Aristotle's Polity and the Role ofFriendship

Katelyn Abraham South Dakota State University

It is clear that all partnerships aim at some good, and that the partnership that is most authoritative ofall and embraces all the others does so particularly, and aims at the most authoritative good ofall. This is what is called the city or the political partnership. (Aristotle 1984b, 1252a3-6)

So begins Aristotles Politics, one ofphilosophys earliest understandings ofthe perfect, or at least most attainable, regime for most men. Through Aristotles exploration ofperfect friendship, as taken from the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, one sees that Aristotles polity requires the idea offriendship to work at full potential. Aristotle claims that the ultimate goal ofevery individual, the final and perfect good, is to be selfsufficient (Aristotle 1984a). At first glance, this goal seems contradictory to the idea offriendship as a basis ofthe good polity. Yet, when Aristotle discusses different types ofregimes in Politics, Aristotle states that the city is to be self-sufficient, not the individuals living within the city. Cities are not built specifically to protect the citizens from injustice, although this is one consequence ofproviding a community that lives well. Families and villages, not individual men, come together to form cities. Political partnerships are formed for the sake ofnobler causes than simply living together. Affection, and therefore friendship, is the intentional choice ofliving together (Aristotle 1984b, 1280b30-1281a7). For each individual to be self-sufficient there would have to be no city at all. Each person does not live his life in isolation, but with family, friends, and other citizens. Each person wants to appear selfsufficient, but his or her social nature does not allow it (Aristotle 1984a, 1097b10). Each person is inherently a political being, who seek to live in a community not only out ofnecessity but for common advantage. For Aristotle, life itselfhas a natural sweetness, (Aristotle 1984a, 1278b18-30) , but this sweetness has no meaning without friends. Aristotle lists mans need for friendship. Friends help guard ones wealth, provide solace in times ofsuffering, and keep the young from error and the elderly in good health. For those in their prime, friendship stimulates them to noble action, the origin ofthe idea that two heads are better than one. Friends are also the best beneficiaries, for it most laudable to give gifts to ones friends (Aristotle 1984a, 1115a5-15). Independently, friendship has many benefits; but when placed into the larger context ofthe city, those benefits are intensified. Before examining the meaning offriendship, Aristotle argues one must look at the values that lead to it. Once gaining the first moral value, magnanimity, a person can reach for the next, justice. Magnanimity, as defined by Aristotle, is the completion ofpersonal virtue. It is moral virtue brought to self-awareness when an individual knows his or her own ability to act in a noble manner (Sokoloswki 2002, 451).

Aristotle's Polity and the Role ofFriendship

53

Aristotle specifically personifies magnanimity in the Homeric hero Achilles (Cain 2008). The process of achieving each virtue can overlap, but justice cannot be completed without magnanimity (1123b11125a34). Although pride has its own problems, magnanimity is important to friendship because the magnanimous person remembers the good deeds he or she has done, but not the ones they have received. Benefactors are superior to the recipients, and the magnanimous person, striving always for superiority, will never cease to do good deeds unto others. The mark ofa magnanimous person is to ask ofnothing for him or herself and instead give help freely (Aristotle 1984a, 1124b15). A true friend will be proud ofhis or her friends and what he or she can do for them. He or she builds them up from himselfor herself, but unlike the true friend, the magnanimous person will never build his or her friends up so high that they are his or her equals. Having equals, as friends, would deprive the magnanimous person oftheir magnanimity. Magnanimity is the first step to an understanding ofjustice. Justice exceeds the other virtues because it applies to more than the individuals impulses and desires; it is about an individuals relationship with others. All moral virtues involve the exercise ofreason (Sokolowski 2002, 452). Justice is reason glorified to do what is best for everyone (451). Justice allows the individual to overcome personal interests and evaluate himselfor herselfas equal with others. Morality from justice does not come from nature alone; it must be practiced and perfected. Inclination, without habituation, leads only to whim (461). Aristotles definition ofjustice takes the popular definition and adds in the elements ofhabit and choice. A just person does the right thing because it has become a second nature to him or her. He or she is the sort ofperson who divides goods equally and does not reserve the best for him or herself. Equality in justice does not mean equal division between parties, but proportional division (Aristotle 1984a, 1134a17). Aristotle does not define what the proportion is, but rather leaves that up to the individual communities and their respective regimes, for the ratio ofgood to evil is dependent on perspective (1131b17-23). Justice itselfis proportional, proportion becomes intermediary, and injustice violates the proportion. The proportion itselfis not continuous, so it is impossible to name. Aristotle leaves justice with a limited, but specific definition, being that justice lies in the proportionate division ofgoods (1131b10-16). All the same, practical reason does not reach its culmination in justice alone. Reason finds its highest employment in friendship, which completes all other moral virtues (Sokolowski, 452). Friendships vary, but fall into one ofthree categories. Some friendships are pleasant, where one friend enjoys the company ofthe other. Other friendships are useful, and each friend provides something ofutility to the other. Although, the best kind offriendship is the perfect friendship, where the good ofone becomes the good ofthe other. Friendship is more than an emotional bond, it is an exultation not only in sentiment but in intelligence as well (459). Friendships built offutility are the lowest form because they are formed to some advantage. As soon as the advantage is gone, so is the friendship. Useful friendships are never permanent. Aristotle states that this type ofrelationship exists chiefly between old people because they only pursue the useful, and not the pleasant. Friendships based in pleasure are given a broader usage. They exist primarily for the young, who live under the constant guidance ofemotion. Young people pursue what is immediately before them,

54

Katelyn Abraham

but as they age, their preferences change. Their friendships change as quickly, ifnot more so, than their preferences. Even when the young fall in love, it is a fickle relationship that may fade away within a day (Aristotle 1984a, 1156a22-1156b6). With so many failed friendships, Aristotle requires the idea ofa perfect friendship, as a guide for all friendships. The fact that each bad relationship, no matter how bad, contains some element ofthe perfect friendship is an optimistic metaphor for bad regimes. Some regimes are meant to fall apart. Regimes built for one utilitarian purpose will not last past its purpose. Others may stand a chance based upon the merit oftheir pleasantness, but as stated above, pleasure can be a very fickle mistress. Only the regimes that are rooted in virtue and distributive justice will have endurance. Aristotle observed that friendship is often the glue that binds cities together. Lawmakers care more about harmony than they do about justice, for unanimity feels something like friendship, and unanimity is what they aim for politically. When men are friends they have no need ofjustice, for it is part of friendship, while the just person still wants friendship to complete them. The truest form ofjustice is that which one finds in friendship (Aristotle 1984a, 1155a22-7). The polity is an agreement to live together. Each citizen knows they have certain duties that the political system recognizes. In a similar fashion, perfect friendship is reciprocal and mutually acknowledged. Only a just person can be a true friend; without justice, friendship becomes blind partiality (Sokolowski, 461). Friendship is not an alternative to justice but a completion ofit. This is displayed more clearly through an example ofvice. Vice prevents perfect friendship because an individual cannot step away from him or herself. Useful and pleasant friendships may be attainable, but the unjust person cannot enlarge their soul to include the good ofothers. A person cannot be loved in return, because they cannot love anyone other than themselves (461). This is why tyranny is devastating both personally and politically, because in tyranny there is little or no friendship (Aristotle 1984a, 1161a32). How does friendship apply to the polity as a whole? The fact that Aristotle chooses to begin his philosophy with the idea ofpartnershipwhich by definition means that each individual participates, at least to ones own ability says that it is one ofthe most important foundations for the polity. Cities are partnerships ofvillages, which are partnerships ofhouseholds, which are partnerships ofindividuals. The polity itselfis a partnership oftwo other forms ofregimes the oligarchy and democracy. Ifproperly blended, citizens can call it either an oligarchy or a democracy or both (1294b12-16). That is why the polity has no real name, only the general Greek term for a political partnership. The defining characteristic ofan aristocracy, according to Aristotle, is virtue and for democracy, freedom. The third characteristic that defines regimes is wealth. Ifa polity should incorporate all three ofthese characteristics, Aristotle would classify it as a more aristocratic regime (1294b9-25). The polity therefore is more based upon virtue than any other characteristic. Iffriendship, according to the Nicomachean Ethics, is the most excellent ofall virtues, then the most defining characteristic ofthe polity is the virtue offriendship. Friendship can play a vital part in the governing structure ofthe polity. Aristotle describes the ideal political system for the most people as a system where the ruling class fluctuates in power, with each

Aristotle's Polity and the Role ofFriendship

55

person serving in political office for a period (Aristotle 1984b, 1294a35-1294b13). The idea is that each will do what is not only good for him or her while that person is in office, but also what is good for him or her when he or she is out ofpower. The good each ruler implements will be good for everyone out of power, because power is only temporary and no ruler would want to punish him or herself. The polity, by nature, equalizes the oligarchs and the masses so that both have a hand in government. Aristotles polity does not have the problem ofinvoluntary rulers such as Platos Republic. The philosopher king would rather philosophize than rule the political world ofhis inferiors (Plato 1968, 517d). Within Aristotles polity, each person wants to rule and wants to do justicewhat is not only good for the one ruling, but for all citizens. Friendship, because ofthe underlying quality ofjustice, makes persons politically selfish and selfless at the same time. In either case, the result is the same, policies that attempt to make everyones life better. Persons address their fellows and acquaintances with the community as friends. The extent oftheir association is the extent oftheir friendship (Aristotle 1984a, 1159b27-28). In a political system where political rule shifts from person to person, the association between individuals should strengthen dramatically. Aristotle never imagined large cities, only self-sufficient ones. In the self-sufficient city, everyone would know everyone. Ideally, every citizen within the polity will have a perfect friendship with every other citizen. Each would want the best for every other, and in doing such; grant him or her the best. The possibility ofthis actually occurring is slim. Aristotle addresses this throughout books eight and nine in the Nicomachean Ethics, stating early that perfect friendships are naturally infrequent because perfect people, full ofboth magnanimity and justice, are rare (1156b25-32). Later he states that persons always wish what is the greatest good ofthem, even in wishing his or her friends good (1159a11-13). Because perfect friendship is unattainable for most citizens, and it is the measure for the quality ofall friendships, it is a cornerstone ofthe polity because citizens strive for friendship in any form, beginning with utility, moving to pleasure, and growing toward perfection. Friendship also plays an important role in decreasing, ifnot eliminating faction within the polity. To begin a relationship, individuals must find something in common. In a perfect friendship, the similarity is moral excellence, and ifthis were the dominant friendship, there would be no factional conflict at all. As this is not the case, friendship must provide another answer. Friendship based upon pleasure can provide enough commonality for the relationship to develop further based on familiarity. The greatest threat of imperfect friendships is that they can fall apart very quickly. Once the element offamiliarity is introduced, the friendship moves closer to a perfect friendship and towards greater longevity and stability (115b33-16). The greater the similarity ofparties creates fewer factions within the city. The easiest way to find political similarities is through friendship. Throughout Aristotles political writings, friendship is not only a necessary virtue, but also the most excellent one. Friendship is the epitome ofpride and justice; pride so that each wants to give more than take, and justice so that all may be equal. Friendship creates better citizens because friends see each other on a more level playing field. Ideally, friends see each other as complete equals, which would lead to the best citizens. Friends also work toward the good ofeach other; citizens ofthis caliber would create a

56

Katelyn Abraham

progressive polity. Without the virtue offriendship, the polity is subject to faction and demise. Friendship is an essential part ofthe proper functioning ofAristotles polity.
Works Cited

Aristotle. 1984a. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works ofAristotle (vol. 2), edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by W.D. Ross. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Aristotle. 1984b. Politics. Translated by Carnes Lord. Chicago: University ofChicago Press. Cain, Patrick. 2008. The Politics ofFamily in Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics. Paper presented at the annual meeting ofthe Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA. Plato. 1968. Republic. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books. Sokolowski, Robert. 2002. Phenomenology ofFriendship. The Review ofMetaphysics 55(3): 451-470.