Allied Intelligence and Indochina, 1943-1945 Author(s): Ronald Spector Reviewed work(s): Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol.

51, No. 1 (Feb., 1982), pp. 23-50 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3639819 . Accessed: 02/12/2012 14:49
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and Allied Intelligence 1943-1945 Indochina,

Ronald Spector
The author is a historianin the Southeast Asia Branch of the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

of haverecently to number historians turned their attention an examof towardIndochina WorldWar II. ination American during policy the if of are As a result mainoutlines, notall details, thatpolicy now Most historians Franklin familiar.' haveagreedthatPresident Rooseto velt's colonialism hisdeterminationestablish and to hostility French the a trusteeship Indochina for of following defeat Japanwas considif not abandoned, the finalweeksbefore in Rooseerablymodified, in velt'sdeath.By V-JdaytheUnitedStateshad virtually acquiesced to thereturn Indochina France. of Yetwhilethisanalysisprobably an represents accurate description ofAmerican from or as viewed it policy Washington London, takesno on accountof the actionsof Americans the scenein Southeast Asia a WorldWar II. Without close look at American as actions, during to policies, it toward Indochina is impossible cometo grips to opposed with the bitter controversies whichhave surrounded this aspectof World War II. concern These controversies writers, by chiefly allegations French and writers to them, thatthe UnitedStatesconsistently sympathetic to rerefused aid in organizing equipping French and a underground
and of 'George C. Herring,"The TrumanAdministration the Restoration FrenchSovin I ereignty Indochina,"DiplomaticHistory, (1977), 97-117; Christopher Thorne,"Indochinaand Anglo-American Historical Relations, 1942-45," Pacific Review,XLV (1976), 73and Indochina:1942-45," American Historical 96; WalterLaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," Review, LXXX (1975), 1277-1295; Gary R. Hess, "FranklinRoosevelt LIX (1972), 353-368 of Journal American History,

OUBTLESSINSPIREDby the events and debates of the 1960s, a

23
Review Historical Pacific CoastBranch, ? 1981,bythePacific Association Historical American

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1944-1945and that, dursistance theJapanesein Vietnam to during the for responsible ingthissameperiod, UnitedStateswas primarily their Ho Chi Minh's anti-French Minh guerrillas Viet along helping took road to power.2 The controversy on a new variation the during in Vietnamwas at whendissatisfaction American with 1960s policy its height. thattimesomewriters At cameto believe thattheUnited notbeinghelpful havemissed splendid a Statesmight opportunity by havebecome "AsianTito."3 to an enough Ho Chi Minh,whomight An examination American of wartime activities directed towardor the Indochina effecting during war yearsenablesus to see theseprobmost lemsfrom different morerealistic a and perspective. Throughout and policies Americans theFar East, parof in ofthewar theactions the and armyair force, navy,plus the ticularly leadersof the army, Office Strategic of were in fact"out of phase" Services, ubiquitous withofficial American in Washington. WhenRoosevelt's antipolicies Frenchinclinations were at theirheight, had orderedthat the he ... to UnitedStates"do nothing in regard resistance or groups in any otherway in relation Indochina."4 Americans to were already But involved withintelligence in and mostinvolved operations Vietnam, somedegreeof cooperation withthe French.Later,during final the months the war, as Washington's of to of opposition the restoration French in Americans thefield became lessened, sovereignty gradually involved withthenationalist of the increasingly opponents theFrench, Viet Minh. At the timethatthe President memo,a pennedhis "do nothing" deal had nevertheless beendone,forthere wererequiregood already in ments Southeast Asia for whichtheFrench couldprovide considerable assistance.These includedproviding information Allied for on bombers likely air and weather, troop Japanesetargets, defenses, in movements Indochina. Information troop on movements ofspewas
Maurice Dessinge,"Les Intrigues 2Pierre Internationales Indochine," Monde,April en Le New Statesman Nation,XLVII (April 17, 1954), 4and 14, 1947; "The Indo-ChinaStory," A and Military 5; BernardFall, The TwoVietnams: Political (New York,1964), 54Analysis on 59, and Fall, "U.S. Policiesin Indochina1940-1960," in Last Reflections a War(New Histoire d'unePaix Manqube(Paris,1967), 25-33, 63York,1967), 125-136;JeanSainteny, 107. The Arrogance Power (New York, 1966), 114; ArthurM. 3J. William Fulbright, of Jr., Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage(New York,1967), and Robert Shaplen,The LostRevolution(New York,1966), chap. II. from Roosevelt the Secretary State,Oct. 16, 1944, in U.S. Dept. of to of 4Memorandum Relations the UnitedStates,1944. Vol. III: The British Commonwealth and State,Foreign of D.C., 1965), 777. Europe (Washington,

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AlliedIntelligence Indochina and

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cial significance of in becausethe shifting Japaneseforces or out of Indochina in The couldaffect military the situation southern China.5 also might in rescuing French shotdownoverIndochina. pilots help also thatboththe Frenchin Indochina and Policymakers believed theVietnamese-ifnotthe Laotiansand Cambodians-wererestive under their and services be Japanesemasters thattheir might enlisted forvarioustypes espionage of and "fifth column" activities. Although American commanders China and India madeno deliberate in effort to contravene circumvent or American the policytowardIndochina, was sufficiently and ambiguous allow fora widevarito policy vague Yet wereseldom etyofinterpretations. local commanders keptabreast ofitslatest twists modifications. needfor and The tactical intelligence was sometimes the fromWashington were few urgent; instructions and uncertain. those For after 1943American in commanders reasons, theFar East frequently the violated spirit, nottheletter, Rooseif of velt'sdictum. the to interest Indochina-specifically in Among first takean active Vietnam-was Navy Commodore Milton E. ("Mary") Miles. As commander NavyGroupChinaand Far East Director theOffice of of of Strategic Services(OSS), the organization underthe responsible ChiefsofStaff unconventional for Miles presided over warfare, Joint a kaleidoscopic withresponsibility liaison,training, for organization and support naval operations.6 of He warfare, espionage, guerrilla also served deputy as director a jointChinese-American of espionage as led groupknown theSino-American Cooperative Organization, by a Chinesemaster-spy, GeneralTai Li. One oftheprincipal missions was to prepareforan Allied givenMiles by the Navy Department on in that landing thecoastof China,a possibility stillseemed likely 1942 and 1943. Sincethatmight also involve in Vietnam, operations Miles attempted extendhis intelligence to to network thatcountry. The manhe chosetoheadtheoperation a French was navalofficer, Commander Robert a of Meynier, supporter GeneralHenri Giraud. Like Giraud,Meynier was a war heroand was anti-German, antiMore important, was married and strongly he British, pro-American. to a womanwithimportant connections manamongtheVietnamese
T. The Origins Revolution Vietnam, (New York,1970), 136. of 5John McAlister, of of 6Fora discussion theactivities Navy Group China, see MiltonE. Miles, A Different Kind of War(New York,1966), and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, "Naval Group China: A Studyof GuerrillaWarfareduringWorldWar II," (Masters thesis,Georgetown 1968). University,

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of darinclass;his wife'suncle,Hoang TrongPhu,was a member the of The other members ofTonkin. and a former council governor privy ofFrench contacts among espionage grouphad extensive Meynier's in and ficers officials Vietnam. hamits the Almost from start Meynier the groupfound operations and circumscribed the FrenchMilitaryMission in Chunby pered the king,which was Gaullist in its loyalties.Ironically, Vichyite of werealso suspicious the Meyniergroupbein French Indochina withthe Gaullistsin Chungking. cause thegroupwas associated By and had mid-1944 untenable, he returned Meynier's position become to Europe. had enjoyed somesuccessin his Meynier Despitethosehandicaps, a in in his Before departure 1944,he succeeded establishing efforts. infrom ofthem insideIndochina. of network agents Many operated side Frenchgovernment agenciesand even insidethe Frenchintelstream the office, DeuxiemeBureau.They sentbacka steady ligence taron of information fieldfortifications, movements, bombing troop and local political developments.7 gets, To complement Meynier'sactiveties amongthe Frenchin IndoMiles preparedstillanother china,Commodore plan to utilizethe and espionage warfare mountain tribesmen Vietnamforguerrilla of the The mountain who included Tai, peoples, againsttheJapanese. and the Meo, the Muong,and the Nungswereethnically culturally as the lowlandVietnamese well as fromeach other. distinct from labeledthe"Speof the Miles's plan to enlist support thetribesmen, forIndochina," been suggested Lieutenant had cial Military Plan by wara UnitedStatesNavy Reserve, psychological GeorgeDevereux, As Devereuxhad done attached Miles's staff. a civilian to fareexpert withtheir research amongtheMeo and was familiar anthropological and socialcustoms.8 dialects Devereux'splan called for a group of twenty speciallytrained ofVietnam nearthe into tobe parachuted thecentral highlands agents The groupwould establish townof Kontum. relationships friendly hatred tribesmen play on theirlong-standing and withthemountain the and thelowlandVietnamese organize to oftheFrench, Japanese,
1-22 andpassim,in toward of Indochina," 7Miles,"Reporton theactivities SACO directed D.C. of MiltonE. Miles Papers,Office Naval History, Washington, 8Miles, "MemorandumforGeneral WilliamJ. Donovan," May 7, 1943, Miles Papers.

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AlliedIntelligence Indochina and

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bands.Arms, and wouldbe supplied ammunition, medicines guerrilla air. by Devereuxhoped to beginoperations withinfouror fivemonths afterentering Indochina.The guerrilla bands would supplyintel"tie up enemy offer rallying a for forces, ligence, ground French patriots native and oftheJapanese," and pose a threat the to opponents rearduring projected the Alliedinvasion Burma.Devereux of enemy that"a minimum 20,000" tribalguerrillas of confidently predicted couldeventually recruited trained.9 planwas approved be and The by theOffice Strategic of Services and by Miles's superiors the Navy in and endorsed the commander the of Department enthusiastically by China-basedFourteenth Force,Major GeneralClair L. ChenAir to air nault,who promised launch diversionary raids to coverthe drop.'0 in By the end of May 1943, Miles and Devereuxhad succeeded a groupofeighteen and marine assembling army, navy, corpspersonof and backnel,most whomspokeFrench someofwhomhad civilian in anthropology psychology. politicalreasons,two or For grounds French also were to officers, former anthropologists, attached themission.In Junethegroupassembled FortBenning, at for Georgia, special parachute But politicalarguments withthe Frenchin training. the Office Strategic of Servicesand Chungking, squabblesbetween of NavyGroupChina,and a constant "kidnapping" Devereux'spersonnelformore urgentassignments forced delayedand eventually cancellation theproject." of Asidefrom Miles'sefforts, most the reliable and widely usedsource ofAmerican in to was an organization intelligence regard Indochina known "theGBT Group,"so-called as of from first the letter thelast namesoftheleadersofthegroup:LaurenceGordon, Canadiancita in of as izen who had worked Vietnam an employee theCal-Texaco Oil Company; a tobacco and merchant; Frank HarryBernard, British Formed first look after businessman. at to Tan, a Chinese-American Alliedbusiness in the property Vietnam, GBT groupsoonexpanded
for in Devereux,"A Program GuerrillaWarfare French 9George Indochina," April 1943, in Miles Papers. memorandum Miles, Aug. 3, 1943,Miles Papers. for 'oGen.Clair Chennault, "Author'sinterview withProfessor Weston Barre,a former La member Devereuxgroup, of the Jan. 9, 1973, Durham,N.C. La Barreexpressed opinionthattheoperation "might very well have succeeded"had it been put intoeffect.

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at intoespionage. Froman outpost Lungchow neartheChinese-Vietnameseborder, GBT groupdirected network couriers the a of and clandestine radio transmitters whichprovided Vietnam, throughout on outstanding intelligence transportation, "consistently industry, and airfields." time passed the GBT group built up As shipping withinthe colonialgovernment contacts strong agenciesand armed forces Vietnam in and encouraged formation an anti-Japanese the of theFrench colonials.'2 underground among of of Originally sponsored thedirector intelligence theChinese by Board,Admiral Military Operations Yang Hsuan Chen,withfunds and equipment theBritish, GBT group, thevalue the as suppliedby ofits workcameto be appreciated, received from increasing support theFourteenth Force.By late 1944,theFourteenth Forcewas Air Air mostof its operating fundsas well as moremodern and supplying morepowerful transmitters itsradionetin Vietnam.'3 for the Air Although Fourteenth Force'ssupportof the GBT group was primarily the purposeof obtaining for the intelligence, military nevertheless the relationship brought UnitedStatesintocollaboration witha colonial anti-colonialists as Major General such power.Strong Patrick Hurley,who was appointed ambassador China in Deto J. cember1944, were suspicious all British of and Frenchclandestine in activities Southeast themas partof an effort reto Asia, viewing establishtheirprewarempires."I indicated Hurley that I had to to in to forces Ingiven youpermission issuesomeequipment certain dochinaas requested ColonelGordon,"wroteGeneralAlbert C. by of Commander UnitedStatesForcesin the China TheWedemeyer, ater and Chiefof Staff Generalissimo to Chiang Kai-shek,in late 1944. "He was notpleasedby the action, I the although mentioned contribution which you desire verymuch and which intelligence causedme to approve request.... However, the GeneralHurleyhad had increasing evidence theBritish, that and Dutchare workFrench,
ing ... for the attainmentof imperialisticpolicies and he felt we

12Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh (London, 1973), 75-76; Gen. AlbertWedemeyer's Data Book, section in U.S. ArmyCenterof MilitaryHistory, 20, D.C.; "OrganizaWashington, tional Reportof 5329th Air Ground Forces ResourcesTechnicalStaff, August-September Air AlbertF. SimpsonHistoricalCenter, 1944," pp. 13-15, in Fourteenth Force Records, Maxwell Air ForceBase, Alabama. '31bid.

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to in endeavors whichruncounter shoulddo nothing assistthem their to U.S. policy."'4 reflected PresidentRoosevelt's own Hurley's positionfaithfully in December viewsas expressed 1944,whentheBritish again governthat ment to protested "it wouldbe difficult denyFrench participation of in the liberation Indochina."Roosevelt responded instructing by of that Secretary StateEdward Stettinius "I stilldo notwantto get It decision. is a matter post-war.... I for mixedup in anyIndochina effort toward liberathe do notwantto getmixedup in anymilitary Air tionof Indochina."'5 forceand otherAmerican unitsin China continued cooperate a limited to to extent with French nevertheless the in to and toaid in therescue insideIndochina order obtain intelligence ofdowned WhenWedemeyer assumed command theChina of pilots.'6 relations the Theaterin October between FreeFrench 1944,he found in Kunming theFourteenth Forceto be "very and Air and cooperative He believed had that"an arrangement beenmade"between friendly." the of thetwowithout cognizance hispredecessor, Lieutenant General JosephStilwell.'7 voiced Ambassador Despitetheconcern by Hurleyand occasionally in American clandestine and to contacts activities regard Indoothers, 1945 were actuallyof small significance. china before spring the of or on in or situation Indochina They had little no effect theinternal on thepolicy theAlliedgovernments. of Their importance in the lay themAmerican factthatthrough commanders the China Theater in from In becamedependent uponintelligence Indochina. thesameway for thatan urgent desire intelligence prompted had somecommanders to cooperate withtheBritish theFrench and so would colonials, they to laterdeal withforces hostile French colonialism oncetheJapanese the in colonialregime Vietnam. repressed French forcibly Withtheliberation Francein 1944 and American of in victories the
to Dec. 27, 1944, Wedemeyer RecordGroup 332, National files, '4Wedemeyer Chennault, Archives citedas RG, NA). (hereafter to IsRoosevelt Stettinius, Jan. 1, 1945, in U.S. Dept. of State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,1945. Vol. VI: The BritishCommonwealth Far East (Washington, and D.C., 1945), 293. lateJanuary1945,a groupdescribed "theFree French as the 16In under-ground" provided Air in of Navy and theFourteenth Forcewith"pinpoint targets theSaigon area." See records Air G-2, Fourteenth ForceIndochina file,RG 332, NA. interview withWedemeyer, 2, 1972,Washington, Feb. D.C. '7Author's

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in of the underwent dramatic a Pacific, French Indochina change attiOld feudsbetween tude towardthe Japaneseoccupation. Vichyites were made to establish and Gaullistswere put aside, and attempts of contactwith the new Frenchgovernment General Charles de and thecolonialadministration Gaulle in Paris.'8In thearmy preparesistance movement rations weremade to organize underground an France. to similar theMaquis in metropolitan From Admiral Louis Mountbatten's SoutheastAsia Command in Ceylon, trained French officers agents and specially Headquarters were parachuted into Indochinaalong with arms,communications and leaderswerebrought out gear.Resistance equipment, demolition of was estaband network elevenstations fordiscussions, a wireless the French leaderstoldtheOSS thatfollishedthroughout country.'9 Vietnam for hopedto holdpartsofnorthern lowingan uprising they Alliedairpower.20 three four or months withhelpfrom These Frenchplans and preparations were a poorlykeptsecret. for was well awareofthelocal preparations reJapaneseintelligence and to counter them.21 and sistance moved Mountbatten energetically Esler Denning, his political cautioned De Gaulle governthe advisor, mentto go slow on encouraging premature actionin Indochina, any As a State Department but to no avail.22 earlyas September 1944, in memon Asia advised President Roosevelt a draft expert Southeast the "It the disarm French orandum: is thought Japanesemayshortly the the of Around sametime, Office War and takeoverthecountry."23 in Information's liaison representative Chungking,William air that Powell,reported "all ofus out hereanticipate quitean upheaval

inIndochina."24

in of Researchand Analysis 's"Conditions FrenchIndochina,"Office Strategic Services, RG 319, NA. (OSS, R and A) Unit Kunming, Rpt. 0016, Oct. 15, 1944, copyin G-2 files, "Force136,FuturePlans," Nov. 16, 1944,and "Force136,Future memoranda, 19Unsigned Plans forFrenchIndochina,"Dec. 28, 1944, bothin W0203/4331,Public RecordOffice, "InLondon;U.S. Military Paris,to Military Div., Rpt. R3-45, subject: Intelligence Attach6, dochinaQuestion,"April 11, 1945, G-2 Intelligence Document RG 319, NA. (ID) files, 200SS Rpt. YH/KM-1, subject: "Conditions Northern in Nov. 15, 1944,G-2 ID Tonkin," RG 319, NA. files, Col. Sakai Tateki,"FrenchIndo-ChinaOperations 21Lt. no. Record," Japanesemonograph Centerof MilitaryHistory. 25, p. 22, in U.S. Army 22Political advisor,SoutheastAsia Command(SEAC), to ForeignOffice, Jan. 24, 1946, W0203/5561A,Public RecordOffice. 23Chief Southwest Pacific Division,"DraftMemo forthePresident," Sept.8, 1944,RG 59, NA. 24William Powell to Clarence Gauss, Sept. 6, 1944, enclosures Gauss to Secretary to of State,Sept. 9, 1944, file851G.00/0944,RG 59, NA.

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French of officials As thepossibility a Japanesetakeover increased, the linesof efforts determine possible to in Kunming "madestrenuous actionthe UnitedStatesmighttake."25 On February 1945, the 2, Frenchmilitary attachein Chungking in approached Wedemeyer a of overthepossibility sucha Japanesemove. of Shouldit state anxiety thattheFrench forces wouldretreat the to believed the occur, attache to on there carry guerrilla warfare mountains, against Japanese.The the underthosecircumstances, UnitedStates askedwhether, attache to assistance. wouldbe prepared provide was non-committal, that Wedemeyer indicating the matter merely was one fordecisionat a higherlevel.Awarethatthe questionof withtheFrench Indochina in was delicate American and cooperation heldstrong viewson thesubject, cabled thatthePresident Wedemeyer for reWashington guidance;but the state and war departments thatthey could"onlyreiterate President's the of sponded policy" nonin matters.26 involvement Indochina had The President's position nevertheless already begunto undergo At of of somechange. a conference Alliedand Russianchiefs stateat Chiefs Staff of thathe Yaltain February 1945,he toldtheU.S. Joint of that was "in favor anything is againsttheJapanesein Indochina withthe French.'27 thatwe do notalignourselves Accordprovided of of theacting chief staff theChinaTheater, General Brigadier ingly, subordinate commanders February on MelvinE. Gross,instructed 20 and suchas furnishing that"appropriate feasible medical help," supbe to who made their plies,might rendered Free Frenchguerrillas of way to the Chinese border.The matter the guerrillas entering between Chineseand "shouldbe settled the China,however, directly theFrench."28 March7, ChinaTheaterheadquarters further cauOn that tionedcommanders "any help or aid givento the French us by be as shallbe in sucha waythatit cannot possibly construed furtheraims ofthe French.... The governing is factor that ingthepolitical of theaction in furtherance ourmilitary be and nota matter objectives

of vol. 25"History U.S. Forcesin the China Theater,"unpublished manuscript, I, chap. 5, p. 24, Centerof MilitaryHistory. RG 26Memorandum byGen. Gross,Feb. 20, 1945,FIC bookII, Wedemeyer files, 332, NA. 27U.S. Dept. of State,ForeignRelations,1945. Vol. VI: BritishCommonwealth Far and East, 297. of 28"History U.S. Forcesin theChina Theater,"vol. I, chap. 5, p. 30.

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ofconvenience theFrench to anyother or Two dayslater to nation."29 theJapanesestruck. At eighto'clockon the evening March 9, theJapaneseambasof sadorto French Indochina Governor-General Admiral presented Jean of thatdirect control thegovDecoux withan ultimatum demanding of be overto the ernment, police,and armedforces thecolony turned French forts Two hourslater moved against Japanese. Japaneseforces and garrisons overIndochina. all Most werequickly but disarmed, a fewoffered and a sizable bodyof fierce, brief, resistance, although in fell jungle troopsstationed the north back intothe mountainous Tonkin Laos, thestart a fighting of retreat across areasofwestern and theChineseborder.30 in The first newsoftheJapanesecoup received Americans the by at China Theater was a radio messagefromthe Frenchgarrison on transmitted aboutmidnight the Vietnam, Langsonin northeastern ninth March.The message of a on attack the reported heavy Japanese and speculated thatan overallattackon all Frenchunitsin garrison Indochina The defenders was probably Ameriunderway. requested on can air strikes designated in area. targets their The commander theFourteenth Force, of Air GeneralClair Chento provide air assistance the whichthe nault,requested permission French had askedforand "to co-operate withtheFrench audirectly in A thorities Kunming" conduct to in attacks Indochina generally. fewhourslaterthetheater on theauthority headquarters, apparently ofMajor GeneralRobert in commander theabsence McClure,acting of GeneralWedemeyer who was in Washington confer withthe to with Chiefs Staff, of "Go ahead. Co-operate replied: completely Joint theFrench. You can use Posehairfield. Givethem hell."The message added thatthe authorization to emer"pertains entirely the present gency."3' At thesametime in thatMcClurewas giving Wedemeyer approval, was receiving from instructions Roosevelt. Washington contradictory "to colonization in (colonialism) the Southeast Wanting discontinue Asia area," thePresident Wedemeyer a private told that in conference he was "determined there that wouldbe no military to assistance the
29Chennault Gross,March 7, 1945, Wedemeyer to RG 332, NA. files, "FrenchIndochinaOperations 30Sakai, Record,"24-29. to DFB 34041, March 10, 1945,Wedemeyer RG 332, NA. 31Gross Chennault, files,

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in When learned ofMcClure's later French Indochina."32 Wedemeyer Chennault aid theFrench, doubted to he authorization permitting in such cirthathe wouldhavegranted sweeping authority similar and had beengiven, it setin Yet cumstances.33 theauthority already of which resulted theactive in involvement of a motion chain events until surrender. in forces Indochina theJapanese American
to ChenWhile American planes were preparing aid the French, nault persuadedthe Chinese head of state,Generalissimo Chiang the to Kai-shek, allow French troops fleeing Japaneseto takerefuge is resistance further in China. Chineseauthorities agreedthat"ifstiff

assistance be the may military against Japanese, putup bytheFrench rendered.'"34 in of tooperate support theFrench first at Authority applied to only theFourteenth Force, on March11,an event Air but which occurred time operate Indoof OSS, whohadwanted some for to in officialsthe saw for A of a Vietchina, as an opening them. group about thousand namese withtwenty French colonial officers, troops slowly fighting their toward Chinese for air the border, way appealed American supThe of force a colonel hadbeen was who port. commanderthe operatan underground radio station, whichhad provided valuable ing Air information Fourteenth Force. tothe OSS officials "an excelsaw lent toorganize group an effective this into force opportunity guerrilla and thereby a of maintain fruitful source information." the When OSS proposed drop to and teams arms, training equipment, guerrilla in Vietnam, McClureand Chennault to resolved seek"a clear-cut to statement" Washington hopeof increasing form in support the French.35 At aboutthesametime their arrived Washington, in the request French of HenriBonnet, called the ambassador, upon Secretary State and requested possible "all in unsupport" Indochina. Apparently awarethat Fourteenth Force Air tactical the was already air flying for missions theFrench, for Bonnet asked "immediate tactical support andmaterial field: direct assistance every in of and support operations
32Author's interview withWedemeyer. 331bid.

34Minutes meeting National of of March10, 1945,enclosure Gen. to Council, Military Hsu YungtoGross, March16,1945, files, Wedemeyer RG 332,NA. 35Chennault toGen.George for Marshall Gen.John FIC book Hull,March13,1945, II, files, Wedemeyer RG 332,NA.

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theparachuting arms,medical of The quinineand food."36 supplies, in Paris,De Gaulle expressed concern theAmerto following evening ican ambassador, aboutreports theAmericans that Caffery, Jefferson and British failed cometo theaid oftheFrench Vietnam.7 had to in Bonnet's and De Gaulle's remarks and Chennault's requestwere ofStateStettinius March 16,whenin a memoranbefore on Secretary dumforthepresident, discussed question American for he of the aid Indochina. On the assumption thatthe Frenchwere attempting to maketheUnitedStates"appear responsible theweakness their for of resistance theJapanese,"Stettinius to that this suggested "we combat trend making to suchassistance maybe as by publicourdesire render warranted thecircumstances ."38 by ... the sanctioned publicstatement, gavehis no he Although president consent continued to for French. theevening March the On of support chief staff, of 18, theU.S. Army's deputy Major GeneralThomas C. home to Handy,telephoned Wedemeyer's just outside Washington rethatthepresident's chief staff, of FleetAdmiral William port personal D. Leahy,had toldhim:"it was alright help the Frogs, to providing suchhelpdoesnotinterfere our operations."39 with In Wedemeyer's his of GeneralPaul absence, chief staff, Brigadier took Handy's call. Aftertrying Carraway through unsuccessfully muchofthenight getin touchwithWedemeyer, was visiting to who in friends Harper'sFerry, WestVirginia, and Carrawaydrafted sent an urgent, to Chennault: "The U.S. Government's priority message attitude to aid theFrench is such doesnot present providing assistance interfere with operations now planned.... Operationsagainstthe Air Japaneseto aid theFrench maybe under-taken theFourteenth by the committed Although UnitedStateswas at thatpointdefinitely the French Indochina, French to aiding in the continued government to express dissatisfaction aboutthekindand extent American of supOn that port. March 24, De Gaulle toldAmbassador Caffery no sup36U.S. Dept. ofState,Foreign Commonwealth theFar and Relations,1945. Vol.VI: British East, 290-299. to of 37Jefferson Caffery Secretary State,March 13, 1945, in ibid.,300. memorandum the President, for 38Edward March 16, 1945, in U.S.-Vietnam Stettinius, Relations(Washington D.C., 1971), VII, 66. from Brig. Gen. Paul Carraway to Wedemeyer, 39Memorandum March 19, 1945, RG 332, NA. files, Wedemeyer 4'Ibid.,March 20, 1945.

Force."40

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to He he plieshad beendropped theFrench. couldonlyassume, said, thattheAmerican of "as a matter policy, does notwant government, to helptheFrench."41 De Gaulle's complaint partially for was justified, fewsupplieshad beenprovided French, the of and onlysmallamounts blankets medicines.The problem an extreme was ofall types suppliesin of scarcity theChina Theater, whichhad to obtainalmost suppliesbymeans all ofhazardous over Yet flights the"hump"oftheHimalayaMountains. theFourteenth Forcehad beenhelping French, Air the havingflown between March 12 and 28 a totalof thirty-four missions overIndoofwhichforty-three bombwere china,involving sorties, ninety-eight offensive and reconnaissance, thirty-one ing missions, twenty-four of werein response regularreconnaissance. Twenty-eight the sorties to direct ChenThere might havebeenmore, requests theFrench. by of surplus nault reported, for"bad weather, non-availability except and of equipment, thefluidity thesituation."42 Chenault'seffort with that of Mountbatten comparedfavorably whowas also attempting fly to missions support theFrench in from of bases in eastern India. But hampered bad weather and thelarger by distances of weresucinvolved, aboutone-third theSEAC sorties only cessful. Chenaultcomplained thatMountbatten failedto coordinate his operations withthe China Theaterand sometimes supdropped De in areas from whichthe Frenchhad alreadywithdrawn.43 plies of two squadrons Gaulle's government offered man and maintain to Liberator but Air out thatno bombers, the British Ministry pointed aircraft wereavailableand thatevenFrench units theEuropean in air Theaterwerestillshort crews.44 of Concerned over Frenchcomplaints the nevertheless, head of the StateDepartment's H. FreemanMathews,sugEuropeanDivision, to that gested informally theWar Department "evena token dropof wouldassistin refuting allegations accusations" and the that supplies theUnitedStateshad no wishto help theFrench. The War Departto of 41Caffery Secretary State,March 24, 1945, in U.S. Dept. of State,Foreign Relations, 1945. Vol.VI: British Commonwealth Far East, 302. and to 42Chennault War Dept., April 14, 1945, Wedemeyer RG 332, NA. files, Allied Commander, SoutheastAsia (SACSEA) to Air Ministry, March 21, 43Supreme Staff Mission(JSM) to Air MemberforSupplyand Organization 1945,W0203/2965,Joint (AMSO), April4, 1940, F2005G, F0371, bothin PublicRecordOffice. Air to RG 332, NA. files, 441bid.; Ministry SACSEA, April5, 1945,Wedemeyer

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in instructed who to ment, response, Wedemeyer, had returned China, forsupplies French to honor only "providing represent a they requests from Theater'splannedoperations entailno and diversion negligible commitments." additional who his was Wedemeyer, was hardputto supply ownforces, stillin no position supply to muchmaterial, suchscarceitems as particularly whichtheFrench a Although limited gasoline, specifically requested. amount of supplies were dropped to the French during April, was Wedemeyer stillobligedto turndown mostrequests exceptfor the War Department'sinstructions to Unaware of medicines.45 the the werequickto attribute failure provide to Wedemeyer, French to of supplies a deliberate policy theAmerican government. and The viewthattheUnitedStatesdeliberately limited delayed its to theFrench theJapanesetakeover thuswas incorrect.46 help during Yetthebelief thattheUnitedStates,forreasonsof political calculawithheld whileFrenchmen at thehands died tion, deliberately support of theJapanesein the spring 1945 came to be accepted most of by Frenchmen and some Americans. The memory America'ssupof and callousresponse theJapanesecoup endured to to posedly tardy later Franco-American efforts cooperation Indochina. at in poison However serious thatdisagreement,was destined be only first it the to ofa seriesofevents 1945 whichserved complicate emto and during bitter Franco-American relations Indochina. concerning Another evenmoredisturbing soon disagreement aroseoverAmerican relations withtheViet Minh. In a cavenearthevillage Pac Bo of in a remote Ho Vietnam, Chi Minh had conpart of northeastern vened eighth the of of meeting theCentralCommittee theIndochinese Communist in May 1941. The meeting a to Party produced decision founda new anti-colonial the Vietnamese coalition, Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi) or Viet Minh, deto of and Japanese.47 The signed appeal to all opponents the French
45Hullto Wedemeyer, to April7, 1945, and Wedemeyer Gen. GabrielSabattier, April21, RG 332, NA. 1945,Wedemeyer files, 46Atypically distorted version in BernardFall, The Two Vietnams. is Fall statesthatthe American towardIndochina".. . meantan automatic deathsentence any French for posture at resistance case ofJapaneseattack";see 55-57. in attempt organized unknown. 47Editor, author,and translator Days WithHo Chi Minh (Hanoi, 1965), 191and in 193; AlexanderWoodside, Community Revolution Vietnam (Boston,1976), 218-219; McAlister, Vietnam,112-113; William J. Duiker, The Rise of Nationalismin Vietnam (Ithaca, 1976), 274-275.

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and recruitof Viet Minh beganan ambitious program propaganda and among Tho, the the in thenearby ment provinces peasants among to tribesmen wereleasthostile theVietnamese. who mountain of the in Remnants rebelbandswhichhad fought French uprisings the into in 1940 wereincorporated theViet Minh and formed basis units.During1943 and 1944,thoseunitsoccaforthefirst guerrilla while with of colonial skirmished elements theFrench militia, sionally a of and supply theirstrength through network training developing neartheChineseborder.48 bases in themountainous regions to from Ho also sought assistance China,and he attempted organize in China intosupporters ofVietnamese exilesliving southern groups and whocontrolled warlords oftheVietMinh.Chinese Kwangsi Yunto however. a visit On had ownplansfor nanprovinces their Vietnam, and spentovera yearin a China in August1942, Ho was arrested theirown VietChineseprison.Meanwhilethe Chineseorganized of movement nameseindependence amongtheremnants theold antiKnownas the Dong Minh Hoi, theChinationalist French groups. or lackedable leadership anyreal following, nese-backed organization from Viet Minh.49 the and it facedstiff opposition the In September 1943,a Chinesewarlord generalcontrolling reto Fa Kwei,decided try totheVietnamese border, Chang gionadjacent for He arranged Ho to be releasedfrom a different prison approach. of and made head of the Dong Minh Hoi, witha subsidy 100,000 made the Viet Ho Chinesedollarsper month. Although ostensibly it. Minh a partof the Dong Minh Hoi, theyin factsooncontrolled of the Chinese subsidyand gainingthe cooperation Tho Utilizing an underthe mountain tribesmen, Viet Minh established impressive Tonkin. northern network throughout ground mostprein WhentheJapanesetakeover March 1945 eliminated Americans insideVietnam, sources information of established viously in China beganto takea seriousinterest theViet Minh. in southern builtupon whichhad beencarefully The wholeintelligence network, was and administration themilitary, at that within French the sources in of As pointinoperable. the director the OSS detachment China, Colonel Paul E. Helliwell,notedat the end of March: "The GBT and has been destroyed, out, the Frenchsystem Group is knocked
Vietnam, 110-112, 140-143. 48McAlister, and China (Princeton, 1969), 56-71. 134-140; King C. Chen, Vietnam 491bid.,

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GeneralTai Li's setuphas been knocked lock,stock, out and barin The Viet Minh appearedto be theone organization Vietrel."50 nam stillable to supplyinformation help in therescueofAllied and pilots. In March 1945 officers the U.S. Air GroundAid Serviceconof and to himwithcomtacted Chi Minh in Kunming agreed supply Ho and small armsin return medicalsupplies, munications equipment, in Alliedpilots.s5 and forintelligence assistance rescuing Duringthe nextfewmonths Air GroundAid ServicesuppliedHo's forces the while a radio withrations, small arms,and medicines air-drop, by withtheViet Minh to transmit was to intelligence operator stationed theChina Theater. the with That cooperation theVietMinh was,in fact, onlyremainas demonstrated theexperience meansofobtaining intelligence, by ing of oftheOffice Strategic Services. The OSS organization China,known theSpecialIntelligence in as or Detachment had been at workforsometimeon a Branch, 202, to The projected to Indochina. goalswerefirst obtain project penetrate and of on intelligence thetransportation system on theJapaneseorder information "internal on battleand secondto obtainpolitical movein to ments regard Chinese,French, and British policies."The OSS fromFrenchofficials and colonial expectedto receivecooperation border and from "numerous revotroops alongtheChina-Indochina which have been used successfully the past." in lutionary groups the These groupswereexpected provide OSS withbothpractical to clear picture FrenchIndochina of a aid and a meansof "obtaining Politics."52 Detachment on March 1, 1945,forwarded plan for 202 a Although to in two Indochina OSS headquarters Washington, days penetrating latertheG-5 section theChina Theaterstaff of instructed detachthe a ment holdtheplan in abeyance to decision extendon pending final
Services China Theater,March 29, 1945, Wedemeyer soPaulHelliwellto Strategic Officer, RG 332, NA. files, Ho [China S'Fenn, Chi Minh,74-83. Fennrecalls(p. 78) that"We askedGHQ Chungking in communist The came clearance, viewofHo's reputed Theater]for background. instructions " back to 'get thatnet regardless.' See also, Lloyd Shearer,"When Ho Chi Minh was an AgentfortheU.S.," Parade,March 18, 1973, p. 8. Intelligence 52Col.Willis H. Bird (Dept. ChiefOSS) to Gross,April9, 1945, FIC bookII, Wedemeyer RG 332, NA. China TheaterRecords, files,

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Six into ingoperations Indochina. dayslatercametheJapanesecoup. The Japanesetakeover theresultant and reduction theflowof inin withtheincreased demand measures aid the for to together telligence, of in of led French, to a revival interest thepossibility OSS operations chiefof staff On March 18, Wedemeyer's in Indochina. Carraway, met thenin Washington, withOSS officials the including director, to GeneralWilliamJ.Donovan, discuss project. the Whileplanswere in GeneralMelvinGross, chief staff of acting proceeding Washington, in China, had decidedto proceedwithclandestine forthoperations and on March20, he issuedtwonewdirectives theOSS. The to with, for first directive an network Inin provided establishing intelligence as dochina proposed Detachment in February. 202 The second diby rective authorized OSS to rendermilitary "in the form the aid of U.S. controlled to any and all suppliesand/or personnel military the opposing Japaneseforces." groups The directive that wereto be treated provided all resistance groups of any particular or impartially "irrespective governmental political The affiliations. criteria will be thatthe resistance the Japanese to accruesto theadvantage UnitedStatesand China military of operawouldreceive notbecauseoftheir aid resistance to, tions."53 Groups or sympathy Frenchcolonialism solelyon the basis of their but for, in or as of performance combat theirusefulness sources information. The first intoVietnam OSS team to enterIndochinaparachuted soonafter Japanesecouptojoin a retreating the French column under GeneralsMarcel Alessandri GabrielSabbattier. and a After grueling retreat the lastingalmosttwo months, columnentered Kunmigin southern China in May, whereOSS representatives withAlesmet sandri and worked an agreement conduct out to misjointintelligence sionsintoIndochina. earlyJune,twenty-five In French officers and about one hundred Vietnamcolonialtroopsfrom Alessandri's force wereassigned OSS for to in Vietnam. The jointoperations northern and wereto OSS was to equip, transport, supplytheteams.54 They
from Chiefof Staff OSS, China Theater,March 20, 1945, "Into 53Memorandum Acting Activities Aid to Resistance and telligence Groups in FrenchIndochina,"Wedemeyer files, RG 332, NA. of 14Text agreement, and from Col. files, message June9, 1945, in FIC bookII, Wedemeyer Paul Helliwell to Gross,June 23, 1945, K5053, China Theater Records, bothin RG 332, OSS: The Secret FirstCentral NA; R. HarrisSmith, of History America's Intelligence Agency 1973), 328-329. (Berkeley,

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in informed report OSS code,whiletheOSS wouldkeeptheFrench Sabattier. through The joint Franco-American operationscarriedout under that wereuniformly becausetheFrench unsuccessful, agreement primarily it found almost to operate thecountryside in a amidst hosimpossible tile Vietnamese In July 1945, forexample,Vietnamese population. led forceconducting raid a guidesdeliberately a Franco-American at againstJapanesepositions the townof Lang Son in northeastern Vietnam intoan ambushsetbytheViet Minh.55 The Americans found Viet Minh well-organized, the and efficient, for as extremely helpful intelligence purposes, exemplified an operby ationknown the"Deer Mission"underMajor AllisonK. Thomas. as American officer fiveenlisted and men,Thomas Alongwithanother a formed teamto operatewithaboutone hundred French and Vietnamesecolonialtroops againstthe Hanoi-Lang Son railroad.While was theforce training in China,Chiduring Juneat Tsingsi southern neseand Vietnamese advisedThomasthatif he entered Vietagents withthe French, would "findthe whole population nam he against hatetheFrench."56 Thomasdecided parachute to withonlypartofhis team and a singleFrenchofficer an advancepartyto see if the as weretrue. reports On July 16, Thomas and his partyparachutedinto northern Tonkinnear the cityof Thai Nguyen, littleover fifty a kilometers of north Hanoi. The VietMinh welcomed them a warmly, displaying "Welcome Our American to Friends." Thomashad largesignreading: a longconference withHo Chi Minh-whom Thomas called "Mr. Hoo" -who informed thatFrench him wouldnotbe welcome. troops Thomasremained withtheViet Minh forovertwomonths, trainHe ing themforoperations againstJapanesecommunications. was at the end of Julyby an additional teamof fourmenunder joined that CaptainCharlesM. Holland.Thomasdiscerned theViet Minh had "thesympathy 85% ofthepeopleofTonkin."He saw no eviof
OSS, 330. s5Smith, Branch(SO from 56Memorandum Major AllisonK. Thomas to ChiefSpecial Operations Br.), OSS, China Theater(OSS/CT), "Reportof Mission 'Deer,' " Sept. 17, 1945, in U.S. on and Lessons Relations Causes,Origins, on the Senate,Hearingsbefore Committee Foreign 92 ofthe VietnamWar, Cong.,2 sess.,p. 255.

him,... would be sniped at ... and would get no food as the natives

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and dencethatthe Viet Minh were communistic thought thattheir was independence.""' "sole purpose Limitedand almostaccidental, between OSS and the cooperation of to the contheVietMinh was destined become subject considerable Later Frenchmen thatwithout sometimes troversy. suggested angrily the arms American-supplied and ammunition, VietMinh wouldhave of after Japanese the beenunableto seizecontrol so muchofVietnam surrender. Likewise Americancriticsof U.S. policyin the 1960s withtheVietMinh should sometimes that suggested theOSS contacts thetruestateof political have been exploited ascertain to opinionin between United the Vietnam toprovide and firm basesfor cooperation Statesand future leadersofthecountry. In reality, from Alliesduring war accounted the the armsreceived foronlyabouttwelvepercent the estimated of 36,000 smallarmsin of Viet Minh handsin March 1946 and onlyabout fivepercent the of the in availabletothem thestart thewar against French at weapons to December1946.58 anycase notall ofthearmssupplied theViet In also Minh camefrom Americans, the sinceFrench intelligence agents "retained and suppliedthemwith liaisonwithViet Minh elements arms."59 and on little As forintelligence, oftheinformation thestrength inthe of tentions theVietMinh collected theOSS everreached policy by of In levelin Washington. July1945,UnderSecretary StateJoseph inforlacksaccurate C. Grewcomplained "theStateDepartment that and as on in mation from OSS and themilitary conditions Indochina to thetemper thenative Even Wedemeyer's of headquarpeoples."60 in and tersreceived brief on OSS operations Indochina, reports only amount of Yet thosewerewholly in tactical nature.61 a considerable to from information abouttheViet Minh was forwarded Washington contact with Chinawhohad frequent American in diplomats southern had discernVietnamese But nationalists there. thatinformation little ible influence American on policy.62
57Ibid. 229-230. Vietnam, "SMcAlister, 147-148. Histoired'une Paix Manquee, 104-105; McAlister, Vietnam, 59Sainteny, C. OSS, July19, 1945, RG 59, NA. 60Joseph Grew to Director 61OSS Weekly RG 332, NA. Operations Report, July6-14, 1945, China TheaterRecords, 62Ronald Are Thinking;American Views of VietSpector,"What the Local Annamites namesein South China 1942-1945," Southeast Asia, III (1974), 741-752; Thorne,"Indochinaand Anglo-American 82-83. Relations,"

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withthe collaboration American effect the brief of The principal the of VietMinh during lastmonths thewar was probably psychologand suspicion the partof the French, on ical. It arousedannoyance of and it enhanced prestige theViet Minh,who couldclaimto be the of the and thus,by inference, representatives the victhe associates The period fromthe Japanese takeoverin toriousAmericans.63 and activeinvolvement to March 1945 witnessed shift moredirect a Yet forces Indochina. the basic American in American policytoby the questionof the region'spost-war ward Indochina, particularly in left and This remained indefinite. indecision, turn, U.S. Army fate, senseof on Air any Army Forcecommanders thescenewithout firm direction. Indochina The needfor moredefinitive a was appreciated by policy There was a generalfeeling, leastin mostleadersin Washington. at thatit was no longer matter that stateand war department a circles, Certainbasic decisions would have to be made could be postponed. the well before endofthewar.The State, War,and NavyCoordinaton March 13, 1945, concluded that"failing take to ing Committee, actionin thisarea withU.S. forces where may lead to a situation lack inaction theUnitedStateshas thepractical effect indicating of by of American in interest thisarea and giving to influence the greater British and the ."64The committee clarification requested French.... ofU.S. policy from president, before action the but couldbe taken any Roosevelt dead. was On April13, 1945,thedayafter Roosevelt's UnderSecretary death, oftheArmy Robert Lovett A. toldtheState,War,and NavyCoordiCommittee was essential it on thatRoosevelt's nating prohibition fora definite be Indochina until"post-war" reconsidered. mulating policy The lack ofa firm he embarwas a "sourceof serious policy, noted, to themilitary." head oftheFrench rassment in The mission military AdmiralRaymond Fenard,Lovettsaid, had takenadWashington, of to to of vantage thesituation submit questions various agencies the and U.S. government, "by obtaining or evennon-committal negative
63Fenn relatesthatHo used an autographed to picturepresented him by Chennaultfor a Air rescuing Fourteenth Forcepilotand six pistols givenhimbytheAir GroundAid Service to demonstrate his rivalsthathe was thespecial representative theAmerican to of military. Fenn,Ho Chi Minh,76. of 64Minutes themeeting, March 13, 1945, records State,War and Navy Coordinating of RG Committee, 165, NA.

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Fenardhad beenin effect American in answers," writing policy Indochina.65 The StateDepartment's on observed representative the committee thatitssub-committee theFar East had beenunableto agreeupon on a firm Indochina of That diverpolicy"due to a divergence views.66 in the sub-committee in microcosm viewsof the the reflected gence entire StateDepartment. for anti-colonialist Support Roosevelt's polcamemainly from fewFar Eastern a suchas JohnCaricy specialists, terVincent, soonto be head oftheOffice Far EasternAffairs, of and Abbott Low Moffatt, Pacific Afchief a newlycreated of Southwest fairs Division(latertheSoutheast AsianAffairs Division).Theywere convinced theneedfor UnitedStates cometo terms of the to with"the ofnationalism all Southeast Asia.67 mounting groundswell engulfing Most other American weremoreconcerned officials withtheproblem of relations withEurope, and theywere anxiousto avoid any relations the policythatmighttendto complicate alreadystrained withFrance.French wouldbe needed, out, cooperation theypointed in helping check Soviet in the expansionism Europeand in supporting United Nations.68 studypreparedby the OSS warned against A of "schemes international and whichmayprovoke unrest trusteeships result colonialdisintegration mayat thesametimealienateus in and fromthe European stateswhose help we need to balance Soviet "Therewas virtually sympathy, ousideofF.E. [theState no power."''69 Far East Division],"recalledthe Southeast Asia desk Department's Kenneth Landon,"forRoosevelt's P. Indochina officer, policy."70 The coordinating thus committee's requestfora policystatement touched a debatein theStateDepartment. off After weeksofdistwo cussion,the department policypaper which adopteda compromise recommended U.S. opposition the restoration Frenchsovno of to in the meanwhile, UnitedStateswas to seekasereignty Indochina; surances Frenchintentions establish of to and self-government local the Whilelabeleda compromise, recommendation a was autonomy.7'
65Ibid., April 13, 1945. 66Ibid. of Low Moffatt, Senate,Hearingson Vietnam in War,163. 67Testimony Abbott "Trumanand Restoration FrenchSovereignty," of 100-101, 116. 68Herring, to of 69Seeibid., 107, forreference OSS Report,"Problemsand Objectives U.S. Policy," April2, 1945. interview withKenneth Landon,Nov. 29, 1971,Washington, P. D.C. 70Author's memorandum French for RG 59, 71Draft government, April30, 1945,file851G.00/4-2845, in NA; Moffett testimony, Senate,Hearingson VietnamWar,176-177.

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Roosevelt's insistence a trusteeon unwavering longstepaway from shipplan. Over thenextfewmonths UnitedStatesmoved the everfurther in the a hand.At theSan Francisco thedirection granting French free of whichconvened April 1945 to discussthe post-war in Conference, the structure theUnitedNations, UnitedStatesfailedto raisethe of for matter a trusteeship Indochina. of one of Indeed, member theU.S. Harold Stassen,told fellowdelegates thatindependence delegation, was "not as important interdependence" compared as and colonial to "theAmerican In May 1945,Secretary federal system."72 empires ofStateStettinius French told Minister Foreign GeorgesBidaultthat is of "the record entirely innocent any official statement the U.S. of evenbyimplication, French over government questioning, sovereignty Indochina."73 the fiCommittee Meanwhile, State,War,and NavyCoordinating on It nallyreported agreement a policyforIndochina. was incorporatedintoa long report "Politico-Military on Problems the Far in East and InitialPost-Defeat toJapan,"which Secthe Policy Relating of State sentto President retary Harry S. Trumanin June 1945. Whileconceding "independence that in sentiment thearea is believed to be increasingly thereport declared that"theUnitedStates strong," French over recognized sovereignty Indochina."74 President Roosevelt's deaththus markedthe end of any genuine American at level return to opposition thegovernmental to a French butthatfactwas notyetapparent American to leadersin Indochina, theFar East. Evenas Indochina was beingcarefully reassessed policy in Washington, in was withAdWedemeyer engaged a heated dispute miralLord Mountbatten, oftheSoutheast head Asia Command, over theater boundaries southeast in Asia. Theywereat therootoftheold Roosevelt policy. Since the beginning 1944, Mountbatten's of command had conductedintelligence para-military and in Siam (Thailand) operations and Indochina anticipation theday whenAlliedmilitary in of operationswouldbe extended thosecountries. operations Indoto The into
72U.S. Dept. of State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,1945, Vol. I: General: The U.N. (Washington, D.C., 1967), 790. Vol. Commonwealth Far East, 307. and 731bid, VI: British 557-568. 74Ibid.,

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china were carriedout in cooperation with officers the French of missionat command were intended to military headquarters. They contact withFrench establish leadersin Indochina loyalto De Gaulle and to laythefoundation underground for the operations against Japanese.75 Indochina within boundaries the China Thethe of Although lay felt in thoseoperations. Siam ater,Mountbatten justified conducting and Indochina wereof direct to his plannedfuture miliimportance and "withthepassageoftime... become everinof taryoperations to of creasing importance the strategy SEAC."76 In addition, Mountbatten considered he had obtained that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's for operations Chungking October the in in 1943. approval He had achieved informal an Siam "gentlemen's agreement" whereby and Indochina wouldremainin theChina Theater,but "as thewar ... Asia the[and]thescopeofoperations oftheSoutheast develops, atre... mayinvolve Thailandand Indochina,... theboundaries betweenthe two theaters to be decided... in accordance are withthe of the forces also make."77Mountbatten progress advances respective claimed to have obtainedapproval,when Chiang visitedIndia in November out in 1944,to carry clandestine operations Indochina. Mountbatten couldfurther claimto haveRoosevelt's tacitapproval forhis actions.Only a fewweeksafter in Roosevelt, October1944, had bluntly declaredthat "we should do nothing regardto rein sistancegroups... in relationto Indochina,"BritishAmbassador Lord Halifax toldthe President was essential it that"Mountbatten shouldbe free, without to of intoIndodelay, getsomeparties French chinato do sabotage."According Halifax,thepresident "that to said ifwe felt was important we had better Mountbatten do it it that tell to and ask no questions." Roosevelt Yet made it clear that"he did not want to appear to be committed anything prejudice political to to a "78 decision.

75"Force136: FuturePlans forFrenchIndochina,"Dec. 28, 1944, W0203/4331,SEAC Public RecordOffice. Records, Feb. 8, 1945, W0203/5561,SEAC Records. 76Political advisor, SEAC, to Foreign Office, Thorne,Alliesofa Kind: The UnitedStates,Britain,and the WarAgainst 77Christopher Japan, 1942-1945 (London,1978), 301. Feb. 12, 1945, F986/11/G, F0371, Foreign Office 78AMSSO to Argonaut, Public Records, RecordOffice.

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knewlittleor nothing thoseinformal of understandWedemeyer He was concerned, aboutthefactthatmilitary however, ings. operaand about whichhe had little tions,overwhichhe had no control werebeingconducted his war theater. in told knowledge, Wedemeyer theBritish was "diametrically he to [Mountbatten's] opposed conceptionofhis'gentlemen's with More agreement' theGeneralisimmo."79 Mountbatten to be wasting and other important appeared airplanes on scarceresources peripheral and, to Wedemeyer, highly questionin warfare.He feltthose resources able, ventures unconventional in in mightbe betteremployed conventional operations China or Burma.so0 Each side suspected other political the of motives. and Wedemeyer Ambassador believed thattheBritish in Indochina Hurley operations were designedto aid the Frenchto reestablish their hegemony. Mountbatten's chiefpoliticaladvisercomplained thatit was "miliindefensible thiscommand, that whichat present alone in a is tarily to organizeeffective clandestine in theseareas, position operations shouldbe hampered by American ... obstruction whichwe knowto be based on purely 81 considerations." political WhentheFrench refused revealdetails their to of partin theoperaclosedKunming to planesoftheSoutheast tions, Wedemeyer airport Asia Command in of The Britflying support clandestine operations. ish nevertheless continued carry operations to out from near Jessore, Calcuttain eastern India. On thenight January 1945,fighters of 23, oftheFourteenth Forcemistook Air threeBritish on bombers, an inmission intoIndochina, Japaneseplanesand shotthem for telligence down.The Royal Air Forceliaisonofficer withthe Fourteenth Air Forcehad not been informed the mission"owingto the political of situation."82 Both Mountbatten and Wedemeyer appealed to theirrespective to governments, whereuponPresidentRooseveltsuggested Prime Minister Churchill "thebestsolution present for that at is youand me
Feb. 10, 1945, W0203/5561,SEAC Records. 79Political advisor, SEAC, to Foreign Office, to 80Wedemeyer SACSEA, May 19, 1945,W0203/5210,Public RecordOffice; Wedemeyer to Marshall,June5, 1945, fileOPD 336ts,June6, 1945, RG 165,NA. Political advisor Foreign to Feb. 8, 1945, W0203/5561,"Extract from 8tlbid.; Office, report of Lt. Col. Carver,"W0203/5210,bothin SEAC Records.Charles F. Romanusand Riley TimeRuns Out in CBI (Washington, Sunderland, D.C., 1959), 259-260. Aircraft No. 358 Squadron,Nightof of note,"Note on Loss ofThree Liberator 82Unsigned Jan 22/23 1945," W0203/4331,SEAC Records.

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to agree that all Anglo-American in Chinese military operations Indochinaregardlessof their nature be coordinated General by as to Meanwhile, Wedemeyer Chiefof Staff the Generalissimo.""83 visitedMountbatten's late in March, Wedemeyer at headquarters and departed thatMountbatten had believing firmly Kandy,Ceylon, not further in unlessapproved operations Indochina agreed toconduct in advancebytheChina Theater.84 to understood Mountbatten, thecontrary, onlythathe had agreed about his operations, to submit not to inform themfor Wedemeyer Thus in May, when Mountbatten informed approval.8" Wedemeyer thathe intended fly to twenty-six sorties intoIndochina, waywas the askedformoreinformisunderstanding. openforfurther Wedemeyer that be mation and suggested theequipment admight used to better Frenchforces whichhad retreated intoChina vantagereequipping the He also wantedto be sure that following Japanese takeover. furnished unitswill be employed guerrilla againstthe "equipment WhenMountbatten withonlygeneral informaresponded Japanese." it "incomplete" askedformoredeand tion,Wedemeyer pronounced tails. After further a fruitless exchangeof messages,Mountbatten that announced becauseofweather, coulddelayno longer that he and are "theoperations nowbeingcarried out."86 was "It to Wedemeyer furious. had neveroccurred me," he wired "thatyou would presume thatyou have authority to Mountbatten, in to ownwithout and cognizance full operate an area contiguous your direct violation theintent our respective of of directives."87 was beingtrueto his chargefrom President Roosevelt Wedemeyer to "watchcarefully prevent to and Frenchpoliticalacany British in tivities Indochina."88 Control clandestine of activities Indochina in enabletheBritish influence to and might political developments alignon to Naval Aide,n.d.,in U.S. Dept. 83Memorandum Indochina assistant thePresident's by of State,ForeignRelationsofthe UnitedStates,1945. Vol. I: Conference Berlin,(Washof D.C., 1960), 918. ington, 84Ibid. SACSEA to Chungking, 85Ibid.; April8, 1945, W0203/5561,SEAC Records. to Naval Aide, in U.S. Dept. of State,Foreign 86Memorandum Assistant President's by of is Relations,1945. Vol. I: Conference Berlin,919. The exchange messages in W0203/ of 5210, SEAC Records. to RG 332, NA. files, 87Wedemeyer Mountbatten, May 25, 1945, FIC bookI, Wedemeyer 88Ibid., May 28, 1945, FIC bookII.

authorityof the commanderof that area....

Your decision ... is a

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mentsthere.Wedemeyer also concerned was that Frenchguerrillas their armsnotagainst Japanesebutagainst the might employ indigenousforces the To ChiefofStaff General opposing Japanese.89 Army noted thattheBritish refusal recto GeorgeC. Marshall,Wedemeyer acognizeIndochinaas beingin the China Theater,the increased tivities theBritish Indochina, thelargeFrench of in and staff military at headquarters the Southeast of Asia Commandall pointed the to existence "a British of and Frenchplan to reestablish theirpre-war in Asia."90Ambassador politicaland economic positions Southeast the withan evenstronger letter Truman. to Hurleysupported general The ambassador called attention the British to actionsin Indochina and asserted Mountbatten usingAmerican that "is lend-lease supplies and other American resources invadeIndochina defeat to to whatwe believeto be American Frenchimperialpolicy,and to reestablish ism."91 came as a surprise Wedemeyer to Washington's replyundoubtedly and Hurley.Whiledeclaring that"there beenno basicchangein has the out reachedat policy," State Department pointed thatdecisions theconferences Yaltaand San Francisco at "wouldpreclude estabthe lishment a trusteeship Indochina of for undertheFrench except government. latter The seemsunlikely." The UnitedStatesat thatpoint, themessage "welcomes French in war stated, participation thePacific to the extent and Frenchoffers assistance of should"be practical," considered their on merits." American in forces China were military freeto cooperate withFrenchresistance in Indochina"progroups videdsuch assistance does not interfere withrequirements other of plannedoperations."92 In a similarmessage,Marshall informed that "the Wedemeyer StateDepartment's eliminates political the of [new]position necessity Lord Mountbatten's in Indochina." Those opercurtailing operations ationsshouldin thefuture judgedstrictly their "be on merits military and in relation thestandoftheGeneralissimo.""93 to So endedthelast
89Memorandum assistant thePresident's to Naval Aide,in U.S. Dept. ofState,Foreign by

Relations, 1945. Vol. I: Conference of Berlin, 919. 1945. Vol. I: Conference of Berlin, 920.

to 9oWedemeyer Marshall,May 28, 1945,OPD 336TS, June6, 1945, RG 165, NA. to g9Hurley Harry S. Truman,May 28, 1945, in U.S. Dept. of State,ForeignRelations,

of 92Secretary Stateto Hurley,June7, 1945, copyin OPD336TS, RG 165, NA. to 93Marshall Wedemeyer, RG 332, NA. files, June4, 1945, FIC bookII, Wedemeyer

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American at command levelto restrict French and attempts the field British activities Indochina. in When the heads of the Alliedgovernments the SovietUnion and metat Potsdam July1945,thedispute in between Mountbatten and over boundaries stillfresh theminds the was in of Wedemeyer theater British and American of had chiefs staff. of The British chiefs staff decided thattheonlysolution was to transfer wholeof Indochina the to Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command,94 when theyprobut thatarrangement Potsdam, JointChiefsof Staff at the counposed teredwitha suggestion be thatIndochina dividedbetween two the theaters. the end it was agreed,despiteWedemeyer's In objections, thatIndochina southofthesixteenth parallelwouldbe theresponsiof Asia Commandand north the parallelthe of bility the Southeast oftheChina Theater. responsibility The truenatureof the changesin American policytowardIndochinaduring spring 1945 never the of known the in becamegenerally China Theater.Wedemeyer, example, for saw Marshall'smessage as no fundamental in American but as merely signifying change policy, another concession French to for war. In pressure a rolein thePacific to he himself boundbytheinstrucregard Indochina stillconsidered tions he had receivedfromthe president.95 and Both Wedemeyer to implement continued Roosevelt's after Hurley trying policylong had it. Washington abandoned The need fora continuous flowof intelligence bothAmerican by and Britishcommanders the Far East together in with a lack of and specific from thuscombined to clear, timely, guidance Washington a Americans thefield, in in produce situation acting virtual whereby of often tookactionswhichsignifiintentions, ignorance American affected The ambiguity U.S. policy of itself was chiefly cantly policy. Commanders inclinedto work with the Britishand responsible. Frenchcould easily findsupporting while policypronouncements, thosecommanders with to steerclear of identification colowanting nialist couldalso find in ad projects amplejustification thePresident's hoc pronouncements. While American were aware thattheiractionscould commanders have politicalconsequences, theirdecisions on theyusuallyjustified
Alliesofa Kind, 627. 94Thorne, 95Author's interview withWedemeyer.

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thebasesofmilitary necessities prosecuting war against in the Japan. To theAmericans, was alwaystheBritish it and French who seemed to be influenced political motives. by Far from French livesto American intercold-bloodedly sacrificing in had from first with the ests,U.S. commanders thefield cooperated in theFrench intelligence matters moved and to aid them durquickly the Japanesecoup of March 1945. It was onlyafter became it ing obviousthattheFrench couldno longer thatthe operatein Vietnam Americans turned to the Viet Minh. This collaberation reluctantly resultedneither decisiveadvantagesfor the Viet Minh nor in in for Yet when at uniqueopportunities theUnitedStates. coming a time was to to Washington attempting movecloser Franceon international French-American and relations give issues,itcouldnotbutcomplicate false signalsto the Viet Minh. Similarly well-intenWedemeyer's tionedattempt carryout Roosevelt's to directives Indochinaon whichhad alreadybeen superceded-ledonlyto misunderstandings and suspicion thepartoftheBritish. on WhileAmerican in latercomplained the1960s in generals Vietnam and 1970sthatWashington interfered their in of conduct operunduly such as Chennaultand Wedemeyer well ations,commanders might have wishedfora littlemore"interference" direction and the from nation's World War II. capitalduring

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