Peirce, Kant, and Apel on Transcendental Semiotics: The Unity of Apperception and the Deduction of the Categories of Signs

Author(s): Jerrold J. Abrams Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Fall, 2004), pp. 627-677 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40321022 . Accessed: 04/05/2011 18:43
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J. Jerrold Abrams

Peirce, Kant,and Apel on Transcendental Semiotics: The UnityofApperception and theDeductionof theCategories Signs of
do SOCRATES: . . . Now by 'thinking' you meanthesameas I do? THEAETETUS: Whatdo you meanbyit? about objectsunder SOCRATES: A talkwhichthe soul has withitself ... is consideration. It seemsto me thatthesoul whenit thinks simply in on questionsand answers carrying a discussion whichit asksitself or affirms denies. And when it arrivesat something them itself, either a gradualprocessor a suddenleap,whenit affirms definite, by and one thingconsistently withoutdividedcounsel,we call this its and judgement.So in my view, to judge is to make a statement, to is whichis not addressed another personor judgement a statement to addressed oneself. spokenaloud,but silently - Plato,Theaetetus, 189e-190a1

Introduction Karl-Otto to theGerman Apel,CharlesS. Peirceis the pragmatist According "Kant of America"(Apel 1980, p. 80), becausehe developeda thoroughgoing of transcendental philosophy signs and language.Apel followsPeirce in this a semiotics Within transcendental semiotics." and callsit "transcendental project, - articulated Apel's book, Towardsa Transformation in of key problem and of of Philosophy is the groundwork the unity apperception the deduction as of of the categories signs.Apel conceivesapperception Peirce's "long run" without problems. its not This accountis, however, entirely stateof inquiry. So, be I as an alternative, will suggestthatsemiotic apperception conceivedas the triadic immediate originally (as sign,whichflowsinto the future Peircehimself to of conceived This accounthas the distinct advantage being logically-prior it). of of runaccount;and it avoidstheproblem thecircular dependence Apel's long the on thegroundwork a goal (as thegoal presupposes groundwork). Ultimately, and form meaning) of of unity (as too, thissemiotic unity apperception thevery relative" of is alsotheform the "triadic Augustus following (whichPeirce, logical and of of De Morgan,helpedpioneer).Fromthisperspective theunity meaning S. Transactions theCharles PeirceSociety of Vol. XL, No. 4 Fall,2004,

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deductionof Peirce's relative logic,we maythenproceedto the transcendental all whichdetermine and Thirdness, Kantiancategories Firstness, of Secondness, and apperception. possible experience, areunified through in Part I. TheTranscendental Unity Apperception Semiotics of Transcendental A. Terminology: Semiotics Kantdefines transcendental logic in the CritiqueofPureReasonas follows: "I entitletranscendental knowledgewhich is occupied not so much with all of objectsas withthe mode of our knowledge objectsin so faras thismode of is to be possiblea priori. system suchconcepts A be of knowledge might entitled a in constructing transcendental The first essential (A12/B26).2 philosophy" step This of philosophy the "layingof the groundwork." transcendental is system of means (in the Kantiansense) establishing highestprinciples thought, the whichare a priori meaningthattheymustbe established any before possible further construction thought(e.g., "scientific," in the Critiqueof Pure of as Reason^or "moral,"as in the Groundwork theMetaphysics Morals3). Kant of of makesthispointin the Critique when he writes follows: as as "Only insofar we build upon thisfoundation we have a reliabletouchstone estimating the do for valueof old and new works thisfield. in Otherwise unqualified the philosophical historian critic passingjudgments or is of assertions others upon the groundless Centralamong these a by means of his own, whichare equallygroundless."4 prioriideas is the unityof apperception and, for Kant, this is the partial "I whichaccompanies unifies and and sentence, think," every thought experience the"I" can everhave. It is precisely here(on the "I think")thatthe transition "transcendental to semiotics"takes place. In Peirce's hands (and Apel's), Kant's transcendental becomes a transcendental semiotics the very moment we in epistemology out substitute theKantian in of the"I," and substitute the subjective groundwork new intersubjective Peirceangroundwork semiosis.Apel makes exactlythis of pointas follows: The term 'transcendental semeiotic'may be taken as the of of connoting Peirceanprogram a transformation Kant's'transcendental as that, it were, logic,' a program replaces the Kantian concept of the transcendental subject of knowledge with that of the indefinite community of sign interpretation,(see Apel 1972/1974/1980; and 1981, part I) (Apel 1995, p. 376) Peircewouldcertainly his is agree,although, ultimately own viewofapperception nothowApel conceives it.

Semiotics 629 Peirce, Kant,and Apelon Transcendental Re B. Peirce's -Definition Apperception of of Peircetellsus thathe "almostknewby heart"(CP 1.560) the entirety in back upon his earlyimmersion this work, Kant's first Critique.Reflecting I his Peirceexplains devotion:"In the earlysixties was a passionatedevoteeof whichappearsin theTranscendental Kant,at least,of thatpartof hisphilosophy in of Analytic the Criticof the Pure Reason. I believedmoreimplicitly the two and of tablesof the Functions Judgment the Categoriesthanif theyhad been in culminated broughtdown fromSinai" (RLT 124). This earlyimmersion Peirce's famous 1867 essay, "A New List of Categories." The "New List" deduction of the categories,and an providesboth a formaltranscendental His "categories"are "new" (as in the "New List") account of apperception. or in becausetheyare fewer number (comparedto Kant's fourgroupsof three, Aristotle's ten); and because they are unified through "linguistic (Peirce'sapperception). consistency" that Peirce here (on the point about consistency) That is, it is precisely of in of consistency" the stream signs.On replacesKant's "I" withthe "unity this,Peirce writesas follows:"We findthat everyjudgementis subjectto a must be capable of being broughtto a its conditionof consistency: elements in Whilethisaccountremains underdeveloped the "New List," slightly unity."5 Peirce does, a year later in his 1868 paper "Some Consequences of Four it contrasts withKant's begin to fillit out (and, indeed,directly Incapacities," used to is "... own account).As Peirceputsit clearly, consciousness sometimes but is but in or theI think, unity thought; thisunity nothing consistency, signify of or the recognition it. Consistency sign,so faras it is a sign; belongsto every its thatit is sign,signifies own sinceit signifies and therefore primarily every sign in place of the man as an "I," Peirceputs the (W2:240-l).6 So, consistency" to (W2:240 and 241); because,according Peirce,"... mylanguageis "man-sign" see also W2:241); and "... thewordor sign thesumtotalof myself(CP 5.314; ... whichman uses is the man himself. man is a sign" (W2:241); he is, Peirce of "a writes, train thought" (W2:241). as Revision Peirce's C. ApeVs LongRun Apperception the of takesplacein two accountof apperception of Apel's revision Peirce'soriginal as of sign's stageis the recognition apperception theimmediate stages.The first identifies Apel agreeswithPeirceon as Peircehimself it). consistency (precisely is this point. But the second stage of the transition the extensionof that Here is thefirst intothefuture. stagein Apel: infinitely consistency potentially used by Peircein his of The phrase'unity consistency,' is in showsthe direction whichPeircehimself criticism, of his 'transcendental forthe 'highest point' searching deduction:' His concern,it is true, is not with the but objectiveunityof ideas in a self-consciousness rather

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Jerrold Abrams J. with the semantical of consistency an intersubjectively valid representation the objects by signs, which of consistency, accordingto Peirce,can only be decided ... about in the dimension signof interpretation (Apel, 1980, p. 83)7

of but So, clearly, Apel takesup Peirce'searly project'sdefinition apperception, he does not seem to go all the waywithit - which,I think, evident his is in for wording.For example,Apel writesthat Peirce "is searching the 'highest thathe has not foundit yet). Or consider point'" (the implication being Apel's utterance of showsthatthe'unity consistency' Peirce following point:"This early was lookingforlies beyondthe personalunityof self-consciousness, whichis Kant's 'highest with point'" (Apel, 1980, p. 83). Obviously, Apel is unsatisfied theearly and thinks Peirceis too. account, And he aimsto makesome adjustments. reasoning not so bad: Apel is The is awarethatthe "New List" underwent revision Peircewent as quite significant in lightof the factthathis categories (almost)completely fell along,particularly in apartwiththe logic of relatives (discussedshortly Part II of thisessay,"The Transcendental Deduction of the Categoriesof Signs"). Peirce saw that the "New List" would have to be revised extendbeyondthe "subject/predicate to model of the proposition. And it is precisely thispoint (as Murray at Murphey has pointedout so clearly)thatPeirce'sprojectof the "New List" is, indeed, open to considerable re-interpretation withinPeirce'sown writings). (from So, withthe "New List," and the transcendental givensignificant problems project, in general, little a logicalwiggleroomwas not unreasonable and Apel,seeing this the wiggleroom,soughtto revise viewofapperception. This brings to the secondpartof theApel's transition, the extension us i.e. of the unity consistency the long run.And as a note here,if thereis one of to to it strong advantage Apel's account(in lightof the logic of relatives), is this: runapperception withitslong rundeduction thecategories, of Apel'slong view, ifit works, does not founder thelogicof relatives. return this on to certainly (I'll pointshortly.) In developing new account, his several clearstatements his of Apel provides view.For example, that(beginning, Peircedoes, withtheunity as of Apel writes semioticconsistency), "From here Peirce comes immediately the decisive to conclusion whichleads to the 'highest point'in the senseof a semiotical unity of consistent He of now dependson what interpretation: says:'theexistence thought is to be hereafter; thatit has only a potential so existence, dependenton the future of the community thought ([CP]5.313-16) (Apel, 1980, p. 84).8 Notice sees Peirceas moving"immediately" the long run (as thoughthe long to Apel runwere a priori"contained"in consistency itself). Along the same lines,Apel also writesthat Peirce "... has to replaceKant's ultimate and presupposition 'highest point,' namely,the transcendental synthesis apperception, the of by

Semiotics 1 63 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental of opinion*..." (Apel 1980, p. 104; see also Apel 1980, pp. postulate an 'ultimate of 87-88).9 Notice here thatthe long run is a "presupposition" semiosis.And again,Apelwrites: of At thispoint Peirce'ssemiotical transformation the logic reachesits 'highestpoint' of the transcendental highest point in what later has been called Peirce's 'Logical Socialism': A man who wishes to proceed logic of logicallyin the sense of Peirce's synthetic interests his of all has to surrender the private inquiry salvation interest hisprivate in finite also theprivate life, in sense) to the (which is existential Kierkegaard's since only the interestof the indefinite community truth: has community a chance to reach the ultimate his 'He who would not sacrifice own soul to save the in is wholeworld, illogical all hisinferences, collectively. in So the social principle is rooted intrinsically [CP]2.654 f.) logic' ([CP]5.354 ff., the two accounts- Apel's and Peirce's- are different: indeed,Apel Clearly, that In Does thisaccountwork? orderto answer notesthispointfairly regularly. whatis at stakein Apel's accountof the long understand we mustfirst question, the run,and whatexactly longrunis. and the D. Inquiry LongRun The "long run" is Peirce's idea of the ultimateendpoint of inquiry, as conceived a "mathematical" in the Calculus) and "evolutionary" process.10 (as and PeirceextendsDarwin'sideas of phylogeny, selection, struggle, adaptation, of "... to inquiry:11 the mindof man is strongly adaptedto the comprehension of the world" (W3:318; see also CP 2.754).12 This adaptation proceedsby way And at of and variation selection traits. and error, of an evolutionary struggle trial of form takesthe distinct this thelevelof humanthought, processof adaptation -doubtwhichone maycall thebeliefi of belief2 an interplay "doubt" and "belief," whichadapt to are Beliefs "habits" (evolvingstructures) of structure inquiry.13 As environment.14 a habit,a beliefis a "settled the external opinion" about the a whichis settled, belief As whichactionflows worldfrom naturally.15 something of The organism reasonis in a calm at is likea biologicalorganism equilibrium. A state;and action flowswithoutdeliberation. belief"... puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion future are arises"(W3:263). In otherwords,beliefs modes of actionthatpropel and selection, modes are reinforced As behavior. these they through repetition become and psychology;and ultimately settle down into our physiology become"fixed"). habits(i.e., they enduring

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In the hereand now, our belief structures hardly are adapted,and perfectly as haveto be removed, they contain kindsof errors all (CP 8.12). So, theseerrors When an erroris detected,then inquiryis stand in the way of "fixation." "alerted" (through doubt), which feels like "the irritationof the nerve" (W3:246).16 In response, the belief actually "... ceases to be a out" through belief (W3:253). In otherwords, beliefs "naturally are selected In idea of struggle doubt.17 thisway,Peirceeffectively relocatesthe Darwinian a to from of biologyto mind:"The irritation doubt causesa struggle attain state of belief. shalltermthisstruggle I the (W3:247). Doubt causes struggle inquiry" of inquiry: "... stimulates mind to an activity which may be slightor it the calm or turbulent. one energetic, Images pass rapidly throughconsciousness, in into another"(W3:262). Inquiry continues thiswayuntil incessantly melting opinionis settled;and a new belief2 replacesthe old belief^whenthishappens, "... thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached"(W3:263). our certainly, new belief2 Although, mayalso come to be doubtedout; and will begin again,as we seek foryet a new belief, And nowa "belief3." inquiry the same, i.e., escape doubt in orderto act: "... the whole again, the goal is function thought to producehabitsof action"(W3:265). And actionis only of is "... possiblewhen our opinionsare settled.So, essentially, the sole object of is of inquiry thesettlement opinion"(W3:248). 1. FourMethods FixingBelief of In "Fixation"Peirce listsfourdifferent methodsforsettling opinion,(1) a priorism, and (4) science. Tenacityis forceful tenacity, (2) authority, (3) assertionof an ungroundedpersonal belief (W3:249). A pluralistic society, will show the tenaciousindividual thatothershave alternative however, beliefs, equally tenaciouslyheld - and this will "shake his confidencein his belief (W3:250). As an alternative, method of authority the enforces belief fixation a state)and forbids critical (typically through inquiry (W3:251-252). But again, seeing other cultureswill shake the confidencein the method of authority and new optionswillbe soughtout. Amongthoseis themethodof a priorism, to whatis "...'agreeable to which,according Peirce,proceedsfrom whatever "we findourselves inclinedto believe"(W3:252). reason,'"i.e., from But a priorismfails because it generates coherent and consistent,but accounts (e.g., Plato vs. Kepler).18 The next (and fourth) incommensurable, methodis science,whichuses the strategy hypothesis of and formulation, (as a real method) also restson a distinct i.e., that thereis a knowable hypothesis, world. This realitytranscendsthe psychologicallybased inclinations, e.g., individualistic inclinations in tenacity), social inclinations in authority or (as (as and a priorism). Peirce(withHegel, and againstKant) conceivesreality whollyknowable as human minds); which means that metaphysical (to "incognizables"are self-

Semiotics 633 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental incoherent. Peircemakesthispointwhen he writes, "Over against referentially thereis an unknownbut knowablereality; but over againstall any cognition, is there onlytheself-contradictory. In short,cognizability possiblecognition, (in its widestsense) and beingare not merely the metaphysically same, but are terms" does not (W2:208). That is, "... theabsolutely synonymous incognizable exist"(W2:240). Indeed,as Peirceputsit,"... sincethemeaning a wordis the of it the has conception conveys, absolutely incognizable no meaningbecause no attaches it. It is, therefore,meaningless a to word."And "... whatever conception as is meantbyanyterm 'the real'is cognizable somedegree... in theobjective in senseof thatterm" (W2:253). of So, while Peirce uses Kant's terminology the "noumena," he uses it For Peirce,the noumenaare unknowable in knowable now,but fully differently. This is how we should take Peircewhen he the distant future(the long run). that in Researches "[l]ightconsidered as in writes Photometric purely something the externalworld may be called noumenallight. Light consideredas an ... phenomenal light"(W3:383). The noumenaexist appearance maybe termed of "... entirely independent our opinions," and they "... affectour senses the laws" (W3:253). As such theyfunction regulating to by according regular in of pretensions the sensibility,19 the Kantiansense. In Peircean-evolutionary And within evolution inquiry." the of selection this terms, is thesameas "natural resultsin positive thisselectionultimately knowledgeof the noumena (contra Kant). This is of have "positive" For Kant,we can never knowledge thenoumena.20 "unknowable" are not becausethe noumena(in Kant's system) in-principle knowable... theyare just not positively indeed, for Kant, theyare positively is of knowable us (i.e., us humans).The reasonis thatour faculty sensation for is of cut offfromour faculty judgment.For Kant, the sensation ontologically of But the faculty judgment(i.e., contactwithreality). intuitive immediate (in sourceof our non-intuitive and is theultimate is theunderstanding) distinctly intuition" withan "intellectual (e.g., God) Only a being endowed knowledge. holds rather thanindirectly. can knowthenoumenadirectly, Peirce,by contrast, and syllogistic is thatthere schism, onlya semiotic simply no judgment/sensation the (whichis extendedeven through senses).So, ultimately, logic of abduction And while we may for Peirce,therecan be "no incognizables" humans?1 for neverbe able purelyto intuitreality, giventime,we can know it betterand better. are as Of course,in the shortrunof science,"... our sensations as different while is to our relations the objects"(W3:253). And error and will be pervasive, Peircewrites as On deal and often. this, will our scientific opinions changea great follows:"Who can be sure of whatwe shallnot knowin a fewhundred years? of the of Who can guesswhatwould be theresult continuing pursuit sciencefor of ten thousandyears,with the activity the last hundred?"(W3:274-275). Peirce'sanswer(to his own question) is thatscienceis "... expectedto show

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considerable fluctuations" "... (W3:280-281); but,eventually, thesefluctuations become less and less; and if we continuelong enough, [inferences] will ... a toward fixed limit"(W3:280-281). Different scientists light(e. of approximate obtain g., Peirce mentionsFizeau, Foucault, and Lissajous) "... may at first different his the results, but,as each perfects methodand his processes, results willmovesteadily towarda destined center"(W3:273). This "destined together center"is the final"... opinionwhichis fatedto be ultimately agreedto by all who investigate whatwe mean bythe truth, theobjectrepresented this is and in If inquiry opinionis thereal.That is thewayI would explainreality" (W3:273). wereto go on to infinity, we wouldagreeto is thefinal what truth.22 Thisis precisely ApePsgroundwork. 2. ApelonLongRun Truth Architectonic and the advance over Kant. Indeed, Peirce avoids Apel certainly recognizes but to "The problem incognizability, witha deep sensitivity error.23 writes, Apel of unknowable thisturn transformed theproblem is into things-in-themselves by of infinite which,indeed,is a paradoxical approximation, problemtoo" (Apel, fallibilism" for "eternal 1980, p. 89). Peirce thus substitutes"temporary banishment fromthe noumena." In fact,we will meet up with the noumena to truth." this (contrary Kant),and thiswillbe the "final Apel,too, appropriates view of truth fromPeirce(and contrasts regularly it withTarski'sown directly semantical viewof truth). ApePs essay,"Pragmatism Sense-Critical In as Realism Based on a Regulative Idea of Truth:In Defenseof a Peircean of Reality Theory and Truth," writes, he Truth(with regard to realityin general) would be consensus that would represented that discursive by be reached in an unlimited of ultimately community if the process of research, under ideal research, communicative and epistemic conditions,could be continued in a way critically surpassing any factual consensus- i.e., going on potentially This infinitely. explication of truth is definitelycounterfactual, the the nevertheless, processof approximating truthis conceived a realpossibility. be sure,itspoint- in as To the sense of maintaining internal the relationbetween thetruth-claim theclaimto justification depends and on theinclusion theconcepto potential of (notactual) infinity. Only in thisway can we givean answerto the of question for a legitimation the claim to universal of truth:an answerthat is not compelledto validity the intrinsic relation truth reality an of to explicate by i.e., externalist-metaphysical conception, either a preby

Semiotics 635 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Kantianontologyof correspondence through adequation, of or by the Kantiansupposition unknowable things-inthemselves. (Transactions theCharlesS. PeirceSociety, of 2001; see also,Apel,"C.S. Peirceand the Post-Tarskian of Problemof an AdequateExplication the Meaningof Truth:Towardsa Transcendental Theoryof -Pragmatic PartII," also in the Transactions, Truth, 1982.) the of that It is clearin theseremarks Apel does not makethemistake conceiving idea thatit is a regulative (a point concrete he recognizes runas strongly long as But that to which return we shortly). he also maintains it functions truth. in A pointshould be made here,however, orderto demarcate Apel's long For about apperception. indeedin Apel's fromhis arguments runviewof truth and the account,the long run is at once both unityof apperception, thatfrom as the categories, well as Truth.I do not wantto takeup here whichwe deduce there a good deal is is this theissueofwhether accountoftruth correct. Certainly and the issuesof long runtruth in of merit it. But it shouldbe pointedout that at times are long run apperception separable.That is, one could, as Peirce of (as argued,have both a shortrun groundwork apperception in the "New List"), and a long run view of truth.Leaving truthaside for the moment, our however, focusis on theworkApelwantsthelong runto do forapperception of later thededuction thecategories). for (and we line As a further preliminary of demarcation, should also note thatApel of structure inquiry the Kantian sees thelong runalso as the "architectonic" (in is of For Kant, the architectonic a transcendental system the outlined sense). is "Transcendental As of thesciences. Kantwrites, philosophy onlytheidea unity of forwhichthecritique purereasonhas to laydown the complete of a science, At architectonic plan."24 the end of the CritiqueofPure Reason Kant makesit each one goes about are scientists really clearthatour everyday just technicians: or or chemistry biology(but in his business a cloistered e.g., physics discipline, the But this precisely job is not and notall three, certainly all sciences together). of all of the unifier and architectonic he of the philosopher: is the grounder divineview is a view of all sciencesin one And his virtually sciencestogether. (verymuch like what Plato means by dialecticin books VI and VII of the in Kant, attempts the "New List" to establishthe Peirce,too, following of the a prioricategories, upon which he may later erect the groundwork series(1891-1893). In his 1891 Monist in architectonic the Monist paper,"The in of Architecture Theories"Peircehas thisprojectclearly mind(at theforefront of of a series five architectonically oughtto be constructed essays):"That systems of the since Kant,but I do not think fullimport the maxim has been preached Withhis own house-building has by anymeansbeen apprehended" (EP1:286). Peirceoutlinesa construction), (at Arisbe)in mind (as a model of ground-up
2S Republic).

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based in (what will view of reality, and evolutionary relational thoroughgoing All of the sciencesare thanthe early become his) three(rather five)categories. unified thus conceived as sciences of evolution,semiosis,and complexity, and whichis also complex, a evolutionary, semiotic. through groundwork and groundwork to develop Apeltoo is also lookingto laythetranscendental for a richapproachto the architectonics science.The motivation thisproject of of a stems just as it does forKantand Peirce- from new explosion scientific of For (and for discovery. Kant, it was the blossoming Newtonianmechanics held up the new which he sought to lay the ground). Peirce, by contrast, scienceof Darwin- and soughtto make all sciences,effectively, evolutionary science (and the "sciences of evolution." Apel too uses the evolutionary form.But he is less of Peirce's long run as an architectonic mathematics) withhumanlinguistic concerned and withbiologicalevolution, moreconcerned new from evolution. And theinspiration thiscomesprominently therelatively for "socialsciences." to content these normative Moreover, (ethicaland political) seeinga strongly in semiotics seeks to lay theirgroundwork transcendental sciences,Apel of in and continuum humansemiosis. particularly the transcendental categorial as On thisview,thesocialsciences, are out emerging of modernity, conceived the "the sciencesof communicative (Apel, 1981, p. 194).26 So, understanding" the by again, Apel is fulfilling dutyof the Kantianarchitectonic philosopher, a outline(or architectonic) the (social) sciences.And it is of providing unified from this project that Apel, and JrgenHabermas (followingApel), have attempted to maintain the modern project's goals of liberation and tarianism againstthe tides of "postmodernism" by constructing a egali revised Kantianethicsbased in whattheycall Communicative The Rationality. newethics commonly is called"DiscourseEthics"(or "Communicative Ethics"). 3. Concerns the with LongRun one constitute of the mostvaluablecontributions Certainly Apel's writings to contemporary Peircescholarship. And here I followhis viewin many(if not But thereis one seriousconcern, and thatis the groundwork of most) respects. thelong run.I do not doubt thatit is an interesting, evenvaluable, and attempt to groundmodernity with as (once again). And certainly, its "logicalsocialism," Peircecalls it, thereis a strongvaluableethicalprojectto be gleanedfromits establishment. before But to agreeing thelong runaccountof the groundwork, two types problems of withthe long runmustbe mentioned. One typeregards the endpoint the long run(whichis handledvery of well by Hausman),and the otherregards the circular relation the groundwork the long run on the of of of the long run (when it should,I think, the otherway around). be endgame We'll handlethesetwoseparately.

Semiotics 637 Peirce, Kant, and Apel on Transcendental a. Contemporary Criticisms Hausman'sResponse and Withregard thefirst to not there have been (although, themostimportant), of manycriticisms Peirce'saccountof the long run(and not all of whichcan be discussed concernregards concretenessthe finallimit. the of here). But a general use in of Quine givestwo. (1) 'There is a faulty of numerical analogy speaking a limit theories, of sincethenotionoflimit than,'which dependson thatof 'nearer is definedfornumbers and not fortheories."(2) We probably won't get one view in all its "... uniqueness('the ideal result')." Rather, perfect accordingto if seems likelier, only on account of symmetries dualities, or that Quine, "[i]t countless alternative theories would be tiedforfirst place."27 MichaelWilliams claims"... we haveno idea of whatit would Alternatively, to in be fora theory be ideally and comprehensive thewayrequired complete by or to such accountsof truth, of whatit would be forinquiry havean end." But "We understand evenifwe did, it's unnecessary anyway: progress retrospectively how a laterviewimproves overits predecessors."28 relieson (Williams by seeing forthisretrospective followsWilliams, Thomas Kuhn account.) RichardRorty it and similarly givesup thelongrun- calling "fishy"29 and "[t]o makeit less Peircewould have to answerthe question'How would we know thatwe fishy as were at the end of inquiry, opposed to merelyhaving gotten tired or and others have given Nicholas Rescher,32 Paul Weiss,31 unimaginative?'"30 criticisms.33 further S. Carl Hausmanin Charles Peirce's (and Philosophy elsewhere)34 Evolutionary to the of to has responded thesesorts criticisms defend long run).According (to assumesthatthe notion thatthe analogyis faulty Hausman,"Quine's objection notions."Peircesimply is to of an ideal limit presumably confined mathematical "The idea of limitin mathematics, at least or to did not reducelimits numbers. it thatcannotbe reached.Therefore, should to one such idea, refers something the to qualify termwith the notion of its being ideal."35And be unnecessary Hausman pointsout thatthe stateis on Rortycritique, similarly the WilliamsGivenPeirce'stychism chance),the (ontological ideal, notan actual"terminus." a consequence, "... the and "open to spontaneity change."As long runis always ..." network judgments The real of Nor is thepossiblefinal path ... is not fixed. Only an generalsare thus "... composed of would-be's,or open possibilities. could selectand actualizethesein a thinker for ideal thought an ideal,infinite that "... no actual mindcan reachthis writes finalstate ..." Hausman further state- it can onlyapproachit asymptotically."36 the finalstateis "... an So, intothefuture."37 recedes thatinevitably actuality in As a regulative ideal, thisappearsquite Kantian.And furthermore, Kant and onlyan ideal mindcan know thereare no "in-principle" incognizables; too, accessedbyhumans).Although, the noumenacompletely still, (neverto be fully and he allowsforprogressive no faculty Peircehas schism, (contra approximation ideal,and not as Kant). Of course,too, Apel holds the long run as a regulative as shouldnot be conceived affecting Quine makesit out to be. So, thisproblem

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withApel's accountis as follows. Apel'sown account.The problem in b. TheProblem LongRun Groundwork Semiotics of Indeed, the problemis not so much the endgameof the long run,but its the becausethe end presupposes beginning). So, (more fundamental beginning in The thereis a questionof circularity. idea of groundwork Kant is meantto to problem,i.e., at the very respond precisely this sort of methodological This is precisely Peircedevelopsthetranscendental of thesystem. why beginning as in groundwork the "New List"38 "meaning"in the hereand now. Otherwise, in semiotic he mustgroundhis phenomenology his Kantian (firstness, categories and thirdness),and then ground these (circularly)in his secondness, he And, of course,lateron (at timesanyway), does just that phenomenology. Out of thislogical with unsatisfied hisearly transcendental semiotics). (becoming in he culminating thelongrun. circularity, thenrunstherestofhissystem, in the system the long run,Apel seems to assume the So, by grounding In words: of conditions thelongrun- and thisrunstherisk circularity. other Tor we want to be careful not to substitute "achievement" an (i.e., a globalized of condition that such as thelong runis) forthe "very achievement, community that in achievement" (such as apperception Kantis meantto be). Certainly is our as as goal (and mayevenbe conceived truth, Apelviewsit) - butitis notyetthe some passages sees groundwork. Apel certainly thisviewin Peirce.And in truth to For do, in fact,lend themselves thisinterpretation. example,in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" (1868), Peirce writes: are our selvesfrom absolute the "Ignoranceand error all thatdistinguish private of pure apperception" This could makeapperception (CP 5.235). appearto ego be an achievement, though somepointin thefuture would be finally as at free we of "ignorance error" statePeircecallsthe "long run") - thatis, we would or (a have"achieved"apperception. Peircedid nothold theviewthatthelong runis apperception. Nevertheless, he made the immediate And withregardto the Rather, sign the groundwork. as long run, this he maintained, Murpheyand Hausman39point out, as a ideal. Of course,as noted,Apel quite agreesthatthe long run is a regulative idea" (see Transactions, 2001, p. 461); but in making long Fall the "regulative run "regulative," whichalso functions "transcendental as Apel is groundwork," accountthan Peircegave. For, as it stands,the concernstill givinga stronger needs handlinghow the groundwork the long run, can simultaneously of function the groundwork the long run. That is, what groundsthe long as for run? As I see it, Peircemaintained long run as a regulative the idea, stemming from groundwork apperception the categories the of and as (but not necessarily the groundwork apperception). of And this he did verylikelybecause of the But ideal were a prioriextended problemof circularity. even if the regulative from stillthereis a problem making "priorto" the categories, in it or meaning,

Semiotics 639 Peirce, Kant, andApelon Transcendental as prior to the unity of meaning. It must come after these structures, are in to hold that groundwork, already place. (In response thisview,Apel might I have simplysterilizedand minimizedthe groundwork down to almost "nothing," such that it is simply too flimsyto support the project of transcendental semiotics thatis, too flimsy an adequate deductionof the for thisa genuineconcern, and I will return it shortly to in Obviously, categories. PartII.) E. Alternative to Approaches Semiotic Apperception: Davidson,Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Hegel clear that Peirce's originaldefinition so very is Still, it is not entirely in the first to it Beforereturning his original view,however, problematic place. to the Peirce will be helpful develop the discussionon apperception (outside on will and literature), as notrelying thelongrun. This analysis providea kindof Peirce's originalaccount. Indeed, other "workingtemplate"for re-visiting withestablishing like apperception, similarly something struggled philosophers the "I think"in Kant- and came up with the of even after rejecting primacy accountssounding verymuchlikethe earlyPeirce'sview.These includeMartin on (i.e., the literature Heidegger,Donald Davidson, Hegel, and Wittgenstein Wittgenstein). 1. Heidegger's "Kantbook" in Kant and the Problemof Metaphysics (what he called his Heidegger, to thatKant was (contrary popularbelief)actually laying "Kantbook"),argues than in the groundformetaphysics an equationof "meaningand time" (rather "the meaningof the the conditionsfor science). In discussing merely setting if of term'laying theground'...,"40Heideggersaysthisis "... bestillustrated we is on: "Ground-laying ... the consider the building trade." And further projectingof the building plan itselfso that it agrees with the direction And will on concerning whatand how thebuilding be grounded."41 thisbuilding in the structure time: "The of will be grounded,Heidegger writes, precisely of grows upon thegroundof time."(I should laying thegroundformetaphysics note herethatHeideggerclaimsthatthisthesisis also the thesisof Beingand is sentence this:"The questionconcerning Time.His nextimmediate Being,the is of of for question a laying thegroundformetaphysics, theproblem grounding not Again, Heidegger'sview here is certainly the "popularview" of Kant for of it thinks is thelogicalconsequence Kant'sarguments Heidegger (although The popularview is givenoften,and can be and the categories). apperception as in for book, Kant, wherehe writes follows: found, example, StephanKrner's "The self of pure apperception,the I thinkwhich must be capable of This is the is all accompanying of my presentations, not located in time."43 to accountof Kant(whichHeideggeris trying oppose). "dualistic" Cartesian) (or
Being and Time.7')42

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is view.For,indeed,"time," But,again,there good reasonto doubt thispopular as Kantconceives is thecondition all appearances, inner and thus of and outer, it, of Kant's unityof must necessarily througheven the basic groundwork run .44 apperception (i.e., the "I" beingthe "inner"par excellence) Takingthisnotion as his pointof departure leastin the "Kantbook"),Heideggersuggests that, (at is forKant,the "I think"simply "Time." This is evident whenHeideggerwrites as follows: "Time and the 'I think'[Kant'stranscendental of unity apperception] no longerstandincompatibly incomparably odds; theyare the same."45 and at And again: "With his layingof the groundfor metaphysics, throughthe and radicalism withwhich,for the first both time,he transcendentally interpreted for Kant brought and foritself, both of time,always itself, the 'I think,' always themtogether their in sameness without, be sure,expressly to original seeing thisas such forhimself."46 in Beingand Time^ And withregardto "being,"the samepointis made: "Itsprimary is future^1 meaning the 2. Davidsonon Triangulation in his own Kantiantranscendental Davidson, Similarly, lays project,clearly the groundwork the triadicstructure meaning(in the here and now).48 in of Davidsonevenuses theexactsameterminology Peircedoes, i.e., as Furthermore, the "second person"(discussedshortly Peirce),and meansthe same thingas in well- although Davidsondoes not use Peirceto thiseffect. in Rather, his essay "The Second Person,"49 Davidson begins with a quote fromWittgenstein's is Philosophical Investigations^ 457: "... meaning likegoing up to someone."50 For Davidson(as forPeirce) "... to have thoughts, so to mean anything and in it to and speaking, is necessary understand, be understood a secondperson." by, to Or, otherwise put,thought, according Davidson,"... dependson the mutual and simultaneous of to responses two or morecreatures commondistalstimuli and to one another's This three-way relation and responses. amongtwo speakers a commonworld I call 'triangulation.'"51 forDavidson (as forPeirce) Indeed, is to One must be able to point at the "triangulation" integral all thought.52 at the same time,speakwithanother world,and, person(even if thatotheris insidemyown mind).As Davidson puts it, "... the idea is as simpleas thatof ostensive ,.."53 learning and soundinglikeHeidegger, to Moreover, according Davidson,thistriadic of structure meaningnecessarily flowsinto the future, i.e., towardthe second who is our "listener" locatedin the ontologicalperson, (and potential speaker), We thatsomeonein temporal space of the "future." mustnecessarily presuppose the futurecan understandus, and because we presuppose this, we also that whatwe presuppose (again,necessarily) thatsecondpersoncan understand mean by the wordswe use. So, we are (just as Peircesaysin the earlyworks) a of of necessarily presupposing certain consistency the meaning our words,and whichis projected forward into the future. This is exactly whatDavidsonmeans withhis idea of "knowing how to 'go on.'" On thisDavidson writes that"...

Semiotics 641 Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Peirce, a communication linguistic requires speakergo on in the same way as others - thatto meansomething speaking, mustmeanthesamething the in one do by same words as othersdo."54 Clarifying notion, Davidson entertains this the do alternative: you (the interpreter) notknowhow thespeaker goingto go "If is how much she has on, you do not knowwhatlanguageshe speaks,no matter said up until now.... fTJhequestiondoes not concernthe past but the future" (emphasisadded).55(Again, just as in Heidegger,we see here that is in and in "the "meaning" all about time, general, moreimportantly, particular, future"). 3. Hegel's Alternative Of course,even beforeDavidsonand Heidegger,a thoroughgoing analysis is in of Kant'sviewof apperception developedin Hegel. This pointemerges his in thesection "Lordship on and Bondage": Phenomenology ofSpirit, in A self-consciousness, beingan object,is just as much have before the us T as 'object.' Withthis,we already Whatstilllies ahead forconsciousness Notion of Spirit. is the experienceof what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different which, in their independent self-consciousnesses, T freedom independence: and enjoyperfect opposition, thatis 'We' and 'We' thatis 'I.'56 Hegel makes this point Throughoutthe Logic and the Phenomenology, about movingbeyond Kant's view of the "I"57 (i.e., the namely, repeatedly, thanin the Phenomenology equationof "I = I"). Nowhereis thismoreapparent this wherethe "I" becomesthe "We." Actually, the Master-Slave Dialectic) (in a as awareofitself intrinsically"We." And in so meansthatthe "I" becomes really as explicitly a "we." That is, "we" come doing,we come to recognizeourselves There as beings-in-language.58 is also therecognition to see ourselves (correctly) about a is here,in Hegel, that consciousness intrinsically triadicconversation in like Plato's view). Mind emerges language(at the objects(in manyrespects of comes to see theperspective and of beginning the Phenomenology), ultimately of the "I" as limited in its unification thought. The triadicform of the to "we" (withtheworldof objects)is essential. willreturn thispointin PartII, (I in theDeductionof theCategories.) An analogousview is foundtodayin JohnSearle,in Mind,Language,and "... On intentionality Society. Searle'sview,we shouldsimply takethe collective 'we intend'even thoughit is in my It in myhead as a primitive. is of the form and "the This "we" is a primitive head."59 individual form, essentially foundation his to Searlealso recognizes proximity Hegel, butrejects of all socialactivities."60 the idea of any "... overarching Hegelian World Spirit,some 'we' that floats

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are aroundmysteriously above us individuals of whichwe as individuals just and This is probablya littleunfairto Hegel. Certainly thereare expressions."61 in problems Hegel, but thisdoes not appearto be one of them.Indeed,Searle caricatures even spooky.This Hegel's "we" as somehow"above us," ethereal, missesthepoint:for,the "we," as Hegel sees it,is more"within (not us" clearly "above us"), and necessarily of unifying our thought. (As an aside,Apel rejects Searle's view, as it is not sufficiently and transcendentalized,62 uses a transcendental of version the"we" himself.) 4. Lear and Gardner Wittgenstein on An additional view is advancedby Jonathan to Lear, who (contrary Searle) holds thatthe we-perspective in fact,quite transcendental. in a sense,he is, So, agreeswithApel, exceptthathe does not locate it in the long run. In "The 'We'"63 Lear developswhat he calls a "... stablemiddleposition Disappearing betweenKantiantranscendental and some formof Hegelianism."64 philosophy he wants a transcendental Kantianview, groundedin an Hegelian (That is, In linguistic "we.") And, in doing this,Lear relieson Wittgenstein. his later describes sharedexperience "forms life," the of of works, Wittgenstein regularly whichtake place in "languagegames,"and whichare (interestingly) discussed from "we-perspective." course,Lear is quite awarethatWittgenstein the Of "... in structures";65 nevertheless, displaysno interest necessary but, proposes to Kantianize this view, and make the unityof apperception into an Hegelian accountof the "We are so minded:."The "we" comes from view Wittgenstein's of "language,"whichaccording Lear, "... is thatin the conceptof whichthe to of is united."66 (open-ended)manifold our representations Sebastian in Kant and theCritique PureReason, writes Gardner, Similarly, of as follows: 'we' - thatin whichWittgenstein's of forms lifeand "Wittgenstein's language games inhere - functionsas the collectiveanalogue of Kant's transcendental And, analogously,Peter Winch also argues for a subject."67 of "the social,"in his book TheIdea ofa SocialScience Wittgensteinian primacy and itsRelationtoPhilosophy.69" also drawson thisaccountin Winch,69 and Apel conceives as the with Wittgenstein laying groundfora transcendental linguistics, the conceptionof the "social" as transcendentally central.In developingthis account (fusing Winch, Wittgenstein, and Peirce), Apel quotes from the Tractatus to the effect: "5.631: There is no such Logico-Philosophicus following thingas the subject that thinks..." (Apel, 1980, p. 99).70 This is part of well-knownargumentagainst "private languages" (i.e., all Wittgenstein's is as thought social in nature).Takingthissubjectlessness a pointof departure, then proceeds to interpretWittgenstein's"social dimension" as Apel like "6.13: transcendental, using passages (perhapsincorrectly) the following: is transcendental."71 Logic

Semiotics 643 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Revisited F. Peirce Idea ofSemiotic ys Apperception we viewsin the background, mayalso proceedto Withthesephilosophical of a Peirceas developing kindof transcendental perspective the "we," interpret muchlikeLear's "We areso minded:." very the Within Peirce'ssemiotics, "we" can servein two different ways(as the like run,and as immediate). (paraphrasing): Apel uses something the first long *' like in "We wouldknow the long runthat cx. Peircehas something the second use "... he this in mind.In developing account, acknowledges theconstant of the he word 'n?'"(EP1:81). And certainly, equates "us-ness"(or "we-ness")with as unitysince it (as apperception sign consistency) follows:"This consistent since it be said to belong to us. Or rather to all our judgments may belongs to the judgmentsof all mankind, we may be said to belong to belongs that Peircesuggests if (emphasis added).72 Takinghisviewto a logicalextreme, is thatin which we frombeingjust one of our particular "tools") language(far and not that "... justas we saythata bodyis in motion, As reside. Peirceputsit, motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thoughtand not that in this are thoughts in us" (W2:227, fn.4). (Apel also recognizes footnote Peirce to on the "we" as integral his own view (Apel 1980, 91 ).)73 So, accordingto in of Peirce,"we" belongto theunity consistency semiosis or,as one mayalso of And our transcendental semiosis. perspective the"we" putit:we areconsistent to "forus." AgainPeircemakesthesamepoint:"Whenwethink^ unifies meaning itself?" whichis ourse address does thatthought-sign whatthought (EPl:38-9, If added). emphasis This maybe this"we" thereis also "You understand." within Furthermore, how uDo you understand we are "goingon"?" But form: in theinterrogative put because (when I am speakingto you) I must the "we" is the groundwork that "you" are "withus" (at least at the level of transcendentally presuppose unifies "forus" We mustnecessarily experience meaning).The we-perspective I are somehowon the same side, at a "logical level." thatyou and presuppose is thatthis"same-sidedness" logically we And further, presuppose priorto any be put as follows: "We The unityof apperception may thus disagreement. it '#.*' interpret object put: "We consistently interpret Or, perhaps maybe better note '#.*'(And thisis hardly veryfarawayfromLear's account.)(As a further well in keepingwith Hausman's here,on the "we," I thinkthisview is fairly betweenPeirceand Kant, the overallview. Hausman,in discussing relationship a the view"... affirms need to turnawayfrom spectator thatthe Peircean writes but without abandoning something valuable in that view: the view, on our communal and individual habits, of acknowledgment constraints that constraints 'we' do notmake.")74
1. Peirce on the ccWe

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2. The"SoptoCerberus": Revision FischiAccount A of In orderto give a better"picture"of this "we," as Peirceconceivesit, I would like to examinea famous(and veryartistic) passagein Peirce,whichhas been notedforitsdifficulty, to by especially Max Fisch.In a letter thesemiotician LadyWeiby,Peircewrites, I definea Sign as anything whichis so determined by an else, calledits Object, and so determines something I effect whicheffect call its Interpretant, upon a person, that the latteris thereby determined the mediately by former. insertion 'upon a person' is a sop to of My becauseI despairof making own broader Cerberus, my conceptionunderstood.I recognize three Universes, which are distinguished threeModalitiesof Being. by (EP2:478, 1908) Fisch in his book, Peirce,Semeiotic, Pragmatismo and devotesa sectionto this remark: "On the 'Sop to Cerberus.'"Fischwrites, "What,then,was the sop to If Cerberus? we recallthattheoriginal of motive subsuming logicundersemiotic in 1865 was to avoid basingit on psychology, can give a tentative we answer. The sop to Cerberus lapsing was from intopsych-talk from semeiotic sign-talk into psychology."75 passage,however, not necessarily This is about "psychology vs. logic." Rather, it seems to me to regard the triadic structureof of In the to apperception especially considering reference the myth Cerberus. Ancient is Cerberus thethree-headed whichguardsthegatesof Mythology, dog, Hades. He allowsnew soulsto enter Underworld, forbids the themto leave. but a fewhave been able to escape,and to do so, first had to "appease" Only they Cerberus otherwise they a had to provide "sop"). Orpheus, example, for (or, put, Cerberus witha song,and escaped. sopped wouldpresenting Cerberus withthe"sign" So, ifthisis thecase,how exactly a looks likea poison or a providea "sop"? It's not exactly meal; and it hardly The answer, think, in the identity the structure the sign,and I lies of of lullaby. the three-headedness Cerberus'sbody: both have threeparts, it were. On of as thisview,then,Peirceis effectively as holdingup a mirror imageto Cerberus, if to say,"Here look at thismirror of yourself(and indeed,likely Cerberus image has neverhad this experience). Peircewrites, As "... it is necessary thatthere should be two, if not threequasi-mindf76 semiosis. for That is, consciousness, to is a consciousness"77 as it is forCerberus). according Peirce, always "triple (just Still, though,even if this is so, how would a mirror image providean Two possibilities themselves. The firstway is less adequate sop? present reasonable: mirror the to as imageis intended stunCerberus, thoughhe werea his own vanity. The second option seems Triadic-Canine-Narcissus, sopped by morelikely: semiotic the mirror to him. image of Cerberusis intended confuse

Semiotics 645 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental is Indeed, the veryidea of having"three-minds-in-one" incredibly confusing even to us humans.And thisis precisely whyPeircesayshe "despairs"of ever confusion (with its deep focusand makingthe idea clear to others.Certainly, wouldprovide adequatesop, at leastone long enoughin duration an for inquiry) the Peirceto escapefrom Hades of Cartesianism. 3. TriadicSemiotics The three heads of Cerberus,accordingto Peirce, are the "sign" (or and the represents), the "representamen"), "object" (whichthe representamen a sees idea (createdin themindin thefuture). example, driver For "interpretant" on a pole, on top of a building; and the windsock a blue windsock, suspended The "object" is the In has been inflated. thiscase, the "sign" is the windsock. the windsockto inflate.The relationship which affects wind, (determines) an the the between objectand thesign(whichrepresents objectof wind) creates insidethedriver's mind:"It is is theidea created The "interpretant." interpretant out." windy of called an "index" (in Peirce'stheory This particular exampleis actually his for essential understanding overall triad, project signs),and is one ofa distinct the the of semiotics. For, dependingon howexactly object affects sign,we will kinds of ideas. There are, in fact,three formsof sign-object have different relation: icons,indexes,and symbols.(1) An "index" is a sign whichsignifies linkedto) itsobject. becauseit is affected (or directly whatit signifies spatially by the includethe blue windsock(above), sunburns signifying sun, or a Examples its a foot.(2) An "icon" signifies object becauseit resembles signifying footprint caused" by thatobject:it "lookslike"itsobject,butis not necessarily "physically It and diagrams. itsobject(as in theindex),e.g., portrait maps,globes, paintings, are to say mirrors icons, too; but thereis some debate on this. is tempting are UmbertoEco, in Kant and thePlatypus, arguesthatmirrors not icons,but a the as We "see through" mirror through pane of (like "prosthetics" eyeglasses). a (in "hearing aid").78(3) Symbols glass(or, we may"hear through" prosthetic alone. For theirobjects by convention to contrast indexesand icons) signify like does intersection not look "slowness" we at a light a traffic example, yellow These kindsof signsare simply all simply agreethatit means"slow to a stop."79 "created"(byus) to "standin" fortheir objects. and 4. Peirceon ccTuism" Timein Meaning takes place in the The fusionof the object and sign in the interpretant withanother mindas thoughthe one personwerespeaking individual's (and, of of thisis wherethe "we" emerges).This movement dialogue,by which course, a also to forward the interpretant, involves timedimension. the signis conveyed a "the interpretant,"(future) thismovement Peircecalls "tuism," (alternatively) to much like a precursor Davidson, "the and, sounding very "quasi-mind," our secondperson."Within internal dialogue,the secondpersonis our constant

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As is to cognitive companion. Peirceputsit, "... all thought addressed a second a secondperson."80 or self (And becausethesecond person, to one's future as to is to the to person notreducible thefirst person, "we" is notreducible the"I.") Of course,the idea is not exactly new. As noted,Hegel saw the same thing in his Phenomenology And long before ofSpirit. Hegel, Plato arguedthisas well. Recallthatwe beganwithPlato's original of in definition thought the Theaetetur. "A talkwhichthe soul has withitself On about objectsunderconsideration." Peirce'sview(somewhat Plato) thesecondpersonis the"otherhalf of following a conversation betweentwo "quasi-minds."Only,Peirceconceivesthe dialogue as semiotic, conceives dialogueas between and the two "quasi-minds." in any So, a there always fundamental is between "quasi-speaker" the and division, thought, the "quasi-listener." Peirceexplains: "The problematical 'listener' be within may the same personas 'the speaker';... in thatcase the listener becomesidentical with the speaker" (CP 2.334).81 That is, "speaker" and "listener"exist (of evenwithin one individual. the Peircealso writes, necessity) ... signs require at least two Quasi-minds;a Quasiutterer a Quasi-interpreter^ although and and thesetwo are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they mustnevertheless distinct. theSign they be In are,so to it a of say,welded. Accordingly, is notmerely fact human but of Psychology, a necessity Logic, thatevery logical evolutionof thoughtshould be dialogic. (CP 4.551, 1906)82 Peirce is following Essentially, throughon Hegel's revisionof Kant. In the as it examines that finds, thought itself, it is always Phenomenology, breaking apart intoopposites. Peircemakesthesamepointwhenhe writes follows: as Whenwe think, whatthought to does thatthought-sign which is ourself address itself? ... [I]t is always interpreted a subsequentthoughtof our own.... by or not determined [T]here is no intuition cognition by thatthestriking in [and] it follows previous cognitions, of a new experience neveran instantaneous is but affair, is an event occupyingtime,and coming to pass by a continuous process.. . . Thereis no exception, therefore, to the law that every thought-sign translated is or in a subsequent one ... (EPl:38-9) interpreted And this idea is the very core of Peirce's pragmatism, or, better, his some contrast the "pragmatisms" WilliamJamesand to of "pragmaticism" (in As to the JohnDewey).83 Peirceputsit, "... according Pragmaticism, conclusion

Semiotics 647 Kant, and Apel on Transcendental Peirce, to of a ReasoningPropermustrefer the Future"(EP2:358-9). (While thereis relation phenomenology on not space hereto do justiceto the Peirce-James and is in an and time, excellent analysis found MathiasGirel,"The Metaphysics Logic Peirce'sReadingof James's of Psychology: Principles"in the Transactions the of Charles Peirce S. 2003.) Society^ in 5. ConsistencyInterpretation From here, a further of is part of the definition apperception in order, is thatof "consistency." consistency" meantthis:each signmust,in By namely, over time. That is, each sign must retain its maintainits integrity effect, the time.This is fundamentally same point that Davidson "referent" through would later make: we must know how exactlythe other will "go on." And we in conversely, orderto be meaningful mustintendforour signsto maintain such their"stable"referents, thatwe allow forthe otherto knowhow we will we our signswhenever wish,and expectfor "go on." We cannotgo changing on as it had. We mustintendto meanwhatwe intendto mean, to meaning go at knows(moreor less) we and provided are communicating all, our interpreter we how exactly are to "go on." whicheveryone Of course,if he does not know,thenthe natural response, as is necessarily presupposes reasonable, to raise the question,"What do you mean by that?" Although,what is actuallybeing said is this. "While we the thatwe consistently interpret object,I am at a loss forwhatthat presuppose are usingmeans,and would likeforyou to explainit." We understand signyou of to the ability raisea questionin thisway as a transcendental presupposition the an of discourse just as we presuppose consistency signs.Not incidentally, on literature these ideas has, over the years,grownup specifically extensive and the project of around Apel's (and Habermas's) Peirce-Kantsynthesis, Discourse Ethics. And these have been put togetherin the volume, The editedbySeylaBenhabiband FredDallmayr, Ethics Communicative Controversy, own piece,"Is the Ethicsof the Ideal Communication whichbeginswithApel's betweenEthics,Utopia, and the a Community Utopia? On the Relationship Critiqueof Utopia." Withinthis volume, an excellentset of the necessarily semiosisis put togetherby RobertAlexyin his rules of rational presupposed Discourse."AmongAlexy's(many)rules(4.1 Basic "A essay, Theoryof Practical Rules)arethefollowing: . him maycontradict or herself.. . (1.1) No speaker (1.3) Each speakerwho applies a predicateF to an to objecta, mustalso be prepared applyF to any to otherobject whichis similar a in all relevant respects.

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J. Jerrold Abrams (1.4) Differentspeakers may not use the same withdifferent meanings. expression

of the elaborates (1.4): "(1.4) requires communality linguistic on usage."84 Alexy are other rulesas well.) (And there many 6. Summary Peirce's Revisited of Definition Apperception of we Taking this view of consistency, may now summarizethe revisited Thisis the in semiotics. Peircean viewof theunity apperception transcendental of of the "We," whichnecessarily every singleone of our accompanies perspective we This is a good deal like the Kant-Hegelsynthesis findin Lear's thoughts. to better view. Only here,rather thanthe "We are so minded:,"it is probably as conceivePeirce'sunity apperception the "We consistently of object interpret cX.Jn the two are, for all practicalpurposes,verysimilar Althoughin truth, regardsthe interpret" (provided we understandthat the "we consistently form distinctive structure the sign-object-interpretant of meaning). This of semiotic.It is also necessarily structure intrinsically is dialogic,and triadically into the future, towarda future i.e., always (as pointed interpretant a second of of the person).And perhaps best"picture" whatthisnew version theKantian "I think" who always and looks (in Peirce),is thethree-headed Cerberus, like dog "We the everywhere object 'x.*9 presupposes structure, consistently interpret Part II. TheTranscendental Deduction theCategories Signs of of in The problemof the transcendental deductionis one the most difficult Kant scholarship. Kant himself difficult reworked and the foundit exceedingly on chapter the deductionin the CritiqueofPure Reason (i.e., the "A" edition and the"B"). And stilltodaythere muchdiscussion thisdifficult on is topic.(See Eckart Frster,Kant's Transcendental Deductions^ and Paul Guyer, "The Transcendental Deductionof the Categories."86) is Our purposehere,however, Peirce'sdeduction in particular). only (and Apel'sinterpretation, A. Terminology"Deduction* of In orderto articulate deduction, this first mustknowwhatwe mean by we "deduction."For, indeed,the present meaningof the term"deduction"is not "one of theforms thesyllogism" of and induction, deduction). (e.g., abduction, It is, rather, meantin the "legal" sense(used bythejurists Kant'sown time). of In the first when speaking rights of and claims, CritiqueKant writes:"Jurists, in the distinguish a legal actionthe questionof right juris) from question {quid of fact(quidfacti); and theydemandthatboth be proved.Proofof the former, whichhas to statethe right the legal claim,theyentitle deduction."87 or A the "deduction"then,forKant,is supposedto show the necessity the categories of "in all possiblethought"- and theirintrinsic to apperception link (both are essential theunity experience). for of

Semiotics 649 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental This methodof establishing differs from Aristotle's categories considerably own approach in the Categories, and his methodologyof establishing the 2, substances Posterior at secondary Analytics .19, as Kanthimself pointsout: This divisionis developedsystematically (whichis the same as the facultyof thought). It has not arisen as rhapsodically, the resultof a haphazardsearchafter the completeenumeration which,as of pure concepts, based on inductiononly, could neverbe guaranteed. and Nor could we ... discover whyjust theseconcepts, It havetheir seat in the pureunderstanding. no others, was an enterprise of an acute thinkerlike worthy for to Aristotle makesearch thesefundamental concepts. he But as he did so on no principle, merely pickedthem procuredten of up as theycame his way, and at first which he called categories(predicaments). them, he Afterwards believed that he had discoveredfive others, which he added under the name of postdefective.88 remained But predicaments. histablestill 2 induction(Posterior intuitive Aristotle Analytics .19 99bl5proceedsthrough for but whichis not onlyindeterminate, (worseyet)non-existent: Kant, 100b89), intuition" a "sensory have no "intellectual we simply (and recall intuition," only the is thisfaculty dividedbya metaphysical from understanding). While,for gulf norintellectual intuition for it is worsestill: we have neither (and, sensory Peirce, In of course,on this,he followsHegel fairly directly). place of thesewe have formulation Peirceis quite aware- comes from "abduction"(the original 2 .25 69a20-3590). Prior Aristotle, Analytics Kant's critiqueof Aristotle, proceedsas Kant does So, Peirce,recognizing and Kant "deduce" the categoriesas deduction.Peirce with a transcendental for necessary anyinterpretation. B. Peirce's of EarlyDeduction Signs deductionof the to According Apel (and I agree), Peirce's transcendental semiotics: (in the "New List") is the keyto his earlytranscendental categories of "... therealbasisof thistransformationtranscendental is provided the by logic deduction'of the three a factthatPeircein 1867 performed 'transcendental types ofsign? (Apel,1980, pp. 84-85).91 in evident the in Peirce'sdeduction the "New List" proceedsfrom meaning, first lines of the essay,whichread as follows:"This paper is based upon the is of established Kant's],thatthefunction conceptions to [namely, already theory of to of sensuous impressions unity,and the validity a reduce the manifold of the of in consists theimpossibility reducing content consciousness conception

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to unitywithoutthe introduction it" (EP1:1). Then, further Peirce of on, clarifies what exactly means by "unityof the manifold." meansthatwe he He mustsaywhatwe are experiencing, put it into a unified and (i.e., a proposition Peircemakesthispointwhenhe writes follows: as "The statement). meaningful reduces impressions the unity of a is unity to which the understanding This unityconsistsin the connectionof the predicatewith the proposition. that of subject;and, therefore, whichis impliedin thecopula,or theconception is the of the being, thatwhichcompletes workof conceptions reducing manifold to unity" (EP1:2). The unityof a proposition only achievableonce we have threevery is theseare the subject, predicate, the and the copula.And put important things: are the unity the manifold the earlyPeirce,at least). Take, of together, they (in for example, my seeing a "tree" (in the park). I only have a meaningful of aboutit.So perhaps say,"The treeis I experience thetreeonce I saysomething let's takethissentence "The tree"(ontologically substance, a green."Now, apart. and propositionallysubject) a "is" (the copula,signifying "Being") "green"(the in I the quality/predicate the semioticformof firstness). unify qualityto the the in of is thing, necessarily by presupposing category Being.And this, turn, the its and the qualities onlyway I can know the thing, namely, through qualities, and thething as for brought together having Being.All thought/experience, the whether saysomething simple I so Peirce,endsup beingof thisbasicform: early as "The rock is gray," or somethingso [seemingly] complex as "Milton's Paradise Lostis the disturbingly beautiful of Satan" - it is alwaysand Epic the we that everywhere same,provided are meaningful, a subjectand a predicate thebasiccategory Being-in-General. of (s) arefused through withour experience meaning, of Peircecan thenproceedto Now, beginning a formal deductionof his categories. derives He fiveof them,and liststhemas follows: BEING to Quality (reference a ground) Relation to (reference a correlate) to (reference an interpretant) Representation SUBSTANCE (EP1:6;CP 1.555) We maythink Being and Substanceas super-categories of (although"super"is not Peirce'sterminology). of And, usingthe "substance/accident" terminology Aristotle's Peircetellsus, "The three intermediate be categories, may conceptions termed accidents" (CP 1.555). We are "nearest to sense" (in Peirce's with and But terminology) Substance itis present immediate. we cannotknow it without a quality it (i.e., without to it traits, "accidents"), or e. ascribing giving we synthesize in "synthetic of the manifold") g., "greenness." Again, (as unity

Semiotics 651 Peirce, Kant, and ApeI on Transcendental to the of "greenness" "tree" through category "being." These qualitiesgiveus of a substance. And thisis wherethe deductionof the middle the "firstness" in are threecategories and thirdness begins,namely, firstness and secondness derived afterwards. That is, from the idea of quality,we can then deduce a relate (or The reasonis this:a quality a quality is becauseit is a different secondness). partly As (or similar onlybymeansof quality). Peirceputsit,". . . we can knowa quality withor similarity another.By contrast and agreement thingis a its contrast to to . to referred its correlate . . The occasion of the introduction reference a of is to or and to a quality property) the reference a correlate, thisis, ground(i.e. in a the therefore, nextconception order"(CP 1.552). Thus,ofnecessity, second fromthe first. The second is "relation"(or, as Peirceputs it emerges category in And the third follows a similar lateron, "reaction"). way,i.e., from category the Thirdsare representations between "ground"and the"relation." therelation rather thandifferentiating) a relateand a (i.e., unifying capable of synthesizing or unitesothertriangles, a dog in one complexform, one triangle e.g., ground in general. dogs represents this Kantian (in works).But already, analysis theearly Certainly, is a strongly even in the "New List," Peirce's futureHegelianismis quite apparent.The middlethreecategories (which will soon stand alone, withoutSubstanceand And will come to resemble Hegel's threecategories. forms) Being as additional to looks similar thatof Hegel's Logic beginas themind eventhe method already led of witha barecategory, a quality Being,it is soon and a priori to say, maytry itsown negation Non-Being)in secondness (i.e., the Relate,Otherness in (or vs. a word,its"antithesis"). thisdyadic"self-same other"dichotomy Yet, (newly will it standstillwitha neither of firstness), achievedas the necessary negation of void in its middle.The mediatingcategory the Third (or Becoming,for of for and forPeirce as well) is necessary the synthesis the two forms Hegel, themas two opposingpoles of the same metaphysical thatwhichunifies (being magnet). List":TheLogicofRelatives the C. A Problem with ccNew the of and simplification the Kantianproject, for Admirable its semiotizing which a encountered seriousproblem(indeed,a problem "New List,"however, too, for thatmatter).For, upon equallyupsetsKant's project,and Aristotle's Peirce De readingAugustus Morgan (1806-1871) on the "logic of relations," realizeda thought mayhavemorethanone subject(i.e., two or three)- and,at tionalforms. his logicalproposi once, he reworked logic to includethesefurther Peirce Of course,not unexpectedly ever-triadically-minded) came up with (the takethe relatives. Monadic relatives basicforms: three monads,dyads,and triadic form . . not a wholelot new . of form "A is jB"(and look liketheregular predicate alone forall logicalrelatives: is dyadiclogical there).But thisform not sufficient thanJ5" "A hit 5," or "A killsJ5"). takethe formof "A is whiter relatives (or

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B havetheform "A givesB to C" (or "A interprets as C," of And triadic relatives or "A is better B thanC"). at In a word, the major problemwith the "New List" is that it is nonform: propositional comprehensive, being groundedin the monadicpredicate the one substance one predicate and "synthesized" through copula.Indeed, this of was far too simple to handle the complexity relativelogic. (And nonis quite a problemfor any Kantianproject,one of whose comprehensiveness a mainaimsis precisely be "comprehensive".) a consequence, good deal of to As undermined. Murphey As theprojectof the "New List" was significantly points of out, the change was extensive:"... the discovery the logic of relations introduces whichare not reducibleto the subject-predicate form, propositions and accordingly becomesan open questionwhether set of categories it a derived continues: from thatform also applyto relative will Murphey propositions."92 in Once Peirce was thoroughly commandof the new it cannot have takenhim long to see what the logic, of answer the questionhad to be. The argument the to 'New List' dependsupon thedefinition thecategories of as the concepts of connectionwhich unite Being to Substance:it is upon thisdefinition the methodof that the and the completeness the list of finding categories But the conceptsof Substanceand Being are depend. clearlyderivedfromthose of Subject and Predicate. Withthe admission propositions of the subjectof not Substance and Being lose their predicate form, and the universality, therefore proofof the universality of the categoriesalso fails.Nor is thereany way of the formso as to generalizing notion of propositional includerelative whichwill leave the 'New propositions List' intact.... Thus the 'New List' collapses entirely once thenewlogicis admitted.93 deductionof the "New List," Peirce (at times So, withoutthe transcendental in anyway) simply positshis threecategories much the same way Kant claims Aristotle does (and should not). Of course,ifthisis the case, thenwe are right back to wherewe started. For whilethe "New List" founders relative on logic on derivation founders circularity (and it certainly does), such an Aristotelian (or as groundlessness, Kantclearly pointsout). D. TheNewDeduction Signs of arenot really bad as Murphey so sometimes makesthem Nevertheless, things out to be. For it is not entirely clearthatPeircemustor evendid abandonthe transcendental after logicof relatives. the at he project, Certainly, times, used the

Semiotics 653 Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Peirce, Aristotelian derivation But, (and herewe willsimply thatasideas misguided). put in that himto do so. in truth, thereis reallynothing the logic of relatives forces of That is, even if the new logic doesforcea revaluation the deductionof the categories(and, indeed, it does), Peirce need not abandon his view of apperceptionas the unity of semiotic consistency(which is perfectly with commensurable thelogicofrelatives). herethatcommentators On the otherhand,it shouldbe mentioned clearly the Peircereally seek to rework transcendental did on whether project, disagree he he indeed,whether could, and to whatextent mayhavesucceeded.We have well on the rather of noted thatApel thinks Peirceas carrying through already a long run deduction.And in this,as noted, the transcendental project,using him in the same way as it does Peirce'searly does not affect logic of relatives we haveagreedin thelong run on Apel'sview, willall simply Well, Why? project. at forms no problem all. relative thatlogic operatesin plural -subject logical for The problem, Apel,as noted,is thelong run.And once thataccountis called deductionas we into question, are back to "squareone" witha transcendental the shortrun. And once we're here,it sign,or taking place in the immediate or withrelative nonwe how exactly begin,whether makesall the difference relative why logic. Indeed, thisis precisely Murpheythinksthe projectof the so "New List" crashes hard. he so I Is Murphey Obviously has a right? don't think - at leastnot entirely. he And certainly makesclear how the to make, one which is relevant. point the he misses creative relatives way "upsetstheapplecart."But I think sometimes anew.And,on the groundwork in whichPeircemayhavesoughtto subtly re-lay his of thiscount,whileI don't agreewithFisch'sanalysis the "Sop to Cerberus," In view of Peirce'searlyprojectseems more on target. fact,Fisch sympathetic as sees Peirce'sworkon the logic of relatives "backingup the "New actually of and Peirce":"The deduction List."Fischmakesthispointin hisessay, "Hegel in the 'New List' of 1867 was backedup (ifnot superseded) thethree categories deductionin his 'Logic of Relatives'([CP] 3.63, in 1870 by a much simpler "94 its (beforeunpacking nOW) i noted that I agree with this; but, first 144). Fischis wrong:the remark shouldbe made. In pointof fact, value),a preliminary doesnot (indeed, cannot)"back up" the "New List" - it is logic of relatives is lost has the Murphey clearly simply case thattoomuch been (and on thisI think correct... no doubt about it). But Fisch is, in fact, quite rightthat the -semioticproject of the "New List" has not been abandoned transcendental (contraMurphey).And he is rightthatit is stillworkable(at least in entirely three refurbished categories. guise),usingtheinitial "It to an In hislate work,Peirceprovides essential text, precisely thiseffect: a prioributwiththedegreeof be can further said in advance, not,indeed,purely the deductionfrom fact as that apriority is properto logic,namely, a necessary triad."For "... therelation mustbe an elementary thatthere are thatthere signs, a is ofevery signto itsobjectand interpretantplainly triad"(CP 1.292, c. 1908).

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for Here it is entirely clearthatPeirceintends quite explicitly the transcendental not projectto proceed as a deductionof threesemioticcategories, fromthe Model, but from the semiotic triadic form of Subject/Predicate/Copula when thirdness itself. We findthe same point articulated threeyearsearlier, of Peircewrites follows: as "We findthena priorithatthereare threecategories elements be expectedin the phaneron..." (CP 1.299, c. to undecomposable are also evidentin 1905). Similarconcernsabout transcendental philosophy Peirce's 1870 paper, "Descriptionof a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, of ResultingFrom an Amplification the Conceptionsof Boole's Calculus of in also CP 3.143, fn. 1; the containment secondness of Logic" (CP 3.45). (See at thirdness CP 3.144; and on the conditions see and limitsof thought, also Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, Lecture 3: "The Logic of Relatives" [RLT 147-164]; and RLT 106, CP 4.3, 1898.) It is clearthat,whilePeircewavered times, at and indeed occasionally used thewrongheaded Aristotelian he also came back fullcircleto his early approach, transcendental deduction, only now well-equippedwith a strongerset of transcendental somewhat are (and Hegelian) tools. The categories thusdeduced fromthe triadic structure the sign,and are transcendental of because theyare even formeaningto begin. They are also irreducible because triadic necessary relations cannotbe reducedto dyadicrelations; dyadscannotbe reducedto and monads.Indeed, thesecategories the "condition"and the "limits"(in the are Kantian Or very sense) of all possiblethought. to put thepointanother way,the are of between categories exhaustive all thoughtbecause thereare no categories them(i.e., thereis no Category 2V2, of any two of the three,and none beyond and thereis no Category the Fourth, Fifth, of or Peircemakesthispoint etc.). whenhe writes follows: as etc. different from "Fourths, fifths, are not essentially thirds. mediatebetweena largernumberof terms. The singular, They simply different formsof number"(W5:3O1). dual, and pluralare all the essentially Peircealso writes, "No fourth class of terms existsinvolving conception the of becausewhenthatof third introduced, is sinceit involves conception the fourth, of bringing all numbers givenat once, inasmuch are objectsintorelation, higher as theconception bringing of is of objectsintorelation independent thenumber of members therelationship" 3.63).95 of (CP 1. Thirdness Now we proceedto theformal whichbeginsnotwiththeform of deduction, "5 is P," but the relativelogical formof "Object O determines S to Sign /." form also formally is to Interpretant This sign-triadic equivalent thestructure of meaning.And once firmly we established, may (fromthirds)proceed to deduce secondnessand firstness (withoutany problem).So, we proceed with as it is manifest the signitself. orderto do this,a recapitulation in In Thirdness, of thedefinition thesignis in order:"A sign" writes of which Peirce,"is a First standsin such a genuinetriadic relation a Second, called its Object, to be to as

Semiotics 655 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental a calleditsInterpretante assumethesametriadic to capableof determiningThird, to to relation its Object in whichits standsitself the same Object" (CP 2.274). The object is a is "Firstness." is monadicquality. It The sign(in itself) a "first": "second": "Secondness." This is dyadic difference reaction). And the (or "Thirdness." This is theinterpretant. is interpretanta "third": deductionis its withthe "New List," the present As a note of difference and the first, thenmovesto methodologically: "New List" deducesfirsts opposite and then moves to deduces thirds The new deduction, thirds. first, however, thatwe cannotproceedin Someonemaysuggest secondsand firsts. alternatively a we that evenin thethird, havepresupposed it contains thiswaybecausealready secondness and firstness. in a And contains it is truethatthirdness first. Indeed, should come first theydo in the sense thismightmakeit appearthatfirsts (as must be made. Firstnessis primary "New List"). But here a distinction firstness "comes but Ontologically, epistemologically. ontologically, is secondary the thirdis seconds and thirds.But in this (alternative) before" deduction, to (evenwhileit is secondary ontologically secondness, methodologically primary in to whichis secondary the first). we proceedfrommeaning, its semiotic So, form. in is And meaning essentially thetriadic form. logicalrelative Form a. TheTriadicLogicalRelative Peirce of of structure meaningis the logical relative thirdness. The formal B sort of example: "A fives to C."96 We may the following gives regularly of of 's definition thestructure meaning thisto Peirce regular (note: they compare are the same): "Now a signis something, whichdenotessome factor object, A, C."97Or, as we mayputit,"A denotesB to C." jB,to some interpretant thought, relation As Christopher Hookwayputsit, on Peirce'sview,"... the signification is in the its triadicrelation; most straightforward is an irreducibly employment of sentences theform or Y X interprets as a signofZ, Y is a signofZ to X."98

form:"T (the sign) is We may also put this propositionin the following Peirce's in determined Z (the object) to X (the interpretant)," orderto reflect by of definition the sign (cited earlier):"... a Sign ... is so determined ... its by ... (EP2:478). We mayalso put the Object, and so determines its Interpretant" time-form": in "linear T(the "Z(the object;in thepast)determines sign-relative And all thoughtis in to in the present) X (the interpretant; the future)." sign; of essentially thisform. then if Of course, (bychance)we happento be thinking 0/thirdness, (in that and the "content"of the particular the both "form"of thought, thought, case) That is, the of structure "the relational are in the formal logic of thirdness."

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is in triadic formal relation meaning a priori of necessary orderevento construct in the very"terms"contained the threespeciesof monadic,dyadic,and triadic relational forms. forexample, "She hitshim"is a dyadic But, So, logicalrelation. In it relative form. otherwords, becauseit is "meaningful," is alsoin the triadic it theexplicit sentence in and form, as suchis a sign.But as a sign, appears dyadic also has an object(a second), and an interpretant third),which, taken (a and then added to the sign, make the (underlying) meaningof the together, to put it even more sentenceequallyinto a triadic relative. Or, dyadic logical or (and as Peircewas fondof saying): you can neverfully escape thinking simply in triads.(And again,thatis whywe mustbeginwiththe triad,rather talking thanthemonad.) is But once thirdness in place,the further deduction proceedsbyunpacking B secondness firstness relatives. and as "A Take theform determines to C, as the in thirdness. i?." This containsthe dyad, "A determines And withinthis sign form,we also have containedthe monadic relative.In relativelogic, a first " B (whatever happensto be as a qualitative appearsas "B is sign). It may also be put in virtually same waythatthe propositional the form appearsin the "New List."Theretheproposition "5 is P." Here (somewhat) we is similarly may think themonadicrelative of as form "B is ." It has only"one tail" and is "non-reactive" are These forms further (meaningthatit is "pre-secondness"). in Peirce's "Existential diagrammatized (semiotically formalized) Graphs": "In existential a spot withone tail- X represents quality, spot withtwo a a graphs, tails- R- a dyadicrelation. But you can neverby such joiningmakea graph withthreetails"(CP 1:346). You can, however, Peirceis quite aware,begin as with three-tailed and constructrelativedyads and monads without logic, when he writes, "Once threedifficulty. KellyParkermakesthispoint clearly termed relations admitted are intothesystem, we discover thatthey are however, the primitive relatives.From triads one can constructmonads and dyads, the is although reverse not thecase."99 h. Thirdness Complexity as As a further within this functions both pointon thirdness, meaning, category as a logicalform, and as materially In in to dynamic. fact, addition beingthevery form the triadic of relative thirdness also the formal is of structure logicalform, as "complexity"(and specifically Peirce conceives that concept). Peirce the of whenhe writes follows: examine as "I the recognizes complexity categories and I endeavor sortout itselements to to thecomplexity of phaneron according their structure. thus reach my three categories" (CP 8.213). Here, by I Peircehas in mindthe structure thirdness particularly of with "complexity," to its containment the othertwo categories, of and firstness. secondness regard For while firstness monadic, and secondnessis dyadic, neitheris really is - in other words: neitherfirstness secondnesscan ever be nor "complex" as defined "organized (or diversity" unified plurality).

6S7 Semiotics Peirce, Kant, and Apclon Transcendental Of course,it is truethatthe dyadis diversity itself, the dyadis only in but mediationas thirdness. is simplyunmediated, "ordered" through Alone, it of to unsynthesized, unorganized.It takes thirdness "close up" the diversity the job of thirdness. secondnessin an ordered form.And this is precisely this we Although, immediately shouldpointout thatin performing job, thirdness in no wayerases dyad(even as it mediates Rather, the thirdness it). (and preserves that the (in goes beyond)the dyadicrelation exactly same way Hegel conceives withthirdness we have organizeddiversity, "complexity." or do idea). So, only in it to And once defined theseterms, is not difficult see how thisrunsthrough in of philosophy. NicholasRescher his book Complexity As Peirce'sentire system nature'sinherent to "C.S. Peirce nevertiredof emphasizing writes, tendency in of butequally Natureis always theprocess generating diversity, complexity."100 whichis it of in theprocess mediating withorder.The processof diversification, of of also themotorof time,is the force secondness but the form timeis the of (and complexform) thethird. logicalrelative this groundworkin complexity Indeed, (as noted) is preciselywhat In laterKantianarchitectonic. "The Doctrineof Necessity Peirce's undergirds on Examined," Peirce proceeds to build this architectonic the ground of the main fact is growth and increasing semioticcomplexity: "Everywhere as of thiscomplexity a mixture law and (EP1:3O8). Peircedefines complexity" II.4-6 (EP1:299). (Theykey on Physics (EP1:3O8), relying Aristotle's spontaneity a withChapterII of Aristotle's pointof view Physics from scientific problem - is the criticism Empedocles's theoryof evolution by chance of anyway II. variation Empedocles'sviewson [Physics 8]; Plato to his creditincorporates in evolution quite explicitly his process metaphysics Timaeus). Although, this as certainly, it is Aristotelian, view is equally Hegelian as well, as Peirce is thatthe universe everywhere notes:"... Hegel discovered himself permeated and nothingelse, is the 'Secret of Hegel') withcontinuous growth(for that, ..."(CP1.40). 2. Secondness a. TheOutwardClash:Peirce, Hegel,and Derrida Of course,while Peirce prized Hegel's Phenomenology (especiallyfor its to at and of analyses complexity thirdness), timeshe is less sympathetic Hegel's of thanin hisanalysis secondness moreapparent view- and thisis nowhere (or of is statement thisone: "The capitalerror "reactive" force).The classiccritical in his whichpermeates whole system everypart of it is that he almost Hegel and of consciousness hitting the ignores OutwardClash. ... thisdirect altogether hit of getting entersinto all cognitionand servesto make it mean something real" (W5:255; EP1:233). In other words, Hegel misses the "clash" of which in a based almostexclusively thirds and (thirds secondness, favors system to is difficult erase secondness). Peirce's perspective not entirely apparently ofAbsoluteMind,whichis stemsfrom understand and likely Hegel's analysis

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not a regulative ideal long run(in Kant'smoremoderate sense),but thegradual and absolute of sublation all difference absoluteunity. to Derrida(who follows Peirceon many Similarly, pointsin his own semiotics) also sharesthiscritique. That is, Derridarecognizes value of Hegel, but the the issue of difference secondness)is of particular concern.As Derridaputs his (or to .. .. point,"I haveattempted distinguish difference. from Hegeliandifference. in the greater determines difference contradiction in order as Hegel, Logic, only to resolveit, to interiorize to lift up ... into the self-presence an ontoit of it, or onto-teleological And in the same vein, Derrida theological synthesis."101 writes that "... this conflictuality differ ance - which can be called of contradiction if one demarcates by means of a long work on Hegel's it only Here it is evident resolved."102 conceptof contradiction can neverbe totally thattheidea of absolutemind,whichmight in close up all thefissures reason,is an excessof theimagination. it was the Zeitgeist the times:the of Indeed, simply nineteenth saw absoluteworldhistorical in century progress almosteverything saw (Nietzschebeingone of thenoble exceptions). to they Contrary thissortof thinking, according to Derrida, the meaning of each thought is always or As "deferred," "put off' and offand off,ad inftnitum. Derridaputsit, "... diffrance refers ... deferring meansof delay,delegation, to referral, by reprieve, And detour,postponement, reserving."103 on thiscount,Derridasees Peirceas solvingthe problem of the excessesof Kant and Hegel. This is evidentin Derrida'sremarks Peirce"... goes very in thedirection that far thatI havecalled the de-construction the transcendental of which, at one time or signified, wouldplace a reassuring to thereference end from another, signto sign."104 On the otherhand,whileDerridarejects of the Hegeliandimension of part he does hold thatthought precisely is thatmechanism whichthe semiotics, by selfnegatesitself into the future, and talksto itselfas-another. And on this, Derridaquite self-consciously alignshis "position"withHegel: "(The positionin Hegeliandialectics, always, is to as of-the-other, finally, pose-oneself oneself by the otherof the Idea, as other- than- oneself one's finite in determination withthe aim of repatriating reappropriating and of close to oneself, returning oneselfin the infinite of richness one's determination, And clearly, etc.)."105 Peirce,too, followsHegel on this count. Moreover,Peirce would appear to followHegel rather arises clearlyevenon thatpoint at whichintersubjectivity fromthe world - i.e., in that verymomentwhere meaningco-emerges in relation theworld, the"this." to in triangular To be sure,the critique the outward of clash tellsonly a smallpart of the of the Peirce/Hegelrelationship pointwhichclearly in story (a emerges Fisch's excellent and Peirce"). In fact, a "secondlook," essay,"Hegel secondness, given looksquite Hegelian.Allowme to elaborate. The keyidea herein Hegel - and the anti-Cartesian in Hegel, Peirce,and Derridaidea perhaps mostimportant
b. Secondness and aThis-ness"

Semiotics 659 Peirce, Kant,and Apelon Transcendental is that thoughtis not unified. its verynature,it is divided:it is helplessly By i.e., continually breakingdown into differences, everytime the mind goes Kantian of The unity apperception. "I" which lookingforthe pure and singular the the goes lookingforthe "I" finds "Not-I" (i.e., it finds secondperson).And intodialectical of thisis thevery phenomenology, whichPeirceis simply gateway Otherwise to thesemiotic example par excellence. put,and contrary Peirce'shasty remarks about the "outward clash,"Hegel's phenomenology begins(not in spite because as necessarily intrinsic all thought. to but) only of, 0/"secondness" is force(of difference) Perhapsnowherein the Phenomenologythisreactive than in the "Master-Slave Dialectic" (the same "Lordshipand more apparent connectedto earlier whichis also intrinsically Bondage" section,mentioned the of of the "we"). Peirceneglects richness thisclashin his analysis theabsence dialecticmay be the most of the outwardclash. But, while the master/slave is the verybeginning the of the most important obvious example example, comes onto the scene in wheretriangulated linguistic meaning Phenomenology, man whentheanimal-being says"This" to an object,whilehe thatvery moment at reasonthanthat at is pointing directly it forno other directly it.And he points or This of to it is reactive him (i.e., it has the quality secondness, difference). is Part A. why Hegel entitles the very firstpart of the Phenomenology, I. at Subsection "Certainty the Level of Sense-Experience The Consciousness, Once the "this" emerges, thenimmediately thought This,' and 'Meaning.'"106 to unfold and moveforwardin time, out of its circular,animal, begins here being meant very state of "consciousness"(consciousness unreflective CharlesTaylorin his book, Hegel, makesthispointwhen he writes, loosely). hereis to askthesubject the movement "Now Hegel's wayof entering dialectical to saywhatit experiences."107 ofsensible certainty in secondness to similar whatwe find Peirce,who alsoconceives This is very of "thisness," or "bcceitas." Moreover, he also emphasized in terms into as "thisness" phenomenological secondness) theveryentryway meaning (or at something, The mindmustfirst the point (in exactly same way Hegel does). and say "this."Or to put the pointanother recognize way,the mindmustfirst of form the signPeircecalls "indexes."As UmbertoEco pointsout the distinct indexesare our most"primitive" in his essay,"Horns, Hooves, and Insteps,"108 being the oldest among the (the oldest and most basic ... "imprints" signs holds a certain the prideof place, finger indexes).And amongindexes, pointing for Peirce - even to the extentof definingthe verysemioticcategoryof a "I As being finger indexicality. Peircewrites, call sucha signan index, pointing the typeof the class" (W5:162-3, 1885). So, again,just as in Hegel, forPeirce, preciselywith the "This," with thought becomes triadic and meaningful of with the mind'sexperience secondness.(As a brief point,we i.e., pointing, bound up with is recallthatDavidson'sidea of triangulation intrinsically should as pointing well,or whathe callsostensin.) Of course, to be fair,Peirce himself recognizedpoints of connectionto

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came to see his view as Hegel, such as these,and, over the years,eventually moreand morewithHegel's own. Indeed,he makesthispointexplicitly aligning as whenhe tellsus thathis early Kantian Kantian they mayhavebeen categories, at first over the yearscame increasingly resemble those of Hegel. to intended, Peircewrites, . in from two years incessant study "My three categories. . resulted the direction trying do what Hegel triedto do. It becameapparent of to that there were such categories as his."109Peirce also writes that Hegel's is "a everwritten."110 And Phenomenology work ... perhapsthe most profound "The cenopythagorean are doubtless another attemptto again: categories characterizewhat Hegel sought to characterizeas his three stages of to thought..."(CP 8.329, 1904; Letter LadyWelby).Indeed,eventhesupposed architectonic Peirceoutlines the Monist in is, series, in the end, a system system of "objective in linewithHegel.111 idealism," clearly It is clearthenthatPeirce'sprimary is evolution thought from of Kantianism to Hegelianism.Coupled with his intersubjective his attackon apperception, and an alreadystrongly incognizables, Hegelian (albeit still transcendental) deductionof the categories, Peirce has emergedfromthe AncientCave of monadicpropositions theimmutable and of and Being,and categories Substance into the clear lightof a thoroughgoing evolutionary Hegelianism. Although, anti i.e., as a Kantian again,the long runendgameremains decidedly -Hegelian, ideal.112 regulative 3. Firstness a. MonadicQuality Firstness itsmaterial in is dimension themostdifficult thethree define, of to the one, perhaps, mostopen to interpretation. it appearsas "feeling," Certainly, in Peirce,whichsoundslike "impressions," Hume and Kant conceivethem. as in is Although, fact,a first not a Humean or a Kantianatomic(self-contained) intuition.113 intuition, Peirceunderstands is "... a cognition An as empirical it, not determined a previouscognitionof the same object, and therefore so by determined something of theconsciousness" out In by then, (W2.-193-4). effect, the stream signsmasksthe experience firsts thirds. of of in and Theyare within behind it were) the triadic structure thirdness. of Peircesees thisas a natural (as "... if thereis no such thingas an consequenceof the absence of intuition: absoluteinstant, thereis nothingabsolutely eithertemporally in the or present senseof confrontation. fact, are thusbrought In we close to thedoctrine the of whichis thatelements Thirdness of cannotentirely escaped" (CP be synechism, that"... the third of its own nature is and 7.653).114Peircealso writes relative, thisis whatwe are always evenwhenwe aimat thefirst second" (CP or thinking, "At in 1.362; see also W5:305). And further, no one instant mystateof mindis therecognitionor representation, in the relationof my statesof mind at but different there (W2:227). is" instants, Whatthenis the activity the first, its activity in the activerelations of if lies

661 Semiotics Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Peirce, of the That is, iffirsts within thirds seconds? the and {within activity thesign,not theresomething to are in termsof monadicrelatives) so difficult conceive,is whichpaintsthemin their natures. . . something we further can say about their and as Peircedoes givean accountof firstness spontaneity, thisI aspect? dynamic But is think theright wayto takethe actionof firstness. evenbeyondthat,there accountof the pure play of musement, is the stillricher developedin the late for the Realityof God." The link work of 1908, "A NeglectedArgument draw is between obvious,but Peircedoes not exactly playand spontaneity fairly thiscategory in out theequationexplicitly, firstness semiosis i.e., equals precisely this thereis good reasonforthinking to be the case of pure play.Still,I think Thomas Sebeok seems to draw this point out as well). But in order to (and makethispoint. to developit,again,it is helpful notehow others b.A NoteonHeidegger yDerrida,and Gadamer the link we forexample, findan intrinsic between importance In Heidegger, of intoBeing,"and a definition thispointer of Dasein as thebeingwhich"points as fundamentally as pure play. That Heidegger conceives human beings "pointers"(and in a quite Hegelian sense,as well) is evidentin the following account(and herenotice, too, Heidegger'suse of the "we" pronoun).In "What is Called Thinking,"Heidegger writes,"When man is drawinginto what thatwaywe are a As he withdraws, pointsintowhatwithdraws. we are drawing whichhas not, not yet, thenat something But we are pointing a pointer. sign, into the languagethatwe speak.It remains been transposed uncomprehended. intoBeing,and we do We semiotically We are an uninterpreted point sign."115 would laterplace at the of a thisonly through field pureplay(a notionGadamer in The point is evident Heidegger's"Kantbook," of his own semiotics). center time and play. where he makes the explicit link between transcendental ... "... play-space is formed pure determinations through Heideggersaysto the inner sense is pure self-affection, original i.e., of the innersense. The pure as time."116 pure apperception timeand Indeed, herejust as Heideggerdefines of it so play." meaning, too does he define terms "original fusesthe We findthe same notionin Derrida,who (quite self-consciously) - and in analyzingPeircean semioticsof Heidegger, Hegel, and Peirce "One could call notionof play.As Derridawrites, a discovers strong difference, of as the absenceof the transcendental signified limitlessness play,thatis to play And of and themetaphysics presence."117 of theology sayas thedestruction ontoin in is neverpresent and of itself, a sufficient "... further: the signified concept and thatwould refer conceptis every Essentially lawfully, onlyto itself. presence to whichit refers the other,to other within in inscribed a chainor in a system is Such play by concepts, meansof a systematic of differences. a play,differance, of of the a concept,but rather possibility conceptuality, a thusno longersimply in here,Derridais makinga Clearly processand system general."118 conceptual in difference relation to the very Peircean point about secondness (or

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and interpretant), argues that "play" is what "undergirds" to speak) this (so movement difference the future. of into note here,Derrida,like (As a further also of Hegel, Peirce,and Wittgenstein, uses the perspective the "we" in his accountof secondness and difference: I am starting, "... from strategically, the place and thetimein which'we' are,eventhoughin thelastanalysis opening my is notjustifiable sinceit is onlyon thebasisof diffmnce its 'history' and thatwe can allegedly knowwho and where'we' are,and whatthelimits an 'era' might of be."119) And similarly, whose work Hans-GeorgGadamer,in Truthand Method^ stems directly fromHeidegger on this point about questioninginto being thata certain through play,suggests logic of questionand answerevolvesin a fieldof pure play.120 as Peirceconceivedhis logic of abductionas Indeed, just out Gadamer also conceives playas of emerging of thecreative ofmusement, play thehorizonout ofwhichall fundamental being emerge. questions c. Peirce Playand Musement on Now proceeding backto Peirceand musement, does describe he firstness as "spontaneity" 6.265; see also CP 3.422, 1892). This is thesameAristotelian (CP of he series(and which, mixedwith principle spontaneity developsin theMonist of in order,generates thirds).It is at once the spontaneity variation evolution, and the objective chance(or tychism) the "open future" Aristotle's of "Sea(cf. in Ch. FightTomorrow," De Interpretation 9, 18a30-19b, especially 19a30-35, this 46-48). Throughthenatural processof evolution, tychism generates higherorderlevelsof playand creativity and, ultimately, As complexity. a note on BrianGoodwin,in How the Its The science, contemporary LeopardChanged Spots: Evolution Complexity,121 thatplaygenerates of similarly argues complexity. This tychistic is never exhausted play fully alongtheevolutionary continuum, butas order increases relation the between and becomes spontaneity organization evermorecomplexand subtle.Whatwas once morechaotic, now,at thelevel is of humans, moredefined terms highly in of creative and playful minds.One of the definitive statements this view is given by Friedrich of Schillerin On the Aesthetic Education Man: In a Series Letters.122 Schiller of of (likePeirce)has Kant in mind,and seeksto synthesize reasonand sensation play- playas synthetic in This idea was one of the first that Peirce encountered a young as activity. and withhimthroughout life, his philosopher, itsforce clearly stayed germinating in his middle-to-later as "tychism," finally and to years flowering a fullbloom in hisvery conception musement. late of In a letter Lady Welby,December23, 1908, Peirceexplains, to "As to the word'play,'thefirst book of philosophy everread ... was Schiller's I Aesthetische wherehe has so muchto sayabout theSpiel-Trieb; it made so much and Briefe, me as to have thoroughly soaked my notionof 'play' to this impression upon The significance this Schillerian of dimensionto Peirce's semiotics day."123 is at lengthby Sebeok, in his book, ThePlay ofMusement explored (the tide of

Semiotics 663 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Sebeok ascribesto this idea in whichwould appear to signal the importance hisbook as follows: Peirce).Sebeokbegins The key to the title of this book is to be found in Peirce's profound study, in 1855-56, of Friedrich In Schiller'sconcept of Spieltrieb. his Briefeber die des desthetische Erziehung Menschen (1974-95), Schiller an analysisof human natureas comprising presented the three "impulses": Stofftrieb, drive for diversity, forever forchange,contrasted with Formtrieb, striving alien to time, the demand for 'form'in the abstract, to to henceoppugnant change(thispaircorresponding a third he Kant'swell-known dualism), component plus or himself dubbed Spieltrieb, play (ein ernstes Spiel) the aesthetictendency,mediatingand harmoniously the way reconciling two-fold of senseand reasonon the ...124 faculties levelof theindividual's and within sensation thethirdness as wheresecondness reaction Playis theregion the of meaningare intertwined. Indeed, play as spontaneity undergirds entire this makesprecisely point processof semiosis.Sebeok (somewhathumorously) and legitimate "... Foreplayis the natural whenhe writes, preludeto semiotic (no lessthansomatic)..." experience.125 While thereis not space here to unpackall the nuances of semioticplay we may point out that there are at least four withinthe Peirceansystem, for useful formulating is of dimensions musement: Musement a "technique," (1) abductions.We see the same technique at work in the AmericanGothic makesthisconnection of stories" EdgarAllanPoe. And Peircehimself "detective when put to the test in when he explainsthat difficult questions, explicitly in in find- "... as Edgar Poe remarked his 'The Murders the often musement, - their themto the This particularly Rue Morgue,' adapts keys. smoothly-fitting see Play of Musement" (EP2:437). (On this literature, Umberto Eco and is ThomasSebeok, TheSignofThree: Peirce.)(2) Musement also Dupin,Holmes, It of senseof thesynthetic of a "form play,"in theSchillerian activity semiosis. is the field between chaos and order, precisely where the structureof takesplace. (3) Peircealso conceivesmusement into complexification the future to as purecontemplative indeed,according Peirce,it "... begins dialogicactivity: of in withdrinking the impression some nook in one of the enough passively three Universes. But impressionsoon passes into attentiveobservation, of into musing,musing into a livelygive-and-take communion observation for withyourself; self between and self (EP2:436); it is an "open conversation Musementalso provides, such is all meditation" accordingto (EP2:437). (4) a synopticview of all three categories:"From speculationson the Peirce,

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homogeneitiesof each Universe, the Muser will naturallypass to the and between two different consideration homogeneities connection of Universes, that or all three. in one typeof occurrence, ofgrowth Especially, themall we find ..."(EP2:437). E. Performative Contradiction With regard to a final demonstration both apperceptionand the of this takes place (as it does in Kant) by its "necessity," i.e., its categories, - such that its negationis self-contradictory. idea of a The unavoidability transcendental formulated Kant (following self-contradiction originally was by as a contradiction betweenP and ~P, where ~P is assertedby the Descartes) and P is the a prioriexistential conditionforthe veryclaim, skeptic, -pragmatic ~P. For example,Descartesenliststhe skepticto claim that he does not exist "I for (~P), butPis thecondition thatassertion. exist"(hereand now) is entailed as propositional contentof the existential Apel and assumption.126 linguistic Habermashave formulated more linguistic a versionof the self-contradiction calleda "transcendental As contradiction." Habermasputsit,"Apel performative and I employthis methodto discoveruniversal of pragmatic presuppositions we and content."127 forexample, So, argumentation to analyzetheirnormative But of might say:(A) We are not speaking. thevery performance thatspeechact the act: (B) We are speaking.(B) is the formal presupposes underlying speech condition the act (A); and (A) and (B) thusstandin a contradictory of relation. who asserts or a like-claim, said to be engagedin a is So, the individual (A)y contradiction." "performative Apel's own accountreliesmoreupon thelong run as groundwork testingperformative for a contradictions. Here, by contrast, "short run" (immediatetriadic sign)-based "performative is contradiction" sufficient. our I are close. Although, meanings, think, very With regard to the "we," a performative contradiction attachesto the of the "we." One cannotbe a self, even utter word "I" (in any or the negation intolanguage.The individual mustbe way) untilafter meaningful beingushered he partof the"us" before can be an "I." ForApel,as forPeirce,"... even solitary must be conceived of as an internalized mode ... of the genuine thinking communication betweenreal members the community (Apel 1995, p. of ..." the of 381). As Apel putsit, the skeptic mayassert negationof the primacy the "we" and the "us." Someonemayclaimthathe is "not one of us." Leavingaside forthemoment, and religion he politics (i.e., all theclassicsocialdividers), must, at once, assert his division, (D) hisunity and with"us." And againthere a is (C) contradictionbetween C and Dy to the effectthat C is performative to fundamentally equivalent ~D. He is "alwaysalready"(as Apel would put it) "on our side." He necessarily thathe is partof the "we," i. logically presupposes he is a prioriin our logical space of meaning.The individual necessarily is e., extended from socialfabric, notprior it. the and to The same goes for the structure time. The sign necessarily of proceeds

Semiotics 665 Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Peirce, in forward time. Someone may negate this point - may even negate time altogether.Yet, if the doubt is given propositionalform and performed contradicts claim. that in speech,he or she simultaneously linguistically everyday occurs between the actual speech act and the contradiction A performative content.I mustassume someone can hear me fromthe "existential-linguistic" the And effectively, same and speak back to me about the world.128 future, relative of the of is used to defend necessity theunity thetriadic logical argument relative results of act The meaningful ofdenialoftheuniversality thetriadic form. takesplace in the because meaningnecessarily in a performative contradiction, the of One mustasserta priori necessity the of form the triadic logicalrelative. he in exactly same moment proposes the relative form triadic (implicitly), logical of thenegation thatnecessity. F. Conclusion and deduction of categories, a transcendental In sum, Peirce attempted This fellapartwiththe logic of in apperception, the "New List of Categories." to and attempts on follows relatives. through the earlyproject, Apel, however, and conceivethe long run as apperception, (fromthere)deduce the categories. a remains concern. the at Yet,without groundwork thestart, chargeof circularity the ideal, while So, alternatively, long run may be left only as a regulative apperceptionand the categories are derived from the immediate sign. is argued) the "unity of semiotic Apperception then (as Peirce originally into the future directed and is transcendentally (even ifpotentially consistency," form are all thoughts also in theintersubjective of Moreover, extended). infinitely This triadicformis the fundamental of the triadicrelative thirdness. starting point for the deductionof the categories(in contrastto the "New List"). each of movement thesign-object-interpretant a relation, Meaningentails triadic the a second,or a third.And, finally, defenseof the partof whichis a first, takes the formof a transcendental performative categoriesand apperception from derived sign. contradiction, Apel,in theimmediate University Creighton jja04319@creighton.edu REFERENCES C.S. Peirce,
1958

1982-

Sanders TheCollected Peirce,8 Vols., C. Hartshorne, PapersofCharles Press. P. Weiss,and A. Burks(cds.), Cambridge:HarvardUniversity number. volumeand paragraph as Referenced CP, with Edition. 1982-, Max of Writings CharlesS Peirce:A Chronological Volumes1Press. IndianaUniversity Fisch,et al. (eds.), Bloomington: as as 6 are published of 1999. Referenced W, withvolumeand page number.

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1992 TheEssential Peirce:Selected Volume 1 (1867Philosophical Writings,

1992

1998

Apel,Karl-Otto 1967 New AnalyticPhilosophy Language and the Geisteswissenschaften. of York:Humanities Press. 1972, 1974, 1980 From Kant to Peirce: The Semiotic Transformation of Transcendental of Logic,Proceedings theThirdInternational KantCongress, 1970, Dordrecht: Reidel,pp. 90-104. 1978 "Transcendental Semiotics and the Paradigms First of In Philosophy." Philosophical Exchange 2(4):3-22. 1980 Towardsa Transformation Philosophy, Adey and D. Frisby G. of (trans.),Boston: Routledge& Kegan Paul. This piece is citedin the textas .Apel, 1980, withpage numbers. 1981 Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatismto Pragmaticism, J.M. Krois Amherst: of Press. (trans.), University Massachusetts 1982 "C.S. Peirce and the Post-TarskianProblem of an Adequate Explicationof the Meaning of Truth: Towards a TranscendentalPragmatic Theoryof Truth,Part II," Transactions theCharlesS. of Peirce Winter XVIII, No. 1. Society, 1984 Towarda Transcendental Semiotics: Selected Volume 1. New Essays, Humanities Press. Jersey: 1987 "C. S. Peirceand Post-Tarskian Truth,"in TheRelevance Charles of of La Peirce, Eugene Freeman(ed.), The MonistLibrary Philosophy. Salle,111.: Open Court. 1995 "Transcendental Semiotics and Hypothetical Metaphysics of Evolution: A Peircean or Quasi-PeirceanAnswer to a Recurrent Problem of Post-Kantian in Philosophy," Peirceand Contemporary Kenneth Laine Ketner(ed.), New York:FordhamUniversity Thought, Press.Citedas AoeL 1995. and Daees. 1998 From a Transcendental Semiotic Point of View, Marianna Papastephanou (ed.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University. 2001 as RealismBased on a Regulative Idea of "Pragmatism Sense-Critical Truth: In Defense of a Peircean Theory of Realityand Truth," Transactions theCharlesS. PeirceSociety, XXXVII, No. 4, pp. Fall of 443-474. NOTES 1. The Theaetetus Plato, Theaetetus 189e-190a, in Myles Burnyeat, of revised Burnyeat, Plato,MJ. Levett(trans.), HackettPublishing, by (Indianapolis: 1990),

and the The Lectures Reasoning LogicofThings: Cambridge Conferences Laine Ketner(ed.), Introduction KennethLaine 1898, Kenneth of by Ketnerand Hilary Putnam, Cambridge:Harvard University Press. Referenced RLT and page number. as TheEssential Peirce:Selected Volume 2 (1893Philosophical Writings, IndianaUniversity 1913), PeirceEditionProject(eds.), Bloomington: Press.Referenced EP2 and page number. as

Houserand Christian Kloesel 1893), Nathan (cds.), Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press.Referenced EP1, and page number. as

Semiotics 667 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental

p. 323.

2. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith (trans.), UnabridgedEdition, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 59. As a note on differs from"transcendent Kant "transcendental terminology: philosophy" philosophy." 2nd are that"... transcendental transcendent not interchangeable terms"(A296/ writes means beyond limitsof experience, the while B353) (Critique,p. 299). Transcendent conditions experience). transcendental meansnecessary ( of translated analysed and 3. Kant,Groundwork the of MetaphysicsMorals, of byHJ. Paton,(New York:Harper& Row, 148, 1953). Al 4. Kant,Critique PureReason, 3/B27, p. 60. of Js 5. Cited fromMurrayMurphey,The Development Peirce Philosophy of Press,1961), p. 89. Apel also recognizesthispoint as (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity central hisown transcendental to semiotics (1980, 91). 6. Murphey, 298. See also p. 305. p. und derPragmatismus von See also Jiirgen Kempski's 7. book, C.S. Peirce in of the 1952). Apel acknowledges importance von Kempski his own account (Stuttgart, (Apel 1980, pp. 81-3). 's here: "In otherwords,the 'highest 8. point' of Peirce Apel also writes of the 'indefinite is the 'ultimate of transformation Kant's transcendental logic opinion' "The of (Apel, 1980, pp. 87-88). And once more,Apel writes: community investigators'" of is community experimentation subjectof thisunity the indefinite quasi-transcendental withthe indefinite whichis identical (Apel, 1980, pp. 87of community interpretation" 88). "... 9. Apel also writes, in the 'New List of Categories'of 1868, [Peirce] deductionof the categories had the transcendental just as much beforehis eyes as the deduction" (Apel,1980, p. 83). metaphysical Peter Skagestad,The Road of Inquiry: 10. On this point, see especially Realism(New York:ColumbiaUniversity Peirceys Charles Press,1981), p. 30Pragmatic of to 31. And withregard the mathematics the long run,the parallelis to the Calculus, Peirce wants ideas to which uses a limit,towardwhich numberscan approximate. do in of toward limit(whichhe thinks as truth), thesamewaynumbers in a approximate theCalculus. in Darwin'sOriginwas published 1859 whenPeircewas twenty 11. years of his old and just finishing degreeat Harvard.In the nexttwo decadesDarwin'stheory evolutiondominatedthe intellectual stage at Harvard.Peirce writes,"I grew up in when TheOriginofSpecies and was about twenty-one appeared."(In Peirce, Cambridge AnnTurrisi Patricia and as a Principle Method RightThinking, (ed.), (New of Pragmatism York:SUNY, 1997), p. 164.) As a note,in theDescent Man Darwinwntes, It is, therefore, 12. highly of have been graduallyperfected faculties that with mankindthe intellectual probable throughnaturalselection" (Darwin, The Descent of Man, collected in Darwin on editedby Thomas F. Glick The Evolution: Development theTheory Natural Selection, of of and David Kohn, (Indianapolis:Hackett PublishingCompany,Inc., 1997), p. 243). Darwin also wrote of the prospectsfor developing an evolutionary epistemology: of to it "Undoubtedly would be interesting have tracedthe development each separate to in the from statein whichit exists the loweranimals thatin whichit existsin faculty a This textis takenfrom the nor permit attempt." my man; but neither ability knowledge selectionfromDarwin's The Descentof Man, collectedin Darwin on Evolution:The

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Development theTheory Natural Selection, 243. of of p. 13. Peircedoes not refer the structure inquiry thisway,but by to of in it doingso we willdo morejusticeto hisaccountbymaking clearer. 14. Bain playeda key role in Skagestadhas pointedout thatAlexander Peirce'ssynthesis knowledge of and Darwinian Bain's definition biology:"It was precisely of beliefwhichenabled Peirce to treatbeliefs a Darwinianmanner:it is onlywhen in beliefs regarded dispositions actionthattheycan be seen as interacting the are as to with selection" environment, thereby becoming subjectto natural (1981, p. 32). 15. Peircewas generousin his debt to Bain. On thissee Max H. Fisch's and Laine editedbyKenneth book, Peirce, Semeiotic, Pragmatism: Essays Max H. Fisch, by Ketnerand Christian Kloesel, (Bloomington:Indiana University J. Press, 1986). See In especiallyChapter 5, "AlexanderBain and the Genealogy of Pragmatism." his to Bain writes that"I consider... Appendix ThirdEditionof Mentaland Moral Science, thatbelief a primitive is to disposition followout mysequencethathas been experienced, and to expecttheresult"(Mentaland Moral Science Green,and Co., 1872], [Longmans, Part1, Appendix, 100; citedin Fisch1986, p. 85). p. 16. Peircederives thisconception the interplay of betweenirritation and from Lamarck.In Zoological Lamarck in equilibrium writes, Philosophy "Irritability all or some of their is of of it than parts themostgeneral characteristic animals; is moregeneral the facultyof voluntarymovementsand of feeling, more even than that of translatedby Hugh Elliot, [Chicago: digestion" (Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, of viewof animals University Chicago Press,1984], p. 51). Peircealso adoptsLamarck's on as of taking habits, partofhistheory inquiry. 17. C. J.Misak, Truth and the End ofInquiry (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Bain also describes experience the as Press,1991), p. 49, footnote and p. 59. Alexander 8; a disruptive "shock" which"unhingesand decomposesbelief."Alexander Bain, Mental and Moral Science,3rdEdition; cited in Fisch, p. 105, footnote44. Fisch provides references Peircewhich derivefromthispassage: "CP 1.332, 334, 336; 5.45; and to and GeorgeSantayana, Scepticism AnimalFaith(New York,1923), pp. 139-149 passim.'" 18. A notehereon theKant-Peirce is relationship in order:the"New List" of 1867 engagesexplicitly the a priori in but does not rejectit as utaste"-based, method, but ten year in the method"thereis clearly changeof tone a later, dismissing "a priori toward Kant. 19. makesthispointwhenhe writes, Peirce'sconceptof the "... Skagestad final as is to opinionofinquiry noumenal empirically equivalent Kant'snegative conceptof the noumenon; is only,unlikeKant,Peircedeniesthatbeyondthelimitthere something of whichwe know nothing"(Skagestad1981, p. 75). This point was made earlierby BruceAltshuler his Ph.D. dissertation, Pragmatic in The MaximofC. S. Peirce: Study A of its Originand Development (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity, 1977), pp. 75-77; (also citedin Skagestad 1981, p. 75). 20. As W.H. Walsh puts it, "An intuitive such as God is understanding, and themin a singleact; it supposedto have,would apprehend particulars conceptualize wouldnotneed to go through doubleprocess first, itwere,getting touchwith the of as in its object and then making it out" (W.H. Walsh, Kant's Critique of Metaphysics of [Edinburgh: University Edinburgh Press,1975], p. 12); see Critique, B29/A15. 21. GivenKant'sdistinction between negative positive the and of concepts the noumena(of whichKant acceptsonlythe negative), Peirceacceptsboth negative the and thepositive withthelong run). (especially

Semiotics 669 Kant, and Apelon Transcendental Peirce,

In his OriginDarwinwrites, natural 22. "... will always selection succeed . and savingevery of the organization. . without any in the longrun in reducing part by meanscausingsome otherpartto be largely developedin a corresponding degree"(The [New York: PenguinBooks, 1985], p. 187) (emphasisadded on "long OriginofSpecies "... will forms generally succeed run").And Darwinwrites, in thelong runthedominant in spreading" (ibid.,p. 328). 23. of Apel writesof "... Peirce's positivetransformation the famous in whichtakesintoaccountKant'slegitimate motives without Kantian distinction, getting down the difference betweenunknowable in cali entangled nonsensi ties.Insteadof laying betweenthe real as the knowablein the long and knowable objectsPeircedistinguishes to be the resultof an actual cognitionbasically run and whatever underlying the may reservation fallibility" of ([CPJ5.257,p. 310). Al 24. Kant,CritiqueofPureReason, 3/B27, p. 60. for I am grateful Patrick to 25. Murray discussionon Kant's notion of as being"divine"in nature. architectonic, specifically a In providing thisnew groundwork, 26. Apel is, of course,not entirely as is insofar it is "necessary" the "falli bilist."Transcendental (in philosophy "infallible," samewayKantconceives it). W.V.O. Quine, Wordand Object(Cambridge:MIT Press,1960), p. 27. 23. The MichaelWilliams, Review Metaphysics 28. XXXIV,No. 2, Issue No. of in text p. 134, December(1980): 243-72, especially 269. There is a footnote Williams's whichreads,"A pointstressed Kuhn.See TheStructure the after word"progressing" of by of 2d Revolutions, ed., (Chicago: University ChicagoPress,1970), p. 206." Scientific and RichardRorty, 29. Papers, yRelativism, Truth: Philosophical Objectivity 10. Volume (Cambridge: Press, 1991), p. 130, footnote University 1, Cambridge 30. Ibid.,p.Ul. the Realitiesalso rejects long Paul Weiss in his book Beingand Other 31. run. "Good theoriesare guides, pointingto what is to be investigated; theyare not know of The members thescientific answer. community necessarily pointedtowarda final of the to content workwithin frame some forlong periodstheyremain whileoften this, Realities that,at the time,is accepted by most" (Paul Weiss, Being and Other theory [Chicago:Open CourtPress,1995], pp. 178-9). writes that Overview A Nicholas Rescherin Complexity: Philosophical 32. Peirce's long run is possible, "[b]ut we can never know- be it in practiceor in it has realized....Reality hiddenreserves; is 'deeper'thanour principle thatit is actually of it everis - or can be - at any particular juncture"(Nicholas Rescher, knowledge Overview A Publishers, 1998], NJ: [New Brunswick, Transaction Complexity:Philosophical p. 40). "Even and in RollinWorkman his essay"Pragmatism Realism"writes, 33. would not have timeto who standsat the end of experience Peirce'sfinalinvestigator of make up a list of all possible phenomenal manifestations Newton's laws, for and Realism," Studiesin the Philosophy instance"(Rollin Workman,"Pragmatism of The CharlesSandersPeirce, ed. Edward C. Moore and Richard Robin, [Amherst: of Press,1964], p. 251). University Massachusetts Realism as a Process Carl Hausman, "Charles Peirce's Evolutionary 34. S. in the Transactions theCharles Peirce 2002, Vol. Society, Winter/Spring, of Philosophy," XXXVIII,No. 1/2, pp. 13-27.

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35. Hausman, Charles S. Peirce3s (Cambridge: Evolutionary Philosophy Cambridge University Press,1993, 1997), pp. 215-216. 36. Hausman(1993, 1997), pp. 199-200. 37. Ibid.,p. 200. 38. 's "This As Kelly Parkerputs it in The Continuity Peirce Thought, of to of arisesifwe try demonstrate correctness the threecategories, the circularity problem becausethedemonstration of Peirce would haveto utilizesome form inference. obviously could not satisfy those who demand a demonstrative or justification, transcendental deductionof the categories."See Parker, The Continuity Peirce'sThought (Nashville: of Vanderbilt University Press,1998), p. 18. 39. Hausman(1993, 1997), pp. 215-216 40. Kant,p. 1, Heidegger, 4L Heidegger, Kant, p. 2. Here Heidegger argues that Kant was the in structure time. of fundamentally laying groundformetaphysics the transcendental For Peirceand Heidegger(and even Kant,at times),groundwork means the necessary flowof meaning and timeintothefuture. we are,at the levelof inquiry, walking still So, on a Peircean too as "bog." And thegroundwork maybe conceived a "bog," buta bog of See the Mirrorof Nature:Rorty, temporal 2002, "Philosophy necessity. Abrams, After and in and Dewey,and Peirceon Pragmatism Metaphor," Metaphor Symbol). 42. Kant,p. 141. Heidegger, 43. Kant (New Haven:Yale University Krner, Press,1955), p. 67. 44. and make up the Space and time, for Kant, are pure intuitions, "transcendental aesthetic" both are necessary cognizingany object. Time is the for condition for all inner and outer appearances,while space is essential for outer At determinate appearances. A32/B50 Kant discusses time;and one mayalso see A32/ B48 foran accountof the one singletimethatunderlies determinate all times. And the external intuition space (A24/B39). Time thusrunsthe gamutof all things is primary thinkable. 45. Fifth Edition, Heidegger, Kant and the Problemof Metaphysics, Enlarged,translated RichardTaft, [Bloomington:Indiana University by Press, 1997 (GermanEdition: 1973)], p. 134. Heideggeralso writes:"For if the Transcendental Schematism determines ontologicalknowledgeon the basis of its essence, then the of of of systematic working-out ontologicalknowledgein the presentation the system mustnecessarily come acrossthe character the schematism priori of a synthetic principles and mustsetforth corresponding the transcendental determinations time.Now thisalso of occurs[withKant's CPR], although within certain limits"[CPR A158ff., 197ff.] B only (Heidegger,Kant, p. 75). HeideggerarguesthatKant is, in fact, layingthe groundfor in structure time:"In thisway,the schemata the of of metaphysics, the transcendental 'determine' time,[now Heideggerquoting Kant:] pure conceptsof the understanding 'The schemataare thus nothing but a priorideterminations tim"[CPR Al 38, of are existential modes of the B177]" (Heidegger,Kant, p. 74). The categories different of "The experience time,of beingin time.As notedin the textabove,Heideggerwrites, for is questionconcerning Being,the grounding metaphysics, the problemof Beingand Time"(Heidegger,Kant, p. 141). We see hispointin Beingand Timewherehe writes as follows: makesDa-sein authentically in futural sucha waythatanticipation "Anticipation itself possibleonlyin thatDa-sein,as existing, is comestoward that itself, is, always already is futural its beingin general"(Heidegger,Beingand Time{A Translation in ofSeinund of Zeit), translated Joan Stambaugh, by [New York: State University New York Press,

Semiotics 671 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental

1996; originally 1953], p. 299). published 46. Kant,p. 134. Heidegger, 47. Beingand Time, 301 . Heidegger, p. he 48. On whether is a pragmatist, Davidsonsays:"No. I don't disbelieve in it, but I don't particularly understand whatRorty meansbythat..." (Davidson,"PostVisions:Donald Davidson,"an Interview withGiovannaBorradori, collectedin Analytic TheAmericanPhilosopher: Conversations Quine, Davidson,Putnam,Nozick, with Danto, and Kuhn, [Chicago: University Chicago Press,1994], p. CaveII, Maclntyre, of Rorty, didn't get thisidea fromMead 44). Davidson also says:"As faras I know,I certainly I had reada little of Mead whileI was in graduate bit because,although school,I did not retain (p. 48). it" "In this essay I shall be 49. Davidson also opens with a qualification: on concentrating the role- the role in principle of the second person.My subjectis secondperson,the 'you' or 'thou,' the't' or add, thegrammatical not,I shouldperhaps I shall be writing about real second people, not the wordsused to address 'vosotros;' them"(Davidson, Subjective, [Oxford:ClarendonPress,2001], Intersubjective, Objective p. 107). This essay, "The Second Person," is also publishedin MidwestStudiesin Vol. Philosophy, XVII, editedby P. Frenchet al., (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1992). 50. translated G.E. by Investigations, Philosophical Ludwig Wittgenstein, M. Anscombe,(New York: MacmillanPublishing Co., Inc., 1958), p. 133e; cited in Press, 2001), p. 107. (Oxford:Clarendon Davidson,Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective Davidson(2001), p. xv. 51. a condition Davidson(2001), p. 121. And it "... is certainly necessary 52. withGiovanna communication" forsuccessful (Davidson 2001, p. 115). In an interview is notes: "My impression thatyou take whilediscussing Habermas,Borradori Borradori, "That's level a intoconsideration moretranscendental of discourse."Davidsonresponds: right" (Davidson 1994, p. 53). Davidson(2001), p. xv. 53. Davidson (2001), p. 114. Davidson also writesthat "... speakinga 54. in speaking thesameway;it merely language. . . does not dependon twoor morespeakers to makehimself thatthe speaker (the speaker intentionally interpretable a hearer requires is must 'go on' more or less as the interpreter expects,or at least as the interpreter (Davidson(2001), p. 115). equippedto interpret)" Davidson2001, p. 110. 55. 56. by of Hegel, PhenomenologySpirit,translated A.V. Miller,(Oxford: Oxford Press,1977), p. 110. University in Here one mayalso see RobertPippinon the we in Geist, You 57. in Problems Hegel's Phenomenology Here: Transition Can't Get There from ofSpirit" in The CambridgeCompanion to Hegel, edited by FrederickC. Beiser, (Cambridge: Press,1993). University Cambridge this I am grateful RandallDipertforraising issueof theimportance to 58. semiotics. ofthe"We" in transcendental 59. JohnSearle,Mind, Language,and Society (New York: Basic Books, 119-120. 1998), pp. 60. Searle,1998, p. 120. 61. Searle,1998, p. 118. More Basic than LinguisticMeaning?" in 62. Apel, "Is Intentionality

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Searle and His Critics,edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Lear with BarryStroud,"The Disappearing 63. Jonathan 'We,'" in The in Proceedings the of Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol. 58, (1994). This piece is republished out Lear, OpenMinded: Working theLogic of theSoul (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,1999). and Lear (1999), p. 298. Lear's viewis Wittgensteinian Hegelian(i.e., 64. and Kantian (i.e., logicallytranscendental), Freudian (i.e., psychologically linguistic), and Lear writes: suggest go back to Kant's definition loosen so thata "I we it, curative). into rule-following countas a transcendental (p. investigation" may nonempirical inquiry 290). out in 65. Lear, "Transcendental Anthropology," OpenMinded: Working theLogicofthe Soul(Cambridge: Harvard Press,1999). University 66. Lear (1999), p. 290. Lear also gives a footnotehere, his footnote number (on page 338 of Open-Minded), follows: 33 as "Cf [Kant] CPR B 137." 67. Kant and theCritiqueofPure Reason(New York: SebastianGardner, 1999), p. 346. Routledge, 68. and itsRelationtoPhilosophy PeterWinch,TheIdea ofa SocialScience York:Humanities Winchcriticizes naturalistic socialscienceand seeks (New Press,1958). to groundit in intersubjectivity. called "hard Natural science , or what is commonly focuses for and on science", exclusively physical causality; thisfocusis too narrow purposes of explaining morecomplexphenomenaof humansocial interaction. meaningful the All behavior analyzed socialscienceis to be derived as from conceptof thesocial.See this by also Winch, "Understanding Primitive a 1 AmericanPhilosophical Society," Quarterly, (1964): 207-24. See also J. Bohman,New Philosophy SocialScience (Cambridge:MIT of of Press,1991), pp. 59-65, fora partial critique Winch'sview. 69. a Acel. From Transcendental PointofView. 47. d. 70. Tractatus translated D.F. Pears Wittgenstein, by Logico -Philosophicus, and B.F. McGuinness, German:1921]), p. (New York:Humanities Press,1961 [original 117. 71. laterin the Tractatus, Tractatus, 133. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein, p. writes 6.421: "It is dear thatethicscannotbe put intowords."And thenalso at 6.421: at "Ethics is transcendental" 421). This sounds like the earliersentence:"Logic is (p. transcendental." bothgivetheimpression ethics logic) is transcendent, that Although, (or and not transcendental. 72. Cited from this Murphey, 89. Apel also recognizes pointas central p. to hisown transcendental semiotics (1980, 91). 73. 7: Apel'sfootnote "Quoted from Murphey, cit.,p. 89. Cf. Peirce." op. 74. Hausman(1993, 1997), p. 224. 75. Max Fisch,Peirce, and Semeiotic, Pragmatism: Essays Max H. Fisch, by edited by KennethLaine Ketnerand Christian J.W. Kloesel, (Bloomington:Indiana Press,1986), p. 342-3. University /. Peircedefinition the sign,"([On Signs],MS 793:1, not dated.)," of from "Commens Dictionary," http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary. html. 77. Made Easy" (MS 325); in Fisch,p. 102 (emphasis Peirce,"Pragmatism added). 78. Umberto Eco, Kant and the Platypus:Essayson Language and

Semiotics 673 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental

fromthe Italian by Alastair translated Inc., McEwan, (New York: Harcourt, Cognition, "And so we trust Italian:1997]), pp. 366-71. Eco writes: 1999 [original mirrors, as just We mirrors as our of we trust, undernormal conditions, own organs perceptions. trust just are we trustspectaclesand telescopes,because, like spectaclesand telescopes,mirrors are and intrusive "There is no doubt thatmirrors extensive Eco continues: prostheses." in allowus to look wheretheeyecannot for par prosthetics excellence, example, thatthey reach:theyallow us to look at our faceand eyes,theyallow us to see whatis happening that"... thereis no longerany interpretation, behindour back." Eco also writes apart that the from perceptual interpretation also comes into playwhen I look at someonein of front me" (pp. 366-7). Peirce writes,"As to the Object, that may mean the Object as 79. of an cognizedin the signand therefore Idea, or it maybe the Object as it is regardless would as and study aspectof it, the Object in suchrelations unlimited final anyparticular the I showit to be. The former call the Immediate Object.... Object,thelatter Dynamical the Take,forexample, Sentence'the Sun is blue.' Its Objectsare 'the Sun' and 'blueness.' it If by 'blueness'be meantthe Immediate Object,whichis the qualityof the sensation, which can onlybe knownby Feeling.But if it meansthat'Real,' existential condition, causesthe emitted Langleyhas already provedthat lightto have shortmeanwavelength, and is theproposition true.So the 'Sun' maymeantheoccasionof sundry sensation, so is in of Object, or it maymean our usual interpretation such sensations [the] Immediate of terms place,of mass,etc.,whenit is theDynamical Object" (EP2:495). The dynamical The former the and theimmediate phenomena. constrain, direct, objectis thenoumenon, and are the endgame of inquiry.On this one may see Vincent Colapietro,Peirce's on to (New York: SUNY Perspective Human Subjectivity Approach theSelf:A Semiotic Press, 1989), p. 14-15. Here Colapietropointsout that the sign is passivein being the in determined theobject.It is active determining interpretant. by S. to In Max Fisch,Introduction, Vol. 1 of Writings Charles Peirce: 80. of Indiana University edited by Max Fisch,et al., (Bloomington: A Chronological Edition, Press,1982-),p. xxix. of This pointis also citedin Habermas'sanalysis Peircein Peirceand 81. translated William in Postmetaphysical by Essays, Philosophical Thinking: Communication," MIT Press,1992), p. Ill, fn.2. MarkHohengarten, (Cambridge: Peirce also conceived ot this As a briefpoint on these remarks, 82. as of structure "quasi-minds" extending beyondthe realmof human thought.In fact, thathe thoughtof signsas semiotics in Peircewas so thoroughgoing his evolutionary the and the world of "... bees, of crystals, throughout purely within physical operative to the on world" (CP 4.551). For further analysis thisdiscussion, readeris referred the Thomas Sebeok, The semiotician on literature "zoosemiotics," pioneeredby the Peircean IndianaUniversity Press,1981). (Bloomington: PlayofMusement ana reirce, between ot For an excellent James 83. analysis therelationship Peirce'sReadingofJames's and see MathiasGirel,"The Metaphysics Logic ofPsychology: S. in 2003, Vol. XXXIX, Spring, of Principles" the Transactions theCharles PeirceSociety, No. 2, pp. 163-203. Robert Alexy, "A Theory of Practical Discourse," in The 84. edited by Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayer, Ethics Controversy, Communicative MIT Press,1990, 1995), p. 163-4. (Cambridge: The Three Deductions: EckartFrster[editor],Kanfs Transcendental 85. and the (Opus Postumum,'(Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press, 1989), 'Critiques3

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Lewis of Drafts theDeductionof the Categories;" Carl,"Kant's First especially Wolfgang on WhiteBeck, "Two Waysof ReadingKant's Letterto Herz: Comments Carl;" Dieter of "Kant'sNotionof a Deductionand theMethodological Henrich, Background theFirst Deduction." and Critique"and Paul Guyer, "Psychology theTranscendental 86. Paul Guyer,"The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories,"in The CambridgeCompanionto Kant, edited by Paul Guyer,(Cambridge: Cambridge Press, University 1992). 87. Kant, Critiqueof Pure Reason,translated Norman Kemp Smith, by Unabridged Edition, (New York:St. Martin's Press,1929), p. 120, A84/B116-A85-B11. 88. Kant, Critique, p. 114, A81/B107-A82/B108. The facultyof Kantwrites, is thefaculty judgment. of "Now we can reduceall actsof the understanding as be to and the understanding therefore represented a may understanding judgments, of faculty judgment" (A69/B94), p. 106. 89. Posterior 2.19 99bl5-100b, in TheBasic Works Aristotle, of Analytics, editedbyRichard York:RandomHouse, 1941), pp. 184-6. Aristotle, McKeon, (New 90. Prior 2.25 69a 20-35, pp. 103-4. Aristotle, Analytics, 91. On this discussion,I am gratefulto members of the Midwest Pragmatism meeting,at Loyola University Chicago, 2002, for a discussionof the categories. 92. Murphey, 152-3. pp. 93. Murphey,p.153. 94. Fisch,p. 264. 95. Peirce writes:"A relativetermcannot possiblybe reduced to any of combination absoluteterms, can a conjugative nor term reducedto anycombination he of simplerelatives; but a conjugative can alwaysbe havingmore than two correlates reducedto a combination conjugatives twocorrelates" 3.144). of of (CP 96. selected and editedwithan Introduction Peirce, Philosophical Writings, York:Dover, 1955), p. 94. Justus Buchler, by (New 97. Peirce, Philosophical Writings Peirce, 93. of p. 98. Hookway(1985),p. 33. 99. Parker (1998), p. 69. 100. Nicholas Rescher, Complexity: PhilosophicalOverview (New A Brunswick: Transactions Publishers, 1998), p. 27. Rescheralso writes:"An inherent towards the realmof humancreative effort. We impetus greater complexity pervades entire findit in art;we findit in technology; we certainly it in the cognitive and find domainas well" (p. 58). 101. Derrida, Positions,. 44 . p 102 . Derrida, Positions,. 44 . p 103. Derrida, Positions,. 8 . p 104. translatedby G.C. Spivak, (Chicago: Derrida, Of Grammatology, of ChicagoPress,1976), p. 49. As Derridasees it,whatis left thetraditional of University notionof meaning not much. Derridahas takenPeirce'sidea of the unlimitedness is of and finds language flooded with difference: sign deferral, potentially any sign can Derrida'sviewderives from represent objectas anyinterpretant. any passagesin Peircelike the following: no present "... actualthought has (whichis a merefeeling) anymeaning, butin whatthisthought value;forthisliesnotin whatis actually anyintellectual thought, within representation subsequent so of maybe connected by thoughts, thatthemeaning a thought altogether is It virtual. maybe objected,thatifno thought any has something

Semiotics 675 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental

... in all is meaning. At no one instant mystateofmindis there meaning, thought without but of or representation, in the relation mystatesof mindat different instants, cognition there (W2:227). Derridathenconcludesthatanyidea can onlyeverhaveits meaning is" as mustnecessarily in whatwill happennext(and lie "as a tease" - insofar its meaning thereare only "traces"of would be next,and so on). And in place of finalmeanings, of that but is rather simulacrum a presence the "The traceis not a presence phenomena: and Phenomena, And and refers dislocates, beyonditself (See Derrida,Speech displaces, OtherEssayson HusserVs by of Theory Signs,translated David B. Allison,[Evanston: discussion Derrida'sviews, on Northwestern Press,1973], p. 156). For further University CornellUniversity On Deconstruction one maysee Jonathan Press,1982). Culler, (Ithaca: NorriscritiquesRorty'sin "Philosophyas not just a 'Kind of Writing': Christopher the Derridaand the Claim of Reason,"in Redrawing Lines,editedby R.W. Dasenbrock, of Press,1989). See also RodolpheGasch,TheTain University Minnesota (Minneapolis: Derrida and thePhilosophy Reflection of (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity of theMirror: of view Press,1986). Rorty'snarrativistic of Derrida'stheory languageis developedin: A "Two Meanings of 'Logocentrism:' Replyto and Circumvention," "Deconstruction and Others: in on Philosopher?," Essays Heidegger Norris,""Is Derridaa Transcendental Volume 2, (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991); and Papers, Philosophical and Solidarity Press,1995); and University (Cambridge, Cambridge Irony, Contingency, Papers, Vol. Ill, (Cambridge: Cambridge Philosophical Rorty, Truth and Progress: University Press,1998), p. 329. of translated Alan Bass, (Chicago: University 105. Derrida,Positions, by 96. ChicagoPress,1981), p. 106 . ofSpirit, . 58 . p Hegel, Phenomenology 107. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 141. 108. Umberto Eco, "Horns, Hooves, and Insteps," The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes,Peirce,edited by Umberto Eco and Thomas Sebeok, (Bloomington: case the IndianaUniversity represent mostelementary of Press,1983), p. 210: "Imprints ..." sign-production 109. Peirce, 1905 Draftof Letterto Lady Welby {MS L 463); in Fisch in 265. Othertexts Peirceon thispointare CP 8.267; 6.32; 4.3; 1.530; 5.43; (1986), p. 5.38. Peirce(MS 478: 28, 1903); in Fisch(1986), p. 271. 110. On this see Richard Bernstein, "McDowell's Domesticated 111. in ReadingMcDowell 2002), pp. 18-19. (New York:Routledge, Hegelianism," While there is only space here to mentionit, perhaps a further 112. or discussionof the relationof Peirceandifferentiation change (as "secondness") to hold thattheconceptof (as Hegeliandifferentiation "negation")in order.Both thinkers of and of to is differenceintrinsic themovement novelty themovement time.And on this, and on viewswithAristotle causality relation. both Hegel and Peircealigntheir certainly and natureboth generates destroys and and In Aristotle's Physics Generation Corruption, substance(i.e., what That is, the secondary not forms substances). (primary, secondary, is not does undergochange.Hence, there no before withhisviewofforms) Platowas after of the measures "before"and "after" and thusno time,as time,forAristotle, and after, in This becomingof the primary withregardto becoming. the present substances, all of cause" (inertmatter), of takesplace as theshaping the "material accidental their by traits, cause" (the designof the to cause" (motion,change),according a "formal the "efficient

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of cause is the ideological towardthe ideal formal thing).The achievement theapproach or finalcause (so, forexample, the finished treeis the finalcause, because it is the oak formalcause alreadyinternal the acorn, but "blown up" with matterby way of to of in efficiency). Corruption the individual decayand death is a natural processas well. But at a verybasic metaphysical occursall level,corruption negation, (or differentiation) the time,everywhere nature.Even in generation, finddifferentiation in we alwaysand to of of and everywhere, according thequalities matter, thenature change.So, an oak tree has lumpsand twists and turns even in its finalstages,according spontaneity to (within The finalformalwaysbears the marksof the material substrate. as Peirce Or matter). would put it,thethirds contain and bearthemarks secondness. of always Similarly, Hegel conceives synthesis containing of as intact negation the whichgivesriseto thatsynthesis. This reactive forceis partof nature the Physics indeed,so intrinsic spontaneity in to is the metaphysics, Aristotle, timesanyway, that at as of thought spontaneity an additional "cause." Or to be more specific, and spontaneity operatesas "natural"diversification, "chance"occursat thelevelofsocialinteraction. 113. I am grateful Patrick to and Jeanne Schulerfordiscussion on Murray thispoint. 114. On thispoint,Murphey writes 69): "Peircedeniestheexistence of (p. - in thissensethere no intuitions; not determined a previous are cognitions by cognition but he does not denythe existence anynon-conceptual of stimuli mental to action.What he meansby 'the manifold sensuousimpressions' actually is veryclose to the something set of all nerveexcitations a giventime.His retention the term'impression' this at in of restricted senseis confusing understandable; Kantianterms but the wereconvenient and he had no others available." readily 115. in edited by Heidegger,"What is Called Thinking?" Basic Writings, David Farrell Krell, (New York:Harper& Row, 1977), pp. 358-9. 116. Heidegger, Kant, pp. 137-8. On this point Heidegger writesas follows: "Kantwantsto say:theencountering thebeingitself of occursfora finite creature in a representing whosepurerepresentations objectivity such haveplayedup to one of as another This is to [aufeinan-der eingespielt]. Being-played-up [Eingespieltsein]tantamount theend,i.e., it is determined advancein sucha waythatin general can be playedout in it in a play-space einem is [in Spiel-Raum kann].This [play-space] formed abspielen through of pure determinations the innersense.The pure innersense is pure selfaffection, i.e., time.The pureschemata transcendental as of determinations timeare whatform original the horizonof transcendence" accountemerges in (Heidegger,Kant, p. 138). A similar who fusesHeideggerand Peirce,in deriving own semiotics his based in playand Derrida, difference. On this Derrida refersto "[d]ifferance temporization, as diffrance as with spacing"(Derrida,Margins Philosophy, of translated, Additional Notes, byAlan Bass, of French:1972, by Les Editionsde [Chicago: University Chicago Press,1982 [original Derridaalso writes "... the play of difference, Minuit],p. 9). which,as [Ferdinand de] Saussurereminded is thecondition thepossibility functioning every for and of us, sign,is in itself silent a play"(Derrida,Margins, 7). p. 117. Derrida,OfGrammatolom/, 0 . p. 5 118. Derrida, Margins, . 11. p 119. A fuller accountof theseremarks Derridareadsas follows: would in "I which neither wordnora concept, is a seemedto say,first thatdiffrance, off, strategically me the mostproperone to think, not to master thought, if herebeingthatwhichis in maintained a certain with limits mastery what of necessary relationship thestructural

Semiotics 677 Peirce, Kant, and Apelon Transcendental

is mostirreducible about our 'era.' Therefore, am starting, I from strategically, the place and the time in which 'we' are, even though in the last analysismy opening is not sinceit is onlyon the basisof diffrance its 'history' and thatwe can allegedly justifiable know who and where 'we' are, and what the limitsof an 'era' mightbe" (Derrida, Margins Philosophy,7). of p. Here we are on the veryedge of meaning,barelyteleological thrust 120. in it the forward, is a playbackand forth, thevery wayHans Georg Gadamerdiscusses to 2nd and Method, RevisedEdition,Translation and froof the play of languagein Truth revised JoelWeinsheimer Donald G. Marshall, and 1993), pp. (New York:Continuum, by a to 103-5. It is precisely playof the self,withthe self,in the mind.I am grateful Liz on for Sperry discussion thispointabout Gadamer. 121. Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolutionof of 1996), p. 175. On therelation Goodwin's (New York:Simonand Schuster, Complexity and Field-Being: view to pragmatism. Abrams,"Pragmatism, See ProcessMetaphysics, and on as Journal Peirce, Santayana, Whitehead Animality PurePlay,"in the International (forthcoming). ofField-Being Educationof Man: In a Seriesof 122. Friedrich Schiller,On theAesthetic and L.A. Willoughby, translated Elizabeth Wilkinson (New York: Oxford Letters, by Press,1994). University The 123. Cited in Charles S. Hardwick (ed.); Semioticand Signifies: Indiana S. between Charles Peirceand Victoria (Bloomington: Lady Welby Correspondence University Press, 1977), p. 77. IndianaUniversity 124. Press, Sebeok, ThePlayofMusement (Bloomington: 1981), p. 1. 125. Sebeok (1981), p. 3. ana 126. Action,translated Habermas,Moral Consciousness Communicate Weber Nicholson,(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1990, Lenhardtand Shierry Christian by German:1983), p. 80. 1995]; original on Remarks Discourse and 127. Ethics, Habermas, Justification Application: MIT Press,1995), p. 163. translated CiaranP. Cronin,(Cambridge: by On this see, Nelson Goodman's Grue Paradox (the New Riddle of 128. of Induction). (Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction,and Forecast[London: University "Solutionto the Problemof Induction:Peirce, London Press,1955].) See also, Abrams, of Apel, and Goodman on the Grue Paradox,"Transactions theCharlesS. PeirceSociety, Fall 2000. to I am verygrateful ElizabethF. Cooke, Peter Hare, and Randall 129. of discussions therelevance on on comments thispaper,especially formany helpful Dipert of of and of the "we" in Peirce'sconception apperception, theimportance the deduction to RichardJ. Blackwelland WilliamC. Charronfor I the categories. am also grateful Schulerfor and Jeanne on conversations Peirceand Kant; and to Patrick Murray helpful on for on discussions Hegel; and to Patrick Murray readingand commenting an earlier on of draft this essay;and to Chris Pliatskafor discussions Davidson. Of course,any are whichremain myown. mistakes