Bukluran ng manggagawa vs CA: On the first ground, the petitioners allege that they complied with Section 3, Rule

46 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the petition filed before the CA by the petitioner unions president was sanctioned by Article 242 of the Labor Code, and the cases of Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union v. CFI of Bulacan,25 Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR,26 and La Carlota Sugar Central v. CIR.27 The petitioner union insists that it would be illogical for the union, as an entity, to require all its members to sign the said petition and the certificate of non-forum shopping. It avers that a labor union is a judicial entity which functions thru its officers. Thus, the president, as an officer of the union, needed no special power of attorney to sign for the union. It stresses that it did not violate Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner union further invokes the policy that the "rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice;" when the rules strictly applied resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is empowered to support the rules. The petitioners argue that they did not stage a strike, much more an illegal strike. They explain that a strike means work stoppage. Considering that the Dyeing and Finishing Division of the respondent was shutdown, it could not have caused a work stoppage. The union members merely picketed in front of the respondents factory to urge the respondent to open and order the resumption of the operations in its Dyeing and Finishing Division. There was, thus, no need to comply with the requirements laid down by Article 263 of the Labor Code and its implementing rules. For its part, the respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the petition filed before the CA failed to comply with Section 1 of Rule 65, Section 3 of Rule 46, and Section 7 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and that the requirement as to the signatories in the petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent reiterates that the petitioners staged an illegal strike, and that as officers of the union who participated therein, the petitioners are deemed to have lost their employment status.1awphi1.nt The contention of the petitioners is erroneous. They are of the erroneous impression that the only respondent in the NLRC was the petitioner union and that it was sued in its representative capacity. The fact of the matter is that the respondent sued not only the petitioner union as respondent, but also its officers and members of its Board of Directors as principal respondents, and sought the termination of the employment of the said officers. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment against all the respondents therein and declared the officers to have lost their employment status. The NLRC affirmed the decision on appeal. It was not only the union that assailed the decision of the NLRC in the CA, but also the dismissed officers. The petitioners (respondents therein) prayed for the reversal thereof and that another judgment be rendered as prayed for by them in their position paper in the NLRC, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Labor Arbiter that, after submission of this Position Paper, the above entitled case be considered submitted for resolution, and the decision be rendered in favor of the respondents employees: 1. Declaring Petitioners guilty of illegal reduction of working days, shutdown and UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES against individual respondents; 2. Ordering petitioners be, jointly and severally, liable to pay respondents actual damages, payment of MORAL and EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the amount of not less than P50,000.00 each individual employees and 10% of the total monetary award for the Office of BMC-SUPER plus P10,000.00 litigation expenses; 3. Ordering that Petitioner Paul Lee be in contempt of court and be fined to pay individual respondents in the amount of P50,000.00 each or imprisonment of Two (2) to Four (4) Years or both. Other relief and remedies equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for.28 Under Section 3 of Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition for certiorari shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, and that the failure of the petitioners to comply with the said requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition: Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized

representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original. The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should, thereafter, learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the title of the action indicates the names of the parties who shall be named in the original petition: Section 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number, if assigned. The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when there are other parties. Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. In this case, the title of the petition for certiorari filed in the CA does not contain the names of the petitioners officers of the petitioner BMC-SUPER and of the members of the Board of Directors; even the petition itself does not contain the full names and addresses of the said officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner union. We quote the title of the petition and the averments thereof having reference to the parties-petitioners: BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ET AL.,Petitioner, -vsCLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, Respondents.29 Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al., is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, can be served with summons and other processes at 4th Floor Perlas Building, 646 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.1awphi1.nt Private Respondent, CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine Laws engaged in textile industry with principal place of business at No. 57 Don Pedro Street, Don Pedro Village, Marulas, Valenzuela City. Public Respondents, National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, herein impleaded as the tribunal exercising judicial functions who issued the assailed decision in NLRC Case No. 05-03332-2001.30 The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR31 is misplaced. In the said case, the Court held that the failure to specify the details regarding the number and names of the striking members of a labor union in the decision or in the complaint was of no consequence. This is due to the fact that it was established that all the union members went on strike as a result of the unfair labor practice of the employer, in consonance with the rule that it is precisely the function of a labor union to carry the representation of its members, particularly against the employers unfair labor practices against it and its members, and to file an action for their benefit and behalf without joining each and every member as a separate party. Significantly, the full names and addresses of the officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner union are set forth in their petition at bench; proof that, indeed, there is a need for the full names and addresses of all the petitioners to be stated in the title of the petition and in the petition itself. We quote the title of the petition and the allegation therein having reference to the partiespetitioners:

BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), AND RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, Petitioners.32 1. Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, the former is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, and the latter are members of the former; they can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court at c/o H.O. VICTORIA AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Unit 305 Web-Jet Building, 64 Quezon Avenue cor. BMA Avenue, Quezon City.33 On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not, therefore, commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should, thereafter, learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. As gleaned from the petition for certiorari in the CA, only the petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy signed the certification of non-forum shopping in his capacity as the president of the petitioner union. The officers and members of the Board of Directors, who were, likewise, principal petitioners, did not execute any certification of non-forum shopping as mandated by the said Rule. The rule is that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.34 Although petitioner Tomaroy was authorized by virtue of his position as president of the petitioner union to execute the certification for and in its behalf, he had no authority to do so for and in behalf of its petitioners-officers, as well as the members of the Board of Directors thereof. The execution by the individual petitioners of a special power of attorney subsequent to the dismissal of the petition by the CA authorizing petitioner Tomaroy to execute the requisite certification does not cure the fatal defect in their petition.351awphi1.nt The respondent alleges that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA was correctly dismissed as it was not signed by counsel. The respondent noted that petitioner Tomaroy was not a lawyer and that petitioner Enrique Belarmino did not manifest in the petition that he was the lawyer. The respondent, thus, contends that Tomaroy and Belarmino engaged in the illegal practice of law, in violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We do not agree. Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.36 Considering that the union is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may sign the pleading. For this reason alone, the CA cannot dismiss the petition. Metro drug distribution vs Narciso: We have ruled time and again that litigants should have the amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their cause free, as much as possible, from the constraints of procedural technicalities. Our judicial system encourages full adjudication of the merits of an appeal. On the other hand, we also follow the rule that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural requirements must be observed to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.14 While litigation is not a game of technicalities and the rules of procedure should not be enforced at the cost of substantial justice, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random. Procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed. Like all rules, their application is necessary except only for the most persuasive of reasons.15

It therefore follows that a party invoking a liberal application of the rules of procedure should at least exert some effort to comply with them. Here, petitioners failed to specify all the petitioners in the caption as required by Section 1, Rule 716 of the Rules of Court. Despite the dismissal of their petition because of this admitted inadvertence, they carelessly committed the same mistake in their motion for reconsideration. The same error occured with respect to their certificate against forum shopping which failed to conform to the requirements of Section 1 (2), Rule 6517 and Section 3 (3), Rule 46.18 The appellate court correctly ruled that the certificate was defective because it was signed by the Vice-President for Finance and Human Resources without evidence of her authority to represent petitioner corporation and the officers impleaded. Again, despite the dismissal of the petition on this ground, petitioners repeated the omission in their motion for reconsideration. They failed to attach the required proof. The appellate court therefore found no reason to reconsider the dismissal of the petition. Petitioners maintain that the procedural requirements they allegedly disregarded applied only to original complaints or petitions. Thus, even if they wanted to comply, they deliberately did not do so in their motion for reconsideration. We find this explanation unacceptable. In justifying their non-compliance, petitioners lost sight of the fact that subsequently conforming with the rules could have cured the procedural defects of their petition and could have provided a basis for reconsideration. In many instances, courts have reconsidered petitions initially deficient in form upon an erring party's satisfactory explanation and subsequent compliance with the rules.19 Petitioners also insist that the Rules of Court did not require the presentation of an authority from the board of directors for the validity of a certification of non-forum shopping. The lack of authority from petitioners' board of directors should not have affected the validity of the certification considering that it had already been signed by the Vice-President for Finance and Human Resources. In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,20 we held that the requirement for petitioner to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applied even to corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court made no distinction between natural and juridical persons. In case of a corporation, it has long been settled that the certificate must be signed for and on its behalf by aspecifically authorized officer or agent who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed. We discussed the rationale behind the rule in National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals:21 Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly delegated individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents. The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/ or its duly authorized officers or agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of directors.22 Consequently, without the needed proof from the board of directors, the certificate would be considered defective. Thus, in another case,23 we held that even the regular officers of a corporation, like the chairman and president, may not even know the details required in a certificate of non-forum shopping; they must therefore be authorized by the board of directors just like any other officer or agent. The right to file a special civil action for certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.24 The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.25 We will not therefore disturb the Court of Appeals' decision to strictly apply the rules. Felicissima Galindo vs Heirs of Roxas: The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether Felicissima, Nestor, Beatriz, Catalina, Danilo, Librada and Cesar, all surnamed Galindo, are proper parties as petitioners in this case; and (b) whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner Juanita Galindo Riveras motion to dismiss on the ground that Reginald S. Roxas had no legal capacity to sue for and in behalf of the heirs of Marciano Roxas, and that the action of the respondents had already prescribed when they filed their complaint on April 7, 1999. On the first issue, the respondents aver that of the eight petitioners in this case, only petitioner Juanita Galindo Roxas was the petitioner in the CA and the sole defendant-movant in the RTC. The seven other petitioners were not parties in the CA and in the RTC. Hence, the respondents aver, the said seven petitioners are not bound by the orders of the trial court; as such, they are not the proper parties in this case as petitioners.

While we agree with the respondents premise that the petitioners herein, except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not partiesdefendants in the RTC and parties-petitioners in the CA, and, as a general rule, are not proper parties as petitioners in this case, the Court finds and so holds that they are indispensable parties and should be impleaded as parties-petitioners in this case. The general rule is that only those parties in a case and their privies and successors-in-interest are bound by the order or decision of the trial court. Persons or entities who are not parties to the case are not and should not be bound or adversely affected by the said order or decision; otherwise, they will be deprived of their right to due process. Since the petitioners, except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties in the RTC and in the CA, they are not bound by the assailed orders of the RTC and the decision of the CA against petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera; hence, they are not the proper parties to appeal from and assail the said orders of the RTC and the decision of the CA. It bears stressing, however, that the respondents, the plaintiffs in the RTC, sought the nullification of the "Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio Galindo with Waiver of Rights" executed by all the petitioners in which they adjudicated unto themselves as co-owners thereof the rights and interests which they claimed the deceased Urbano Galindo had over Lot 1048 covered by TCT No. 335593(M) which was issued to and under the name of petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera on the basis of the said deed, and the retention of TCT No. T-2145 under the names of the heirs of Gregorio Galindo. Thus, all the petitioners, who executed the said deed, are indispensable parties as parties-defendants in the RTC and as parties-petitioners in the CA under Section 7, Rule 311 of the Rules of Court, and should have been impleaded by the respondents in their complaint. Without the presence of the said petitioners as defendants, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief to the respondents. The failure of the respondents to implead all the petitioners as parties-defendants constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate courts exercise of judicial power over the said cases and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.12 The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.13 The RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.141a\^/phi1.net The petitioners themselves must have realized the need to join petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera as a party-petitioner without waiting for the court to order the same because they eventually joined petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera as such party.1a\^/phi1.net The respondents even failed to implead the seven brothers/sisters of respondent Reginald Roxas, all of whom inherited the undivided share of their father Eleazar Roxas in the property subject of the deed of extrajudicial settlement, as well as the children of their uncle Vicente Roxas, namely, Rosalinda, Vicente, Jr. and Sergio, all surnamed Roxas. Respondent Reginald Roxas, his siblings and the children of Vicente Roxas were co-owners of the property; hence, they are, likewise, indispensable parties as plaintiffs in the RTC.15 Their absence warranted the dismissal of the complaint as well. On the second issue, we agree with the petitioners that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the respondents failure, as plaintiffs, to sufficiently allege in their complaint and prove that Reginald Roxas had the representative capacity to sue as such representative of all the heirs of the deceased Marciano Roxas. Section 1, Rule 316 of the Rules of Court provides that only persons or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Section 4, Rule 817 of the said Rules further provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can lawfully be prosecuted in the name of that person.18 The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.19 Corollary, the defendants can assail the facts alleged in the complaint through a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff has no capacity to sue under Section 1(d) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, that is, that he does not have the representative he claims.20 Section 1, Rule 721 of the Rules of Court, likewise, provides that the names of the parties should be included in the caption of the original complaint. In this case, the caption of the complaint of the respondents states that the "Heirs of Marciano Roxas," represented by Reginald S. Roxas, are the plaintiffs. The following were, likewise, alleged in the body of the complaint: 1. That plaintiffs representative, Reginald S. Roxas, is of legal age, married, and a resident of 36 Narcisus St., Roxas District, Quezon City; whereas, defendant is of legal age, married, and a resident of Alley Guevarra St., Pag-asa, Obando, Bulacan, where she may be served with summons and other processes of this Court; 2. That the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, is impleaded in his official capacity to accord complete relief where it may be served with summons at its office address at Meycauayan, Bulacan; 3. That plaintiffs are the legitimate children of the late Marciano A. Roxas, namely: Maximiano Roxas (deceased), Benjamin Roxas (deceased), Eleazar Roxas (deceased), Lydia Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-De Perio (deceased), Elisa Roxas-Medina,

Virginia Roxas-Santos (deceased), Uriel Roxas (deceased) and Fortunato Roxas; plaintiffs representative, Reginald S. Roxas, is one of the eight (8) children of the said deceased Eleazar Roxas; 4. That the said late Marciano A. Roxas (died on June 4, 1950) is an owner of a parcel of land consisting of 48,089 sq.m., more or less, under Lot No. 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate situated at Sta. Maria, Bulacan, as evidenced by a Decision dated August 12, 1965 rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan, under Civil Case No. 1067 and billed as "Heirs of M. Roxas vs. F. Galindo, et al." for Specific Performance, copy of a certified xerox copy of the same is attached hereto and marked as Annex "A" and submarkings.22 As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, of the nine plaintiffs, six are already deceased, namely, Maximiano Roxas, Benjamin Roxas, Eleazar Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio, Virginia Roxas-Santos and Uriel Roxas. There is no allegation in the complaint that a special proceeding to settle the estate of the said deceased had been filed and was pending. Indeed, neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party-plaintiff in a court action.23 As explained by this Court: A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedents estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not, likewise, lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.24 In fine, the deceased Maximiano, Benjamin, Eleazar and Uriel, all surnamed Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio and Virginia RoxasSantos have no capacity to sue and may not be sued as parties-plaintiffs. Neither does respondent Reginald Roxas have the capacity to represent the said deceased as party-plaintiff, nor is there any allegation in the complaint that Lydia Roxas, Elisa Medina and Fortunato Roxas are of legal age and have the capacity to sue. We agree with the ruling of the trial court that the action of the respondents against petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera was one for quieting of title under the second paragraph of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court25 and not one for the enforcement of the decision of the CFI in Civil Case No. 1067. It bears stressing that the nature of an action and the court which has jurisdiction over the case are determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the law existing at the time of the filing of the action and the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to such relief prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the consent or waiver of the parties.26 Neither is the caption of the complaint determinative of the nature of an action. Tanjuatco vs Gako: The Court is unable to fully agree with the recommendation and the premises and arguments holding it together. We start off with the role of the respondent in the matter of the amendment of the complaint. As complainant claims, respondent judge instructed Pantaleons counsel to amend the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-27334 and to attach to the amended complaint the verification of his son, Vicente B., and to allege that the amount deposited in escrow, exclusive of the interest accrued, should be paid to Vicente B. by way of rentals. Agreeing with the complainant, the Investigating Justice stated the observation that said actuations of respondent judge is "partial, irregular and in direct violation of procedural rules," adding that the original complaint should have been dismissed outright pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. We are not persuaded. Contrary to complainants posture, the assailed suggestions made by respondent may be viewed as an attempt to comply with the guidelines laid down in Administrative Matter No. 03-1-09-SC, more known as the Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Courts in the Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures. The policy behind the pre-trial guidelines is to abbreviate court proceedings and ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets. Pursuant to this policy, the judge is expected to determine during pre-trial if there is a need to amend the pleadings. Sec. 5 of the pre-trial guidelines reads: 5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall: a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre- trial proceedings and confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents; b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts pending before other courts and order its consolidation if warranted;

c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the amendments if necessary; d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the same; e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties. As it were, respondent judge noticed that the person who verified Vicente B.s complaint was his attorney-in-fact, obviously leading the respondent to conclude that the verification was defective. He believed a correction was in order to prevent future complications, such as the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint which undeniably will only prolong or delay the case. In actuality, no clear benefit redounded to Vicente B. as a result of respondents suggestion, for the requirement on verification may be made by the party, his lawyer or his representative or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading.11 Thus, Pantaleons verification accompanying the original complaint would have had sufficed. Complainants assertion that respondent made it appear that Pantaleon was the plaintiff is a bit specious. The title of the case, no less, clearly indicated that Vicente B. is the plaintiff, not Pantaleon. The Investigating Justice erred too when she concluded that the complaint should have been dismissed outright under Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 5, Rule 7 refers to certification against forum shopping. The correct and applicable rule is the preceding Sec. 4 of Rule 7 which deals with verification. Even if the Investigator cited the correct Rule (Sec. 4, Rule 7), she would still be incorrect in her conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed, for it is basic that verification is only a formal, not jurisdictional, requisite.12Accordingly, even if the verification is flawed or defective, the Court may still give due course to the pleading if the circumstances warrant the relaxation of the rule in the interest of justice.13 On another point, the Investigating Justice faulted the respondent for not impleading complainant and her brother, Carlos del Rosario, as parties-plaintiffs. She reasoned that respondent need not wait for complainant and the other heirs to intervene, it being the courts duty to implead all indispensable parties before resolving the case. To a certain extent, the Investigating Justice is correct. While it is true that the pre-trial guidelines (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC) obliges the judge, if proper, to add or drop parties to the case, the inclusion of parties-plaintiffs is a different situation. Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of sound discretion of the Court. Sec. 2, Rule 19 of the Rules on the subject, Time to intervene, specifically provides that "the motion to intervene may be filed at anytime before rendition of judgment by the trial court." Thus, intervention to unite with the plaintiffs must be filed before rendition of judgment. Thus, respondent acted within the bounds of the rules when he denied Carlos del Rosarios intervention, filed as the corresponding motion was after the assailed decision was rendered. The investigation report stated that it is the "duty of the judge to ensure that all indispensable parties are impleaded before resolving the case." This may be true with respect to the joinder of defendants as jurisdiction over their persons can be acquired by means of service of summons. With respect to other real parties-in-interest as additional plaintiffs, however, the court cannot simply issue an order towards the impleadment of said parties as additional plaintiffs. These proposed plaintiffs must give their consent to their inclusion as plaintiffs. Otherwise, the addition of such parties will be useless and irregular considering they may be adverse to the idea of being parties-plaintiffs in the first place. Thus, the respondent was correct in not simply adding complainant and Carlos del Rosario as coplaintiffs of Vicente B. since the RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. As a matter of fact, they filed a motion to intervene but was rejected because it was filed after the decision was promulgated. To be sure, the Investigating Justice was mistaken in her belief that Pantaleon, the attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Vicente B., cannot represent the other interested heirs like complainant and Carlos del Rosario even without the joinder of the latter as co-plaintiffs. It should be borne in mind that Pantaleon, Carlos del Rosario, and complainant, as compulsory heirs of Vicente S., are co-owners of the subject lots. And a co-owner may bring an action in that capacity without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.14When a suit is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.15 Thus, complainant and Carlos del Rosario stood to be benefited by the suit filed by Pantaleon, as attorney-in-fact of Vicente B., as the two, as co-owners, are entitled to their prorata share in the monetary award to be adjudged to Vicente B. Thus, there was really no prejudice suffered by complainant or her brother, Carlos, when respondent denied the faulty-filed motion for intervention. Agdeppa vs Heirs of Bonete:

While it is true that respondents committed a procedural infraction before the RTC, such infraction does not justify the dismissal of the case.

Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.[15] Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court clearly provides: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

It bears stressing that TCT No. T-56923, covering the subject property, was issued in the name of Dorotea. This is established by the record, and petitioners themselves admit this fact. However, because TCT No. T-75454, allegedly issued in favor of Littie Sarah, and the purported deed of sale, allegedly executed by Dorotea in favor of Littie Sarah, are not on record. Considering the allegations in the pleadings, it is best that a trial on the merits be conducted. We fully agree with the apt and judicious ruling of the CA, when it said: As the former owner of the subject property, the same having been titled in her name under TCT No. T56923, Dorotea Cariaga Bonete, being the real party [in] interest, has the legal capacity to file the instant case for reconveyance and annulment of deed of sale. The complaint was filed by the [respondents] precisely to question the issuance of TCT No. T-75454 in the name of Littie Sarah Agdeppa as the transaction allegedly contemplated was only to secure Doroteas loan. Why the property became the subject of the deed of sale which is being disputed by Dorotea should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits in order to afford the contending parties their respective days in court. As held in Del Bros. Hotel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 33, the complaint is not supposed to contain evidentiary matters as this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.

A final note.

A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in situations involving excusable formal errors in a pleading, as long as the same do not subvert the essence of the proceeding, and they connote at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. [16] The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment, if blind and stubborn adherence to procedure would result in the sacrifice of substantial justice for technicality. To deprive respondents, particularly Dorotea, of their claims over the subject property on the strength of sheer technicality would be a travesty of justice and equity. Sari-sari group of companies vs Piglas-Kamao: Effect of Non-Verification by All Parties Section 1 of Rule 6529 in relation to Section 3 of Rule 4630 of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for review filed with the CA should be verified and should contain a certificate of non-forum shopping. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative.31 On the other hand, the rule against forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a partylitigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure.32 A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for Verification and noncompliance with those for Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. As to Verification, non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective; hence, the court may order a correction if Verification is lacking; or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.33

A pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified may be given due course even without a verification of the circumstances warranting the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice.34 When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.35Moreover, many authorities consider the absence of Verification a mere formal, not jurisdictional defect, the absence of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on the case.36 In Torres v. Specialized Packing Development Corporation,37 the problem was not lack of Verification, but the adequacy of one executed by only two of the twenty-five petitioners, similar to the case at bar. The Court ruled: These two signatories are unquestionably real parties in interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the Petition. This verification is enough assurance that the matters alleged therein have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. The requirement of verification has thus been substantially complied with.38 Based on the foregoing, the lone Verification of respondent Jose del Carmen is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. On the other hand, the lack of a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, unlike that of Verification is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.39 The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional.40 The rule on certification against forum shopping may, however, be also relaxed on grounds of "substantial compliance" or "special circumstances or compelling reasons."41 Applicable to this case is Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile.42 Finding that the petitioners were relatives and co-owners jointly sued over property in which they had common interest, this Court in that case held that the signature of just one co-owner on the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping in the petition before the Court substantially complied with the rule in this wise: We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules. All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question. There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.43 In the case at bar, respondent Jose del Carmen shares a common interest with the other respondents as to the resolution of the labor dispute between them and the petitioner. They collectively sued the petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices and have collectively appealed the NLRC decision. Similarly, there is sufficient basis for Jose del Carmen to speak on behalf of his corespondents in stating that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there any other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, even if only respondent Jose del Carmen signed the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, the rule on substantial compliance applies. The CA therefore did not commit any error in entertaining the appeal of the respondents. Hutama vs KCD Builders: Third, Hutama questions the verification and certification on non-forum shopping of KCD, issued by its board of directors, because the same was signed by the latters president without proof of authority to sign the same.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The party does not need to sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.[13]

On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar

action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.[14]

It is true that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers.
[15]

However, it is settled and we have so declared in numerous decisions that the president of a corporation may sign the

verification and the certification of non-forum shopping. In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,[16] we held that the lone signature of the University President was sufficient to fulfill the verification requirement, because such officer had sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.

In Peoples Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. CA,[17] we held that in the absence of a charter or bylaw provision to the contrary, the president of a corporation is presumed to have the authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within the scope of his or her usual duties. Moreover, even if a certain contract or undertaking is outside the usual powers of the president, the corporations ratification of the contract or undertaking and the acceptance of benefits therefrom make the corporate presidents actions binding on the corporation.

Finally, Hutama questions the resolution of the CA on its motion for reconsideration on the ground that it denied the same without stating clearly and distinctly the factual and legal basis thereof.

In denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA ruled that it found no plausible reason to depart from its earlier decision wherein all the issues had been exhaustively passed upon. That ruling contained a sufficient legal reason or basis to deny the motion. There was no need for the CA to restate the rationale for its decision that the petitioner wanted reconsidered. Sixto Crisostomo vs SEC: We now address the public and private respondents' separate motions to dismiss the petition and to cite Crisostomo and his counsel for contempt of court for forum-shopping. The records show that Crisostomo had two actions pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 and CA-G.R. No. 20285 CV) when he filed the petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095) in this Court on July 27, 1989. The case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV, is his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, dismissing his complaint for annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement and the Stock Purchase Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese investors. CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 is his petition for certiorari to review the SEC's en banc resolution upholding those transactions and ordering the holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the directors of the UDMC, and of a board of directors meeting to elect the officers. Notwithstanding the pendency of those two cases in the Court of Appeals, Crisostomo filed this petition for certiorari 1 and prohibition on July 27, 1989 where he raises the same issues that he raised in the Court of Appeals. The prayer of his petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 reads thus: 3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered: a) Annulling and setting aside the questioned rulings of the respondent COMMISSION 2 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and b) Making permanent the preliminary injunction issued in this case against the respondents. (p. 241, Rollo.) In his petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095), he also prays that 1. Upon the filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order issue enjoining respondents, their representatives or agents from implementing or executing the SEC opinions (Annexes "F", "G" and "H") and its June 27 and July 21,1989 orders (Annexes "M" and "O") until further orders from the Honorable Court.

xxx xxx xxx 3. After notice, this petition be given due course and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued for the same purpose and effect upon such terms and conditions the Honorable Court may impose; and thereafter, judgment be rendered granting the writ prayed for and annulling and setting aside the said opinions rendered by the SEC in their stead, affirming the orders of the Hearing Officer (Annexes "A" and "B"). (pp. 27-28, Rollo.) Additionally, in his petition for review (G.R. No. 89555) he prays this Court to giant "all the reliefs" prayed for by him in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435. Here is a clear case of forum-shopping. There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. (Villanueva vs. Adre, G.R. No. 8063, April 27, 1989.) (p. 303, Rollo) Forum-shopping is prohibited by the Interim Rules of Court for it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Phil. Port Authority, 101 SCRA 450). Section 17 of the Interim Rules of Courts provides: 17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc., No petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the Supreme Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the action taken by the Intermediate Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. (Interim Rules of Court.) Forum-shopping makes the petitioner subject to disciplinary action and renders his petitions in this Court and in the Court of Appeals dismissible (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, Resolution dated July 31, 1986; Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34, 38-39; Collado vs. Hernando, L-43886, May 30, 1988). For this reason, if not for their lack of merit, the petitions should be, as they are hereby, dismissed. Traveno vs Bobongon Banana Growers: Petitioners posit that the appellate court erred in dismissing their petition on a mere technicality as it should have, at most, dismissed the petition only with respect to the non-signing petitioners.

Dwelling on the merits of the case, petitioners posit that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC disregarded evidence on record showing that while the Cooperative was their employer on paper, the other respondents exercised control and supervision over them; that the Cooperative was a labor-only contractor; and that the Orders of the DOLE Secretary relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not applicable to them as the same pertained to a certification election case involving different parties and issues.[14]

DFI, commenting for itself and TACOR, maintains that, among other things, it was not the employer of petitioners; and that it cannot comment on their money claims because no evidence was submitted in support thereof.[15]

It appears that respondent Cooperative had been dissolved.[16]

As respondent Dole Asia Philippines failed to file a comment, the Court, by Resolution of November 29, 2006,[17] required it to (1) show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its failure to heed the Courts directive, and (2) file the required comment, within 10 days from notice.

Dole Philippines, Inc. (DPI) promptly filed an Urgent Manifestation[18] stating that, among other things, while its division located in Davao City received the Courts Resolution directing Dole Asia Philippines to file a comment on the present petition, DPI did not file a

comment as the directive was addressed to Dole Asia Philippines, an entity which is not registered at the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Commenting on DPIs Urgent Manifestation, petitioners contend that DPI cannot be allowed to take advantage of their lack of knowledge as to its exact corporate name, DPI having raised the matter for the first time before this Court notwithstanding its receipt of all pleadings and court processes from the inception of this case.[19]

Upon review of the records, the Court finds that DPI never ever participated in the proceedings despite due notice. Its posturing, therefore, that the court processes it received were addressed to Dole Asia Philippines, a non-existent entity, does not lie. That DPI is the intended respondent, there is no doubt.

Respecting the appellate courts dismissal of petitioners appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying verification and certification against forum-shopping, the Courts guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo,
[20]

which were culled from jurisprudential pronouncements, are instructive: For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping: 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons. 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in the challenged Resolutions of the appellate court. Petitioners contention that the appellate court should have dismissed the petition only as to the non-signing petitioners or merely dropped them as parties to the case is thus in order. Cavile vs Heirs of Clarita Cavile: Petitioners essentially argue that the Deed of Partition is a public document duly acknowledged before a Notary Public. Hence, its genuineness and due execution need not be proved. Its character as an ancient document under the Revised Rules on Evidence is immaterial in this case since said rule applies only to private documents. They further contend that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Ramona Tacang and Filomena Pareja which were mere general denials.

Respondents, on the other hand, pray for the denial of the petition on two grounds: first, it violates the rule on the certification against forum shopping required to be attached to petitions for review filed with this Court; and second, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in its assailed decision. Respondents harp on the fact that only one of the twenty-two (22) petitioners, Thomas George Cavili, Sr., executed and signed the certification against forum shopping when the Rules require that said certification must be signed by all the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents argue that the Deed of Partition presented by the petitioners may not be admitted in evidence as said document has not been identified and its due execution has not been fully established. Respondents allege that said document is tainted with forgery because it was shown that Simplicia Cavili was in Mindanao before, during and after its execution. Before going into the substantive issue raised in the petition, we shall first resolve the procedural issue raised by the respondents, that is, that the certification against forum shopping attached to the petition was signed by only one of the petitioners. The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.7 The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.8 We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules. All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question. There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as "special circumstance" for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.9 San Miguel Bukid HA, Inc. vs City of Mandaluyong: In Fuentebella v. Castro,[16] the Court categorically stated that if the real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors.[17] In this case, the Certificate of Board Resolution attached to the petition for certiorari filed with the CA reads as follows: x x x in a meeting of the Board of Directors of the SAN MIGUEL BUKID HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, held on 7 November 1999, the following resolution was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the Association: RESOLVED, that the ASSOCIATION re-file its Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against the CITY GOVERNMENT OF MANDALUYONG and A.F. CALMA GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION in order to enforce their obligations under the CONTRACT AGREEMENT for a housing project in favor of the ASSOCIATION; RESOLVED, further, that MR. EVELIO D. BARATA, President of the ASSOCIATION, be authorized to initiate, sign, file and prosecute the COMPLAINT.[18]

Evidently, petitioner only authorized its President, Evelio Barata, to initiate, sign, file and prosecute the Complaint for specific performance.

Certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. [19] It is an original and independent action that is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the complaint filed before the trial court.[20] The petition for certioraribefore the CA is, therefore, a separate and distinct action from the action for specific performance instituted before the RTC, as the writ of certiorari being prayed for is directed against the judicial or quasi-judicial body, not against the private parties in the original action for specific performance. Such being the case, the November 7 1999 Resolution of the Board of Directors of petitioner association is not and cannot be considered as an authorization for its President, Evelio Barata, to initiate, sign, file and prosecute another case for the

special civil action of certiorari. The CA was, thus, correct in dismissing the petition for lack of authority of Evelio Barata to sign the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in representation of petitioner.

The submission of a Secretarys Certificate with the Motion for Reconsideration is also insufficient to cure the initial defect. Said Certificate stated that petitioners Board of Trustees approved a Resolution at a meeting held on April 7, 2002, confirming and ratifying the authority of Mr. Barata to sign all necessary papers for the petition for certiorari. Note that the petition was filed on March 26, 2002, or before the date of said Resolution. There is no certification as to when petitioners Board of Trustees originally granted Mr. Barata authority to show that as of the date of the filing of the petition for certiorari, Mr. Barata had been authorized to perform such acts. Moreover, as ruled in Tible and Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association,[21]to wit: In Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes, the Court stressed that certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by the law. x x x. xxxx x x x subsequent compliance does not ipso facto entitle a party to a reconsideration of the dismissal order. As the Court aptly observed in Batoy v. Regional Trial Court, Br. 50, Loay, Bohol: x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a partys failure to complytherewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. x x x [22] (Emphasis supplied) Espiritu vs Petron Corporation: First. Petitioners Espiritu, et al. point out that the certificate of non-forum shopping that respondents KPE and Petron attached to the petition they filed with the Court of Appeals was inadequate, having been signed only by Petron, through Atty. Cruz.

But, while procedural requirements such as that of submittal of a certificate of non-forum shopping cannot be totally disregarded, they may be deemed substantially complied with under justifiable circumstances.[7] One of these circumstances is where the petitioners filed a collective action in which they share a common interest in its subject matter or raise a common cause of action. In such a case, the certification by one of the petitioners may be deemed sufficient.[8]

Here, KPE and Petron shared a common cause of action against petitioners Espiritu, et al., namely, the violation of their proprietary rights with respect to the use of Gasul tanks and trademark. Furthermore, Atty. Cruz said in his certification that he was executing it for and on behalf of the Corporation, and co-petitioner Carmen J. Doloiras. [9] Thus, the object of the requirement to ensure that a party takes no recourse to multiple forums was substantially achieved. Besides, the failure of KPE to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping does not render the petition defective with respect to Petron which signed it through Atty. Cruz. [10] The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted correctly in giving due course to the petition before it.

Mid-Pasig Land Devt. Corp. vs Tablante: In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,9 the Court had occasion to explain that: It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; x x x. In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.1avvphi1 While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."10 From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the failure to attach the Secretarys Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio Mereloss authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be considered fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents.11 Considering that petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was, therefore, unwarranted. Time and again, we have emphasized that dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities.12