The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga-Volume Three, 1988-1998

Joys of Quebec file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Walt/My%20Documents/G...
JOYS OF QUÉBEC
Wee had just arrived at their home in the town of Beebe, in the Eastern Townships of Québec.
It was March 15, 1988, and we were on a house hunting expedition. Somewhat tired from
the day's journey, which included a six-hour long delayed flight from Winnipeg, and a long
drive through a heavy snow storm from Montréal, we looked forward to some relaxation and
good conversation that evening.
Our friends, John Henderson and Pippa Hall stood by quietly watching, as Phyl and I stared
incredulously at the March14 edition of the Sherbrooke Record, which was propped up on
their dining table.
Plastered across the front page was a story about AECL's plan to construct and operate a ten
megawatt SLOWPOKE ("Safe Low Energy Critical Experiment") nuclear reactor at the
University Hospital at Sherbrooke, the principal city of the Townships. I quickly scanned
the story, which had been leaked to the newspaper, revealing AECL's plan to build the
reactor for the stated purpose of heating the hospital.
AECL was to own and operate it, and the hospital would pay the heating bill. Most
importantly, the reactor, the first of its kind, was planned to serve as a demonstration
model, for potential world-wide customers. The ten megawatt reactor would be very different
from the demonstration two megawatt version (which we knew was still not up to operating
at full-power) at the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment at Pinawa, Manitoba.
"I don't believe this," and "You've got to be kidding," were but a few (printable!) comments
made by the two of us, as we read the lead article.
Our activities in Manitoba were well known to some of the environmental and peace
activists in the Townships area. We had made contact with them several years earlier during
the 1985 controversy over a possible nuclear waste dump in northern Vermont.
When some of them heard that we were moving into the area, we were asked to join them in
dealing with the new-to-Sherbrooke SLOWPOKE issue.
A short time after our arrival into what we had hoped would surely be a relaxed new start in
retirement life, Phyl and I were involved in strategy meetings with peace and ecology groups,
a meeting with AECL and hospital officials, news conferences and media interviews. To use a
Yogi Berra phrase, "It was deja vue all over again." It was as if we had never left Winnipeg.
No matter that most of the meetings were in French, a language which we had planned to
study, while living in the Townships. People kindly whispered translations to us during the
proceedings. Nevertheless, it became clear, very quickly, that our role would be quite
different than it had been in Manitoba (particularly for me) --- much more behind the
scenes.
Since my concern about the so-called SLOWPOKE reactor had already started to grow over
the past several years in Winnipeg, it seemed only appropriate to be involved in this new
controversy. I recalled when AECL announced it would store its customers' high level
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radioactive SLOWPOKE waste at its Chalk River, Ontario and Pinawa, Manitoba facilities.
One of AECL's main objections to Manitoba's new radioactive waste law was that it would
prevent(!) the Crown Corporation from fulfilling that objective at Pinawa.
I recalled an article in the Lac du Bonnet Leader that confidently predicted that
SLOWPOKES could some day replace oil and gas furnaces for home-heating.
The more I learned about the new mini-nuke, the less I liked it:
It would use highly-enriched uranium which must be imported from other countries.
It would create high-level radioactive waste, which would contain weapons grade
plutonium.
It would be marketed anywhere in the world.
It would operate unattended for periods of time, leaving it vulnerable to those with
malicious intent. Furthermore,
It would routinely emit radioactive gasses into the environment.
Yet, the plan now was to place such a machine in, of all places, a large hospital, where, as is
true of anything else designed by humans, accidents could, and did happen.
When Phyl and I left Winnipeg, we had put our belongings in storage as we searched for a
house in the Townships. As it turned out, we did not find a house we liked before we sold
our place in Winnipeg. So, we rented a furnished mobile home in a farming area near Beebe.
We brought the essentials for living with us in our camper van which pulled our old 1960s'
tent trailer from Winnipeg to the Townships.
However, I had packed one box of assorted files on nuclear waste issues in the tent trailer.
Now, I am not especially a mystic, but it turned out that one of those files was full of papers
on the SLOWPOKE reactor! It contained information which later proved to be very useful
in shaping future events.
However, it now seemed as if our dream of "peace, quiet and contemplation" in the rolling
hills of the Eastern Townships was not to be. [Our histories showed that we were probably
never cut out for that kind of a life anyway!]
For us, it would be the "Year of the SLOWPOKE."
SLOWPOKE
The SLOWPOKE deal between AECL and the Centre Hospitalier de l'Université de
Sherbrooke, (CHUS), was unknown to the general public, until someone leaked the
information to the Sherbrooke Record. By now, I had become quite accustomed to AECL's
covert approach. Eight years of involvement with the nuclear waste issue repeatedly revealed
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this approach as AECL's modus operandi . Sooner or later, of course, the public does find out,
but by that time, AECL has usually succeeded in getting its "ducks" lined up nicely, all in a
row.
The minutes of a February 16, 1988 meeting between AECL and the Hospital Board of
Directors include an AECL quote that
". . . an appropriate strategy produces very little public reaction."
[After all, what should one expect from a Crown Corporation which receives much of its
revenue from the taxpayer? Openness? Transparency? Ha! ]
This time, however, AECL's "appropriate strategy" obviously did not take into account that
someone(s) high up within the hospital's staff itself might have more than a few misgivings
about the venture and would leak the information to the media.
As word spread and citizens became concerned, the nuclear reactor plan quickly became a
very public issue. Various peace and environmental groups began to raise questions. The
Townships Peace Group asked us to attend a May 2, 1988 meeting at the CHUS with
hospital officials, AECL representatives, and persons concerned about the SLOWPOKE
project.
We were already seated at the board room conference table when the AECL contingent
arrived. Several AECL officials present from the Pinawa, Manitoba, Whiteshell Nuclear
Research Establishment (WNRE), were visibly shaken when they saw us there. Of course,
they did not know that we had very recently moved from Winnipeg to Québec. "What are
you doing here?" asked one of them. "We live here." I retorted. I'll never forget the
astonished look on his face.
The Robbins, former Concerned Citizens of Manitoba stalwarts, were probably the last two
people they wanted to see that morning!
They were no doubt unhappy about the presence of others who also were at the meeting,
including Gordon Edwards, well known nuclear critic from Montréal, and Max Krell, a local
university professor, (and a very concerned nuclear physicist). The hospital officials and
AECL reminded me of a group of kids who had just got caught with their hands in the
cookie jar. I imagine that they all realized at that moment, that their "appropriate strategy"
might have just gone down the tube!
Although "good manners" were observed throughout, it became quite obvious that the
citizens' representatives were not going to "buy in" on the proposal.
It did not take long for a coalition of peace and environmental groups and other concerned
individuals to take shape in the Eastern Townships. The group called itself the "Coalition
CHUS" (Continue Hydro, not Uranium for our Safety, or, en franç ais , Continuer l'Hydro
non l'Uranium pour notre Sécurité.) I was one of the speakers at the May 19 public meeting
at which time it was formed.
Using the hospital's own acronym (CHUS) turned out to be a great idea, except for one
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overlooked detail. It seemed to lend support to the Québec Government's insatiable desire to
build more hydro-electric megaprojects. The good people working against that possibility,
were not amused! However, the coalition kept the "Coalition CHUS" identification as an
instantly recognizable symbol to garner public support to oppose the nuclear reactor.
After the initial flurry of organizational and media activity, Phyl and I settled into our
relatively benign role of "behind the scenes" support to the mostly French speaking
Coalition. But I had one more moment in the spotlight, which Phyl provided for me. She
had carefully reviewed the contents of the SLOWPOKE file that we had brought with us
from Winnipeg, and had found an amazingly frank, and startling statement by John
Hillborn, the inventor of the SLOWPOKE reactor, concerning the possibility of nuclear
accidents.
In a June, 1981 paper he co-authored for the Second Annual Meeting of the Canadian
Nuclear Society in Ottawa. (AECL document No. 7438), Hillborn said that,
"It is now well known that people will accept frequent, small disasters more
readily than rare catastrophes."
Airplane crashes were used as an example. The paper continued,
"Although we may have to endure the legacy of Three Mile Island for many years,
a decentralized system of small reactors which effectively eliminates the
possibility of a single big accident may have a significant advantage in licensing,
insuring, and gaining public acceptance.
"Eventually the public may accept accidents to small reactors to the same extent
that they accept fires, explosions, and airplane crashes, as long as the
consequences are not obviously worse. It would be unrealistic however, to expect
many communities to welcome nuclear reactors within their boundaries until
there are severe regional shortages of gas and electricity."
On June 22, 1988, I read this statement, without comment, at the Coalition's first press
conference. The media jumped on it. The following day the quote was used in the lead
editorial in the Sherbrooke Record . Hilborn's statement became one of the Coalition's, and
the media's favorite items. It was an excellent example of the fact that one of our most
powerful tools against it was AECL's own prose.
I was not alone in finding Hilborn's statement to be a chilling one, with its assessment of
public reaction to "small" nuclear catastrophes. The 1980s witnessed bitter and protracted
conflict and public concern over radioactive spills from discarded medical equipment in scrap
yards, radioactive soil in housing developments, radioactive materials dropping from space
satellites, and missing quantities of plutonium. [ All "interesting" examples of the careless lack
of monitoring and controls that ought to be in place with these highly hazardous materials. ]
The fact that there is no safe level of radiation is understood by the public. Increasingly,
evidence points to negative health effects from the most negligible levels of radiation. And
the public has become far more sophisticated about the potential long-term health
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consequences from nuclear radiation in whatever forms and amounts. Even the negative side
of natural radiation has become more evident. There is nothing to suggest that the public
will, in Hilborn's terms, easily accept "small" nuclear disasters.
Coalition CHUS continued to raise questions about the safety of the reactor. An exchange of
correspondence between an official of Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and
myself, revealed that the so-called "nuclear regulators" had no(!) safety information on the
reactor. Their October 5, 1988 letter to me stated that
"It is likely that the 10-mw reactor will be significantly different from the (2-mw)
SDR." The letter also noted that "At this time the AECB does not have any
detailed design information on the proposed 10-mw installation."
Not only was the 10-megawatt SLOWPOKE an "experiment" in the true sense of the word,
even its supposed prototype 2-mw version, at the WNRE, was still in its embryonic stages.
AECB had reviewed that reactor and requested that AECL take a number of significant steps
to improve its safety.
As the SLOWPOKE issue developed and the Coalition CHUS quickly grew during the
Summer and Autumn of 1988, Phyl and I continued to provide advice, moral support,
assistance in developing letters and fact sheets and even some opportunities for
entertainment.
In July, we had moved into a century-old Victorian house in the town of Waterville, about
10 miles south of Sherbrooke. We decided to hold a combined fund-raiser/ housewarming
party. As I chewed on my fingernails, that big old house passed the structural engineering
test when at least fifty people decided to step-dance to the music of the "fiddles and the
banjos" We didn't raise much money, but a good time was had by all!
I was absolutely astounded at the energy and the effectiveness of the anti-SLOWPOKE
coalition. Something was happening all the time. Meetings, mailings, radio and TV coverage,
debates, button and t-shirts sales --- just about every legitimate, democratic, non-violent
form of protest and expression was taking place.
The t-shirts were an instant success: someone came up with the notion of using one word
"Tcherbrooke," printed in yellow, on a dark green shirt. The colors were the official colors of
the City of Sherbrooke. The word was a clever play on the word Chernobyl, which, en
français is "Tchernobyl." The shirts sold out, almost immediately, and again, after a second
run was printed. For years after, a wearer was almost assured of a nod of recognition and a
grin of approval, from local residents.
By October, 1988, the movement had acquired a life of its own. There were so many media
events, activities, and speakers' appearances going on that it was difficult just to keep track
of all.
As Coalition CHUS rapidly expanded, Phyl and I continued to supply information and
ideas. For example, in one of her fact sheets Phyl included information about AECL's own
stated policy of excluding pregnant women and small children from tours and open houses at
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the WNRE, which contained the 2 megawatt "prototype" of the SLOWPOKE. Pregnant
women and small children visit the CHUS every day for medical treatment. Would not a ten
megawatt reactor at the hospital provide at least equal, if not greater risk? The point was not
lost on the nurses at the hospital. Their union passed a unanimous resolution opposing the
reactor, declaring it a public health risk.
By November, 1988, coalition support was estimated at twenty-five thousand, with almost
ten organizations a week joining our forces. Much of the opposition came from the hospital
staff itself. Politicians were falling over themselves to come onside. The handwriting on the
wall was writ large and clear.
On December 20, 1988, we received the best Christmas present of all: the hospital Board of
Directors announced its withdrawal from the SLOWPOKE project, a decision taken in spite
of AECL's initial offer to absorb the five-to-seven million-dollar capital cost. Coalition
CHUS had done its work well.
AECL folded its tents and left Sherbrooke. It had lost another round in its struggle to
market its mini-nuke. The Sherbrooke rebuff was not the first. There had been earlier
unsuccessful attempts to market its nuclear heating system in such places as the Northwest
Territories (NWT) and Fort Nelson, BC.
AECL's public relations and sales forces had again failed to convince any community that
they had invented the near-perfect nuclear heating machine; one which they promoted as
being completely safe, and which would operate in the midst of a populated area without
negative consequences, for at long as 30 years -- - even though the design of the reactor had
not yet been finalized!
Undaunted, the federal Crown Corporation continued to seek a location for a full-scale
demonstration SLOWPOKE to enhance the reactor's credibility in the eyes of potential
foreign customers. But no one was buying. After two more failed attempts (one at a G.E.
plant in Peterborough, Ontario, and another lengthy one at the University of
Saskatchewan), the marketing project stalled.
A few years later, the two megawatt "prototype" at WNRE (which had never operated at full
strength) was shut down. By November 1991, and forty-five million dollars later, the entire
SLOWPOKE project was consigned to oblivion.
But, in December, 1988, the coalition's victory in Sherbrooke was sweet indeed, and roundly
celebrated. Elation would be too mild a word to describe the emotions of everyone who was
involved with the issue.
Much of the Coalition CHUS dissolved after that. But a few of the groups decided to
continue monitoring nuclear and other environmental issues. They used the French name
"Coalition pour la Surveillance du Nucleaire, which in English became the simple "COSUN"
(pronounced "co-sun"). This new coalition turned its attention to such issues as the nuclear
reactors in Québec and, of course, high-level nuclear waste developments.
I mused over the stark difference between the SLOWPOKE battle in Québec and the
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high-level nuclear waste controversy centered in Manitoba. The battle was all over in Québec
in about nine months, whereas it had taken over six years of continuous pressure to achieve
anti-nuclear dump legislation in Manitoba.
One reason for this was fairly obvious. In Sherbrooke, people were dealing with a specific
location and site. The perceived threat was tangible; a reactor in a hospital. In Manitoba, the
public could not get very excited about the somewhat vague notion of research into the
assessment of a nuclear waste disposal concept. The difference between a "concept" and a
"site," when it comes to things nuclear, is profound!
The SLOWPOKE issue was initiated by a leaked document to the media. But it was not to
be the only leaked document that caused controversy during that rather frenetic year of
1988.
SPY CAPER
In the midst of all the SLOWPOKE turmoil, another nuclear "bombshell" was dropped on us.
On July 16, 1988, we learned that an AECL "confidential" document, along with several
other papers, had been leaked, in plain brown wrappers, to, at least four environmental
groups in Canada. In a forty-three page report, twenty Canadian environmental groups
known for their criticism of the nuclear establishment were listed, complete with
documentation on their internal organization, membership, budgets, and, in some cases,
personal history data on key individuals.
More importantly, each write-up also included an assessment, including:
each organization's strengths, weaknesses,

its threats to AECL, and
"opportunities" for AECL to deal with the perceived threats(!) . Italics added
The document was marked "Copyright, 1987 by Ridley Research Group, Toronto."
The Sherbrooke Coalition CHUS was much too new to be included in the AECL strategy
document. Concerned Citizens of Manitoba (CCM), on the other hand, was included along
with personal history data on yours truly, and my activities with the group.
I recalled that sometime during the latter part of October 1987, while still in Winnipeg, I
had engaged in a long phone call with a man who identified himself as a free-lance reporter
working on a story for Harrowsmith Magazine. Knowing that Harrowsmith ran articles on
the nuclear waste issue, I had no reason to believe that the call was not authentic.
He asked many questions about CCM as well as about my own background. When I read
the leaked AECL document, I realized that most of the information in it must have come
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from that phone call. However, the sections on "Threats to AECL," and "Opportunities for
AECL," were apparently an analysis provided by the Ridley Research Group.
CCM's strengths were identified as
"Good at organization and has track record in developing high profile publicity,"
and "CCM knows how to influence governments."
Its main weakness was that the
"future of the organization is in question."
As for "opportunities for AECL," the document considered that AECL could address CCM's
"serious concerns inherent in the unattended operation of SLOWPOKE."
CCM's concerns over whether Bill 28 would stand the test of constitutionality, were
mentioned also under this section of the write-up.
Many of the other environmental groups had also given information to a "free-lance
journalist" about their activities.
It was nasty enough that someone under contract to AECL had misrepresented himself in
order to acquire information about environmental groups. It was even worse that some of
the information could only have been obtained through covert means.
For example, the Toronto -based Energy Probe group reported that the leaked document
contained information that was never publicly divulged, such as projected meetings, future
press conferences, and data from unpublished studies . Energy Probe said that some of the
information could only have been acquired "through surreptitious means of some kind."
Environmentalists across Canada expressed anger and outrage that AECL, a publicly-funded
Government of Canada agency, would engage in what amounted to a covert
intelligence-gathering operation, the objective of which was to design strategies to silence its
critics.
On July 18, 1988, simultaneous news conferences were held by environmental groups across
Canada, including one by our new coalition in the Quebec Eastern Townships. The
Canadian public quickly became aware of what had happened.
On July 19 th and 20 th , newspapers across Canada gave the story plenty of news and
editorial coverage. The July 20 th , 1988 Winnipeg Free Press editorial mentioned the fact
that
"One of Ridley's suggestions, which AECL circulated, was creation of a fake

environmental group controlled by AECL, which could join the (Canadian
Environmental) network and find out what the environmental people are saying
about AECL."
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The editorial concluded that
"AECL's worst problem is that its management is not too bright. That was once a
state secret but is now common knowledge."
That was a rather astonishing comment from a diehard media supporter of the agency, but I
would have liked to read something further about AECL's sense of ethics!
During the press conference in Sherbrooke, I made some strong statements about AECL's
lack of ethical behavior and said that I believed my civil liberties and individual right of
privacy had been violated. In a protest letter of August 1, 1988 to Marcel Masse, Federal
Energy Minister, I pointed out that the data collected about CCM and myself was done
without my knowledge or my consent. I asked that the Minister provide me with the
originals and copies of any files in AECL's possession that pertain to me. I also asked for an
apology for the incident.
I concluded my letter by saying that
"…AECL has the right to publicly disagree with its critics, which it does ---
frequently. But it does not have the right through secret or covert activities to
gather information about its critics and to design strategies of reprisal,
intimidation and infiltration."
In his October 18, 1988 letter to me, the Minister referred to the results of an investigation
conducted by AECL senior management which concluded that the idea of infiltrating various
anti-nuclear groups was "totally unacceptable." The letter did not address the specific points
I raised about violation of individual rights or the propriety of collecting information in such
a reprehensible manner. And, of course, the letter contained no apology.
One of the documents also leaked to the environmental groups, was a 1987 Canadian
Nuclear Association public education and communication strategy report which outlined a
plan to associate nuclear energy with the medical technology side of the industry. In the
words of this document,
"Making people more aware of the medical technology side of the industry will
help soften the hard image the industry currently has and will help raise the
stature and credibility of the industry as a whole.
"The tactic should be to encourage people to associate the nuclear industry and
the term 'nuclear,' itself, with the positive, progressive, warm, sensitive quality of
life overtones associated with the medical technology side of the industry."
[Being a fiddler, I could have supplied appropriate background music to that statement.
Such prose was enough to bring tears to the most hardened! ]
It was clear that the attempt at placement of the SLOWPOKE reactor in the University
Hospital at Sherbrooke was part of this strategy. Potential foreign customers for AECL's
"mini-nuke" would obviously have been impressed with the fact that Canada considered it
safe enough to put into a large hospital.
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And the medical uses of the mini nuclear heating machine (for isotopes) would certainly
have fit with the Canadian Nuclear Association's attempt to improve the image of the
nuclear industry.
To me, the strategy is simply one more indication of the last gasps of a dying industry, (were
it not propped up on life-support systems by the Canadian taxpayer). Attempting to
associate huge nuclear power stations and potential underground nuclear waste dumps on
the one hand, with medical uses of radioisotopes on the other, are, at the very least,
misleading. CCM and all the other nuclear watchdog groups have always gone out of the way
to exempt medical uses of radiation from their critiques of the nuclear industry.
[Having said that, I hope and trust that some day, medical science will develop more "user
friendly" therapies to deal with serious medical problems .]
While the SLOWPOKE and "spy caper" dominated my retirement activities in 1988, I had
not forgotten about the emerging environmental assessment of AECL's underground nuclear
waste burial concept. The powers that be in Ottawa and Pinawa were busy putting the final
fine touches on a process that could decide the fate of some of the most radioactive and
toxic substances ever produced by the human race.
"EARP!" "Excuse Me!"
On June 23, 1988, Federal Energy Minister, Marcel Masse announced that he had taken the
first step in initiating an environmental review of nuclear fuel waste management issues,
including a specific review of AECL's geologic disposal concept. I reflected on the many
agonizing years that CCM had spent simply trying to get a public airing of the AECL
underground nuclear waste project at Lac du Bonnet. Now Mr. Masse, referred the matter to
the Environment Minister, who would use his Federal Environmental Assessment Review
Office (FEARO) for the process.
From 1980 on, CCM had been told by AECL and the Federal Government that the Lac du
Bonnet project was "minuscule," and did not warrant the open public hearings that we
frequently requested. Now, after eight years, and much sweat and tears, the project had
become the focus of what the Minister later termed as
"one of the most important environmental assessments ever undertaken in this

country . . . (the results) will provide an essential foundation for future decisions
on energy policy."
In a Summer 1988 article published in the Saskatchewan periodical, NeWest Review, I

described some common pitfalls found in public participation programs. One reason why
these kinds of programs fail, as noted by social science researchers, is the scheduling of
hearings as late as possible(!) in the planning process. The contemplated use of the Federal
Environmental Review Process (known then as the Environmental Assessment Review
Process or, " EARP " --- which caused many a bad pun), on the AECL underground nuclear
waste concept, is, in my view, a classic example of this " as late as possible " problem.
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The AECL concept was conceived in the late 1970s. Ten years passed before the issue would
be aired in an open government-run forum. During that time, enormous vested interests had
developed, pre-judgements of the success of the research were not uncommon, and millions
of taxpayers' dollars had been spent.
Under the circumstances, it was very difficult not to be cynical about the upcoming EARP
process. My guess was that this would not really be a "public" inquiry in the true sense of the
word, but rather a forum for special interest groups, pro and con, on the nuclear waste issue.
Hope for a real "peoples'" hearing, with objective airings of the issues involved (the kind we
envisioned in 1980) had all but vanished.
As the EARP process began to unfold, my cynicism grew.
On December 8, 1987 I attended a FEARO public consultation meeting at the Sheraton

Hotel in Winnipeg. The purpose of that meeting was to exchange some ideas with FEARO
officials, about proposed changes in the federal legislation for the environmental assessment
process.
When I walked into the conference room, it was obvious that there was another agenda as
well. The meeting was dominated by AECL, which had sent four principal staff members to
participate. Clearly AECL had more than a passing interest in the EARP process. Marcel
Masse's announcement in June 1988 came as no big surprise. We awaited further
information.
The September 23, 1988 letter of referral from Mr. Masse to Environment Minister Tom
McMillan provided some detail about the upcoming EARP. He stated that
". . . a Federal Environmental Assessment Panel should be formed to examine

publicly the broad range of issues."
He also recommended that the Panel establish a Scientific Review Group (SRG) to
". . .facilitate evaluation of the scientific and technical matters. (That group
should be composed of) ". . . eminent, independent experts . . . (Its purpose would
be to) ". . . conduct specific in-depth examinations of the safety and acceptability
of the concept of disposal in granite rock formations of the Canadian Shield."
More than a year passed from the time the nuclear waste EARP was first announced by
Marcel Masse, and the actual establishment of the Panel. A new Progressive Conservative
(PC) Government replaced the Liberals in Ottawa. Jake Epp, MP, the stalwart nuclear
establishment proponent from eastern Manitoba became the new Energy Minister, and
Québec's Lucien Bouchard was appointed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to the
Environment portfolio.
Bouchard announced the establishment of the nuclear waste EARP Panel on October 4,
1989. With the possible exception of one or two appointees, the composition of the Panel
did little to alleviate my cynicism and apprehension about the upcoming hearings. The
backgrounds of the Panel members included such fields as health physics, biology,
engineering, religion and aboriginal concerns.
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A Panel Secretariat was established and it began conducting interviews to aid in the selection
of the Scientific Review Group (SRG).Since, over the years, by its use of contractual
arrangements, AECL had virtually "cornered the market" on technical expertise, especially in
the geo-sciences, I had serious doubts about the formation of any group of so-called
"eminent, independent experts."
[Phyl and I often resorted to gallows humor in these kinds of situations, and went so far as
to invent our own fictitious group of scientific advisors for the Panel. They included such
prestigious characters as: Iban Boughtov, Phd, Physics Department, University of Manitoba;
Ima Token, M.A., Department of Domestic Sanitary Engineering, Western Technical
Institute for Agricultural Studies, North LaRonge, Sask.; and Roche de Pierre, Phd, Chef,
bloc des rivieres, Baie James, Québec.
In-jokes, such as these, made this otherwise gloomy issue, barely tolerable. I particularly
liked Phyl's "Ima Token," character, since AECL had so few women involved in its project.
But few others appreciated our quips! ]
The EARP got off to a rather dismal start with our COSUN group and the other concerned
organizations across Canada. A major controversy developed over the scope (i.e. terms of
reference ) of the inquiry. At the outset, it was made clear that the EARP would be restricted
to consideration of nuclear waste management issues only, and principally, the AECL
concept for underground burial.
The broader and most critical issue of what to do about the actual production of future
nuclear waste would not be included. Inclusion of concerns about the future of Canadian
energy policy was absolutely verboten!
These exclusions were explicit; so much so that FEARO officials joked that the Panel
members would push a button which would drop people through a trap door to oblivion if
they should perchance stray from the path of the inquiry.
This kind of "rigging" of the terms of reference was not uncommon. Another reason given by
social science researchers for the failure of public participation programs (mentioned in my
NeWest Review article), was that they often exclude many of the main concerns of the
people.
(It would be another ten years before this critical problem with federal environmental
assessment processes would finally become a major issue in the public arena. As reported in
the July 11, 1998 edition of the Globe and Mail , a Federal Court judge declared that an
environmental assessment of a bridge construction in Alberta was deficient because it was,
essentially too narrow (not the bridge --- the assessment!) It did not take into account ". . .
the cumulative environmental effects from the project."
It was becoming painfully evident to me that the nuclear waste EARP was likely to include
most, if not all of the "no-no's" identified by social science research over previous decades for
the conduct of public participation programs. It was then that I started thinking about the
legal implications of these kinds of maneuvers.
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Initially, the inquiry was to be restricted geographically as well. Only the nuclear energy
producing provinces would participate, (i.e., Ontario, Québec and New Brunswick). That
decision was changed later when both Manitoba and Saskatchewan requested that they be
added to the EARP. Both provinces had significant interest in matters nuclear, (Manitoba
with the underground research, and Saskatchewan with the uranium mining industry).
Questions surrounding the EARP's terms of reference became a hot topic for discussion
among environmental groups. Happily, collaboration among these groups had become much
easier as a result of new communication technology.
The advent of the EARP coincided nicely with the development of a non-profit Canada-wide
telecommunications network (known as " The Web ") designed primarily for
non-governmental social and environmental groups. By the Fall of 1989, various
organizations concerned with the EARP quickly began to network using the e-mail and
conferencing system. The Web provided the various groups and individuals the opportunity
to share information and even to strategize together in a very rapid and effective manner.
Giving and receiving quick feedback, inexpensively, became possible for the first time.
A significant outgrowth of this collaboration was the establishment of a "Nuclear Waste

Group," which, for "rations and quarters" was attached to the Canadian Environmental
Network (CEN) Energy Caucus. Many of these same groups and people had already been
targeted by AECL in its covert data collection effort designed to deal with its opponents.
[Our early efforts to use computer technology were both amusing and frustrating. Some
weird and wonderful indecipherable hieroglyphics would periodically appear on the computer
screen, along with almost audible(!) groans of "I wish I could figure out this (blankety-blank)
machine!"]
The controversy over the scope of the inquiry lingered into the Spring and Summer of 1989.
Brennain Lloyd of Ontario's Northwatch environmental group described this issue well in
one of her e-mail messages:
" Public interest groups requested meetings and opportunities to discuss the terms of
reference in advance of their formulation and release, and were refused;
They submitted "draft" terms of reference, and were ignored.
The terms of reference for the eventual Federal Environmental Assessment and Review,
designed and delivered without opportunities for public input, were restrictive in the
extreme, and have been subject to much and repeated criticism since their release."
The Nuclear Waste Group had hoped to convince the Government to broaden the terms of
reference, and during the Spring of 1989 repeatedly requested a meeting with both the
Federal Ministers of Energy and Environment (Epp and Bouchard). It took months of
letters, requests and delays before that meeting was actually held, on October 26, 1989. By
that time, the final version of the terms of reference for the EARP had already been
established and published!
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The idea for the meeting with the ministers about the terms of reference, came out of a
meeting of some members of the Nuclear Waste Group in Montréal on January 4, 1989. It
was held at the rectory beside the burned-out hulk of the Unitarian Church of Montréal.
That was one of the coldest days I have ever experienced. The wind whipped around the tall
buildings with a bite that surpassed anything I had ever experienced, including a nine month
tour of duty on Baffin Island with the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1946, and nearly eighteen
winters of residence in Manitoba.
Phyl and I attended the resulting meeting with Messieurs Epp and Bouchard. We had
previously arranged that each environmental group present would raise one or more specific
concerns. The time was divided between nuclear waste issues, and other environmental
concerns.
I was representing COSUN and my statement and questions dealt with data from a new
AECL public opinion poll, which revealed that over eighty percent (!) of Canadians opposed
the idea of burying high-level nuclear waste. That information did not seem to make a dent
in Jake Epp's nuclear armor.
Not surprisingly, Jake Epp expressed little sympathy and a good deal of impatience with the
questions and statements raised by the participants. Bouchard looked as if he would much
rather be somewhere else. He seemed bored with the whole thing; that is, until the list of
other environmental topics to be discussed was revealed. It included the proposed Great
Whale project at James Bay, in Northern Québec.
Bouchard nearly leaped out of his skin and imperiously demanded to know why that item
was on the list for discussion. Great Whale, he said, was the business of Québec, and Québec
alone. The Federal Government had nothing to do with it. It was obvious that the best way
to get Bouchard's attention was to mention the word "Québec." [ Little did I suspect at the
time that he would eventually become the Premier of Québec and the leader of its movement
to separate from Canada. ]
But, since the EARP terms of reference had already been published, the meeting with Epp
and Bouchard was essentially a waste of time.
A year later, 1990, the Great Whale project had escalated into a major international
controversy. The indigenous people in northern Québec were overwhelmingly opposed to the
dam project with its potential for massive destruction of their traditional hunting and fishing
grounds. Opposition grew to the point where the Québec government had little recourse but
to indefinitely suspend the project. It became a pocketbook issue for the Province, when
some of the Northeastern States started making noises about not going through with
proposed electric power import deals.
Again, the new telecommunications network served as a major tool. During 1990, from the
comfort of the office in my home, I was able to provide various environmental groups in
New England with information they needed, such as the time and location of various
meetings in Québec, and the location of some of the people in the Province who were
directly involved in the effort to stop Great Whale.
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[Apart from our environmental efforts, our proximity to New England was really great for us.
We were less than a day's drive from the Maine Coast and the beautiful Mt. Desert Island
that we had first visited during the 1960s while living in the Washington area. ]
While Phyl and I waited for more information about the events, timetables, and other
details of the forthcoming environmental assessment, we continued to try to put down some
roots in the Québec Eastern Townships, including daily French lessons at the adult
education center in Sherbrooke, informal music sessions, and our usual activities of writing,
gardening, traveling, music and visits with our children and grandchildren.
On May 3, 1990, FEARO announced that the first series of public events would be held over
the following several months. It was time to get "fired up" once more for the next episode of
the seemingly never-ending, nuclear waste story!
Open House
On May 3, 1990, The Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, (FEARO)

announced that public "open houses" on the nuclear fuel waste management and burial
concept, would be held during May and June 1990 in cities in the five provinces selected for
the environmental assessment review process (EARP). In Québec, these meetings would take
place in Québec City, Montréal and Trois Rivières.
FEARO said it intended to use these events as an opportunity to outline the terms and
conditions of the nuclear waste review. At last, the Environmental Assessment Review
(EARP) Panel was moving the process into the public arena. It was also announced that
Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) staff would provide promotional displays and
literature.
Our COSUN group was infuriated by the fact that FEARO was giving AECL an exclusive
forum in which to further promote its underground nuclear waste concept. AECL had
already spent enough time and tax dollars trying to convince an increasingly skeptical public
about the "merits" of its plans to permanently bury its lethal radioactive garbage.
COSUN quickly challenged FEARO's plan and requested that organizations other than
AECL be permitted to provide information at the open houses.
The Québec City open house was scheduled for May 28, 1990 at Loews' Le Concorde Hotel.
Phyl and I were attending a three week-long Elderhostel program at Laval University, which
was devoted to French language skills training. Our plans were to skip class that day and
show up at the open house with a box of COSUN literature. One of our COSUN cohorts,
Natalie Beaulieu (fluently bilingual, and with a degree in geological engineering) came up
from Sherbrooke to help us.
Upon our arrival, we were told that FEARO would not allow us to set up a table in the
meeting room for COSUN literature. So, the three of us "button-holed" everyone who came
near, and handed them our fact-sheets and pamphlets.
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As it turned out, the two sessions in Québec City that day, produced a total of only six (!)
members of the public, so our job was easy. Most of the time we sat around shooting the
breeze with AECL and FEARO staff.
FEARO had run small ( very small) advertisements for the open houses in newspapers across
the country, but it was clear that if they were really serious about significant public response
and participation (which I doubted) they would have to do a lot more than that!
The Province of Québec did send two observers to the open house. We had already learned
that the Québec Government had decided not to actively participate in the EARP. Although
Québec's Gentilly II reactor continued to produce high-level nuclear waste, the Province was
opposed to the idea of hosting a repository. I presume the reasoning was that
non-participation in the process would underscore its position. Québec was keenly looking
out for its own interests. In this case, I was delighted it was! But I was not sure that a
boycott was the best strategy.
The Spring, 1990 open houses were the prelude to the next set of public events called
"scoping" meetings. These meetings were for the purpose of assisting the Panel in developing
guidelines for AECL, as the proponent. AECL would then use these guidelines to formulate
an environmental impact statement (EIS). FEARO explained that the meetings would also
provide an opportunity for scientists, interest groups, government agencies and the general
public to identify and prioritize concerns and issues related to the safety and acceptability of
the AECL concept, including the social, economic and environmental implications of a
possible nuclear fuel waste management facility.
The advent of the scoping sessions brought the issue of intervener funding to a head. Earlier,
FEARO had announced that funding would be available for groups and individuals to assist
them in developing their presentations and submissions to the Panel.
As the proponent, AECL was required to provide these funds, but the amounts were pitifully
small, especially when judged against AECL's own public relations expenditures, the costs of
the underground burial concept, and possible future nuclear waste dumps.
Only two hundred thousand dollars were to be provided for the scoping sessions and five
hundred thousand for the entire remaining environmental assessment.
Environmental groups were outraged. Some of them calculated that the amounts needed to
do a credible job should be up in the "low millions," and that the two hundred thousand
dollars was little more than "seed money" for any significant interventions in the five
provinces selected for the EARP.
They were probably right. It would certainly cost a lot of money to hire the kinds of
expertise needed to do a reasonable analysis and evaluation of the AECL concept. And that
was only one of the many potential high cost items.
This was one more indication that the EARP was off on the wrong foot. Inadequate
intervener funding was another of the reasons cited in social science research as to why these
kinds of public participation efforts frequently fail.
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However, COSUN, along with many environmental groups across Canada, submitted
budgets to FEARO, in hopes of getting at least a sliver of the small pie. On August 27, 1990,
COSUN presented a detailed budget request for fifty-one thousand dollars to do a proper
scoping study for the Panel on legislative, regulatory and institutional issues related to
nuclear waste management. As it turned out, COSUN received the munificent amount of
one thousand dollars
"…to assist in the preparation for and participation in the environmental

assessment review of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal concept."
Along with COSUN, most environmental groups received but a fraction of the amounts they
requested.
The "pittance" provided to the environmentalists was not the only departure from the
principles of sound public participation. Timing was another. Prospective interveners were
given only a few short months(!) to develop their budgets, and to actually complete their
submissions in time for the Autumn 1990 scoping sessions.
Increasingly, the word "boycott" entered into our on-line discussions about the EARP.
Frustrations over the narrow terms of reference, inadequate intervener funding, timing
problems (i.e., "hurry up and wait") mounted to the point that on the 19 th of October,
1990, Greenpeace Canada announced it would no longer participate in the EARP. In its
press release, Greenpeace said that
"These hearings are a propaganda exercise. They are meant to create the
impression that there is a long term solution for disposing of thousands of tonnes
of toxic radioactive waste. There isn't."
FEARO's scoping schedule included a morning and an afternoon session in Montréal, on

November 16, 1990, at Le Nouvel Hotel. COSUN chose the afternoon session to make its
presentation to the Panel.
Without doubt, however, the best presentation made that day, was from the "Raging
Grannies," a group of elderly women appearing in outlandish costumes to sing songs and
read poems. Their humor evoked the only real laughter during an otherwise deadly afternoon
of presentations and discussions on a deadly subject. Their refreshing approach put the
whole questionable enterprise of permanent nuclear waste "disposal" into some human
perspective.
The Raging Grannies were not the only ones to use a little humor at scoping meetings.
Referring to AECL's "outhouse technology," the Concerned Citizens of Manitoba graphically
illustrated the basic concept on which AECL had spent ten years and three hundred million
dollars.
At the Winnipeg meeting, they displayed an eight-foot tall outhouse into which simulated
nuclear waste was unceremoniously deposited. As "the assistant" in full radioactive-protective
garb poured the waste down the hole a "scientist" with a pointer illustrated the following
main points;
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1.Put the waste in the hole.
2.Cover it up.
3.Walk away.
Not too surprisingly, the red simulation liquid then leaked out from under the "shaft!"
Alas, my own presentation to the Montréal meeting, for COSUN, was not only sober and
serious, but made worse by a mean attack of sinusitis.
After chiding the Panel about the EARP's narrow terms of reference, timing problems, etc., I
provided some background information about COSUN's remarkable effort to block the
Slowpoke reactor as well as its successful intervention (in an earlier incarnation) in the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear waste dump siting episode in northern Vermont.
On that point, I could hardly resist reminding Panel members that the Government of
Canada itself had then expressed grave misgivings about underground repositories situated in
watersheds draining into Canada .
I raised the question with the Panel:
"Did not the Government of Canada effectively reject the concept of underground
burial of high-level nuclear waste in Cambrian Shield rock, when, in 1986 it
successfully engaged in diplomatic efforts to prevent the U.S. Government from
characterizing and conducting research in Cambrian Shield rock in a number of
northern States? Has not our Government already said that it has no faith in such
an undertaking?"
Obviously, the Panel was not impressed with this argument, as it never responded to it. Nor
did the Panel ever respond to my contention that AECL's concept assessment lacked legal
legitimacy; that it was not sanctioned by any specific Act of the Canadian Parliament. It was
purely an administrative device. In the absence of legislation, AECL simply made up its own
rules, and changed them whenever it wished to do so.
I also made a strong point about AECL's institutional lack of credibility in light of growing
negative public opinion about the underground burial concept, as reflected in the Crown
corporation's own commissioned polls. This point, I believe, did seem to resonate with some
of the Panel members.
However, the most significant point I raised concerned the propriety of using the Federal
environmental review process to assess a so-called "concept" in the absence of an actual
physical site. My own research into official government documents underlying the Federal
process, revealed requirements that a Panel must hear from people affected by the proposal,
particularly those who live near ". . . the proposed site."
Since there was no "proposed site," how could the Panel hear from these "non-existent
people?"
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A year later, the Panel did write and release draft Guidelines for the EARP which attempted
to deal with the incredible ambiguities of conducting an environmental assessment of an idea
or a concept, in the absence of a site. Some of the language in the Guidelines made me think
of a wry slogan on a plaque which I have had for years. It reads: ESCHEW OBFUSCATION .
The Guidelines certainly left out the " ESCHEW " part!
During the early 1990s, I wrote several articles about the Canadian nuclear waste situation
for the Nevada-based Citizen Alert newsletter. In the Fall of 1991, in one of the articles,
referring to the "prose" in the Panel's draft EIS Guidelines, I aired the question:
"How do you write guidelines for an environmental impact statement, in the

absence of an actual physical environment? With great difficulty! For example,
bend your mind around this paragraph under the heading ' Impacts on the Natural
Environment. '
"The study strategy should use an ecological scoping process to incorporate a

conceptual outline of the project within an ecological setting, and should evaluate
the impacts of the Concept on the ecological habitats structure and function of
the receiving environment. This conceptualization must explore the linkages
between the Concept and ecosystem components through cause and effect
relationships. . . "
"Clear as mud, eh?""
Was there a legal question here? Did the Government have the legal right to embark on an
environmental assessment of this generic concept for the burial of nuclear waste? Were there
other legal issues in this EARP that should be explored? I decided to try to find out!
SUE 'EM? YOU'RE KIDDING!
In the early 1980's, CCM's attempts to stop AECL with legal maneuvering got nowhere.
Although Legal Aid Manitoba thought we might have a case over the use of the leased
Crown land, the Provincial Government's Attorney General clearly did not want to challenge
AECL's formidable power. CCM itself lacked the financial resources required for a credible
legal challenge of its own.
Some of the environmental groups began voicing the idea of a possible legal challenge to the
nuclear waste EARP as early as the Fall of 1989. Much of this initial sabre-rattling was part
of an angry reaction to the narrow scope of the inquiry established by the Federal Energy
Minister, Jake Epp.
My sour experience with legal approaches in Manitoba, should have taught me to emulate
the philosophy of the legendary Robert Hutchins, Chancellor of the University of Chicago,
during the 1940-50s. On the subject of physical exercise, Hutchins is alleged to have said
"Whenever the urge comes over me, I lie down until it passes."
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Perhaps it was my American background, where the ethic seems to be " sue 'em now, and talk
later " that motivated me, once again, to charge into the realm of the lawyers during the
Autumn of 1990. While ambulance-chasing is definitely not my hobby, I have always been
impressed with the results American activists and state governments have achieved using the
court system when dealing with the nuclear waste issue.
Finding friendly and interested lawyers was surprisingly easy, (much easier then finding
friendly geo-scientists!). There were already several lawyers associated with the Canadian
Environmental Network's Energy Caucus Nuclear Waste Group. Two of them, Peter
Weldon, of COSUN, and Lloyd Greenspoon, of the Algoma-Manitoulan Nuclear Awareness
Group (AMNA), were criminal lawyers. They were very valuable resources, and, while I
personally viewed the whole nuclear waste burial concept as a sort of a "crime," the need for
some specific administrative law background was evident.
Four such lawyers emerged in rapid succession. An Ottawa lawyer, Paul Shuttle, produced a
paper with an astounding array of possible legal strategies and bases for a challenge of the
EARP. Long time friend, John Henderson, an administrative lawyer, was quite interested in
the nuclear waste issue and spent some of his own time developing several very creative legal
arguments. David Poch, while up to his ears in a legal challenge to the Canadian nuclear
liability law, for Energy Probe, took time to critique some of the various legal strategies and
issues being advanced.
And, I discovered that Ian Lawson, of the Public Interest Advocacy Center (PIAC), in
Ottawa, was very interested in the legal aspects of the nuclear waste EARP. After some
internal discussions, PIAC agreed to take on COSUN as a client (at no cost to COSUN) and
to do some of the legal research.
My role became one of an ad hoc coordinator and information conduit between the various
lawyers. I did not always fully understand their legal jargon, but was delighted that these
lawyers were "on the case."
The lawyers entertained and discussed a host of possible legal issues, including some related
to the Canadian Charter of Rights.
The main legal point which initially emerged from the discussions was the propriety of using
the EARP for the nuclear waste concept, in the absence of a specific site.
COSUN's scoping presentation to the Panel had questioned the use of an environmental
assessment on a generic concept in the absence of a real environment, (i.e., a specific nuclear
waste dump site). We pointed out that the EARP guidelines and procedures clearly assumed
an actual physical environment.
In his May 23, 1991 letter, PIAC's Lawson wrote to COSUN, that
"If there is one complaint in common with most participants in the process so far
(and also with those groups currently boycotting the EARP), it is that there is no
site which is the subject of the review. This is an EARP of a concept, not a
proposal with identifiable and quantifiable environmental impacts."
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By July, 1991, after consultation with the other lawyers, Lawson had developed a detailed,
two-pronged legal strategy surrounding the issue of using the EARP for a concept. As the
discussions between the lawyers progressed, I became downright giddy at the thought of the
possibility of some judge telling the Government of Canada that AECL's proposal for an
environmental assessment lacked legality! In my view, there was no other way to stop this
ridiculous EARP.
Alas, it was not to be! History repeated itself. The case was not pursued. With few
exceptions, the larger organizations in the nuclear waste group rejected the idea. My old
friends at CCM endorsed it at a meeting in October, 1991 and even offered a few hundred
dollars to help cover court costs, etc.
In retrospect, I think there were two reasons for the reluctance to pursue the legal avenue:
In the first place , some of the environmentalists, including the Canadian Environmental Law
Association, were very uncomfortable with a challenge based on the conceptual nature of the
nuclear waste EARP. These groups wanted to deal with potential environmental problems as
early as possible, especially while they were in the proposal or planning stage. They were
concerned that a successful legal challenge of a concept-based assessment would set a bad
precedent.
Our lawyers thought that they could get around this problem by demonstrating that this
particular "concept," (like no other), was so inexorably dependent on the characteristics of a
particular site, that it could not be assessed in the absence of a site.
However, the biggest hurdle to the legal challenge was fear of the costs which might be
involved, as a "worst case scenario." As the lawyers began to calculate the possible court
costs, the estimates kept rising, up to one hundred thousand dollars. As well, if we lost the
case, the Court could require us to pay the "court costs" incurred by the Government.
I thought we might try to get some of the EARP intervener funding channeled into a court
challenge, but FEARO was alert to such "chutzpah." Their funding guidelines restricted the
use of lawyers to advisory roles only.
There was absolutely no point in COSUN, CCM and a few other small groups undertaking a
legal challenge of this importance and magnitude. Even if the money were available, a
commitment by most, if not all of the nuclear watchdog organizations in Canada, would be
essential to provide the needed credibility.
By 1994, the idea of a legal challenge had taken a back seat to involvement in the EARP
process itself. I put the idea on the back burner. My final attempt to persuade the nuclear
waste group to go the legal route took place at a meeting on January 28, 1996, sponsored by
the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout (CNP). Again, my initiative was inspired by more
rumblings from within the nuclear waste group about FEARO's handling of the EARP.
I presented a paper to the group which I prepared after consultation with my lawyer friend
from the Eastern Townships --- John Henderson. It contained some very ingenious strategies
including reference to recent environmental law precedents. We thought we could prove that
21 of 52 2/15/2007 2:09 PM
the Panel was not even following its own Guidelines.
Once again, I encountered considerable resistance, especially from the more influential
individuals and organizations within the nuclear waste group. One, to our great
astonishment, considering all the legal opinions and arguments gathered, even challenged the
idea on the grounds that "the Panel has not broken any laws"!
At that moment, I vowed I would not waste any more of my time and energy on the legal
approach to the nuclear waste issue; a decision I should have reached several years earlier.
The advent of the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout (CNP), which was officially launched on
April 19, 1990, provided an interesting sidelight to our ongoing efforts to deal with the
nuclear waste issue.
COSUN, as one of the Energy Caucus organizations, was invited to the initial CNP
organizing meeting, November 16-17, 1989. At that meeting, we learned that a private
foundation was interested in funding a campaign to phase-out nuclear energy. We also
learned that this same foundation had been involved in a successful, fifteen- year long
anti-smoking campaign, which culminated in Federal legislation (passage of a so-called
"private member's bill") on that issue.
The foundation was prepared to spend sixty thousand dollars for each year of the proposed
three-year phase-out campaign, which included the cost of a full-time coordinator.
It was never made clear to me why that foundation chose nuclear energy as an issue to
pursue. Considering the broad range of possible "causes" in need of funding in Canada, why
would anyone willingly invest large sums of money for the perverse pleasure of "beating their
heads against the nuclear wall"? "Talk about suffering, down below!" as the old hymn goes.
Unfortunately, COSUN's relationship with the CNP got off to a rocky start. Phyl and I
happily participated in the productive two-day brainstorming exercise which resulted in a
long list of possible action items. Many regional and local strategies were identified and
discussed. We naturally assumed that some of the foundation's money would be used to help
groups such as COSUN, pursue local and regional strategies, especially public education
efforts, some of which would be targeted at the ongoing nuclear waste EARP. We were very
unhappy when we discovered that this would not be the case.
It quickly became apparent that the foundation had its own, single-focused agenda: It was to
be an intensive lobbying effort to persuade members of Parliament to vote for a private
member's bill to phase out nuclear energy. CNP planned to use the resources and backing of
the Energy Caucus groups to meet the specific objective of running a campaign modeled
after the successful anti-smoking effort.
The CNP mission was underscored at its meeting on January 27-28, 1989, attended by
COSUN's Peter Weldon, at which point the foundation representative expressed, in no
uncertain terms, that money could not be diverted from the private member's bill campaign,
to fight regional battles. Regional efforts would have to mesh with the campaign objectives
in order to be funded.
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Though very disappointed by these developments, COSUN still decided to support the CNP
effort, by serving on its steering committee, helping with its lobbying efforts, endorsing press
releases and assisting in the development of educational materials.
My own personal opinion was that CNP was really barking up the wrong tree with its
single-minded legislative lobbying effort. My experiences (in Manitoba and Québec), had
convinced me that strong initiatives at the local and regional levels were the essential
ingredients for change. The two, large federal political parties of the day were
overwhelmingly pro-nuclear, and the smaller New Democratic Party, was "schizophrenic" on
nuclear issues. Spending a lot of time, energy and money on passage of a private member's
bill, was, in my view, counterproductive. However, it wasn't my money!
On November 20, 1991, the CNP sponsored private member's bill to phase out nuclear
energy in Canada (Bill C-204)was defeated in the House of Commons with 65 in favor and
113 opposed.
After one more aborted private member's bill initiative, CNP decided to change its strategy
and assume a much more flexible and productive coordination role in the matrix of
organizations and individuals confronting the nuclear establishment. It continued to develop
excellent educational materials, widened its lobbying and public relations skills, and, began
to use information technology to track and deal with nuclear issues world-wide. As well,
CNP became directly involved in the increasingly contentious nuclear waste environmental
assessment review process.
During 1994, the CNP was monitoring several U.S. nuclear waste issues which had
significant implications for Canada. When I was invited to a nuclear waste activists' meeting
in Washington, D.C., on November 13 th and 14 th , I coordinated my efforts closely with the
CNP co-ordinator.
I was really looking forward to a visit to my old home town again. A new perspective on the
nuclear waste issue was long overdue. Phyl and I were on our way to another networking
foray into "the old country."
HOMECOMING
Four days of driving, much of it through interstate highway construction, to attend a

two-day meeting, is a grind that perhaps only the retired can afford to enjoy. But, the
November, 1994 trip to Washington turned out to be well worth our time, energy and
money.
We stayed with our old friends, Alex and Jayne Greene at their beautiful, historic home in
Rockville, Maryland. Visiting with them was a real bonus of the trip. We also found time for
a visit with my brother Paul, who lives in nearby Silver Spring, Maryland. I knew I had been
away from the Washington area for a long time when I succeeded in getting us lost trying to
take a short cut from downtown Washington, to Paul's house!
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The nuclear waste activists' meeting was held at a large downtown Washington church on
Sunday and Monday, November 13 th and 14 th, 1994. Although we drove down to the
meeting on Sunday, we decided not to fight the D.C. traffic on Monday morning. Happily,
the Greenes' place was in walking distance of a Washington Metro station.
Riding the Metro that Monday morning was a great experience for me. It moved quietly and
swiftly from Rockville, to Silver Spring and into the downtown Washington area in about
twenty minutes. This was a far cry from my 1960s' pre-Metro, forty-five minute long,
bumper-to-bumper car commute to work. That the Metro was not built sooner, was a
reflection of how formerly disenfranchised Washingtonians tried but failed to convince the
"absentee landlord" Congressmen on the House of Representatives' District of Columbia
Committee to undertake such projects.
The meeting was organized by several key nuclear watchdog groups, including
Washington-based Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), and Minnesota's
Prairie Island Coalition. Organizations from all over the US were represented. Phyl and I
knew some of the US attendees as a result of our years of networking on the nuclear waste
issue. It was good to see them again.
The sense of urgency in the air was understandable when it became clear that the US Senate
was actively considering passage of legislation, Bill S.167, proposed by several pro-nuclear
hawks, which would establish an interim, above ground, high-level nuclear waste monitored
retrievable storage (MRS) site in the State of Nevada. The waste would be placed in close
proximity to the potential underground repository site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, even
though that site was highly controversial, and might never be developed.
The focus of the meeting was on the potential dangers of transportation of the nuclear waste
from all over the US to the MRS site in Nevada. If the Bill passed and was signed into law,
the waste would travel continuously, by rail and road through forty-three states over a thirty
year time period.
National, regional and local campaigns were planned in an attempt to defeat Bill S.167.
Much preliminary work had already been done, including the preparation of detailed maps
showing the exact transportation routes and the number of waste containers to be shipped
through each state.
Phyl and I were very pleased when most of the group took a strong position opposing any
transportation of nuclear waste into, within or from the US to other countries, including
Canada. The Canadian connection was not a totally academic issue at this point in time.
Two other people from Canada were present at the meeting. Stephanie Sydiaha of
Saskatchewan's Interchurch Uranium Council (ICUC) and Judy Bird of Prince Albert,
Saskatchewan. Both were very concerned about another potential cross-border nuclear waste
issue, this time involving aboriginal groups both in the US and Canada.
The US part of the issue became public in 1994 when the Northern States Power (NSP)
Company announced that the Mescalero Apache tribe in New Mexico was interested in
taking the utility's spent nuclear fuel (for a fee, of course!). The Mescalero reserve was to
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develop an above-ground, monitored retrieval storage (MRS) site and hold the waste until a
permanent repository (e.g., Yucca Mountain, Nevada) was available. NSP was leading a
group of thirty US electric utilities which were interested in contracting with the Mescalero
for what some called a "rental locker" operation for high-level radioactive waste.
Some members of the Mescalero group, along with the Governor of New Mexico and the
state's congressional delegation, spoke out strongly against the plan. Throughout the debate,
charges of environmental racism were raised. NSP's opponents declared that, once again,
land belonging to people of color, was considered to be a suitable dumping ground.
One of the organizers of the opposition to the plan, Rufina Laws of the Mescalero Apache
reservation was a participant in the Washington meeting.
The US Government-sponsored effort to "bribe" some aboriginal group to establish a

temporary dump had failed miserably. Apart from the Mescalero, only one other aboriginal
group entertained the idea of such a facility: the Goshutes in Western Utah.
Unlike the Mescalero, the Goshutes decided not to negotiate directly with the utilities but
only with the US Government. But the US Government office which searched for such a
facility was in the process of being abolished.
Canada entered into these machinations, when the Meadow Lake Tribal Council, near
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, decided it was interested in becoming the custodian of
high-level nuclear waste. However, that Council had a far more ambitious plan in mind than
a temporary holding site.
It wanted nothing less than to host a permanent Canadian underground nuclear waste
repository, which, when completed, would accommodate the entire inventory of Canadian
and US commercial radioactive waste. The Mescalero and the US utilities could then ship all
the waste to Canada when the repository was completed(!).
As some of the members of the Canadian Energy Caucus had discovered, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could be interpreted to permit such a venture, in
that it
". . . prevents limiting or prohibiting the importation [of] spent (irradiated) fuel
elements of nuclear reactors" from the US and other countries .
--- Chapter Nine, Article 901.2c and Article 902.3a.
According to the aboriginal representatives at the Washington meeting, Mescalero and

Meadow Lake Tribal Council members had engaged in discussions about this scheme. I was
also told that Meadow Lake Council members, who had already discussed the idea with
AECL officials at the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment at Pinawa, realized that
the Canadian part of the deal would depend on the outcome of the ongoing nuclear waste
EARP.
Although the viability of this bizarre plan looked quite plausible for a while, it became clear
over the next several months that the position of the two tribal councils did not represent
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the sentiments of many of their constituents. Ultimately, the aboriginal activists, who had
worked hard within their communities, as well as networking with each other, prevailed.
Both initiatives died out. But, based on my own experiences with this issue, and the conflicts
that it causes within a community, it will take a long time for the scars to heal.
The Mescalero - Meadow Lake connection was not the only cross-border issue to occupy our
time at the meeting. Several people told us that they had heard about a scheme to export
weapons grade plutonium to Canada to use as fuel in CANDU reactors. This was an option
the US was exploring with Russia, to reduce the inventories of the weapons plutonium
declared "surplus" by the two countries now that the cold war was over.
Our attention had been brought to this when a Globe and Mail story on the issue appeared
on July 8, 1994. As the start of a protest campaign in Canada the Campaign for Nuclear
Phaseout (CNP) had coordinated a "sign-on" letter, delivered July 15, to Prime Minister Jean
Chretien objecting to the import of plutonium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel into Canada. [ MOX
fuel is a mixture of weapons-grade plutonium and natural or depleted uranium .]
Chretien's response to the CNP letter, in November 1994, was another classic example of
the kind of deception I have come to expect from our federal government on nuclear related
issues. He wrote that
". . . it is premature at this stage to suggest how Canada will deal with this (MOX)
matter."
"Premature"? "How to deal with"? According to the people I spoke with in Washington,
AECL officials had been holding meetings at the Canadian Embassy to promote the idea of
using MOX fuel in CANDU reactors! I verified that AECL had been actively lobbying the
US Government, with a Congressman's assistant who had actually attended such a meeting.
[We have been mislead by our top politicians and technocrats so many times about the
realities and the status of government initiatives on nuclear projects. How I remember those
days in early 1980 when we were told that the nuclear waste research project in Manitoba
was "only in the planning stage," while, at the very same time, the bulldozers were going
about their work digging the hole for the Underground Research Laboratory (URL) .]
As to the potential negative consequences associated with the import and use of
MOX-plutonium fuel in Canada --- an entire book could be written. Many of the problems
were stated in submissions made to the US Department of Energy (DOE) by concerned
Canadians in response to its 1997 "predecisional" environmental assessment of the project,
known as" Parallex ."
The assessment, confined to environmental concerns in the US, was for a proposed "test
burn" of MOX fuel in an experimental reactor at AECL's Chalk River, Ontario nuclear
research facility. Presumably, if the test was deemed "successful," Canada would then see
major shipments of MOX on its highways over a very long period of time.
DOE received more than twenty responses to its assessment document from Canadian
sources. The principal message was "we don't want the plutonium in Canada!" Many of the
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responses deplored the fact that the Government of Canada had not conducted a similar
assessment dealing with the potential environmental consequences of MOX fuel shipments
once they crossed the border. Many also pointed out that MOX fuel produces nearly as
much plutonium as would be "burned up" in a CANDU reactor.
Judging by all the negative consequences identified by the reviewers of the DOE
environmental assessment report, the MOX route is not a particularly great way to rid the
world of weapons plutonium.
My own response to the DOE report covered a multitude of concerns. I was particularly
incensed by the provision that
"All spent fuel resulting from the tests would be disposed of in Canada under the
Canadian spent fuel program."
By August, 1998, the plan to ship some MOX fuel to Chalk River, was still in the works, but
for a variety of reasons, had not yet been implemented. Many US and Canadian
environmental groups continued their opposition to the MOX plan. [ I especially enjoyed the
"NIX MOX" slogan used by the US groups to describe their anti-MOX campaign .]
All the depressing discussions at the 1994 Washington meeting, about aboriginal
involvement in nuclear waste dumps, and possible plutonium shipments to Canada, drove us
to take an extra long lunch hour at the Monday session.
It was a beautiful day, so I suggested that we clear our heads by taking a walk down
Connecticut Avenue to Pennsylvania Avenue, and pay a quick visit to our alma mater,
George Washington University (GWU). Some forty four years earlier, we had first met each
other there, and had not visited it for most of those years.
Many of the old buildings we knew had disappeared! When we tried to purchase some
alumni sweat shirts at the "new" GW book store, we could not find any with the names of
the University departments we had attended! All the names had changed. Indeed, "you can't
go back, again." But, it was a fun excursion, and a good break from nuclear waste
discussions.
On our drive back to Quebéc, Phyl and I discussed the meeting and its significance to
Canada. In view of the aboriginal and MOX plutonium issues, I hoped to persuade our
Energy Caucus and CNP friends to "hitch-hike" on to the US strategy with its intensive, and
multi-faceted transportation campaign. Alas, although the ideas were discussed, the
suggestion was not adopted. But I suspect, that some day, it will be a high-priority item if
and when the specter of large-scale nuclear waste shipments from other countries becomes a
reality.
The remarkable US activist campaign which emerged from the Washington meeting was
successful, as Bill S.167 (dubbed "mobile Chernobyl") was defeated in the US Congress.
Over the ensuing years, further attempts to push through similar legislation have also failed,
with the help of effective lobbying efforts on the part of the activist groups.
There is little question but that the efforts of the US activists have had a significant impact
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on the nuclear establishment's inability to get the waste "out of site and out of mind."
But the US Department of Energy does not give up easily. It is still trying to determine if
the Yucca Mountain, Nevada site itself is suitable as a permanent underground repository
for high-level radioactive waste. It had originally planned to have such a facility for the
waste operating by 1988. After all these years and two billion dollars later, that facility, if it
is found suitable, is not expected to receive a nuclear waste shipment before the year 2010.
Over the years since it was selected as the primary candidate site for a US repository, Yucca
Mountain has evoked no end of controversy over potential technical problems. For example,
scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico hotly debated a theory that
the nuclear waste in the repository might erupt in an explosion, scattering radioactivity into
the wind and water.
Several DOE geologists cited earthquake potential as another major source of concern. But
the technical issue that really caught my attention was that of water intrusion.
The October 15, 1994 issue of the Las Vegas Sun , reported that
" . . .(the) test discovers liquid seepage at Yucca site . . . Radioactive water from
past nuclear testing has penetrated to layers below the proposed storage site.
Scientists studying Yucca Mountain as a place to store the nation's high-level
nuclear waste have found evidence that surface water from the days of
atmospheric nuclear testing probably seeped to layers beneath the proposed
repository site, a Department of Energy spokesman said Friday."
The DOE spokesman, Greg Cook was reported as saying
". . . the finding is 'obviously of concern to us' because ground water intrusion
within of the repository would make it more difficult to contain for 10,000 years
the 77,000 tons of spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors that the
government wants to entomb there."
The account continued by quoting Carl Johnson, a geologist for the State of Nevada Nuclear
Projects Agency, which monitors the federal Yucca Mountain studies, that
". . . the finding means 'at least one very fast pathway' exists for ground water to
move from the surface to below the repository site."
Johnson said that
". . . samples collected from a bore hole on the southeast side of the repository
site, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, contained tritium and chlorine-36
isotopes, residuals from nuclear weapons testing. That means the water seeped
from the surface to a depth of 1,450 feet within the 49 years since the first US
nuclear weapons test was conducted in New Mexico and probably since nuclear
testing began in Nevada in 1951."
DOE's Cook said that
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"Water moving through the mountain is of particular concern because scientists

fear if waste canisters are put in the mountain and water contacts them, they
could corrode, increasing the risk of releasing radioactive materials into the
environment."
Water, water, everywhere! Even in the arid Nevada desert! But if water is a problem in the
tuft rock formation of Yucca Mountain, than what of Canada's granite rock?
There was no shortage of water at the underground test facility (URL) at Lac du Bonnet,
Manitoba when I visited the place, in its early stage of development. It was a dank and wet
hole from which water was continuously being pumped to the surface.
During the 1986 Nuclear Waste Issues Conference in Winnipeg, physicist Marvin Resnikoff
put the water issue into perspective during his talk, The Earth Does Not Stand Still . He
explained how the hairline cracks of only 1/1000 inch, (0.00025 cm) , spaced three meters
apart in a granite repository could permit a backfilled excavation to become filled with water
in forty years.
It seems that the "witches' brew" as Resnikoff called it, could, under various circumstances,
find its way to the surface through these microscopic fractures in only a fraction of the time
required for repository integrity .
Water was also a topic mentioned by Walter Patterson, when he spoke at the same
conference. Patterson, a native Winnipegger trained in nuclear physics and residing in the
UK, was involved with many aspects of nuclear technology for decades. He visited the Lac
du Bonnet URL underground facility in 1985, as an advisor to a Select Environmental
Committee of the British Parliament. After the visit, the Parliamentarians asked his opinion
of the operation. Patterson told the conferees, that for the first time on the entire Canadian
trip,
"I had to say I had not the faintest idea. I do not know why they are doing what
they are doing: because if this is supposed to be research for an underground
repository for final disposal of spent fuel, everybody in the business knows that
the one thing you have to avoid is water -- and the place is soaking! Absolutely
soaking! Up to here (gesturing) in water!"
Nearly a decade after Resnikoff and Patterson gave their talks at the Winnipeg conference,
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Panel was trying to come to grips with one of the
principle questions that it was supposed to answer: Just what might be the environmental
impacts of the AECL underground nuclear waste burial concept?
EIS
In 1988 Federal Energy Minister Marcel Masse trumpeted that the nuclear waste
environmental assessment review process (EARP) was ". . . one of the most important
environmental assessments" (ever)! But, who in Canada knew that during most of the
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1990s?
In our nation's newspapers, as with the rest of the Canadian media, it wasn't exactly a front
page story --- nor even a back-page one.
Sadly, but predictably, the EARP failed to achieve what should have been one of its most
important objectives; that is, significant public awareness and participation.
Periodically, a government press release or a notice of public hearings would get a few lines
of print in the newspapers. There were very few editorials on the subject. From time to time,
FEARO issued an update, a newsletter or a calendar of coming events, and meetings.
Some major environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, had abandoned the EARP in its
early stages, roundly condemning it for a variety of reasons. Other environmental and social
concerns groups, many of which were always on the verge of boycotting the process,
continued to "hang in" in faint hopes of making some impact on the crucial decisions to
come.
Throughout the lifetime of the EARP, the Energy Caucus' Nuclear Waste Group, continued
to network via computer, telephone conference calls, and periodic meetings. Some of the
meetings were linked to the annual conferences of the Canadian Environmental Network
(CEN), or to the regular meetings of the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout (CNP).
These gatherings usually produced many ideas, but few results. The fundamentally flawed
EARP process lumbered on, unscathed. As expected, efforts to persuade Federal and
provincial politicians to consider changes in the EARP had little to no impact.
Of course, the EARP was only one item on the platter of the various environmental and
social action groups. Most were swamped with other issues. This was especially true of those
Ontario-based groups involved in a major provincial review of energy policy.
My old CCM cohorts in Manitoba were working overtime to expand their watchdog role to
encompass many of the activities of AECL's Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment
(WNRE) at Pinawa. Two of the issues under scrutiny were
the two-megawatt Slowpoke reactor there, (still not operating up to capacity, and fated
never to do so), and
spills of radioactive coolant into the Winnipeg River.
On the other hand, not much was going on in the Eastern Townships of Québec. By the
mid-1990s, COSUN's membership had dwindled to a handful. After regular meetings were
suspended, I maintained phone contact with the dozen or so key people who were still
interested in discussing nuclear energy and waste related matters. Phyl and I also attended
the regular meetings of the Lennoxville, Québec- based group, Citizens for Social
Responsibility (CSR). But, as the Québec political separation issue heated up yet again, the
energies for social action seemed to dwindle.
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In March, 1997, Phyl and I moved again, this time from Québec to Kingston, Ontario. The
moving company charged us for twelve thousand pounds of household goods. That was more
than two thousand pounds more than the weight of the shipment nine years earlier when we
moved from Winnipeg to Québec .
This increase came in spite of the fact that we had acquired very little while in Québec , and
had divested ourselves of thousands of pounds of "stuff," including an aging twelve
horsepower John Deere tractor complete with tiller, snow thrower and mower attachments.
We concluded that there could be only one reason for the additional weight:
It must have been all of AECL's supplementary "reference documents," which were part of its
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that were responsible for our increased weight load!
To move the boxes in which these documents were packed was to challenge the abilities of a
professional weight lifter. The "bright side" was that it was only books being transported ---
not large shipments of nuclear waste --- down the TransCanada highway. At least, not yet.
The Panel had asked AECL to provide much detailed information about the underground
concept as well as possible impacts on the environment. One requirement that particularly
caught my attention was for "A description of and comparison with, alternatives to the
concept." (emphasis added)
I planned to look at that one very carefully. Another intriguing question for me was how
AECL would handle the social impacts of its concept in the absence of a specific site.
AECL's weighty EIS and reference documents covered the following subjects:
1. Public Involvement and Social Aspects
2. Site Screening and Site Evaluation Technology
3. Engineered Barriers Alternatives
4. Engineering for a Disposal Facility
5. Preclosure Assessment of a Conceptual System
6. Postclosure Assessment of a Reference System
7. The Vault Model for Postclosure Assessment
8. The Geosphere Model for Postclosure Assessment
9. The Biosphere Model, BIOTRAC, for Postclosure Assessment
In its basic EIS document, AECL asked the Panel to endorse its concept, including its
technical and safety requirements and to accept its four basic recommendations:
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. . . that the strategy for long-term management of Canada's nuclear fuel waste be based
on the concept of disposal in plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield."
. . . that those who have responsibility for the safe management of used fuel -the federal
government and the owners of the fuel - also have responsibility for implementing the
disposal concept. In addition to addressing their requirements, the plan for
implementation should address the requirements of any provincial government that
could be affected by implementation and those resulting from the present
environmental review.
. . . that those responsible for implementing the disposal concept be committed to the
principles of safety and environmental protection, voluntarism, shared decision making,
openness, and fairness (sic!)
. . . that Canada progress toward disposal of its nuclear fuel waste by undertaking the
first stage of concept implementation - siting.
In the light of all the behind the scenes maneuvering which we knew had gone on since
1980, between and among the AECL and various government agencies, including local
governments, the prose about
(the need for) ". . .shared decision making, openness, and fairness"
reeked with hypocrisy!
FEARO sent out a notice (as part of its widespread media communications to the public)
setting a deadline of August 8, 1995 for responses to AECL's EIS.
During the fall of 1994, relying heavily on use of the web computer network, Nuclear Waste
Group members shared information on what aspects of the EIS each would review. The
topics covered a broad range including the legal aspects, implications of the Meadow Lake
involvement, internal inconsistencies in AECL's concept assessment program, scientific
review of computer models, social and ethical aspects, uncertainties and risk methodology,
aboriginal concerns, and transportation issues.
My initial review of the AECL EIS material revealed many weaknesses. After touching base
with my COSUN colleagues, I drafted for their review, a submission based around three
specific areas of the Panel's Guideline.
My first point was that the Panel's requirement for a "detailed, unambiguous and clear"
concept assessment, was not met. AECL had made frequent references to the need for
"site-specificity" in order to provide conclusive determinations and evidence. I used verbatim
quotes of several of these kinds of statements.
For me, this aspect of AECL's EIS simply confirmed what I, and many others, had thought;
that this concept could not be considered to have been fully assessed without a complete
site-specific analysis. My conviction was strengthened that a legal challenge of the
environmental assessment on this point could have succeeded, had it been launched on a
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timely basis. But that was now water over the dam.
Secondly, I made the point that AECL did not meet the Panel's Guideline requirement to
address "potential negative impacts and uncertainties" related to the burial concept. Instead,
the tone and content of the EIS was one of unbridled optimism; little more than a lengthy
public relations pitch!
AECL did provide us with a good hearty laugh on page 200 of the EIS, which states that
"One way to protect a disposal vault following closure would be to establish a park
or wildlife preserve on the site. Thus the use of the land would be controlled as
specified in the applicable legislation, such as the National Parks Act or the
Canada Wildlife Act."
I could hardly contain myself when I wrote
"Where was the Canada Wildlife Act five hundred years ago and how will it be
enforced five hundred or ten thousand years hence?"
The last main item in my paper was that the Panel requirement for
"'. . . a significant analysis of alternatives in sufficient detail to permit a

meaningful comparison with the burial concept. . .' was not at all met."
In three hundred forty-four pages of text, the EIS document devoted only fourteen pages to
the subject of alternatives, essentially rehashing the same material and arguments made by
AECL some fifteen years earlier. Worse yet, the EIS included AECL's concern that the public
might go so far as to want to wait for technological advances, which could delay
implementation of the underground concept.
The statement on page seventy-eight of the EIS, that
". . . we believe that waiting for advances in technology is not a legitimate reason
for delay"
speaks volumes about how AECL had become blinded by its own vested interests.
I concluded the COSUN presentation with four recommendations, mimicking the

bureaucratic language used by AECL in its recommendations:
Any strategy for long-term management of Canada's nuclear fuel waste not be based on
the concept of "disposal" in plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield, as requested by
AECL.
Those who have responsibility for the safe management of used fuel - the Federal
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Government and the owners of the used fuel, in consultation with the public,
undertake a comprehensive examination of alternatives to underground isolation, with
special emphasis on above-ground, long-term, on-site dry storage, coupled with
accelerator-driven transmutation technology.
As a result of such an examination, the Government of Canada provide a clear

legislative mandate for the development and implementation of a nuclear waste
management policy and program based on appropriate alternatives to the AECL
proposal.
To avoid a recurrence of the restrictive narrowness of this particular Environmental

Assessment Review Process (EARP) in the future, as an essential component of the
review and legislative initiative recommended above, environmental assessments must
encompass the full range of issues and environmental consequences associated with the
production , as well as management of nuclear fuel waste.
Reactions to AECL's EIS were generally predictable. Social and environmental groups,
especially those in the Energy Caucus' Nuclear Waste Group, identified many deficiencies,
while most industry and scientific organizations praised the documents.
Compendium
However, I did find a few real and startling surprises in the Panel's two volume
of Comments Received on the Adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement on Nuclear
Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept. The staff of the regulatory body, the
Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), concluded that
". . . the EIS, by itself, does not adequately demonstrate the case for deep
geological disposal for nuclear fuel waste."
Also, Environment Canada's submission stated that it
". . . cannot support the EIS in its present form, nor the implementation of the
disposal concept based on the documentation in the EIS."
In general, however, "establishment" organizations which did raise technical questions about
the viability of the AECL concept, continued to be very friendly toward the idea of
underground "disposal" of high-level nuclear waste. For them, site specific studies were the
essential next step in probing some of the unanswered questions in the EIS.
The Panel did not "trash" the EIS, as COSUN and many environmental groups had urged. It
did, however, request additional information from AECL to try to get answers to some
outstanding questions, especially those related to the assessment of long-term safety of the
burial concept. The Panel's own Scientific Review Group (SRG) had raised such questions in
its response to the EIS.
AECL supplied the requested additional information in May, 1996, with a somewhat
defensive air. On page vi of its response, AECL stated that
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". . . reviewers expected information beyond what could or should be provided at a

concept assessment stage."
Their message seemed to be, "Hey, after all folks, it's only a concept!"
For once, AECL found it necessary to fall back on the inherent limitations of its burial
"concept," the virtues of which it had touted for so many years.
The Panel scheduled the first phase of its public hearings (on social issues) over a three
month period starting in March, 1996. I made the presentation in behalf of COSUN, at the
March 28 session held in the North York section of Toronto. The subject was the
transportation of nuclear waste.
I started my presentation with a quote from the March 12 th , 1996 editorial in the Globe
and Mail , which pointed out that:
"AECL has spent 24 years and a half-billion dollars answering questions about the
permanence and security of various burial techniques for nuclear waste. . . but
have they been asking the right questions?. . . With so much invested, it is easy to
lose perspective."
My presentation took the same position on transportation which most of the nuclear waste
activists had adopted at the 1994 meeting in Washington, DC:
Nuclear waste should not be transported!
I quoted from a statement made by Bill Magavern, Director of the U.S. Critical Mass Energy
Project, to the U.S. Senate in March, 1995:
"Transporting nuclear materials poses significant risks to populations along the

route. With an increased number of shipments, the likelihood of a serious
accident involving a cask of irradiated fuel waste increases. Adequate steps have
not been taken to ensure cask integrity in the event of such a mishap.
"Cask safety standards fail to incorporate the full range of trauma to which a
container may be exposed in an accident. For example, temperature tolerance
standards are lower than the temperatures that a cask might experience in a fire
that results from an accident. Furthermore, regulations do not even require that
testing be performed on full-scale models to ensure that the containers meet
regulatory standards. Even accident-free transport causes radiation exposures
along routes, as casks are unable to fully contain radiation."
I seized the opportunity to confront the Panel on the issue of advanced physics research
(barely referenced in AECL's EIS, although information was then, and is now available) into
Accelerator Transmutation of Nuclear Waste (ATW). The risks associated with "permanent"
underground burial, coupled with thirty years of non-stop transportation of nuclear waste,
might conceivably be avoided by encouraging the development of promising new ATW
technology.
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The premise of ATW is that protons, propelled by very high-energy accelerators would target
the waste, producing neutrons which, through nuclear fission would convert most radioactive
substances into ordinary, non-radioactive ones.
I requested that the Panel invite ATW scientists to make a presentation during the hearings.
Phyl and I attended the sessions the following day, March 29, 1996, on "Implementing and
Management Agency." Why, I wondered, would the Panel devote time to the subject of
"implementing and managing" the AECL underground burial concept, when its
environmental impact has yet to be assessed?
The underlying assumption seemed to be that, sooner or later the AECL concept would be
approved, so we might as well get on with discussing its implementation. An indication of
the Panel's bias?
Ontario Hydro made a long presentation, complete with audio-visuals, extolling its
qualifications to become the lead organization to implement a site selection program. Here
was an organization which could hardly cope with all the technical problems it was
experiencing with its nuclear reactors. It would not be long before the Provincial utility
would be roundly criticized for mismanagement of its nuclear program.
My guess was that Ontario Hydro viewed the nuclear waste burial business as one way to
deal with its growing debt burden.
On April 15, 1996 the Panel announced the dates, locations and topics for Phase II of the
hearings. These were to be technical (scientific and engineering) sessions on the long-term
safety of AECL's concept. The sessions would begin on June 10, 1996.
Exercising admirable restraint, I opted out of Phase II.
When doing so, I recalled the words of Moe Sheppard of the Atikokan (Ontario) Citizens
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, during his speech at the Concerned Citizen's
Committee public meeting on May 2, 1980 at the Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba, secondary
school:
"The important thing to remember in that (nuclear waste) fight, I believe, is to

demand the right to say yes or no. All other arguments associated with technical
expertise, economics, etc., are totally irrelevant. We should not be drawn into
such arguments."
I also opted out of the Phase III "community" hearings scheduled from January through
March of 1997. COSUN was, for all practical purposes, history. The process itself seemed
almost farcical. And, at that point, Phyl and I were involved in preparations for our move
from Québec to Ontario.
By early 1997, the seemingly never ending nuclear waste environmental assessment was
drawing to a close, this ". . .(most) important environmental assessment. . ." still largely
unpublicized and unknown by the vast majority of the Canadian people.
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SHAFTED?
The nuclear waste FEARO Panel allowed participants to submit written closing statements
until April 18, 1997. Amidst the chaos of our approaching move to Kingston, I prepared
one, but missed the deadline by five days. My statement was returned to me by the FEARO
staff. I wrote to the Chairman, asking for an exception to the deadline in view of my move.
The essence of his response was - No Dice!
In my statement, harking back to events during the 80's, I made the point again that
". . .the public does not accept the underground burial idea." Additionally, I
emphasized the importance of exploring alternatives to the AECL waste burial
concept.
The Panel did not respond to my suggestion of March 28, 1996, that it invite ATW
(Accelerator T ransmutation of Nuclear Waste) experts to testify at the hearings. On June 12,
I wrote to the Panel once again about the need to investigate ATW technology. In his July
16, 1996 reply, the Panel Chairman stated that
". . . our mandate suggests that we be aware of other approaches for the
management of nuclear wastes rather than assess other methods of managing
them."
I wondered just how aware they really were.
He also dismissed my complaint that ATW received only three brief bibliographic references
(on pages 322 and 323) of the EIS, and that the technology was certainly not discussed
". . . at a level of detail sufficient to permit a meaningful comparison with the

(AECL) concept," as required by the Panel's own Guidelines . The Chairman
considered that the few references were sufficient and ". . .are available for
consultation if one needs further details to assess the information in the EIS."
My interest in the general topic of transmutation began in the early '80s, when I read
AECL's off-handed, one sentence rejection of it in its October, 1978 document, Management
of Radioactive Fuel Wastes-the Canadian Disposal Program :
" . . . However, the application of transmutation as a disposal method would

require the development of new high efficiency separation processes and special
irradiation facilities."
Why was AECL so anxious to dismiss transmutation? No explanation was given as to why
that would be a less acceptable option than the development of all the new paraphernalia
required for another unproven technology; the permanent, virtually forever, storage of the
waste in holes poked into vast underground granite rocks.
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The notion of disposing of nuclear waste by rendering it inert, through chemical, heat,
biological or other methods, had been considered by some West German scientists in the
1970s, but was rejected by the nuclear establishment and their own government as being too
costly, and too difficult to do.
Some light was shed on the subject as it pertained to Canada, in a June 1977 article in
Science Forum by science writer Jeff Carruthers. He pointed out that part of the problem
rests with the Canadian nuclear establishment's dilemma over the lack of a government
decision on the use of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. Plutonium recycling was
(and is) considered a real possibility, and the original idea was to build temporary
above-ground mausoleums in order to buy time on the government's reprocessing decision.
In the late 70s, Canada joined with other countries in opting for the permanent
underground "disposal" option, but, the Canadian nuclear establishment continued to hope
for a future reprocessing decision.
Of course, reprocessing and permanent underground storage go "hand in glove." Leftovers,

after reprocessing for plutonium extraction, would wind up in the "solid rock" of the
Canadian Shield. Present Government of Canada policy bans reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel. But, the operation of free trade provisions, and changes in world market prices for
uranium ore may alter that policy.
AECL, in its First Interim Concept Assessment Feedback Report, April, 1986, stated
". . . that no firm decision on reprocessing will be taken until after the year 2000
and the decision will depend on the uranium supply situation as well as the
economics of recycling that prevail at that time."
In his Science Forum article, Carruthers stated that some German scientists believed that the
best possible solution to nuclear waste was to
". . . 'burn' the minor actinides and other long-lasting nuclear wastes by using a
special nuclear reactor. Initial calculations suggest that ten to twenty years in a
fast-breeder type reactor would work, with no energy loss since the wastes would
provide energy themselves."
Carruthers pointed out that there would be many technical problems relating to separation
of the waste products. He concluded his article by pointing out that if transmutation proved
to be successful, it could put to rest the big waste bugaboo of the nuclear industry. The
public might then be more amenable to nuclear energy.
"What they seem to be ignoring is the possibility that a failure to resolve the
waste disposal problem could make nuclear power not just uncompetitive but
unacceptable, in the public's eye," he wrote.
It doesn't take a genius to figure out that the single most powerful reason for the rejection of
the transmutation option , in any form, is the fact that many in the nuclear establishment
consider the spent fuel itself a valuable substance to be used for future recycling. The last
thing that many pro-nuclear advocates want to do is to destroy the substances which could
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become the lifeblood of a newly-reborn nuclear industry.
However, some of the more enlightened nuclear scientists have recently realized that
transmuting the waste to reduce its longevity and potency must take priority over nuclear
energy production.
For me, the dirty and dangerous business of using fast breeder reactors and reprocessing, is a
totally unacceptable way to produce energy or to transmute spent nuclear fuel. But for years,
I have wondered whether a reasonably safe and relatively benign transmutation process
could someday be developed.
Those who dismiss such an idea as impossible, impractical, and a "never-never land" proposal
seem not to have learned much from the history of scientific developments. Science does not
stand still. Few of us nowadays think that the Earth is flat. And, primitive "outhouse"
technologies, such as AECL's underground burial concept, will surely be quickly eclipsed by
more sophisticated physics based methodologies.
Not terribly long ago, some scientists were convinced that smashing or controlling the atom
was too complex a problem and would never happen!
Christopher Cerf and Victor Navosky, in their book, The Experts Speak, The Definitive
Compendium of Authoritative Misinformation , provide us with some marvelous quotations.
For example:
"There is no likelihood man can ever tap the power of the atom . . . Nature has
introduced a few foolproof devices into the great majority of elements that
constitute the bulk of the world, and they have no energy to give up in the
process of disintegration."
---1923 Physics Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Robert A Millikan
"There is not the slightest indication that (nuclear) energy will ever be obtainable.
It would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will."
--- Albert Einstein, 1932.
These eminent scientists' "learned" statements from a pre-atomic age now appear quaint, to
say the least. But the present-day question remains:
Could the stockpiles of high-level nuclear waste be "tamed" and, perhaps eventually,
rendered inert?
A 1998 paper on the subject, Disposition of Nuclear Waste Using Subcritical

Accelerator-Driven Systems: Technology Choices and Implementation , by Francesco
Venneri, Ning Li, Mark Williamson, Michael Houts, and George Lawrence, of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, suggests that significant progress is being made in ATW
research.
The paper states that
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"The goal of the ATW nuclear subsystem is to produce a three orders of

magnitude reduction in the long-term radiotoxicity of the waste sent to a
repository, including losses through processing. If the goal is met, the
radiotoxicity of ATW-treated waste after 300 years would be less than that of
untreated waste after 100,000 years."
I have seen other ATW references that are even more optimistic, to the effect that the
process has the potential to preclude the need for permanent underground burial facilities
altogether.
During 1996 and 1997, I monitored the progress of work being done on ATW and was in
touch with scientists around the world who were deeply involved in that technology. I had
told them of my efforts to try to persuade the Panel to learn more about ATW. They were
very cooperative in supplying me with information and documents.
One document was a 1997 (CD ROM) version of an ATW status report, prepared for the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by scientists in six countries, including France,
Japan, Sweden, Russia, and the US, and two international organizations.
One particular statement in the introductory portion of that report really caught my
attention:
"Many countries are considering to permanently store long-lived highly

radioactive material in stable geological formations, e.g., such as the Yucca
Mountain in Death Valley in USA. However there is concern that geologic
formations and the climate might change over millions of years. Moreover, the
fact that the waste remains dangerous for many tens of thousands of years
exacerbates these concerns. The concern that such repositories can become mines
for Plutonium has become of even greater concern as the U.S. has made it known
that nuclear weapons can be made from commercial Plutonium. Therefore, it is
worthwhile studying an alternative approach that would separate the long-lived
nuclei from the high-level waste by transmuting such nuclei into short-lived or
non-radioactive wastes."
The prospect of "plutonium mines" proliferating over the next centuries is not a particularly
pleasant one.
An underlying premise of the AECL burial concept is that the waste would not only become
irretrievable, but the waste repositories themselves, would require "no institutional controls."
Given the advance of science and technology, there is absolutely no reason to believe that an
underground facility would need any fewer institutional controls than an aboveground one.
It would be prudent to assume that those in the future who might want to extract the
contents of an underground nuclear burial place, will have the capabilities to do so with
whatever technologies, and for whatever purposes they may then have.
As for ATW, whether or not the promising research into the technology will, in fact, lead to
both a technically and socially acceptable solution for disposal of high-level radioactive
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waste, remains to be seen. But, for whatever its reasons, the Canadian Federal
Environmental Review Panel avoided the subject as if it were the plague !
In February, 1997, at long last, the Panel completed its work, and submitted its final report
to the Government of Canada.
With a press release of March 13, 1998, the Minister of Natural Resources, Ralph Goodale,
and Minister of Environment, Christine Stewart, released the report to the public and
announced that
"The federal Panel studying the long-term management of nuclear fuel waste and
the safety and acceptability of Atomic Energy of Canada's concept to bury nuclear
waste deep within the rock of the Canadian Shield has recommended a
step-by-step approach to managing nuclear wastes. Accordingly, the eight-member
Panel is recommending that the search for a specific site not proceed at the
present time.
"The Panel has undertaken an exhaustive review and consultation on a very

complex issue. Its report will permit the government to come to an informed and
balanced response," said Environment Minister Christine Stewart.
The Panel, over its eight-year mandate, carefully examined the criteria by which the safety
and acceptability of any concept for long-term waste management and disposal should be
developed. It reached two conclusions:
Broad public support is necessary in Canada to ensure the acceptability of a concept for
managing nuclear fuel wastes; and
Safety is a key part, but only one part, of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from
two complementary perspectives: social and technical.
Applying these criteria to Atomic Energy of Canada's "disposal" concept, the Panel arrived at
the following conclusions:
While the safety of the AECL concept has been adequately demonstrated from a
technical perspective, from a social perspective it has not.
The AECL concept in its current form for deep geologic disposal does not have broad
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public support, and does not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as
Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes."
The Panel has also recommended the creation of a nuclear fuel waste management agency to
assume responsibility for managing and co-ordinating the full range of activities required to
deal with nuclear fuel wastes in the long term.
"This Panel report raises key issues which the government will give consideration
to in its response. This will set the stage for the next steps regarding the long-term
disposal of nuclear fuel waste in Canada," said Minister of Natural Resources
Ralph Goodale.
The release concluded with the fact that
". . . the Panel heard 531 registered speakers and received 536 written
submissions."
As of the report release date, the complete report was posted on a Department of
Environment Internet site: http://www.ceaa.gc.ca
The March 14, 1998, page 2 article in the Globe and Mail called the report a
". . . setback" for Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, ". . . which has spent $575 million
over the past 15 years to verify the safety of the deep-rock disposal concept." The
article noted the Panel's recommendation for ". . . the creation of a new Nuclear
Fuel Waste Management Agency to conduct further consultation and to 'build
and determine' public acceptability over the next three or four years."
The conclusion that the public does not accept the concept, appears to be the overriding
reason why the Panel did not recommend site selection as the next step in the nuclear waste
management program.
However, as George Ylonen and I agreed during a telephone conversation after the Panel
report was released:
We could have told the Government that, before they spent so much money on
this EARP, and we would have charged only a fraction of what the EARP cost!
COSUN and many other groups involved in the EARP had made the point over and over
again, about public opposition to the concept. Although the Panel did not specifically
acknowledge the many years of AECL opinion polling, showing high levels of public
opposition to the burial concept, it arrived at the same conclusion.
In truth, the Panel heard from but a very small segment of the Canadian population. Only
536 written submissions were received by the Panel; and those mostly from special interest
groups, pro and anti-nuclear.
The Panel acknowledged this problem when it stated that:
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"We recognize that it is difficult to determine whether participants in our

hearings, both those opposed to and those supportive of the AECL concept, were
representative of the larger public. We recognize also that it may be difficult to
gauge with precision the extent of support for or opposition to the AECL concept,
particularly in the absence of a real site and a real design. We judge, however, that
significant numbers of the public are currently sufficiently opposed to the AECL
concept that it would be ill advised to proceed with it now."
In light of that conclusion, the Panel recommended that
". . . Until the foregoing (a four stage, step-by-step process) is completed and
broad public acceptance of a nuclear fuel waste management approach has been
achieved, the search for a specific site should not proceed."
As for the technical side of the equation, although the Panel concluded that
". . . the safety of the AECL concept has been adequately demonstrated,"
it expressed reservations on this point in the report.
In Section 5.2.2.1, the Panel stated that:
". . . we are very concerned about the number, nature and importance of the
scientific uncertainties that are inevitable in such a new field over such a long
time frame. Few precedents guide us, but we do have previous historical and
community experience with similar undertakings to inform our view of safety. We
are also concerned about the specific shortcomings in the AECL proposal that
many eminent scientists identified. We are not greatly reassured that these same
scientists nonetheless suggest that the concept is suitable for proceeding to the
next stage."
Nevertheless, despite the concerns about uncertainties , and specific shortcomings, the Panel
reached the main conclusion that the Canadian nuclear establishment has been waiting a
long time to hear -- safety of the concept ". . . has been adequately demonstrated."
The Panel's "step-by-step" plan to acquire public acceptance, is spelled out in detail in
Section 6.0 of the report (Future Steps). The four phases of the plan include:
1. Set-Up,
2. Concept Acceptance,
3. Project Acceptance, and
4. Implementation (if the project is accepted).
The first phase, Set-Up, emphasizes the need for an immediate Government policy
statement, an Aboriginal participation program and establishment of a Nuclear Fuel Waste
Management Agency (NFWMA), which would be at "arms length" from AECL and the
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utilities and would
". . . manage and co-ordinate the full range of activities relating to the long-term
management of nuclear fuel wastes."
This phase would last for about one year.
Phase II, Concept Acceptance , would have the new agency develop a public participation
plan to determine which of the concepts for nuclear fuel waste is the most acceptable.
NFWMA would
". . . develop practicable long-term waste management options for Canada." The
agency would ". . . compare the risks, costs and benefits of practicable long-term
options" and ". . . develop an ethical and social assessment framework."
This would take about two years.
Phase III, Project Acceptance , would
". . . determine whether a site-specific project based on the selected concept is

acceptable." It would include ". . . a full environmental assessment and public
hearings -- to ensure broad public support for developing the proposed facility at
the selected site"
If the project is accepted, development of a Phase IV Implementation plan, would follow.

Specific time frames are not indicated for the last two phases of the plan.
As for the "options" or "concepts," which would be considered by the NFWMA during the
two years of Phase II, the Panel specifically included
". . . a modified AECL concept for deep geological disposal; storage at reactor
sites; and centralized storage, either above or below ground."
It is obvious that a "modified AECL concept" is the pre-ordained winner in any contest over
any other possibilities. In the Panel's own words, when it listed the options for the new
agency to consider, it
". . . retained deep geological disposal based on the AECL concept for several
reasons: it is the technically preferred research option internationally; much effort
has already been devoted to its realization; and it is consistent with current
regulations."
And, of course, the Panel had already concluded that the safety of the AECL concept has
been adequately demonstrated from a technical perspective.
In the light of the obvious bias toward the AECL concept, it is difficult to imagine how, in a
two year time frame, the other options specified by the Panel could possibly prevail.
However, just to demonstrate its even-handedness, they did leave open the door a crack
(about 0.00001mm wide and 0.00001mm high!). As for any other options, the Panel added
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an intriguing proviso:
"Should additional options become technically and economically feasible, they

should also be considered. In addition, governments should direct the NFWMA to
monitor closely all international progress on options for managing nuclear fuel
wastes."
After examining Appendix L of the report: Various Approaches to Long-Term Management

of Nuclear Fuel Wastes , it seems unlikely to me that the Panel was thinking much about
recent developments in ATW research. Amidst a discussion of the reasons for rejecting
"classical" transmutation processes, only one sentence could conceivably be referring to
present day ATW technology (without mentioning it by name):
"A number of participants put forward transmutation options that were not
discussed in the EIS."
Perhaps the ATW door has also been opened a tiny, tiny crack.
As of this writing, in this "El Nino" Summer of 1998, the Governments of Canada and
Ontario have not as yet responded to the Panel report. Full acceptance of the report would
mean that a decision to proceed with site selection (on some kind of site specific concept)
would follow in only three years.
The question is still out there, the same question that we asked at Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba,
in January, 1980:
Will we or won't we --- Get The Shaft?
Upon Reflection
Here it is, 1998, more than eighteen years since I became involved in the nuclear waste
issue, fourteen years since Getting the Shaft, the Radioactive Waste Controversy in
Manitoba , was first published, and ten years since I started the manuscript to its sequel(s).
How time flies when you are having fun(?).
My nephew, Brian Robbins, came up with the name SHAFTED! for a sequel to Getting The
Shaft . His assessment is probably right, but, at least for the time being, I have used a
question mark instead of an exclamation point after the book title ( SHAFTED? ), and as the
title for the previous, and last chapter of this, my third major piece of writing on the subject.
The question mark is there because I believe that it is still possible to prevent the actual
development of a permanent underground nuclear waste dump in Canada.
A "Learning Experience"
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When Phyl and I met with George Ylonen and Marguerite Larson on that cold January
evening in 1980, at the Croziers' farm house in Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba, I had no idea that
it would be a major turning point in my life. Here, in the late 1990s, I am still tracking and
writing about the nuclear waste issue, because I believe it is the right thing to do.
It has been, as they say, "a learning experience." My entire philosophy of life has been
affected by my work on this issue. Nuclear waste concerns led to a re-evaluation of the place
of nuclear energy in society, which created an interest in alternative forms of energy.
Awareness of conservation and energy efficiency led to an examination of ecological
economics, questions about our consumer society, a vision of a conserver society, green
politics, and on and on!
Above all, my experiences with the issue have changed the way I think about the functioning
of our democratic institutions. There is much improvement to be made in that arena.
[And "they" say that old folks are supposed to be set in their ways. . .]
At the beginning of the 1980s, I believed that I had two distinctly different and completely
independent interests in life: one was my professional work in civil rights, organization
development, and human resources. The other was my avocational work on the nuclear
waste issue.
Gradually, the two merged into one philosophy. It became increasingly apparent that true
human development within organizations, or society in general, cannot proceed in a healthy
manner if we continue to plunder our natural resources, and systematically destroy the
life-sustaining qualities of the only planet we humans happen to inhabit at the moment.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II in the mid-twentieth century,
my generation sought what it considered to be "the good life," the American dream, rooted
in upward mobility and the acquisition and consumption of more and more goods and
services.
Making the transition from that hedonistic, ultra-materialistic post-war philosophy, to a new
ecological paradigm is very difficult. It requires a fundamental shift in values, and I find that
it does not easily translate into one's own way of life. But that it must, to some extent, is an
axiom.
How we, as a society, deal with such questions as nuclear energy, and especially nuclear
waste, has become, for me, the litmus test of the kind of future for humanity on planet
Earth.
In our 1950s exuberance and techno-arrogance, we rearranged the atom to suit our fancy,
without seriously considering the long-range consequences of what we were doing. I did work
in the US Atomic Energy Commission headquarters for several years during the late 1950s
and remember that period very well. Although it is a hot substance, nuclear waste simply was
not a hot topic!
That 1950s mind set is coming back to haunt us in many ways. Chernobyl, adverse health
impacts of low dose radiation, aging and leaking nuclear reactors, gross cost miscalculations,
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missing quantities of nuclear materials, the growing inventory of nuclear wastes of various
kinds, and the awful specter of a "plutonium economy," with "plutonium mines," are some of
the results of the lack of foresight we exhibited in those heady days.
The very fact that by the late1990s, no nation has yet produced a truly good and publicly
acceptable solution to the nuclear waste problem speaks volumes. But, where is the law of
nature that states that every problem encountered by humankind, must have a good and
acceptable solution? Perhaps, this is a problem for which no good or acceptable solution
exists, at least, at this time in history.
However, I still have some hope that science will find a better way to deal with these wastes,
other than burying them in an underground hole.
What is good and acceptable for one vested interest group, may not be for the rest of us.
The nuclear establishment, by and large, is sanguine about the idea of burying the highly
irradiated fuel from nuclear reactors. "Get it out of sight and out of mind and clear the decks
for more nuclear development!"
Mind you, their "outhouse technology" to bury the waste will be done in a very sophisticated
and scientific manner. Nevertheless, whatever euphemism you care to use for the burial
option, it still represents one more example of humankind's historical penchant for shoveling
unwanted and unsavory substances, into the skin of the planet. It seems to me that Mother
Earth sends us a message every time she regurgitates the poisons that we humans
periodically inject into her.
A dump is a dump is a dump! Call it a scientifically-designed, state of the art repository, if it

makes you feel better, but even a "scientific" dump is a dump. Wherever it is, the nuclear
waste is still potent, and some of it will remain quite lively (deadly!) for eons!
I truly resent the nuclear establishment's use of the term "disposal" to describe its
underground burial plans. The question is not if these dangerous substances will reach the
external environment, it is rather, when?
Nor is it wise to base the answer to the "when question " on the primitive burial technologies
and computer models of the late twentieth century. The relative infancy of the geosciences
coupled with the " theo logical" time frames required to contain these wastes should have led
the nuclear waste Environmental Assessment Review Panel to deem the AECL proposal
technically unacceptable. Unfortunately, it did not. Instead, it gave the concept its technical
endorsement, (albeit a lukewarm one).
Back in the early 1980s, I began to believe that Canada would become the nuclear waste
dump, not just for our own radioactive leftovers, but for much of the world's, as well. In the
ensuing years, the probability of that belief becoming a reality has increased. Periodic
statements by members of the nuclear establishment advocating the "world dump" idea,
have, unfortunately, strengthened my belief.
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The inclusion of nuclear waste as an acceptable cross-border commodity in the 1980s North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) underscored Canada's possible future role as the
"keepers of radioactive waste," (a dubious companion activity to "hewers of wood and haulers
of water"). More recent efforts to negotiate world trade agreements using the NAFTA model,
if successful, could put Canada into an even more vulnerable situation.
I hope that I am wrong.
Activism:
That it is not impossible to thwart the aspirations of the nuclear establishment for the
development of underground waste burial facilities, has been demonstrated by dedicated
activists in various parts of the world.
I use the word "activist" with some trepidation. The term has been overworked by the media
and frequently misunderstood by the public. Unfortunately, for many, it has a negative
connotation.
For me, an activist is someone who is able and willing to use words well, but will go well
beyond structured public debates, hearings, and press conferences. He or she understands
the power of a whole range of advocacy strategies and tactics, and is not adverse to the
appropriate use of them (preferably within non-violent, democratic parameters).
For example, the Concerned Citizens of Manitoba, (CCM) group was not afraid to take
risks; to hold demonstrations; stage sit-ins; use street theater; risk arrest; and confront
politicians, in a not so polite manner.
Although frequently criticized by "the establishment", CCM's efforts paid off in the form of
municipal resolutions and Provincial anti-nuclear dump legislation. Furthermore, the
Manitoba public learned about the issue through the media, because of some of CCM's
"antics."
US activists have tied the nuclear establishment in knots with such similar tactics as mock
highway shipments of nuclear waste, coupled with an aggressive use of the legal system.
Perhaps an effective legal challenge in the late 1970s could have prevented AECL from
undertaking its ill-conceived "march" across the Canadian Shield, disrupting one community
after another in search of a compliant host. Perhaps its "concept verification" exercise would
never have gotten off the ground.
There was certainly no specific legislative basis for what AECL did. The Crown Corporation
and Ontario Hydro should have been challenged on that point in the courts, right off the
top!
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One thing I have learned over the past eighteen years is that reason, logic, facts, research,
debates, etc., are all essential and important ingredients in the ongoing effort to deal with
various environmental projects, such as attempting to deal with nuclear waste.
But "head games" are not sufficient. Without the dedication, risk taking and the skills of
activists, which leads to increased, heightened public awareness, change will not occur.
A much higher degree of activism over the next decade, will be required to prevent Canada
from becoming the international dumping ground for high-level radioactive wastes.
The Panel Report:
It is clear that the words in the Panel report were very carefully chosen. This is reflected by
the fact that some environmentalists as well as some pro-nuclear advocates have both praised
and criticized the report.
There is no doubt, as one reads the report, that the Panel was deeply divided on a number of
key issues. A more classic Canadian compromise would be difficult to find. I suspect both
pro and anti-nuclear groups will debate just "what the Panel really meant," for many years to
come. But in my view, a report that can engender so much opportunity for widely varying
interpretations really isn't worth very much at all!
It is too bad that the Panel members did not do the honorable thing, and write a report
which clearly stated the majority and minority opinions, expressing the dissenting views on
key issues, along with the identification of the Panel members holding those views.
As for me, there is no room for compromise when it comes to the permanent underground
burial of high-level radioactive waste. I will oppose any such plan!
The bottom line is that the Panel succeeded in getting itself off the hook. It avoided making
the inevitably contentious "go for a site" decision, by using lack of public acceptance as its
rationale, and by setting up an elaborate step-by-step decision-making mechanism which will
take at least three years to complete, and which is heavily weighted to arrive at exactly the
same "go for a site" decision.
It surrounded the AECL underground burial concept with enough of a "technically

acceptable" halo to virtually ensure its chances of implementation during the first decade of
the twenty-first century.
Since, according to many a nuclear pundit, there is no great urgency to build such a facility,
in some way the Panel's findings may actually have accelerated the site selection process.
Witness the specter of Ontario Hydro, openly seeking the institutional leadership role at the
FEARO hearings, and nosing around in closed-to-the-public meetings with the Lac Du
Bonnet Council, in advance(!) of the Panel report.
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Consider the Pinawa Municipal Council (as reported in the May 19, 1998 Pinawa Paper ),
passing a resolution requesting the Federal Government to establish a demonstration facility
on the property of the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment --- and, using the Panel
report as the rationale!
Early indications are that the nuclear establishment is now more aggressively pursuing the
three-stage process spelled out in the Acres Consulting Report in 1978, and unchanged
since:
(1) test facility (URL),
(2) demonstration vault (with some nuclear waste) and
(3) final repository.
In my view, the Panel has succeeded in conceiving an elaborate plan. It carefully lays out
what it thinks would be required to "brainwash" the Canadian people into thinking that the
technically safe(!) AECL nuclear waste burial concept is just fine. It sets out the parameters
and design for such an agency which would administer a two year-long exercise in nuclear
waste burial propaganda.
I don't think it will work. AECL's own polls have shown over and over again how
unacceptable the concept is, to the general public. But, who can say for sure? Much depends
on how the definition of "broad public support" will be interpreted, by the government of
the day, during and after the initial three year period.
It is already clear just how the nuclear establishment itself, will interpret the Panel report ---
"the concept is safe, so all we need is a little more public relations in the right places!"
Has Pinawa, Manitoba already achieved "broad public support"? Was the Local Government
District of Pinawa's decision requesting location of the Stage 2 demonstration vault (1978
Acres Report) deemed to be sufficient to meet that requirement? I am certain that the Panel
was talking about a much larger segment of the Canadian public.
However, given the track record of our pro-nuclear Federal Government, and the knowledge
that Pinawa will soon rank as an abandoned settlement without some large infusion of a
work project, my guess is that the "broad public support" argument has already found
acceptance.
Again, I hope I am wrong.
Next Steps:
There is no guarantee that the Government of Canada will adopt all or even part of the
Panel report. However, I cannot envision our pro-nuclear Government rejecting the Panel's
conclusion that the concept is, "on balance" safe. [ That would really surprise me to the
50 of 52 2/15/2007 2:09 PM
degree that I might even be forced to write an epilogue to this manuscript! However, I would
be delighted to do that in such an improbable event. ]
But, suppose the Government asked me for my response to the report (ha!) --- what would I
say? I would:
concur with the Panel's conclusion that the AECL concept does not have broad public
support and should not be adopted as the Canadian approach to nuclear waste
management.
not concur with the conclusion endorsing the safety of the concept, given all of the
misgivings expressed by the Panel.
recommend that the AECL concept be indefinitely "shelved."
not concur with the Panel's four point program.
suggest that a task force be established to study the on-site monitored and retrievable
storage option, with a view toward sustaining and improving it.
urge that the Government of Canada join in the ongoing international research efforts
in accelerator transmutation of waste (ATW)
Most assuredly, I would not endorse the creation of a new agency which is given but two
years to decide among three options, one of which is already identified by the Panel as the
internationally preferred approach (i.e., some variation of the AECL's underground burial
concept).
If the Governments of Canada and Ontario accept the report, including creation of the new
agency and the four-phase plan, there still is an opportunity to discuss alternatives to the
underground burial concept.
During that two year period, strong efforts could be undertaken to dissuade the new agency
from proceeding with a "gussied up" version of AECL's underground concept, in favor of
continued on-site, monitored retrievable storage, and participation in international research
in various alternatives, such as accelerator transmutation.
If that strategy fails and the new agency proceeds with implementation of a modified AECL
underground burial plan, which would then culminate in a site selection effort --- what then?
Or, if the Government simply gives the nuclear establishment a "green light" to put its public
relations machine into high gear and it targets in on Pinawa, or another potential site in the
Canadian Shield --- what then?
In either case, I would say, it will be up to activists (whoever and wherever they may be) to
make sure that "all hell breaks loose" in the land! Unless, of course, we all have a strong urge
to get universally
SHAFTED!
Walter Robbins
51 of 52 2/15/2007 2:09 PM
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The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga-Volume Three, 1988-1998

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The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga-Volume Three, 1988-1998

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For us, it would be the "Year of the SLOWPOKE."

". . . an appropriate strategy produces very little public reaction."

Airplane crashes were used as an example. The paper continued,

More importantly, each write-up also included an assessment, including:

each organization's strengths, weaknesses,

CCM's strengths were identified as

Its main weakness was that the

"future of the organization is in question."

"serious concerns inherent in the unattended operation of SLOWPOKE."

"One of Ridley's suggestions, which AECL circulated, was creation of a fake

The editorial concluded that

I concluded my letter by saying that

"EARP!" "Excuse Me!"

"one of the most important environmental assessments ever undertaken in this

In a Summer 1988 article published in the Saskatchewan periodical, NeWest Review, I

As the EARP process began to unfold, my cynicism grew.

On December 8, 1987 I attended a FEARO public consultation meeting at the Sheraton

". . . a Federal Environmental Assessment Panel should be formed to examine

A significant outgrowth of this collaboration was the establishment of a "Nuclear Waste

On May 3, 1990, The Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, (FEARO)

"…to assist in the preparation for and participation in the environmental

FEARO's scoping schedule included a morning and an afternoon session in Montréal, on

1.Put the waste in the hole.

I raised the question with the Panel:

"How do you write guidelines for an environmental impact statement, in the

"The study strategy should use an ecological scoping process to incorporate a

"Clear as mud, eh?""

SUE 'EM? YOU'RE KIDDING!

the Panel was not even following its own Guidelines.

Four days of driving, much of it through interstate highway construction, to attend a

The US Government-sponsored effort to "bribe" some aboriginal group to establish a

--- Chapter Nine, Article 901.2c and Article 902.3a.

According to the aboriginal representatives at the Washington meeting, Mescalero and

The DOE spokesman, Greg Cook was reported as saying

Johnson said that

DOE's Cook said that

"Water moving through the mountain is of particular concern because scientists

1. Public Involvement and Social Aspects

2. Site Screening and Site Evaluation Technology

3. Engineered Barriers Alternatives

4. Engineering for a Disposal Facility

5. Preclosure Assessment of a Conceptual System

6. Postclosure Assessment of a Reference System

7. The Vault Model for Postclosure Assessment

8. The Geosphere Model for Postclosure Assessment

9. The Biosphere Model, BIOTRAC, for Postclosure Assessment

reeked with hypocrisy!

I could hardly contain myself when I wrote

"'. . . a significant analysis of alternatives in sufficient detail to permit a

The statement on page seventy-eight of the EIS, that

I concluded the COSUN presentation with four recommendations, mimicking the

As a result of such an examination, the Government of Canada provide a clear

To avoid a recurrence of the restrictive narrowness of this particular Environmental

Also, Environment Canada's submission stated that it

". . . reviewers expected information beyond what could or should be provided at a

Nuclear waste should not be transported!

"Transporting nuclear materials poses significant risks to populations along the

Exercising admirable restraint, I opted out of Phase II.

"The important thing to remember in that (nuclear waste) fight, I believe, is to

I wondered just how aware they really were.

". . . at a level of detail sufficient to permit a meaningful comparison with the

" . . . However, the application of transmutation as a disposal method would

Of course, reprocessing and permanent underground storage go "hand in glove." Leftovers,