 43; Reichel-Dolmatoff and ReichelDolmatoff, 1961: 247-254). Social relations are tenuous and delicate, while overtly characterized by formal courtesy and
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unemotionality (see Reichel-Dolmatoff and Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1961: 441-442; Nash, 1967: 98-99). Alcohol is often needed to "loosen up" interpersonal relations on ceremonial occasions (Simmons, 1965), brawls break out easily on trifling occasions (Fals-Borda, 1955: 208-211), and friendships are either absent (Nash, 1967: 72-74) or contain an element of fragility and treacherousness (Foster, 1967c: 100-103; Reina, 1959). Ritual kinship, which has been viewed both as a mechanism of economic security and as a manifestation of expressive solidarity in the rural community, entails obligations which may be perceived as onerous (Siegel, 1957: 251) and may involve deep-seated tensions and conflicts underneath the surface of overt respect (Sayres, 1956). Cooperative exchanges entail similar ambiguities. Exchanges of gifts and labor are highly valued as ritualized assertions of solidarity (Foster, 1967a: 21 5-216; Beals, 1970; Reichel-Dolmatoff and ReichelDolmatoff, 1961: 247-254), but at the same time there are anxieties about incurring future obligations, about the willingness of others to reciprocate in an exchange, and about the motives of the initiator (Reichel-Dolmatoff and ReichelDolmatoff, 1961: 257-258, 260-264; Foster, 1967b: 314). Exchanges of labor and gifts can thus promote horizontal solidarities while at the same time undermining them; cooperation is "too costly to be enjoyed and too rewarding to be given up" (Bequiraj, 1966: 36). A very salient aspect of social relations in many Latin American rural communities may be what Foster (1967b) described as the "image of limited good." According to this cognitive orientation, the good things in life are perceived as existing in limited amounts and as always short in supply, while the peasant has no power to increase the available quantities. A corollary of this principle is that within the campesino community, gains of individuals are perceived as threats to some or all others, unless they are received from outside sources such as luck, God, or powerful patrons. If such an orientation is implicit in peasant behaviors, as Foster suggested, then the rewards which individuals could receive from intraclass soli-
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darity are limited, while the rewards which could be derived from vertical solidarities with upper-class patrones are at once more legitimate and more "realistic." As the frequent conflicts and rivalries over economic resources within and between campesino communities suggest,'' the immediate threats are often seen as arising from within the peasant class rather than from upper-status groups. These are some of the traditional parameters which have, in varying degrees, determined the structure of patron-campesino interactions. In the pattern which emerges from the preceding analysis, campesinos have traditionally been dependent and powerless to change their situation through directed action. They therefore had more or less to follow the demands of their patrones and adapt themselves cognitively to low status and deprivation. Lowering expectations and perceiving the source of all good things as being outside their own community are prominent examples of such cognitive responses to exchange and power imbalances. It follows from this analysis that will (1) powershiftsin favorof campesinos be the mostimportant of campesino single factor in the emergence action-oriented movements; movements expectedto developwhen campeare (2) campesino instiunaccessible sinos gainincreased controlover previously whilethe traditional tutionalandeconomicresources monoply of the landholders theseresources over breaks down; with outcomesfrom traditional relationships the (3) deteriorating to of will landholders reducethe attraction campesinos these relationships; sources of movements emergewhenalternative will (4) campesino by neededservices benefitsemergeor areperceived campeor sinos. In the following section, these propositions will be examined in the light of historical evidence about campesino movements in Latin America.
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Campesino Movements and Reequilibra tion
In terms of the preceding analysis, campesino movements are seen as processes of balance restoration when in the patroncampesino exchanges the campesinos experience deteriorating outcomes, find improved outcomes from alternative sources (alternative patrons, peers, self-improvements), and in general when changes in the sociopolitical macrostructures within which the exchanges take place result in an improvement of the campesinos' bargaining position. With regard to deteriorating outcomes, two hypotheses may be formulated: Hypothesis Campesino movementstend to developwhen the 1: traditional paternalistic benefits supplied the patronto the by are campesinos no longerforthcoming. Evidence for this hypothesis is provided by a number of studies. Tullis (1970: ch. 6) and Alberti (1970a: 110-115) have documented for the Mantaro valley in Peru how a change on an hacienda from an interested patron to a disinterested absentee owner in conjunction with mismanagement and an economic decline. of the estate sparked the development of a rural syndicate. On a Chilean fundo, Petras and Zemelman (1969) noted that the withdrawal of certain traditional paternalistic benefits for the inquilinos (tenant-laborers) in favor of more universalistic labor relations marked the beginning of rural organization. In Guatemala it has been observed that during the Arevalo and Arbenz governments rural unionization programs had greater success in areas where there was a relatively mobile labor force than in areas where a "stable" labor force residing on the estates received paternalistic benefits from "their patron" (R. N. Adams, 1960: 251-252). Hypothesis Campesino 2: movements tend to develop whenthereis a threatto, or deterioration the socialandeconomic statusof of, the campesinos, when the traditional with and relationships the landholders decreasing yield returns.
Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASSCONFLICT ] [53 /
Numerous Indian rebellions in Latin America have been defensive reactions against the encroachment of European colonists upon Indian lands. Such uprisings have taken place ever since the original conquest in countries such as Bolivia (Huizer, 1967: 143-145; Antezana, 1969), Peru (Huizer, 1967: 165-167; Tullis, 1970: 76-81; CIDA, 1966c: 215), Colombia (Friede, 1943), and in Mexico (Silva-Herzog, 1959: 105-107) where the Zapatista movement had its origin in the village councils of Morelian Indians in defense against land-hungry hacendados. Against the historical background of long-standing suppression and aggression, it usually takes individual acts of violence or increased demands on the part of the landowners which spark campesino resistance. In the valley of La Convencion (Peru), the peasant movement began when the landowners tried to reclaim improved lands and coffee trees and demand new onerous work obligations from their tenantlaborers (Craig, 1969: 284). In Ucurenfa(Bolivia), fraudulent manipulations of landowners designed to deprive the campesinos of legally acquired lands unified the nascent syndicate (Dandler, 1971, 1969). The peasant leagues in Northeast Brazil originated with the landowner's attempt to evict the moradores (resident workers) who had formed a rather innocuous mutual aid society (Correia de Andrade, 1963: 241-255). Such withholding of legitimate benefits or leveling of new demands was frequently due to changes in macro-economic structures which rendered the landholders incapable of maintaining their traditional bargainingposition." 2
Hypothesis 3: Campesino movements tend to develop when the traditional isolation of the rural community from the larger society breaksdown.
The breakdown of infrastructural constraints isolating campesinos from the larger society is manifested in the extension of transportation and communication facilities as well as in increased contacts of campesinos with neighboring communities and larger cities. The impact of extended transportation networks and newly emerging market centers, upon the
development of campesino organization has been most clearly demonstrated in Craig's (I 969: 281, 1967: 24-27, 50-52) study of the rural movement in the valley of La Convencion. Increased contacts of campesinos with the outside world will be discussed further below. The breakdown of the campesinos' isolation from the larger society per se, however, would not be expected to encourage campesino movements unless it is associated with the emergence of new alternatives.
Hypothesis 4: Campesino movements to develop tend whenalterna-
tive sources of needed benefits and service emerge or are perceived the campesinos. by This hypothesis implies that there is a breakdown in the landowners' monopolies over a variety of institutional resources to which the campesinos have had access only via their patron. It was the patron who traditionally marketed the campesinos' produce in the larger society, who mediated the campesinos' dealings with governmental and judicial authorities, and who had the cultural skills (speaking Spanish, education, travels) necessary to communicate effectively in the larger society. Furthermore, the landlord alone had the political influence and economic recourse to manipulate institutional structures for the benefit and protection of his subordinates. Ideal-typically, the landlord has been the only cultural and political "broker" who monopolized the junction at which his dependents intersected with the institutions of the larger society. This total dependence of the campesinos on the patron has declined with the emergence of alternative brokers and with the emergence of politicoeconomic resources within the campesino communities.
ALTERNA TIVE BROKERS
As Wagley (1964: 45-46) has noted, traditional brokers such as the patron or the padre have become increasingly challenged by new brokers such as teachers, lawyers, urban politicians, or labor leaders.' 3 New brokers emerge within the context of new
AND CLASSCONFLICT Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS / [551
power domains which encroach on the traditional monopoly of the hacendados, most notably the central government (see R. N. Adams, 1967a: 226-231, 238-247; 1967b). Campesinos thus come to occupy various positions within a complex of ''multiple power domains," which enables them to play different individuals and organizations with access to governmental powers, against each other (R. N. Adams, 1967a: 241). The availability of alternative brokers to campesinos reduces their dependence; it thus improves their bargaining position vis-a-vis the landlord and may even enable them to bypass the latter altogether when dealing with higher organizations and institutions. The particularistic dependence of individual campesinos on their patron has in the past encouraged much of the atomization found in rural communities. This pattern has been represented graphically in terms of a triangle with the patron (P) at the apex and with an open base, signifying lack of solidarity among the campesinos (C) (Figure 1). The emergence of campesino solidarity under alternative brokers and brokerage networks is then represented in the closed triangle of Figure 2. A number of authors have found the model of the closing triangle useful in representing campesino movements in Peru and Bolivia (Dandler, 1971: 64-75, 1969: 4-16; Tullis, 1970: 43-45; Whyte, 1970; Alberti, 1970a: 90-96, 1970b), and observations in other countries suggest that the pattern can be further generalized (see Powell, 1969: 88).
P P Lawyer Teacher Union Official
C_THE_OPEN_TRIAGLE
Figure2TH
CLOSED
TRIANGLE
Figure 1: THE OPEN TRIANGLE
Figure 2: THE CLOSED TRIANG;LE
The changes outlined above mark a transition from paternalism to a clientelistic political pattern in which formal campesino organizations have taken the place of the traditional patron by providing their followers with tangible benefits in return for mass support (see Powell, 1970; Greenfield, 1969, 1966). The benefits for the campesinos are ultimately obtained by the organizations from the government. The mass support of the campesinos, in turn, constitutes the inducement for the government to provide needed benefits to the campesinos. The degree to which campesino organizations are controlled by the government or are able to exert pressure on the government varies in different countries, but in order to function any campesino organization had to be at once a patron to the campesinos and a client to the government (be it the revolutionary government brought to power by campesino support). The services provided by campesino organizations to their members have been very similar to the benefits formerly received from the patron (see Singelmann, 1973). They included leadership and the skills to handle grievances vis-a-vis governmental and judicial bodies (see Powell, 1969: 72). Campesino leaders throughout the continent appear to be more educated, traveled, and experienced than the average campesino, and the top leadership at the regional and national levels has frequently been constituted of politicians, lawyers, clergymen, students, and other individuals of middle-class status who could mobilize political influence in the larger society.1 4 Apart from the necessary leadership and brokerage qualifications, the crucial criterion of a successful campesino organization has been the ability to actually deliver the needed services to its clientele. The peasants' and workers' organizations in Northeast Brazil, the syndicates in Peru's Mantaro and La Convencion valleys, Emiliano Zapata's peasant armies in Mexico, the rural syndicates in Bolivia after the revolution of 1952, the Venezuelan Campesino Federation, and the Guatemalan rural organizations during the Arevalo and Arbenz regimes-all of them depended for their measure of success on their ability to deliver tangible, material benefits in the form of
Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [571
land, arms, franchise, food, medical services, judicial and administrative services, spoils, and patronage. Indeed many a campesino leader or allied politician (e.g., Juliao, Paz, Rojas, Villaroel) have been viewed by grateful campesinos with the same affectionate submission that is said to have characterized the traditional patron-campesino relationships (see, Moraes, 1970: 470-471; Heath, 1969: 16, 189).
HORIZONTAL SOLIDARITY
There is evidence for an interdependence between manifestations of horizontal solidarity and gainful cooperation or exchange at the community level. Past and expected success of rural syndicates has given rise to increased cooperativeness of campesinos in Bolivia and Peru (Heath, 1969: 191; Alberti, 1970a: 129, 133). A marked effect of syndical success upon the motivations of old and prospective new members of the organization has been often observed (e.g., Dandler, 1971: 83-88; Alberti, 1970a: 147-150; Matos Mar, 1967: 4; Landsberger, 1969a: 43-44). Various symbolic manifestations of expressive solidarity have also been noted in association with successful cooperative actions and horizontal exchanges. The success of the campesino movement in La Convencion led to the emergence of "communities" around the new commercial and market centers of the valley (Craig, 1967: 3, 49-53); different degrees of solidarity in the communities of the valley were associated with joint efforts at school construction (Craig, 1967: 93); and community solidarity as perceived by key informants was greatest in communities where there was high willingness to cooperate on community projects, absence of widespread boundary disputes among the members, and absence of competing labor unions (Craig, 1967: 70, 72). The success of rural syndicates has been related to an extension of solidarity expressions beyond the kin group among the Aymara in Bolivia (Heath, 1969: 191) as well as among the members of rural syndicates and asentamientos (agrarian reform settlements) in Venezuela (Mathiason, 1966: 151-152). Last, it may be noted that in the valley of La Convencion, unity in campesino communities was directly related to a perception that the
hacendado was not part of the community (Craig, 1967: 78). This is related to Mintz and Wolf's (1967) observation that the tendency of peasants to seek ritual kinship ties with upper-class patrons diminishes as the powers and contributions of these patrons decline. While it must be acknowledged that the processes and causal sequences of solidarity formation among campesinos have received little systematic exploration, it may nevertheless at this point be noted that there appears to be a general association of campesino movements not only with declining outcomes from relationships with the patron and with power shifts in societal macrostructures, but also with increased benefits that can be reaped from cooperation and exchanges at the community level. 5: Hypothesis Campesino movements tend to developwhenthere are relativeimprovements the campesinos' in powersand bargaining positions. Since force has always been the ultimate source of power for the landholders in Latin America, a decline in their monopolistic control over institutional means of coercion should encourage campesino movements. Thus, rural organizations in Northeast Brazil have occasionally been aided by benevolently neutral police forces (Hewitt, 1969: 379)-although this was quite atypical, and invaders of Peruvian haciendas have been encouraged by their beliefs that the police would not intervene on behalf of the landlords (Tullis, 1970: 142). Direct control over force by the campesinos has been a pivotal factor in the agrarian movements of Mexico after 1910 and Bolivia after 1952. To some extent, campesino movements have also benefited from favorable developments in the judicial process. This includes winning court decisions (see Dandler, 1971: 86-87; Tullis, 1970: ch. 6) and legal recognition (see Huizer, 1967: 187; Price, 1964: 68-69). But a more crucial potential resource for campesinos is the vote. If the vote is reasonably free (which is by no means always the case), campesinos become attractive for politicians as well as for labor organizations who may peddle
AND CLASSCONFLICT MOVEMENTS Singelmann CAMPESINO [59] /
the campesino vote to those guaranteeing the highest returns. For this reason, Bolivia's MNR "gave" the vote to the campesinos after its ascension to power in 1952, and for the same reason President Goulart of Brazil tried to control the rural movement as a potential mass electorate (see Hewitt, 1969; Price, 1964). In Chile, Petras and Zeitlin (1970: 510-522) noted that the introduction of the single ballot in 1958 greatly aided the reform-oriented and radical parties in the country. The mutual exchange of votes against the spoils of the agrarian reform in Venezuela has been documented in detail by Powell (1969). It is in the context of such political transformations that clientelistic political systems have emerged in Latin America. Within these systems, formal campesino organizations became intermediary agencies which were on the one hand patrons to their members (see above), and on the other hand clients to the government. The degree to which these client organizations could pressure the governments for pro-agrarian programs depended essentially on the power which the mass of campesinos exercised through its free disposition over arms (as in Bolivia), influence peddlers (as in Brazil), or votes (as in Venezuela). The point, however, is that these capabilities in themselves were often "favors" and "gifts" from a government which needed a mass base, and these gifts could be taken away forcefully by other governments. The fate of campesino movements, formal or informal, has thus invariably depended on the fate of sympathetic governments and other political allies. This has been true in Mexico (see Huizer, 1970, 1967), Venezuela (see Powell, 1971, 1969; Huizer, 1967), Guatemala (Pearson, 1969; Murphy, 1970; R. N. Adams, 1960), Bolivia (Heath, 1969; Patch, 1960; Dandler, 1971; Huizer, 1967: 147-149), Peru (Matos Mar, 1967; Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969; Craig, 1969, 1967; CIDA, 1966c), Brazil (Hewitt, 1969; Wilkie, 1964; Moraes, 1970; Galjart, 1965, 1964; Leeds, 1964), and Chile (Walker Linares, 1953; Landsberger, 1969b; Petras, 1966). In all these countries, the degree of success of campesino organizations has been directly related to the degree of support or tolerance they have received from governments and political
parties (see also R. N. Adams, 1964: 64-68). While campesinos have often formed organizations that were able to put pressure on the government, the degree of their political autonomy was variable and a direct function of their control over arms and votes. Campesino movements have been relatively successful when high-level political sponsors have (a) directly organized the movement from the outside (Venezuela, Guatemala, large parts of Bolivia and Brazil), (b) had to bargain with the campesinos for military or electoral support in return for legal and administrative measures (Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico under Zapata, Chile), (c) intervened militarily, politically, or judicially on behalf of the campesinos (all pertinent countries), or (d) adopted a "neutral" strategy and thereby deprived the landholders of their traditional monopoly over institutional means of repression. Such policies have been erratic and frequently reversed in different countries, usually due to military coups. But it appears that there is a general trend in Latin America toward the incorporation of the peasantry as a power factor into the national political systems. The degree to which campesinos are the manipulators or the manipulated, varies with different macro-political structures over which they have relatively little control. Imbalances in traditional patron-campesino relations derived from changes in definitions can be reflected in enlarged cognitive capacity, changing perceptions, and changing evaluations of current outcomes. Hypothesis6: Campesino movements tend to developwhen there areincreases the campesinos' in cognitive capacity. Such a cognitive transformation increases the number of alternatives of which individuals are aware and thereby reduces dependence on traditional adaptations. Indirect indicators of cognitive capacity are levels of literacy and education, availability of reference sources outside the community, and the complexity of the social structure within the community. Internal differentiation, expanding communication and transportation, migration, and travel are processes which can be
Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [61]
expected to positively affect the cognitive capacity of individuals. Studies consistently reveal that education is a prime goal among campesinos who undergo great sacrifices to obtain it at least for their children (e.g., Cotler, 1970a: 556; Wagley, 1964: 41; Tullis, 1970: ch. 6). In Peru's Mantaro valley and Bolivia's Cochabamba valley, increased education among younger campesinos has led to class organization and resistance to the status quo (Tullis, 1970: ch. 6; Alberti, 1970a: 123, 1970b: 184-195; Dandler, 1971: 42-43, 53-55, 102). The effects of increased communication have received little systematic exploration. There is some speculation that increased exposure to radio and newspapers by Chilean inquilinos has been a factor contributing to rural syndicalization (Petras and Zemelman, 1969: 6, 18); in Brazil, it has been suggested that the concentration of formerly dispersed moradores on the sugar plantations in compact settlements along the roads has facilitated the communication and shared expression of discontent in the 1950s and 1960s (Furtado, 1964: 152; Forman, 1971: 4-5; Lopes, 1966: 200). A number of studies in different countries has suggested an association between the development of campesino movements and increased accessibility of reference sources in neighboring communities, town and market centers, mining centers, or plantations in other regions of the country. The main reference sources available in these areas have been schools and universities, industrial and mining unions, and wage earners with universalistic contractual ties to rural employers.15 Various forms of migratory experiences have been related to campesino movements. In Chile, seasonal migration has been associated with new occupational experiences and left-wing voting (Petras and Zeitlin, 1970). Radicalization in association with migration into an area has been observed in Peru's Chancay valley (Matos Mar, 1967: 12-13) and La Convencion valley (Craig, 1967: 28-30). Return migrants with experience in schools and mines have disproportionately contributed to the leadership and active participation in rural organizations in Peru's Mantaro valley (Tullis, 1970: ch. 7; Alberti, 1970a, 1970b: 184-185, 197). Many prominent campesino leaders such
AFFAIRS OF STUDIESANDWORLD [62] JOURNAL INTERAMERICAN
as Rojas in Bolivia, Blanco in Peru, Zapata and Tapia in Mexico, as well as many others, have either moved into rural communities from the outside or had experience in the cities, the armed forces, or even abroad. These observations suggest that increased cognitive capacity of campesinos may contribute to rural unrest in Latin America. But such a relationship should develop only when increased cognitive capacity is accompanied with a stagnant or declining opportunity structure. This thesis has been elaborated and supported by a number of studies in Peru (Tullis, 1970; Weldon, 1968; Craig, 1967; Alberti, 1970a, 1970b). These studies all point to the significance of imbalance, inconsistency, or "structural binds" as disequilibrating factors in the development of campesino movements.
Hypothesis 7: Campesino movements tendto develop whencampe-
sinosperceive alternative coursesof actionandimproved chances of success suchresponses. for Changing perceptions include redefinitions of the political situation and changing self-images, perceptions of new models for conduct, and changing expectations of future outcomes. While it remains plausible to postulate the significance of redefinitions of the political situation and of changing selfimages for the development of campesino movements, direct evidence for this proposition is scarce. Dandler (1971: 84-85, 101-102, 111-114, 167) has reported manifestations of class consciousness in the early phases of the rural syndicate in Ucurefia, Bolivia, and recorded reflections of a Puerto Rican cane worker (Mintz, 1960: 186) clearly indicate a shifting political awareness from paternalism to clientelism. Successful campesino syndicates have been models for conduct among nonmembers and neighboring villagers in several areas of Peru (Craig, 1967: 36-37; Alberti, 1970a: 134; Matos Mar, 1967: 7), Bolivia (Dandler, 1971: 43-44), and Brazil (Juliao, 1962: 30). It is reasonable to assume, however, that such models have been effective not by their example alone but also by virtue of the demonstration that their adaptation had a realistic chance of success. Successful campesino movements thus change the
Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [63]
expectations of others that the risks involved in the process may pay off. Such changing expectations are also reflected in the repeated observation that spontaneous unrest tends to break out in the countryside when a new president is elected who is believed to be sympathetic to the agrarian cause. Such outbreaks occurred in Chile after the election of Salvador Allende. Similar incidents occurred after the elections of Lopez Michelsen in Colombia (1 934), Belaiunde in Peru (1 963), Villaroel (1943) and Paz (1952) in Bolivia, and Frei in Chile (1964). There is little evidence to be found for the proposition that changing evaluations have contributed to campesino mobilization. While this may have been the case in some places, it appears that in general agrarian movements arise not when campesinos change their values and needs, but when existing needs are no longer satisfied, when traditional values are threatened, or when new opportunities arise (and are perceived) which grant the expression of existing discontent a realistic chance of success (see Huizer, 1969).
Conclusions
This paper has outlined an exchange-theoretical framework for the analysis of campesino movements in Latin America which postulates that power, macrostructural constraints and opportunities, and subjective definitions on the part of the actors constitute significant factors intervening in the transactions between Jandlordsand campesinos. A broad overview of the proposed approach has been given at the expense of more detailed issue analysis. A number of hypotheses were derived from the theoretical framework and examined in the light of historical evidence. I submit that in view of this evidence the theoretical scheme outlined at the beginning appears to merit attention for its potential to explain and predict the development of campesino movements in Latin America. For this purpose, a more refined conceptualization will be needed so that more precise hypotheses can be derived than were presented in this paper.
The general thesis which emerges from the preceding presentation is that the traditional distribution of wealth and power in Latin America has produced extremely unilateral exchanges and dependencies between landholders and campesinos. For the campesinos, this meant two things: first, acquiescence to the landholders' demands and cognitive adaptations were the most realistic responses to powerlessness and dependence; second, scarcity and dependence in the rural community gave rise to conflict and competition among the campesinos while at the same time encouraging the establishment of particularistic loyalties between individual campesinos and their patron, at the expense of class solidarity. Changes in this pattern developed with shifts in macro-structuralbalances of power which reduced the campesinos' subordination to, and dependence on, the landholders. The improvements in the campesinos' bargaining position at once increased the feasibility of active responses to exchange imbalances (as in the form of campesino movements) and removed one principal obstacle to intraclass solidarity (the brokerage monopoly of the patron). While these are admittedly crude generalizations which have different degrees of applicability in the various parts of the subcontinent, they may be a useful point of departure for a more refined analysis.
NOTES
1. For original formulations of cognitive dissonance theory, see Festinger (1957). For thorough refinements and assessments of cognitive dissonance theory and other cognitive consistency theories, see Brehm and Cohen (1962); Shaw and Costanzo (1970: 188-218). 2. While the term "campesino" is used to denote almost all poor rural dwellers (compare Adams, 1967: 91), the discussion is in this paper limited to those campesinos who interact with a landholder as renters, sharecroppers, colonos, or wage laborers-part-time or full-time. Excluded are independent smallholders and members of indigenous communities, even though these may also in various ways depend on a landholder, e.g., for marketing their produce, water rights, and rights of way. It is only when these groups enter into labor relations with the patron of a neighboring hacienda or when a neighboring hacendado encroaches upon their lands that the theory advanced here may become relevant for them. 3. These parameters have been widely analyzed and are generally fairly well understood. For the purpose of this paper, they will, therefore, be only briefly summarized. For a more detailed analysis, see the references cited.
Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [651 4. For some general observations on arbitrary labor/tenancy arrangements in rural Latin America, see Pearse (1970); Barraclough and Domike (1970: 53-54). A general discussion of the colono pattern can be found in Schulman (1955); Tannenbaum (1960: 81-82). For case studies and descriptions of labor aild teniancy exchanges in various countries see Centro Interamericano de Desarrollo A-ricola (1966a, 1966b: 125-131, 1966c: 112-113, 1965: 38-41, 135-151, 158-168); Cotler (1970a: 543-545); Erasmus (1967: 553-556); Heath et al. (1969); Tullis (1970: ch. 6); Martinez (1967, 1963a); Palacio (1961, 1960, 1957a, 1957b); Silva-Herzog (1959: 133-137). 5. Feder (1971, 1969) and Barraclough and Domike (1970) have provided an excellent analysis of the economic obstacles standing in the way of improvements for campesinos. Valuable case studies have been provided in all of the CIDA studies, especially the one on Brazil (1966a). 6. For some general observation of regionalism and caudillismo, see Tannenbaum (1960: 66-76, 136-172), Beezley (1969), Moreno (1971), and Guillen Martinez (1963: e.g., 84). For an analysis of the Brazilian variant, coronelismo, see Nunes Leal (1948), Vianna (1949: 1). 7. Penetrating analyses of the political macrostructures surrounding local bossism have been provided for Brazil by Vianna (1949: I) and Nunes Leal (1948). On political stakes and conceptualizations in terms of "ins" versus "outs," see these same authors and Daniel (1965: ch. 3), Guillen Martinez (1963: 150), Payne (1965: 269), Dix (1967: 231), Wolf (1969: 264-268). See also the general descriptions by Landy (1959: 54-56), Tannenbaum (1960: 136-172), and Fals-Borda (1955: 241-244). 8. These traits are: distrust in interpersonal relations, lack of innovativeness, fatalism, low levels of aspiration, absence of deferred gratification, limited time perspective, familism, dependence on government authority, lack of cosmopolitanism, and low level of empathy. 9. In the receptive character orientation, a person feels the source of all good to lie outside himself and expects the good things to be "given" to him as favors or because he has been so "good" or in "need." The superior's "goodness" is perceived to be a more important determinant of the reception of rewards than the person's own efforts. Thus, receptive persons "fall for" anyone who gives them what is perceived as love and affection (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970: 69-70). In the hoarding orientation people have little faith of anything new that comes from the outside world. Security is derived from saving and hoarding while spending is perceived as a threat. They surround themselves quasi with a protective wall and retreat into exclusive solidarity with the family (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970: 71). Such character orientations do not exist under mutual exclusion but may overlap. 10. Submissiveness was conceptualized in psychodynamic terms, while acceptance of traditional authority designated a cultural pattern which emphasized historical continuity as a source of security and meaning (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970: 80-81). 11. Such conflicts have been described by Lewis (1960: 47), Tullis (1970: 81-84), Craig (1967: 72), and Alberti (1970a: 79-92). They involve conflicts within the village community over land boundaries during agrarianreform surveys, conflicts between villages within a municipio over the utilization of communal lands, or conflicts between ex-colonos of an expropriated hacienda and the members of adjoining indigenous communities over the original title to the lands of the former hacienda. See also the related analysis of divisions in peasant movements by Landsberger and Hewitt (1970).
[661 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 12. The gradual economic declines in Mexico during the second half of the nineteenth century have been analyzed by Silva-Herzog (1958: 104-105, 127-128), Wolf (1969: 19-2 1), and White (1969: 120-1 21). For Bolivia, see Heath (1969: 197), Heath et al. (1969: 117), and Dandler (1971: 100). For Venezuela, see Powell (1969: 63-64). For Colombia, see Gilhodes (1970: 413, 421-422). For Brazil, see Furtado (1964: 149-153), Lopes (1966: 198), Mitchell (1967), CIDA (1966c), and Foland (1968a, 1968b). 13. Perhaps some of the best-known new brokers are Padres Melo and Crespo (heads of large church-oriented rural syndicates in Northeast Brazil), Francisco Juliao (the lawyer-politician who led the peasant leagues of Northeast Brazil), Otilio Montafio (the schoolteacher who drafted the revolutionary Plan de Ayala with Emiliano Zapata in Mexico), and Hugo Blanco (a former university student who emerged as a leader of the peasant movement in La Convencion, Peru). The role of persons such as teachers and lawyers assisting campesinos in Peruvian and Bolivian communities has been described in detail by Tullis (1970: ch. 6) and Dandler (1971: 87-90). Blondel (1957) has described the influence of the novos politicos (new politicians) who challenged the dominance of the traditional coroneis in a Brazilian rural community. Landsberger (1969b) described in detail the intervention of labor union leaders, members of the clergy, and government officials in settling a vineyard workers' strike in Chile. 14. See note 1. For further references on urban and middle-class leadership, see Moraes (1970), Hewitt (1969), Pearson (1969: 346-350), Cotler and Portocarrero (1969: 306-307), Quijano (1965). For the characteristics of indigenous campesino leaders in La Convenci6n, Peru, see Craig (1967: 37-38); for Venezuela, see Powell (1969: 81-83); for Latin America in general, see Quijano (1967). 15. For data on Chile, see Petras and Zeitlin (1970) and Petras and Zemelman (1969). For Peru, see Tullis (1970: ch. 6) and Alberti (1970a, 1970b). For Bolivia, see Dandler (1971: 25-27, 38).
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Campesino Movements and Class Conflict in Latin America: The Functions of Exchange and Power Author(s): Peter Singelmann

Departmentof Sociology University Missouri of on leaveto LatinAmerican Teaching Fellowships,Mexico

This paper will attempt to evaluate the utility of exchange

[40] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASSCONFLICT / [411

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Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT (431

OF STUDIESAND WORLD AFFAIRS [44] JOURNAL INTERAMERICAN

Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [451

[46] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASSCONFLICT / [471

AFFAIRS STUDIESAND WORLD OF [481 JOURNAL INTERAMERICAN

Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASSCONFLICT / [491

OF STUDIESAND WORLD AFFAIRS [501 JOURNAL INTERAMERICAN

AND CLASSCONFLICT ] MOVEMENTS Singelmann CAMPESINO / [51

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Campesino Movements and Reequilibra tion

Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASSCONFLICT ] [53 /

[541 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

AND CLASSCONFLICT Singelmann CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS / [551

Figure 1: THE OPEN TRIANGLE

Figure 2: THE CLOSED TRIANG;LE

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Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [571

[58] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

AND CLASSCONFLICT MOVEMENTS Singelmann CAMPESINO [59] /

[601 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [61]

AFFAIRS OF STUDIESANDWORLD [62] JOURNAL INTERAMERICAN

Singelmann / CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS AND CLASS CONFLICT [63]

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