\u25a0

to- other units. 300,000 .men were transferred into the- XnSpj[ ' .30-, 000 to the SS. The forming of paraphute regiments"' cause &[\u25a0 y '***\u25a0." . another cut into PIale personnel. Finally, of the original men,'/: y [ -' only tho^e -.-.'ere left who were 'absolutely needed, The men who' \ veie wi-thdrawn were replaced by foreigners, women and .GrAF-helpers.: . down to 15 years of age., : / A
'
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'

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batteries,

79.

Afc3 a' rule, women were only employed -\u25a0" . . .

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on search-light .
\u25a0

- :; ' \u25a0' : . FI?lc Batteries , , . 80." Elak was. constantly 'augmented, batteries of four nieces being increased -to 6," 8 and 1.2 pieces;* After 'the -beginning"" of. our day-bombing .att AC'k'S, Flak batteries' were -, augmeh/te;d as' fa.st as the gun?; could.be. produced,' AA guns -having '".a first- priority, in production. .apbr.oximi?.tel ry 12, QQ'CTheavy guns. At the end there
\u25a0

'

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'81.. The ratio between fighter approximately 2:1, Flak -personnel their claiTas^ that ".'h :iv&ver they claimed was recognized.
1

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.41

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.32, There was no particular purpose in- the' fact 'that :ce r'tain routos were left free of Flak, _- The .reason was simply that GERMANY had not sufficient AA guns to protect everything; and this despite the' feet that, as GOBBING' claimed, GERMAHY had .the greatest I?lak for6-e' in -tko "/orld, However, certain important' targets had first _ . ,j - , , ; . ,'\u25a0;..\u25a0 -. >\u25a0 .\ 83,. Tliere- was a heavy .J*l.^k- Barrage beimnd the >West ;Wall*:-and behind .this .barrage were numerous Flak For%s.".''"''\u25a0\u25a0
t

-.

j..

j.

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Cooperation". Cooper ation'.

r> r\ between n ueween fighters and Flak was very good*, \u25a0' The Flriok -Kihrer was in the CP of the Jagddi vision^ .

84. o^.

Cocpr.s,tion uocper.iiuion
,

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/-,

MISCELLAHEOUg.
i^

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; -.and -had :mA&/j:M \u0084aalGul;^ton \u25a0ie-cordf iigX^; ;.Mi^'i^B;sa#ief : QWW ted v:v;pi?: ^^|i>o.ris \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 fessea-. . i-t0 ytja^.^'i&p^^ | S.ui S.ui 1 : : '\u25a0:%M: ;.;6r!3.8:^.-SGJ -:^i|^!tS1 vay^^emattee'v; : .: )"':<'' COIS&; in "fciie ;)iH %M Gj-ILa^S .area,^ ; .Til ';GOxSJ^G h:^ -.: /: crippliiig: of^tie. Lu^twaffe,;
;
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:

?MkS : aM a/a returned

to their 'xOine bases.

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The Luftwaffe s /Hew Year Is 'greetings, 1 January 1945* 86, Although the 1 January 1945 attack wes ordered by G-OBRING-, the c:tuse for it w-is - so GOSRING said HITLER 1 8 interference^ once -Again. Prior to this Gf-OEKE IJG- htid deployed liis entire fighter
'\u25a0 strength- in a long .line from the West of G-ERMAIY to-- the East.^ His
intention- .was to'~eng:ige the 'Allied fighter escorts along the entire
. line,- In the triiddle of November 1944, however, HITLER ordered- that jt, the line be turned hixcl t Lpy^d in.'.a^pr.tl^feSfluth/-

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: ; ; .;'; :-.- ::'; v? Sl'. ;:T>i;e ;21 jcm-vrocket waa ueitiv' .for the :^ir:g:t ;;- time. ,^n Si^mffier^ : t-;-w@s--";ii;si?i;CtJil. t \u25a0;;tQ;- Ql^se- . :{-I .\u25a0 .'\u25a0Vl 9 4sv'v-v3(fc.s iiae %g-s aCscdHt'inu'e^;;be;aaase : i \u25a0k: i2'.\u 5a0\u25a0' ;-"'4n .jon; t&g . borner in::the exac;t >4istanoe far :w&iciri;' tHe ;cie tQn;Jtor^ .<-.\u25a0 :" r-l ; : SSv v? '\u25a0\u25a0 ::W&a. . :se ti;'.';;> ':, \u25a0; \u25a0.:;\u25a0;.\u25a0\u25a0:\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0 : -\u25a0; k;^; \u25a0\u25a0;. :; y; \u25a0\u25a0:-.<;-\u25a0 . :V - :;\u25a0'> :. . ;\u25a0 v;;"0:'.;>v>^J \u25a0;?>\u25a0 .;:,^\ -/\u25a0 /:::: \ '; \u25a0';.: ;\u25a0 \u25a0>\u25a0'.: :: . -:.' ;I

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;' /:\u25a0\u25a0;:' .-. v- . I^^^r^^y^^Q^6i:'^ii^n: : -y^ te2?;, andvEG- ;26 ;, ! GEUR CHIlift-: feec.a>me :Prims^Miiiis : aad/been:|int,en:dM vry/ : . \u25a0'-\u25a0. the& /carried' out on. a sms.!! scale, . wha't;y originally : \u25a0' ::
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all~-out; ;efort.. .

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;- \ month. At' the end \ of the war, -the a/c ,was already in . production, but :Ln all only, 1-40 had.'/ been delivered, Oberst '": : - GrQ'LIi'OP after testing th,e : j SeY.l'-62 vto ld 'BHAUGIIIiSCH 'that' its endur' \u25a0' : 'anee on- the deck''was -2Q minuses with .full' throttle, jiha.t. it v/as "' ,' \ good a/c "but of no mili/bary importance^. . ,".'' ''..- _, 'Me 163* /'.'- "\u25a0 ;\u25a0 '-.'\u25a0' . '--"..' \u25a0;-' 108-. _ Th's Me 163-., the fastest of all the' j.et/a/c so' far pro" _ dutJed, had almost' the speed of a rocket but because', of .its cxV ; trembly short range, 'it was to be" based in the,, vicinity of important '' '\u25a0 . '. oil targets "for protective parpos.es,

a/o

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series

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d -It/ -co ill hcive been produced $uch f-aster than rt actually w.as,- but on account -of personal -differences- between -its desi'gnier, , Prof 'LlpPlseii; and Prof. LISSSERSCHMITT, its production was neg-^

109

lee ted in favor- of the Me

2-62

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11-o'* The .manufacture of' tha Me- 1.63 finally had tpv.be xlis continued "altogether becaase of I'aclc .of the necessary fuel, (C-Stoff) which could no longer be produced. . :
\u25a0

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111.' xofx 0f all the jet a/c, the Me "262 hc-,d- been planned to be -first one to go' into" mas s--pr eduction in August 1944. However, the .\u25a0for the reasons 'outlined in -the next section -dealing its operational use,, production was delayed."' The' planned, production' ' figures could , therefore, not be- attained, . . .
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*
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'The original plan called fo-r 500 a/c for .December 1944, per month for January and February,, and 800 for March 1945,. 500/600 -The 'highest, output reported by the industry was 280 a/c .in March" '1945, but actual deliveries to operational units to tailed- -only - Altogether, 1400 Me 262' s had been- built - 190 a/c for that month. by the end of the 7var, Over.' half iof these 1400 a/c were lost, conversion, train through our bomb. attacks on their 'A/Ds, crashes, ing and '-other causes. Of the 700 a/c 'which be cane operational, the greater p^rt was lost in combat, \u25a0'through' crashes or defec/bs in the propulsion units. A -number were destroyed by the' Germans at the 'end of the war. '

112.

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113% tiombing attaclcs on the Llessersohmitt plant caused, according to OOERING-, merely slight -delay but no. decisive .set-back. to a somewhat lesser extent He stated 'that the seine holds true 'of the effect of "bombing of the Junkers plants making the 'jet propulsion units for the Me 262.
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'

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delay v/as caused when it became necessary to abandon underground factories', not on account of bombing, but rather bec-a^e of ,the 'advance of our ground forces. With the railway system thorougnly disorganized, as it vas following our' constant bombing_ _ attacks,' removal from one underground, factory _. _. - _ .. _ _ . .. . " to another was compile at eel and took considerable time.. Without this difficulty,- underground production," according to G-OERING-, would' have increased over the previous -surface output,, sis ander -

114.

A. more serious

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ground production was concentrated .raid' therefore, eliminated delay caused by wide, dispersal of component' factories,
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the -

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of Me 262s 'by a .shortage of main components waa handicapped caused by. our . 'bombing as Tell .as by the e4yance 'of our ground forces, to the RUHR

115.

In the last stage

of the war, the production

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x 115,, &O"I7IiNG- Wias "aslc^d ; -"W-Uat was ' the reason for the .-/->>:'. :;V in...the use pf the Me. 262 as a -fighter?"" "^roj&ptly and excxte-SiJKv-.- '/ \: v '-c-jne the answer: "ADOLF HITLER Is, madness" (-<Der Wahnsimr-'-Adolf^ r' \u25a0" ''"\u25a0 v ;' > f s! \u25a0Hitler l lie elaborated' this statement with tn& following' -ex-. I planet! on:" 'When the first' Me 2bZ, left,the : assembly line In May ..;'.< '.-, - . 1944, G'OXjRIiJCr confidently, and full of hope for .a revival of*.- -the ,\ ; to .ADOLF HITLER as the fightey , G-AI? 1 s' fighter strength,; .presented it .' 7v';iioh' war?' to sweep Allied air /power 'froia t'l+e. skies. /
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.117,

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aa-- a fighter .~ H rleoiiigifrte He oi do rod tlu't the ai'ia^m 250 kg bombs be o<r.r to.--the fv-ct th.u.t ,a KITLHI su^cottid .th^t c th^mby :aiao increasing norc?.nce, st/.ted. G-QEHIBCr, fuel would bo consumed, i retu-m* .
1

xIITLEP sal'^i - "I

To GrO'j.-RIUCr19" and

Everybody else *,s 'surprise

and 'const erin jbhi's plkne - \ to "a, bomber.,- /\u25a0 "x 500' kg or 2 oc

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attention
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the' *^/<3*.v !-lITLI".E in- his, ,ig-' .isse that -slnc-e this extra > 5- 'or;lgin9.1 unb^l:aice would
>

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the

iron-t

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118 i li.ITXjT;R even went @j j3P^l3? ...a \u25a0%o' l%iwe G-OESXIfG- issue 'a written c^dcx strictly f-orfei^iiiaf -that the a/c be referred to as a fighter. He wanted it t be- called a "Blitzboinber;"-. .!'\u25a0".
,

119 * u-encralToutnant 4Hu#, fpw&g *nd f.^mbus G-erman;-fight|r ' Pi.ghte^joammd"r)^-V (got^f=-p4'4?% ace^ Gcn^rsu. rder Jagdflie^oo? |>t %#..pte# by o tlier fighter -p'ilpts ,;. embittered b; this decision;' 0f long and fame', t^i^Ht.!' fi^it Efi^LER and 'had a heated argument \^'ith him^ On HI-'TLlp\#- i%in%.%tem y GOERIN& - had _' then to ' '_\u25a0"\u25a0 dismiss G-ALIiAHD. ,
/
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'

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'

120,- Because of 'all: t^osp nr^uuaeiit^-, the Me 262 fortunate-* ly for us, but' to G-OKRING 1 &\u25a0 r-egret, k-ept from its effective use Only ctie concession was made by HITLER, Our foz bOT-crcil months. intrusioias ovey German territory -v-'ere becaiiiing so .troublesome ?? L!us tangs -;,s ivOl iliNG- pu it : bh-dt i-v-re pr-.ctically- doing truin- . e ,ing flights over BAVARIA", , (JALLATO >&s therefore -recalled., to stop "this nonsense 5 and gi^r-en a sib all unit of' about 16 Me -262s ( JV 44-) for v^iich he picltesl tiio niost experienced pilo-ts he could
'

-f>-i r-|r-| a

'

I^'l, At .long: I'sst, at the end of 1944,' -KI-TLKR' gave permisio According to to use t%is ,a/c as a fighter qp & larger scale,

'

; ": :'"':-;;.-. ;.:: 1;22,^ ,;;:,Ouc e. : Hi^lJE^ had".,:dec iiel; i-%fe -l;@ \u25a0: ; 2:^%|c osie;;; : ;ipit^r:;: : ;^;.;f .a . M+. t oSll.|[ S^^^S -r^:.;X-:S @ra t'i ?^?, "::r.;a^e;: ?;li>e> 'wan t a-S rfe.' to be coiiie - Qp; ',iisiemctt J.^; ? \u25a0;\u25a0 -^.;-!3; ob^lv-l;v
\u25a0 \u25a0

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Greschv/adoi 'vvitn it, This,, Uouovc-r^ i/as not approved by HITLSR and death v^s tlire.vtcnecl to anypne who trie^- to keep"d, jet a/c from trie l^roni; line, ...'\u25a0'
;.:... "',;;'

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[fymMinp;.
-iriac-Jmeijt 5/5 cm c:.nnon were supposed to be the -ixm^mei^t for the Me 262, As-thio c-mnon' liad not yet been produced,, HI/XLSR always favoring heavy arman^nt -"'demanded th^t the- lohg-bcirre-l 5 cm cannon used -byr tanks should, be built in". It toolr a, long tiiao toconvinc-j iiim tLat this was in^visable- o.s the. barrel of hi<s vcannon would stick %xit -of the a/c bjr about 2 in, "a damnable asparagus" as . OOUjr:.IJKr- -q ailed it. 001;EIH(r- -c , ",.

125.

T?;O

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