Aferiat: It's Google's World and We're Just Clicking in It

AFERIATNOTE(DONOTDELETE)
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ItsGooglesWorldandWereJust ClickinginIt:WhytheGrowthof SponsoredLinkAdvertisingNecessitates aShiftofTrademarkRegulationonthe Internet
ALEXAFERIAT*
ABSTRACT
Google AdWordsa product of Internetgiant Googleallows businesses to bid on keywords and create corresponding advertisements that will appear whenever the keyword is searched on Googles search engine. For businesses looking to find new consumers and compete with the Apples, BMWs, and Verizons of the world, this sponsored link advertisingtoolhasbeennothingshortofasensationfinally,advertisers have found a lowcost way of leveling the advertising playing field. But this practice has raised a significant trademark concernbusinesses are freetopurchasenotonlygenericsearchterms,butalsotheircompetitors trademarks. So this begs the question: are sponsored link advertisements violatingtrademarklaw?Oraretheyoutsidethescopeofregulation?This Note will argue that the evolution of online consumer behavior has outpaced judicial understanding of sponsored link advertising, reducing theneedforexcessiveinterventionanddemandinganewapproachtothe trademarkregulationofsponsoredlinksinthefuture.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England Law | Boston (2013). B.S., Business Administration,magnacumlaude,BostonUniversity(2010).Iwouldliketothanktheeditors and associates of Volumes 46 and 47 of New England Law Review for all of their thoughtful assistancewiththisNote.
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INTRODUCTION
aveyoucheckedoutthenewiPhone5?afriendasks,hopingto discuss its sleek new fourinch retina display and rave about its thinnerandlighterdesign.1Unawareofthenewdevice,youhop on Google and type iPhone 5 into the Google search bar. When the results page pops up eleven milliseconds later,2 you see link after link abouttheiPhone5dozensforApple,theiPhone5smanufacturer,afew for retailers where its available, and a slew of links for product reviews. ButinadditiontoalltheseiPhonespecificlinks,alinkshowsupatthetop oftheGooglesearchbarthisone,foravideoabouttheSamsungGalaxyS III.3Howisthispossible?YoudidntsearchfortheGalaxySIII,andinfact, you didnt even know it existed until this advertisement popped up. Suddenly, youre presented with a choicelearn about the iPhone 5? Or checkoutthisstrikinglysimilaralternative?Andthisresultraisesaneven largerquestionisitevenlegalforSamsung,themanufacturerofGalaxyS III,4toseeminglyusurptheGooglesearchforiPhone5? Thisquestionhasbeenthesubjectofgreatdebateamongstthecircuit courts.5 Businesses just like Apple and Samsung have turned to Google AdWordsaproductofInternetgiantGooglewhichallowsthemtobid on keywords and create corresponding advertisements.6 Whenever someone performs a Google search using the purchased keyword, these sponsoredlinkadvertisementswillappearalongsidesearchresults.7But this practice has raised a significant trademark concernbusinesses are freetopurchasenotonlygenericsearchterms,butalsotheircompetitors
1 See iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (notingthattheAppleiPhone5isthethinnest,lightest,andfastestiPhoneeverandthatthe devicefeaturesa4inchretinadisplay).
About Google Instant, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/instantabout.html (lastvisitedNov.23,2012).

3 See SamsungMobileUSA, The Next Big Thing is Already Here, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/user/samsungmobileusa?v=nf5Prx19ZM (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (mocking the new Apple iPhone 5 as inferior to Samsungs Galaxy S III by noting that the GalaxySIIIhasabiggers[screen],afastervideosharingtool,andhad4Gcapabilitybefore theiPhone). 4 GalaxySIII,SAMSUNG,http://www.samsung.com/us/galaxys3smartphone/?cid=ppc (lastvisitedSept.22,2012). 5 See Richard J. Pinto et al., Recent Developments in Trademark and Copyright Law, in UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAWAND COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENTSFOR ONLINE CONTENT37, 3940(2010)[hereinafterPinto].
How AdWords Works, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/ answer.py?hl=en&answer=2497976(lastvisitedSept.19,2012).

7 Google AdWords: Advertise Your Business on Google, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ ads/adwords2/(lastvisitedNov.26,2012).
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trademarks.8Thus,courtshavebeentaskedwithdeterminingwhetherthis practice violates trademark law, or whether it falls outside the scope of regulation.9 Courts have overwhelmingly decided in favor of the former, ruling that unauthorized trademark users in sponsored link advertising have caused an actionable form of trademark infringement under a doctrine knownasinitialinterestconfusion.10Thisconclusionhasoverlookedthe growthofInternetusageandthesubsequentevolutionofconsumersearch behavior.11 Moreover, this presumption has ignored the reality that this typeofcomparativeadvertisementhasbeenlongrecognizedasfairuse intheworldoftraditionalmediaadvertising,suchasontelevision.12Only onecircuittheNinthCircuithasrecognizedthesenewrealities.13 This Note will argue that the evolution of online consumer behavior has outpaced judicial understanding of sponsored link advertising, reducing the need for excessive intervention and necessitating a new approachtothetrademarkregulationofsponsoredlinks.InPartsIandII, the Note will trace the development of trademark law and follow its growth into the Internet age. In Part III, the Note will assert that courts haveoverwhelminglymisunderstoodhowtheInternetfunctionsandhow consumers react to Internet advertising, limiting the need for trademark regulation of sponsoredlinks. TheNote will further argue inPart IV that sponsored links are merely another form of fairuse comparative advertising that increase competition and facilitate consumer choice. Finally,PartVoftheNoteproposesthattheNinthCircuitsrecentholding in Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts should become the standardforresolvingsponsoredlinktrademarkdisputesinthefuture. I. TraditionalTrademarkLaw:TheLanhamActandtheConfusion Inquiries
Thelawoftrademarkscanbereducedtoonesingleidea:noonehas anyrighttorepresenthisgoodsasthegoodsofanother.14Thisideatraces
8 Ashley Tan, Note, Google AdWords: Trademark Infringer or Trade Liberalizer?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM.&TECH.L.REV.473,477(2010). 9
Id.at47778.
See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: The Diversion of Trademark Law, in 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE87,8790(PeterK.Yued.,2007)[hereinafterRothman,Diversion].
11 12 13
10
SeeinfraPartsII.A,III. SeeinfraPartIV.
SeeinfraPartV;seealsoNetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638 F.3d1137,1142(9thCir.2011).
14
BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION1.02,at4(4th
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backtooldEnglishcommonlaw,wherethefocusoftrademarkprotection developed from a form of common law fraud15 into the recognition of trademarks as a property right.16 Recognizing the historical plane of trademarks as both a form of consumer protection and as a form of propertyprotection,17theU.S.Congressbeganfullyregulatingtrademarks inthe1946LanhamAct.18 A. TheLanhamAct:TheUmbrellaofTrademarkRegulation The Lanham Act broadly defines a trademark as any word, name, symbol,ordeviceusedincommercebyapersontoidentifyordistinguish his or her goods from those manufactured or sold by others.19 Unlike copyrightsandpatents,whoseownersreceiveafinitetermofmonopolistic controlovertheirintellectualproperty,20theLanhamActallowstrademark ownerstoenjoyperpetualexclusiveownershipbutononecondition:the mark must remain in commercial use.21 This use in commerce requirement22 is derived from the underlying Congressional authority for
ed.2000). Seeid.(Unfaircompetitionisthegenusofwhichtrademarkinfringementisoneofthe species.Alltrademarkcasesareinfactcasesofunfaircompetition...andthisismerelythe dutytoabstainfromfraud.).

16 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1.12(2011)[hereinafter1MCCARTHY].Aspartoftrademarklawsdevelopmentfromcommon law fraud, there appeared the notion that the right in a trademark is an actual property right.PATTISHALLETAL.,supranote14,1.03,at6. 17 1MCCARTHY,supranote16,at2.2.Congressexplainedthatthegoalsoftrademarklaw are twofold, ensuring that the public may be confident [when] purchasing a product bearingaparticulartrademark...itwillgettheproductwhichitasksfor...andensuring thatwheretheownerofatrademarkhasspentenergy,time,andmoneyinpresentingtothe publictheproduct,heisprotectedinhisinvestmentfromitsmisappropriationbypiratesand cheats.S.Rep.No.1333,at3(1946)(statementofSen.ClaudePepper,Chairman,S.Comm. On Patents), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/trademarks/ PreLanhamAct_026_HR_1333.pdf. 15
LanhamAct,ch.540,60Stat.427(1946)(codifiedasamendedat15U.S.C.10511129 (2006)).
19 20 21
18
15U.S.C.1127. AnnBartow,LikelihoodofConfusion,41SANDIEGOL.REV.721,726&nn.89(2004).
15U.S.C.1127(Thetermuseincommercemeansthebonafideuseofamarkinthe ordinarycourseoftrade,andnotmademerelytoreservearightinamark.);seeWilliamM. Landes&RichardA.Posner,TrademarkLaw:AnEconomicPerspective,30J.L. & ECON.265,287 (1987) (The lack of a fixed term for trademarks is one of the striking differences between trademarks,ontheonehand,andcopyrightsandpatents,ontheother.).
22 15 U.S.C. 1127 (defining use in commerce as the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinarycourseoftrade,andnotmademerelytoreservearightinamark).
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trademarkregulationtheCommerceClause.23 TheLanhamActcreatesaprivatecauseofactionforanyinfringement upon a trademark used in commerce.24 Specifically, the Act prohibits the use of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registeredmarkwheresuchuseislikelytocauseconfusion,ortocause mistake, or to deceive.25 If a party is found to have breached this provision,theActempowerscourtstograntinjunctivereliefaswellasto award lost profits, costs of the action, and in rare cases, attorneys fees.26 But the Lanham Act also explicitly excludes certain fair uses of a trademark,27 which allows the trademark to be used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services by a nonregistrant of the trademark.28 This fair use doctrine presumes that as long as the non registrantistruthfulandisnotusingthemarktodeceive,theLanhamAct willlikelypermittheuse.29 B. TheLikelihoodofConfusionInquiry:TheTouchstoneof TrademarkInfringementClaims UsingthestatutoryauthorityoftheLanhamAct,courtshavetapered mostfederaltrademarkinfringementactionsdowntoonesimplequestion: [I]s the defendants trademark, because of its similarity to the plaintiffs trademark, causing or likely to cause consumer confusion as to the true source of the defendants goods?30 This question, known as the likelihoodofconfusioninquiry,hasbecomethetouchstoneoftrademark infringement disputes.31 In proving a trademark infringement claim, a
See U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 3. Congress derived its power to regulate trademarks throughtheCommerceClause,makingtheuseincommercerequirementathresholdissue forregulationandforsubsequentlitigation.SeeDeborahF.Buckman,LanhamAct Trademark InfringementActionsinInternetandWebsiteContext,197A.L.R.Fed.17,2,at31(2004).
24 25 26 23
Seegenerally15U.S.C.1114. Id.1114(1)(a).
Id. 11161117, 1125(a); see Gregory R. Shoemaker, Comment, Dont Blame Google: Allowing Trademark Infringement Actions Against Competitors who Purchase Sponsored Links on InternetSearchEnginesUndertheInitialInterestConfusionDoctrine,58CATH. U. L. REV.535,545 (2009).
27 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4). This exclusion was formerly a common law defense. See PATTISHALLETAL.,supranote14,at344. 28 29
15U.S.C.1115(b)(4).
SeePATTISHALL ET AL.,supranote14,at344,359(explainingthat[t]heuseofanothers trademark . . . is permitted provided there is truthful disclosure and no likelihood of confusion).
30 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF.L.REV.1581,1582(2006). 31
Bartow,supranote20,at744;seealsoMinn.Mining&Mfg.Co.v.RauhRubber,Inc.,130
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partyneednotproveactualconfusionovertwosimilarmarks;rather,the partymustmerelyshowthattheconsumerislikelytobeconfused.32This factintensiveinquiryisgenerallyproventhroughamultifactoranalysis factorswhichvaryacrossvirtuallyeverycircuitinthenation.33 Applying these factors has essentially become a roleplay for the courtsa judge will put himself or herself in the shoes of a reasonably prudentconsumer,andwiththeaidofthemultifactoranalysis,thejudge will try to determine ifa reasonable consumeris likely to be confused by thetwomarksinquestion.34Thecourtsgenerallylookforthislikelihood of confusion at the pointofpurchasethe moment when a consumer is standing in a store aisle and is ready to buy35and consider whether a combination of the factors weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion betweenthetwomarks.36 C. TheInitialInterestConfusionTest:ModifyingtheLikelihoodof ConfusionInquiryBeforethePointofSale Though courts typically look to the likelihood of confusion inquiry
F.3d1305,1308(8thCir.1997)(writingthatthelikelihoodofconsumerconfusion...isthe hallmarkofanytrademarkinfringementclaim(quotingPolymerTech.Corp.v.Mimran,37 F.3d74,80(2dCir.1994))).
32 See Bartow, supra note 20, at 747 (explaining actual confusion is not necessary to the plaintiffs burden of proof); see, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d867,875(2dCir.1986)(notingthatitisblackletterlawthatactualconfusionneednotbe showntoprevailundertheLanhamAct,sinceactualconfusionisverydifficulttoproveand theActrequiresonlyalikelihoodofconfusionastosource);W.E.BassettCo.v.Revlon,Inc., 435F.2d656,662(2dCir.1970)(holdingthatashowingofactualconfusionisnotnecessary andinfactisverydifficulttodemonstratewithreliableproof).
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 24:30 (2012) [hereinafter 4 MCCARTHY] (highlighting that each of the [thirteen] federal circuit courts of appealhasdevelopeditsownversionofthelist[offactors]andeachappearstobejealousof itsownformulationoffactors);seealsoBeebe,supranote30,at158283&n.5.
34 See, e.g., Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 112930 (9th Cir. 1998)(illustratingthatcourtsattempttoperformamindmeldwithareasonablyprudent consumer and will consider whether such a reasonably prudent consumer is likely to be confusedbythesimilarityoftwomarks);VitarrozCorp.v.RiverBrandRiceMills,Inc.,266F. Supp.981,984(S.D.N.Y.1967)(commentingthatthejudgemustplaytheroleofanordinary memberofthepurchasingpublicwhenresolvingalikelihoodofconfusioninquiry)(citing Avrickv.RockmontEnvelopeCo.,155F.2d568,573(10thCir.1946)));seealsoLouisAlman& Malla Pollack, Likelihood of ConfusionBalancing of Factorsin General, in 3A RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAWOF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS,AND MONOPOLIES21:11(4thed. 2012) [hereinafter Alman & Pallack] (noting that a court frequently resolves a likelihood of confusiondisputebyplac[ing]itselfintheshoesofaprospectivepurchaser). 35 36
33
4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:5.
SeeAlman&Pollack,supranote34,at21:11(explainingthat[c]ourtshaveinsistedthat allrelevantfactorsmustbeconsideredwhendetermininglikelihoodofconfusion).
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toresolvetrademarkdisputes,confusiondoesnotnecessarilyneedtooccur at the point of sale.37 Courts began to recognize that infringement of a trademark may occur when the consumer begins his or her initial search for the productwell before a purchase is ever made.38 This alteration of the likelihood of confusion inquiry is known as initial interest confusion, and occurs when a consumer becomes initially interested, deceived, or misdirected to a product through another products trademark, despite whether the consumer ultimately purchases the infringing product.39 Through the use of another owners trusted logo, symbol,orbrandname,theinfringingproductcapitalizesonthesuccessful trademarks goodwill, thus providing the infringing product with consumer credibility early in the transaction that results in an actionable formoftrademarkinfringement.40 To understand how initial interest confusion works, it is helpful to consider the following analogy.41 Consider a law firm that is recruiting bright, young associates for its upcoming summer.42 One student purposefullymisrepresentshisorhereducationalbackgroundonaresume
See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 23:5 ([P]oint of sale confusion does not mark the outer boundaries of trademark infringement.); Ted P. Pearce & Corby C. Anderson, The InitialInterestConfusionDoctrine:APowerfulProtectionAgainstInfringement,24FRANCHISEL.J. 241,241(2005)(suggestingthatatrademarkinfringementclaimdoesnotrequirelikelihood ofconfusionatthepointofsale). See Pearce & Anderson, supra note 37, at 241; see, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus PetroleumCorp.,818F.2d254,259(2dCir.1987);GrotrianSteinwegv.Steinway&Sons,523 F.2d1331,1342(2dCir.1975).
39 Shoemaker, supra note 26, at 537; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 23:6; 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, 5.14[1][a], at 5176 (2007) [hereinafter 2 GILSON] (When a company uses anothers trademark to capture customers attention and lead customers to its goods or services, that company may be liable for trademark infringementevenif theconsumerrealizesbeforepurchasethattheproductwasnotmadeby theoriginaltrademarkowner.). 40 See4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6;2GILSON,supranote39,5.14[1][a],at517677; see, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2005) (Initialinterestconfusiontakesplacewhenamanufacturerimproperlyusesatrademarkto createinitialcustomerinterestinaproduct,evenifthecustomer realizes,priortopurchase, thattheproductwasnotactuallymanufacturedbythetrademarkholder.);Dr.SeussEnters. v.PenguinBooksUSA,Inc.,109F.3d1394,1405(9thCir.1997)(holdingthatuseofanothers marktocaptureinitialconsumerattention,eventhoughnoactualsaleisfinallycompletedas aresultoftheconfusion,maystillbeaninfringement);DorrOliver,Inc.v.FluidQuip,Inc., 94F.3d376,382(7thCir.1996)(describinginitialinterestconfusionasabaitandswitch that will affect the buying decisions of consumers in the market for the goods, effectively allowingthecompetitortogetitsfootinthedoorbyconfusingconsumers). 41 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 23:6 (providing the fact pattern from which the followinganalogyisadapted). 42 38 37
Seeid.
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andsubsequentlyobtainsaninterviewattheprestigiousfirm.43Yetatthe interview, the law student explains that the inflated resume claim was actually a fabrication, revealing the truth about his or her academic credentials.44Atthispoint,itisunlikelythatthefirmwillextendanofferto thisdeceitfulcandidate.45Nonetheless,themisrepresentedresumeallowed thelawstudenttoobtainahighlycovetedinterview,allowinghimorher togainaclearadvantageoverotherswhohonestlystatedtheireducational achievements.46 Moreover, the law firm was deceived into considering an applicantthattheywouldotherwisenothavechosentointerview.47 This is precisely how initial interest confusion came into practice courtsrecognizedthatwhenatrademarkisusedinsuchawaytoinitially deceiveconsumersintobelievingthatitrepresentsacompetingtrademark, an actionable harm is caused to both the consumer and competing trademarks.48 Even if no purchase results from the initial deceit, there remainsanoticeableharmtobothconsumersandcompetingmarks.49 In reference to trademark owners, the impact of initial interest confusion is twofold.50 On one hand, the trademark holder potentially loses the business or attention of a consumer who has been initially deceived to select the infringing trademark.51 On the other hand, the trademark holder may also recognize harm in the form of depleted goodwill.52 When an infringing trademark capitalizes on this goodwill by misdirecting consumer interest, the quality of the product or service no longer matches the trademarks consistent standard of quality, devaluing the brand.53 This dilutionof brandidentity isundoubtedlya detriment to thetrademarkowner.54
43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51
Seeid. Seeid. Seeid. Id. Cf.4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6. Buckman,supranote23,at2;accord2GILSON,supra39,at5177. See4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6;2GILSON,supranote39,at5176. 2GILSON,supranote39,at5177.
Id. (The prospective customer may be diverted to a store or web site that he or she believesincorrectlyisassociatedwiththetrademarkowner.).
52 See id. at 5178 (The customer may rely on the trademark owners reputation in purchasingtheinfringingproduct,areputationthathasbeentimeconsumingandexpensive for the trademark owner to create. (citing Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239(10thCir.2006))). 53 54
See4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6.
See2GILSON,supranote39,5.14[1][a],at5178.TheSecondCircuitclearlyidentifiedthis harmtothetrademarkholderwhendecidingwhetheralittleknownpianomanufacturerhad createdinitialinterestconfusionwithworldrenownedpianomaker,Steinway.SeeGrotrian
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On the other side of the equation is harm to consumers themselves.55 From an economic standpoint, this harm materializes as a detrimental increase in search coststhe time it takes to pursue and select a trademarked product based on a consumers preconceived belief of the productsquality.56Whenaconsumerselectsatrademarkedproduct,such as an Apple iPhone, BMW X3, or Coke Zero, the consumer intuitivelyappliesavaluecalculationtothebrandoftheproduct:57
In short, a trademark conveys information that allows the consumertosaytohimself,Ineednotinvestigatetheattributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as thatofthebrandIenjoyedearlier.58
In other words, when getting ready to make a purchase, reasonable consumers use trademarks to select a brand, product, or service at the exclusion of all others.59 However, in a scenario where a deceitful trademark initially misdirects the consumer, this value calculation is spoiled: the consumer has exhausted needless energy on a product or serviceheorshewouldotherwiseignore.60
v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (The GrotrianSteinweg name . . . wouldattractpotentialcustomersbasedonthereputationbuiltupbySteinway....Theharm to Steinway in short is the likelihood that potential piano purchasers will think that there is someconnectionbetweentheGrotrianSteinwegandSteinwaypianos.Suchinitialconfusion worksasaninjurytoSteinway.(internalcitationsomitted)).
55 56
See2GILSON,supranote39,5.14[1][a],at5176.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 26970 (defining search costs as the time expended deciding on a specific product or service, and explaining that trademarks allow a consumer to quickly apply a previous experience with the trademark to a new product or service,thusreducingthecostoftheirsearch);seealsoTyInc.v.Perryman,306F.3d509,510 (7thCir.2002)(Thefundamentalpurposeofatrademarkistoreduceconsumersearchcosts by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods.); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values andInterestsinTrademarkLaw,44IND. L. REV.427,43940(2011)(notingthatthereductionof consumersearchcostsisonegoaloftrademarklaw,andinsinuatingthataninfringementofa trademarkthusharmsaconsumerbyincreasingsearchcosts).
57 58
SeeLandes&Posner,supranote21,at269.
Id.
59 Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer Search Costs, andtheChallengeoftheInternet,28SEATTLEU.L.REV.97,99(2004).
See id.; Mireles, supra note 56, at 482. The Second Circuit identified this harm to consumers in considering whether a startup petroleum trader, Pegasus Petroleum, caused initial interest confusion with oilgiant, Mobil. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,818F.2d 254,259(2dCir.1987)(warning thataconsumer mightlisten to acoldcall fromPegasusbecauseofthecrucialcredibilityduringtheinitialphasesofadealthatthe court believed could only be explained by its resemblance to Mobils logo). The similarity betweenthePegasusnameandMobilslogowasconsidereddetrimentaltoconsumersearch
60
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II. ApplicationofInitialInterestConfusiontoInternetSponsored LinkAdvertising InthecontextoftheInternet,initialinterestconfusionresultswhena consumerismisdirectedfromhisorherintendedwebsitetoanothersite, believingthisothersitetoberelatedtoorsponsoredbythesiteoriginally sought.61 When the Internet began to percolate into public use in the late 1990s, this was a relatively simple area for courts to monitorthere were limited numbers of active websites, and virtually no major retailer had used the Internet for commercial use.62 But now, in an age where e commercepredominates63andInternetisavailabletovirtuallyanyperson withalaptop,cellphone,orevenatelevision,64initialinterestconfusion hastakenonanewlife.65 A. GoogleAdWordsandtheRiseofSponsoredLinkAdvertising This is exceptionally evident in the world of online advertising.66 The explosion in online commerce67 is largely attributable to Googlethe Internet search giant that is rapidly changing the face of Internet consumerism.68 Valued at over $200 billion,69 Google has become the
costs,andthereforewasanactionableformoftrademarkinfringement.Seeid.
61 62
2GILSON,supranote39,at5180.
See generally Greg Lastowka, Googles Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 133234 (2008) (describingthelimitedcommercialuseoftheInternetinitsearliestdays).
63 See Allison Enright, ECommerce Sales Rise 14.8% in 2010, INTERNET RETAILER (Feb. 17, 2011, 11:08 AM), http://www.internetretailer.com/2011/02/17/ecommercesalesrise1482010 (reportingthatonlineshoppersspent$165.4billionin2010alone). 64 See Internet Users in the World, INTERNET WORLD STATS (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (noting that 78% of the population of North America is connected to the internet, and that more than 30% of the global population has access to the Internet); Aaron Smith, Mobile Access 2010, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT(July7,2010),http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/MobileAccess2010.aspx. 65 66
Pearce&Anderson,supranote37,at243.
See Rachel R. Friedman, Note, No Confusion Here: Proposing a New Paradigm for the LitigationofKeywordAdvertisingTrademarkInfringementCases,12VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 355, 357 (2010) (noting that online advertising is blurr[ing] the boundary between fair use and unfaircapitalizationofanownerstrademark). See,e.g.,EmarketerStaff,OnlineAdSpendResumesRapidGrowth,ADWEEK(July21,2010), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/onlineadspendresumesrapidgrowth102871 (noting that by 2014, marketing experts predict annual online advertising expenditures will exceed $96.8 billion); Janet Thaeler, Online Advertising Growth Rateat Least 20% a Year, MARKETING PILGRIM (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.marketingpilgrim.com/2008/02/online advertisinggrowthrateatleast20ayear.html (reporting that online advertising expenditureshaveexpandedby20%everyyearsince2007).
68 67
SeeLastowka,supranote62,at1328.
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worlds leading search engine70 and essentially functions as the hub of the Internet for the majority of Americans.71 Before Google, Internet searches were cumbersome, slow, and inefficient.72 But by simplifying virtuallyeveryfacetofInternetsearch,Googlemanagedtodesignasearch engine that fundamentally transformed how individuals use the Internet, skyrocketingthe company to corporate stardom.73 One needs virtually no otherindicationofthebreadthofGooglesdominanceontheInternetthan to hear someone else say, just Google ituniversally understood to mean,gosearchfortheinformationontheInternet.74 However, in terms of expansion of Internet advertising, the biggest game changer in Googles tool chest is Google AdWords.75 Google AdWords allows a company to purchase unique search terms that, if entered into the Google Search Engine, will generate an advertisement alongside the search results.76 These advertisementsknown as sponsored linksthen become internally linked to the search term so thatitwillappeareverytimethesearchtermisentered.77DespiteGoogles many other successes, none compare to the vast success of Google AdWordsas Googles most profitable business, it generated $28 billion forthecompanyin2010alone.78 Unlike traditional media, which has historically favored larger, more profitable businesses over smaller startups, Google AdWords effectively levelstheadvertisingplayingfield.79Tounderstandhow,itisimportantto
69 Google Market Cap, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/GOOG/market_cap (last visitedNov.17,2012).
See Matt McGee, Google Now #1 Search Engine in Czech Republic; 5 Countries to Go for Global Domination, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Jan. 13, 2011, 2:27 PM), http://searchengineland. com/googlenunberoneczechrepublic5countriesleft61174.
71 72
70
Lastowka,supranote62,at1330.
See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a LargeScale Hypertextual Search Engine, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 2.1.2 (1998), available at http://infolab.stanford.edu/pub/ papers/google.pdf (noting how Googles ability to page rank during a search increases efficiencyandaccuracyandisanimprovementoverprevioussearchengines).
73 See Hesham Zebida, How Google Changed the Way We Think and Remember, FAMOUS BLOGGERS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.famousbloggers.net/googlethinkremember infographic.html. 74 75 76 77 78
Lastowka,supranote62,at1330. SeeTan,supranote8,at474;Lastowka,supranote62,at1340. GoogleAdWords,supranote7. SeeTan,supranote8,at475n.3,476.
Google, 2011 Financial Tables, GOOGLE INVESTOR RELATIONS TBL. 1, http://investor .google.com/financial/tables.html(lastvisitedNov.17,2012)(notingGooglestotaladvertising revenues).
79 SeePeteKennedy,WhyYouShouldAdvertise(EvenifYouDontNeedTo...),MAINSTREET R.O.I. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.mainstreetroi.com/whyyoushouldadvertise/ (noting that
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note the distinction between the results of an organic Google search when search results display after typing in a search term such as Appleand the sponsored link results of Google search after the development of AdWords.80 Prior to the introduction of AdWords, Googles complex searchalgorithm wouldrank sites based on how many otherpageslinkedtothesite.81Thus,whilepageswithfrequenttrafficin many cases, the pages owned by companies with exceptional brand awarenesswerealmostalwaysrankedasthemostrelevantaccordingto Google, the pages with little viewership and little brand awareness were pushed to the bottom of the listsometimes, hundreds or thousands of ranksdownontheresultspage.82 In contrast, Google AdWords fundamentally altered the results of a Google search by prioritizing sponsored linksadvertisements connected to the search term through Google AdWordsand automatically ranking these sponsored links on top of all other search results.83 The Google AdWordsprogramallowstheadvertisertocircumventtheorganicGoogle searchresultsandperpetuallyappearatthetopofsearchresultpages,thus artificially inflating the rank of the link.84 It is this restructuring of the pageranking that levels the marketing playing field:85 while advertisers oncehadtobattlethehighervolumepagesfornoticeableplacementona searchresultspage,GoogleAdWordsnowallowsfirmslookingtoexpand their viewership and brand awareness to appear alongsideand in some cases, directly abovethe other search results, placing them within the samepageplacementastheirbiggestcompetitors.86
Google AdWords is a profitable and easy starting point for businesses to advertise on Google). See Lastowka, supra note 62, at 134449 (comparing the left columnthe organic searchresultsandtherightcolumnthekeywordadvertisingresultsofGoogle).
81 See Brin & Page, supra note 72, 2.1.2 (explaining that Googles PageRank system wouldrankpagesontwovariables:onhowmanyotherwebsiteslinkorpointtothepage, andonthelikelihoodthatarandom[web]surfervisitsthepageoverhisorherothersearch results.) 80
See id. (explaining that the PageRank algorithm is designed to provide an objective measure of [a websites] citation importance that corresponds well with peoples subjective ideaofimportance,whichthuspusheslessimportantpagestothebottomofsearchresults).
83 Tan, supra note 8, at 474; Duran Inci, How Does Google AdWords WorkPPC and Google AdWords, OPTIMUM7.COM (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.optimum7.com/internet marketing/googleadwords/howdoesgoogleadwordswork.html. 84 85 86
82
Tan,supranote8,at475. SeeKennedy,supranote79.
See id.; Patrick Schmid & Ulf Weihbold, How Does Google AdWords Work?, THE BIG PICTURE (Nov. 24, 2011, 4:00 PM), available at http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/11/how doesgoogleadwordswork/.
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B. TrademarkInfringementConcernsCausedbyGoogleAdWords Yet this leveling effect carriesits own set of concerns.87 In addition to placing the sponsored links on top of (or directly alongside) all other organic search results, Google AdWords also allows users to bid on any searchtermthattheydesiretocreatethecorrespondingsponsoredlinks this includes generic terms, like cell phone, as well as trademarked terms,suchasiPhone5eveniftheuserdoesnotholdtherightstothe trademarked term.88 Ostensibly, this allows a virtual unknown in the marketplacetopurchaseitslargestcompetitorstrademarkedbrandname asasearchterm,createasponsoredlinkthatincludesthistrademark,and have that link appear in a consumers sightline directly alongside the original trademark owners website or advertisement.89 And the result showsgenuinecauseforconcern:fiveoutofeverysixsearchengineusers cannot identify the differences between a sponsored link and an organic searchresult,androughlyhalfofallusersarecompletelyunawarethatany distinctionactuallyexistsbetweenthetwo.90 C. JudicialApplicationsofInitialInterestConfusiontoSponsored LinkDisputes Looking for a way to stop the sudden ascendency of lesserknown firms from encroaching on their web traffic, major trademark holders rushedtothecourts,demandingtrademarkprotectionunderthetheoryof initial interest confusion.91 Yet while there has been no shortage of litigation,therehasbeenashortageofconsistencyoftrademarklawbeing applied by the circuit courts.92 Indeed, attempting to apply established trademarklawinthefastdevelopingworldoftheInternet[was]somewhat liketryingtoboardamovingbus.93Mostcourtshaveappliedtheinitial interest confusion test very leniently, delivering victory after victory for
87 See generally Lastowka, supra note 62, at 1371 (highlighting the concern of trademark infringement via search result manipulation); Tan, supra note 8, at 47779 (discussing the trademarkinfringementconcernsinvolvingGoogleAdWords). 88 89 90
Tan,supranote8,at477. Cf.Lastowka,supranote62,at1371.
BUT
DEBORAH FALLOWS, INTERNET SEARCHERS ARE CONFIDENT, SATISFIED, AND TRUSTING THEY ARE ALSO UNAWARE AND NAVE 1718 (2005) [hereinafter PEW REPORT 2005], available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2005/PIP_Searchengine_ users.pdf.pdf.
91 92
Pinto,supranote5,at39.
See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 23:6 & n.2 (2011) (noting the various ways circuit courtshaveappliedtheinitialinterestconfusiontheory).
93 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997); see Buckman, supra note23,at2&n.4(identifyingthecitedquotation).
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plaintiffslookingtoprotecttheirtrademarks.94Morerecentlyhowever,the Ninth Circuit applied initial interest confusion with more rigorous requirements, making it harder for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief to safeguardtheirtrademarks.95 1.TheInternetTrinity:TheHighWaterMarkofInitial InterestConfusionLeniency Circuit courts in the late 1990s and 2000s turned to three factors to determine whether a defendants use of a trademark created initial interest confusion and thus infringed on a competing mark: (1) the similarity of the marks,(2) the relatedness of the goods andservices,and (3)thepartiessimultaneoususeoftheInternetasamarketingchannel.96 These factors, known as the Internet Trinity, were first applied in Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment.97 The case involved two competing claimants to the trademark Moviebuff.98 The plaintiff, Brookfield Communications, used the term as the brand name to its computer software that it marketed to the entertainment industry.99 Brookfield filed suit when it discovered that the defendant, West Coast Video, had created a website, MovieBuff.com, to market its own video rentalservice.100 After the Central District Court of California denied Brookfields motion for a preliminary injunction, Brookfield appealed to the Ninth Circuit and pleaded that West Coast be enjoined from using the term Moviebuff in its online marketing.101 The Ninth Circuit agreed that a traditionallikelihoodofconfusionanalysiswouldnotresultinafinding favorabletoBrookfieldbecausetheconfusionwouldnottakeplaceatthe
94 JamieN.Nafziger&JoseHernandez,KeywordAdvertisingAfterRescuecom:Predictability Remains Elusive, DORSEY, at 67 (2009), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/ nafziger_keyword_advertising_cle.pdf;see,e.g.,NissanMotorCo.v.NissanComputerCorp., 378F.3d1002,101819(9thCir.2004);HorphagResearchLtd.v.Pellegrini,337F.3d1036,1040 (9th Cir.2003);PromatekIndus., Ltd.v. EquitracCorp.,300F.3d808,812(7thCir.2002);Eli Lilly&Co.v.NaturalAnswers,Inc.,233F.3d456,46566(7thCir.2000). 95 Nafziger & Hernandez, supra note 94, at 7; see e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638F.3d1137,1142(9thCir.2011). 96 Allison S. Brehm & Mariya Kupershmidt, Ad Men and AdWords: How Trademark Law is AdaptingtotheInternet,COMM.LAW.,Nov.2011,at11(citationomitted).
BrookfieldCommcns,Inc.v.WestCoastEntmtCorp.,174F.3d1036(9thCir.1999);see Shoemaker,supranote26,at548([T]heNinthCircuitextendedtheinitialinterestconfusion doctrinetocasesconcerningtrademarksandtheinternet.).

98 99
97
Brookfield,174F.3dat1041. Id. Id.at104243. Id.at1043.
100
101
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pointofsale.102Instead,thecourtturnedtoinitialinterestconfusionand considered its applicability to the Internet.103 The court looked to the Internet Trinity, and concluded that West Coasts deceitful practice of usingBrookfieldsregisteredtrademark,Moviebuff,asametatag104onits website wrongfully diverted Internet users away from Brookfield.105 The court compared this practice to driving on a highway and spotting a distractingbillboard:
SupposeWestCoastscompetitor(letscallitBlockbuster)puts up a billboard on a highway readingWest Coast Video: 2 milesaheadatExit7whereWestCoastisreallylocatedatExit 8butBlockbusterislocatedatExit7.CustomerslookingforWest CoastsstorewillpulloffatExit7anddrivearoundlookingfor it. Unable tolocate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store rightbythehighwayentrance,theymaysimplyrentthere.Even consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbusterrightthere.106
The Brookfield court ultimately found that West Coasts practices diverted consumer attention away because of its use of Brookfields trademark.107 Many other similar cases followed Brookfield, where courts found infringement simply on the basis that consumers may become attracted, distracted, interested, or diverted by other available choicesthatreferenceorusetheplaintiffstrademarkontheInternet.108The Internet Trinity essentially allowed any plaintiff who could present strong evidence that the defendant had used a similar mark in its sponsored link or other Internet advertisement to sell related products or services and also marketed its products or services online to receive an injunctionagainstthedefendantsfutureuseofthemark.109
102 103 104
Id.at1057. Seeid.at1062.
MetatagsareHTMLcodethatanInternetusercannotseebutthatsearchenginesuse to pull up websites that correspond to descriptive keywords the user enters into the search engine.Pearce&Anderson,supranote37,at243.
105 106 107 108
SeeBrookfield,174F.3dat106566. Id.at1064(emphasisadded). Id.at1062.
Rothman, Diversion, supra note 10, at 93, 108 n.24 (highlighting the collected cases as subsequent examples of the circuit courts willingness to find initial interest confusion in theInternetcontext);see,e.g.,NissanMotorCo.v.NissanComputerCorp.,378F.3d1002,1018 (9th Cir. 2004); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. NaturalAnswers,Inc.,233F.3d456,46466(7thCir.2000);InterstellarStarshipServs.,Ltd.v. EpixInc.,184F.3d1107,1111(9thCir.1999).
109
SeeNafziger&Hernandez,supranote102,at67.
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2. NetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSystemsConcepts,Inc.: TighteningtheBeltAroundInitialInterestConfusion InMarch2011,theNinthCircuitsuddenlytookatougherapproachto initialinterestconfusionwhenlookingattwobusinessessellingsoftware in Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts.110 Network and Advanced Systems were competing firms that both sold job scheduling and management software.111 The two firms operated their own trademarked software productsNetwork marketed AutoMate, while Advanced marketed ActiveBatchand both relied heavily on Internet advertising.112 To break through some of the clutter, Network began using Google AdWords, choosing to maximize its reach by purchasing both product category terms as well as the trademarked name of its products largest competitor,ActiveBatch.113Asaresult,everytimeapersonsearchedfor ActiveBatch on Google, a link to NetworkAutomation.com would appear alongside the search result as a sponsored link advertisement.114 AdvancedfiledatrademarkinfringementsuitagainstNetworkandsought to invoke the doctrine of initial interest confusion.115 Relying on the popularInternetTrinity,theCentralDistrictCourtofCaliforniafoundin favor of Advanced,116 and enjoined Network from using the Google AdWords sponsored links with the ActiveBatch trademark. Network quicklyappealedthedecisiontotheNinthCircuit.117 In a move that brought about the first major alteration to initial interest confusion since its application to the Internet in Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts decision.118 The court acknowledgedthatwhiletheInternetTrinitytestmayhavebeeneasyto understand,its major flaw was that it did not look at a consumers likely confusionitmerelyfocusedonaconsumersdivertedattention.119Inthis case, the court posited, consumers certainly may have been diverted by
110 SeeNetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638F.3d1137,1142,1154 (9thCir.2011). 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
Id.at1142.
Id. Id. Id.at1143. Id.at1142. NetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1141,1143. Id.at1142,1144.
Id. at 1142; see Brehm & Kupershmidt, supra note 96, at 11 (noting the radical departure from previous initial interest confusion case law by finally discarding the prolongedrelianceon...theInternet[T]rinity).
119
SeeNetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1149.
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spotting Networks sponsored link containing the ActiveBatch trademark, but arriving at the Network website would immediately alert the consumer that the site was owned by Network and contained no affiliation to Advanced Systems.120 Additionally, the court noted that initial interest confusion required a showing of harm to the trademark owner.121Thisrequired,justasithadbeenappliedinpastcases,ashowing of detriment to the goodwill of the mark as well as economic loss to the trademarkowner.122 However,merelyusingtheActiveBatchtrademarkinadvertisement did not, on its face, constitute damage to Advanced Systems because no economic or significant reduction in goodwill accompanied the use.123 ConsumersmayhavevisitedNetworkssitebyclickingtheadvertisement with the ActiveBatch trademark, but this would not provide Network with any instant financial advantage over Advanced Systems.124 Further, nothing prevented consumers from clicking right back and visiting the Advanced Systems website.125 The court held that despite the use of the ActiveBatchtrademarkinNetworkssponsoredlinks,theresultwasnot trademark infringement.126 Ultimately, the holding in Network Automation showed that initial interest confusions application to the Internet specifically, to sponsored link advertisingwas bursting with flaws that neededtobeaddressedinthefuture.127
ANALYSIS
III. TheApplicationofInitialInterestConfusiontoSponsoredLink TrademarkDisputesMisunderstandstheGoogleConsumerand ChangesinConsumerSearchBehavior. Prior to sponsored link issues and the age of Internet advertising, competitors connected to consumers primarily through static forms of media.128Asaresult,consumerslookingforaproductforwhichtheyhad
120 121 122
Seeid.at115254. Seeid.at1144.
Compare Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975); Mobil Oil Corp.v.PegasusPetroleumCorp.,818F.2d254,259(2dCir.1987);withNetworkAutomation, 638F.3dat1146.
123 124 125 126 127 128
SeeNetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1151. Cf.id.at1152. Id. Id.at1154. Brehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at13.
SeeSallyJ.McMillan,InternetAdvertising:OneFaceorMany?,inINTERNETADVERTISING: THEORY AND RESEARCH1516(DavidW.Shumann&EstherThorson,eds.2007)(notingthat
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little knowledge of alternatives had very high search costs, making investment in one particular brand, product, or service particularly timesaving.129Theconsumersdesiretoreducesearchtimewasveryhigh becauseinmanyways,choosingbetweenmultiplebrandswasfartootime consuming and difficult.130 But then came the Internetan interactive, omnipresent source of information on any product, topic, or interest area available for global consumption.131 Consumers, once unable to easily identifyalternativestoproductsthattheyhadbecomeaccustomedtointhe past, were suddenly flooded with a nearly endless stream of available alternatives to everything from music to microwaves; from televisions to textbooks.132Yeslackofconsumerchoicebecameathingofthepast,and the world became one of Google consumersconsumers who were confident,selfsufficientsearchersofinformation.133Theproblem,however, was that courts seemingly missed this great transition, and continued to view consumers as absentminded, feeble beings who needed to be safeguarded from marketing tactics set out to trick unsuspecting shoppers.134 Theapplicationofinitialinterestconfusioninsponsoredlinkcasesis atextbookcaseofthismisunderstanding.135ThecourtinBrookfieldwarned against the proverbial highway exit that would trap unsuspecting consumers sent looking for the wrong product or service.136 Yet, the
staticmediameaningtelevisionorprintadvertisingisspaceboundand...timebound andisentirelydistinguishablefromInternetadvertising,whichspanstimeandspace).
129 See Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270 (explaining that the reduction of search costsiscriticaltoconsumers). 130 Cf.id.(Thevalueofatrademark[foraconsumer]isthesavinginsearchcostsmade possiblebytheinformationorreputationthatthetrademarkconveysorembodiesaboutthe brand....). 131 132
SeeMcMillan,supranote128,at20.
See Margaret Case Little, Google Exec Talks Dos and Donts of Online Marketing, Search andHolidayPrep,BLOG.SHOP.ORG(Sept.12,2011),http://blog.shop.org/2011/09/12/googleexec talksdosanddontsofonlinemarketingsearchandholidayprep/.
133 See Zebida, supra note 73 (describing the concept of the modern consumer who uses Google);Little,supranote132(illustratingthewaysGoogleappealstoanaverageconsumer). 134 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet,41HOUS.L.REV.777,802(2004)(insinuatingthatcourtshaveexpandedthedefinition of actionable confusion to protect consumers from nontraditional uses of established trademarks);JessicaLitman,BreakfastwithBatman:ThePublicInterestintheAdvertisingAge,108 YALE L.J. 1717, 172223 (1999) ([C]ourts . . . believe themselves bound to protect fictional consumerswho,asaclass,[are]farmoregullible,careless,andeasilydeceived....).
See Rothman, Diversion, supra note 10, at 90 (positing that courts misunderstood the nature of the Internet and thus felt a greater need to protect consumers, which led to erroneousfindingsofinitialinterestconfusion).
136
135
SeeBrookfieldCommcns,Inc.,v.W.CoastEntmtCorp.,174F.3d1036,1064(9thCir.
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Internetsimplydoesnotoperatelikeahighwayexitwhereaconsumer has to drive around looking for his or her desired purchase.137 Instead, the Internet has becomethanks to the widespread use of Google and similar Internet companiesan easily navigable system that leaves everythingjustabackbuttonaway.138Thishighwayanalogyassumed thatInternetconsumersmustexpendvastlyhighsearchcostsiftheydo notfindtheirdesiredproductorserviceanassumptionthatspeakstothe ignorance of Internet consumption.139 In reality, consumers expend virtuallynoextrasearchcostswhentheyhappenuponthewrongpage or product because clicking back or actively choosing a different link on Google or another search engine is both expeditious and effortless.140 By ignoringthesenewrealtiesofInternetuse,courtshavegrosslyoverstepped their role by offering safeguards for consumers who did not wantnor needanyadditionalprotection.141 Additionally, research shows that consumers searching online are more confident and more aware than ever before.142 In one study, 87% of searchengineusersreportedbeingsuccessfulintheironlinesearchesfor information, and in a separate study where searchers were instructed to searchforfivetypesofinformation,between85%and94%oftheassigned users found the exact information that they were instructed to find.143
1999).
137 See Tan, supra note 8, at 483 (highlighting that the application of initial interest confusionhasbeenheavilycriticizedfornotaccuratelyreflectinghowtheInternetoperates); cf.F.GregoryLastowka,SearchEngines,HTML,andTrademarks:WhatstheMetaFor?,86VA.L. REV. 835,85758(2000)(discussinghowmetatagsandbyextension,theInternetitselfdo notoperatelikeaseriesofbillboards). 138 SeeBihariv.Gross,119F.Supp.2d309,320n.15(S.D.N.Y.2000)(Theharmcausedby a misleading billboard on the highway is difficult to correct. In contrast, on the information superhighway, resuming ones search for the correct website is relatively simple. . . . [O]ne clickofthe mouseandafew secondsdelay. .. .);ZacharyJ.Zweihorn,Note,Searchingfor Confusion:TheInitialInterestConfusionDoctrineanditsMisapplicationtoSearchEngineSponsored Links,91CORNELLL.REV.1343,1357(2006). 139 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commcns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (There is a big difference between hijacking a customer to another website by making the customer think he or she is visiting the trademark holders website[,] even if only briefly[,] . . . and just distracting a potential customer with another choice....);Dogan&Lemley,supranote134,at815(notingthatswitchingcostsarerelatively minimalontheinternet).
Dogan&Lemley,supranote134,at815(explainingtherationaleofreducingconsumer search costs does not translate readily into the online context, in which switching costs are minimal).
141 142 143
140
Rothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90,102. SeePEWREPORT2005,supranote90,at9. Id.at910&n.19.
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Despite the fact that some consumers may have difficulty distinguishing between sponsored links and organic search engine results,144 the uncertaintyresultsinnegligibleharmtoconsumersbecausethenatureof Internetsearchallowsforcontinualmovementtheconsumercansimply choosetoleavethepageandreturntotheorganicsearchresults.145 The concept of initial interest confusion came into practice to penalizetrademarkusersfromengagingindeceptivepracticesthatwould confuse the consumer prior to his or her purchase.146 However, in cases involvingsponsoredlinks,consumersoftenexhibitnolegitimateconfusion ofanykind.147Caselawhasestablishedthatthetouchstoneinquiryunder the Lanham Actthe likelihood of confusion inquirydoes not effectivelyapplytosponsoredlinkdisputesbecausetheyofteninvolveno purchase.148 Nonetheless, the underlying rationale of the likelihood of confusion inquirydetermining whether consumers are likely to be confused by the use of anothers trademarkstill must exist even in an initial interest confusion dispute.149 Cases applying initial interest confusion have equated mere diversion of consumer attention with consumerconfusion,butthischaracterizationofconsumershasunderrated consumercapabilityandunderstanding.150 In the earliest applications of initial interest confusion, courts denied trademark users the right to trick consumers when they were
144 145
Id.at1718.
See Zweihorn, supra note 138, at 1357 & n.98 (explaining that online, the loss of resourcesaconsumersufferswhenarrivingatthewrongWebpageishardlycomparableto theofflinecontextbecause[a]consumercanclickthebackbuttonandreturntothecorrect locationatessentiallynocost).
146 See Grynberg, supra note 59, at 109 (focusing on the development of initial interest confusion as an explanation for how a junior [trademark] user may be said to have misappropriatedsomethingbelongingtothesenior[trademark]user).
SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90(highlightingthatinitialinterestconfusion caseshavebeendecidedabsentanyfindingofconfusion).
148 149
147
2GILSON,supranote39,at5:14.
Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law,27CARDOZOL.REV.105,12223(2005)[hereinafterRothman,Crossroads].
150 Id.CompareNissanMotorCo.v.NissanComputerCorp.,378F.3d1002,1018(9thCir. 2004)(defininginitialinterestconfusionascapturingconsumerattention),andPromatek Indus.,Ltd.v.EquitracCorp.,300F.3d808,812(7thCir.2002)(allowingliabilityunderinitial interest confusion when consumers are merely lured or diverted to another site regardless of the degree or duration of potential confusion), and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers,Inc.,233F.3d456,46466(7thCir.2000)(findinginfringementunderinitialinterest confusion despite any finding of likely confusion), with Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding no infringement becausemerediversiondidnotamounttoconsumerconfusion).
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initiallydecidingbetweenlimitedchoices.151However,asconsumerchoice becamemoreprevalentasaresultofInternetproliferation,152courtsmissed theiropportunitytorecognizeconsumerchoiceasajustificationforfairuse of trademarks.153 Consumers today appreciate expansive options and alternatives at their disposal, and products such as Google AdWords presentthesealternativesinaneasilyaccessiblemanner.154Theplacement of Google AdWords sponsored linkswhether on top of, or alongside organic search resultsdoes nothing to expressly harm the consumer; rather, it is a reflection of the widespread availability of choice.155 By preventingtrademarkusersfromusingsponsoredlinks,courtssucceedat couching consumer choice under the veiled name of consumer protection.156 IV. TheOverbroadApplicationofInitialInterestConfusiontoGoogle AdWordsandSponsoredLinksStiflesLegitimateCompetition. Unfair competition is the genus of which trademark infringement is oneofthespecies.157YestheLanhamActhas,fromtheearliestdaysof its passage, sought to prevent unfair competition by the wrongful use of anothers trademark.158 However, the Lanham Act was not intended to stifleallcompetition.159Onthecontrary,businesseshavelongbeenallowed to reference chief competitors to distinguish their own products features
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987); Grotrianv.Steinway&Sons,523F.2d1331,1339(2dCir.1975).
152 DEBORAH FALLOWS, SEARCH ENGINE USE 4 (2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Search_Aug08.pdf.pdf (Search engine sites have become so useful and well tuned that people turn to them for an increasinglybroadrangeofquestions.). 151
Grynberg, supra note 59, at 123 (One must remember, however, that the effects of initial interest confusion are not uniformly negative. The second effect . . . is to expose consumerstoanalternativeproperchoice.).
154 SeeDogan&Lemley,supranote134,at824(notingthatconsumersdonotwishtobe coddl[ed], and further arguing that the only way to ensure consumers have access to competitivegoodsthattheymightenjoyistopermitInternetintermediarieslike[Google] tooffertheseoptions). 155 SeegenerallyLastowka,supranote62,at134445,1398(highlightingthatGooglesuseof atwocolumnapproachisnotaformofevilrather,itexpandsconsumerchoice). 156 157 158 159
153
SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90. PATTISHALL,supranote14,at4. Id.at34. SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at86.
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from those of the competition.160 When consumers watch television, they are hit with a barrage of commercials that distinguish one cars standard features from another,161 that promote a namebrand painkiller at the expenseofitschiefcompetitor,162andthatpromisemorenetworkcoverage over the other cell phone providers.163 Despite the fact that these commercials explicitly use the trademarked product and brand names of their competitors, there is nothing actionable about these types of advertisementsundertheLanhamAct.164Sothisbegsthequestionwhat makes these comparative advertisements different from the use of anothers trademark in a Google AdWords sponsored link on the Internet?165 Ultimately, no real distinction exists.166 Courts, uncomfortable with the ability of any business to buy the trademarked keyword of a competitor,turnedtoinitialinterestconfusiontoassertthatonebusiness cannotuseanotherstrademarktodivert,attract,distract,orcapture interestontheInternet.167However,theverynatureofcompetitionisto
160 Rothman,Crossroads,supranote149,at130(alertingthatbusinesseshavelongbeenable tocomparetheirgoodstothoseofatrademarkholdersothatconsumerscanmakeinformed choicesaboutwhichproducttobuy);seealsoAugustStorckK.G.v.Nabisco,Inc.,59F.3d616, 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that truthful comparative advertising is not a form of trademarkinfringement);LindyPenCo.v.BicPenCorp.,725F.2d1240,1248(9thCir.1984) (We have recognized that liability for infringement may not be imposed for using a registeredtrademarkinconnectionwithtruthfulcomparativeadvertising.). 161 See,e.g.,NewRoadsGM,ChevyCruzeCivicHuntingSeason,YOUTUBE(Sept.16,2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5y7oeCyR6E (comparing the Chevy Cruze to its chief competitor,theHondaCivic,withthetagline,ItsCivicSeason);TellyFarnsworth,2010Ford Swap Your Ride Commercial, YOUTUBE (May 16, 2010) (comparing the Ford Escape with the HondaCRVbygettingdriverstoswap[their]rides). 162 See, e.g., Bretcostegan, Aleve Commercial, YOUTUBE (Aug. 22, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yhSE6aIGgw (comparing Aleve to Tylenol by criticizing Tylenolsreducedrelieftime). 163 See, e.g., RockBandit, Theres a Map For ThatVerizon Commercial, YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=37NKnDRPFKU (highlighting Verizons larger 3G service by superimposing its coverage map over AT&Ts own coverage area and insisting, theresamapforthat). 164 See15U.S.C.1115(b)(4)(2006)(allowinguseofanotherstrademarkfordescrib[ing] thegoodsandservicesofthecompetitorsproducts). 165 SeeRothman,Crossroads,supranote149,at13031(Itisalsoquestionablewhethernon confusingreferencestoanotherstrademarkactuallyharmatrademarkholdersgoodwill.).
Cf. Zweihorn, supra note 135, at 137576 (noting that online sponsored links are indistinguishablefromacceptedofflinemarketingtechniques).
167 See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003); Promatek
166
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divert and distract consumers away from the larger competition and provide the consumer with alternatives.168 By continuously holding that virtually any diversion of consumer attention is an actionable form of trademark infringement, courts have effectively prevented online marketers from engaging in the same form of fair use comparative advertisingthatthemarketerwouldbefreetoengageinontelevisionorin othertraditionalformsofmedia.169 Thisisnottosaythatallusesofsponsoredlinksshouldbeimmune from trademark infringement disputes.170 When a trademark is used to intentionally deceive consumers to believe that the trademark represents another, courts have every reason to find trademark infringement.171 This wouldincludeusessuchaswherethetrademarkuserneveridentifiesthe truesourceoftheadvertisementorusesthatpresentfalsestatementsabout competition.172 However, these cases represent the minority of examples
Indus., Ltd. V. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers,Inc.,233F.3d456,46466(7thCir.2000);InterstellarStarshipServs.,Ltd.v.EpixInc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Rothman, Diversion, supra note 10, at 93 & n.24 (highlighting the collected cases as subsequent examples of the circuit courts willingness to findinitialinterestconfusionintheInternetcontext).
168 See Lars Perner, Introduction to MarketingThe Marketing Environment, UNIV. S. CAL., http://www.consumerpsychologist.com/marketing_introduction.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012)(explainingthattheeconomicsofcompetitionincludestheavailabilityofsubstitutesand alternativesinthemarket).TheFederalTradeCommissionthefederalagencythatregulates anticompetitive behaviorexplicitly encourages the use of comparative advertising in its own regulations. See 16 C.F.R. 14.15(b)(c) (2010) (Commission policy in the area of comparative advertising encourages the name of, or reference to competitors . . . . Comparative advertising encourages product improvement and innovation and can lead to lowerpricesinthemarketplace.). 169 170
SeeMireles,supranote56,at482;Zweihorn,supranote135,at137576(2006).
SeeRothman,Crossroads,supranote149,at16061;seealsoShoemaker,supranote26,at 565(notingthatinitialinterestconfusionshouldcontinuetobeappliedwhenacompetitor deceitfullyusesthetrademarkofanother). See,e.g.,RosettaStoneLtd.v.Google,Inc.,676F.3d144,15759(4thCir.2012).InRosetta Stone, a counterfeit software manufacturer used Google AdWords to advertise counterfeited copiesoftheRosettaStoneforeignlanguagesoftwarebycreatingsponsoredlinkswiththe RosettaStonebrandname,whichluredconsumersintopurchasingtheillegalsoftware.Id. at 15152. Though the Fourth Circuit never applied the initial interest confusion test in Rosetta Stone, the basic facts of the case perfectly illustrate a scenario when sponsored link advertising would legitimately cause confusion and should not be immune from trademark infringement.Cf.id.at160.
172 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 134, at 82122; Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 158 (disapproving of the defendants acquiescence to the use of sponsored link advertising for counterfeitsoftwareproducts);DorrOliver,Inc.v.FluidQuip,Inc.,94F.3d376,382(7thCir. 1996) (finding initial interest confusion where a trademark is used as a bait and switch 171
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wheredeceitfulintentactuallyexists.173Thevastmajorityofcasescontain nearlyidenticalfactstoNetworkAutomation,whereabusinessmerelyused a trademarked word in products like Google AdWords to present alternatives to its competitors in the industry.174 Specific to Network Automation, where the two businesses involved were essentially the only games in town, drawing a distinct comparison is not only smart for businessitsanecessity.175 Consider major corporate rivals that continuously draw distinctions between one another to increase the size of their business: Coke and Pepsi;176 Verizon and AT&T;177 General Motors and Ford.178 Each of these companies has a legitimate business interest in distinguishing itself from the competition, and this interest sometimes includes the need to make a direct comparison to the features, specialtiesor on many occasions, the
that affect[s] the buying decisions of consumers in the market for the goods, effectively allowing the competitor to get its foot in the door by confusing consumers (internal quotationmarksomitted)).
173 See, e.g., 1800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir. 2005) (comparingonlineadvertisingtoinstoreproductplacementandnotingthatitisroutinefor vendors toseek specificproductplacement. .. preciselytocapitalizeontheircompetitors name recognition (emphasis added)); see also Paul L. Bonewitz, Note, Beyond Confusion: ReexaminingTrademarkLawsGoalsintheWorldofOnlineAdvertising,81ST. JOHNS L. REV.899, 91516 (2007) (discussing the commonplace use of online advertising for legitimate competitivepurposesandwhysuchuseshouldnotresultintrademarkliability).
See, e.g., Rothman, Crossroads, supra note 149, at 130; Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini,337F.3d1036,1039,1041(9thCir.2003)([I]tisoftenvirtuallyimpossibletoreferto a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other suchpurposewithoutusingthemark.(internalquotationmarksomitted));EliLilly&Co.v. NaturalAnswers,Inc.,233F.3d456,462(7thCir.2000)(Themerefactthatonemarkbrings anothermarktomindisnotsufficienttoestablishalikelihoodofconfusionastothesourceof theproduct.).
175 JerryB.Gotlieb&DanSarel,ComparativeAdvertisingEffectiveness:TheRoleofInvolvement andSourceCredibility,20J. ADVERTISING38,4344(1991)(notingthatcomparativeadvertising is significantly more effective than noncomparative advertising when a highcredibility sourcemakesthecomparison). 176 SeeColaWars:CocaColavsPepsi,COKEVSPEPSI,http://cokevspepsi.net/(lastvisitedMay 29,2012). 177 See dmo580, AT&T Mobility Wireless vs. Verizon WirelessRollover Minutes, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HTHCCsDx4Eo (featuring a direct comparisonofAT&Tspolicyoflettingcustomersremainingcellphoneminutesrollover, whileexplicitlysayingVerizonspolicyistoletthemlapse). 178 SeeSharonTerlep&MikeRamsey,FordandGMRenewaBitterRivalry,WALLST.J.(Nov. 23,2011),http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203710704577054193247860700
174
.html.
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shortcomingsof the competition.179 The use of anothers trademark on Google AdWords is just another fair use method for drawing these direct, descriptive distinctionsa method explicitly authorized in the Lanham Act.180 The comparative advertisements are generally considered acceptableuseswhenoccurringintheofflinecontext,sothereissimplyno economicorpolicyreasonforpreventingtheiracceptableuseintheonline context.181 By relying too heavily on initial interest confusion, courts are ultimately not protecting business intereststhey are harming them.182 Despite plaintiffs condemning the use of their trademarks in sponsored links as a direct harm to their brands goodwill, many cannot provide specific, or even speculative, economic harm from sponsored link comparative advertisements online.183 Courts have moved too far away fromthehistoricrootsofinitialinterestconfusion,whichwasrootedina prevention of bait and switch advertising that captured the business of unsuspecting consumers.184 Courts must resist the urge to penalize trademarkuserswhosimplyusesponsoredlinkstocomparetheirproduct or services to their competitors.185 Instead, courts must reconcile the doctrine of initial interest confusion with the underlying rationale of unfair competition186a proper balance between the protectionist desires
179 See Rothman, Crossroads, supra note 149, at 129 (Such [use] is crucial for the efficient operation of competitive markets and protects the publics ability to choose between reasonablypricedproducts.).
See15U.S.C.1115(b)(4)(2006)(Thattheuseofthename,term,ordevicechargedto beaninfringementisause...whichisdescriptiveofandusedfairlyandingoodfaithonlyto describethegoodsandservicesof[thetrademarkholder]);Zweihorn,supranote135,at1376.

181 182 183
180
SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90,102. Seeid.at101.
See2 GILSON, supranote39,at5.14(1)(a)(notingthatinitialinterestconfusionshould onlybeaviablecauseofactionwhenthereisresultingeconomicdamageandthatonlyafew appellate courts have found this to exist in the Internet context); see, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell,420F.3d309,317(4thCir.2005)(notingthatthefewcourtsthathaveimposedliability forusingmarksontheInternetonlydidsowhere[p]rofitingfinanciallyfrominitialinterest confusion[was]...akeyelementforimpositionofliabilityunderthistheory).
184 SeeRothman,Crossroads,supranote149,at18990(notingthatthereisapressingneed toreignintheinitialinterestconfusiondoctrine,whichhasexpandedbeyonditstraditional purpose). 185 186
SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at107.
See Jedediah Wakefield & Marybeth Milionis, Ninth Circuit Clarifies Standards for KeywordAdvertisingTrademarkCases,16CYBERSPACELAW.28,28(2011).
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of the haves against the legitimate competitive interests of the have notswhoadvertiseusingGoogleAdWordsandsponsoredlinks.187 V. The Ninth Circuits Holding in Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts Should Become the Standard for Resolving SponsoredLinkTrademarkDisputesintheFuture. Amidst a generation of circuit opinions misunderstanding consumer behavior and cataclysmically expanding traditional trademark law,188 Network Automation was the first initial interest confusion case to grasp the evolution of consumer behavior and reassess the role of unfair competition on the Internet.189 Recognizing that consumers expect choices anddistractionswhileusingtheInternet,theNinthCircuitrefusedtoissue an injunction for Networks use of the ActiveBatch trademark.190 This decisionmarkedaneededtransitionbecauseithighlightedareturntothe goalofconsumerprotectionintrademarklaw.191Italsomarkedrecognition of consumers new expectation of choice192a notion that courts have inexplicably ignored for an entire decade despite the growth of Internet practices that vastly empowered consumers to take charge of selecting theirproductsandservices.193 But beyond the policy implications of the decision in Network Automation, there is a genuine legal reason why courts must resist their previous precedent for initial interest confusion and adopt the Ninth Circuits holding as the new standard for future cases of sponsored link advertising disputes: the decision signals a return to flexible, factspecific
See Pinto, supra note 5, at 39 (describing large businesses with strong trademark recognitionasthehavesandsmallerstartupbusinesseswithouttrademarkrecognitionas the have nots, and asserting that the role of courts is to properly balance the interests of bothgroups).
188 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 134, at 816 (warning that initial interest confusion has expanded in a novel and dangerous direction that disregards its confusionbased origins, defiescoretrademarkdoctrine,andthwartsthenormativegoalsoftrademarklaw). 189 SeeBrehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at13(notingthecourtslongoverduefocus onconsumersophisticationandchoiceontheInternet). 190 Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142, 1149 (9thCir.2011). 191 Cf.Grynberg,supranote59,at117(notingthatcourtsshouldrestorethebalancingof searchcostsagainstconsumerbenefits). 192 193 187
SeeBrehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at13.
See Lastowka, supra note 62, at 137071 (noting that courts have grossly expanded initial interest confusion to situations where consumers are not confused . . . allow[ing] trademarklawsscope...todriftfarafield).
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inquiriesofinitialinterestconfusion194thatwillreduceexcessivejudicial interventionandshiftregulationtotheextremecasesthatactuallycontain confusionnotmerediversionordistractioninatrademarkinfringement dispute.195 Moreover, by returning to a more flexible approach to initial interest confusion, courts will be better equipped to handle the new realitiesofonlineconsumerbehaviorandbusinesscompetition.196 In Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment, the court warned,[w]emustbeacutelyawareofexcessiverigiditywhenapplying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.197 Despite this warning, circuit courts subsequently adopted a testthatreliedononlythreefactorstheInternetTrinitytodetermine whether trademark infringement occurred in the Internet context.198 Case after case, courts ignored highly pertinent facts and looked past any semblanceofactualconfusionallinfavorofusingasupposedlysimple, threefactor test.199 But by focusing exclusively on the similarity of the marks, the relatedness of the goods and services, and the parties simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing channel, courts could neverultimatelymakeafullyinformeddecisionaboutwhethertrademark infringementactuallyoccurred.200 In one case, the Sixth Circuit found initial interest confusion even wherethewebsitehadanexpressdisclaimerwarningvisitorsthatthesite hadnorelationtotheseniortrademarkssite.201Theonlythreefactorsthat the Sixth Circuit considered left no room to consider a mitigating factor such as a disclaimer.202 In another case, the Ninth Circuit found initial interestconfusionwherethedefendantmerelyusedthetrademarkasan
194 195
Cf.Wakefield&Milionis,supranote186,at28.
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 134, at 816 (highlighting that allowing a trademark ownertosuebasedonmerediversionstretchestheboundsofinitialinterestconfusion).
196 197
SeeWakefield&Milionis,supranote186,at28.
NetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638F.3d1137,114142(9th Cir.2011)(citingBrookfieldCommcns,Inc.v.WestCoastEntmtCorp.,174F.3d1036,1054 (9thCir.1999)).

198 199
Shoemaker,supranote26,at537&n.11.
Rothman, Crossroads, supra note 149, at 14344 (noting courts often discount several key factors, making it much more likely that a defendant will be found to have infringed a trademarkorcommittedunfaircompetition).
200 201 202
Seeid.at14244. PACCARInc.v.TelescanTechs.,L.L.C.,319F.3d243,253(6thCir.2003).
Seeid.at25355(A disclaimer disavowingaffiliationwith the trademarkowner read byaconsumerafterreachingthewebsitecomestoolate.).
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ingredient in its product and listed it on the website.203 Though the Internet Trinity factors were all satisfied by this use, the decision has been widely panned for ignoring that the trademark was a necessary descriptorfortheproduct,andwithoutreferringtoit,theproductwould befarmoredifficultforanonlineconsumertofind.204 These are merely two examples of cases where the courts have been heldhostagebytheirowninflexibletesttheInternetTrinity.205Courts continuedmisunderstandingoftheInternetmadethistestdesirable,butit hasproventoorigidandhasledtonearlylaughableconclusionsofinitial interest confusionespecially in the sponsored link arena.206 One need not be an expert in this area oflaw to conclude that other factors may be useful in determining whether an average consumer is truly at risk of confusionwhenheorshebeginsaninitialproductsearchontheInternet.207 This is precisely why the decision in Network Automation is so significant to this segment of trademark law.208 The court expressly chastised itself and its sister circuits for forever enshrin[ing] these three factors known as the Internet [T]rinity... as the test for trademark infringement on the Internet, and emphasized that other factors may emerge as more illuminating on the question of consumer confusion.209 When considering whether Network had caused initial interest confusionbyitsuseoftheActiveBatchmark,thecourtaptlyjettisoned the old Internet Trinity test and instead considered the most relevant factors to the facts and circumstances.210 Under the Network Automation
203 204
SeeHorphagResearchLtd.v.Pellegrini,328F.3d1108,1110(9thCir.2003).
SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at91(Theholdingthat[thedefemdant]suseof Pycnogenol...isinfringingisproblematic.TherearebillionsofWebsitesavailable...[and] [i]f[thedefendant]cannotusethePycnogenoltrademark...,theoddsofanyonelocatinghis sitewillbereduced.).

205 See,e.g.,NissanMotorCo.v.NissanComputerCorp.,378F.3d1002,101819(9thCir. 2004);PromatekIndus.,Ltd.v.EquitracCorp.,300F.3d808,812(7thCir.2002);EliLilly&Co. v.NaturalAnswers,Inc.,233F.3d456,46162,466(7thCir.2000).
SeeRothman,Crossroads,supranote149,at169(notingthatmanycourtshavemissed themarkapplyinginitialinterestconfusiontotheInternetcontextwithoutexperienceor knowledgeofthemedium);Zweihorn,supranote138,at135657(notingthatapplicationsof initialinterestconfusiontotheInternetcontexthaveyieldedludicrousconclusions).

207 208
206
Seesupranotes199206andaccompanyingtext.
SeeNetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638F.3d1137,1154(9th Cir.2011);Brehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at11.
209 210
NetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1148.
Id.([I]tmakesnosensetoprioritizethesamethreefactorsforeverytypeofpotential online commercial activity. The [Trinity] is a particularly poor fit for the question presented here.).
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facts, the strength of the mark, any evidence of actual confusion, the marketingchannels,thetypeofgoods,thepurchasersdegreeofcare,and theappearanceoftheadvertisementswerethemostrelevantforthecourts analysis.211 Rather than rigidly applying old precedent, the court allowed for a closer study of facts, which enabled the court to come to a better informed decision.212 Though the court found no ultimate infringement usingthesefivefactors,213itrightlywarnedthatitsdecisionshouldnotbe readasmerelyareplacementofonerigidfactortestforanother;rather,the courtinsistedthatfactspecificanalysisrequiresflexibility.214 The decision in Network Automation should serve as a standard to the othercircuitsthathavecontinuouslyfocusedonalimitednumberofrigid factorsbecauseignoringpertinentfactsininitialinterestconfusionhas for lack of a better wordcaused more confusion than clarity.215 Future initialinterest confusion sponsoredlink casesshouldfollow the lead of theNinthCircuitandconsideronlythefactorsrelevanttothecaseatbar rather than merely reverting to a test that has ultimately proven to have limited applicability in the sponsored link context.216 While other circuits continue to accept simplicity over relevancy,217 the Ninth Circuit set a higher bar for initial interest confusion and has ultimately restored necessary flexibility to this segment of trademark law.218 This restoration willallowcourtstobesttailortheinitialinterestconfusioninquirytothe newrealitiesofGoogleConsumersandonlinecompetition.219
211 212 213
Seeid.at1154. SeeBrehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at1112.
SeeNetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1154(holdingthatbyconsidering(1)anyevidence of actual confusion, (2) the marketing channels, (3) the type of goods, (4) the purchasers degreeofcare,and(5)theappearanceoftheadvertisements,thecourtcouldfindnoultimate trademarkviolation).
214 215
Id.at1148.
Accord Rothman, Crossroads, supra note 149, at 14344 (insinuating that courts need to focus on more pertinent factors when considering a claim of initial interest confusion); Dogan&Lemley,supranote134,at781.
216 217
SeeBrehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at1112.
See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 123839 (10th Cir. 2006); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. NaturalAnswers,Inc.,233F.2d456,46466(7thCir.2000);CliniqueLabs.,Inc.v.DepCorp., 945F.Supp.547,551(S.D.N.Y.1996).
218 219
SeeNetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1149. SeesupraPartsIIIandIV.
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CONCLUSION
The proliferation of Internet advertising and the expansion of Google AdWordshasundoubtedlychangedthefaceofinitialinterestconfusion and the historical understanding of trademark use.220 The initial interest confusion testmuch like the classic likelihood of confusion inquiry from which it was derivedwas rooted in protecting the goodwill and financial interests of trademark owners as well as in lowering consumer search costs. However, when initial interest confusion was applied by the circuit courts to cases involving disputes over sponsored links, these protected interests no longer appeared in the balance.221 Instead, courts blinded by their own ignorance of consumer behavior and pressured by trademark owners hoping to drive down competitionissued injunction after injunction against trademark users that were engaged in essentially thesametypeofcomparativeadvertisingthatbrickandmortarbusinesses hadengagedinfordecades. TheNinthCircuitsdecisioninNetworkAutomationwasthefirstcaseto clearly define this failed application of trademark law to sponsored link disputes. The court implicitly acknowledged that initial interest confusionhadgonetoofarinlimitingonlinecompetitorsfromcomparing themselvesusingsponsoredlinks.222Moreover,theholdingrecognizedthat consumersmoresophisticated,aware,andconfidentontheInternetthan ever beforeare perfectly capable of protecting themselves from the onslaught of competitive advertisements online. The court also restored needed flexibility to the initial interest confusion test, which will allow courts in the future to apply only the factors most pertinent to fulfilling thesepolicygoals. In the future, the other circuit courts need to consider these changes and the new reality of the Internet landscape. While businesses still have anundeniableinterestinprotectingthesanctityoftheirtrademarks,courts mustcarefullybalancethisinterestwiththebroaderconcernofexpanded consumersophisticationandtherighttofaircompetition.Unlesslitigants can present financial harm or significant evidence of confusionas they would be required to do under a traditional likelihood of confusion inquiry223courts should refrain from stifling the sponsored links and
220 221 222
SeeRothman,Crossroads,supranote149,at18990. Grynberg,supranote59,at117.
SeeNetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638F.3d1137,1148(9th Cir.2011).
223
SeesupraPartI.AB.
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allow these innovative, comparative advertisements to expand consumer choice.Andinthecaseswheretheactionsofatrademarkuserdoseverely infringe upon the rights of a trademark owner, courts must ensure that they respond with flexibilityjust as the Ninth Circuit did in Network Automationand not with rigidity and rapidity. Network Automation has sentasignaltotheothercircuitsthatdespitejudicialdiscomfort,theageof Googleconsumersisheretostay.

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AFERIATNOTE(DONOTDELETE)

ItsGooglesWorldandWereJust ClickinginIt:WhytheGrowthof SponsoredLinkAdvertisingNecessitates aShiftofTrademarkRegulationonthe Internet

About Google Instant, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/instantabout.html (lastvisitedNov.23,2012).

How AdWords Works, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/ answer.py?hl=en&answer=2497976(lastvisitedSept.19,2012).

BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION1.02,at4(4th

ed.2000). Seeid.(Unfaircompetitionisthegenusofwhichtrademarkinfringementisoneofthe species.Alltrademarkcasesareinfactcasesofunfaircompetition...andthisismerelythe dutytoabstainfromfraud.).

Seeid. Seeid. Seeid. Id. Cf.4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6. Buckman,supranote23,at2;accord2GILSON,supra39,at5177. See4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6;2GILSON,supranote39,at5176. 2GILSON,supranote39,at5177.

See2GILSON,supranote39,5.14[1][a],at5178.TheSecondCircuitclearlyidentifiedthis harmtothetrademarkholderwhendecidingwhetheralittleknownpianomanufacturerhad createdinitialinterestconfusionwithworldrenownedpianomaker,Steinway.SeeGrotrian

Lastowka,supranote62,at1330. SeeTan,supranote8,at474;Lastowka,supranote62,at1340. GoogleAdWords,supranote7. SeeTan,supranote8,at475n.3,476.

BrookfieldCommcns,Inc.v.WestCoastEntmtCorp.,174F.3d1036(9thCir.1999);see Shoemaker,supranote26,at548([T]heNinthCircuitextendedtheinitialinterestconfusion doctrinetocasesconcerningtrademarksandtheinternet.).

Brookfield,174F.3dat1041. Id. Id.at104243. Id.at1043.

SeeBrookfield,174F.3dat106566. Id.at1064(emphasisadded). Id.at1062.

Id. Id. Id.at1143. Id.at1142. NetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1141,1143. Id.at1142,1144.

SeeNetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1151. Cf.id.at1152. Id. Id.at1154. Brehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at13.

SeeSallyJ.McMillan,InternetAdvertising:OneFaceorMany?,inINTERNETADVERTISING: THEORY AND RESEARCH1516(DavidW.Shumann&EstherThorson,eds.2007)(notingthat

Rothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90,102. SeePEWREPORT2005,supranote90,at9. Id.at910&n.19.

SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90. PATTISHALL,supranote14,at4. Id.at34. SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at86.

See15U.S.C.1115(b)(4)(2006)(Thattheuseofthename,term,ordevicechargedto beaninfringementisause...whichisdescriptiveofandusedfairlyandingoodfaithonlyto describethegoodsandservicesof[thetrademarkholder]);Zweihorn,supranote135,at1376.

NetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638F.3d1137,114142(9th Cir.2011)(citingBrookfieldCommcns,Inc.v.WestCoastEntmtCorp.,174F.3d1036,1054 (9thCir.1999)).

Seeid.at25355(A disclaimer disavowingaffiliationwith the trademarkowner read byaconsumerafterreachingthewebsitecomestoolate.).

SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at91(Theholdingthat[thedefemdant]suseof Pycnogenol...isinfringingisproblematic.TherearebillionsofWebsitesavailable...[and] [i]f[thedefendant]cannotusethePycnogenoltrademark...,theoddsofanyonelocatinghis sitewillbereduced.).

211 212 213

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AFERIATNOTE(DONOTDELETE)

ItsGooglesWorldandWereJust ClickinginIt:WhytheGrowthof SponsoredLinkAdvertisingNecessitates aShiftofTrademarkRegulationonthe Internet

About Google Instant, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/instantabout.html (lastvisitedNov.23,2012).

How AdWords Works, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/ answer.py?hl=en&answer=2497976(lastvisitedSept.19,2012).

BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION1.02,at4(4th

ed.2000). Seeid.(Unfaircompetitionisthegenusofwhichtrademarkinfringementisoneofthe species.Alltrademarkcasesareinfactcasesofunfaircompetition...andthisismerelythe dutytoabstainfromfraud.).

Seeid. Seeid. Seeid. Id. Cf.4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6. Buckman,supranote23,at2;accord2GILSON,supra39,at5177. See4MCCARTHY,supranote33,at23:6;2GILSON,supranote39,at5176. 2GILSON,supranote39,at5177.

See2GILSON,supranote39,5.14[1][a],at5178.TheSecondCircuitclearlyidentifiedthis harmtothetrademarkholderwhendecidingwhetheralittleknownpianomanufacturerhad createdinitialinterestconfusionwithworldrenownedpianomaker,Steinway.SeeGrotrian

Lastowka,supranote62,at1330. SeeTan,supranote8,at474;Lastowka,supranote62,at1340. GoogleAdWords,supranote7. SeeTan,supranote8,at475n.3,476.

BrookfieldCommcns,Inc.v.WestCoastEntmtCorp.,174F.3d1036(9thCir.1999);see Shoemaker,supranote26,at548([T]heNinthCircuitextendedtheinitialinterestconfusion doctrinetocasesconcerningtrademarksandtheinternet.).

Brookfield,174F.3dat1041. Id. Id.at104243. Id.at1043.

SeeBrookfield,174F.3dat106566. Id.at1064(emphasisadded). Id.at1062.

Id. Id. Id.at1143. Id.at1142. NetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1141,1143. Id.at1142,1144.

SeeNetworkAutomation,638F.3dat1151. Cf.id.at1152. Id. Id.at1154. Brehm&Kupershmidt,supranote96,at13.

SeeSallyJ.McMillan,InternetAdvertising:OneFaceorMany?,inINTERNETADVERTISING: THEORY AND RESEARCH1516(DavidW.Shumann&EstherThorson,eds.2007)(notingthat

Rothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90,102. SeePEWREPORT2005,supranote90,at9. Id.at910&n.19.

SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at90. PATTISHALL,supranote14,at4. Id.at34. SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at86.

See15U.S.C.1115(b)(4)(2006)(Thattheuseofthename,term,ordevicechargedto beaninfringementisause...whichisdescriptiveofandusedfairlyandingoodfaithonlyto describethegoodsandservicesof[thetrademarkholder]);Zweihorn,supranote135,at1376.

NetworkAutomation,Inc.v.AdvancedSys.Concepts,Inc.,638F.3d1137,114142(9th Cir.2011)(citingBrookfieldCommcns,Inc.v.WestCoastEntmtCorp.,174F.3d1036,1054 (9thCir.1999)).

Seeid.at25355(A disclaimer disavowingaffiliationwith the trademarkowner read byaconsumerafterreachingthewebsitecomestoolate.).

SeeRothman,Diversion,supranote10,at91(Theholdingthat[thedefemdant]suseof Pycnogenol...isinfringingisproblematic.TherearebillionsofWebsitesavailable...[and] [i]f[thedefendant]cannotusethePycnogenoltrademark...,theoddsofanyonelocatinghis sitewillbereduced.).

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