COLL APSE

WORLD TRADE CENTER AFTERMATH

NFPA engineering experts believe the World Trade Center succumbed to fire, not structural deficiency. JOHN NICHOLSON

or nearly an hour on September 11, the World Trade Centers twin towers still soared high above Manhattan, even after two hijacked jetliners had ripped into them, spewing thousands of gallons of burning jet fuel over several floors. The 244 closely spaced steel columns of the 110-story towers, the tallest buildings in New York City, held their own as smoke billowed from shattered walls and an inferno raged inside. On most floors, the steel columns still formed the towers exteriors. At 9:59 a.m., however, the 1,362-foot (415-meter) south tower collapsed in a tragic display of terror. About a half-hour later, the 1,368-foot (417-meter) north tower went down. What had finally reduced the well-constructed towers, which had survived a terrorist bombing in a basement parking garage in 1993, to a pile of concrete and steel about 12 stories high? A number of engineers, including NFPAs building experts, believe each tower couldve withstood the impact of a single large airplane, as they were designed to. Once the 24,000 gallons (91,000 liters) of aviation fuel in each Boeing 767 exploded into flames, however, it was just a matter of time before the towers collapsed, they say. It was the heat that the fires created that brought the buildings down, says Robert E.

VISIT WWW. NFPA.ORG. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON NFPA 5000 AND NFPAS INVESTIGATION OF THE 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING.

Opposite page, firefighters walked past the American flag as they worked at the blast site in New York City,

John Nicholson is the associate editor of NFPA Journal.

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 NFPA JOURNAL 37

PHOTOGRAPH: AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/U.S. NAVY JOURNALIST FIRST CLASS PRESTON KERES

longer support the weight above them. As one floor collapsed into another, the structures collapsed inwardly, minimizing damage. to the surrounding area. The tower collapsed downward. The design helped prevent extensive damage to neighboring buildings, says Manley.
Sprinkler system overwhelmed

Solomon, NFPAs chief building fire protection engineer. The heat from the jet fuel fires, which are estimated to have reached temperatures of 2,000F (1,093C), wouldve been hot enough to melt the steel trusses holding up the concrete-slab floors. As an engineer, says Bonnie Manley, NFPAs structural engineer, I was thankful to see the buildings still standing, but I knew it wasnt beyond the realm of possibility that theyd collapse. There was no immediate col38 NFPA JOURNAL NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001

lapse, but the fires weakened the structures, and one collapsed and then the other in whats called a pancake failureone floor falling down on the other. To maximize the space inside the buildings, the towers were designed with a column-free interior supported by an inner core of steel columns and the tubular steel that ringed the structures. The aircrafts impact, the explosion, and the heat from the resulting fires softened the steel girders until they could no

In a conventional fire, the towers sprinkler systems shouldve been sufficient to control the blaze, but these unconventional fires overwhelmed the suppression systems. In a normal office setting, theres quite a bit of material that can feed a fire, but adding the aviation fuel created a fire that was far larger and hotter than a normal system could handle, Manley notes. As a result, there was never enough water to stop the fires and prevent the massive structural instability that toppled the towers. According to David Hague, NFPAs senior fire protection engineer, the initial impacts probably rendered the sprinkler and standpipe systems inoperative on the fire floors and displaced any fire-resistance coatings on the structural steel. This exposed the steel to temperatures in the range of 1,600F (871C) and higher. At that temperature, steel deforms, particularly when under load, he says. Even if the fire protection systems had remained operative, its unlikely theyd have discharged enough water to protect the structural steel, he says. We can design systems to cope with the fire loading presented by such quantities of jet fuelits done constantly in aircraft hangars, Hague notes. But the system would be a foam system, and a foam system isnt practical for buildings of this type. Water has some effect on jet fuel, but its not as effective as foam. Hague adds that he cant advocate a foamwater sprinkler system for this type of occupancy simply to prepare for the possibility of impact from an aircraft.
GRAPHICS: COURTESY LOS ANGELES TIMES

Rescue workers continued their efforts at the site of the September 11 World Trade Center terrorist attack in New York.

The money would be better spent on security, he says.

Safety by design

Dedicated in 1973 after five years of construction, the towers had 10 million square feet (929,003 square meters) of office space. They were owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and were designed by Michigan-based Minoru Yamasaki Associates Inc., and Emery Roth and Sons of New York. When engineers design a building, they calculate the loads and forces to which the building will be subjected over its lifetime. Typically, these include the effects of hurricanes, blizzards, floods, earthquakes, and, in taller buildings, plane strikes. The World Trade Center was designed to withstand a lot of stress, even a direct hit from a Boeing 707, which was the state-ofthe-art jetliner at the time it was designed. The impact of a large plane and resulting jet fuel fire were factored into the towers design as a result of lessons learned 56 years ago, when an Army Air Force B-25 crashed into the Empire State Building in heavy fog. Fourteen people died, and damage to the building, which was hit between the 79th and 80th floors, came to $1 million. The buildings structural integrity wasnt affected. According to Manley, the towers designers took into account all types of extremes when they drew up the plans for the World Trade Center more than 30 years ago. However, there was no way to imagine that this collapse would ever happen when the buildings were designed, she says. The towers design has been described by the American Society of Civil Engineers as a series of load-bearing exterior columns spaced 3 feet (91 centimeters) apart and tied together at every floor by a deep horizontal
PHOTOGRAPH: AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

beam, creating a strong lattice of square tubing around each tower. Special plates were placed among the buildings trusses to reduce stress caused by winds up to 200 miles (322 kilometers) per hour. The twin towers also had the worlds highest load-bearing walls, designed by Seattle-based structural engineer Worthington, Skilling, Helle, and Robertson as vertical, cantilevered steel tubes. Exterior columns were hollow box sections 14 inches (35-centimeters) square spaced 39 inches (99 centimeters) on center. Spandrels welded to the columns at each floor created huge trusses. This gave the towers, each of which measured 208 by 208 feet (63 by 63 meters), a column-free interior between the outer walls and the 79-by-139-foot (24-by-42meter) core. The core surrounding each buildings 99 elevators also consisted of a lattice of steel covered by concrete that connected the interior columns to the exterior. Staircases in all four corners of the buildings were designed to be evacuated in an hour, according to published reports. Each tower also had five underground parking levels. Redundancy was also a part of the design. Redundancy in a building provides multiple load patterns for dissipating gravity and environmental loads. If one link breaks in that chain, the chain no longer functions, however, redundancy means that there are several more changes available to pick up a share of the load that was once carried by the chain, says Manley. Such safeguards slowed the buildings eventual collapse and provided occupants more time to evacuate, saving many lives. Eventually, however, the redundant systems were, like the fire suppression system, overwhelmed. What happened was completely unexpected, and this extreme situation

overwhelmed the systems, says Manley.

What now?

Will future design standards and building codes take into account events such as the attack on the World Trade Center? NFPA experts working on NFPA 5000, Building Code, dont believe the new code will reference the incident, but there will be a greater sense of awareness within the building community that things such as this can happen. Following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, there was a great deal of discussion about what it would take to destroy a building, but that stopped when experts realized that terrorists could quickly override any standards proposed. When it comes to terrorist attacks, what a building can withstand wont be defined, Manley says. Standards, such as those in blast engineering, arent specific. You cant define the loading because once you do, someone will come up with a way to overcome it, says Manley. Can engineers design terrorist-resistant buildings? Yes, but theyd probably resemble fortresses, and people might not use them or be able to afford them, says Manley. Which leaves the option of increased security. Among the methods engineers use to enhance building security are reinforced structural frames and perimeters, Kevlar curtains or bullet-proof glass, fewer windows, and more secure entrances. Designs can also eliminate or restrict vehicle access and parking. All of these options will doubtless come into play in the future design and construction of public buildings, particularly high rises. The lessons learned at such a cost in the attack on the World Trade Center will change the way things are done on many levels, some of which we cant yet envision.
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WORLD TRADE CENTER AFTERMATH

Evacuation
NFPA will revisit previous World Trade Center study with an evacuation behavior follow-up. JOHN NICHOLSON

iscovering how and why people behave the way they do when confronted with an emergency has been a priority with researchers, investigators, and engineers at NFPA for years. To update their information and develop future strategies in the wake of the ultimate emergency, NFPAs Fire Analysis and Research Division plans to undertake a study on the way people behaved during the evacuation of the World Trade Center on September 11. The study will follow up on a 1993 study, in which NFPA researchers examined human behavior following a 1993 explosion in the World Trade Center garage. The bombing killed six workers, and more than 1,000 occupants were injured as they made their way out of the towers. Rita F. Fahy, Ph.D., NFPAs manager of Fire Databases and Systems, and Guylne Proulx, Ph.D, a researcher at National Research Council of Canada (NRCC), studied the behavior of building occupants in 1993 and documented the buildings engineering details that affected it. More than 400 occupants of the two towers responded to the survey sent to the 1,600 employees and tenants who were members of the buildings fire safety team. NFPA did both an investigation and a

human behavior study of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, she says. Were looking to do a follow-up on human behavior. We havent yet determined a methodology for this, or funding. The original study was funded by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the General Services Administration, NFPA, and the NRCC. Of course, the new investigation of evacuation behavior will be hampered by the severity of the event. In 1993, the World Trade Center towers survived, and many of the people working in them were available to discuss what had happened and how they had responded. This time, far fewer occupants survived, and tracking and surveying them will be more difficult. Most of what we have to date is anecdotal. We dont have the same access we had before, says Fahy, who notes that its possible that some of the survivors of the September 11 attack were also surveyed following the 1993 bombing. In addition to the human behavior study, NFPAs Fire Investigations Division conducted a formal investigation of the 1993 bombing to document and analyze factors that contributed to the loss of life and property. Cooperating in the investigations were

the New York City Fire Department and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Lessons learned behavior report

In the wake of this tragedy, NFPA, in its mission to reduce the loss of life, is planning to deliver a series of workshops next spring in major metropolitan areas of the United States that will prepare facility management to develop or improve emergency evacuation planning. The behavior of the office workers during the September 11 evacuation of the World Trade Center is of particular interest to NFPA because the Association traditionally advises a Defend in Place approach for high-rise emergencies. The Defend in Place concept recommends evacuating only those floors immediately at risk from a fire, urging other occupants to stay where they are and relying on the buildings fixed fire protection and suppression systems for protection. Among other things, defending occupants in place reduces the number of people trying to evacuate a building at one time, thus keeping the egress routes free for responding emergency personnel. It also keeps the number of people gathering outside a building to a minimum, which reduces the chance of evacuees being

A firefighter, (left) ran up the stairwell as office occupants evacuated Tower One. As water flowed down the stairs, people evacuated.
PHOTOGRAPH: AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

40

injured by falling debris. In a normal emergency, such a concept makes a great deal of sense. However, what we had on September 11 and back in 1993 were extremely severe conditions, Fahy says. In this extraordinary circumstance, it appears that those who took it upon themselves to evacuate stood the better chance of survival, notes Proulx. There could have been as many as 50,000 people in the two towers, without counting those in the street and the rescuers, Proulx adds. When I saw the towers collapse, I thought the toll would be around 25,000. The number of survivors is amazing. Many of the recommendations NFPA derived from lessons learned after the 1993 accident, including the importance of staying calm during an emergency, had been implemented over the years, and adherence to the recommendations eased the evacuation for many office workers on September 11. The Port Authority made many changes to the emergency system after the 1993 bombing, and these changes ease the evacuation for many people on September 11, Fahy says. Published reports indicate that people left the

buildings in an orderly manner and that few panicked. Some of those who escaped actually made it from the uppermost of the towers 110 floors to the outside in an hour. In 1993, the same trip took most of the evacuees one to three hours. The exit paths were there for people. The lights were there, and there were no reports of generator failure during the early moments of the attack, says Fahy. This is evident in a series of photographs taken September 11 by John Labriola, an independent contractor with the Port Authority, which owns the World Trade Center. Labriola worked on the 71st floor of the north tower and escaped without injury. Fahy notes that his dramatic images of the north tower evacuation shows people calmly walking down lighted stairways. This, she says, wasnt the case in 1993, when the stairwells were pitch black. They were so dark that evacuees walked into blank walls at crossover points in some of the stairwells. They had no way of knowing what was there, and people were in a panic. They hit the wall and then started feeling their way along the walls hoping to find a door, says Fahy.

When they did, the doors were locked. The photographs also show office workers walking down the stairs being guided by phosphorescent paint, which NFPA recommended following its 1993 investigation. Another finding of the 1993 study showed that people were willing to move through smoke coming from below to escape. This was apparently borne out by the actions of those just above and below the crash floors who made it out on September 11. There were instances of people continuing into worse conditions than they were leaving, says Fahy. Although the smoke and fire wouldve been coming down from the upper floors in the September 11 attack, people were willing to leave and get out as fast as they could. Following the 1993 bombing, people were trained in evacuation techniques, and office workers were brought into the stairwells so theyd be familiar with the exits and know where each exit went. The lessons learned from any study of the September 11 attack will add to our store of fire protection knowledge, the way the 1993 study did. And application of these lessons will serve as a memorial to the injured and dead.

Search&Rescue
NFPA standards guide the way officials search for WTC survivors and victims.
JOHN NICHOLSON

n the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, more and more fire departments across the country are likely to adopt two NFPA standards related to search and rescue operations: NFPA 1670, Operations and Training for Technical Rescue Incidents, and NFPA 1006, Rescue Technician Professional Qualifications. Frank Florence, NFPA senior fire service specialist and staff liaison to the NFPA 1670 and 1006 Technical Committees, says that the protocols most emergency rescue service teams use today follow NFPA standards. In the case of the September 11 attacks,

each circumstance is unique and presents searchers with a variety of obstacles, he notes. Each 110-story tower came down on thousands of people, presenting an assortment of risks that require various levels of response. New York has resources that many other communities dont, and its likely other large cities will follow New Yorks lead, says Florence. New York City has always been a leader in developing search and rescue techniques. As long ago as 1915, the New York City Fire Department formed a special rescue company in response to the construction of the first large commercial refrigeration units, equip-

ping responders with butyl rubber entry suits to protect them from the ammonia in the unit. Florence believes the extreme nature of the attacks will prompt many cities and towns to develop a search and rescue response of their own because nothing now seems off limits for terrorists. Communities that never thought theyd be considered terrorist targets are reexamining their resources. The NFPA standards are there for communities to adopt and make their own, he says. These standards, which work in concert with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) guidelines on search
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 NFPA JOURNAL 41

WORLD TRADE CENTER AFTERMATH and rescue, include information about the organization of search-and-rescue operations and criteria the agency conducting a rescue must follow to comply with the standards, Florence says. FEMA oversees the operation of the National Urban Search and Rescue units. The NFPA standards also include certification qualifications and outline the skills and competencies responders need to be part of a rescue team. The (FEMA) guides deal with the circumstances of the disaster and the operation, Florence says. There are different guides for different events, and its likely the World Trade Center attack will have an impact on how future search and rescue operations are performed. This attack could prove to be the ultimate test. The purpose of NFPA 1006 and NFPA 1670 is to help the local authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) assess structural collapse hazards in a response area, identify the level of operational capability, and establish training and safety criteria. NFPA 1670 was developed to define levels of preparation and operational capability that any AHJ responsible for search and rescue operations at structural collapses should achieve. These defined levels provide an outline for a system to manage an incident efficiently and effectively in order to maximize personnel safety, rescue of survivors, recovery of victims, and the eventual termination of the event. If followed, the system will enhance the AHJs ability to deal successfully with even the most complex incident. The system progresses from the basic operational level to the light and medium operational levels, and finally to the complex, heavy operational level. As it expands, the systems requirements for training, operational skills, management ability, and types and amount of equipment also expand.
Changes to the standard are likely

Rescuing people from collapsed buildings has become more sophisticated over the years, Florence says, as we learn from past disasters. Following the Mexico City earthquake in 1987 and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, for example, a more concerted effort was made to develop the specific skills emergency responders need to locate and extricate people trapped in confined spaces. Equipment has also evolved. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers developed a device that allows an operator to listen for sounds of victims in the rubble, then zero in on the probable location. In a further refinement, a firefighter developed a probe with a television camera and a combination microphone/speaker that can be inserted into debris so an operator can inspect an area and

speak with victims. Just what developments will come out of the more recent disasters at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon remain to be seen, but its likely that there will be changes to the standards based on our experiences in New York, says Florence. Additional competencies will probably be added to the certification requirements for rescue technicians, he notes. More people will probably want to become certified, and there will be a need to certify those wholl replace persons lost in the attack. The technical committee members havent yet discussed how the events in New York and Washington relate to the standards or any possible revisions because most committee members were directly or indirectly working on the search at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. As a result, Florence cancelled a technical committee meeting scheduled for the end of September. But you can be sure that the September 11 attacks will be at the forefront of the committees agenda when they next meet.
Firefighters, rescue crews, and other emergency personnel worked on clearing the area of the remains of the World Trade Center Twin Towers in downtown New York.
PHOTOGRAPH: AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

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Terrorism:
jet airplane loaded with highly flammable fuel crashing into a skyscraper.... A couple of months ago, it was just an action movie plot line. Today, its something fire chiefs everywhere must consider a real threat. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon attacks, fire safety officials and fire protection engineers around the world are rethinking their response to terrorism now that it could include combating jet fuel fires in high-rise targets. Certainly, there were formal pre-incident plans for the World Trade Center, says Russell E. Sanders, a former fire chief with the Louisville, Kentucky, Fire Department and NFPAs central regional manager. And, yes, every conceivable disaster wouldve been considered in training exercises, such as bombs, fires, hazardous material releases, and airplane crashes. I doubt, however, that a total collapse scenario had been considered. Sanders, executive secretary to NFPAs Metropolitan Fire Chiefs Section, believes its a matter of time before changes are made, based on the recommendations of fire chiefs and fire chief organizations. Such postmortem changes to the way fire departments respond to disasters are common, and many NFPA codes and standards have grown out of disasters. For example, the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire of 1911 lead to the development of NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. According to members of NFPA Metro Chiefs Section, the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks are the new disasters

Impetus for Change

NFPA examines its role of providing the fire service with standards that aid the response to terrorism. JOHN NICHOLSON

professionals will learn from, and NFPA should be the leader in making the necessary code changes. Arthur E. Cote, NFPAs senior vice president of operations and chief engineer, agrees. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon present many challenges to

NFPA. As with any disaster, NFPA will review its standards and make appropriate changes, if theyre necessary. We have a tremendous record of protecting the public and we will continue to build on our record, he says. As with any changes made, weill look to our members and constituents and make changes based on a consensus. Our staff and technical committees will carefully weigh what we have in place and consider possible

enhancements, particularly when it comes to protecting first responders. Most chiefs say their departments would respond to a fire in a high-rise building today using the approach theyve always used. If an airliner crashed into a high-rise building, however, theyd look at their responses differently. Before September 11, few fire department pre-incident plans addressed airplane crashes into buildings or structural fires fed by jet fuel. In the weeks following the attacks, fire departments in metropolitan areas large and small reviewed their emergency plans and began updating them. According to Fire Chief Bill Bamattre of the Los Angeles City Fire Department, the department is currently reviewing its high-rise firefighting manual to determine if additional or specific information should be added about the type of damage an airplane strike can do to a building. The Los Angeles Fire Department is now conducting studies to calculate the effects of an airplanes impact on a range of high-rise buildings in an effort the help firstresponse commanders make informed decisions. San Francisco Fire Chief Mario Trevino, section secretary, says his departments guidelines and regulations for attacking fires in high-rise buildings dont include specific strategies for handling an airplane strike. According to Chief Trevino, however, plans will need to address this new hazard. The same is true elsewhere in the world. Chief Albrecht Broemme of the Berlin, Germany, Fire Department doesnt currently have standard operating procedures (SOPs) requirNOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 NFPA JOURNAL 43

ILLUSTRATION: EARL F. LAM III

WORLD TRADE CENTER AFTERMATH ing pre-incident plans for airplane strikes in high-rise buildings, either. We have only a general aircraft crash plan, he says. The worst case is a crash outside the airportand that means in Berlin. Although Palm Beach, Florida, County Fire-Rescue doesnt have a specific plan for an airplane strike on a building, it does have guidelines that cover mass casualty incidents, building collapse, and confined space recovery, as well as hazardous materials containment, spill control, mitigation, and treatment, all of which might be put into action in this type of incident, says Division Chief Randy Sheppard. Palm Beach County Fire-Rescue already deploys multiple-casualties incident equipment caches to plane crashes and mass contamination incidents in its jurisdiction.
Little cities

have no terrorism response plans, either. However, theyre increasingly aware of terrorist threats, and many are starting to play catch-up. For example, the Toronto Fire Services has no SOPs for dealing with terrorist activities, but were presently consulting with other fire departments on this matter, says Deputy Chief William A. Stewart. In light of the events of September 11, well review our planning process for the potential of an aircraft strike or other terrorist activities. Some fire departments have already been through that exercise. In Palm Beach, a specific annex to the fire departments disaster management plan deals with terrorist inci-

and chemical incidents. Our department was part of the NunnLugar Grant, and were currently completing requirements for appropriations of equipment associated with the Multiple Medical Response System Grant, says Chief Robert Leigh. The Aurora Fire Department was also a lead agency in last years Top Off readiness exercise. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act of 1996, as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act is known, stipulates the training of first responders to deal with WMD terrorist incidents. In fiscal year 1997, first respon-

The situation is the same in smaller metropolitan areas. According to Chief Robert Gareri of the Huntsville, Alabama, Fire Department, his departments guidelines for high-rise buildings dont include an airplane strike. I think we need to look beyond our disaster plans to consider this issue, he says. The Mesa, Arizona, Fire Department has a SOP that addresses pre-incident planning for high-rise and high-risk properties and shares that information with all fire companies, says Chief Dennis Compton. However, the plans dont include specific strategies for handling an airplane strike. Other than an airplane strike at one of our airports, our incident management system covers many of the components that would be expected in an aircraft emergency, such as building a command team, multi-patient incidents, transportation hazardous materials, and decontamination, Chief Compton says. At this time, we operate under the incident management system, which addresses large incidents, regardless of the cause. An incident management system, also referred to as incident command systems, is an organized set of roles, responsibilities, and SOPs used to manage emergency operations.
Terrorist response plans

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon present many challenges to NFPA. As with any disaster, NFPA will review its fire service codes and standards and make appropriate changes, if changes are necessary.
dents. Part of that annex covers threat assessment, which identifies targeted properties, occupancy uses, and public gatherings. It also identifies the flow of intelligence from law enforcement community to fire/EMS agencies, and identifies specific security measures for affected properties and populations, including exposed response personnel. In addition, the annex establishes caches of medical supplies and medications. In Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Operational Area Terrorism Working Group has developed a county-wide operational plan dealing with a multi-agency response to a terrorist event, Chief Bamattre says. Mesa also has an SOP that addresses terrorists attacks, says Chief Compton. The SOP dovetails into the management system, which allows for expansion or reduction of resources depending on the size and nature of the incident, he says. The Aurora, Colorado, Fire Departments SOPs address civil unrest, and its haz-mat team is trained to mitigate nuclear, biological, ders in 120 of the largest cities in the United States began training for such incidents under the Nunn-LugarDomenici Domestic Preparedness Program, which gives each city $300,000 from the Department of Defense for personal protection, decontamination, and detection equipment. Recently, the number of cities designated as recipients of the Domestic Preparedness Program funding grew to 157. By the end of 1998, 40 cities had received training, and the remaining cities were scheduled to have completed the program in this year. Many of those fire departments that have plans in place anticipate future refinements based on the attacks. However, all the additional planning may not be enough. At the moment, were discussing additional general planning, including terrorists attacks. We still believe that all this planning wont help if a building crashes down, as the WTC did, says Berlins Chief Broemme.

Just as many national and international fire departments have no plan in place for dealing with an airplane crash into a building, many
44 NFPA JOURNAL NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001

What can NFPA do?

Gary O. Tokle, NFPAs assistant vice president of Public Fire Protection, says his department will examine the public fire pro-

The IAB developed the Standardized Equipment List, which is used as a guide for equipping first responders. Still, many chiefs would like to see NFPA

Steel workers cut beams from World Trade Center Building 7 in New York City.

tection standards under its jurisdiction and make any recommendations for changes that will enhance them. Changes as a result of this disaster are inevitable, Tokle says. Certainly, well be looking at our role as a leader in public safety protection. In addition to its work in fire safety and prevention, NFPA has been a leader in preparing for terrorist and other attacks, developing many standards designed to meet the challenge. Those standards include NFPA 471, Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents; NFPA 472, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents; NFPA 1991, Vapor-Protective Ensembles for Hazardous Materials Emergencies; and NFPA 1994, Protection Ensembles for Hazardous Materials Emergencies. NFPA has also been a member of the InterAgency Board for Standardization and InterOperability (IAB) from its inception.
PHOTOGRAPH: AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

concentrate more closely on the area of chemical threats, focusing specifically on new technologies. I think a key for the future will be to include chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) provisions and precautions in the development of certain codes and standards, Sanders says. CBN is going to be on every first responders mind, so we need to increase our involvement in these areas. The key to doing much of this will be identifying new technologies. The Metro Section currently has a memorandum of understanding with NASA to identify and develop new technologies. NFPA could play a much bigger role in that and other initiatives. Well evaluate what we have in place and adapt our standards to the lessons learned from the attacks on New York and Washington, says Tokle. First responders are of particular concern because theyre the first on

the scene. Weve already done quite a bit in this area but no one could have anticipated what happened on September 11. Other chiefs see NFPA as an umbrella organization that could bring together various agencies, certification programs, and public education. Due to the current state of affairs in the United States, it would be appropriate for some organization to take the lead in this type of activity, says Chief Leigh. There are numerous types of training available in this area for individuals and organizations, but it needs to be consistent and standardized. Its possible that this could be included in NFPAs haz-mat standards or technician standards. Preparedness is the key to mitigating an emergency, and provisions for identifying potential terrorist attacks could be considered in future revisions of the codes and standards. NFPA should be specifically involved in public education that promotes an awareness of terrorism and in developing code provisions or standards that require a builder or building owner to establish pre-incident plans for building occupants and emergency responders, Chief Bamattre says. Chief Luther Fincher of the Charlotte, North Carolina, Fire Department agrees. I feel very strongly that NFPA should look at the development of education programs for the public on terrorist events and how they differ from other types of emergencies, he says. NFPA should also discuss standards of mass decontamination for first arriving fire units. In addition, fire departments need an overall way to assess each threat and determine the appropriate response. I believe it would be helpful for NFPA to develop a planning guide/template to help local jurisdictions complete a threat assessment/capability assessment, says Chief Sheppard. Additionally, a standard of exceptional practices would be a valuable resource. NFPA should step into the terrorism world, if only to provide a good resource and yardstick to which fire departments can compare themselves, says Chief Michael Burton of the Grand Rapids, Michigan, Fire Department.
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WORLD TRADE CENTER AFTERMATH

First Responders
The real thing shows the need to refine first-responder preparedness and protective equipment or terrorist attacks. HALLIE EPHRON TOUGER
efore September 11, experts talking about the potential for a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction agreed that it wasnt if, but when and that the first response would be local. So none of them was surprised when two hijacked jets flew into the World Trade Center, another hit the Pentagon, and a fourth crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. Nor were they surprised by the staggering death toll among firefighters, police, and medical personnel. In a no-notice event like this, theres no way anyone other than a first-responder organization can be used because there is no one else, says Charles Bell, chief of the Defense Consequence Management Systems Office for the U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command. Theyre the people who rush into the building when everyone else rushes out. What did surprise experts was the attack itself. Agencies had been focusing on chemical or biological threats, not planes used as bombs. No one Ive talked to anticipated the magnitude or the number of planes that were used, Bell says. You could imagine one. Thats been done before. It was almost inconceivable to imagine four. In the aftermath, experts discussed questions the attack raised. Did first responders have the protective clothing and respiratory protection they needed? Can the equipment needed be quickly identified and deployed? Are first responders being adequately prepared and trained?

Protective clothing and respiratory protection

In hindsight, emergency workers conducting ground operations at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon could have used different kinds of protective clothing and respiratory
46 NFPA JOURNAL NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001

protection than they did. Firefighters labored in heavy, thickly insulated structural gear long after their efforts had turned from firefighting to search and rescue, and police officers worked in their usual uniforms. Police have absolutely nothing to work in except their standard issue, says Lieutenant Eric Hahn of the Boston Police Department. Our special operations and hazardous materials teams are well covered. Everybody else is on their own. I hope this will change. Given the unknowns before an attack, each community must make its best guess as to the likeliest threats and invest in emergency response resources accordingly. Theres a limit to the resources any city or political entity is going to commit to equip and train without a specific threat, says Hahn. We have to put our money on the most likely event, not the least. In equipping their emergency personnel for terrorist attacks, communities rely on NFPA 1991, Vapor Protective Ensembles for Hazardous Chemical Emergencies; the new NFPA 1994, Protection Ensemble for Chemical/Biological Terrorism Incidents; and the Standardized Equipment List (SEL), promulgated by the InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB). NFPA is among the civilian and government agencies that make up the IAB, which grew out of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act passed by Congress in 1996. The Act requires the Department of Defense to help prepare federal, state, and local emergency personnel to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive terrorism. NFPA and the IAB were already working to address the need for protective clothing and equipment for police personnel before the attack. A subcommitte revising NFPA 1994 had made it a priority to develop perfor-

mance criteria for tactical law enforcement, says Bill Haskell of the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. IAB is now speeding up its efforts to create an urban search-and-rescue equipment annex in the SEL. It was being discussed for the 2002 version. We didnt know wed need it this quickly, says Bell, a longtime IAB member. Observers such as Haskell suggest that uniforms made of a lighter-weight, more durable material could have made the searchand-rescue phase less physically stressful on the responders, while protecting them from chemical and biological threats. Haskell points to a selectively permeable membrane material being developed by the military, which can be used to make protective clothing that weighs less and helps personnel stay cooler, while still affording a high level of protection. Prototype protective clothing using this material is already being tested by a number of fire, police, and emergency medical response agencies, including the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the Boston Emergency Medical Service. A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Urban Search and Rescue Team from Beverly, Massachusetts, wore several prototype ensembles in training exercises last February. The first week of October, they told Haskell that they were being deployed to assist in recovery efforts at the World Trade Center, and arranged to use the prototypes there and provide feedback. Keep in mind that urban search and rescue folks currently dont have protective ensemble that would give them chem/bio protection, says Haskell. This technology would give them that as well as increase protection from bio liquids they they encounter during victim and human remains recovery.

Firefighters watched World Trade Center Building 7 collapse.

Deploying special equipment quickly

In New York, most firefighters were equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus with 30-minute air cylinders. That was appropriate while inside and evacuating people, says Bruce Teele, NFPA senior fire service safety specialist and NFPA staff liaison for NFPA 1991 and NFPA 1994. What was lacking was a secondary level of respiratory gear to protect them from the particles of dust and debris they were choking on later. Local authorities didnt anticipate the widespread need for air-purifying respirators equipped with lightweight, replaceable canisters that fit over the eyes, nose, and mouth. This equipment was readily available through the military and could have been deployed along with other specialized equipment, such as command-and-control shelters, modular field showers, and mobile laundries, says Haskell. The problem was, no one knew to ask. We need to put logistics support and sustainment in place to ensure that the right protective clothing and equipment are available and make local agencies aware of where to reach out for it, says Haskell. Teele agrees. The system today is too complicated, he says. The federal government isnt allowed to come in and intervene. When local authorities need military assistance, the request has to go to the governor, then to the White House. Its supposed to be coordinated through FEMA, which then goes to the military. In an emergency, Teele says, it takes too
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long. We need to change the laws so the military can come in right away and say, Weve got a ton of equipment. Just let us know what you need. A regional equipment distribution system was in the planning stages long before September 11. Funding had been appropriated and an evaluation had been underway for almost a year to determine how best to implement pre-positioned equipment pods, according to Chris Rizzuto, acting director for Congressional Public Affairs, Office of Justice Programs. Rizzuto says many details, from the type of equipment to make available, to request procedures, to deployment logistics, to maintenance routines, are still being worked out, now as quickly as possible.
Preparation and training

The events of September 11 wont fundamentally change the way communities prepare to respond to weapons of mass destruction attacks, but theres an added urgency now to make sure everything is ready. Theres been a lot of well-meaning effort at the federal level to train and equip first responders, but as we see and as the President has said, we need to focus on those more, says Stephen Foley, who chairs NFPAs IAB standards coordinating committee and is an senior fire service specialist at NFPA. Provide more training to the people who need it. Provide more of a focus to manage the whole terrorism arena. Emergency response agencies at all levels have benefited from large-scale, counter-terrorism exercises and tabletop exercises. These

exercises have strenghened links among agencies, enabling them to cooperate and provide mutual support across jurisdictions and geographic boundaries. The Boston Police Departments Hahn says extensive regional planning and counterterrorism efforts had prepared first responders to work together. Because weve had the opportunity to shake hands, we know whom were supposed to be playing with, and we can function a lot better in an emergency than we could if we were just meeting for the first time, says Hahn. Foley agrees. At the local and the federal levels, response plan capabilities have really been taxed, and theyre working, he says. Being able to pull multiple agencies and people with multiple jurisdictions together for a common goal is critical.
Moving forward

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, public safety organizations across the country are reexamining their preparedness. Weve pulled all our plans and laid them on the table, reassessing their value and worthiness, says Los Angeles County Fire Department Battalion Chief Ron Watson, This tragedy has awakened the sense of urgency for first responders. Its very real, and itll change our response tactics and strategies, though its too early to speculate how. First responders bear the brunt of terrorist action. Its still the knowledge, training, and equipment we have immediately available that will mitigate the situation.
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